Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	authority_n	church_n	great_a	2,167	5	3.1621	3	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A44006	Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject / by Thomas Hobs.	Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.	1654 (1654)	Wing H2252; ESTC R20187	27,647	98

it is manifest that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it and therefore by his Lordships own reason all effects are necessary Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the first cause and necessary in respect of Second causes mine it does as his Lordship well notes imply a contradiction But the distinction of free into free from compulsion and free from Necessitation I acknowledge for to be free from compulsion is to do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it for a man is then onely said to be compelled when fear makes him willing to it As when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself or submits to his enemie for fear of being killed Thus all men that do any thing for love or revenge or lust are free from compulsion and yet their actions may be as necessarie as those that are done by compulsion for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear But free from Necessitation I say no man can be and 't is that which his Lordship undertook to disprove This distinction his Lordship says uses to be fortified by two reasons but they are not mine The first he says is that it is granted by all Divines that an Hypothetical necessitie or Necessitie upon supposition may stand with Libertie That you may understand this I will give you an example of Hypothetical necessity If I shall live I shall eat This is an Hypothetical necessitie Indeed it is a necessarie proposition that is to say it is necessarie that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered but 't is not the necessitie of the thing nor is it therefore necessarie that the man should live nor that the man should eat I do not use to fortifie my distinctions with such reasons let his Lordship confute them how he will it contents me but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby how easie and plain a thing but withal false with the grave usage of such terms as Hypothetical necessitie and Necessitie upon supposition and such like terms of School-men may be obscured and made to seem profound learning The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from compulsion and free from necessitation he says is that God and good Angels do good necessarily and yet are more free than we This reason though I had no need of yet I think it so farforth good as it is true that God and good Angels do good necessarily and yet are free but because I find not in the Articles of our Faith nor in the decrees of our Church set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good Angels to work by necessitie or in what sence they work Freely I suspend my sentence in that point and am content that there be a freedom from Compulsion and yet no freedom from Necessitation as hath been proved in that a man may be necessitated to some action without threats and without fear of danger But how my Lord can avoid the consisting together of freedom and necessitie supposing God and good Angels are freer than men and yet do good necessarily that we must examin I confess saith he that God good Angels are more free than we that is intensively in degree of Freedom not extensively in the latitude of the object according to a libertie of exercise not of specification Again we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom to cover ignorance and blind the understanding of the Reader For it cannot be conceived that there is any libertie greater than for a man to do what he will One heat may be more intensive than another but not one libertie than another he that can do what he will hath all libertie possible and he that cannot hath none at all Also Libertie as his Lordship says the Schools call it of exercise which is as I have said before a libertie to do or not to do cannot be without a Libertie which they call of Specification that is to say a libertie to do or not to do this or that in particular For how can a man conceave he hath libertie to do any thing that hath not libertie to do this or that or somewhat in particular If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this and that and every other particular kind of flesh how can he be understood to have a libertie to eat flesh more than he that hath no licence at all You may by this again see the vanitie of distinctions used in the Schools and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them by Authoritie of Doctors in the Church hath been a great cause that men have labored though by Sedition and evil courses to shake them off for nothing is more apt to beget hatred than the tyrannizing over mens reason and understanding especially when it is done not by the Scriptures but by the pretence of Learning and more judgement than that of other men In the next place his Lordship bringeth two Arguments against distinguishing between free from compulsion and free from necessitation The first is that election is opposite not onely to Coaction or compulsion but also Necessitation or determination to one This is it he was to prove from the beginning and therefore bringeth no new Argument to prove it and so those brought formerly I have already answered And in this place I deny again that election is opposite to either For when a man is compelled for example to subject himself to an enemy or to die he hath ●till election left him and a deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better endure And he that ●●led to prison by force hath election ●nd may deliberate whether he will ●e hal'd and traind on the ground ●r make use of his own feet Likewise when there is no compulsion but the strength of temptation to do ●n evil action being greater than the motives to abstain it necessarily determines him to the doing of it ●et he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do sometimes the motives to forbear are working on ●im and consequently he electeth which he will But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us we acknowledge necessity but when we see not or mark not the force that moves us we then think there is none and that it is not causes but liberty that produceth the action Hence it is that they think he does not choose this that of necessity choose it but they might as well say fire doth not burn because it burns of necessity The second Argument is not so much an argument as a distinction to shew in what sence it may be said that voluntary actions are necessitated and in what sence not And therefore his Lordship alledgeth as from the authority of the Schools and that which rippeth up the bottom of the

the will to forbear the forbearing also will be necessary The Question therefore is not whether a man be a free Agent that is to say whether he can write or forbear speak or be silent according to his will but whether the will to write and the will to forbear come upon him according to his will or according to any thing else in his own power I acknowledge this Liberty that I can do if I will but to say I can will if I willt I take to be an absurd speech wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his preface In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of Libertie and saies he meaneth not Libertie from sin nor from servitude nor from violence but from Necessitie Necessitation inevitabilitie and determination to one It had been better to define Liberty than thus to distinguish for I understand never the more what he means by Libertie and though he say he means Libertie from necessitation yet I understand not how such a Libertie can be and t is a taking of the Question without proof for what is else the Question between us but whether such a Liberty be possible or not There are in the same place other distinctions as a Liberty of Exercise onely which he calls a Libertie of contradiction namely of doing not good or evil simply but of doing this or that good or this or that evil respestively and a Libertie of specification and exercise also which he calls a Liberty of contrarietie namely a Liberty not onely to do good or evil but also to do or not do this or that good or evil And with these Distinctions his Lordship saies he clears the coast whereas in truth he darkneth his own meaning and the Question not onely with the jargon of exercise onely specification also contradiction contrarietie but also with pretending distinction where none is For how is it possible that the Libertie of doing or not doing this or that good or evil can consist as he saies it does in God and good Angels without a Liberty of doing or not doing good or evil The next thing his Lordship does after clearing of the coast is the dividing of his forces as he calls them into two squadrons one of places of Scriptures the other of Reasons which allegory he useth I suppose because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship who is military man All that I have to say touching this is that I observe a great part of those his forces do look and march another way and some of them fight amongst themselves And the first place of Scripture taken from Numb. 30.14 Is one of those that look another way the words are If a wife make a vow it is left to her husbands choice either to establish it or make it void For it proves no more but that the husband is a free and voluntary Agent but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary causes For if there come into the husbands minde greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow the establishing will follow necessarily and if the evil that will follow in the husbands opinion out-weigh the good the contrary must needs follow and yet in this following of ones hopes and fears consisteth the nature of Election So that a man may both choose this and cannot but choose this and consequently choosing and necessity are joyned together The second place of Scripture is Joshua 24.15 The third is 2 Sam. 24.12 whereby 't is clearly proved that there is election in man but not proved that such election was not necessitated by the hopes and fears and considerations of good and bad to follow which depend not on the will nor are subject to election And therefore one answer serves all such places if there were a thousand But his Lordship supposing it seems I might answer as I have done that necessity and election might stand together and instance in the actions of children fools or bruit beasts whose fancies I might say are necessitated and determined to one before these his proofs out of Scripture desires to prevent that instance and therefore saies that the actions of children fools mad men and beasts are indeed determined but that they proceed not from election nor from free but from Spontaneous Agents As for example that the Bee when it maketh hony does it Spontaneously and when the Spider makes his web he does it Spontaneously but not by election Though I never meant to ground my Answer upon the experience of what Children Fools Mad men and Beasts do yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by Spontaneous and how it differeth from voluntary I will answer that distinction and shew that it fighteth against its fellow Arguments Your Lordship therefore is to consider that all voluntary actions where the thing that induceth the will is not fear are called also spontaneous and said to be done by a mans own accord As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for Merchandise or out of affection he is said to do it of his own accord which in latine is sponte and therefore the action is spontaneous though to give ones mony willingly to a thief to a void killing or throw it into the Sea to avoid drowning where the motive is fear be not called spontaneous But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation that is to say some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of whereas many actions are done of our own accord and are therefore spontaneous for which nevertheless as my Lord thinks we never consulted nor deliberated in our selves As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but the thing we are about is good we eat and walk or in anger strike or revile which my Lord thinks spontaneous but not voluntary nor elective actions and with such kinde of actions he saies necessitation may stand but not with such as are voluntary and proceed upon election and deliberation Now if I make it appear to your Lordship that those actions which he saies proceed from spontanity and which he ascribes to Children Fools Madmen and Beasts proceed from election and deliberation and that actions inconsiderate rash and spontaneous are ordinarily found in those that are by themselves and many more thought as wise or wiser than ordinarily men are then my Lord Bishops Argument concludeth that necessity and election may stand together which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his Arguments to prove And first your Lordships own experience furnishes you with proof enough that Horses Doggs and other Bruit Beasts do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take the Horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees and coming on again to avoid the spur And what else doth

can for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power The other is that we signifie that honour and esteem by our words and actions which is called Cultus or worship of God He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from Gods eternal will and consequently are necessary does he not think God Omnipotent Does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart Again he that thinketh so is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it than he that thinketh otherwise yet is this external acknowledgement the same thing which we call worship So that this opinion fortifies piety in both kinds external and internal therefore is far from destroying it And for Repentance which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way though the cause that made him go astray were necessary yet there is no reason why he should not grieve and again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary there remained still the causes of joy So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of Repentance grief for the errour and joy for returning And for prayer whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroy prayer I deny it for though prayer be none of the causes that move Gods will his will being unchangeable yet since we finde in Gods word he will not give his blessings but to those that aske the motive of prayer is the same Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed 'T is manifest that Thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past and that which is past is sure and necessary yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for Gods blessings in general and though it precede the particular thing we ask yet it is not a cause or means of it but a signification that we expect nothing but from God in such manner as he not as we will and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray thy will not our will be done and by example teaches us the same for he prayed thus Father if it be thy will let this cup pass c. The end of prayer as of thanksgiving is not to move but to honour God Almighty in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him onely The fourth Argument from Reason is this The order beauty and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some free some contingent He that shall make all things necessary all things free or all things contingent doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world In which Argument I observe first a Contradiction for seeing he that maketh any thing in that he maketh it maketh it to be necessary it followeth that he that maketh all things maketh all things necessarily to be As if a work-man make a garment the garment must necessarily be so if God make every thing every thing must necessarily be Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth though we know it not that some Agents should work without deliberation which his Lordship calls necessary Agents and some Agents with deliberation and those both he and I call free Agents and that some Agents should work and we not know how and their effects we both call Contingents but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his election necessarily determined to one by former causes and that which is contingent and imputed to fortune be nevertheless necessary and depend on precedent necessary causes For by contingent men do not mean that which hath no cause but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive As for example when a Traveller meets with a shower the journey had a cause and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it but because the journey caused not the rain nor the rain the journey we say they were contingent one to another And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events necessary contingent and free yet they may be all necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe To the first Argument from Reason which is that if liberty be taken away the nature and formel reason of sin is taken away I answer by denying the consequence The nature of sin consisteth in this that the action done proceed from our will and be against the Law A Judge in judging whether it be sin or no which is done against the Law looks at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer Now when I say the action was necessary I do not say it was done against the will of the doer but with his will and necessarily because mans will that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a sufficient and therefore a necessary cause and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin and nevertheless be necessary and because God may afflict by a right derived from his Omnipotence though sin were not and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners is the cause that produceth justice and maketh sin less frequent for God to punish such sinners as I have said before is no injustice And thus you have my answer to his Lordships Objections both out of Scripture and from Reason Certain Distinctions which his Lordship supposing might be brought to evade his Arguments are by him removed HE saies a man may perhaps answer that the necessity of things held by him is not a Stoicall necessity but a Christian necessity c. But this distinction I have not used nor indeed ever heard before nor could I think any man could make Stoicall and Christian two kindes of necessity though they may be two kindes of Doctrine Nor have I drawn my Answer to his Lordships Arguments from the authority of any Sect but from the nature of the things themselves But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordships in this place as making against his own Tenet Where all the causes saith he being joyned together and subordinate one to another do make but one total cause if any one cause much more the first in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary it determines the rest and without doubt maketh the effect necessary For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect is the joyning together of all causes subordinate to the first into one total cause If any of these saith he especially the first produce its effect necessarily then all the rest are determined Now