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A52424 Letters concerning the love of God between the author of the Proposal to the ladies and Mr. John Norris, wherein his late discourse, shewing that it ought to be intire and exclusive of all other loves, is further cleared and justified / published by J. Norris. Norris, John, 1657-1711.; Astell, Mary, 1668-1731. 1695 (1695) Wing N1254; ESTC R17696 100,744 365

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Speculation Hitherto I have courted Truth with a kind of Romantick Passion in spite of all Difficulties and Discouragements for knowledge is thought so unnecessary an Accomplishment for a Woman that few will give themselves the Trouble to assist them in the Attainment of it Not considering that the meliorating of one single Soul is an Employment more worthy of a wife Man than most of those things to which Custom appropriates the Name of Business and Affairs But now since you have so generously put into my Hand an Opportunity of obtaining what I so greedily long after that I may make the best Improvement of so great an Advantage I give up my self entirely to your Conduct so far as is consistent with a rational not blind Obedience bring a free and unprejudiced Mind to receive from your Hand such Gravings and Impressions as shall seem most convenient and though I can't engage for a prompt and comprehensive Genius yet I will for a docible Temper The Esteem I have for those necessary and useful Rules you have already prescribed shall appear by my strict Observation of them For indeed the Span of Life is too short to be trifled away in unconcerning and unprofitable Matters and that Soul who has any Sense of a better Life can't chuse but desire that every Minute of her Time may be employed in the regulating of her Will with the most critical Exactness and the extending her Understanding to its utmost Stretch that so she may obtain the most enlarg'd Knowledge and ample Fruition of GOD her only Good that her Nature is capable of I will therefore pass on to explain a little what I asserted in my last next add a few Thoughts concerning Divine Love and in the last place a Proposal or two for the better Prosecution of those you have already made Now in order to the first I am very well satisfied that GOD is the Cause of Mental as well as Bodily Pain if by mental Pain you understand Grief my Mistake lying in this that I confounded Sin and mental Pain 'T is indeed evident that Sin and Grief are two distinct things yet I cannot form to my self any Idea of Sin which does not include in it the greatest Pain and Misery For as Sin is the meritorious Cause of all Misery so it seems to me that the Punishment of Sin is concomitant to the Act Misery is inseparable from Sin and the Sinner is ipso facto punished When therefore I said that mental Pain is the same with Sin I meant no more than this that as a musical Instrument if it were capable of Sense and Thought wou'd be uneasie and in pain when harsh discordant Notes are plaid upon it so Man when he breaks the Law of his Nature and runs counter to those Motions his Maker has assign'd him when he contradicts the Order and End of his Being must needs be in Pain and Misery And as the Health and Perfection Ease and Pleasure Good and Happiness or whatever you will call it of a Creature consists in its Conformity to the End of its Creation and the being in such Circumstances as are agreeable to its Nature from which when in the least it deviates it loses both its Beauty and its Pleasure so the Soul of Man being made on purpose for the Contemplation and Love of GOD whensoever it ceases to pursue that End must needs be put out of the Order of its Nature and consequently depriv'd of all Pleasure and Perfection whilst it stands rightly affected towards GOD it cannot be destitute of Pleasure but whatsoever sets it in Opposition to him does by that Act deprive it of all Delight So that my Hypothesis will lie thus That although GOD only has Power to modifie the Soul of Man and to affect it with Pain and Grief yet since these are rather Uneasinesses than Evils strictly so call'd nothing according to my Notion being the proper Evil of Man but Sin of which more anon since they are design'd by GOD as Mediums to good and are if not formally yet at least consequentially Occasions of Pleasure since the wilful and affected Ignorance of the Understanding and Pravity of the Will or in other Words Sin is the true and proper Evil of a Man because Sin only is absolutely and directly opposite to the Essence of Goodness and seeing GOD can no way be said to be the Author of Sin consequently his being the Cause of our uneasie Sensations can be no just Bar to our Love much less any Motive to our Aversion As for the Distinction of the Soul into inferiour and superiour Part I am as little satisfied with it as you can be and do confess to you ingeniously that I have no clear Idea of that which is properly my self nor do I well know how to distinguish its Powers and Operations For the usual Accounts that are given of the Soul are very unsatisfactory that in your Letter being the best I have met with and therefore for want of better Expressions I made use of this Distinction which I did the more readily because I learned it from your Christian Blessedness P. 158. All the remaining Difference therefore lies in this Question whether Sin be the only Evil And in order to the removing it I shall first shew you my Design in affirming that it is and then the Reasons that incline me to it and when I have done so I will refer all to your better Judgment First for what I aim at I have observ'd that most of the Folly and Mischief that is in the World proceeds from false Notions of Pain and Pleasure and Mistakes concerning the Nature of good and evil For would Men be perswaded that GOD is their only good so they might enjoy him they would not much regret the Absence of other things neither would they so greedily pursue the Shell of Pleasure nor fix their Hearts on sensible Objects which can never satisfie And were they but convinced that nothing is so evil as Sin they would not choose Iniquity rather than Affliction As therefore your Account of Pleasure does rectifie the Errors of our Love so I could wish that our Aversions were better regulated than they usually are and that Sin which though it be not the efficient is yet the moral Cause of all our Evils and Displeasures were so represented as that it might appear the only proper and adequate Object of our intire Hatred and Aversion This is my Design Now for the Reasons besides what are already intimated which incline me to think that Sin is the only Evil. I grant that whatever is contrary to the Pleasure and Good of Man in any of his Capacities may in some Sense be call'd an Evil and in this Latitude no doubt but that both mental and sensible Pain are Evils But because when we speak of Evil we usually understand something that in its own Nature is the proper Object of our Aversion evil as evil being no way eligible and
being they proceed from infinite Goodness and tend towards it And therefore since he has made us passible only for our good and designed Pain as well as Pleasure in order to our Happiness that by these two different Handles he might the better move and direct our Souls towards himself their true and only Felicity I see no reason but to conclude that he is every whit as lovely when he produces Pain as when he causes Pleasure For the Truth is my Letter was principally designed in Favor of a Notion which I have entertain'd and which you further confirm me in by what you add in your Postscript viz. That Afflictions by which we usually understand something Painful are are not Evil but Good which at first seem'd to be contradicted by your Assertion That nothing does us good but what causes Pleasure though upon second thoughts I think they are consistent enough And if there by any shadow of a difference I suppose it arises only from the equivocalness of the words Pleasure and Pain as in truth our mistakes are chiefly owing to our encumbring one word with divers Idea's most of the Controversies that are in the World being in my Opinion rather about words than things By Pleasure I suppose you mean in general all those grateful Sensations which Mankind is capable of that is all such as are truly agreeable to his Nature For I know not how it can consist with the purity of the most holy GOD to say he is the Author of those pleasing Sensations wicked Men do or pretend to feel in what we call sinful Pleasures so that we must either conclude that GOD is not the Author of these irregular Sensations or else that they are not Pleasures I am for the latter and do indeed think it the greatest nonsense in the World to call any thing that is sinful pleasant Pain you tell us is nothing else but a disagreeable Modification of the Soul an uneasie Thought occasion'd by some outward Bodily Impression In which Definition there are two things considerable the Bodily Impression and the uneasie Thought that is consequent thereunto And when you say that GOD is the Author of Pain I suppose you mean no more than that an uneasie Thought is produc'd in the Soul of Man by the Power and Will of GOD at the presence and by occasion of that Impression which sensible Objects make upon the Body Now I suppose that this disagreeable Modification is in the inferiour part of the Soul that which is exercis'd about Objects of Sense and does not necessarily and directly affect the superiour part the Understanding and Will and therefore is no real Evil to that which is properly the Man And this I take to be the right Notion of Pain considered as a Sensation and as GOD is the Author of it but then I deny that in this sense it is strictly and properly an Evil. Now as this Sensation which for distinction sake I will beg leave to call sensible or Bodily Pain is occasioned by some disorder in the parts of the Body or else by the presence of something disagreeable or absence of something necessary to the well-being of the Bodily Frame In like manner when the Understanding and Will deviate from the Order and Perfection of their Nature and are destitute of their proper good they are as truly and if they be in Health as sensibly affected with Pain as the Body is when it suffers the above-mentioned displacences This I call mental Pain and do reckon it the only proper Evil of a Man both because the Mind being the Man nothing is truly and properly his Good or Evil but as it respects his Mind as also because so long as he is under it 't is impossible for him to enjoy any degree of real Happiness For where there is a true Vital Principle where the Soul is not quite mortified or at least Paralytick and Diseas'd 't will as certainly feel Pain when 't is thrust out of its Natural Order and does not move towards GOD the true Term of its Motion as its Body will when its Members are distorted will be as sensibly affected with craving and unsatisfied desires when destitute of the Grace of GOD the proper aliment of the Soul as that is with Hunger and Thirst when in lack of its necessary Food and will feel the same uneasie chillness and darkness come upon it when deprived of the Light of GOD's Countenance that its inferiour part does when it wants the Sun 's comfortable and enlightning Beams And this I take to be the true meaning of what some People call Desertion pain and torment being as necessary to the Soul when she does not stand rightly affected to her GOD as to the Body when under Sickness or outward Violence And in proportion to the health of the Soul and the fineness of its Complexion so is the degree of its Pain when interrupted in its Motion towards him But can GOD in any sense be said to be the Author of this Pain Hath he not taken all the Care that is consistent with the Nature he hath given us to secure us from it and has made all imaginable provision to prevent our falling into that disorder which is necessarily attended with mental Pain so that whenever we fall into it 't is purely owing to our own Folly For though it be sometimes said that GOD does arbitrarily withdraw the chearing Beams of his Countenance which cannot but be uneasie to us so long as we are under that Eclipse yet for my own part I cannot think that he ever does it unless to quicken our Desires and exercise our Graces and then since 't is in order to our greater good it cannot strictly and absolutely be call'd an Evil. Or else 't is the noisom Vapours of our Sins that raise a Cloud between us and the Sun of Righteousness which being our own fault we only are to be blam'd for it Nor do I believe GOD ever denies his Grace to any but such as have first wilfully obstinately and habitually refus'd it So that in fine mental Pain is neither more nor less than Sin which I take to be the true and only Evil of a Man For as nothing is good but GOD so nothing is essentially evil but Sin because nothing else is directly opposite to the Essence of Goodness Since therefore GOD can in no manner of Way be said to be the Author of Sin he cannot be the Cause of mental Pain And I know no Hypothesis that does infer it except the Predestinarian which for that Reason I look on as irrational and absurd and can scarce forbear giving it severer Epithets The short is GOD is the Author of Pain considered as a Sensation and so he is of all our Faculties and Powers and as it proceeds from him it is good designd to do us good and therefore our good But he is not the Author of Pain considered as an Evil as such it is purely
be capable of different Sentiments Being modified thus it shall be affected with Grief and being modified thus it shall be affected with Pain which will be sufficiently distinguished from each other by saying that Pain is a Modification of the Soul that anticipates and prevents all Reason and Reflection and that Grief is a modification that follows it and proceeds from it Thus I choose to distinguish them rather than by subjecting as you these two Sensations in two parts of the Soul whereof I have no Idea or by calling as others that Pain which the Soul suffers by the mediation of the Body and that Grief which the same Soul suffers in and by her self without the Mediation of the Body For though according to the Law of this State Pain be always occasioned by some Motion or Change in the Parts of the Body yet since 't is the Soul that truly feels it and GOD that truly raises it I can easily conceive that GOD can if he pleases raise the Sensation of Pain in her though no Change be made in the Body nay though she had no body at all That GOD for instance can raise the Sensation of Burning in the Soul without any Impression of Fire upon her Body Which by the way may serve to shew the Impertinency of that Question among the School-men how the Soul that is an immaterial Substance can suffer when separate by by a material Fire For let them tell me how Fire affects the Soul now she is in the Body and I 'll tell them how it may torment it when out of the Body But this by the by The thing I directly intend is that since the Soul may be capable of Pain as well without the Mediation of the Body as with it this cannot be its Distinction from Grief that it affects the Soul by the Mediation of the Body But to go on as I am not satisfied with the Ground of your Distinction so neither am I with the Use and Application you make of it Mental Pain say you is an Evil but such as GOD does not cause Again sensible Pain GOD does indeed cause but then that is not properly the Evil of Man Now I cannot accord with you in either of these As to the first I think it very certain that mental Pain being a real Modification of the Soul is caused by GOD who alone is able to new modifie our Souls who only acts upon them and is able to make them happy or miserable as I have sufficiently proved in my Discourse of Divine Love and as you will evidently perceive if you retire within your self and attentively consult your Reason And I wonder why you should stick to allow GOD to be the Author of mental Pain or Grief when you allow him to be the Cause of mental Pleasure or Ioy. If he be the Cause of our Happiness why cannot he be as well the Cause of our Misery And if of Pain why not of Grief For as to the other Part that sensible Pain which God causes is not properly an Evil you will find it very hard to perswade any one that has felt it to this Paradox That I suppose which perswaded you to it was your distinguishing the Soul of Man into two Parts a superiour and an inferiour Part the Latter of which being not properly the Man that Pain which is lodg'd there cannot be said to be the proper Evil of Man Thus the Stoicks reasoned of old and thus you now But besides that this Distinction of the Soul into a superiour and inferiour Part which is the Ground of this Supposition wants it self a good Foundation I further consider that if there were such a thing as an inferiour Part of the Soul yet since the higher is conscious of and affected with what is transacted in the other I do not see what Advantage accrues from this Distinction And since 't is the same Soul that feels Pain and Grief I see no Possibility of conceiving but that Pain must be as truly an Evil as Grief And if 't were put to my Choice there are several Degrees of Grief that I would chuse to indure rather than some Pains And I would fain know whether Pain be not against the Happiness of Man or whether Happiness can consist with it You your self imply that it cannot when you say that Indolence is necessary to perfect Felicity And must not that then be an Evil that is contrary to Happiness And should you not think your self guilty of offending against that Charity which you owe to your Fellow-Creatures and which obliges you to wish and seek their Welfare if you should put any of them without Cause to Bodily Pain Or would you try to bring your self off by your Distinction of the superiour and inferiour Part of the Soul That the Pain which you inflicted was only in the inferiour Part which being not properly the Man you could not be said to have done any real Evil to him and so not to have trespassed against Charity I believe you have too much good Nature as well as Discernment to use such a Plea as this But now if Pain be not a proper and real Evil how can it be against Charity to cause it in any one For what but willing an Evil to a Man can be contrary to wishing well to him It must therefore be concluded that sensible Pain is truly an Evil as well as mental evil I mean in it self formally and simply considered and that it can become good only occasionally and consequentially as it may be a Means to avoid a greater Evil or procure a greater Good and so may mental Pain too which when all is done I think the best Apology that can be offered for God's being the Author of it and to salve him from being the Object of our Aversion upon that Account viz. to say that though sensible Pain be truly an Evil as well as mental and that though GOD be the true Cause of both yet GOD does not will our Pain as he does our Pleasure and Happiness for it self and as such but merely for the sake of something else as it is a means to our greater good And is therefore so far from meriting our Hatred for the Pain which he causes in us that he ought for that very reason to be loved by us since 't is for the sake of Pleasure that he causes Pain This I take to be the most satisfactory Account of the Difficulty which as it resolves into what I offered in my last so 't is what you your self think fit after all to take up with as your last Expedient toward the latter Part of your Letter where indeed you deliver your self very nobly upon this Occasion Madam I have now done with the Body of your Notion and have now only to consider some looser Parts that relate to it You say you think it an unquestionable Maxim that all our Good is wholly and absolutely from GOD and all our Evil
Innocence so it makes the best Provision for our Pleasure The Soul of Man may as well cease to be as cease to love something or other it must desire but so long as it moves towards the Creature it may amuse its Cravings but can never satisfie them How often will the Objects of our Love be wanting How often will the Objects of our Love be wanting How often will they be unkind And suppose them as present and as kind as we can wish them shall we not be as sick of our Fruitions as we were of our Desires For what is there in the Creature but Emptiness Vanity and Vexation But the Object of Divine Love is always essentially present nothing can hide him from us but our own Neglect if we do but fix the Eyes of our Understanding on and direct the Motions of our Will towards him we may always contemplate and enjoy his Beauty may always asswage our Thirst at this Fountain and feast our hungry Souls upon his never-failing Charms which though they will still draw us on to pursue a further Enjoyment because of their infinite Amability and Perfection yet all along they will satisfie and fill our Souls with unspeakable Delight though they don't extinguish all Desire yet they will remove all Emptiness and at once replenish our Faculties and enlarge them But these ravishing Delights which the enamoured Soul feels in every Approach to her Divine Lover are better felt than expressed and when we have once tasted of these most sapid Pleasures we shall for ever disdain the muddy Streams of sensual Delights Thus the Love of GOD defends us from the Uneasiness of Pain and Grief as well as from the Evil of Sin and makes us happy in all our Capacities It is so Divine a Cordial that the least Drop of it is able to sweeten and outweigh all the Troubles of this present State and render the most Calamitous Condition not only easie but joyous For it gives an Anticipation of those Joys in which it will at last invest us brings down Heaven into our Bosoms e're it carries us up thither and were it but largely shed abroad in our Hearts we should be out of the Reach of Fortune might slight and trample on all Afflictions Though the Arrows of Pain and Grief should ruffle our Skin they could not touch our Hearts or they might touch but could not hurt us Finally to what Heights of Piety will not this Divine Principle elevate the amorous Soul For what can be too difficult to do to acquire a more perfect Enjoyment of what we love What can be too hard to suffer for the sake of that Object that hath won our Heart 'T is nothing else that cramps our Endeavours and slackens our Industry after one of the brightest Crowns of Glory but the dividing our Love between GOD and Mammon If a foolish ill-grounded Passion can many times excite the Soul in which it dwells to do things beyond it self If the Love of dirty Clay or popular Breath can reconcile us to Fatigues and Distresses and many things very uneasie to our Animal Nature shall not the most rational and becoming Love that Love which is the End and Perfection of our Beings which is secured from Disappointment Jealousie and all that long Train of Pain and Grief which attends Desire when it moves towards the Creature set us above all Difficulties render our Obedience regular constant and vigorous refine and sublimate our Natures and make us become Angels even whilst we dwell on Earth In the last Place for the Proposals I am to make When you think we have sufficiently examined the Subject we are upon I desire the Favour of you to furnish me with such a System of Principles as I may relie on and to give me such Rules as you judge most convenient to initiate a raw Disciple in the Study of Philosophy least for want of laying a good Foundation I give you too much Trouble by drawing Conclusions from false Premises and making use of improper Terms I have no more to add but my repeated Thanks for that great Condescention you continue to shew to Worthy Sir Your most obliged and humble Servant December 12. 1693. LETTER VI. Mr. Norris's Answer Madam IT deserves neither your Thanks nor your Admiration that I should endeavour to be particularly civil to a Person of your extraordinary Worth and Accomplishments which indeed appear so great and so beyond what I ever yet found or could imagine as at the same time to command and lessen the highest Respect and Deference that can be shewn to you Your Hypothesis as you now explain and rectifie it runs clear and unperplext and has nothing in it but what equitably understood challenges my full Consent and Approbation The Defect of it before lay partly in your supposing GOD not to be the Author of mental Pain and that because you made mental Pain to be all one with Sin and partly in your supposing sensible Pain of which you allow'd GOD to be the Author not to be in it self a real Evil. But now both these Faults are mended and all is right and as it should be For whereas before when you confounded mental Pain with Sin you pleaded thus against our hating and for our loving GOD notwithstanding the Pain which he is acknowledged to inflict upon us mental Pain is truly an Evil but such as GOD does not cause sensible Pain GOD does cause but then that is not truly an Evil. Now distinguishing mental Pain from Sin and substituting Sin in the room of mental Pain you make your Apology for the Love of GOD run thus Sin which is truly an Evil GOD does not cause and as for mental and sensible Pains whereof GOD is the true Cause they are not truly and properly Evils By which latter Clause I presume you mean not as you seem'd to do at first that they are not truly and properly Evils in their own formal Natures and as simply in themselves considered for so 't is evident that they are Evils as being as such against the Happiness and Well-being of a thinking and self-conscious Nature but only as in that particular Supposition Juncture or Circumstance wherein they are inflicted by GOD who having a thorough comprehensive View of our whole Condition and so knowing what upon all Considerations is best for us thinks it adviseable sometimes to molest and trouble our Repose with mental or sensible Pain not for their own sakes or that he is delighted in them as such any more than we our selves are but in order to our Good and as they are necessary Means to avoid some greater Evil. In which respect both Pain and Grief though evil in their inward formal Natures do relatively considered so far put on the Nature of Good as to be truly eligible and would not fail to be actually willed and chosen by us for our selves as by GOD for us if we had the same Views and Prospects of things
that he has In this Sense it is very true and certain that both the mental and the sensible Pain which GOD inflicts in this Life for as to the Misery of the next I do not apprehend the present Question concerned in it are not all things considered truly and properly Evils because upon the whole they are eligible which Sin can never be it being a contradictory Supposition that that should be eligible as a Means to avoid a greater Evil which is it self the greatest of all And herein I take it consists the Peculiarity of the Evil of Sin that it is never eligible but always the due and just Object of our Hatred and Aversion So that if in this Sense you will have Sin to be the only Evil that whereas all other Evils are not so far Evils but that in some Junctures and Suppositions they may become good and eligible Sin as being the greatest Evil can in no Supposition imaginable become good but remains ever a fixed and unchangeable Evil as GOD does a Good without the least Variation or Shadow of turning I intirely consent with you and do and hope always shall think Sin to be thus the only Evil. And since GOD is not the Author of Sin which can never be eligible but only of our uneasie Sentiments which in some Circumstances may and then are no longer to be considered as Evils this gives clear and full Satisfaction to that Objection against the Love of GOD taken from his being the Cause of our painful Sensations And I can now well conceive that GOD is always lovely and to be loved by us not only when under the little common Uneasinesses of Life but when most miserable and afflicted even by a Martyr in his Flames And so we are come to a fair Resolution of this Difficulty concerning the Love of GOD. As to what you say concerning the Inferiour and Superiour Part of the Soul that you the rather us'd this Distinction because you learnt it from my Christian Blessedness I confess that I do there make use of this Scheme of Speech not intending thereby two parts of the Soul Really and Physically distinct but only the same Soul diversly consider'd with respect to different Objects and ways of Operation In consideration of which it is usually divided into Parts in a popular way of speaking which in a popular Discourse and where there was nothing of particular Theory depending upon it I had no reason to depart from but rather to comply with But when Good or Evil Grief or Pain come to be distinguished by their being lodg'd in this or that part of the Soul in the Superiour or Inferiour Part which must then signifie Parts really Distinct I then deny that there are any such Parts In all other Cases I should not scruple to speak in the common Language not apprehending that I should give any one thereby just occasion to think that I held two real Parts in the Soul any more than by using another popular mode of speaking of the Vegetative Sensitive and Rational Soul in Man that it was my real Opinion that he had three Souls I like your Ingenuity in confessing that you have no Clear Idea of that which is properly your self and I further tell you that you never will have while you are in this State We do not know our Souls here by any Idea of them as not seeing them yet in GOD but only by Consciousness or interiour Sentiment which is the reason that the Knowledge we have of them is so imperfect We see Bodies by their Idea's but we know no more of our Souls than what we feel to be done in them I forbear enlarging upon this matter though a very noble and useful point of Speculation because you may find a most excellent Account given of it by M. Malebranche in the 7th Chapter of his Third Book de la recherche de la Verite page 352. And again more at large in his Illustration upon that Chapter page 461. of Amsterdam Edition And the same most excellent Person elsewhere viz. in his Meditations Chrestiennes of Cologne Edition page 152 gives a very satisfying Account of the Reasons why it has not pleased GOD to give us an Idea of our own Souls The first of which is that if we did see clearly what we are we could not be so closely united to our Bodies as is necessary to the preservation of this Animal Life We should not look upon it as a Part of our selves and unhappy as we are at present we should not think it worth our Care to preserve it and consequently having so little Value and Regard for it we should have no Sacrifice to offer to GOD c. His other Reason he pursues more at large and because 't is one of the loftiest Strains of Reason and Eloquence that I ever met with I shall give it you as near the Original as I can translate it from the Author who thus brings in the eternal Wisdom speaking to her Disciple Secondement parce que l'Idee d'une ame est un Object si grand si capable de ravir les Esprits de sa beuatè c. Secondly because the Idea of a Soul is an Object so great and so apt to ravish Spirits with its Beauty that if thou hadst an Idea of thy Soul thou wouldst be no longer able to think upon any thing else For if the Idea of Extension which represents only Bodies does so strongly touch Natural Philosophers and Mathematicians that they oftentimes forget all their Duties to contemplate it If a Mathematician has so much Delight when he compares Bignesses among themselves thereby to discover their Relations that he often sacrifices his Pleasures and his Health to find out the Properties of a Line what Application would not Men bestow upon the Research of the Properties of their own Being and a Being infinitely more noble than Bodies What Pleasure would they not take to compare among themselves by a clear View of the understanding so many different Modifications the bare Sentiment of which however feeble and confuse does so strangely busie and employ them For thou must know that the Soul contains in her self all the Beauties and Finesses that thou seest in the World and which thou art wont to attribute to the Objects that environ thee Those Colours those Odours those Savours with an Infinity of other Sentiments with which thou hast not yet been touched are no other than Modifications of thy own Substance That Harmony which so elevates thee is not in the Air which strikes thy Ear and those infinite Pleasures of which the greatest Voluptuaries have but a feeble Sentiment are included in the Capacity of thy Soul Now if thou hast a clear Idea of thy self if thou didst see in me that Archetypal Spirit upon which thou wast formed thou wouldst discover so many Beauties and so many Truths in contemplating it that thou wouldst neglect all thy Devoirs Thou wouldst discover
separated us from the Love of God has made the Soul willing to fill that Emptiness which she feels in her self by the Possession of Creatures Whether these Objects are spiritual or Corporal the Desires which we have of them are always carnal in the Language of Scripture For which reasen it is that St. Paul puts Dissentions and Emulations among the Works of the Flesh. So that it is a no less carnal Lust to desire Glory and Reputation and all that serves in order to it than to desire the Pleasures of the Body because these Objects are no more our true good than the other God does no more permit that we should part our Love between him and Reputation between him and the 〈◊〉 of Men than between him and feasting and other Bodily Pleasures For 't is always the Division of a thing which was all due to him 'T is always a Debasement of the Soul which being made for Good stoops beneath and degrades her self in being willing to enjoy a Creature either equal or inferiour to her self God is great enough to be the only and intire Object of our Heart and 't is to injure him to divide it because 't is in effect to declare to him that he does not deserve it all You see here is the Judgment of a whole Society of great Men no less than the illustrious Port Royal of France in as clear and express Terms as can be to our purpose 'T were infinite to appeal to all those Writers who have either directly asserted this Conclusion or occasionally let fall Expressions that favour and insinuate it There is hardly a Book of Morality or Devotion extant whererein Passages of this Nature are not to be found I do not say there are many that offer to deduce this Conclusion from Principles but that it is generally held and upon all Occasions alluded to and glanced at which is enough to shew the irresistible Prevalency of the Truth and to skreen them from the prejudice and imputation of Novelty and Singularity who undertake upon a rational Ground to clear and defend it ERRATA PAge 44. Line 7. dele ● l. 8. read from enjoying pleasures that do very much out-weigh it and is it self an Occasion and Medium to p. 49. l. 9. after pretend add 〈◊〉 p. 50. l. 6. f. that r. than p. 180. l. 15. d. that p. 192. 1. 6. f. the r. this p. 286. l. 5. r. pleases LETTERS Philosophical and Divine TO Mr. IOHN NORRIS With his Answers LETTER 1. To Mr. Norris SIR THough some morose Gentlemen wou'd perhaps remit me to the Distaff or the Kitchin or at least to the Glass and the Needle the proper Employments as they fancy of a Womans Life yet expecting better things from the more Equitable and ingenious Mr. Norris who is not so narrow-Soul'd as to confine Learning to his own Sex or to envy it in ours I presume to beg his Attention a little to the Impertinencies of a Womans Pen. And indeed Sir there is some reason why I though a Stranger should Address to you for the Resolution of my Doubts and Information of my Judgment since you have increased my Natural Thirst for Truth and set me up for a Virtuso For though I can't pretend to a Multitude of Books Variety of Languages the Advantages of Academical Education or any Helps but what my own Curiosity afford yet Thinking is a Stock that no Rational Creature can want if they know but how to use it and this as you have taught me with Purity and Prayer which I wish were as much practis'd as they are easie to practise is the way and method to true Knowledge But setting Preface and Apology aside the occasion of giving you this trouble is this Reading the other day the Third Volume of your excellent Discourses as I do every thing you Write with great Pleasure and no less Advantage yet taking the liberty that I use with other Books and yours or no bodies will bear it to raise all the Objections that ever I can and to make them undergo the severest Test my Thoughts can put 'em to before they pass for currant a difficulty arose which without your assistance I know not how to solve Methinks there is all the reason in the World to conclude That GOD is the only efficient Cause of all our Sensations and you have made it as clear as the Day and it is equally clear from the Letter of the Commandment That GOD is not only the Principal but the sole Object of our Love But the reason you assign for it namely Because he is the only efficient Cause of our Pleasure seems not equally clear For if we must Love nothing but what is Lovely and nothing is Lovely but what is our Good and nothing is our Good but what does us Good and nothing does us Good but what causes Pleasure in us may we not by the same way of arguing say That that which Causes Pain in us does not do us Good for nothing you say does us Good but what Causes Pleasure and therefore can't be our Good and if not our Good then not Lovely and consequently not the proper much less the only Object of our Love Again if the Author of our Pleasure be upon that account the only Object of our Love then by the same reason the Author of our Pain can't be the Object of our Love and if both these Sensations be produced by the same Cause then that Cause is at once the Object of our Love and of our Aversion for it is as natural to avoid and fly from Pain as it is to follow and pursue Pleasure So that if these Principles viz. That GOD is the Efficient Cause of our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure and that he is the only Object of our Love be firm and true as I believe they are it will then follow either that the being the Cause of our Pleasure is not the true and proper Reason why that Cause should be the Object of our Love for the Author of our Pain has as good a Title to our Love as the Author of our Pleasure Or else if nothing be the Object of our Love but what does us Good then something else does us Good besides what causes Pleasure Or to speak more properly the Cause of all our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure being the only Object of our Love and nothing being Lovely but what does us Good consequently that which Causes Pain does us Good as well as that which Causes Pleasure and therefore it can't be true That nothing does us Good but what Causes Pleasure Perhaps I have express'd my self but crudely yet I am persuaded I 've said enough for one of your Quickness to find out either the strength or weakness of this Objection I shall not therefore trouble you any further but to beg Pardon for this and to wish you all imaginable Happiness if it be not absurd to wish Felicity to one who
Object of our Love True it is not so far as it causes Pain for the causing of Pain as such can be no reason of Love But I suppose your meaning is whether we may not by the same way of arguing prove that what causes Pain is not at all the Object of Love To which I Answer That if that which causes Pain does it in all respects after the same manner as it causes Pleasure the causing of Pain will for ought I can at present see to the contrary be as good an Argument for its not being to be lov'd as its causing Pleasure is for its being to be loved But thus it is not in the present Supposition Though I acknowledge Pain to be as truly the Effect of GOD as Pleasure for I know not what else shou'd cause it yet it is not after the same manner the Effect of GOD as Pleasure is Pleasure is the natural genuine and direct Effect of GOD but Pain comes from him only indirectly and by Accident For first 't is of the proper Nature of GOD to produce Pleasure as consisting of such essential Excellencies and Perfections as will necessarily beatifie and make happy those Spirits who are by being in their true rational Order duly dispos'd for the Enjoyment of him But if this same excellent Nature occasion Pain to other Spirits this is only indirectly and by Accident by reason of their Moral Indisposition for so Sovereign a Good Again as 't is thus in Reference to the Nature of GOD so in Reference to his Will GOD's antecedent and primary Design is the Happiness of all his Creatures for 't was for this that he made them but if any of them in the event prove miserable 't is wholly besides his first Design and only by a subsequent and secondary Will Again when GOD causes Pleasure 't is because he wills it for its self and naturally delights in it as comporting with his primary Design which is the Happiness of his Creatures but when he causes Pain 't is not that he wills it from within or for it self for so 't is not at all lovely but only from without and for the sake of something else as it is necessary to the Order of his Justice For you are to consider that if there had been no Sin there wou'd never have been such a thing as Pain which is a plain Argument that GOD wills our Pleasure as we are Creatures and our Pain only as we are Sinners But now in measuring our Devoirs to GOD we are not to consider how he stands affected to us as sinners but how he stands affected to us as Creatures how he is disposed towards us as we are his Work and not as we have made our selves And therefore if as Creatures he Loves us and Wills our Happiness that lays a sufficient Foundation for our Love to him and 't is not his treating us with Evil as sinners that can overturn it Indeed if GOD had designed us for misery and inflicted it upon us as Creatures if this had been his primary and direct Intention his Natural and Original Will according to the systeme of those who say That GOD made Man on purpose to Damn them then indeed I see nothing that should hinder your Objection from taking place GOD would not then be the proper much less as you say the only Object of our Love at least as to those miserable Wretches so destin'd to Ruin which by the way is to me a Demonstration of the falshood of that strange Hypothesis But upon the supposition that GOD wills and causes Pleasure in us as Creatures and puts us to Pain only as Sinners there will not be the same reason for our not loving him upon the account of his being the Author of our Pain as for our loving him as the Author of our Pleasure and Happiness For we stand obliged to GOD as we are Creatures and if in that Relation GOD be our Benefactor and the Author of our good he has a sufficient Right and if the only Author the only Right to our Love though as sinners he puts us to pain which being thus will'd and effected by GOD after a manner so different from our pleasure cannot so well conclude for our not loving him as this does for our loving him Which may serve to take off the force of your first Instance And will be equally applicable to your second For whereas you further urge that if both these Sensations viz. Pleasure and Pain be produced by the same Cause then that Cause is at once the Object of our Love and of our Aversion I answer by the same Distinction that if both these Sensations were to be produc'd by the same Cause acting alike in the one as in the other it would be as you say But since it is otherwise as I have represented it all that you can argue from GOD's being the Author of our Pain as well as Pleasure will be this That he is justly to be the Object of our Fear but not of our Aversion We are indeed to Fear him and him only as being the true Cause of all Pain and only able to make us miserable according to that of our Saviour I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear c. But this is no reason why we should hate him as never inflicting it but when Order and Justice require it And if he did not inflict it then he would be less perfect and consequently less amiable in the view of all regular and well-order'd Spirits I shall not determine any thing concerning the Case of the Damn'd whether that invincible Love which they have for Happiness may not inspire them with an invincible hatred against him who is the Cause of their Misery Perhaps it may be so Though whether it should be so and whether they do not sin Eternally in so doing is another Question But I shall determine nothing here thinking it sufficient for my present purpose that this is no reason why GOD should be the Object of any Mans Aversion in this Life whom as the Author of Pain we are indeed to Fear but not to Hate for the reasons before alledged Now as to your last Instance That if these Principles viz. That GOD is the Efficient Cause of our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure and that he is to be the only Object of our Love be firm and true it will then follow either that the being the Cause of our Pleasure the doing us good you should say to make a right Antithesis is not the true and proper reason why that Cause should be the Object of our Love or else if it be then something else does us Good besides that which causes our Pleasure or as you otherwise word it That which causes Pain does us good as well as that which produces Pleasure I think neither of these Consequences need be admitted Not the First because I have shewn you That God's being the Cause of our Pleasure is
a sufficient and proper reason why he should be the Object of our Love notwithstanding that Pain which is also but after a different manner caus'd by him As to what you suggest to the contrary namely That the Author of our Pain has as good a Title to our Love as the Author of our Pleasure 'T is true he that is the Author of our Pain has as good a Title to it as the Author of our Pleasure because they are both one and the same but not as he is the Author of our Pain He has a Title to our Love not for that but notwithstanding that 'T is his being the cause of our Pleasure that makes him the proper Object of our Love which he is notwithstanding his being also the Author of Pain But then say you if his doing us good be the reason of his being the Object of our Love then something else does us good besides that which causes our Pleasure namely Pain the Cause of our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure being the Object of our Love I answer Pain may in some sense be said to do us good as it may occasion to us some good that exceeds its own proper Evil. But formally and directly it does not do us good as not making us while actually under it Happy but Miserable Nor is there need that upon our Supposition it should God being sufficiently lovely to us as the Author of our Pleasure to which we need not add the advantage that may accrue by Pain or suppose Pain to be in it self as Beneficial as Pleasure 't is enough if the Evil of the former does not frustrate the Obligation that arises from the good of the latter As I have shewn you that it does not But after all Madam there is one thing I must further offer to your Consideration viz. That your Objection whatever force it may have is not peculiarly levell'd against me but lies equally against all those who make the loveliness of God to consist in his Relative Goodness or in his being our Good who I think are the most at least the most considerable Those of the common way say God is to be lov'd because he is our Good or the Author of our Good which Notion I think right but only add to it That he is the only Author of our Good and therefore the only Object of our Love In which Argument I suppose these Men would not deny the Consequence as being the same with their own but only the minor Proposition But now if it be an Objection against my Notion That God is also the Author of Evil then the same will no less conclude against the common way proving as much that God ought not to be lov'd at all as that he ought not to be lovd only I say it proves one as well as the other though I think if you will attend to what I have offer'd you will find that it proves neither Madam I have said all that at present occurs to my Thoughts upon this occasion and I think as much as is necessary and have now only to thank you for the great Favour of your Letter assuring you that whenever you shall be pleas'd to do me that Honour again you shall have a speedier Answer from Madam Your very humble Servant J. NORRIS Bemerton Oct. 13. 1693. Postscript ONE consideration more When you speak of GOD's being the cause of Pain either you mean as to this Life or as to the next If as to the next that has nothing to do with the Duty that we owe him here If as to the present Life the pain that God inflicts upon us here is only Medicinal and in order to our greater good and consequently from a Principle of Kindness And I think setting aside my other Considerations there will be no more pretence for not loving or hating God for this than for hating our Physitian or Surgeon for putting us to pain in order to our Health or Cure LETTER III. To Mr. Norris SIR YOU see how greedily I embrace the advantageous Offer you made me in the Close of your excellent Letter for which I would return some Acknowledgments but that I want Expressions suitable to its Value and my Resentments Nor is there any thing in it from which I can with-hold my Assent but that too favourable Opinion you seem to have conceiv'd of a Person who has nothing considerable in her but an honest Heart and a Love to Truth I am therefore exceeding glad to find this noble and necessary Theory That God is the sole Object of our Love so well establish'd And though any one of the three Principles you argue from in your Printed Discourse is a sufficient ground for that Conclusion though it may be singly infer'd both from God's being the Author of our Love and from the Obligation we are under of conforming to his Will as well as from his being the true Cause of our Pleasure yet joyntly they are irrefragable and I have nothing more left to wish but that it were as easie to perswade Men to fix the whole weight of their Desire on their Maker as it is to Demonstrate that they ought to do it For when all is said and all conclusions are tried there is no rest no satisfaction for the Soul of Man but in her God she can never be at Ease nor in Pleasure but when she moves with her full bent and inclination directly towards him and absolutely and entirely depends on him Yet I am very well pleas'd that I made the Objection which you have so well resolv'd because it has procur'd me a clear and accurate account of what before I had only in confuse and indistinct Notion and has begun a Correspondence which if it may be continued I shall reckon the greatest advantage that can befall me For though by observing the Rules you have already enrich'd the World with I may possibly find out Truth yet I can't be assur'd I 've done so being too apt to suspect my own Notions merely for being my own but if they can pass so exact a Touchstone as your Judgment I shall without hesitancy subscribe to them So far am I from thinking that GOD's being the Author of our Pain is any just Impediment to our entire Love of him that I 'm almost perswaded to rank it among the Motives to it For though Pain considered abstractedly is not a Good yet it may be so circumstantiated and always is when GOD inflicts it as to be a Good To the pious Man it is so both intentionally and eventually and though inflicted as a Punishment on wicked Men it is however materially good being as you observe an Act of GOD's Justice And I think it is an unquestionable Maxim that all our Good is wholly and absolutely from GOD and all our Evil purely and intirely from our selves Whatever Methods GOD uses to draw us to himself I am fully perswaded are good in themselves and good for us
Servant All-Saints Eve 1693. LETTER IV. Mr. Norris's Answer Madam THE sincere Love you seem to have for Truth and the great Progress you have made in it together with that singular Aptness of Genius that appears to be in you for further Attainments makes me not only willing to enter into a Correspondence with you but even to congratulate my self the Opportunity of so uncommon a Happiness For the better Improvement of which and that our Correspondence may be the more useful I would desire that it may be continually imployed upon serious and important Subjects such as may deserve the Time and reward the Pains that shall be bestowed on them and may occasion such Thoughts and Reflections to pass between us as may serve to give true Perfection and Inlargement to the Rational and right Movements and Relishes to the Moral Part of our Natures And since I have taken upon me to prescribe I would have these Subjects well sifted and examined as well as well chosen that so we may not enter upon a new Argument till that which was first undertaken be throughly discharged whereby we shall avoid a Fault very incident to common Conversation wherein new Questions are started before the first is brought to an Issue and which makes the Discoursings of the most intelligent Persons turn to so little an account But this Fault so frequent and almost unavoidable in the best Companies is easily remedied in Letters and therefore since we are now fallen upon a noble and sublime Subject I desire we may go to the Bottom of it and not commence any new Matter till we have gone over all that is of material Consideration in this of Divine Love So much by way of Proposal I proceed now to consider the Contents of your present Letter in which I find very great and extraordinary things and such as will deserve more and more studied Reflections than my present Leisure I fear will permit me to bestow upon them However I shall go as far as my Time and Paper will allow and if you think I leave any thing considerable omitted the Defects of this shall be supplied in another Letter I observe then that though you declare your self satisfied with the Account I gave in my last why GOD's being the Author of Pain should not strike off that Obligation of Love which was grounded upon his being the Cause of the opposite Sensation of Pleasure yet so greatly are you concerned to have that ill Consequence effectually shut out you advance another Hypothesis for the Solution of the Difficulty And because it is very ingenious and worth our considering I shall therefore first of all set down what by comparing the several Parts of your Letter together I take to be your Notion Which when I have stated and considered I shall reflect upon some single Passages in your Letter that relate to it And in this you have the Model of the Answer that I intend To begin then with an Account of your Notion You distinguish of two Sorts of Pain that which is sensible or bodily and that which is mental By sensible Pain meaning that which is in the inferiour Part of the Soul that which is exercised about Objects of Sense and by mental Pain that which affects the superiour and intellectual Part. Now as for mental Pain that you allow to be an Evil and the only proper Evil of Man but then you say GOD is not the Cause of that And as for sensible or bodily Pain that you allow GOD to be the Cause of But then you say that is not truly and really an Evil as not affecting what is properly the Man And therefore though GOD be the true Cause of Pian as well as Pleasure yet since the Pain which he causes is not of the first Sort viz. mental Pain which is an Evil but of the second Sort viz. sensible Pain which is not the proper Evil of the Man this ought to be no Bar to our Love of him much less a Reason of making him the Object of our Aversion This I think is in short your true System which lying thus in a regular and compendious Draught may be the more distinctly considered which is the Advantage I aim at by casting it into this Form My first Remark upon this is that your Distinction of sensible and mental Pain in the general is right and founded in the Nature of things For certainly the Ideas of Joy and sensible Pleasure Grief and bodily Pain are very distinct Some I know that pretend to Philosophy confound these making that Pleasure or Pain suppose which a Man feels upon his drawing near the Fire to be all one with Joy or Grief The Soul knowing say they or feeling that the Body which she loves is well or ill disposed that there happens some good or ill to its mechanical Frame either rejoyces or is grieved at it The one is our Pain the other our Pleasure But this I take to be gross Philosophy though the Authors of it think it fine It is true indeed that as often as the Sentiments of Pleasure or Pain do give us notice that our Bodies are well or ill disposed we are affected with Joy or Grief but a little Reflection may help us to perceive that this Joy and Grief that are the Consequences of our knowing how 't is with the State of our Bodies differ exceedingly from those antecedent Pains and Pleasures whence the Information is receiv'd For these prevent our Reason whereas the other follow upon it Pain anticipates all Thought or Reflection but Grief supposes it and is grounded upon it I grieve because I know my self to be in Pain or because I expect or fear it whence it is evident that my Grief and my Pain are not one and the same but two very different and distinct Sentiments I therefore allow your Distinction though I am not so well satisfied with the Ground of it You ground your Distinction of mental and sensible Pain upon a double Part of the Soul the superiour and the inferiour The Distinction is authorised by Custom and what is more by you but I must own to you sincerely that I do not understand it I have heard much talk of this superiour and inferiour Part of the Soul and have thought much about it but cannot for my Life form to my self a clear Idea of any such Parts For besides that I think the Soul has no Parts at all if it had sure they are not such dissimular and heterogeneous Parts as superiour and inferiour intellectual and sensitive The Soul I take to be an intire simple uniform Essence Intellectual throughout without any Parts at all much less such heterogeneous Parts Nor is there any need that it should be supposed to have any such for the Establishment of the present Distinction The Distinction of Sentiments does not need Distinction of Parts in the Soul The same Essence of the Soul being variously modified may be variously affected and
soever in their other particular Determinations agree in this and because we have no manner of Freedom in this Motion or Command over it but are altogether passive in it which shews it to be properly a natural Motion I lay down this therefore as an evident and undeniable Proposition that the natural Motion of the Will is to good in general But now how can the Will be moved towards good in general but by being moved towards all good For to be moved towards good as good is to be moved towards all good And how can the Will be moved towards all good but by being moved towards a universal Being who in himself is and contains all good For as the Understanding cannot represent to it self universal Ideas but by being united to a Being who in the Simplicity of his Nature includes all Being so neither can the Will be moved to good in general but by being moved towards a universal Being who by reason of the Infinity of his Nature comprehends all good that is towards GOD who is therefore the true Term of the natural Motion of the Soul And that he is so will be further evident if we consider the Operation of that Cause by which this natural Motion is produced This Cause I here suppose and have elsewhere shewn to be GOD and indeed who else should be the Cause of what is natural in us but he who is the Cause of our Natures Let us see now how this Cause acts GOD cannot act but by his Will that 's most certain But now the Will of GOD is not as in us an Expression that he receives from without himself and which accordingly carries him out from himself but an inward self-centring Principle that both derives from and terminates in himself For as GOD is to himself his own good his own Center and Beatifick Object so the Love of GOD can be no other than the Love of himself Whence it will follow that as GOD must therefore be his own End and whatever he wills or acts he must will and act for himself as I have already represented it in the Discourse of Divine Love so also that the Love which is in us must be the Effect of that very Love which GOD has for himself there being no other Principle in the Nature of GOD whereby he is supposed to act Whence it will further follow that the natural Tendency of our Love must necessarily be towards the same Object upon which the Love of GOD is turned For since Love in all created Spirits is not produced but by the Will of GOD which it self is no other than the Love which he bears himself it is impossible that GOD should give a Love to any Spirit which does not naturally tend whither his own Love does And since it is evident that the Term of his own Love is himself it is as evident that the same is also the natural Term of ours that as our Love comes from him so it naturally tends to him and that as he is the efficient so he is also the true final Cause of the Will of Man which I take to be nothing else but that continual Impression whereby the Author of Nature moves him towards himself Which by the way may serve to furnish us with the true Reason of a very considerable Maxim which has hitherto been entertained without any as being thought rather a first Principle than a Conclusion I mean that the VVill of Man cannot will Evil as evil VVhich though a Truth witnessed by constant Experience and such as all Men readily consent to and acquiesce in I despair of ever seeing rationally accounted for upon any other Supposition than the present But according to this the Account is clear and easie For here the VVill it self being supposed to be nothing else but that general Impression whereby GOD moves us continually towards himself it is plain that we cannot possibly will or love Evil as evil as having no Motion from GOD towards it but to the contrary viz. to himself who is the universal good And as we may demonstrate a Priori from this Impression whereby GOD moves us towards himself that we cannot love Evil as evil so from the Experience we have that we cannot love Evil as evil we may argue as a Posteriori that our VVills are by their original Motion carried towards GOD and that he is the true and sole Object of their natural Tendency VVhich is also further proved by all those Arguments which I have already and may more at large produce for our seeing all things in GOD as our universal Idea For since the VVill of Man is moved only towards what the Spirit perceives as is universally granted and by Experience found to be true and since as it has been sufficiciently proved we perceive all things in GOD who presents to Spirits no other Idea than himself who indeed is all it plainly and necessarily follows that the natural Motion of our VVills is and must be towards GOD and him only who having made himself the sole Term and Object of our natural Love ought also to be made by us the sole Object of that which is free since as was laid down in the Beginning the Determinations of our VVill that are free ought to be conformable to that which is natural The whole Sum and Force of this reasoning lies in this Syllogism That which is the sole Object of our natural Love ought to be the sole Object of that which is free But the sole Object of our natural Love is GOD therefore GOD ought to be the sole Object of that which is free The first of these Propositions is evident from that moral Rectitude which must necessarily be supposed in the natural Motions of our Love as proceeding from the Author of our Natures to which therefore the free Motions of it ought to be conformable The second Proposition is that which I have professedly proved and I think sufficiently Wherefore I look upon the Conclusion as demonstrated viz. that GOD ought to be the sole Object of our free Love which being the only Love that falls under Command and the only one that is in our Power we must conclude that GOD requires all the Love which he can possibly require and all the Love which we can possibly give even our whole Heart Soul and Mind which we are not therefore to divide betwixt him and the Creature but to devote to him only and religiously to present as a Burnt-offering intirely to be consumed at his divine Altar And thus the whole Motion of our Wills falls under the Right and Title of GOD who becomes the just proprietary and adequate Object of them in their largest Capacity and utmost Latitude There are but two Sorts of Motions in our Souls as in our Bodies natural and free and both these belong of right to GOD who has taken the greatest Care to secure them to himself He prevents that which is natural and he
of a Physical Efficiency towards the Production of them No not so much as by way of Instruments For even Instruments belong to the Order of efficient Causes though they are less principal ones and 't is most certain that GOD has no need of any since his Will is efficacious of it self If therefore this be meant by sensible Congruity that the Objects of our senses have any real Part or Share in the Production of our sensations though it be only in an instrumental Way I utterly disclaim it as an absurd and unphilosophical Prejudice and that without any Danger of rendring the Workmanship of GOD vain or unnecessary that Inconvenience being sufficiently salved by the first kind of sensible Congruity as you may easily perceive This Madam I think gives full Satisfaction to your first Instance As to your second That it seems more agreeable to the Majesty of GOD to say that he produces our sensations mediately by his servant Nature than to affirm that he does it immediately by his own Almighty Power I reply briefly First That Arguments from the Majesty of GOD signifie no more here against GOD's being the immediate Author of our sensations than in the old Epicurean Objection against Providence And indeed they seem both to be built upon the same popular Prejudice and wrong Apprehension concerning the Nature of the Deity as if it were a Trouble to him to concern himself with his Creation If it were not beneath the Grandeur and Majesty of GOD to create the World immediately neither is it so to govern it and if his greatness will permit him to order and direct the Motions of Matter much more will it to act upon and give sentiments to our Spirits though with his own immediate Hand which is necessary to hold and govern the World which it has made For after all secondly we have no reason to think it beneath the Majesty of GOD to do that himself which can be done by none but himself Which as I have sufficiently shewn to be the Case in reference to our Sensations so I doubt not but that if you carefully read over Mr. Malebranch Touchant l' efficace attribuèe aux Causes Seconds you will find to hold as true as to all things else I mean that GOD is the only true efficient Cause and that his Servant Nature is but a mere Chimera As to what you say lastly That the Supposition of Bodies having an immediate Causality in the Production of our Sensations will be no Prejudice to the Drift of my Discourse the intire Love of GOD because of the mechanical and involuntary Way of their Operation I do not know whether this Supposition will be so harmless or no. But this I am sure of that the safest Way to bar the Creatures from all Pretensions to my Love is to deny that I have any of my Sensations from them or that I am beholden to them for the lest Melioration or Perfection of my Being And besides if we should once allow them in a true and Physical Sense to cause our Sensations I am inclined to think that this may justly be used as an Argument a Posteriori to prove that they do not do it so mechanically and involuntarily as you represent it but rather knowingly and designedly since it is impossible that any thing but a thinking Principle should be productive of any Thought as all Sensation certainly is And thus Madam I have endeavoured to give you the best Satisfaction I can upon this great and noble but much neglected Argument and shall think my self very happy and sufficiently rewarded if by the Pains I have bestowed I may deserve the Title of Madam Your sincere Friend and humble Servant J. NORRIS Bemerton Sept. 21. FINIS Books printed for S. Manship at the Ship near the Royal Exchange in Cornhil MR. Norris's Collection of Miscellanies in large 8 o. His Reason and Religion The 2d Edition in 8 o. His Theory and Regulation of Love The 2d Edit in 8 o. His Reflections upon the Conduct of Humane Life The 2d Edition in 8 o. His Practical Discourses upon the Beatitudes of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Vol. I. The 3d. Edit in 8 o. His Practical Discourses upon several Divine Subjects Vol. II. The 2. Edit in 8 o. His Practical Discourses upon several Divine Subjects Vol. III. in 8 o. His Charge of Schism continued In 12 o. His Two Treatises concerning the Divine Light in 8 o. His Spiritual Conusel or Father's Advice to his Children in 12 o. Books sold by R. VVilkin at the King's Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard A Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of their true and greatest Interest By a Lover of her Sex in 12 o. Dr. Abbadie's Vindication of the Christian Religion 8 o. Mr. Edwards's farther Enquiry into several remarkable Texts of Scripture the 2d Edit 8 o. His Discourse concerning the Authority Stile and Perfection of the Books of the Old and New Testament 8 o. Bishop Patrick's glorious Epiphany 8 o. His Search the Scriptures 12 o. His Discourse concerning Prayer 12 o. Dr Goodman's Old Religion 12 o. * The Reader is desired to take Notice that no more is meant by these Phrases than that Sin in its own Nature or Formality is entirely evil it has neither Form nor Beauty that we should desire it can never be ordinable to a good End is none of GOD's Creatures and therefore has not any the least Degree of Goodness in it is neither eligible for its own sake nor upon any other Account whatsoever * The Reader is desired to take Notice that no more is meant by these Phrases than that Sin in its own Nature or Formality is entirely evil it has neither Form nor Beauty that we should desire it can never be ordinable to a good End is none of GOD's Creatures and therefore has not any the least Degree of Goodness in it is neither eligible for its own sake nor upon any other Account whatsoever