are few who are able to bear the Expence of them Besides there are not Men enough in the Provinces for the Alterations which must needs be made if Employments are made Triennial Those Mutations are not only practicable but absolutely necessary in the great Employments of Spain as those of the Viceroys of Naples of Sicily of Sardinia the Government of Miâ—an and other Employments of the like Consequence And all of them are so profitable to those that possess them that in quitting the Abundance of the one they enter into the Wealth of the other Places which are distant from the abode of Princes require a Change of Governours in Places of the Consequence of those I have mention'd by reason that a longer Residence than that of Three Years might enable them to form Projects to settle themselves there for ever seeing particularly that the Ambition of Men is so prevailing that they are easily inclin'd to change the Condition of Subject into that of Master But the case is different in France where the Governments are not so distant from the abode of the Kings as to fear such Inconveniences nor the said Employments so great as to give the Possessors a sufficient Authority to make themselves Masters of the same Therefore provided your Majesty and your Successors keep the Power of Changing the Governments as you shall think sit upon real Cause given so to do which you may always do with Justice provided they are given gratis and not sold I dare be bold to say That it is better in that point to follow the ancient Custom of France than to imitate that of Spain which is nevertheless so politick and so reasonable considering the extent of its Dominion that though it cannot be usefully practic'd in this Kingdom yet it will be proper in my Opinion to make use of it in those Places of which France will preserve the Possession in Lorrain and in Italy SECT III. Which condemns Survivorships THe Survivorships in question in this Place are granted either against the Will of the Possessors of Places or by their Consent All Men are sensible that it is very unjust to nominate the Successors of a Man while he is alive against his Will since it exposes his Life to the Artifices of the Person that is to profit by his Death and that the Dread which may justly seize his Mind is a kind of Death to him That Practice which was formerly very much in vogue in this Kingdom is at present banish'd from thence It is so dangerous that the Councils and the best Constitutions of Temporal Princes do condemn it as well as Reason Neither can the Consent of the Possessors any ways justifie that Proceeding since that whatever Confidence they may repose in those who are appointed to succeed them they are often mistaken Though it is impossible to satisfie every body in a State by Grants yet it is necessary at least to afford hopes to those to whom nothing better can be given Which can never be done if Places Offices and Benefices are given to Children who in the height of their Merit and of their Age would perhaps hardly dare to expect those Honours and Dignities which are granted them in the Cradle Such Favours in which the State is greatly concern'd hardly oblige any body A Man does not think that that is given him which his Father or another Relation is in possession of he looks upon the Survivorship of it as a Right of Inheritance rather than as an effect of the Prince's Goodness Notwithstanding that the Good of the State requires that in the Promotion of Offices Merit should be preferr'd to all other things in what relates to Survivorship a greater regard is had to the Service of him who demands a Successor than to the persons that is to succeedhim can do The Favour of the one on such occasions often serves in lieu of Merit in the others who have nothing but their Importunity to recommend them Therefore I conclude that the less Favours of that kind are granted is certainly the best and that it would be better yet never to grant any seeing that whatever particular Considerations can be alledg'd the Consequence of them is dangerous in States where Examples have often more Force than Reason If any one observes that I condemn a thing in this Article the practice whereof I have suffer'd even in respect to my own Relations I am sure that he will remain very well satisfied if he considers that while a Disorder is in vogue without any possibility of a Remedy Reason requires that Order should be extracted out of it Which was my Intention in preserving Places which had been establish'd by my Cares to Persons whom I could more strictly oblige to follow my Intentions and my Steps If it had been possible during the Troubles of a Reign agitated by divers Storms to settle the Regulation I propose I would have been a very Religious Observer of it CHAP. VI. Which represents to the King what Men think he ought to consider in relation to his Person GOD being the Principle of all Things the Soveraign Master of Kings and He who makes them Reign prosperously if your Majesty's Devotion were not known by all the World I would begin this Chapter which relates to your Person in representing to you That unless you follow the Will of your Creator and submit to his Laws you must not expect to have yours observ'd and to find your Subjects obedient to your Orders But it would be superfluous to exhort your Majesty to Devotion you are so naturally inclin'd to it and so much confirm'd in it by the Habit of your Vertue that there is no reason to fear that you will ever deviate from it Therefore instead of representing to you what Advantages Religious Princes have above others I will content my self with saying That the Devotion which is necessary in Kings must be free from Scruples I say it Sir because the Niceness of your Majesty's Conscience often makes you dread to offend GOD in doing things which certainly you cannot abstain from without Sin I am sensible that the Faults of Princes which are of this nature are much less dangerous for the State than those which incline to Presumption and to the Contempt of those things they ought to reverence But since they bear the name of Faults it is necessary to correct them particularly if it be true as it is most certain that many Inconveniences may arise from thence very prejudicial to the State In consideration of which I make it my humble Petition to your Majesty That you would be pleas'd more and more to fortifie your self against Scruples calling to mind that you can never be guilty before GOD if you follow on Occasions which will prevent themselves of difficult Discussion in what relates to your Conscience the Advice of your Council confirm'd by that of some good Theologians unsuspected in the case in question This first
Officers of this kind to be turn'd out those who will find themselves deprived of their usual imployments will be constrain'd to follow the Wars to ingage into Trade or to turn Labourers If in the next place all Exemptions are reduc'd to the Nobility and to the Officers in ordinary of the King's Houshold it is most certain that the Cities and Communities which are exempted the Soveraign Courts the Offices of the Treasurers of France the Elections the Salt Magazines the Offices of Waters and of Forests of the Demain and of the Tithes the Intendants and Receivers of Parishes which compose a Body of upwards of 100000 exempted persons will discharge the People of more than one half of their Tailles it being also certain that the Richest which are liable to the greatest Taxes are those who get exemptions by dint of Money I am sensible that it will be urg'd that it is easie to make such Projects like unto those of Plato's Commonwealth which tho' fine in his Ideas is a real Chimera But I dare affirm that this design is not only so reasonable but so easie to execute that if God pleases to grant your Majesty a speedy Peace and to preserve you for this Kingdom with your Servants of which I esteem my self one of the meanest instead of leaving this Advice by Testament I hope to accomplish it my self SECTION VIII Which shews in few words that the utmost point of the Power of Princes must consist in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts THe Finances being manag'd as above written the People will be absolutely eas'd and the King will be Powerful by the Possession of his Subjects Hearts who considering his care of their Estates will be inclin'd to love him out of Interest Formerly the Kings thought themselves so happy in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts that some were of opinion that it was better by this means to be King of the French than of France And indeed this Nation had formerly such a Passion for their Princes that some Authors praise them for being always ready to spill their Blood and to spend their Estates for the Service and Glory of the State Under the Kings of the first second and third Race until Philip le Bell the Treasure of Hearts was the only publick Wealth that was preserv'd in this Kingdom I am sensible that former times have no relation nor proportion to the present that what was good in one Age is often not permitted in another But tho' it is certain that the Treasure of Hearts cannot suffice at present it is also very certain that the Treasure of Gold and Silver is almost useless without the first both are necessary and whoever shall want either of them will be necessitous in Wealth CHAP. X. Which concludes this Work in showing that whatever is contain'd in it will prove ineffectual unless the Princes and their Ministers are so mindful of the Government of the State as to omitt nothing which their Trust obliges them to and not to abuse their Power IN order to conclude this Work happily I am now to represent to your Majesty that Kings being oblig'd to do many things more as Soveraigns than as private Men they can never swerve so little from their Duty without committing more faults of omission than a private person can do of commission It is the same with those upon whom Soveraigns discharge themselves of part of the burthen of their Empire since that Honour makes them liable to the same obligations which lie on Soveraigns Both of them being consider'd as private persons are liable to the same faults as other Men but if we regard the Conduct of the publick which they are intrusted with they will be found liable to many more since in that sence they cannot omit without sin any thing they are oblig'd to their Ministry In that consideration a Man may be good and virtuous as a private person and yet an ill Magistrate anâ—ilh Soveraign by his want of care to discharge the obligation of his Trust In a word unless Princes use their utmost endeavours to regulate the divers orders of their State If they are negligent in their choice of a good Council if they despise their wholsom Advice Unless they take a particular care to become such that their Example may prove a speaking voice If they are negligent in establishing the reign of God that of Reason and that of Justice together If they fail to protect Innocence to recompence signal Services to the Publick and to punish disobedience and the Crimes which trouble the order of the Discipline and Safety of States Unless they apply themselves to foresee and to prevent the evils that may happen and to divert by careful Negotiations the Storms which Clouds easily drive before them from a greater distance than is thought If Favour hinders them from making a good choice of those they honour with great imployments and with the principal Offices of the Kingdom Unless they are very careful to settle the State in the Power it ought to have If on all occasions they do not preferr Publick Interest to Private Advantages tho' otherwise never so good livers they will be found more guilty than those who actually transgress the Commands and Laws of God it being certain that to omit what we are oblig'd to do and to commit what we ought not to do is the same thing I must moreover represent to your Majesty that if Princes and those who are imploy'd under them in the first Dignities of the Kingdom have great advantages over private Men they injoy that benefit upon hard conditions since they are not only liable by omission to the faults I have already observ'd but also that there are many others of commission which are peculiar to them If they make use of their Power to commit any injustice or violence which they cannot do as private persons they are guilty of a sin of Prince or Magistrate by commission which their sole Authority is the source of and for which the King of Kings will call them to a very strict account on the day of Judgment Those two different kind of faults peculiar to Princes and to Magistrates must needs make them sensible that they are of a far greater weight than those of private persons by reason that as universal Causes they influence their disorders to all those who being submitted to them receive the impression of their movements Many would be sav'd as private persons who damn themselves as publick persons One of the greatest of our Neigbouring Kings being sensible of this Truth at his Death cry'd out that he did not stand in so much dread of the sins of Philip as he was apprehensive of the King 's His thought was truly Pious but it would have been much better for himself and for his Subjects to have had it before his Eyes in the heighth of his Grandeur and of his Administration than when in discovering the
Your Majesty's Innocence is the more apparent in that your Ambassador never enter'd into any Treaty with that Conquerour until Six Months after his entring into Germany which evidently justifies that the Conditions that were made with the said Prince were the Remedy of the Evil of which they could not be esteem'd the Cause The Treaties that were made not only with that Great King but also with many other Princes of Germany are the more just in that they were absolutely necessary for the safety of the Duke of Mantua unjustly attack'd and for that of all Italy over which Spain had no less Right than over the Dominion of that poor Prince since they thought their Convenience a sufficient Right The Danger this Kingdom had been reduc'd to by the Division the Spaniards had openly fomented in your Royal House oblig'd your Majesty to seek out proper Expedients to resettle it Monsieur having left the Court of France for the third time by divers Artifices which the Spaniards certainly were the principal Authors of and the Cardinal Infant having receiv'd the Queen your Mother in Flanders as he did at that time it is natural to conclude that unless those good Neighbours had been employ'd at home they would have proceeded farther and would have employ'd themselves at your Majesty's Cost in this Kingdom It was absolutely necessary to remove the Storm and moreover to prepare to sustain the Effort of it in case it could not be avoided For that reason after your Majesty was assur'd of a potent Diversion you did like those who in order to prevent the Plague which the Corruption of the Air threatens them with carefully purge themselves being perswaded that the best and safest way to secure themselves from external Injuries is to cleanse the Inside God's Providence prov'd so favourable to you on that occasion that those who animating the Queen and Monsieur against France thought thereby to put them in a way to do it a great deal of Harm only rendred them incapable of doing any and your Conduct appear'd so much the more wonderful on that occasion that in recalling the one and desiring the return of the other your Goodness towards them was evident to all the World while the Effects of your Justice fell upon those who had advis'd them to take such ill Measures The Duke de Bellegarde was depriv'd of the Government of Burgundy and consequently of the Keyes of the Gates he had open'd to Monsieur to let him out of the Kingdom The Duke d' Elboeuf was likewise turn'd out of that of Picardy which your Majesty had lately given him The Duke of Guise being conscious of his Faults retiring into Italy when you call'd him to Court there to give an Account of his Actions that Criminal Retreat made him lose the Government the late King your Father had honour'd him with Thus your Majesty was deliver'd of ungrateful faithless Governours and Burgundy Picardy and Provence Provinces of great Consideration remain'd in your Hands free from those dangerous Spirits You gave the first to the first Prince of your Blood who was passionately desirous of it and thereby you prudently interess'd him in the Affairs of the Time and fill'd Monsieur with anxious Thoughts who with reason dreaded nothing so much in the World as the Establishment of a Person who came up so close to him You bestow'd the Second on the Duke of Chevreuse a Prince of Lorrain to shew that Faults are personal and that your Indignation extended only on those of that Family who had made themselves guilty by their ill Conduct You gratify'd the Marshal de Vitri with the Third as well upon the account of his Loyalty as because that being upheld by your Authority he was naturally capable to oppose him who had lost it In the mean time the Declarations you caus'd to be Register'd in the Parliament were highly approv'd of by every body seeing that in condemning the Authors and Adherents of the Queen and of Monsieur's Flight you excus'd those two Persons who are as dear as nearly related to your Majesty altho' the contrary had been done formerly on the same occasions Your Majesty eluded with a great deal of Vigilancy divers Designs and many Enterprizes meditated and attempted in the Queen and Monsieur's Names and you shew'd so much Patience on those unhappy Occurrences that I may almost affirm that you made nothing known of their Ill Conduct but what you could not dissemble Nevertheless in order to stop the Course and remove the License wherewith all things seem'd lawful to be undertaken under their Shadow you caus'd the Marshal de Marillac's Head to be cut off with so much the more reason that being condemned with Justice the present Constitution of the State requir'd a great Example Those great and vexatious Affairs did not hinder you from repressing with as much Authority as Reason certain Enterprizes of the Parliament of Paris which had been tolerated in many other occasions which is more remarkable in that it was done during the Heat of the Discontents of the Queen and of Monsieur and of all their Adherents than for the thing it self Afterwards Monsieur enter'd France with Sword in Hand at the Instigation of the Spaniards and of the Duke of Lorrain with Forces of which those good Neighbours had furnish'd the greatest part One should have thought that the News your Majesty receiv'd at that time of his being expected in Languedoc by the D. de Montmorency who had a great Authority in that Province which he was Governour of should have put a stop to the Design which had led you in Lorrain to disingage that Duke out of the ill Party he had espous'd but finishing what you had begun to so good an end you caus'd Monsieur your Brother to be pursu'd so close by the Marshal de Schomberg and you follow'd him so soon your self after having receiv'd three Places from the Duke of Lorrain as Pledges of his Faith that all the Efforts of those who were Leagu'd against you prov'd ineffectual The Victory which your Majesty's Forces commanded by that Marshal obtain'd at Castelnaudari was as certain an Argument of the Blessing of God on your Majesty as the Favours you afterwards granted to Monsieur and to his Followers when the ill state of his Affairs might have induc'd you to use them otherwise was an evident Testimony of your Goodness The Sincerity wherewith you observ'd all the Promises which were made to them in your Name at Beziers tho' you were sensible that Puy-Laurens's only Design was to avoid the Danger he was in under the pretence of Repentance which he could avoid no other way was also as Authentick a Proof of your Majesty's great Courage as of your inviolable Faith The Chastisement of the Duke de Montmorency who never could contain himself from making an Inlet to all manner of dangerous Rebellions at all times and particularly when an Heir apparent of the Crown made himself by ill Counsel Head
beat the Duke of Savoy assisted by the Spaniards rais'd the Siege of Cazal and constrain'd all your Enemies to agree with you This glorious Action which restor'd Peace in Italy was no sooner atchiev'd but your Majesty whose Mind and Heart never found any rest but in Labour pass'd directly into Languedoc where after having taken Privas and Alez by force you reduc'd the rest of the Huguenot Party throughout your Kingdom to Obedience and by your Clemency granted a Peace to those who had presum'd to wage a War against you not by granting them Advantages prejudicial to the State as had been done till then but by banishing him out of the Kingdom who was the only Head of that miserable Party and who had all along fomented it That which is most considerable in so glorious an Action is that you ruin'd that Party absolutely at a time when the King of Spain endeavour'd to raise it again and to settle it more than ever He had newly made a Treaty with the Duke of Rohan to form in this State a Body of Rebellious States to God and to your Majesty at once in consideration of a Million of Livres which he was to pay him yearly for which he made the Indies Tributaries to Hell But their Projects prov'd ineffectual And whilst he had the Mortification to hear that the Person he had employ'd to be the Bearer of so glorious an Establishment was executed upon a Scaffold by a Decree of the Parliament of Thoulouse before whom he was Try'd your Majesty had the Satisfaction and Advantage to pardon those who could no longer defend themselves to annihilate their Faction and to use their Persons well when they expected nothing but the Chastisement of the Crimes they had commited I am sensible that Spain thinks to excuse so ill an Action by the Succours you granted the Hollanders but that Excuse is as ill as their Cause Common Sense will convince every body that there is much difference between the continuation of a Succours established upon a Lawful Subject if Natural Defence is so and a new Establishment manifestly contrary to Religion and to the Lawful Authority Kings have received from Heaven over their Subjects The late King your Father never enter'd into a Treaty with the Hollanders until the King of Spain had form'd a League in this Kingdom to usurp the Crown This Truth is too evident to be question'd and there is no Theology in the World but will grant without going against the Principles of Natural Reason that as Necessity obliges those whose Life is attempted to make use of all Helps to preserve it so a Prince has the same Right to avoid the loss of his State That which is free in the beginning sometimes becomes necessary in the sequel Therefore no body can find fault with the Union your Majesty maintains with those People not only in consequence of the Treaties of the late King but moreover because Spain cannot be reputed otherwise than as an Enemy to this State whilst they retain part of its ancient Demeans It is evident that the Cause which has given a Rise to those Treaties not being remov'd the continuation of the Effect is as lawful as necessary The Spaniards are so far from any Pretence of being in the same case that on the contrary their Designs are so much the more unjust that instead of repairing the Injuries they have done this Kingdom they increase them daily Moreover the late King never join'd with the Hollanders until they were entred into a Body of State and was constrain'd to it by an Oppression which he could not wholly avoid He neither occasion'd their Revolt nor the Union of their Provinces And Spain has not only often favour'd the Revolted Huguenots against your Predecessors they also endeavour'd to unite them in a Body of State in yours A holy Zeal has induc'd them to be the Authors of so good an Establishment and that without any Necessity and consequently without Reason unless the Continuation of their ancient Usurpations and the new ones they design rectifie their Actions so much that what is forbidden to all the World besides is lawful in them upon the account of their good Intentions Having treated this matter more at large in another Treatise I will leave it to continue the Sequel of your Actions The ill Faith of the Spaniards having induc'd them to attack the Duke of Mantua again to the Prejudice of the Treaties they had made with your Majesty you march'd the second time into Italy where by the Blessing of God after having gloriously cross'd a River the Passage whereof was defended by the Duke of Savoy with an Army of 14000 Foot and 4000 Horse contrary to the Faith of the Treaty he had made with your Majesty the Year before You took Pignerol in sight of the Emperour 's and King of Spain's Forces and of the Person and all the Power of the Duke of Savoy and that which renders that Action the more Glorious in sight of the Marquess de Spinola one of the greatest Captains of his Time By that means you took Susa and overcame at once the three most considerable Powers of Europe the Plague Famine and the Impatiency of the French of which there are not many Examples in History After which you Conquer'd Savoy driving an Army of 10000 Foot and 2000 Horse before you which had a better Advantage to defend it self in that Mountainous Country than 30000 to attack them Soon after which the Combats of Veillane and of Coriane signaliz'd your Arms in Piemont and the taking of Valence Fortify'd by the Duke of Savoy in order to oppose your Designs made the World sensible that nothing could resist the Just Arms of a King as Fortunate as Powerful Cazal was reliev'd not only against the Opinion of most Men but even against the very Thoughts of the Duke de Montmorency who had been employ'd to that end and against the Opinion of Marillac who was substituted in his Place who both publickly declar'd that it was an impossible Enterprize The Relief of the said Place was the more glorious in that a stronger Army than your Majesty's retrench'd at the Head of the Milaneze which furnished them with all sorts of Conveniencies and shelter'd under the Walls of Cazal which had been consign'd in their Hands was constrain'd to quit it and five other Places at the same time which the Spaniards held thereabouts in the extent of Mont-Ferrat Those who know that in the very height of that Design your Majesty was reduc'd to the utmost Extremity by a Fit of Sickness and that tho' your Person was dangerously Ill your Heart was yet in a worse Condition If they consider that the Queen your Mother at the Instigation of some malicious Persons form'd a potent Party which weakning you considerably strengthen'd your Enemies If they also consider that they daily receiv'd Advice that your Majesty's most faithful Servants whom they both did hate and dread would
Learning and Vertue in order to their being promoted to some of those they are in possession of if they prove capable of them I might mention many other things to ease the Nobility but I suppress the Thoughts of it upon Consideration That as it would be very easie to write them it would be very difficult if not impossible to put them in practice SECT II. Which Treats of the Means to prevent Duels SO many Edicts have been made hitherto to no purpose to put a stop to Duels that it is very difficult to find out a certain Way to stop the course of that Rage The French despise their Lives so much that Experience has taught us that the most rigorous Proceedings have not always prov'd the best to stop their Frensie They have often fancy'd that it was very glorious to violate the Edicts and to shew by such an Extravagance that they valued their Honour more than their Life But the dread of losing the Conveniency without which they cannot live happy in this World having a great influence over them than the fear of Dying without the Grace of God without which they will be unhappy in the next the fear of losing their Places their Estates and their Liberty has prov'd more prevailing than the fear of losing their Life I have us'd my utmost Endeavour to find out some proper Remedy for the Cure of this dangerous Distemper I have often consulted to know whether as it is lawful for Kings to make two private Men Fight to prevent a Battel and thereby to decide the difference which has oblig'd them to take Arms they might not also grant some Combats to avoid the multitude of Duels that are daily Fought I urg'd That it was very likely that this proceeding might free France of this Frensie which is so prejudicial to it since that in putting those in hopes of obtaining leave to Fight who should have a just Reason to claim the Combat every Man would freely submit to the Judges deputed to examine the Nature of the Offence which probably might prevent the Misfortune of Duels since most Quarrels would be determin'd by a good Accommodation The better to favour this Thought I added That formerly many Duels had been allow'd of in this Kingdom which had also been practis'd in divers States I thought it might be a means to abolish the Barbarity of the Custom which wills That every Man that is offended should do himself Justice and find his Satisfaction in his Enemy's Blood But after having perus'd over and over what the most Authentick Authors say upon those Matters and often mus'd on this important Subject I have found by the Advice of the least scrupulous and most resolute Theologians of the Time That Kings being Establish'd to preserve their Subjects and not to ruine them they cannot expose their Life without some publick Use or particular Necessity That they cannot permit private Combats without exposing the Innocent to receive the Punishment of the Guilty seeing that God not having oblig'd Himself always to render Reason victorious the Fate of Arms is uncertain And that notwithstanding such Permissions have been Authoriz'd sometimes at least in divers States and even with the Approbation of some particular Churches they have ever prov'd abusive which appears evidently since finally the Universal Church has prohibited and condemned them under very great Penalties I have discover'd that there was a great deal of difference between making two particular Persons fight to prevent a Battel and to put a period to a War and making them fight to prevent a Duel The First is lawful because Nature teaches us That Part ought to be expos'd for the Whole ' and that Reason requires That Particular Persons ought to be hazarded for the General Good by reason that besides that the said Expedient has been practis'd at all times we find Examples of it in Holy Writ and that the Effect of it is wholesom and certain in that whatever Event a Duel allow'd of in this Case may have it saves the Lives of abundance of Men who may serve the Publick in other Occasions But it is not so with the Second which is unlawful in its Nature since that instead of certainly saving the Generality by the hazard of some private Persons and thus to prevent a great loss by a small it exposes private Men directly to their Ruine upon the bare Imagination of a publick Good which has no certain Foundation This Method is the less allowable since that instead of preventing Duels it is capable to increase the Licentiousness of them because the Blindness of the Nobility is such that many being of Opinion That to demand a Combat thus would be to seek out a way to avoid it would think themselves oblig'd in Honour to find out a shorter way to right themselves and to shew their Courage The late King attempted this Way in 1609. with all the Circumstances that could make it useful He depriv'd all those of Estates Places and Life who should Fight without leave but all in vain And that oblig'd your Majesty after having made the same Trial at the Beginning of your Reign to have recourse by your Edict of March 1626. to another Remedy which has prov'd more effectual by reason that though the Penalties of it are more moderate yet they are more smarting to those who value their Lives less than their Estates and Liberty Now whereas the best Laws in the World are useless unless they are inviolably observ'd and that those who commit those kind of Faults use so much Art to invalidate the Proofs of it that it is almost always impossible to convince them I presume to tell your Majesty That it is not enough to punish averr'd Duels and Challenges by the Rigour of your Edicts but when there is a Notoriousness without Proof it will be absolutely necessary to imprison the Delinquents at their own Charge for more or less time according to the divers Circumstances of their Faults Otherwise the common Negligence of your Attorneys-General to inform against them the Indulgence of your Parliaments and the Corruption of the Age which is such that every Man esteems it as Honourable to assist those who have Fought to disguise their Crime as an honest Gentleman would think it shameful to conceal the Theft of a Robber will make the Edicts and your Cares ineffectual 'T is in such a Case that nothing but the way of Fact can oblige Men to observe your Laws and Ordinances 't is on those Occasions your Authority must pass over Forms to maintain Rule and Discipline without which a State cannot subsist and it will enable your Officers to punish Crimes according to Forms since it is more probable that the Cause and Proof of a Fault will be sooner found when the Guilty are seiz'd than when at liberty to use their utmost Endeavours to stifle the Discovery of the same If in the next place your Majesty will be pleas'd to order
have bought Places very dear should not be allow'd to sell them again but as it is impossible to make any Settlements of great use for the Publick without their being attended with some Inconveniencies for private Persons the said Inconvenience is not considerable seeing that as they did not buy their Places with an assurance of leave to sell them again like those Officers who pay an Annual Duty to the King they may be depriv'd of the Hopes they had fram'd to themselves without any Injustice And though some private Persons may find themselves griev'd by such an Alteration all the Nobility and the Greatest will find a notable Advantage by it in that whereas they were formerly oblig'd to sell a considerable part of their Estates to get Places which has often ruin'd the best Famiies of the Kingdom there will be no means left to expect them but Merit which will hinder them from ruining their Estate and will oblige them to acquire Vertue which is despis'd in this Age because the Price of all things only consists in Money Moreover there will be so many means to satisfie those who upon the account of any particular Consideration will deserve to be exempted from the general Rule That the Publick will receive the Benefit of the Advantage your Majesty will be pleas'd to procure them and yet such private Persons as might have cause to complain with Justice will receive no prejudice by it As it is impossible to question the Usefulness of these Propositions the Facility to put them in Execution is evident since as abovesaid it only requires a firm and constant Resolution in your Majesty to reap the Benefit of the same and to restore your Houshold to its former Greatness CHAP. VIII Of the PRINCE's Council SECT I. Which shews that the best Prince stands in need of a good Council IT is no small question among Politicians to know Whether a Prince who Governs a State by his own Head is more desirable than he who not confiding so much in his own Abilities relies much on his Council and does nothing without their Advice Whole Volumes might be compil'd of the Reasons which might be alledg'd for and against it But referring this Question to the particular Fact which obliges me to introduce it in this place after having preferr'd the Prince who acts more by his Council than by his own Opinion to him who prefers his own Head to all those of his Counsellors I cannot forbear saying That as the worse Government is that which has no other Spring than the Head of a Prince who being incapable is so presumptuous as to slight all Counsel the best of all is that of which the main Spring is in the Sense of the Soveraign who though capable to Act by Himself has so much Modesty and Judgment that he does nothing without Advice upon this principle That one Eye does not see so well as many Besides that Reason discovers the Solidity of this Decision Truth obliges me to say That Experience has convinc'd me so much of it that I cannot forbear affirming it without doing my self a Violence A Capable Prince is a great Treasure in a State a Skilful Council and such as it ought to be is no less considerable But the Concert of Both together is of an inestimable Value since thereon depends the Felicity of States It is certain that the most happy States are those in which Princes and Counsellors are the Wisest It is also certain That there are few Princes capable to Govern States alone and moreover though there were many they ought not to do it The Almighty Power of GOD his infinite Wisdom and his Providence do not hinder Him from making use in things which he might do by his bare Will of the Ministry of Second Causes and consequently Kings whose Perfections are limitted instead of being infinite would commit a notable Fault in not following his Example But whereas it is not in their power as in GOD's to supply the Defects of those they employ they must be very careful to chuse them as perfect and as accomplish'd as possible can be Many Qualifications are requir'd to make a perfect Counsellor nevertheless they may be reduc'd to Four viz. Capacity Fidelity Courage and Application which includes many others SECT II. Which represents what Capacity is requir'd in a good Counsellor THe Capacity of Counsellors does not require a pedantick Knowledge None can be more dangerous in a State than those who will Govern Kingdoms by the Maxims they find in Books They often ruin them thereby because the Time past has no relation to the present and that the Constitution of Times Places and Persons is different It only requires Goodness Steadiness of Mind Solidity of Judgment true Source of Prudence a reasonable Tincture of Letters a general Knowledge of History and of the present Constitution of all the States of the World and particularly of that in which they are Whereupon two things ought particularly to be consider'd The First That the greatest Wits are more dangerous than useful in the Management of Affairs unless they have a great deal more Lead than Quicksilver they are no ways fit for the State Some are fertile in Inventions and abounding in Thoughts but so variable in their Designs that those of the Morning and of the Evening are never alike and have so little connexity and choice in their Resolutions that they alter the good as well as the ill ones and never remain constant in any I may say with truth as knowing it by Experience that the Levity of such Men is no less dangerous in the Administration of Publick Affairs than the Malice of many others Much is to be dreaded from Minds whose Vivacity is accompanied with little Judgment and tho' those who excell in the Judicious part should not have a great reach yet they might be useful to States The Second Remark to be made on this Subject is That nothing can be more dangerous in a State than to give a great Authority to certain Men who have not Sense enough to Govern themselves and yet think they have too much to stand in need of any body's They are neither capable to take a good Counsel from their own Head nor to follow the Advice of those who are capable to direct them and thus they commit gross Faults Presumption is one of the greatest Vices a Man can be guilty of in publick Employments and if Humility is not requir'd in those who are design'd for the Conduct of States yet Modesty is absolutely necessary since it is most certain that those who have the greatest Parts are sometimes the least capable to admit Society and Counsel Qualifications without which even those to whom Nature has given most Knowledge are not fit for Government Without Modesty Men of great Parts are so wedded to their own Opinions that they condemn all others though better and the Pride of their natural Constitution being join'd to their Authority
according as he thinks fit so in the Conduct of a State nothing is requir'd but the Operation of the Mind which sees and orders at once what it thinks fit to be done If it be true that the Sun which heats all things is not hot in it self it is evident that in order to make the World act corporeally the Action of the Body is not requir'd I own nevertheless that I have often wish'd my self rid of the Government of the State upon the account of my want of Health the Line of which has been so short that it has almost been impossible for me not to exceed the measure of it often Finally After having serv'd your Majesty many Years in the most difficult Affairs that can be met with in a State I may confirm by Experience what Reason teaches all the World That it is the Head and not the Arm which conducts States SECT VI. Which represents the Number of Counsellors of State that is requisite and that one among them ought to have the Superiour Authority AFter having examin'd and discover'd the Qualifications that are necessary in those who are to be employ'd in the Ministry of State I must also observe That as the Plurality of Physicians sometimes causes the Death of the Patient instead of contributing towards his Cure so the State will receive more prejudice than advantage if the Counsellors are in great Number I add That no benefit can be deriv'd by them if their Number exceeds Four and moreover That one of them must have the Superiour Authority to be as it were the Primum Mobile which moves all the other Heavens without being mov'd by any thing but its Intelligence I am loth to set down this Proposition because it will look as if I design'd to maintain my own Cause but considering that it would be easie for me to prove it by several Authorities of Scripture of the Fathers and of Politicians and that the Confidence your Majesty has always honour'd me with while you have been pleas'd to give me a share in the Administration of Publick Affairs wants no other Principle for the defence of it but that which was necessary for its Establishment I mean your Will whick will be look'd upon by Posterity as a just Reason of the Authority I have had all along in your Councils I find that I may speak upon this Subject without being suspected and that it is my Duty to do it to prove that by Reason which the Honour I have always receiv'd from your Goodness will authorise by Example The natural Envy which is commonly met with among equal Powers is too well known to every body to want a long Discourse to shew the Truth of this Proposition Divers Experiences have made me so knowing in this matter that I should think my self answerable before GOD if this present Testament did not declare in proper terms That nothing can be more dangerous in a State than divers equal Authorities in the Administration of Affairs What the one undertakes is cross'd by the other and if the worthiest Men is not the most capable though his Propositions should prove the best they would always be eluded by the most powerful in Sense Each will have their Sectators which will form divers Parties in the State and will divide the Forces of it instead of uniting them together As the Distempers and Death of Men only proceed from the Discord of the Elements they are compos'd of so it is certain that the Contrariety and the want of Union which constantly reigns among equal Powers will ever disturb the Peace of the States they have the Management of and will produce divers Accidents which finally may ruin them If it be true That Monarchical Government is more consonant to GOD's than any other if all Politicians both Sacred and Prophane teach us that that Form surpasses all those that were ever put in practice we may boldly affirm That if the Soveraign cannot or will not have a continual eye himself upon his Map and upon his Compass Reason requires that he should give the peculiar Charge thereof to one above all the rest As divers Pilots never put their Hands at once to the Helm so there must be but one at the Helm of the State He may receive the Advice of others moreover he ought sometimes to desire it but he is to examine the Goodness of it and to turn his Hand to the Right or Lest as he thinks it best to avoid the Storm and to steer his Course The main point consists in making a good Choice on that occasion and never to be deceiv'd in it Nothing can be more easie than to find a Primum Mobile to move all without being mov'd by any Superiour Authority but that of his Master but nothing is more difficult than to find one to move well without being able to be mov'd by any Consideration which might its Motion All Men will think themselves by their own Sence capable of that Function but as no Man can be a Judge in his own Cause the Judgment of a thing of this importance must be referr'd to those who have no interest to blind them Such a Man will not be capable of being wrought upon by the Practises and Presents of the Enemies of the State who may be mov'd by their Artifices Another may be capable of being wrought upon by Interests which though not criminal might nevertheless prove very prejudicial to the State There are many who would rather die than act against their Conscience who nevertheless would not be useful to the Publick because they are too apt to yield to the Importunities and to the Tenderness they have for those they love Some may be incapable of being mov'd by any Interest whatever who may be mov'd by Fear by Astonishment and by a panick Terrour I am sensible that the Capacity Integrity Courage and in a word all the Qualities which we have attributed to Counsellors of State may remedy such Inconveniences but to speak the truth as the Minister we are speaking of must be above all the rest so he must have all those Qualities in an eminent degree and consequently he must be carefully examin'd before he is chosen The Prince must have a personal Knowledge of the Person he intrusts with so great an Employment and though the said Person must be elected by himself yet the Choice he makes of him must if possible be accompanied with Publick Approbation for if he has the liking of every body he will be the more capable to do good As those who are the best skill'd in Astronomical Supputations can never be deceiv'd of one Minute but the Judgments they make afterwards must be liable to all manner of Falsities so it is certain that if the Qualifications of the Person who is to govern others are only good in appearance his Conduct will prove very bad and that if they are but mean his Government will not prove excellent It is is
absolutely necessary for the Conduct of States IT is a common but a very true saying which has ever been in the Mouths and Minds of Men that Punishments and Rewards are the two most considerable points for the Conduct of a Kingdom It is most certain that tho' no other Principle be us'd in the Government of States but that of being inflexible in Chastising those who act against them and Religious in rewarding those who procure them any notable advantage They cannot be Govern'd amiss since all Men may be kept within the bounds of their Duty either by Fear or Hope I place Punishment before Reward because that if there were a necessity to be depriv'd of one of them one might better dispense with the last than the first As good is to be imbrac'd for its own sake there is no Reward due to those who perform it taking it in the strictest Sence But as there is no crime which does not violate that to which Men are oblig'd there are none but what require the Punishment which is due to disobedience and that obligation is so strict that in many occasions a fault cannot be left unpunished without committing a new one I speak of faults which affect the State and are committed with premeditation and not of many others which happen by chance and by misfortune for which Princes may and ought to use Indulgence Tho' to Pardon in such cases is a laudable thing not to Punish a considerable Fault the impunity of which opens a door to Licenciousness is a criminal omision Theologians allow it as well as Politicians and all agree that on certain occasions in which the Prince would be to blame not to Pardon those who are intrusted with the Government of the Publick they would also be inexcusable if instead of a severe Punishment they should use Lenity Experience teaching those who have had a long practice of the World that Men easily lose the remembrance of Favours and that when they are loaden with them the desire of increasing them often makes them Ambitious and Ingrateful together shows us also that Punishment is a more certain way to keep Men within the bounds of their Duty since they are not so soon forgotten by reason that they make a stronger impression on the sences of most Men than Reason which has but little power over many To be severe towards Private Men who make it their Pride to despise the Laws and Ordinances of a State is to be kind to the Publick And the greatest crime one can be guilty of against the Interest of the Publick is to be indulgent towards those who violate them Among many Combinations Factions and Seditions that have been made in my time in this Kingdom I have never observ'd that Impunity ever inclin'd any one naturally to correct his evil Inclination But on the contrary that they return'd to their old Vomit and often with more success the second than the first time The Indulgency hitherto practis'd in this Kingdom has often reduc'd it to very great and very deplorable Exremities Faults not being Punish'd every Man has made a Trade of his Place and without regarding what he was oblig'd to do to discharge his Trust worthily he only consider'd what he could do to get the more by it If the Ancients have been of opinion that it was dangerous to live under a Prince who will remit nothing of the Rigor of Right they have also observ'd that it was more dangerous to live in a State in which Impunity opens a door to all sorts of Licenciousness Some Princes or Magistrates will be afraid of being faulty by too much Rigor who would be accountable to God and must needs be blam'd by all Wise Men unless they exerted that which is prescrib'd by the Laws I have often represented it to your Majesty and it is my humble Petition still that you would be pleas'd to remember it carefully by reason that as there are Princes who want to be persuaded from Severity to avoid Cruelty to which they are naturally inclin'd your Majesty wants to be diverted from a false Clemency more dangerous than Cruelty it self since Impunity obliges to use a great deal in the end which can only be prevented by Punishment The Rod which is the Emblem of Justice must never be useless I own at the same time that it ought not be so much accompany'd with Rigor as to be destitute of Goodness but that last qualification does not consist in the Indulgency which authorizes disorders which tho never so inconsiderable are often so prejudicial to the State that they may prove it's ruin If any are so ill advis'd in this Kingdom as to condemn the severity which is necessary in States because it has not been practis'd hitherto let them only open their Eyes and they will find that Impunity has been too common in it hitherto and the only cause that Order and Rule have not been observ'd and that the Continuation of Disorders obliges to have recourse to the utmost Extremities to put a stop to them The only Source of all the Parties that have been form'd heretofore against Kings has been their over much Indulgence Finally those who are acquainted with our History cannot be ignorant of this Truth of which I produce a Testimony which is the less to be suspected in this case because it is taken from the Mouth of our Enemies which almost in all other occasions would make it suspicious Cardinal Sapata a Man of good Sence meeting Baraut and Bautru in the King his Master's Antichamber a quarter of an hour after their having receiv'd the News of the Duke de Montmorency's Execution put this question to them Which was the chief cause of that Duke's death Bautru answer'd immediately according to his fiery temper in Spanish Sus falsas No reply'd the Cardinal Pero la Clemensia de lors Royes antepassados which was as much as to say that the Punishment of the said Duke was more to be imputed to the faults the King's Predecessors had committed than to his own In Crimes of State it is absolutely necessary to banish Pity and to despise the Complaints of persons concern'd and the discourse of an ignorant Multitude who sometimes blame what is most useful to them and often absolutely necessary Christians ought to bury the remembrance of private Injuries but Magistrates are oblig'd not to forget those which concern the Publick and indeed to leave themunpunish'd is rather to begin them anew than to pardon and remit them There are many whose ignorance is so stupid as to imagin that a new Prohibition is a sufficient remedy to any Evil but they are so much in the wrong that I may affirm with Truth that new Laws are not so much a remedy for the disorders of States as Testimonies of their Illness and certain proofs of the weakness of the Government by reason that had th' antient Laws been put in execution there would be no necessity to revive them nor
represent freely to Princes to what degree they are answerable before God when they give Places of great Trust out of pure favour which can never be possessed by mean Capacitys without prejudice to the State It is on the said Occasion we are oblidg'd to show that tho we do not absolutely Condemn particular Affections which have no other foundation but that natural Inclination which Men have rather for one Person than for another we cannot excuse Princes who suffer themselves to be prevail'd upon so far as to give those they Love thus Places in the administration of which they show themselves as prejudicial to the State as useful to themselves Those who have the happiness to Injoy the favour of Princes by the force of their Inclination must not be depriv'd of receiving Advantages from them tho they have not all the Qualifications requir'd to make them worthy of the same and the Public can not complain of it with Reason unless they are Immoderate But it is a sinister Omen for a Prince when he who is the most Considerable for his Interest is not the most consider'd by his Favour and States are never in a worse Condition than when the Inclinations the Prince has for some particular Persons prevail before the services of those that are more useful to the Public In such a Case neither the Esteem of the Soveraign nor the Affection one has for him nor the hope of reward do any longer excite Virtue Men remain on the contrary in an Indifference of Good and Evil and Envy and jealousie or Spite Induce all Men to neglect their Duty because that in performing it they have no prospect of reward A Prince who desires to be belov'd by his Subjects must fill up all the Places of Trust and the first Dignitys of his State with Persons so much esteem'd by every one that the Cause of his Choice may be found in their merit Such Men must be carefully sought after throughout the State and not receiv'd by importunities or chosen in the Croud of those who press most about Kings and about their Favourites If Favour has no hand in Elections and Merit be the Sole foundation of them besides that the State will be well serv'd Princes will avoid a great deal of Ingratitude which is often met with in certain Men who are the less grateful for the favours they receive in that they least deserve them It being most certain that the same Qualifications which render Men worthy of favours are the same which make them Capable and desirous to acknowledg them Many have good sentiments in the moment you Oblige them but the Constitution of their Nature sways them soon after and they easily forget what they owe others because they only love themselves and as Fire converts all things into its own substance they only consider Public Interests to convert them to their one advantage and equaly despise those who do them Good and the States in which they receive it Favour may innocently be allow'd in some things but a Kingdom is in a sad Case when the Throne of that false Goddess is raised above Reason Merit should always turn the Scale and when Justice is on our side favour cannot prevail without Injustice Favourites are the more dangerous in that those who are raised by Fortune seldom consult Reason and whereas it seldom favours their designs it proves commonly Ineffectual to stop the Course of those they form to the prejudice of the State In my opinion nothing is more likely to Ruin the most flourishing Kingdom in the World than the Apetite of such Men or the inordinate Passions of a Woman when a Prince is possessed by them I am the bolder in advancing this Proposition because there are no Remedies against those Evils but such as depend altogether on Chance and Time which often suffering the Sick to dye without any assistance must be look'd upon as the worst Physician in the World As the greatest Light in Nature cannot make the blind perceive one glimpse of their way so there is no Ray capable to unseal the Eyes of a Prince when they are seal'd by Favour and Passion Those whose Eyes are blinded can never make good Choices unless by Chance and therefore since the welfare of the State requires them ever to be made with Reason it also requires that Princes should not be possessed by Persons who deprive them of the Light they stand in need of to see the Objects which are put before their Eyes When the Hearts of Princes are ingag'd by such means it is almost Useless to do well because the Craft of those who are in possession of their Affections tarnish the lustre of the purest Actions and make the most signal Services pass for Offences Many Princes have undone themselves by preferring their particular Affection to Public Interest Such misfortunes have befallen some by the unruly Passions they have had for Women Some are fallen into the like Inconveniences by such a simple blind Passion they have had for their Favorites that in order to raise their Fortune they have ruin'd their own There have been others who having no natural Inclination for any thing have nevertheless been sway'd with so much Violence in favour of some particular Persons that they have occasion'd their Ruin Men perhaps will wonder at this Proposition which is nevertheless as True as it is easy to be conceiv'd and if Men consider that such Motions are distempers to the Minds that are influenc'd by them and that as the Cause of Feavours is the Corruption of Humors one may also say That those sorts of Violent Affections are rather Grounded on the defect of the Person in which we find them than on the Merit of those who receive the Effect and Advantage of them Such Evils commonly carry their Remedy along with them in that being Violent they are not lasting but when they continue they often occasion Death as well as the Feavers of that Kind or a want of health which is seldom repair'd afterwards The wisest Princes have avoided those divers kinds of Evils in making Reason the guide of all their Affections Many have cur'd themselves of them after having found to their Cost that unless they did it their Ruin was Inevitable To return precisely to the Point of the Question proposed in this Chapter the scope of which is to show how Important it is to discern those who are the fittest for Employments I will conclude it saying That since Interest is that which makes Men guilty of Male-adminnistration in the Places that are committed to them Ecclesiasticks are often to be preferr'd to many others in what relates to Places of great Trust Not that they are less subject to their own Interest but because they have a great deal less self Interest than other Men since that having neither Wives nor Children they are free from the Bonds which ingage Men most CHAP. VIII Of the Evil which Flatterers Detractors and Intriguers
pag. 171 Sect. I. Which sheâ—â—s that the best Prince stands in need of a good Council ib. Sect. II. Which represents what Capacity is requir'd in a good Counsellor pag. 173. Sect. III. Which represents the Integrity that is requir'd in a good Counsellor pag. 175. Sect. IV. Which represents what Courage and Foree is requir'd in a Counsellor of State pag. 181. Sect. V. Which represents what Application is requir'd in Counsellors of State pag. 184. Sect. VI. Which represents the Number of Counsellors of State that is requisite and that one among them ought to have the Superiour Authority pag. 191. Sect. VII Which represents what the King's Behaviour is to be towards his Counsellors and shews that in order to be well serv'd the best Expedient he can take is to use them well pag. 195. The second PART Chap. I. THe first Foundation of the Happiness of a State is the Establishment of the Reign of God pag. 2. Chap. II. Reason must be the Rule and Conduct of a State pag. 5. Chap. III. Which shows that Public Interest should be the only End of those who govern States or at least that it ought to be preferr'd to particular Advantages pag. 9. Chap. IV. How much Foresight is necessary for the Government of a State pag. 12. Chap. V. Punishment and Reward are two Points absolutely necessary for the Conduct of States pag. 16. Chap. VI. A Continual Negotiation contributes much towards the good success of Affairs pag. 24. Chap. VII One of the greatest Advantages that can be procur'd to a State is to give every one an Employment suitable to his Genius and Capacity pag. 32. Chap. VIII Of the Evil which Flatterers Detractors and Intriguers commonly occasion in States and how necessary it is to remove them from Kings and to banish them from their Courts pag. 38. Chap. IX Which Treats of the Power of the Prince and is divided in to Eight Sections pag. 45. Sect. I. The Prince must be Powerful to be Respected by his Subjects and by strangers pag. 45. Sect. II. The Prince must be powerful by his Reputation and what is necessary to that End pag. 46. Sect. III. The Prince must be Powerful by the force of his Frontiers pag. 48. Sect. IV. Of the Power a State ought to have by its Land-Forces This Section has several Subdivisions upon the account of the abundance of matter it contains which will be specify'd in the Margin pag. 51. Sect. V. Of Natural Power pag. 80. Sect. VI. Which Treats of Trade as a dependency of the Power of the Sea and specifies those which are most Convenient pag. 92. Sect. VII Which shews that Gold and Silver are one of the Principal and most necessary supporters of the State declares the means to make this Kingdom Powerful in that kind shows the revenue of the same at present and how it may be improv'd for the Future in discharging the People of three parts in four of the Burthen which overwhelms them at this Time pag. 140. Sect. VIII VVhich shews in few words that the uâ—most point of the Power of Princes must consist in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts pag. 132. Chap. X. Which concludes this Work in showing that whatever is contain'd in it will prove ineffectual unless the Princes and their Ministers are so mindful of the Government of the State as to omit nothing which their Trust obliges them to and not to abuse their Power pag. 133. THE END * Saxony first abandon'd the King of Sweden Brandenburg the Landgrave of Hesse several Hans Towns Wittemberg Parma and Mantua * The Judges Royal had already begun a little to affect the Cognisance of what only belongs to the Church under pretence of the possission of Benefices of which the Bull of Pope Martin given in the Year 1439. attributed the Cognisance to them * That first Regulation never had the Name End or Effect of Appeals * Ordinances of â—539 †The Word has its Original from the Practice of Attornics and Advocates who according to the Order of applying themselves before the Parliament by way of Appeal gave the same Name to the recourse Ecclesiasticks had there * Regulation of Church-Affairs * The like Remedy was practis'd 15 Years after the Pragmatical Sanction to stop the course of the Secular Judges Vsurpations over the Ecclesiastical furisdiction it was ordain'd That those who had a mind to get Letters out of the Chancery to oppose the Resâ—ripts and Letters of the Popes should â—â— oblig'd to quote evidently the means by which they did pretend to justifie that the Pragmatical Sanction was infring'd †Fifty Years ago this distinction of Priviledg'd Cases and of Common Trespasses was unknown to the Church Common Trespasses are all the Faults the Cognizance whereof belongs to the Ecclesiastical Tribunal * Agreement made between King Francis tâ—â— 1. and Pope Leo the 10. about Benefices * By Letters Patent of 1453. Charles the 7th granted that favour to the Holy Chappel injâ—â—ad of the Gift Charles the â—â—â— had made to them of the remainder of all the â—ccounts deliver'd in the Chamber which he desir'd to be employ'd for the Reparation both of the Palace and of the Holy Chappel * By the Edict of â—ebr 1569. †The Bishop du Bellay * The Deed begins with these words Dominus Rex †The Ordinance Dom Episcopus a â—cujus Episcopaâ—â—â— ubi Rex habet Regaâ—â—â—â— Philip the 4th in his Philippines of the Year 130â— uses these words Io â—â—quibus Ecclesâ—â— Regâ—â— Philip the 6th in his Ordinance of the Year 1334. speaks thus In the Bishopricks in which we have a Regalia Lewis the 12th in his Ordinance of 1499. cited by the first President Le Maitre We have and do forbid all our Officers in the Archbishopricks Bishopricks Abbies and other Benefices in which we have no Right of Regalia or of Guard to establish any there on pain of being punish'd as guilty of Sacrilege Pasquier in the 3d Book of Enquiries chap. 13. The late King Henry the 4th by his Edict of the Year 1606. Art 17. We only design to enjoy the Rights of the Regalia as our Predecessors and our selves have done heretofore without extending the same to the Prejudice of the Churches that are exempted from it And that good Prince believing that the Parliament of Paris would judge to the contrary suspended all the Causes about the Regalia for a year by his Letters Patent of the 6th of Octob. 1609. The King now Reigning having inherited his Piety as well as his Kingdom declares by the Ordinance of 1629. Art 16. That he only designs to enjoy the Regalia as it has been done for the time past And the Clergy having complain'd that those Terms were not express enough H. M. order'd his Commissioners to make this Answer That the Ordinance being refer'd to that of 1606. those Terms were sufficient to satisfie the World that he did not desire to enjoy the Regalia in those