Retail he may be pleas'd to receive it in these following words That God did not absolutely irrespectively unconditionally decree the everlasting misery of any one but in a foresight and intuition of their refusing his proffer That he sent his son to dye for all the sins of the whole world inviting and commanding all men every where to repent and be forgiven Act. 17. 30. but that most like the slave in Exodus are in love with their bondage and will be bored through the ear That everlasting fire was prepared especially not for men but for the Devil and his Angels nor for them by a peremptory irrespective Decree but in praescience and respect of their pride and Apostasie That Christ came to save that which was lost and to call sinners to Repentance and to have gather'd them as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings but they would not That God gave his law his rule his promises to all and excepted none in the publishing of either but so as he expected they should be willing as well as he for he would not save any whether they would or no That God Almighty made no man on purpose to torment him but that he might participate of his goodnesse That so many as perish may thank themselves and that so many as live forever are beholding to nothing but the grace of God That God Decreed the fall of none but the raising up of those were down and that those very men who are reprobated had been predestin'd to salvation if they would have return'd and remain'd in truth and holinesse Gods Decrees being to many the cause of their rise but to none of their downfal Lastly that they who have despis'd the will of God which did invite them to repentance shall feel the terrors of his will which is to execute vengeance upon the children of Disobedience 20. From all this together which hath been said from Scripture The Result of all from Reason from the Authority of the Ancients who are the fittest of any to interpret Scripture I thus conclude within my self That God Almighty is the Author of men and Angels That wicked Angels and wicked men are the Authors of sin and that the sin of men and Angels is the Author of unexpressible and endlesse punishment That sin is Rebellion against the Majesty of God That hell was made to punish Rebels and that God never decreed any Rebellion against himself Upon which it followes that as I look for the Cause of my election in the sole merits of my Redeemer so for the cause of my Reprobation in the obliquity of my will because the Reason of my punishment is to be taken from my sin and the Reason of my sin is to be taken from my self from whence there followes and follow it will do what I can A second Inference from my first Compared with my first Principle viz. CHAP. III. 21. That every Reprobate is predetermin'd to eternal punishment not by Gods irrespective but conditional Decree God doth punish no man under the notion of a Creature but under the notion of a Malefactor and because he does not create a malefactor but a man he hateth nothing that he hath created but in as much as it hath wilfully as it were uncreated his image in it So that no man is sinfull because ordain'd to condemnation but ordain'd to condemnation because he is sinful Sin is foreseen and punishment is foreappointed but because that sin is the cause of punishment and that the cause is not after but before the effect in priority of nature though not of time it followes that the effect is not foreappointed until the Cause is foreseen So that God damns no man by an absolute decree that is to say without respect or intuition of sin but the praescience of the Guilt is the motive and inducement to the determining of the Iudgement And yet however my second Inference is depending upon my first by an essential tye which gives it the force and intrinsick form of Demonstration yet because some Readers will assent much sooner to a plain Reason lesse convincing then to a more convincing Reason lesse plain and that some are wrought upon by an argument exactly proportion'd to their Capacities or Tempers rightly level'd and adapted more by luckinesse then design whilest another argument is displeasing they know not why but that there is an odnesse in the look and meen which betokens something of subtilty and makes them suspect there is a serpent though they see not the Ambush in which it lurks I will gratifie such a Reader by a proof of this too first from Scripture then from Reason grounded upon Scripture and last of all by an addition to my former suffrages of Antiquity in which S. Austin more especially shall speak as plainly and as strongly in my behalf as any man that can be brib'd to be an Advocate or a witnesse 22. That my proof from Scripture may be the more effectual I shall first desire it may be consider'd that since God is affirmed to have a secret and a revealed will we must not praeposterously interpret what we read of his revealed will by what we conjecture of his secret one for that were to go into the dark to judge of those Colours which are seen only by the light but we must either not conjecture at that which cannot be known as Gods secret will cannot be but by ceasing to be secret or if we needs will be so busie we must guesse at his secret will by what we know of his revealed one that so at least we modestly and safely erre Upon which it followes that we who meekly confesse we have not been of Gods Councell must only judge of his eternal and impervestigable Decrees by what we finde in his Word concerning his Promises and his Threats which are fitly called the Transcripts or Copies of his Decrees Such therefore as are his Threats such must needs be his Decrees because the one cannot praevaricate or evacuate the other but his Threats as well as Promises are all conditional therefore his decrees must be so too Thus in his Covenant with Adam and indeed the word Covenant doth evince what I am speaking he threatens Death or decrees it not with that peremptory Reason which is the redoubling of the will only I will therefore because I will but on supposition of his eating the forbidden fruit Which was not therefore forbidden that Adam might sin in the eating man was not so ensnared by the guide of his youth but Adam sin'd in the eating because it had been forbidden Such immediately after was Gods language to Cain If thou do well thou shall be accepted and if thou doest not well sin lyeth at the door Again saith God by the mouth of Moses Behold I set before you this Day a Blessing and a Curse A Blessing if ye obey and a Curse if ye will not obey That
that he had never spoke otherwise according to that of Austin Ex nolentibus facit volentes He saies facit not adigit cogit compellit He makes us willing who were unwilling but does not force us to be willing whilest we are unwilling that is to say to be willing against our wils or whether we will or no 12. But I finde that I have shot somewhat farther then I aim'd it being only my design and the proper businesse of this place to shew that the words of the Apostle he worketh all things are infinitely far from being meant either of sin or Reprobation So far from that that God Almighty does not permit sin as permission signifies connivence or consent but he permits it as that signifies not to hinder by main force If I see a man stealing and say nothing to him I so permit as to be guilty but if I warn and exhort if I promise and threaten and do all that may avert him besides killing him I so permit as to be innocent In like manner all that is done by God Almighty by way of permission is his suffering us to live and have that nature of the will with which he made us Whereas to destroy us for the prevention of sin or to make us become stocks as Beza phrases it or like wooden Engines which are moved only by wires at the meer pleasure and discretion of the Engineer were by inevitable consequence to * uncreate his Creature which to do were repugnant to his immutability as Tertul. shewes This is all that I am able to apprehend or pronounce that God permits our sins in this sense only and that he disposes and orders them to the best advantage 13. Having proved my first Principle by Scripture and Reason it will be as easie to confirm it by the common suffrage of Antiquity and to avoid the Repetition of so long a Catalogue which I suppose will be as needlesse as I am sure it will be nauseous to a considerable Reader I refer him to the Citations which will follow my first inference Sect. 18. I will content my self at present to shut up all with that Article of the Augustan Confession to which our 39 Articles have the greatest regard and conformity and which for that very reason is to me the most venerable of any Protestant Confession except our own That though God is the Creator and Preserver of Nature yet the only cause of sin is the will of the wicked that is to say of the Devil and ungodly men turning it self from God to other things against the will and commandements of God And the Orange Synod doth pronounce an Anathema upon all that think otherwise If any will not subscribe to this Confession I will leave him to learn modesty both from Arrian the Heathen and from Philo the Iew {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} Arrian in Epictet {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} Philo {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} p. 325. CHAP. II. MY first Demand being fully granted as in the Mathematicks 't is usual to build upon certain Postulata it doth immediately follow that man himself is the sole efficient cause of his eternal punishment I say the sole Cause as excluding God but not the Devil whom yet I also exclude from the efficiency of the Cause because he can only incite and propose objects and adde perswasions to sin but cannot force or cause it in me without my will and consent so that the Devil being only a Tempter and Perswader cannot for that be justly styled an efficient Or if he were sure for that very Reason God himself cannot be so but only Man and the Devil must be the Concauses of man's Destruction Which is the second thing I am to prove both by Scripture and Reason and the whole suffrage of Antiquity 15. And sure I shall not be so solicitous as to rifle my Concordance but make use of such Scriptures as lye uppermost in my memory and so are readiest to meet my pen These I finde are of two sorts negative on God's part and affirmative on man's God gives the first under his oath Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked turn from his way and live turn ye turn ye from your wicked waies for why will ye die O house of Israel In the 18. chapter of the same Prophesie the Latine translation is more emphatical then the English for there it is not non cupio but nolo mortem morientis not that he doth not will the death of a sinner but that he wils it not he doth not only not desire it but which makes the proof more forcible he desires the contrary even that he should turn from his wickednesse and live chap. 33. v. 14. not willing saith S. Peter that any should perish but on the contrary that all should come to Repentance And so 1 Tim. 2. 4. He will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth Where it appears by the Context that the Apostle does not only speak of all kindes of particulars but of all particulars of the kindes too For he first of all exhorts them that prayers and supplication and giving of thanks be made for all men vers. 1. Secondly he does instance in one sort of men for Kings and all that are in Authority vers. 2. Thirdly he addes the Cause of his exhortation for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour who will have all men to be saved vers. 3 4. And if the Spanish Frier said true that few Kings go to hell giving this Reason because all Kings are but few the Apostles way of arguing will be so much the stronger for when he speaks of all men in generall he makes his instance in Kings in all Kings without exception thereby intimating Nero the worst of Kings under whom at that time the Apostle liv'd And he uses another argument vers. 6. because Christ gave himself a Ransome for all This is yet more plain from Rom. 2. 4 5. Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse and forbearance and long-suffering not knowing that the goodnesse of God leadeth thee to repentance but after thy hardnesse and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thy self wrath against the day of wrath Observe who they are whom God would have to repent even the hard hearted and the impenitent But I have stronger proofs out of Scripture and lesse liable to Cavil then any of these which yet I thought fit to use because I finde they are the Chief of those that Vossius relies upon and expounds to my purpose from the Authority of the Ancients I will adde to these but three or four Texts more of which the one will so establish and explain the other as to leave no place of evasion to the gainsayer First our
were not a murderer Whom he condemns as murderer and not as man For whilest he hath a will to hang the murderer he hath a merciful woulding to save the man He doth not hang the man but only because he is a murderer And if it lay in his power he would destroy the murderer to save the man Both the one and the other is not an absolute but a conditional will He would save the man with an if he were not a murderer And doth destroy the murderer with a because he is a Malefactor Just so God's antecedent will is that every man would repent that they may not perish It is his consequent will that every one may perish who will not repent Both the one and the other is respective and conditional Thirdly I distinguish with Prosper of an inviting and revenging will The inviting will is that by which all are bidden to the Wedding Feast his revenging will is that by which he punisheth those that will not come Or fourthly I distinguish with reverend Anselme of the will of God's mercy and of the will of his Iustice It is the will of his Mercy that Christ should die for the sins of all but 't is the will of his Iustice that all should perish who come not in to him when they are called or who only so come as not to continue and persevere unto the end 41. All these Distinctions come to one and the same purpose and being rightly understood as well as dexterously used do seem to me a Gladius Delphicus sufficient to cut asunder the chiefest knots in this Question For the first will of God may be repealed whereas the second is immutable Which is the ground of that Distinction betwixt the Threats and Promises under God's Oath and those other under his Word only Of which saith the Councel of Toledo Iurare Dei est à seipso ordinata nullatenus convellere Poenitere verò eadem ordinata cùm voluerit immutare When he is resolv'd to execute his purpose he is said to swear and when it pleaseth him to alter it he is said to repent For there are some Decrees of God which being conditional do never come to passe as he thought to have done an Evil of punishment unto Israel which yet he did not Exod. 32. 14. And the reason of this is given us from that distinction before mentioned Which also serveth to reconcile many seeming repugnances in Scripture For when it is said that God repenteth 1 Sam. 16. 35 it is meant of the first nill and when it is said he cannot repent 1 Sam. 16. 29. it is meant of the second In respect of the first we are said to grieve to quench to resist the Spirit of God 1 Thes. 5. 19. but when it is said who hath resisted his will Rom. 9. 19. it is meant of the second God's Mercy is above and before his Iustice and therefore that is his first will that all should be saved and come to the knowledge of the Truth 1 Tim. 2. 4. but yet so as that his Iustice is not excluded by his Mercy and therefore that is his second Will that so many should be damned as hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of the Lord Prov. 1. 29. The will of his Mercy that all should live is from nothing but his goodnesse whereas the will of his Iustice that some should die depends upon something in the Creature So that both parties may be gratified they that are for the dependence and the independency of his Will That the Reprobate is invited is from the mercy of God's Will but that he is punished for not accepting is from the obliquity of his own In respect of the first it is the man that refuseth God Ier. 8. 5. But in respect of the second it is the God that doth reprobate man Rom. 1. 28. The free Love of the Creator is the only motive to his first will but man's ingratitude and rebellion is his impellent to the second The first shewes him a tender and compassionate Father the second speaks him a righteous and an impartial Iudge Both proclaim him a powerful and a provident God Now can any Distinction be better chosen can any word that is aequivocable be more safely understood can any Opinion of God's will or mans be more rationally or more warily or more religiously entertain'd then that wherein God's Mercy doth greet his Iustice and wherein his Love doth kisse his Power I appeal to any man living whether this be an Error or if it is whether it is not a very safe one and if it is so whether it is not a very small one and if so safe that no body can suffer by it if so smal that no body can see it whether the Author of this Appeal is not very excusable both for not being able to see his own Eyes nor to see his own Error with other mens As much as in me lies I would live peaceably with all men With those especially who when I speak unto them thereof make them ready to battle And in order to that Peace I desire them to lay this one thing to heart That as if I were as they I would quit my Opinion so if they were as I they would not long keep their own CHAP. IV. 42. HAving proved hitherto that Sin is really the cause of Punishment that Man is really the cause of Sin and therefore that Man is the grand cause of Punishment as being the cause of the cause of his Damnation intending thereby to secure my self against the errors and blacker guilt of the Manichees the Marcionites the Stoicks and the Turks who do all affirm some directly some by necessary consequence That God's absolute Will is the cause of sin and man's only the instrument the second part of my Task is to be an Advocate for the pleading and asserting the Cause of God too and that against the Opiners of the other Extreme to wit the Pelagians and the Massilienses who to be liberal to Nature do take away from Grace and to strengthen the Handmaid do lessen the forces of the Mistresse And though I think the latter to be the milder Heresie of the two it being lesse dangerous to ascribe too much goodnesse to the Power of Nature which very power is undoubtedly the gift of God then the very least Evil to the God of all Grace and this according to the Judgement of the Synod at Orange which pronounced an Anathema upon the first Heresie whereas it did but civilly reject the second yet in a perfect dislike and rejection of this latter Extremity as well as of the former my second Principle is this That all the good which I do I do first receive not from any thing in my self but from the special Grace and Favour of Almighty God Who freely worketh in me both to will and to do of his good pleasure Phil. 2. 13. 43. That I may not be
of certain death to Hezekiah do put this quite out of all scruple for the first was not destroyed and the second did not die at that determinate time when God had threatned they should Of which no reason can be given but that Gods Purposes and Decrees and Threats were conditional on supposition of their Impenitence he threatned to destroy and therefore on sight of their Repentance he promis'd to preserve And from hence it is natural to argue thus Is God so merciful to bodies and is he lesse merciful to souls Does he decree temporal Iudgements conditionally because he is pitiful and will he decree Eternal ones absolutely meerly because he will Is he so unwilling to inflict the first death and will he shew his power his absolute power in the second Did he spare the Ninevites in this life because they were penitents and will he damn them in the next because they were Heathens by his peremptory Decree Is he milde in small things and severe in the greatest Is there no other way to understand those Texts in the 9. to the Romans then by making those Texts which sound severely to clash against those that sound compassionately Is it not a more sober and a more reasonable Course to interpret hard and doubtful Texts by a far greater number more clear and easie then perversly to interpret a clear Text by a doubtful one or an easie text by one that 's difficult which is to shew the light by the darknesse Or if some Texts have two senses if some Texts are liable to many more must we needs take them in the worst and that in meer contradiction to the universal Church If I had no other Argument against an absolute Reprobation this one were sufficient to prevail with me That that Father of mercies and God of all consolation who spareth when we deserve punishment did not determine us to punishment without any respect to our indeservings He that had mercy upon wicked Ahab meerly because of his Attrition did not absolutely damn him before he had done either good or evill before the foundations of the world were laid He doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men Lam. 3. 33. much lesse doth he damn them for his meer will and pleasure When God doth execute a temporal punishment upon such as already have deserv'd it he comes to it with reluctation {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} and therefore cals it his * strange work a work he loves not to be acquainted with a work which he doth sometimes execute because he is Iust but still * unwillingly because he is compassionate And he therefore so expresses it as we are wont to do a thing we are not us'd to and know not how to set about How shall I give thee up Ephraim how shall I deliver thee Israel how shall I make thee as Admah how shall I set thee as Zeboim Mine heart is turn'd within me my Repentings are kindled together I will not execute the fiercenesse of mine anger for I am God and not man Now that God doth professe to afflict unwillingly and many times to repent him of the evil which he thought to do unto his people is a demonstrative argument of his Conditional decrees in things Temporal and by a greater force of Reason in things Eternal 30. My eighth Reason is taken from the little flock which belongs to God and the numerous herd which belongs to Belial Which would not have been if they had both been measur'd out by a most absolute Decree For when it pleas'd the Divine goodnesse to suffer death upon the Crosse for all the sins of the world the every drop of whose bloud had been sufficiently precious to have purchased the Redemption of ten thousand Adams and ten thousand worlds of his posterity he would not yeeld the major part unto his Rival Rebel the black prince of Darknesse reserving to himself the far lesser portion and all this irrespectively meerly because he would He would not absolutely determine such a general Harvest of Wheat and Tares as freely to yeeld the Devil the greater crop He would not suffer his Iustice so to triumph over his Mercy who loves that his Mercy should rejoyce against Iudgement It was not for want of a new Instance to shew his Power or his Iustice for they were both most eminent in the great Mysterie of Redemption Much greater Instances and Arguments then an Absolute Decree as I could evidently shew if I were but sure of my Readers patience My ninth Reason is taken from the Reprobation of Angels which was not irrespective but in regard to their Apostasie as is and must be confessed by all who place the object of Reprobation in massâ corruptâ For the overthrowing of which tenent in all the Sublapsarians Dr. Twisse himself does thus argue Si Deus non potuit Angelos reprobare nisi ut contumaces ergo nec homines nisi ut in contumaciâ perseverantes De Praedest Digres 4. 4. c. 2. 31. My tenth Reason is taken from the Absurdities which have and still must follow if Gods eternall decree of mans misery is not conditional but absolute And those absurdities are discernible by this following Dilemma Let Dives be suppos'd to be the man that is Damn'd It is either because he sins or meerly because God will have it so If for the first Reason because he sins then sin is the Cause of his Damnation and consequently before it From whence it followes that Dives is not Damn'd meerly because God will have it so but that God will have it so because he sins Which plainly shewes the Conditional Decree But if it be said that it is for the second Reason meerly because God will have it so then that absolute Decree to have it so doth either necessitate him to sin damnably or it does not First if it does then how can Dives be guilty of that thing of which Gods absolute Decree is the peremptory Cause Or how can that be guilt which is necessity Dives could as little have cherisht Lazarus as the Tower of Siloe could have spared the Galilaeans if his will had been no more free then that Tower had a will And secondly if it does not necessitate him to sin damnably then Dives who is Damn'd might possibly have not been damn'd From whence it follows That Dives is not Damn'd absolutely but in regard to his sins Which had they not been his choice they had not been his but his that did choose them And it is a Contradiction to say a man chooses any thing without a free will or by an absolute necessity which is whether he will or no Besides if God did absolutely decree the end which is Damnation and consequently the means which is final impenitence these Absurdities would follow First it would be a Reprobates duty to be damn'd And to endevour his salvation would be a sin Because 't were striving
something moves it The Suppositive is that by which a man shall be damn'd if he die Impenitent The latter necessity though not the first does mightily well consist both with the liberty of man's will and God's Conditional Decrees E. G. I am now writing and God foresaw that I am writing yet it does not follow that I must needs write for I can choose What God foresees must necessarily come to passe but it must come to passe in the same manner that he foresees it He foresees I will write not of necessity but choice so that his foresight doth not make an absolute and peremptory Necessity but infers a Necessity upon Supposition We must mark in a Parenthesis how great a difference there is betwixt the making and the inferring of a Necessity Whatsoever I do there is an Absolute Necessity that God should foresee yet God foreseeing my voluntary Action does not make it necessary but on supposition that it is done If all things are present to God as indeed they are his foresight must needs be all one with our sight As therefore when I see a man daunce as he pleases it is necessary that he do what I see he does but yet my looking on does not make it necessary So Gods foreseeing that man would sin implyed a certainty that so it would be but did not make it an absolutely necessary or involuntary thing For that a thing may be certain in respect of its event and yet not necessary in respect of its cause is no newes at all to a considering person who will but duly distinguish Gods Omniscience from his Omnipotence and his Foresight from his Decreè and infallible from necessary and spontaneous from voluntary and that which follow's as a Consequence only from that which follow's as a consequent If I may judge by those errors which I convince my self to have been in when I was contrary minded to what I am I see as many mistakes in other men arising from the misfortune of confounding those things which I just now distinguisht as from any one unhappinesse that I can think of And from all that I have spoken upon this last subject it seems inevitably to follow that a suppositive Necessity and none else is very consistent with a free and contingent Action Whilest I see a man sitting it is necessary that he sit but upon supposition that I see him sitting His posture is still a voluntary contingent thing For he sate down when he would and may arise when he pleaseth but still with a proviso of God's Permission I desire to be taught what is if this is not exact speaking viz. That God by his prohibition under penalty makes my Disobedience become liable to punishment And by his Decree to permit or not hinder me he leaves me in the hand of mine own counsel and so in the state of peccability that I may sin and perish if I will So that by his praescience that I will sin he hath no manner of influence or causality upon my sin which infers my destruction to be entirely from my self I am a little confident that whosoever shall but read Boethius his fifth book and reading shall understand it and understanding shall have the modesty to retract an error he will not reverence the 4. Section of the 23. chapter of the 3. book of Institutions because it is Mr. Calvins but will suspect Mr. Calvin because of that Section The Question there is Whether Reprobates were praedestined to that corruption which is the cause of Damnation To which he answers with a Fateor I confesse that all the sons of Adam by the expresse will of God fell down into the misery of that condition in which they are fetter'd and intangled And a little after he professeth that no accompt can be given but by having recourse to the sole will of God the cause of which lies hidden within it self And that we may not think he speaketh only of the posterity of Adam he telleth us plainly in the close of that Section that no other cause can be given for the defection of Angels then that God did reprobate and reject them In this place I would aske Was the Angels Defection or Apostasie their sin or no if not why were they reprobated and cast into chaines of darknesse and if it were how then is God's Reprobation not only the chief but the only Cause of such a sin This is the sad effect of being enslaved to an opinion and of being asham'd of that liberty which looks like being conquer'd I beleeve the love of victory hath been the cause of as many mischiefs as have been feigned to leap forth from Pandora's Box Whereas if every one that writes would but think it a noble and an honourable thing to lead his own pride captive to triumph over his own conceitednesse and opiniastrete and to pursue the glory of a well natur'd submission there is perhaps hardly an Author of any considerable length but might think he had reason to write a book of Retractations And sure it will not be immodesty for a young man to say That many old men might have done it with as much reason as S. Austin 40. But as I have learnt of Boethius that most excellent Christian as well as Senator and profound Divine as well as Philosopher who lived a Terror to Heresie and died a Martyr for the Truth to distinguish of Necessity so have I learn't from other Antients to distinguish better of God's will then I was wont to do before the time of my Retractation First I distinguish with S. Chrysostome of a first and second will Gods first will is that the sinner should not die but return rather from his wickednesse and live His second will is that he who refuseth to return receive the wages of iniquity Secondly I distinguish with Damascene of an antecedent and a consequent will The antecedent is that by which he wils that every sinner should repent His consequent is that by which he preordaineth the Damnation of the impenitent Which distinction is not made in respect of Gods will simply in which there cannot be either prius or posterius but in respect of the things which are the object of his will For every thing is will'd by God so far forth as it is good Now a thing consider'd absolutely may be good or evill which in a comparative consideration may be quite contrary E. G. To save the life of a man is good and to destroy a man is evil in a first and absolute consideration But if a man secondly be compared with his having been a murderer then to save his life is evil and to destroy it good From whence it may be said of a just Iudge that by his antecedent will he desires every man should live but by a consequent will decrees the death of the Murderer And even then he doth so distinguish the murderer from the man that he wisheth the man
consequence It is one thing to follow as the effect of a Cause in order of Nature and quite another to follow as the sequel of an Antecedent in way of Argumentation The short and plain upshot of all is this The precious vessels of Election do very certainly and infallibly persevere unto the end and that by reason of God's omniscience which cannot be deceived but not of necessity and irresistibly by reason of his omnipotence which cannot be frustrate nor defeated What God foresees shall come to passe shal infallibly come to passe and that because he cannot erre who is omniscient On the other side what God decrees shall come to passe must come to passe of necessity because he cannot be resisted who is omnipotent 49. Hence it is easie to distinguish betwixt the other two things which have been so often and so unhappily confounded I mean sufficient effectual and irresistible applyed to Grace 1 Sufficient Grace is that which possibly may produce that effect for which it is given 2 Effectual is that which certainly will 3 Irresistible is that which necessarily must That which is irresistible doth carry away its object to what it pleaseth like a mighty Torrent by indisputable force malgre the greatest opposition that can be made and therefore cannot take place in the elections of the will which ceaseth to elect after the nature of a will in case it be made to do any thing whether it will or no as hath already been shew'd from no lesse a concession then that of Doctor Twisse But that which is only effectual is quite another thing and doth prevail upon the will not ineluctably but infallibly It doth so strongly and effectually incline the will at such critical opportunities and by such congruous means as that the will doth very certainly and undoubtedly assent But it doth not so irresistibly and compulsively necessitate as to take away the freedome and possibility of assenting by making it do what it doth even whether it will or no 50. I discern the Truth of this distinction with greater ease by having alwaies in my prospect the very great difference betwixt the generical notion of acting or taking and the specifical notion of willing or choosing God indeed if it please him can by his absolute power over his Creature make him act this thing or take that thing by ineluctable Necessity and whether he will or no But then that acting is not volition and that taking is not choice For the very word choice cannot be apprehended but it must carry along with it a sound of freedome Optio must be optimorum and so duorum at least It is of two things or more that we choose the best whether in reality or in appearance And this liberty of the will by which we choose being acknowledged on all sides as well by Mr. Perkins and Dr. Twisse as by Bellarmine and Arminius as every man knows that hath but read and compar'd them that famous {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of a twofold Necessity the one of coaction and the other of infallibility being built upon a manifest and grosse mistake both of the word Necessity and the word Infallibility seems to me to be serviceable to no other end then to cover a wound which 't is impossible to cure But admit of that distinction of a twofold Necessity or admit a Necessity be twentifold yet still it ceaseth not to have the nature of a Necessity If it is absolutely Necessary that I must go to London it doth not cease to be Necessity because I am drawn rather then driven Coaction and infallibility if they do both imply an absolute and peremptory Necessity and so by consequence an irresistibility and so by consequence are opposed to the elective faculty of the Will it is no matter how they differ in their syllables and their sounds Shall I declare my Iudgement then although in weaknesse yet in sincerity how freewill is necessary to the choosing of good to which without Grace it is altogether insufficient My judgement is that it is necessary not as a Cause but as a Condition Not as that by vertue of which we can do any thing that good is but as that without which we cannot choose it God's Grace alone is the cause of the good but man's will is as really the instrument of the choice We can do good as God's Engines without a will and so did Balaams Asse without a Reason But we cannot choose good without a freewill as that Asse could not possibly understand what she spake without a Ratiocination This seems to me to be as plain as the light And now I speak of the light if my Reader please by that light I will make it plain We know the Sun is the fountain or Cause of light And light the only means by which we see But yet the opening of the Eye-lid is a necessary condition because if I wink I am dark at noon And if my Eyelid is held open by such a power as I cannot resist my Eye in that case cannot choose but see and therefore cannot choose to see My sight may be with delectation but not properly with that which is call'd election Thus if a man be never so much delighted in doing good but by reason of necessity cannot possibly but do it it is God that chooseth that good and the man doth only act it I say God chooseth by a catachrestical way of speaking meerly the better to shew my thoughts For though God did choose to make a world and one world because it was in his power to have made many worlds or none at all yet I conceive it absurd to say that God did choose to be good or that he chooseth to do good in opposition to evil because he is good and doth good by an absolute necessity he cannot choose to be or to do any otherwise And so he loves but doth not choose it For if that were true speaking it would be as true speaking to say that God doth will his being and doing good whether he will or no or that he cannot choose but choose Which is sure very childish untoward speaking Only he chooseth to enable us to do it because he can choose whether he will so enable us or not When he giveth us his Grace he hath the power to withhold it when he continueth his Grace he hath the power to withdraw it therefore doth he choose both to give and to continue it The goodnesse of his essence is not arbitrary and elective but spontaneous and natural Whereas the goodnesse of his effects in all his Creatures is not naturally necessary in respect of him but arbitrary and elective meerly depending upon his choice and pleasure For he gave us our goodnesse when we would and may take it away when he pleaseth To understand this the better and to hold it the faster in my understanding 51. I must carefully distinguish betwixt spontaneum that