a morall goodnesse righteousnesse and true holinesse without it impossible that man should obtaine the end prescribed unto him that he should performe the duties injoined him and it was against the justice and goodnesse of God and so a grosse contradiction to appoint unto man an impossible end to impose upon man impossible commandments Gods chalking out such an end for man to seek implieth that he supplyed him with meanes for assecution hereof his injunction of lawes argueth that he gave power and ability to yeeld obedience unto them but of this allready more fully and distinctly in the first part of the question Unto what is there said 〈◊〉 me adde what Dr Feild in his learned booke of the Church pag. 251 252 253. hath in resutation of this fiction of the Papists that man might have been created in his pure naturals in a state of neutrality and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 grace or sin his argument may briefly be thus summ'd up It was impossible for the nature of man without grace to performe its principall actions about its principall objects the sirst truth and the chiefest good without grace 't was impossible for man to know God as he ought to love him as he should amore amicitiae with a love of friendship for himselfe and his own sake and without such a love all a mans actions would have bin sins for they could not have been done unto the glory of God because t is such a love only that referreth mans actions unto Gods glory and that state cannot but be a sinfull state wherein all that a man doth is sin breifly thus without the grace of God 't is impossible to love God and without the love of God all our actions will be evill and sin and therefore à primo ad ultimum without grace all our actions will be sin and hereupon 't will follow that there can be no state of nature sinlesse without grace and consequently that there can be noe state of pure or meere nature For the surther clearing of this I shall lay downe two 〈◊〉 which cannot reasonably be denied First that God decreed that man should act rationally that he should performe rationall actions Secondly that all his rationall actions were under the law of nature some for their substance as to love seare prayse and glorify God and others for their 〈◊〉 and other the like 〈◊〉 whether a man did eate or drinke whatsoever he did he was to doe all unto the glory of God to deny this were to uncreature man take away his dependance upon and relation unto God and from this grant it undeniably followes that all a man's rationall or voluntary actions were capable of morall goodnesse or badnesse and consequently that how ever some of them might be indifferent in their generall and abstract 〈◊〉 yet considered actu exercito as singularized and cloathed with circumstances they were all either morally good or evill for morall goodnesse and badnesse are privatively opposite and 't is an unquestioned rule in Logick inter privativè opposita non datur medium in subjecto capaci Between privative opposites there can be no middle either of abnegatien or participation in a capable subject every subject capable of privative opposites must necessarily have one or the other thus a sensitive creature must be either seeing or blind the aire must be either lightsome or darke now if there could be no indifferency or neutrality in the rationall actions of man but that they must all necessarily be either good or bad then it was impossible there could be any such state of indifferency and neutrality in the rationall faculties of man they must also be morally either good or bad holy or sinfull and therefore the possibility of man's existence in a state of pure naturals without grace or sinne hath no foundation in sound reason The second conclusion It was absolutely impossible for man to be created with the contrary of originall righteousnesse concupiscence a pronenesse or inclination of all the faculties of man unto sin This conclusion is thus confirmed if man had been created with this concupiscence God had been the author of it but 't was impossible for God to be the author of it the Apostle John saith it is not from the Father but is of the world 1 John 2. 16 we may goe farther and say it could not bee from the Father and therefore it was 〈◊〉 for man to be created with it The Minor is thus prov'd it was impossible for God to be the author of sin but concupiscence is sin and therefore God could not be the author of it Unto this argument we find in Bellarmine two answers First that God would not have been the author of this concupiscence though man had been created with it Secondly that this concupiscence is not sinne and therefore though God had been the cause of it yet it would not have therefore followed that hee had been the cause of sinne First that God would not have been the author of concupiscence though man had been created with it but it would have been besides his purpose and intention for it would saith he have flowne naturally from the condition of the matter of man and so it would have been naturall unto man not as a good gift or ornament of nature but as a defect disease or infirmity of nature he endeavoureth to illustrate this by the similitude of a Smith though a Smith frame a sword of Iron and the sword grow rusty yet the rust is not caused by the Smith but proceedeth as a sequele from the nature or quality of the Iron that is the matter of the sword But this answer is first dissonant from the truth secondly repugnant unto Bellarmines owne principles First dissonant from the truth and that I shall cleare by three arguments The first argument Causa causae est causa causati in 〈◊〉 subordinatis the cause of a cause is the cause of its effects in things essentially subordinate but God is the cause of the nature and matter of a man and by the opinion of Bellarmine concupiscence is essentiall to the nature and matter of man 〈◊〉 and a 〈◊〉 for it would naturally and necessarily thinks he have resulted from the nature and matter of man but that it was supernaturally prevented by the gift of originall righteousnesse and consequently God must needs be the cause and author of it A second argument is because this concupiscence is not only in the sensitive and inferiour but also in the rationall and superiour faculties in the understanding and will St. Paul Coll. 2. 15 speakes of a fleshly mind vainly puft up by his fleshly mind so then there is flesh in the very mind of man the carnall mind or the minding of the flesh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is enmity against God Rom. 8. 7 remarkable is that saying of Augustine voluntas sine charitate est tota vitiosa cupiditas without love the will is as it were wholy turned into lust
of it first negatively that God is not the cause of it for he made man upright secondly affirmatively that man himselfe is the cause of it But they have sought out many inventions If it be objected that the Divell was also a cause of the corruption of man's nature and therefore the Preachers resolution of it into man alone is defective he might have found that Satan propounded unto our first parents many inventions as well as that they sought out many inventions For answer Satan was the cause of our first parents fall or sin only per modum suadentis not per modum 〈◊〉 determinantis he was only a counselling and perswading cause and that 's only an imperfect cause only a morall cause he was not of sufficient efficacy to make them sinne for nothing can be the sufficient cause of sinne unto man besides his own will as Aquinas rightly 2 a. 2ae q 43. Ar. 1. ad 3 m nothing can compell or determine him thereunto so then notwithstanding Satans temptations the Preacher saith truely touching the causation of that pollution which is in our nature that 't is only to be attributed to the fall of our first parents because they of their own accord have freely sought out many inventions There 's a second 〈◊〉 of the word translated only that makes it to amount to no more than chiefly and indeed some Logicians say that exclusive particles sometimes exclude not à 〈◊〉 à 〈◊〉 but only à summitate 〈◊〉 and if the particle may be thus interpreted then Solomon by the addition thereof signifies that the principall thing that is to be remarked touching the sinfullnesse of men is that God was not the cause of it by his creation of man's nature but that our first parents were authors thereof by their fall from that rectitude in which God created them God hath made man upright but they have sought out many inventions now the preheminence of this above all other doctrines touching the sinfulnesse of man is very evident unto those that looke upon sinne as the scripture describes it for 't is the foundation of all true sincere sorrow for sinne and mortification of it the knowledge of an effect is ever confused untill we understand it's cause so our sight of sinne is never distinct and accurate untill we come to a veiw of the originall of all sinne and when this fountaine of sinne is found out originall sinne both imputed and inherent it will be then a farre more easy worke than formerly to discover the streames of actuall sins There 's a third interpretation of the particle yet behind which renders it seorsim apart or severally and by this exposition Solomon professeth that he hath separated in his consideration God's worke from man's worke God's work in the creating of man's nature upright and mans worke in the defiling of his nature by his fall wherein he sought out many inventions and 〈◊〉 separation of God's act and man's act being 〈◊〉 made may sufficiently instruct concerning the cause of 〈◊〉 irrectitude in men and women of which he complaines in the verse preceding that 't is not God but man himselfe Having thus briefly run over the praecognita proceed we next unto the conclusions themselves The first conclusion concernes originall righteousnesse the second concernes originall sinne The first conclusion concernes originall righteousnesse God made man upright not only with an uprightnesse of innocency but also with an uprightnesse of sanctity but of this before at large The second conclusion concernes originall sinne peccatum originale originans the fall of our first parents they have sought out many inventions these words describe the fall of our first parents not as 't is considered formally in it selfe but metonymically by it's motives or effects by it's motives if we understand them only of our first parents by it's effects if we extend them unto their posterity also First by it's motives if we understand them of our first parents only they sought out many 〈◊〉 that is plurima 〈◊〉 many reasonings as Junius and Tremelius render the word they found out many reasons arguments or motives to eate of the forbidden fruit and what they did in this their first sinne is reckoned to be done by us their off-spring because we were represented by them and contained in them even as Levi is said to pay tithes in Abraham because he was in the loines of his Father Abraham when Melchisedech 〈◊〉 him Heb. 7. 9 10. Against this interpretation there are two doubts The first these reasons or motives were first propounded by Satan and therefore not sought out by them they were his temptations and not so properly their own inventions Answer They are said to be sought out by them as their inventions because they so greedily and speedily embraced them their acceptation of them answer'd Satan's temptations as an eccho and there is such resemblance betwixt a voyce and an eccho as that standers by sometimes can hardly discerne betwixt them A second doubt is concerning the multitude of these inventions or reasons they have found out many inventions now Moses in his history mentioneth but a few motives or arguments that induced them to this fact Gen. 3. 6 and when the woman saw that the tree was good for food and that it was pleasant to the eyes and a tree to be desired to make one wise shee took of the fruit thereof and did eat and gave also unto her husband with her and he did eat improbable therefore that the Preacher speakes of these reasons or motives Answer These motives were very comprehensive though they were formally and expressly few yet they were implyedly many that one designe to be wise to have their eyes opened knowing good evill virtually comprehended many other plots dependent upon it or concomitant with it they hoped that their knowledge and wisdome would be backed or accompanied with an equall power and so able to effect whatsoever they desired they projected then not only to be as knowing but also as powerfull and in every thing as happy and glorious as Gods But some may thinke that this exposition is somewhat strayned and far fetched and therefore I shall propound a second which extends the clause not only unto them but to all their posterity also that descend from them in an ordinary way of generation and so the fall of our first parents is here set forth by it's mediate effects the inventions of them and their progeny touching their actuall sins which issue from originall corruption inherent in both as streames from a fountaine and branches from a tree they have all sought out many inventions First for the committing of sinne Secondly for the defending of sinne Thirdly for the extenuating of sinne Fourthly for the concealing of sinne First for the committing of sin so the clause may be verified either of the same or of several men both again of the same or several sins First of
Saviours healing the diseased his Disciples plucking and eating of the eares of corne on the Sabbath day 't was not grounded on their actions but onely 〈◊〉 by the Pharisees swelling uncharitablenesse What other was that appearance of evill with which the Gentiles charged the primitive Christians lifting up of their hands in prayer when they accused them for adoration of the Clouds as appeareth by Tertullian and by a Poet of their own qui puras nubes coeli numen adorant This imaginary appearance of evill proceeds from either supposals of willfull or weake ones The censures and supposals of wilfull proud and wicked ones and the scandals thence arising scandala Pharisaeorum I determined in my first Edition of this 〈◊〉 that we might slight our warrant said I is our 〈◊〉 president When his Disciples told him that the Pharisees tooke offence at his speech he made no reckoning thereof but answered let them alone Matth. 12. 13 14. and we warranted by his example may then be secure and regardlesse of many calumnies and groundlesse exceptions against the government discipline and ceremonies of our Church for 〈◊〉 hath been so much spoken and written concerning these subjects as that the pretence of weaknesse is quite taken away from those that are capable of information First here my censure of the non-conformists to be wilfull proud and Pharisaicall was very rash and uncharitable all that I can say in excuse for my selfe is that when I wrote this I was a very young man and conformity vnto the Ceremonies established by Law was then generally embraced without any of the least contradiction for ought I knew nay stoutly and zealously pleaded for by men whom I admired for the generall report that went of their sanctity and 〈◊〉 v. g. Dr John 〈◊〉 Dr Sclater Dr Sanderson and others And then I had read but one side being an utter stranger unto what the Inconformitants could say for themselves and their adversaries represented their objections and answer to be so weaks and ridiculous as that 't is no great wonder that I was prejudiced against them But about the beginning of the long Parliament being awakened with the generall complaint of the Godly against the Ceremonies I began to thinke a new of the controversy and out of my former prejudice intended a full vindication of the discipline and Ceremonies of the then Church of England and in order hereunto I read all such books of the non-conformist's as I could procure for I knew well by experience that a controversy can never be well handled unlesse all dissenting opinions thereabouts be weighed but upon perusall of the non-conformists I soone found that their adversaries most disingeniously misrepresented all that they said that they refused to joine issue with them in the state of the Question that they came not up to an orderly grapple with their arguments and that they seldome regularly replyed unto the solutions which were given unto their objections and this quickly produced an alteration in my judgment and I believe it will do so too in all that will make such an impartiall search into the matter as I have done But Secondly to come unto the examination of that aspersion that the scandals of the malitious of Pharisaicall and willfull spirits are not to be regarded so as to sorbear that by which they are scandalized Gregory de Valentia though he lay downe the affirmative in the generall yet afterwards he delivers it to be his opinion that we are to doe what lyeth in us to prevent the scandals of even Pharisees so it may be done without any great losse or notable damage unto our selves Existimo etiam si quis cum nullo suo vel pene nullo detrimento posset impedire scandalum proximi Pharisaicum aliquid faciendo vel omittendo debere ipsum facere Nam ut tradidimus suprà in quaest de correctione fraternâ etiam is qui ex malitiâ peccaturus alioqui est est in aliquali necessitate spirituali ac proinde ut illic vidimus debet ex charitate corrigi vel aliter à peccati scandalo impediri quando id sine detrimento proprio fieri potest tom 3. disp 3. q. 18. punct 4. For the better stating of this Question I shall premise some distinctions of scandall a scandall is either active or passive An active scandall is in all such words or deeds as culpably occasion the fall of another into sin and this is againe by Gregory de Valentia tom 3. disp 3. q. 18. punct 1. rightly subdivided into that which is per se and into that which is per accidens An active scandall per se is in such publique acts as either by the expresse intent of the agent or from their nature and in themselves are inductive unto sinne and they are againe twofold First all publick sinnes or sinnes committed before another Secondly all such publick actions as carry a reall and manifest appearance of sin An active scandall per accidens is in such things as are not in themselves and in their own nature occasions of sin unto another and this is either in an unseasonable performance of positive duties commanded by affirmative precepts which are not necessary hic nunc or else by an unseasonable use of our liberty in things 〈◊〉 A Passive scandall is the fall of another into sinne and this by the author but now mentioned is subdivided into given and taken Scandalum datum a passive scandall given is that which ariseth truly from the active scandall of another as from its morall cause Scandalum acceptum a passive scandall that is onely taken is that which is onely the fault of the party scandalized and cannot be imputed to any other as a morall cause the words or deeds of another may be an occasion of it but not a culpable occasion I desire that these distinctions of scandall may be well heeded for the want of Consideration of them hath occasioned a great deale of confusion in mens discourses about scandall First many exclude from active scandall all things that scandalize per accidens and then what will become of those scandals Paul speaks against Rom. 14. 1 Cor. ch 8. ch 10. Secondly most confound a passive scandall with scandalum acceptum a scandall that is onely taken and make them to be of an equall extent whereas a passive scandall may de distributed into both given and taken if it be culpably both given and taken then it is scandalum datum if it be culpably taken and not culpably given then it is scandalum acceptum Well these distinctions being thus premised I suppose it will be agreed upon by all sides that the question is to be understood First of active scandals our scandalizing of the wicked or Secondly which comes all to one of such passive scandals of them as are given by us as well as taken by them Not thirdly of such passive scandals as are onely taken by them not given by us for from
that is wholly depraved and defiled with lust he thinkes then that lust might be seated in the will nay 〈◊〉 himselfe though he thinke that concupiscence hath it's chiefe residence in the flesh by which he meanes the body and the sensuall powers of man yet he withall 〈◊〉 that there is something like unto it in the superiour part of the soule for even that is prone immoderately to desire honours vaine glory and the like vanities and therefore Paul Gal. 5 having said that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lusteth against 〈◊〉 spirit he nameth not only fornication drunkennesse and the like carnall sinnes but also idolatry heresies envyings c which were spirituall sinnes sinnes of the upper region of the soule thus you see that a great part of concupiscence is placed in the supreme the rationall faculties of man and extended unto spirituall and immateriall objects and hereupon it will follow that at least this part of concupiscence cannot 〈◊〉 from the condition 〈◊〉 the matter A third argument is because this assertion that the resultancy of this concupiscence from the nature and matter of man would have been besides the intention of God strikes against either the omniscience or omnipotency of God for either God foresaw this resultancy or not to say that he did not foresee it takes away the infinitenesse of his knowledge if he foresaw it then I demand whether he could not or would not prevent it to say that he could not prevent it denieth the infinitenesse of his power if he could but would not prevent or stay it then it followeth that this resultancy was not besides but agreeable unto his purpose and intention Secondly this answer is repugnant unto Bellarmine his own principles I shall instance in two First it is apparent that he maketh this concupiscence to be chiefly the naturall and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties unto their proper and naturall object and from this I thus argue Naturall and necessary propensions of the naturall faculties of any thing unto their naturall and proper object cannot be besides the intention of God the creatour for such propensions must needs be positive qualities and of every positive being God is the cause and author But now concupiscence is by Bellarmines discourse the naturall and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties of man unto their proper and naturall objects And consequently t is not besides the intention of the Creatour flowing as a naturall defect or disease only from the condition of the mould or matter of man A second thing in Bellarmine with which this his answer clasheth is his confession that concupiscence is contrary to the nature of man de gratiâ primi hominis cap. 7. From hence I thus argue Nothing that is against the nature of man can 〈◊〉 naturally and necessarily from the principles of his nature But Bellarmine confesseth that this concupiscence is against the nature of man And therefore he contradicts himselfe when he affirmeth that it results from the principles of man's nature the condition of his matter As for the similitude of the Smith and the Iron sword that will be nothing unto the purpose for First no Smith whatsoever can make Iron that is the matter of a sword but God alone is the author of the matter of man and consequently is the cause of all the naturall sequels thereof Secondly a Smith if he could would frame such a sword as might not be subject or inclined unto rust but it is not a thing in his power for he cannot alter the nature of Iron so that if he will produce an Iron sword it will be lyable unto rust The Papists seeme to ascribe such an impotency unto God himselfe for they suppose all along that God cannot make man to be compounded of a reasonable soule and sensible matter but that besides the intention of God the naturall and necessary result of such a composition will without supernaturall prevention be a headlong inclination unto sensible objects against the dictates of right reason but the falshood of this supposition I shall anon at large detect A second answer of Bellarmin's which we frequently sind also in Dr. Taylor is that this concupiscence is not a sinne but only a disease languer infirmity or 〈◊〉 of nature and therefore though God had been the cause of it it would not yet have followed that God was the author of sinne Unto this I shall oppose the cleare testimony of Paul who in 6 7 8. chapters of his Epistle unto the Roman's cal's it sinne fourteene times as Bishop Davenant and Dr. Francis White after Bishop of Ely calculate the places But unto all these places Bellarmine replyeth in which reply he is seconded by Dr. Taylor that concupiscence is called sinne by the Apostle not properly and formally but 〈◊〉 because it is the effect and cause of sinne the effect of Adam's first sinne and the cause of our sinne But that concupiscence is properly and formally a sinne I shall prove against both Bellarmine and his confident second Dr. Taylor from it's influence subject adjuncts opposites First from it's influence mediate and immediate First from it's mediate influence it is the cause of all actuall sin whatsoever whensoever we are tempted to any sinne we are enticed and drawne away by our own lust this is the mother that conceiveth and bringeth forth all sinne Jam. 1. 14 15 and doubtlesse the daughter resembleth the mother the cause and the effect have the same nature that which as a habit or quality is the cause of sinne must needs be sinne too but concupiscence or the originall pronesse of our natures unto sinne is the roote of all sinne and therefore to use the Apostles expression 't is exceeding sinfull Rom. 7. 13 for nil dat quod non habet vel formalitèr vel eminenter But for confirmation of this argument we have the testimony of him who is the truth it selfe Mat. 7. 17 18. A corrupt tree bringeth forth evill fruit a good tree cannot bring forth evill fruit now concupiscence or an inclination unto sinne bringeth no fruit but that which is morally evill and corrupt and therefore 't is a tree morally evill and corrupt but this argument I shall insist on more fully hereafter in opening Jam. 1. 14 15. Secondly from it's immediate influence it naturally and directly produceth as it 's immediate effects those first motions unto sinne which are without consent and therefore if we can prove these first motions unto sinne to be sinne our adversaries will confesse that concupiscence is sinne also now that they are sinne may be concluded from the Apostles description of sinne 1 〈◊〉 3. 4. Sinne is the transgression of the law for the first motions unto sinne trespasse against that which our Saviour cal's the first and great commandement thou shalt love the Lord with all thy soule might mind and strength for if sinne God's greatest enemy hath any motions or inclinations of the soule any thoughts of the
inquit naturae ex spiritu rationali corpore naturali facta sit modo perfecto subordinationem infert unius propensionis ad alteram quae pugnam omnem excludit The union betwixt the body and the soule of man was perfect and therefore inferred a subordination of the propensions and operations of the body unto the soule and subordinatorum nulla est pugna subordination excludes all opposition this argument strikes chiefly against such as make the body to be the proper subject of the sensitive powers But there be some as you may see 〈◊〉 Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 5. tit 6. art 1. who in man make all sensitive powers to be seated in the soule and unto them too this argument may be applied the conjunction betwixt the sensitive and rationall faculties in the same soule supposing them to be both there which now it is not pertinent to dispute was a most perfect and orderly conjunction made by God the author of all good order who abhorreth all ataxy and confusion and order still requireth a subjection of those things or persons that are inferiour unto those which are their superiours the sensitive faculties therefore being the more ignoble were by God who made man subjected unto the rationall and they never had rebelled if man by his fall had not perturbed this order indeed we may now apply unto the powers of lapsed man that of Solomon Eccles. 10. 7. I have 〈◊〉 servants upon horses and Princes walking as servants upon the earth those powers which by the law of creation were servants made to serve and obey have the throne and supremacy in the soule and those unto which God gave the regency are dethroned and become servile but it was impossible for any such disorder or confusion to be in the soule of man by creation there could not then but bee a most perfect sweet and blessed harmony betwixt all man's parts and powers without any the least clashing or disagreement for othewise how could man be made as Solomon saith he was straite or upright Eccles. 7. 29. A second reason I have borrowed of Tilenus syntag pag. 1. cap. 33. s. 40. the specificall forme of man his reasonable soule doth so limit determine and restraine his generall formes vegetative and sensitive as that it makes their operations not only agreeable but proper unto man it maketh the operations of the vegetative soule which of themselves are common unto men with plants and beasts so proper unto man as that they are in man after a sort only humane and therefore man groweth and encreaseth not as a tree or beast but after a humane way even so also it maketh the operations of the sensitive soule which are common unto men with beasts proper and peculiar unto man so that whilst man's nature was uncorrupted he naturally coveted sensuall and corporeall things not after a bruitish but humane manner that is conformably unto right reason his nature then as 't was created by God for so you must still understand me was without any repugnancy between his sensuall and rationall appetites As for the other objections of Bellarmine I shall wholy passe them over because some of them come not nigh the question as stated by me others of them are triviall and receive an easy solution and unto all of them the Reader may find sufficient answers in Ames Rivet Gerard Maccovius and other writers upon popish controversies It may now be expected that I should make some application of this point and in particular that I should shew how far we are to be humbled for Originall sin whose formale is the privation or want of originall Righteousnesse and I had prepared a great deale of matter upon this subject but shall now wholy lay it aside because I am happily prevented by the learned and elaborate work of Mr. Anthony Burgesse concerning originall sinne whither I shall referre the Reader and all that I shall doe more shall be to annexe a briefe exposition and application of some few scriptures that conduce to this purpose Jam. 1. 14 15. But every man is tempted when he is drawne away of his own lust and enticed Then when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sinne and sinne when it is finished bringeth 〈◊〉 death IN the foregoing verse the Apostle James denyeth God to be the authour of temptation unto sinne in verse the 15. he opposeth unto this deniall an affirmation that man himselfe is the cause thereof and this Antithesis is denoted by the particle but. There is no doubt can be made but that lust is here taken in an ill sense but even so it hath a twofold acception it signifieth either the habit or the act Habituall lust againe is twofold either originall or acquired and contracted 1. Lust is not here taken for the act of lust because actions are here ascribed unto it to draw entice conceive bring forth it draweth 〈◊〉 to sinne eonceiveth bringeth forth sinne and actionis non est actio actions are better and more fitly ascribed to an habit than to an act 2. Lust is not here 〈◊〉 for contracted and acquired habituall lust because the lust here spoken of is the cause of all temptations into sinne whatsoever Every man whensoever he is tempted into sin he is drawne away of his own lust and enticed and men may be tempted sometimes into some sins not by any contracted and acquired habits of lust as is plaine in the temptation of Noah into drunkennesse of Lot into both drunkennesse and incest 〈◊〉 Peter into a cowardly deniall of his Master and Saviour The lust then which is the Theme that the Apostle James here treates of is that which is called originall sinne Aquinas 1 a. 2ae q. 82. a. 3. Well observeth that there be two things considerable in originall sin the formale and the materiale of it 1. The formale and that is nothing else but the privation and want of originall righteousnesse 2. The materiale is an inordinate conversion or inclination of man's faculties especially of his two appetites rationall and sensuall unto the creature and so it is called lust or concupiscence which saith Cornelius Jansenius in his Augustinus Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 7. is nihil aliud quà m pondus habituale quo animus inclinatur ad sruendum creaturis 〈◊〉 ut Augustinus loquitur rebus 〈◊〉 it is as it were an habituall weight whereby the soule is inclined and carried downewards unto the fruition of the creatures as it 's supreame end Concerning this originall lust we have here remarkeable 1. The propriety of it's inherence his own lust 2. The force of it's influence it tempteth every man unto 〈◊〉 c. 1. The propriety of it's inherence by his own lust 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indeed originall lust is one and the same specifically for sort or kind in all men unto which some apply that of Solomon Prov. 27. 19. As in water face answereth to face so the heart of man to man but yet every
sufficient 〈◊〉 First To say that that which is 〈◊〉 is positive is nonsense Put to say that 〈◊〉 is essential unto man either à priori or à 〈◊〉 is to say that 〈◊〉 which is privative is positive for the essentials of man are positive and the sormality of sin is a privation Therefore to say that sin is 〈◊〉 unto man either à 〈◊〉 or à posteriori 〈◊〉 nonsense Secondly To say that that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉 ac 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of man in primo or secundo modo dicendi per se is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se per accidens are opposite ways of predication But to say that sin is predicated of man in primo or secundo modo 〈◊〉 per se is to say That that which is predicated of man per accidens is predicated of man per se sor that sin is predicated of man per 〈◊〉 will be questioned by none who know what primus modus dicendi per accidens is Therefore to say that sin is predicated of man in primo or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se is nonsense Thirdly To say that that which is predicated contingently of man is predicated 〈◊〉 of him is nonsense But to say that sin is predicated of man in primo or secundo modo 〈◊〉 per se is to say That that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉 is predicated of 〈◊〉 necessarily for sin is predicated of man contingently because man and sin cohere 〈◊〉 man might not have been a sinner and when he shall not be a sinner he will still be a man and then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se est gradus necessitatis Therefore to say that sinne is predicated of man in 〈◊〉 or secundo modo dicendi per 〈◊〉 is nonsense If these arguments satisfy you not you may command more of me when you please as also any further enlargement of these Yea but you say that sinne is essentiall is 〈◊〉 to say but to say so is not non-sense To this I answer that however it may be 〈◊〉 in Grammar yet 't is nonsense in Logick because 't is a 〈◊〉 for in 〈◊〉 every contradiction not only expresse but that also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and implyed is nonsense a 〈◊〉 as we usually speake thus 't is nonsense to say that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that a spirit is corporeall that a body is 〈◊〉 without quantity or extension that an 〈◊〉 subsists or that a substance properly inhereth Now my three arguments above irrefragably prove that to say that sinne is 〈◊〉 to man is a contradiction for 't is in effect as much as to say that that which is privative is positive that that which is predicated of man per accidens is predicated of him per se that that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉 is predicated of man necessarily and these are grosse and palpable contradictions and therefore not only false but most pitifull and 〈◊〉 nonsense You accuse me of uncharitablenesse and unreasonablenesse in supposing that you say that sinne is essentiall unto man but from this accusation I have 〈◊〉 vindicated my selfe by beating you from all your miserable shifts And unto what I have said herein I shall referre both your selfe and the Reader Dr Taylor In the next place you charge me this with blasphemy if I 〈◊〉 said or meant what you 〈◊〉 you had reason but then I pray consider how your charge will 〈◊〉 really 〈◊〉 your selfe for if it be 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 God to be the Author of sinne 〈◊〉 what I derived from Adam is no sinne for that Adam's sinne should 〈◊〉 upon me I demand who was the Author of that If you please you may take time to consider it but in the interim if you be pleased to 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 discourse of 〈◊〉 called Deus justificatus you shall find my question not to be answered by you if you 〈◊〉 any regard to the authority or to the reason of Mr Calvin Dr Twisse and some other of the 〈◊〉 of your party Jeanes 1. Here you tempt me to a digression and you may with as good reason call upon me to answer all the reproaches that Bellarmine in this particular 〈◊〉 upon the Protestant Churches and some of the most eminent members thereof as propound this question unto me 2. However yet I briefly answer to it that Adam was the author of the descent of his sinne upon me not God for to be the Author of sinne is to be a desicient culpable cause thereof and it is impossible that God should be defective in a culpable manner and that our doctrine of originall sinne maketh him to be such you may boldly affirme but can never prove 3. Bishop 〈◊〉 in the doctrine of 〈◊〉 sinne is one of our party and he speaks that which will abundantly 〈◊〉 your demands in his animadversions upon Hord pag. 323. 224. It was not sayes he God's absolute decree of 〈◊〉 but Adam's voluntary act of rebellion which brought sinne and the guilt of sinne upon himselfe and all his posterity God having justly 〈◊〉 that Adam's children should participate with him 〈◊〉 his state of 〈◊〉 did as justly 〈◊〉 that they should also participate in the state of sinne If this Author deny the propagation of 〈◊〉 from Adam he must acknowledge 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 c. His whole discourse concerning originall sinne and the propagating 〈◊〉 unto all mankind is 〈◊〉 in that he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the divine 〈◊〉 must needs be 〈◊〉 or causative of all the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereas if the events be actions sinfull God's decrees are 〈◊〉 and ordinative not 〈◊〉 of causing much esse necessitating such evill 〈◊〉 as hath been often told him 4. I have seene your little 〈◊〉 called 〈◊〉 justisicatus and must say of it as Florus did of the Ligurians lib. 2. cap. 3. Major 〈◊〉 labor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vincere The Rhetorick of it is so rank as that it will be a very hard matter to find out the Logick and reason that is in it If you please to put your arguments into forme you then may command me to consider them but otherwise I shall be very loath to adventure upon any thing of yours for I find by this present debate about two or three lines that I shall not without great difficulty search out what is your meaning 5. I wonder why you say that by this discourse I shall find your question not to be answered by me why pray Sr could I answer it before you propounded it but your meaning is I suppose that I shall find that your question cannot be answr'd by me but the event will 〈◊〉 that 6. That which you meane in Mr Calvin and Dr Twisse are I 〈◊〉 those places which you quote pag. 32 of that your 〈◊〉 and then unto the place in Calvin you have an answer in Dr Twisse 〈◊〉 gra lib. 2. dig 2. cap. 3. pag. 42. where he cleares it from the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 And then for the place in Dr Twisse you may gather an answer from that he saith unto
is bound to know such an errour is at least indirectè voluntary and sinsull and cannot oblige A Second exception Conscience hath no power to oblige but what it deriveth from God and therefore what it obligeth unto God also obligeth unto and God is the morall cause and consequently the Authour of whatsoever he obligeth to but he cannot be the morall cause and authour of that which is sinne and unlawfull either per se or per accidens and therefore neither he nor his deputy Conscience can oblige so much as per accidens unto that which is unlawfull A Third exception shall be the objection of Durand in the place above quoted Sola vera notitia de re 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 magis confirmat sed vera notitia de eo quod 〈◊〉 conscientia dictat tollit 〈◊〉 ergo obligatio nulla suit To be well informed and to have a true knowledg of a thing cannot take away any obligation to it But to be well informed and to have a true knowledg concerning that which an erroneous Conscience dictates takes away all obligation to it Therefore there was never any such thing as an obligation to it The most considerable objection is that of 〈◊〉 Sum Theol. 2. part p. 1. tom 2. tract 1. cap. 4. Durandus còncedit illum p 〈◊〉 qui operatur contra hanc conscientiam Ergo debet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hanc conscientiam obligare Nam ubi non est 〈◊〉 ibi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Durand grants that he sinneth who acts against an erroneous Conscience therefore he ought also to grant that an erroneous conscience obligeth for where there is no obligation there can be no sin But the answer hereunto is very easy by distinguishing concerning obligation which is twofold either as touching the 〈◊〉 or manner of actions Though there be no obligation as touching the matter of such actions concerning which an erroneous Conscience dictates yet there is a generall obligation as 〈◊〉 the manner of all actions that they be done without the Contempt of conscience and therefore in every action where conscience is contemned sin is committed Quaevis voluntas saith Aquinas 2 dae q. 19. art 5. à ratione sive 〈◊〉 sive errante discordans semper est mala Which brings me unto my third conclusion Allthough this erroneous conceit of the unlawfullnesse of this action 〈◊〉 to be necessary either in its nature or at least in its use because lawfully commanded by authority doth not obligare that is so bind as that I must follow it yet it doth ligare so intangle and perplex as that I cannot without sin oppose it and for this I shall alledge these following reasons First because whosoever goeth against his Conscience whether ill or well informed it matters not goes against the will of God although not for the thing he doth yet for the manner of doing it although not 〈◊〉 yet formally and interpretatively because whatsoever the Conscience 〈◊〉 a man takes for the will of God each mans Conscience being 〈◊〉 Deputy God to informe and direct him Looke as he who reviles wounds kills a private man mistaking him for the King is guilty of high treason against the King himselfe so he that ' thwarts the judgment of even an erroneous Conscience fights against God warres against Heaven because what his conscience saies he thinks to be the voice of Heaven Thus you see that he who acts against an erroneous Conscience in such an action 〈◊〉 himselfe as disaffected towards God for he knowingly adventureth upon that which he thinketh will infinitely displease him And in a second place such an action is an argument of disaffection towards that rule of our morall actions which God hath appointed he that hath an erroneous Conscience supposeth it to be right and well informed and therefore if he act against it he slights that which he takes to be the rule of his working and therefore his action is for the 〈◊〉 of it lawlesse and irregular Thirdly in such an action there is a depraved affection towards sin and that in Morals is the fountaine of all ilnesse If a mans conscience be right and well informed and he act against it every one will grant that such an action proceeds from the love of that which is sinne and there is the same reason to say as much of that action which is against the dictate of an erring Conscience Besides these reasons I shall alledge Scriptures to omit Rom 〈◊〉 23. allready spoken of 〈◊〉 quotes also Rom. 14. 14. To him that esteemeth any thing to be uncleane to him it is uncleane The learned Dr Hammond alledgeth for the same purpose the 1 Cor. 8. 7. For some with Conscience of the Idoll i e. 〈◊〉 resolved in mind that it is not lawfull to eat or taste of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 part or portion of the Idol-feast whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the idol table or having bought it at the shambles as it seems was the fashion of those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be sold there at second hand chap. 10. 25. 〈◊〉 it unlawfull to eat any meat consecrated to that use do yet eat that which is of this nature and by so doing their weake i. e. uninstructed Conscience is polluted i. e. they sin against their Conscience do that which they are perswaded they may not doe which although it be never so innocent and harmlesse thing in it selfe an Idoll being simply nothing yet to them which do it when they thinke it unlawfull and all have not knowledge saith he in the beginning of the verse i. e. are not sufficiently instructed in their duty it is pollution or sin I shall proceed unto the fourth and last conclusion The only way then for a man to rescue himselfe out of these difficulties is to rectify his Conscience to depose and correct the errour thereof so he shall escape contempt of the judgment of his own Conscience on the one hand and breach of either Gods or mans lawes on the other This Rayunaudus from whom I know none do dissent expresseth as followeth Moral disc dist 4. q. 3. art 1. n. 247. Unum igitur illud subsidium superest ut judicium de malitiâ vincibilitèr errans abjiciatur Si enim neque adhaerere ei licet ut primo loco monstravimus neque illi obsistere ut nunc diximus non aliud superesse potest quà m ut homo errorem depellat quod posse supponitur 〈◊〉 de malitiâ sensum induat alioqui quocunque se vertat in culpâ erit An imaginary appearance of evill issues Secondly from the supposals of not only ourselves but others that censure it whose judgments are either misled by ignorance and weaknesse or else blinded through pride and prejudice such was that in the moving of Hannah's lips not afforded by her fact but only fastned on it by old Eli his hasty censoriousnesse no other appearance of evill was there in our
shared thankfulnesse should now content him who was alwaies so jealous of his glory In the beginning he created the earth naked void and without forme Gen. 1. 2. lest we thinks Chrysostome should ascribe that beauty and glory wherewith afterwards it was apparreld vers 12. unto its own nature and not his omnipotency that made it out of nothing In the ceremoniall law he commanded the Israelites not to lift up any toole of iron upon any altar of stone they should erect but to build it all of unhewen and unpolish'd stones Exod. 20 25. Deut. 27. 5. to intimate saith Rabbi Isaac that what ever blessings they obtained at the Altar they should attribute them not to humane indeavours but meerly to the good will and pleasure of that free spirit which bloweth when and where and how he listeth But farther as we are not to detract or defalk any thing from the intirenesse absolutenesse and plenarinesse of Gods praises by rendring them unto others So neither Secondly by giving them to our selves either wholy or in part Wee give the commendation of a wise speech and saying unto not the tongue that utters but mind that conceiv'd it For the fairenesse of a Character not the pen but the hand that guides it is praise worthy so the glory of benefits belong not unto us who possesse them but unto God that gave them The Illustrations are not mine but Bernards for them no sacrifice to be offered to our own nets either of nature or indeavour as some I remember descant upon that place of Habakkuk The people that are with thee saith God to Gideon Judg. 7. 2. are too many for to give the Midianites into their hands Why lest Israel vaunt themselves against me saying mine own hand hath saved me Should then Israel have said mine own hand hath saved me they had vaunted themselves against God T is Salvians note Now 〈◊〉 we make default two manner of waies by attribution of our blessings unto our selves either as the physicall and reall causes the procurers or morall causes the deservers of them First as to the physicall and reall causes and procurers of them We perswade our selves that we have wonne them propria Marte by our hand or head something in us and therefore deserve to weare them Aristotle tels us of some who had their eyes so depress'd and darkned that they imagined themselves to see in the ayre neere unto them as in a glasse their own proper and bodily figures We I am sure have the eyes of our understandings so blinded and darkened that we can see nothing in all the good we have all the good we doe but our own abilities and indeavours But if it be plaine that nothing in us hath gotten our blessings that God is the sole Author of them then next we flatter our selves with a presumptuous conceite that we are the morall causes the deservers of them That something from us our desert holinesse hath moved God to bestow them Against this no so soveraine remedy as meditation upon the second thing above propos'd As God the principall Author of blessings so in him his mercy the sole motive to conferre them And therefore those abilities and perfections which the Philosopher called Habits St James stild gifts James 1. St Paul 1 Cor. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 grace gifts or gifts not of Justice but of grace as they are à Deo for the Author so they are ex Dono for the manner from God and by way of most free and Liberall Donation although in the procurement of benefits there be a concurrence of our abilities our hand and head power and wisdome yet if we digge to the roote we shall find these abilities to be the free gifts of God For what hast thou that thou hast not received 1 Corinth 4. 7 Could we deserve as we cannot favours at the hand of the allmighty yet in the last resolution that desert would be of grace For whence but from God should come power to deserve But what talke we of desert can God be 〈◊〉 to any man or hath any man given to him first that it might be recompensed him againe Rom. 11. 35. As for our parts wee are not onely 〈◊〉 but male merentes not only undeserving but ill deserving so every way lesser then the least of Gods mercies Not therefore unto us Lord not unto us not to our abilities indeavours merit but unto thee and in thee to thy free grace and goodnesse be the honour and glory of all our blessings Well we have done with the party to whom our thanks are to be directed and in whom terminated I will but touch upon the last particular the Mediator in whose name our thanks are to be tendred In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. There is first neoessity of a 〈◊〉 or meane to preferre our thanks unto God then congruity that Christ should be he First need we have of a Mediator whether we regard our selves or our thanks First our selves who as Creatures are infinitely beneath God as sinners at odds and 〈◊〉 with God enimies unto him and therefore should not dare in our own persons approach the pure eyes and dreadfull presence of so consuming a fire to present our selves or our thanks unto him Especially considering In a second place The blemishes of our thanks Our thanks alas are seldome faint dull heartlesse livelesse like the sacrifice of Prometheus to Jupiter nothing but skinne and bones outside and formality and therefore of themselves unlikely to winne acceptance A Mediator therefore necessary to take away the guilt of sinne from our persons by his merits to hide the failings of our thanks by his intercession and so to winne our persons accesse our thanks acceptation to God This office not more needfull for us and our thanks then Christ meet for it In the name through the Mediation of none so congruously as of Christ can our thanks be given to God For first Decursus gratiarum the streams of Gods bounty flow unto us from God by Christ from God as the fountaine by Christ as the channell and therefore Recursus gratiarum the returne of our thanks should be unto God by Christ unto God as the object by Christ as the Mediator or meanes in which presented If for his sake by his meanes merito Passionis beneficio Intercessionis efficaciâ Operationis for the merit of his passion by the virtue of his intercession through the efficacy of his Operation God showreth down his blessings on us therefore in his name through his mediation should wee powre out our Benedictions unto God Secondly Thanks cannot be given but Adjutorio Christi by helpe and 〈◊〉 from Christ by assistance of his spirit working in us both the will and the deed the will the habit of thankfulnesse the deed the act of thanksgiving and therefore should not be given but Nomine Christi in the name of Christ. And there is a third reason too
This therefore was no dark but visible foundation of what I said In assigning any rite or ceremony for the service of God 〈◊〉 saith the 〈◊〉 was to 〈◊〉 observed the onely rule to judge of that is say I to consider the Customes of that particular place of which we consult Where bowing the knee or 〈◊〉 on the ground is customarily used as a token of reverence where putting off or keeping off the hat there the choice of Ceremonies must be made with 〈◊〉 to those particular 〈◊〉 Here 't is evident that I mean not the frequent usage of that ceremony in opposition to a first usage of it as Mr. 〈◊〉 is willing to mistake me and found one of his arguments upon that mistake but the standing custome of the place by which as by an argument or evidence such a ceremony is demonstrated to be a reverential respect and so for the service of God to whom all reverence is due decent in that place though in nature or in the estimation of all other men it be not so Jeanes 1. If the Apostle had said as you say he saith there ought to be no farther controversie about the lawfulnesse of humane ceremonies but that clause in assigning any rite or ceremony for the service of God c. is an Apocryphal addition of yours without any colour from the Text it self or from the coherence and therefore all you build upon it is but fancy and fiction That the Apostles decency cannot be observed without assigning such Rites and Ceremonies as you dispute for you may dictate and boldly affirm but can never with all your learning 〈◊〉 prove and unlesse you can make proof hereof you and your party have just reason to be ashamed of urging this place for ceremonies with such an unshaken confidence as you do 2. Whereas you tell us 't is evident that you mean not the frequent usage of that ceremony in opposition to the first usage of it This evidence of your meaning you have not so much as attempted to prove and if you shall for the future make such an attempt it would I am afraid prove 〈◊〉 The custome of a thing unlesse you can fasten upon it a sense or meaning never yet heard of is opposed unto the first usage of that thing for custome implyeth the frequent usage of a thing and to say that the frequent usage of a thing is the first usage of it is an evident repugnancy and an apparent contradiction contradictio in adjecto 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 as they say I am therefore much to seek for the sense and reason of that Antithesis you make in these words I mean not the frequent usage of that ceremony in opposition to a first usage of it but the standing custome of the place c. for 't is impossible that the standing custome of the place in a ceremony should be the first usage of that ceremony where the mistake is let the Reader judge 3. In that which followeth there is nothing of argument unlesse you can prove every ceremony which can plead the standing custome of a place to be a fitting and decent expression of that reverential respect which is due unto God Bishop Morton in his Book of the Institution of the Sacrament of the blessed 〈◊〉 and Blood of Christ p. 80 81. sheweth that the opinion of reverence hath been the 〈◊〉 and nurse of 〈◊〉 superstitions and after such demonstration he quotes a saying of 〈◊〉 upon Joh. 13. 8. Let us therefore learne 〈◊〉 honour and reverence Christ as he would and not as we think sit Dr. Hammond sect 10 11 12 13 14. 10. Certainly this is so evident in it self and so undeniably the importance of my words that there can be no need farther to inlarge on it much lesse to examine the weight or meaning of his concession 〈◊〉 it cannot be 〈◊〉 but that 〈◊〉 doth imply such customes the omission of which 〈◊〉 inferres indecency 11. This saying of his some Readers may look on with Reverence as not readily comprehending the importance of it others may 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 it under the appearance of a tautologie But upon pondering it will appear that the Author had a 〈◊〉 in it which be designed should bring in some advantage to his cause and without which he was not likely to advance far 〈◊〉 succeed in it 12. Some customes we know there are which are so highly decent as that the omission of then necessarily infers indecency But what are they why such as the law of at least 〈◊〉 nature prescribes covering of nakednesse and the like of which 't is evident among all that have not learnt of Carneades industriously to rase out all naturall measures of honest and dishonest that the omission of them 〈◊〉 indecency yea and necessarily infers it this sort of decency being naturall to all men that ever were or shall be in the world born and educated in what uation or inured to what custome seever and this the very first hour after our first Parents fall before any custome had been contracted which might recommend it to them 13 And as of these his rule is true that the omission of these necessarily inferrs undecency so it is in a manner proper to these and belongs not to any other sort of things whose decencie flowes but from some positive command though it be of God or custome or command of men To such things whose decency flowes from any 〈◊〉 either of God or man this rule cannot be fully applyed for that command might have been not given or there might be a space before it was given or a people to whom it was not given and then in any of those cases the omission would not be indecent to whom the law was not given and so it doth not necessarily and absolutely but onely dependently on the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so in like manner the 〈◊〉 holds not in those things whose 〈◊〉 is introduced onely by custome for that Mr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 frequency of actions it must againe bee granted 〈◊〉 there was a time when that which now is 〈◊〉 was new and so not custome and againe there are or may bee Nations with whom that custome whatsoever can be instanced in hath not 〈◊〉 which prejudges still the 〈◊〉 spoken of that such omission should inferre indecencie And so we see the summe of Mr. J. his liberal concession viz. that decency 〈◊〉 naturall decency or such customes which are naturally decent and so the omission of them naturally indecent and if the Doctor or his party do not prove or make 〈◊〉 that the administration of Baptism without the Crosse is against the law of nature that the Preaching without the Surplice beares 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 of nakednesse he is utterly refuted by Mr. J. in his interpretation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or notion of decency Jeanes 1. That I had no design in putting in the word necessarily is evident by my leaving it out in the next words but