Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	army_n	great_a	king_n	2,073	5	3.6840	3	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A05575	Tvvo bookes of constancie. Written in Latine, by Iustus Lipsius. Containing, principallie, A comfortable conference, in common calamities. And will serue for a singular consolation to all that are priuately distressed, of afflicted, either in body or mind. Englished by Iohn Stradling, gentleman; Iusti Lipsi de constantia libri duo.	Lipsius, Justus, 1547-1606.; Stradling, John, Sir, 1563-1637.	1595 (1595)	STC 15695; ESTC S120692	104,130	145

the best and great Iupiter and thundering and Stator that is Stable or standing not so called as Historians deliuer because that after a vowe vndertaken he stayed the Roman Armie flying away But because all thinges stand by his free benefite therefore was he named stander or stablisher If you call him also Fate or destinie you shall not belie him For sith that destinie is nothing but a folded order of causes hee is the principall first cause of al wheron the residue do depend Which last words are so godlie spoken that slaunder it selfe cannot slaunder them In this point dissented not from the Stoickes that greate Writer to a greate King I thinke that Necessitie ought not to be called any thing els but God as a stedfast and stable nature And destinie that which knitteth together all thinges and holdeth his course freely without let or impediment Which sayinges if they haue any tast of temeritie in them yet not of impietie and beeing rightlie interpreted differ not much from our true fate or destinie I doe in good earnest giue this commendation to the Stoickes that no other sect of Philosophers auowed more the maiesty and prouidence of God nor drewe men neerer to heauenlie and eternall thinges And if in treading this trace of Destinie they went somewhat astray it was thorough a laudable and good desire they haue to withdrawe blind men from that blind Goddesse I meane FORTVNE The nature whereof they did not onelie mightilie hisse out of their companie but euen the verie name CHAPT XIX The fourth and true kind of Destinie expounded The name brieflie spoken of it is lightly defined and prooued to differ from Prouidence THis much may suffice touching the opinions and dissentions of the Auncients For why shoulde I ouer curiouslie search the secretes of hell as the prouerbe is I shall haue ynough to doe with true Destinie which now I propound and illustrate calling it AN ETERNAL DECREE OF GODS PROVIDENCE which cannot bee taken away no more than prouidence it selfe And let not any man cauill with mee about the name because I say there is not in Latine an other proper word to expresse that thing but FATVM What haue old writers abused it Let vs vse it and so inlarging this word out of the prison of the Stoickes let vs bring it to a better light It is called in Latine FATVM a fando of speaking neither is it any thing els properlie but The saying and commaundement of God And this is it which novve I seeke for I define it eyther vvith that famous PICVS A ranke and order of causes depending vpon Gods counsell or vvith mine owne vvordes more obscurely and subtillie An immooueble decree of Prouidence inherent in things mooueable whi●h firmlie effecteth euerie thing in his order place and time I call it A decree of Prouidence because I agree not vvhollie vvith the Diuines of our dayes let them giue me leaue in the free studie of the trueth who in name and nature confound it with prouidence I know it to be a hard matter and full of temeritie to conceiue or restraine vnto certaine wordes that Super-naturall and super-celestiall essence I meane God or ought that belongeth to him yet vnto mans capacitie I defend and maintaine that prouidence is one thing properlie and the same which wee call fate or destinie another For I consider prouidence no otherwise then that it be A Power and facultie in God of seeing knowing gouerning all things A POWER I say vniuersal vndiuided guarded and as Lucretius speaketh vnited together But Destinie seemeth to descend into the things themselues and to be seene in the particulars of them being as it were a disposing and bestowing abroad of that vniuersall prouidence by particulars Therefore Prouidence is in God and attributed to him alone Destinie in the things and to them is ascribed You thinke I trifle and as it is saide bore holes in Millet seede No Lipsius I take this out of the talk of the common people among whome nothing is more vsuall than to say This was my good or euill d●stinie and likewise this was the fatall decree of this kingdome or that town But no man so speaketh of prouidence no man applyeth it to the thinges themselues without impietie and dirision Therefore I said well that the one of them was in God thother trulie from God and perceiued in the selfe thinges I say moreouer that though Prouidence be not really diuided from Destiny yet it is more excellent and more ancient Euen as we are taught in the schooles of the wise to say that the Sunne is more worthy than the light Eternity than time Vnderstanding then reason But to drawe into a short summe these curious not common matters Thou seest I haue iust cause both to vse this distinction and also to retaine the name of Destinie against the new Consistory of Diuines For why Those auncient famosed Fathers prohibite mee not but that I may vse in his right and true sense the word DESTINY But now that I may return to make plaine my former definition I sayd it was An inherent decree to shew that Destinie should be marked in the thinges to the which it commeth and not from whence it proceedeth I added In mooueable thinges signifying that although Destinie it selfe bee immooueable yet it taketh not away motion nor any naturall facultie from thinges but worketh easilie and without force euen as the markes and signes imprinted by God in each thing do require In causes secundarie I meane that be necessarie it worketh necessarilie In natural causes naturallie in voluntarie causes voluntarilie In contingent contingentlie Wherefore in respect of the things it doth neither force nor constrain But as euerie thing is made to doe or suffer so it directeth and turneth all thinges But if you recall it to his first originall I meane God and his prouidence I affirme constantly and boldly that all thinges are done necessarily which are done by destiny Lastlie I ioyned of the Order place and time establishing that which I saide before that prouidence was of things in vniuersality Destiny by distribution in particularities By ORDER I vnderstande the course and vniting together of causes which destiny limitteth By PLACE and TIME I meane that woonderful and incomprehenble power whereby all euentes or actions are tyed to their certaine places and moments of time It was destinitie that Tarquinius should be banished his kingdome Be it so but first let the adulterie bee committed You see the order of the causes It was destiny that Caesar should bee killed So But in the Senate by the image of Pompei You see the place That Domitian should bee murthered of his owne people Let him be murthered but yet at the very houre euen the fift which in vaine he sought to preuent Thus you see the time CHAPT XX. It is distinguished by foure Notes from Stoicall