into their civill government nor have any thing to do with them which are the ordinary occasions of accord among men He ordained likewise that leather money should passe currant thereby to take from every one the defire to come thither and bring any merchandise or art to them so that that citie could never grow big by multiplying her inhabitants And because all our actions imitate nature it is neither possible nor naturall that the slender body of a tree should beare a grosse bough therefore a smal Republique cannot hold cities nor kingdomes of greater power and strength then she her selfe is and if perchance it comes to passe that she layes hold on them it befalls her as it does that tree the boughs whereof are greater then the body that sustaining it with much adoe with every small b'ast it is broken as we see it happen'd to Sparta which having seized on the rule of all the cities of Greece Thebes no sooner rebell'd against her but all the other cities likewise fell from her and so remain'd as the dead trunk of a tree without branches which could never befall Rome having her body and stocke so huge that it was of force with ease to support any bough whatsoever This manner then of proceeding together with those others which we shall afterwards speake of made Rome exceeding great and powerfull Which Titus Livius shewes in few words where he sayes All this while Rome wax'd great upon the ruines of Alba CHAP. IIII. Republiques have taken three particular courses to amplifie and inlarge their states HE that hath read the ancient histories with observation findes that Commonwealths have three manner of wayes to amplify their states The one hath bin that which the ancient Tuscans followed to make a league of many Republiques together where no one is preserred before the other neither in authority nor in dignity and to make other cities partakers with them in their gains just as now adayes the Swisses do and formerly in Greece the Achaeans and Etolians were wont And because the Romans had much war with the Tuscans the better to shew the quality of this first way I will inlarge my self in giving notice of them par ieularly Before the Romans had any great power in Italy the Tuscans were very mighty both by sea and by land and though there is no particular history that touches their affairs yet is there some small remembrance thereof and some signes left us of their greatness and we know how they sent a colony to the sea coast above called by them Adria which prooved of such renown that it gave the name to that sea and the Latins call it the Adri tick to this day Moreover we know that they had conquered all from Tiber to the very foot of the Alpes which encompass the whole body of Italy Notwithstanding that two hundred years before the Romans grew to any considerable strength the said Tuscans lost the dominion of that countrey which is now called Lombardy Which was seized on by the French who either driven by necessity or allured by the delicacy of the fruits especially the wines came into Italy under the conduct of Bellovesus their Captain and having defeated and chased out the natives seated themselves in that place therein built many cities and called the Countrey Gallia from the name they then bare and this they held til they were conquered by the Romans The Tuscans then liv'd with that equality and proceeded in the amplifying their State in that first manner spoken of before and there were twelve Cities among which were Clusium Vejum Desola Aretium and Volaterra and the like who by way of league rul'd their dominions nor could they inlarge their conquests beyond the bounds of Italy whereof also there was a great part left untoucht by them for the reasons which we shall afterwards tell The other manner is to make allies yet not so thought that thou still reservest not to thy self the principal place in the command rule and title of all the exploits which course was alwaies observ'd by the Romans The third manner is to make them immediatly subjects and not allies as did the Spaâ—tans and Athenians of which three waies this last is altogether unprofitable as it appears it was in the two foresaid Republiques which for no other cause went to ruine but for possessing themselves of those dominions which they were not able to hold For it is a thing of great difficulty and pains to hold the government of Cities by violence especially of those that have bin accustomed to live free And if thou beest not in armes and well furnished with good numbers of soldiers thou canst neither command nor rule them And to be able to do this it is necessary to make friends and companions who may assist thee in multiplying the people of thy City And because these two Cities did neither the one nor the other of these their manner of proceeding was of no advantage to them And because Rome which gives us an example touching this third manner did the one and the other therefore grew it to that excessive power and for that she alone took this course of living she alone therefore became so mighty For she having taken to her throughout all Italy many for her companions to help her who in many things liv'd with her upon equal termes but on the other side as is abovesaid reserving to her self alwaies the seat of the Empire and the title of commanding these their companions who were never aware of it with their own pains loss of their own bloud came to bring their own necks to the yoke for when they began to transport their Armies out of Italy and to reduce Kingdomes into Provinces to make thosetheir subjects who for that they were used to live under Kings were never much troubled to become Subjects and receiving Roman Governors over them and having bin overcome by Armies whereof the Romans had the name and title they acknowledged no other head but Rome So that those allyes of Rome that were in Italy found themselves on a sudden begirt round by Romes Subjects and oppress'd by an exceeding vast City as then Rome was and when they perceiv'd the deceit into which they had bin train'd it was too late to help it Rome had then gotten such authority with forrein Nations and was then of such strength within it self the people of their City being grown very numerous and warlike And although those their companions to be reveng'd on them for these injuries conspir'd together against them yet in a short time were they losers by the war making their own conditions worse for of allies they became Subjects Which manner of proceeding as is said hath bin observ'd onely by the Romans nor can a Republique that would enlarge her State take any other for experience hath not shew'd us any course more certain or true This way formerly spoken of concerning the leagues wherein anciently
among his people and withall diligence to shew that his valour got not the victory but rather it came by chance or by the enemies cowardise or by the direction of the other Captaines who were together with him in that imployment After that Vespasian being in Judea was by his army declar'd Emperor Antonius Primus who was then with another army in Illiria took his part and came thence into Italy against Vitellius who commanded at Rome and valorously conquer'd two Vitellian armies and made himself Master of Rome so that Mutianus sent by Vespanian found all already gotten by Antonius his valor and all difficulties surpassed The reward Antonius gain'd hereby was that Mutianus took away his command of the army and by little and little made him of no authority in Rome whereupon Antonius went away to Vespasian who was yet in Asia by whom he was so coldly receiv'd that in a short time depriv'd of all dignity he dyed in despaire And of these examples stories are full In our daies every one living knows with what industry and valour Gonsalvus Ferdinand warring in the Kingdom of Naples against the Frenchmen for Ferdinand King of Arragon brought that Kingdom under his obedience and how he had for reward of his conquest that Ferdinand parted from Arragon and came to Naples and first discharged him of his command of soldiers afterwards took from him the fortresses and then brought him away with him into Spain where a while after he dyed in disgrace Therefore this suspicion is so natural in Princes that they cannot escape it and it is impossible they prove thankfull to those who by victory have under their banners made great conquests And from that which a Prince is not free 't is no marvaile nor a thing worthy of greater note that a people is not free For a city living free hath two ends the one to gain the other to keep it self free and it cannot be but in the one or the other by excess of love it may erre Touching the errors in getting they shall be spoken of in their place as for the errors in maintaining their liberty there are these among others to hurt those citizens they should reward and to suspect those they should repose upon And though these wayes in a Republique come to corruption cause great evils and that many times they hasten it to a Tyranny as at Rome it befell Caesar who by strong hand took away that which unthankfulness denied him yet in a Commonwealth not corrupted are they causes of great good and make it live more free keeping men for fear of punishment more vertuous and less ambitious It is true that of all people that ever reign'd upon the causes above alleadg'd Rome was the least ungratefull for of her ingratitude we may say there is no other example but that of Scipio for Coriolanus and Camillus were banisht for the injury the one and the other had done the people But the one was not pardoned because he alwaies continued his malicious mind against the people the other was not only recall'd but all his lifetime after ador'd as a Prince But the ingratitude us'd towards Scipio grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him which was never conceived of the others which arose first from the greatness of the enemy Scipio had overcome from the reputation that the conquest of so long and perrilous a war had given him from the quick dispatch of it from those favours which youth wisdome and other his memorable vertues had gotten him Which things were so great that the Magistrates of Rome fear'd his authority more than any thing Which displeas'd the grave men as a matter not accustomed in Rome And his manner of living was thought so extraordinary that Priscus Cato reputed a man of great integrity was the first that stir'd against him and said that a city could not be called free where the Magistrates stood in fear of one citizen So if the people of Rome in this case followed Cato's opinion they deserve that excuse which I said before those Princes and people merit who through suspicion prove unthankfull Wherefore concluding this discourse I say that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness it shall appear that the people never put it in practise upon covetousness and upon suspicion less than Princes having less cause to be suspicious as quickly it shall be declared CHAP. XXX What means a Prince or Republique should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude or what A Commander or Citizen to be free from their danger A Prince to avoyd this necessity of living with suspicion or being ungratefull ought personally go to the warrs as in the beginning did those Roman Emperors and in our daies the Turk does and as those that are valorous have done and yet do For overcoming the glory and the gain is all their own And when they are not there in person the glory of the action belonging to another they think they cannot well make that conquest their own unlefs they put out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get and so become ungratefull and unjust And without doubt greater is their loss than their gain but when either through negligence for lack of judgment they stay idle at home and send out a Commander I have no other precept to give them than what they know of themselves But I advise that Commander because as I think he can hardly escape the nips of unthankfulness that he betake himself to one of these two expedients either presently upon his victory let him leave his army and put himself into his Princes hands abstaining from any action savouring of insolence or ambition that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him or at least not hurt him Or when he likes not to do thus let him resolutely take part against him and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his Prince what he hath gotten procuring the soldiers and the subjects good wills let him make friendship with his neighbors possess with his men the strong places corrupt the Chief of his army and assure himself of those he cannot and this way endeavor to punish his Lord for the ingratitude he would have us'd towards him Otherwaies there are not but as it was said before men know not how to be wholly vicious nor wholly good And alwaies it comes to pass that presently after the victory they will not part with their army behave themselves with modesty they cannot and to stand upon defyance in some honorable termes they know not how So that being irresolute which way to take between delay and doubt they are suppressed But to a Republique which would avoyd this vice of ingratitude we cannot apply the same remedy we may to a Prince that is that she go herself and not send out in her imployments being necessitated to make use of some one
full of cruelty and violence and how that many times those countries and cities that no weapons nor warlick instruments nor any other force of man hath been able to open one action of humanity piety chastity or liberality hath laid wide open Whereof in stories besides this we have many other examples And we all see that the Romans by war were not of power to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy and yet Fabritius his Frankeness sent him out when he discover'd to him the offer which a familiar friend of his had made the Romans to poison him We see also that the conquest of new Carthage got not Scipio Affricanus so much credit in Spaine as the example he gave of his chastity when he restored a young woman he took which was exceeding beautifull untoucheed by him to her husband The fame of which action got him friendship throughout all Spaine We see moreover how much these vertues are by the people wished for in great men and how much commended by writers both by those that set forth Princes lives and those also that give instructions how they ought to live Among whom Zenophon takes much painesin shewing what honours how great conquests and how exceeding good reputation Cyrus gained by his humanity and affability and by abstaining from all actions of pride cruelty luxury and other vices which blemish men lives Yet notwithstanding seeing Hannibal by courses contrary to these gained great fame and great victories I purpose to discourse thereupon in the Chapter following from whence this proceeded CHAP. XXI From whence it came that Hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of Scipioes wrought the same effects in Italy which the other did in Spaine I Think that some men could well marvaile seeing certain Commanders notwithstanding that they have led a contrary course of life bring to effect the like things which they have done that lived in the manner above written so that it appears that the cause of these victories depends not upon the aforesaid reasons and it seems that those waies gain thee neither more force nor better fortune being that glory and reputation may be gotten by contrary courses And not to part from the men I have above written of and the better to clear what I propounded I say as we see Scipio enter into Spain and by his humanity and mildness gain the friendship of that whole country and for them be adored and admired of those nations on the contrary side wee see Hannibal enter into Italy using all contrary waies which is by violence cruelty and rapine and all manner of infidelity worke the same effect that Scipio did in Spain for to Hannibal all the Towns in Italy rebelled and all the people ran after him And considering whence this may arise we see therein many reasous the first is that men are desirous of new matters insomuch as very often times as well they that live at case as they who do not desire novelty for as we said otherwhere and it is true men are as well glutted with good as afflicted and vexed with evill This desire therefore opens the gates wide to every one that in any Country makes himself the cheif of any innovation And be he a stranger they run after him if of the Country they come all about him they strengthen and favour him so that in what sort soever it be he proceeds he comes to advance exceedingly in those places Besides this men are thrust forward by two principal things either by love or feare so that he as well commands them that makes himself beloved as he that causes himself to be feared and most commonly he is more followed and obeyed that makes himself be feared then he that makes himself beloved Therefore it little imports a Commander by which of these wayes he goes provided that he be a Worthy man and that worth causes him to be of great repute among men for when that worth is great as it was in Hannibal and Scipio it cancells all the errors they commit either by the great love they beare them or the great feare they stand in of them For from the one and the other of these two waies great inconveniences may arise of force to ruine a Prince for he that desires to be too much belov'd any little that he swerves from the true way becomes contemptible And that other who would be too much feared when he a little exceeds the mean growes odious and to keep the middle way it is not possible for our nature will not comport it But it is necessary to allay these things that exceed with an extraordinary worth as Ha nibal and Scpio both did yet it appeard that the one and the other of them were endamag'd by their manner of life for which they were esteem'd and valu'd The valuation of both of them we have already spoke of the damage as for Scipio was that his own Soldiers in Spain together with some of his friends mutined against him which proceeded from nothing else than because they feard him not for men are so unsetled that upon the least overture made to their ambition they forth with forget all the good will they owe their Prince for his mildness and courtesie as did the aforesaid Soldiers and friends in so much as Scipio to remedie this inconvenient was constraind to practise that cruelty in some part which he had abhor'd As for Hannibal we have no particular example where the cruelty he us'd or his small faith did him any harm But we may well conceive that Naples and many other Townes that continued in obedience to the Romans did it for fear thereof This we see plainly that his wicked manner of living made him more odious to the people of Rome than any other enemy that Commonwealth ever had so that whereas to Pyrrhus while he was with his Armie in Italy they discoverd the party that intended to poyson him they never forgave it Hannibal though disarm'd and banish'd till they had made an end of him These incommodities then accru'd to Hannibal for being held impious a breaker of his faith and cruel but on the other side he thereby got one very great advantage which is much admired by all Writers that in his army though composed of several Nations there never arose any mutiny neither among themselves nor against him Which we caunot derive from any other cause than from the terror that grew from his person which was so great mixt with the reputation he gave of his valor that it kept his Soldiers in quietness and concord I conclude then that it imports not much in which of these two waies a Commander proceeds provided he hath so great worth in him as may well season the one and the other manner of living for as it is said both in the one and the other there is defect and danger when it is not corrected by some extraordinary endowments And if Hannibal and Scipio the one by commendable
to me seem to blame those things which were the first occasion of Romes liberty and that they think more of the stirs and noises which arose from those tumults then they regard the good effects they brought forth and that they consider not how there are two severall humours in every Republique that of the Commons and the other of the great-ones and how all the laws that are made in favor of liberty spring first from their disagreement as easily we may perceive it follow'd in Rome For from the Tarquins to the Gracchies more then 300. years the tumults of Rome seldome times caus'd banishment and very seldome blood Insomuch as no man can well deem these stirres hurtful nor say the Commonwealth was divided which in so long a time through her discord banish'd not above eight or ten Citizens and put very few to death nor yet condemn'd many in sums of money Neither can that be term'd with reason in any sort a disorderly Commonwealth whence we have so many rare examples of vertue for good examples proceed from good education a good education from good laws good laws from those tumults which many unadvisedly do condemn for whosoever shall examin the end thereof shall not find that they produc'd any banishment or violence in hinderance of the common good but laws ordinances in benefit of the publick liberty And if any man should alledge that the means were extravagant in a manner outragions To see the people together cry out against the Senate and the Senate against the people to run tumultuously through the streers to shut up their shops and the whole people of Rome to quit the town all which things fright even those that read them I say that every city ought to have its own waies whereby the people may vent their ambition especially those cities that in matters of importance wil availe themselves of their people among which Rome had this way that when the people would have a law made either they did some of the things forenamed or refus'd to have their names inrolled for the warres so that to quiet them there was a necessity in some sort to give them satisfaction And it is but seldom seen that the desires of free people tend to the hurt of liberty for they arise either from their oppression or from their suspicion they are falling into it And in case these opinions were false yet is there a meanes to rectifie them if some discreet Oratour in their assemblies perswade them of their error and the people as Tully says though of themselves ignorant yet are they of capacity to conceive the truth being told them by any man worthy of credit and do easily submit Wherefore we ought more sparingly to blame the Roman Government and consider the good effects issued from that Commonwealth which never proceeded but from good causes And for creating the Tribuns they deserve exceeding great praise for besides the giving to the people their share of Government they were ordain'd as guardians of the Roman liberty as it shall appear in the Chapter following CHAP. V. Whether the people or the nebiliry are the better Guardians of liberty and which have greater occasions of being tzmvltuous either they that strive to enlarge the state or they than endeavour but to maintain it THey who have judiciously laid the foundations of a Commonwealth have among other principal things ordain'd by them provided a safegard for liberty which as it is rightly plac'd so is it of long or shorter durance And because in every Republick there are the Nobility and the Commons question is made to which of these two more safely may be intrusted the Guard of liberty And among the Lacedemonians and in our times among the Venetians it hath been given to the Nobility but among the Romans it was committed to the peoples trust and therefore is it necessary to examine which of these two Common-wealths made the better choyce And if a man list to argue the case there want not arguments on both parts butif we look to the issue they had we should yeeld it to the Nobility because Sparta and Venice enjoy'd either of them their freedome longer then Rome And comming to argument I say first taking part with the Romans that they ought rather to be intrusted as guardians of any thing who are least desirous to usurpe it without doubt considering the designes of the nobility of the people we must needs confess they are very ambitious of rule these only desire not to be oppress'd and consequently affect the continuance of their freedome having less hope to usurpe it then the Nobility soâ— that the people being set as guardians of the Common liberty it is probable they are more careful of it and being themselves out of hope of it will never suffer that it fall into others hands On the other side he that argues for the Spartan and Venetian customes sayes that they who intrust it with them that are powerful doe two good things at once the one that they rather give a satisfaction to their ambition that having a greater part in the Common-wealth by holding this staffe in their hand they have greater reason to be contented the other is that they free the peoples unquiet minds from such a kinde of authority which is the occasion of infinite discords and offences in the Commonwealth and like enough to bring the Nobility to some desperation which in time may do much mischief and they give us Rome it self for an example hereof that when the Tribuns of the people had this authority in their hands they were not content to have one Consul to be a Plebeyan but would have both and thereupon they would have the Censor and the Pretour and all other dignities in the rule of the City nor was this enough but led on still with the same rage they began in after times to adore those men whom they saw fit to curbe the Nobility whereupon grew the power of Marius and the ruine of Rome and truly whosoever should sift this matter throughly the one and the other would much doubt which he should make choyce of for the guardians of liberty not knowing which sort of men is more hurtsull in a Commonwealth either that which desires to gain the honour it hath not or the other which endeavours to maintain what they have already got and at last whosoever shall examin the whole throughly will make this conclusion Either you reason of a Republick that aymes at such a dominion as Rome had or of one which seeks no farther then her own preservation In the firâ— case it is best to doe as Rome did and follow her footsteps In the second he may follow Venice and Sparta for those occasions as it shall be said in the Chapter following But to return to the point what kind of men are the more hurtful in a Republick either they that would enlarge the State or those that
are wary not to lose what they have already gotten I say that Marcus Menenius being made Dictatour and Marcus Follius General of the horse both Plebeyans to inquire after certain conspiracies which were made in Capua against Rome authority was also given from the people to find out those that in Rome by ambition or any extraordinary way did strive to gain the Consuâ—ship and the other great honours of the City whereupon the Nobility thinking this authority granted to the Dictatour as against them they reported all about Rome that they were not the Nobles that ambituously sought after dignities by unlawful means but the Plebeyans who not confident of their births nor worths sought by extravagant wayes to attain to those degrees and particularly accused the Dictatonr and so powerfull was the accusation that Menenius in a publick assembly where he complain'd of the calumnies the Nobility had laid on him quit the Dictatourship and submitted himself to the tryal which was made before the People and after his cause was heard he was absolved where it was argued whether savour'd more of ambition either he that would maintain or he that would gain for the one and the other appetite may occasion very great tumults Yet notwithstanding most commonly are they caus'd by him who already hath the possession because the feare of losing doth breed in them the same desires which are in those who aime at conquest because men think they hold not surely what they have unless they make a new addition of somewhat else and besides this the larger territories they are Master of the greater force and power they are able to imploy in bringing their designs to effect and this also may we adde that their unlimited and ambitious behaviours kindle in the breasts of those that have not a desire to have or to be reveng'd on those that despoyle them or else to become Lords themselves of that wealth and those honours which they see others use ill CHAP. VI. Whether in Rome there could have been â—uch a State founded as would quite haâ—â— taken away the hatreds between the People and the Senate WEE have discours'd upon the effects which the differences betwixt the People and the Senate made Now they continuing till the Gracchies where they occasion'd the ruine of the common liberty some man would wish that Rome could have atchieved these glorious acts she did without those jarres in her Yet it seems worthy the consideration to see if it were possible so to frame a State in Rome as could void all differencesâ— and if a man would examin this he should have recourse to those Republiques which without so many fallings out and bickerings have been long free and see what kind of State theirs was and whether Rome were capable of it An example among the ancients is Sparta among the modernes Venice both by me formerly named Sparta made it self a King with a little Senate to govern it Venice divided not the government with the names but in one general tearm all those that had a hand in it were call'd Gentlemen which chance rather cast on them then the deliberation of their founder for many inhabitants being met together upon those rocks where now stands that City upon the occasions foretold when they were grown to such a number that for them to live together it was necessary for them to ordain Lawes they appointed a forme of government and meeting also together in Counsel to advise touching the City when they found themselves of sufficient number to make up a body politick they excluded all others who afterwards in process of time should come to dwell there from all power in State affaires And in success of time finding there were many inhabitants in the place out of the Government to give them reputation that govern'd they call'd them Gentlemen and the others Plebeyans So that this order might well be begun and continued without the dislike of any for when it was first made every one that dwelt at Venice did equally partake of the Government so that none could complain they who afterwards came to inhabit there finding the State setled and limited had neither occasion nor meanes to make any tumult there was no occasion because nothing was taken from them and the meanes they had not because they that govern'd kept them in subjection nor trusted them so far with any imployment that they could take authority upon them Add hereunto that they who afterwards came to inhabit Venice were not many nor of so great a number that there was disproportion between the Governors and those that were governed for the number of the Gentlemen was either equal to them or greater then they were so that for these reasons Venice could well begin such a State and maintain it in unity Sparta as I said was govern'd by a King and a strict Senate and might well maintain it self so a long time because there being in Sparta but few inhabitants and they having seis'd upon the Government in prevention of those that should afterwards come to inhabit there and with reputation living in observance of Lycurgus Lawes took away quite all occasion of discord so that they might easily continue together in a long agreement for Lycurgus by his Laws ordain'd in Sparta more equality of estates and less of dignities for here poverty was to all alike and the Plebeyans less ambitious for the Magistracies of the City were communicable only to some few Citizens and were held apart from the People neither did the Nobility ever with their harsh usage make them covetous of them This eame from the Spartan Kings who being plac'd in that Principality and set in the midst of that Nobility had no surer means to maintain their dignity stedfast then to defend the People from injurious oppressions which made the People that it neither feared nor affected the Government and not having the rule nor fearing it the contention they might have with the Nobility was quite avoided and all occasion of tumults and in this sort they might live in peace a long time But two principal things caus'd this agreement because the inhabitants of Sparta were few and therefore might be govern'd by few the other because not accepting of strangers into their Republick they had not occasion either of being corrupted or making great increase so as to become insupportable to those few that govern'd them Wherefore considering these things it appears that the founders of Rome were to have us'd one of these two expedients if they desir'd to maintain it quicker like one of these Commonwealths we have spoken of either not to imploy the common people in War as the Venetians or not admit strangers into the City as the Spartans both of which they did which gave the people force and increase and sundry occasions of tumults So that if the Roman State grew more quiet this inconvenient follow'd that it was also weaker because it disabled it self of the means to come
the popular faction advis'd that now the time was come they had power to chastise the people and to take away that Authority which they had laid hold on in prejudice of the Nobility by keeping them in hunger and want distributing the Corn to them Which opinion of his they hearing of took such distast against Coriolanus that had not the Tribunes cited him to appear to defend his cause the people had slain him in a tumult as he came out of the Senate Upon which accident we note that which before was said how fit and usefull it is that the Commonwealths with their Lawes give meanes to vent the choler which the universality hath conceiv'd against any one Citizen For when they have not these ordinary meanes they have recourse to extraordinary and out of question these are of worse effect then those For if by an orderly course one Citizen be ssuppres'd although it were wrongfully done yet follwes thereupon little or no disorder in the Republick because the execution is done without any private mans power or assistance of forrein forces which are those that take away the common liberty but by the publick and lawful power which have their particular bounds nor any way pass so far as to endammage the Commonwealth And to confirm this opinion with examples this of Coriolanus from the ancients shall suffice me upon which let every one consider what mischief thereby had faln on the Common-wealth of Rome if in a tumult he had been flain for thereupon had grown offences between particular men offences cause feare feare seekes defence for defence men make partisans and thus parties grow in Cities and from them the ruine of Cities But the matter being order'd by publick authority they took away all those mischiefes which might have happen'd had it been carried by private power we have seen in our daies what innovations it hath brought on the Florentine Republick in that the multitude had no legal meanes to vent their displeasure against a single Citizen as it befel in the time of Franciscus Valorus who was as it were Prince of the City and being by many thought ambitious and a man that by his insolent and high stomack would not content himself to live within a civil Government and there being no way in the Commonwealth to resist him unless with some faction opposite to his thence it came that he not doubting other then some extraordinary meanes began to seek favourers of his party to defend him On the other side they that oppos'd him having no ready way to suppress him devis'd some extraordinary waies insomuch as they came at length to fight and where if by an ordinary course he could have been restrain'd his power had sunk with his own loss onely a now having to use extraordinary meanes in breaking it there ensued not only his but the ruine of many other Noble Citizens There might also be alledged to confirm our former conclusion the accident chanc'd in Florence upon the occasion of Peter Soderinus which wholly proceeded from the want of meanes in that Republick to accuse the ambition of some powerful Citizens for it was not enough to accuse a mighty man before eight Judges in a Commonwealth The Judges ought to be in great number for a few do after the manner of two or three so that if such courses were taken either the Citizens would have accus'd him living ill and thereby without calling the Spanish Army to aid would have wreak'd their anger on him or not behaving himself ill they durst not have ventur'd to seek his ruine for feare themselves of incurring danger And so on all sides had ceas'd that ravenous cruelty which was the cheif occasion of offence Whereupon we may conclude this that so oft as we see forrein forces call'd upon by any party of Citizens we may well beleeve that in that City there is lack of good Ordinances even lack of that ordinary meanes to vent without extraordinary waies the maligne humors which grow in men whereunto it is sufficiently remedied by allowing of accusations before many Judges and withall countenancing them Which courses were so well order'd in Rome that in so many quarrels between the people and the Senate neither the one nor the other nor any particular Citizen ever intended to availe themselves by any forreign strength because they having a remedy at home were not necessitated to go seek it abroad And though the examples above written are sufficient to prove this yet I will alledg another related by Titus Livius in his History who reports that in Clusia the Noblest City in those daies in all Tuscany by one Lucumon Aruns was ravished and he not being able to work his revenge by reason of the ravishers might went and found out the French-men who then raign'd in that place we now call Lombardy and encourag'd them to bring an Army to Clusia showing them that with their gain they might revenge him of the injury done him and if Aruns had seen possibility to have been righted by any means in the City he never would have inquir'd after any barbarous power But as these accusations are profitable in a Commonwealth so are calumnies unprofitable and hurtful as it shall appear by our discourse in the next Chapter CHAP. VIII Accusations are not more beneficial to Common-wealths then Calumnies pernitious NOtwithstanding that the virtue of Furius Camillus after he had freed the City of Rome from the siege and oppression of the Frenchmen had brought to pass that none of the Citizens of Rome thought it took any way from their credit or degree to give him place yet Manlius Capitolinus could not endure that so much honor and renown should be ascribed to him Being of opinion that touching the safety of Rome in that he had defended the Capitol from the Enemies he deserv'd as much as Camillus and in regard of other warlike glories he was no way second to him So that overburden'd with envy nor being able to take rest for this mans honor and perceiving he could sow no discord among the Fathers he made his address to the people scattering among them divers sinister opinions And among other things he said this also that the treasure which was collected for the Frenchmen and after not given them was usurp'd by some private Citizens and if it were had again it might be turn'd to the publick good easing the people of their tributes or some private debts These words were of force with the people so that they began to run together and as they listed to raise many tumults in the City Which thing much displeasing the Senat and they taking it for a matter of great moment and dangerous created a Dictatour that he might examin the case and bridle the violence of Manlius Whereupon the Dictator cited him and they met in publick one against the other the Dictator environ'd with the Nobility Manlius with the People Manlius was demanded who had the treasure he spoke
which to Numa was necessary who feign'd to have familiar conversation with a Nymph who instructed him wherewith continually to advise the people And all sprung from this because he desiring to settle new orders and unaccustomed in that City doubted that his own authority was not of full force And truly never was there yet any maker of extraordinary laws in a nation that had not his recourse to God for other wise the laws had not been accepted For many several goods are known by a wise man which have not such evident reasons in themselves that he by perswasion can quickly make others conceive them Therefore the wise men that would free themselves of this difficulty have recourse to a God so did Lycurgus so Solon so many others whose design was the same with theirs Thereupon the people of Rome admiring his goodness and wisdom yeelded to all his purposes But it is true because those times were then full of Religion and those men rude and gross on whom he spent his pains this much facilitated his designs being thereby able to mould them into a new forme And without question if any one in these daies would frame a Republick he should find it easier to deale with rude mountainers who had never known any civility than with those who had been accustomed to live in Cities where the government 's corrupted and a carver shall easier cut a saire Statue out of a rough marble than out of one that hath been bungl'd upon by another Wherefore having well considered all I conclude that the Religion introduc'd by Nutna was one of the principal occasions of that cities happiness for that caus'd good orders good orders brought good fortune and from their good fortunes grew all the happy successes of their enterprises and as the observance of divine worship occasions the greatness of a Commonwealth so the contempt of it destroys it For where the feare of God is wanting it must needs be that either that Kingdom goes to ruine or that it be supported by the awe it stands in of the Prince who may supply the defects of Religion and because Princes are but short-liv'd that Kingdom must needs have an end quickly according as the vertue thereof failes from whence it comes that governments which depend upon the vertue of one man abide but a while because that vertue ends with his life and it seldome chances that it is renew'd by succession as well saies the Poet Dante Rade volte discende per li rami L'humana probitate questo vuole Quel che lada perche da lui si chiami Therefore the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom consists not wholly in a Prince that governs wisely while he lives but in one that so orders it that he dying it can preserve it self And although it be easier to work rude and untaught people to a new course and frame yet argues it not therefore an impossibility to prevaile with men that have liv'd in a civill government and presume somewhat to understand themselves The Florentines think not themselves either ignorant or rude yet were they perswaded by Frier Jerom Savanarola that he talked with GOD. I will not judge whether it were true or not because we ought not to speak of such a great personage but with reverence But truly I say that very many beleev'd him not having seen any great matter to perswede them thereto for his life doctrine and the subject he took were sufficient to make them credit him Wherefore let no man be discouraged as if he could not reach to what another hath heretofore attaind for men as we said in our preface were born liv'd and died under the same laws of nature CHAP. XII Of what importance it is to hold a worthy esteem of Religion and that Italy for having fail'd therein by means of the Church of Rome hath gone to wrack THose Princes or those Republicks which would keep themselves from ruine are above all other things to preserve the ceremonies of their Religion incorrupted and maintain it alwaies venerable For there is no greater sign of a countries going to destruction then to see in it the contempt of divine worship And this is easie to be understood it being once known upon what ground the Religion is built where a man is born For every Religion hath the foundation of its being upon some principal thing The life of the Gentiles Religion subsisted upon the answers of the oracles and upon the sect of the conjecturers and soothsayers all the other ceremonies sacrifices and rites depended on these Because they easily believ'd that that God that could foretell thee thy future good or evill could also send it thee From hence came the Temples the Sacrifices and supplications and all other ceremonies in their veneration for the Oracle of Delos the Temple of Jupiter Ammon and other famous Oracles held the world in devotion and admiration As they afterwards began to speak in imperious manner and their falshood was discover'd among the people men began to be incredulous and apt to disturb all good orders Therefore the Princes of a Republick or Kingdom should maintain the grounds of the Religion they hold and this being done they shall easily keep their Commonwealth religious and eonsequently vertuous and united They ought also to favour and increase all those things that advantage it howsoever that they think them false and the rather should they do it the wiser they are and understand the causes of natural things And because this course hath been taken by many wise men hence grew the opinion of miracles which are celebrated even in false Religions for wise men augment them what beginning so ever they have and their authority afterwards gives them credit Of these miracles there was great quantity at Rome and among others there was this one the Roman soldiers sacking the Vejentes City some of them went into the Temple of Juno and comming to her image ask'd her wilt thou go to Rome some thought she nodded another thought she said yes For those men being very religious which T. Livius shews for that entry into the Temple was without tu mult all devout and full of reverence imagined they heard that answer which pâ—radventure they presuppos'd before â—and would be made them this opinion and belief was altogether favour'd and augmented by Camillus and the other principal men of the City Which Religion if it were maintained among the Princes of the Christian Republick according as by the institutor thereof it was ordain'd the Christian States and Republicks would be far more in unity and enjoy more happiness far then now they do nor does any thing give us so shrewd a conjecture of the declining of it as to see that those people that are neerest neighbours to the Church of Rome head of our Religion are the most inreligious And whosoever would well consider the original grounds thereof and look upon the present use how much this differs from
of her citizens It sutes well therefore that for her best remedy she take the same course the Commonwealth of Rome took to be less unthankfull then all others Which grew from her manner of government for the whole city both Nobles and Plebeians being train'd up to war there arose alwaies in Rome in all ages men of such valour experience and reputation that there was no occasion to doubt of any one of them they being many who kept one another in order And so long they continued â—iu integrity and with regard not to make others jealous of their ambition nor give occasion to the people to do them harme taking them for ambitious persons for if any one were made Dictator he got most honor by it that laid down his Dictatorship soonest And so such like way not being sufficient to raise suspect could not breed ingratitude So that a Republique that would not have cause given her to be unthankfull should governe her self in the same manner Rome did And a citizen that would be free from all their despights should follow the same steps the citizens of Rome went CHAP. XXXI That the Roman Commanders were never extraordinarily punish'd for any error committed nor at all punish'd when either by their ignorance or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them the Commonwealth suffer'd loss THE Romans as formerly we have discours'd were not only less ungrateful than other Commonwealths but also were more pitifull and more advised in the punishment of the Generalls of their armies than any else For if their fault proceeded from malice yet they gently chastis'd them but if it was through ignorance they were so far from punishing them that they rewarded and honour'd them This manner of proceeding was well consider'd by them for they judg'd it a matter of great importance to those that commanded their armies to have their mind free without any clog upon it and without any outwards respects to restrain them in their resolutions because they would not add new difficulties and danger to a thing by it self hard and dangerous advising well that with these hindrances a man cannot bravely execute his designs For example when they sent an army into Greece against Philip of Macedon or into Italy against Anniball or against those people they first overcame That Commander to whom the imployment was committed had the vexation of all those cares that follow such charges which are of weight and importance Now if to such cares this were added that many examples of the Romans were recorded where they had crucifyed or otherwise put to death those that had lost any battels it was impossible that that Captain among so many suspicions cou'd resolve any thing couragiously Therefore they deeming these sufficiently punish'd with the shame of their loss they were not willing to startle them with any more grievous punishment Here is one example of a fault committed and not through ignorance Sergius and Verginius were incamp'd against the Veyans each of them commanding a part of the army Sergius was to incounter the Tuscans and Verginius was to set upon the other side It chanc'd that Sergius being assaulted by the Falisci and other people endur'd rather to be quite rout'd and put to flight before he would send for ayd to Verginius And on the other side Verginius staying til til he should humble himself would rather see the dishonour of his country and the ruine of the army than succour him A case indeed very exemplary and of much malice neither would it have bin for the Common-wealth of Romes reputation to have let the one or the other pass without censure True it is that where another Republique would have punish'd them with death this punish'd them only in a sum of money The cause hereof was not that their offences deserv'd not greater punishment but because the Romans would in this case for the reasons already alleadged continue their ancient customes And touching errors of ignorance we have no better example than that of Maro through whose rashness the Romans having bin broken at Canne by Hanniball where the Republique came indanger to lose her liberty yet because it was ignorance and not malice they not only did not chasise him but honor'd him and the whole order of the Senatâ—rs mâ—thim upon the way in his return to Rome and because they could not thank him for the battel fought they thankt him yet that he was return'd to Rome and had not despair'd of the Roman State When Papirius Cursor would have put Fabius to death for having contrary to his command fought with the Samnites among other reasons which Fabius his Father brought against the Dictators obstinacy was this that the people of Rome in any loss that ever her Captains had made had never done that which Papirius in a victory would have done CHAP. XXXII A Republique or Prince should not defer to do good unto men until their necessity requires it ALthough it succeeded happily to the Romans to have us'd liberality towards the people upon occasion of a sudden danger when Porsenna made war against Rome to restore the Tarquins where the Senate doubting of the people lest they would sooner accept of the Kings than endure out the war to make themselves sure of them they took off from them the taxes of salt and every kind of grievance saying the poor contributed enough to the common good if they did but nourish their children and thereupon in regard of this benefit the people expos'd themselves to indure the siege the famine and the war Yet let none presuming upon this example delay to gain the good will of the people til the times of danger for it will never prove so well to them as it did to the Romans for the generality will think they have not this good from thee but from thy adversaries and being to fear that when that necessity is past thou wilt withhold from them that good which of force thou didst them they will not think themselves any way beholding to thee And the reason why this business succeeded well to the Romans was because the State was new and not well setled yet and that people also had seen that formerly laws had bin made for their advantage as that of appeal to the people so that they might well perswade themselves that the good they had was done them not so muth upon occasion of their enemies coming as from the good disposition of the Senate towards them Moreover the Kings were yet fresh in their memory by whom they had bin many waies scorn'd and abus'd And because such like occasions seldom fall out it seldom also comes to pass that the like remedies are of use whosoever therefore sit at the helme in a state be it either a Commonwealth or a Prince should consider before hand what contrary times may come upon them and what men in their troubles they may stand in need of and therefore should live with them alwaies in such a
manner that upon any accident chancing they may find them ready and willing to serve their occasions And he that governs otherwise either Prince or Republique but especially a Prince and afterwards upon the exigent when danger is at hand thinks with any benefits to recover or obligemen to him is much deceiv'd for he does not onely not secure himself but hastens his own destruction CHAP. XXXIII When an inconvenient is much grown either in a state or against a state it is better to beare with it for a while then presently to struggle with it WHen the commonwealth of Rome grew in reputation force and rule the neighboring people who at first were not aware of the harme this new Republique might do them began though late to know their fault and desiring to remedy that which at first they had neglected nigh fourty several people were joyned together aâ—ainst Rome whereupon the Romans among the remedies they were wont to make use of in their extreamest dangers betook them to create a Dictatour that is to give power to one man that without calling any Council he might resolve and without any appeal he might execute his resolutions Which remedy as then it serv'd to purpose and was the occasion they overcame those eminent dangers so it was alwaies exceeding profitable in all those occasions which in the grow'th of the Empire at any time did rise against the Republique Upon which accident we are first to discourse how that when an inconvenient that rises either in a Commonwealth or against a Commonwealth caus'd by an inward or an outward cause is become so great that it begins to make every one afraid the safer course is to temporise with it then strive forthwith to extinguish it For most commonly it proves that they who indeavor to quench it kindle it much more and suddenly pluck down that mischief upon their heads which was then but fear'd from thence And of such like accidents many arise in the Commonwealth oftner upon inward oceasions then outward Where oftentimes either a citizen is suffered to lay hold of more forces then is reasonable or else some law begins to be corrupted which is the very nerve and life of liberty And this error is suffer'd to pass on so far that there is more danger in the remedy then in the evil And so much the harder is it to know these inconvenients at their birth by how much more it seems to agree with mens natures alwaies to favor things in their beginnings and these favors are of more force rather then in any thing else in those works that seem to have somewhat of vertue in them and are done by young men For if in a republique any young noble man put forward himself having in him extraordinary vertue all the citizens begin to cast their eyes on him and agree together without any consideration to honor him so that if he hath any touch of Ambition meeting with those favors nature affords him and this accident coming suddenly in place before the Citizens perceive the errors they are in it falls out that they have small means to help themselves And when these that have the remedies in their powers would put them in practise they do but with haste augment his authority Hereof we might alleadge sundry examples but I will give onely one out of our own city Cosmus of Medici from whom the house of Medici in this city took the beginning of their greatness came into such reputation through the favor that his own wisdom and the other citizens ignorance gave him that he began to make the state somewhat afraid of him so that some citizens held it very dangerous to offend him and others as dangerous to let him alone But Nicholas of Vizzano living at the same time who was esteem'd a very expert man in civil affairs and being that the first error was made is not knowing the dangers that might arise upon Cosmus his reputation while he liv'd would never suffer that they should make the second which was that they should indeavor to put him down judging that such an assay would be altogether the ruine of their state as in effect it came to pass which was after his death For those citizens that were left not following this advice made themselves strong against Cosmus and chas'd him out of Florence Whereupon it follow'd that his faction resenting the injury a while after recall'd him and made him Prince of the Commonwealth to which step he could never have climb'd without that manifest opposition The selfsame befell Rome with Caesar whose vertue being favor'd by Pompey and others at length came to change their favor into fear whereof Cicâ—ro witnesses saying that Pompey had late begun to fear Caesar Which fear caus'd them to think upon the remedies and the remedies they us'd hasten'd the ruine of their Commonwealth I say then that seeing it is a hard thing to know these evils when they arise this difficulty being occasion'd by a deceit wherewith most things in their beginning do deceive the wiser way is to dissemble them when they are knowne then to oppose them For temporizing with them they either are extinguish'd of themselves or at least the evill is put off for a longer time And in all affaires Princes ought to be well advis'd who intend either to suppresse evills or to oppose their forces and their invasions that in liew of hurt they do them not good and thinking to thrust on forward a businesse they draw it not after them or instead of choaking a plant they water is not And they should well consider wherein the greatest force consists and when they find their powers sufficient to heale what is amiffe they should then apply their strongest remedies or otherwise let it alone nor in any case meddle with it for it would fall out as before hath bin said and as it befel the neighbours of Rome for whom it had bin better after that Rome was so growne in strength with treaties of peace to indeavour to quiet it and so yet keep it backward rather then by making a strong warre against it to force it to new courses and new defences For to what other purpose serv'd their conspiracy then to make them more lively and to thinke upon new wayes whereby in a farre shorter time they much inlarg'd their power Among which was the creation of a Dictatour by which new order they not onely overcame the dangers that hung over their heads but it was an occasion to stop very many misischiefes which without that remedy the commonwealth must needs have incurr'd CHAP. XXXIIII The Dictatours authority did good and not harme to the Commonwealth of Rome and how authorities which the citizens take upon them of themselves and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices are hurtfull to the civill government THose Romans are by some writer condemned that found out in that city the way to create a Dictatour as a
countrey affords whereby is taken away the occasion of all conversation and the beginning of all corruption For so they could not learn the French Spanish or Italian manners which nations together corrupt the whole world The other reason is because those Republiques where the common liberty is preserv'd and uncorrupted do not permit that any citizen of theirs should live after the manner of a gentleman but rather maintain among them an equality and those that live in that countrey are cruel enemies to the Lords and Gentlemen And if by chance they fall into their hands they put them to death as the principal authors of corruption and occasions of scandal And to make plain this name of gentlemen what it is I say that those are call'd gentlemen that live in idleness yet deliciously of the profits of their estates without having any care to cultivate their lands or to take any other pains necessary to the maintenance of mans life These kind of men are very hurtfull in every Commonwealth and countrey but worse are they that besides the foresaid fortunes hold strong Castles and have vassals that obey them With these two sorts of men the Kingdom of Naples abounds the countrey about Rome Romagna and Lombardia This is the cause that in those countreys there hath never bin any Republique nor any civil government for such kinds of men are enemies to all civil government And if a man had a minde to bring into such countreys the forme of a Commonwealth he would find it impossible but to bring them under some order if any man had the power he could take no other course then reduce them to a Royalty The reason is this because where the matter is so extreamly corrupted that the laws are not able to restrain it it is needfull to ordain together with them a greater power which is the authority of a King who by his absolute and extraordinary power may be of force to bridle the excessive ambition and corruption of the mighty This reason is verified in the example of Tuscany where we see that in a small space of countrey three Republiques have long consisted Florence Siena and Lucca and that the other cities of that countrey serve in such a kind that they have their dispositions and their orders much like them and that they would willingly maintain the common liberty all this arises from hence because there are no lords of Castles in those countreys and never a one or very few Gentlemen but such equality that an understanding man that hath appli'd himself to the knowledg of the ancient civil governments might easily reduce them to a free state But their misfortune hath bin so great that as yet they have not lit upon any man that had either the power or knowledg to put it in execution This conclusion then I draw from hence that he that strives to frame a Republique where there are many gentlemen cannot do it unless he first dspatch them all out of the way and he that would erect a Monarchy or a Principallity where there is much equality shall never effect it unless he drawes out of that equality many of ambitious and turbulent mindes and makes them rather gentlemen in effect then in title enriching them with Castles and possessions allowing them the favor of wealth and men to the end that he being plac'd in the midst of them by their means may maintain his power and they by his favor preserve their ambition and the rest be constrain'd to bear that yoke which force and nothing else can make them endure And there being by this way a proportion from him that forces to him that is forced thereby men continue setled every one in their order And because to bring a countrey to be a Republique which is fit to be a Kingdom and of one fit to be a Republique to make a Kingdome is a subject worthy of a man of extraordinary judgment and authority many there have bin that have endeavor'd it but few have bin able to go through with it because the weight and consequence thereof partly frights them and partly so overbears them that they fail in their first beginnings I think the experience we have of the Republique of Venice will seem a little to contrary my opinion that where there are gentlemen a Republique cannot be instituted for there none can partake of the dignities unless they be gentlemen The answer hereto is that this example makes no opposition against us for the gentlemen in that Republique are rather in name then in effect for they have not great revenues out of possessions and lands but their great wealth is founded upon merchandise and moveable goods and moreover none of them hold any Castles or have any jurisdiction over men but the name of gentleman among them is a name of honor and credit not being grounded upon any of those things that caus'd those in other cities to be call'd gentlemen And as other Republiques have all their divisions under several names so Venice is divided into the Gentility and the Commonalty and their order is that those are capable of all honors these not Which is not any cause of imbroile among them for the reasons we have other where said Let a Common-wealth then be there ordain'd where allthings are reduc'd to an equality and contrariwise let a Prince be made where great inequality is otherwise shall there be neither proportion nor continuance CHAP. LVI Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or a countrey usually there are some prodigies which forerun them or men that foretell them FRom whence this proceeds I know not but it is evident as well by ancient as modern examples that no very heavy accident ever befell any countrey or City that hath not bin foretold either by some Diviners or by some revelations or prodigies or signes from heaven And not to goe too far from home to fetch the proof hereof every one knows how long before the coming of Charles the eighth of France into Italy was foretold by Fryer Jerome Savanarola and how besides this it was said throughout all Tuscany that there were heard in the aire and seen over Arrezzo many men in armes skirmishing together Moreover we all know here that before Laurens of Medici the old mans death the Duemo or principal Church was fir'd with lightning on the top even to the ruine thereof Nor is any man here ignorant how a little before that Peter Soderini who had bin made the Florentines chief Standard-bearer for life was banish'd and depriv'd of his dignities the Palace was in the same manner burnt with lightning A man might alleadge other examples beside these but I leave them rather to avoyd tediousness I shall relate that onely which Titus Livius speaks of before the the Frenchmens coming to Rome and that is how one Marcus Ceditius a Plebeyan told the Senate that he had heard at midnight as he past by the new way a voyce greater
than any mans which warn'd him to tel the Magistrates that the Frenchmen were coming to Rome The reason hereof I think fit to be discours'd upon and treated of by some man well versed in the knowledge of natural and supernatural things which I profess not Yet it may be as some Philosophers will have it that the ayre being full of spirits who by their natural knowledge foreseeing things to come take compassion upon men and advertise them by such like signes to the end they should prepare themselves for their defence But however it is we may find it true that alwaies after such strange accidents new and extraordinary chances befall countreys CHAP. LVII The Common people united are strong and vigorous but taken apart and separated vile and contemptible MAny Romans the countrey all about being much ruined and wasted upon the Frenchmens passage to Rome were gone to dwell at Veyum contrary to the appointment and order of the Senate who to remedy this disorder commanded by their publique edicts that every one within a set time under a certain penalty should return to inhabite at Rome At which edicts at first they against whom they were directed scoffed but afterwards when the time drew near that they were to obey they all yielded their obedience And Titus Livius uses these words Of fierce that they were all in general each one out of his particular fear became obedient And truly the nature of a multitude in this particular cannot better be laid open than here in this Text it is shewed for the multitude is many times very insolent in their speeches against their Princes decrees Afterwards when they see their punishment near and certain not trusting to one another they hasten all to obedience so that it plainly appears that a man ought to have regard to the good or ill disposition of the people towards him if it be good to take such order that it may still continue if ill to provide so that it cannot hurt him This is meant for those ill dispositions which the people have bred in them upon any other occasion than for the loss of their liberty or for the love of their Prince who is yet living For the evil humors that arise from these causes are terrible beyond measure and have need of great remedies to restrain them Their other indispositions will be easy when they have not made choyce of any heads to whom they may have their recourse for on oneside there is not a more dreadfull thing than a dissolute multitude and without a head and on the other side there is nothing weaker then it for though they have their weapons in their hands yet will it be easy to reduce them provided that thou canst avoyd the first shock of their furie for when their rage is a little appeas'd and every one considers that he is to return again to his home they begin then a little to doubt of themselves and to take a care for their safety either by flight or agreement Therefore a multitude up in armes desiring to escape these dangers is to make ehoyce of a head out of themselves who may direct them keep them united and provide for their defence as did the common people of Rome when after the death of Verginia they departed from Rome and for their own preservations they chose 20 Tribuns from among themselves which if they do not there allwaies befalls them that which Titus Livius saies in his above written discourse that joyntly together they are of strength and vigor but when each one afterwards begins to advise of his own danger they become weak and contemptible CHAP. LVIII The multitude is more wise and constant then a Prince THat nothing is more vain or inconstant than the multitude as well our Author Titus Livius as all other Historians do affirm for we find it often in the relations of mens actions that the multitude hath condemned some man to death whom afterwards they have grieved for and exceedingly wish'd for again as we see the people of Rome did for Manlius Capitolinus whom after they had condemn'd to death they much desir'd again And these are the words of the Author The people after that by his death they perceiv'd themselves free from danger wished him alive again And in another place when he shewes the accidents that followed in 〈…〉 cusa after the death of Hieronymus Hie 〈…〉 nephew he sayes This is the nature of the multitude that they are either slavish in their obedience or insolent in their auihority I know not whether herein I undertake not too hard a task so full of difficulties that I must either give it over with shame or continue it with blame having a desire to defend that which as I have said is accused by all writers But however it be I do not judge it nor ever will a defect to defend some opinions with their reasons without any intention to use either authority or force Therefore I say that of that defect whereof those writers accuse the multitude all men in particular are guilty and especially Princes for every one that is not regulated by the lawes would commit the same errors which the loose multitude does And this we may easily know for there are and have bin many evil Princes and vertuous and discreet ones but a few I speak of Princes that have bin able to break the bridle that could check them among whom we reckon not those that were in Egypt when in that very ancientest antiquity that countrey was governed by the lawes nor those of Spavta nor those that in our daies are in France which Kingdom is order'd more by the laws than any other which in these times we have knowlege of And these Kings which grow up under such constitutions are not to be accounted in that number from whence we are to consider the nature of every man by himself and discerne if he be like the multitude for in parallell with them we should set down a multitude in like manner regulated by the lawes as they are and therein shall be found the same goodness that is in them and we shall see they neither insolently domineere nor slavishly serve as the people of Rome which whilest the Republique continued uncorrupted never serv'd basely nor rul'd proudly but with their own customes and Magistrates held their own degree honorably And when it was necessary to rise up against one that were powerfull they did it as it appear'd in the example of Manlius and in that of the ten and others who went about to oppress them And when it was requisite they should obey the Dictators and the Consuls for the common safety they did it likewise and if the people of Rome desired again Manlius Capitolinus being dead it is no marvail for they desired his vertues which had bin such that the remembrance of them mov'd every one to compassion and might be of force likewise to work the same
the Tuscans Acheans and Aerosians liv'd and which now adayes the Swisses use is the better way next after that the Romans took for it being not possible by it to grow very great thou gainest two advantages thereby the one that easily thou drawest no war upon thee the other that what thou gettest thou easily holdest The reason why they cannot grow great is because they are disunited Republiques and placed in divers seats which makes it more difficult to consult and resolve And besides because they are not very greedy of extending the limits of their dominions for that divers Commonalties being to participate of that rule they value not so much such conquests as does a Republique alone which hopes to injoy it all her self Moreover they govern themselves by common advice and counsel and therfore of force they must be slower in every deliberation then they that live within the walls of the same City It is plain also by experience that this manner of proceeding prescribes it self certain bounds which it passes not nor have we any example that they were exceeded And these were to joyn together some dozen or fourteen Commonalties and afterwards never seek to go beyond that for being come to those terms that they think they are able to defend themselves against every one they desire no greater power as well because necessity does not bind them to have greater force as also because they understand not any great profits that arise from such like purchases for the causes formerly alledged for then of necessity they must either go on forward to make themselves allyes and so the multitude would make a confusion or els to make them their subjects and because they see herein many difficulties and no great advantage in holding them they make no account of them Whereupon when they have attaind to such greatness that they think they may live secure they apply themselves to two things the one to entertain others in their protection and undertake their defences and by these means to draw money from every part which they can very easily divide among one another and the other to serve in the wars under another and to take pay of this or that Prince who gives them wages for their service as now adayes the Switzers do and as we read those we spoke of before did whereof Titus Livius bears witness where he sayes that when Philip King of Macedon came to a parley with Titus Quintius Flamminius to treat an accord in presence of a Prercur of the Aetolians the said Pretour comming to some words with Philip was reproved by him for avarice and infidelity saying that the Aeâ—olians were not ashamed to take pay and serve in the wars on both sides so that many times their ensignes were seen in two contrary Armies We know withall that this manner of proceeding by Leagues hath bin alwayes alike and hath prodec'd the same effects We see also that that way of making people become subjects hath bin alwaies weak and brought forth but small advantages and when they have exceeded the due mean they have gone to ruine And if this course of making Subjects be unprofitable in warlike Commonwealths surely in those that are disordered it must needs be far worse as in our daies have bin the Republiques of Italy Wherefore we find that to be the true way which the Romans held which is the rather to be admired in somuch as there was no other example thereof before that of Rome nor since hath bin any that hath imitated it And touching the leagues there are the Switzers onely the Swevian league that follows them And as in the conclusion of this matter shall be said so many orders observ'd by the Romans as well concerning the affairs within the City as those without in these our times are not onely not followed but made no account of some of them are deem'd untrue some unpossble others nothing to purpose or unprofitable so that whiles we stand still in this ignorance we become a prey to any that invades our Countrey And though it should seem difficult to imitate the Romans yet ought it not seem so to follow the steps of the ancient Tuscans especially to the Tuscans now living for though they were not able for the reasons alledged to make themselves an Empire like that of Rome yet could they gain them that power in Italy that their manner of proceeding would permit them which for a long time was with great glory of their rule and wars and with exceeding great commendation of their manners and religion Which power and glory was first abated by the French and afterwards quite put out by the Romans and so put out that of this power which two thousand years since was very great at this present we have no memory left Which hath made me muse what the cause is that matters are thus forgotten whereof in the Chapter following we shall treat CHAP. V. That the changes of Religions and Languages together with the chances of floods or pestilences abolish the memory of things TO those Philosophers who would have made men beleeve that the world is eternal I think one might have replyed that if such antiquity were true it would be consequent that we should have some notice of more then five thousand years time past being that it is not apparent how the remembrances of times by several occasions were abolish'd Whereof part proceeds from men and part from heaven Those that proceed from men are the changes of sects and tongues for when a new sect begins that is a new religion the first endeavor to gain it self reputation is to blot out the memory of the old and when it so falls out that the founders of the new sect are of a different language they easily extinguish it which thing is known by considering the waies which the Christian Religion used against the Sect of the Gentiles whereby it hath cancel'd all their orders and ceremonies and defac't the whole remembrance of thatancient Theology It is true that they attaind not thorowly to wipe out the knowledge of the prime men thereof which was occasioned by their maintaining of the Latin tongue to which they were forc't being they were to write this new Law in it for if they could have writ it in a new tongue considering the other persecutions they made against it there would have bin no remembrance left of things past And whosoever reads what courses St. Gregory took and the other heads of the Christian Religion shall see with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memorials burning all the Poets and Historians works defacing their images and destroying every other thing that gave any lightwww of that antiquity so that if to this pâ—rsecution they had added a new language we should have seen every thing in a short time forgotten It is very likely therefore that what the founders of the Christian Religion did against the sect of the Gentiles they of
stopd but when those that are constraind to abandon their Countrey are not very numerous there is no such danger of them as of those people we spoke because they cannot use such violence but ought rather by some stratagem make themselves masters of some strong place and therein being setled keep it by making of friends and allies as we see Aeneas did with Dido the Massilians and others who all by agreement with their neighbors where they once set themselves down were able to continue The people that goe forth in the greatest multitudes and those also that have gone forth almost all came out from those parts of Scythia cold and poore Countries where because there are men in abundance and the Country of that condition that it cannot feed them all they are compeld to goe forth having many causes to drive them out and nothing to keep them in And if now for these five hundred years it hath not happend that any of these nations have made an inundation upon any Countrey it hath proceeded from several reasons The first is the great evacuation that Countrey made in the declining of the Empire they having since sent out huge swarms more than thirty several times the second is because Germany and England from whence these people came have their Countries well mended so that they are able to live there with better conveniency and thereupon not necessitated to change their seat On the other side these men being very warliâ— are as it were a Bulwark against the Scythians who border upon them to keep them within their confines and territories and many times there chance great risings among the Tartars who are kept in by the Hungarians and Polacks who vaunt and not without reason that were it not for their forces Italy and the Church had often felt the weight of the Tartars Armies And this shall suffice touching those forenam'd peoples CHAP. IX Vpon what occasions commonly warres are begun among Princes THe occasion that gave beginning to the warres betweene the Romanes and Samnites who had beeng long in league together is very ordinary and happens often to powerfull Principalities Which occasion either comes by chance or else is offerd by him that desires to make warre That which was betweene the Romans and Samnites feil out by chance for the Samnites intention was not by making warre first against the Sidicini and then against the Campani afterwards to set upon the Romanes But the Campani being oppressed having their recourse to Rome beyond the Romanes expectation and the Samnites the Campani giving themselves into the Romans hands they were constraind to desend them as their subjects and take upon them that warre which they thought with their honour they could not avod For it seemd very reasonable to the Romans not to undertake the defence of the Campani though their friends against the Samnites their friends but they thought it also a shame not to dessend them when they were their subjects or recommended to their protection judging that when they had not taken that defence in hand they cut off the way from all others that ever should have a mind to shelter themselves under their power And Rome having for her maine end the Empire and glory and not quiâ—t could not refuse this enterprise The selfe same occasion gave beginning to the first warre against the Carthaginians for the defence of the Massineses which the Romans undertooke in Sicily which fell out by chance also But now the second warre that grew between them came not by chance For Hannibal the Carthaginian Captaines set upon the Saguntins that were allyes to the Romans in Spaine not so much for to endammage them as to provoke the Romanes to warres and to have occasion to fight with them and so to passe into Italie This manner of kinoling new warres hath been alwayes usd among those that are mighty and that have some saith joynd some other respects for if I desire to make warre with a Prince and between us some capitulations of peace have firmly been observed a long time upon some other title fair justifiable and under some other colour I will assayle some ally of his rather than himselfe knowing very well that in setting upon his alley eyther he will resent it and so I shall have my intent of moving warre against him or not resenting it his weaknesse shall be discoverd or his infidelitie in not defending one that is under his protection and the one and the other of these two is sufficient to discredit him and facilitate my designes Therefore what wee have formerly sayd may be noted touching the taking occasions to move warre out of this example of the yeelding of the Campani and besides what remedie a Citie may have which cannot by her selfe alone make her defence and yet in any case would not fall into her assaylants hands Which is freely to give her selfe into his hands who thou hast a purpose should defend thee as the Capuans to the Romanes and the Florentines to Robert King of Naples who though he would not defend them as allyes yet afterwards defended them being his subjects against the forces of Castruvius of Lucca who then put them hard to it CHAP. X. Moneys are not the sinews of war according to the common opinion BEcause every one can begin a warre at his owne pleasure but not end it a Prince should before he undertake an enterprise measure his owne forces and order himselfe according to them he should also have so much judgement that he deceive not himselfe with the conceit of his owne forces and he shall alwayes be sure to be deceiv'd when he measures them either by the scituation or by the good will of men towards him his owne proper forces on the other side fayling him for the things aforesayd may increase well thy forces though give thee them they cannot and by themselves alone they are of on worth nor nothing avayle without the helpe of Souldiers fathfull to thee for great store of treasure serves to no purpose without that nor the strength of thy Country neither doth the faithfulnesse nor good will of men last for these cannot be faithfull to thee thou not having force to defend them Every mountaine every lake every unaccessible place is made plaine where the strong defendants are wanting Nay rather moneys are so far from defending thee that they expose thee for a prey Nor is there any thing more false than that common opinion that affirmes Moneys to be the sinews of warre which sentence was first given by Q. Curtius in the warre betweene Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta Where he relates that for want of moneys the King of Sparâ—a was forc'd to fight and was broken whereas if he had deferd the battell a few dayes newes had come into Greece of Alexanders death where he had remaind conqueror without combat But his treasure fayling and he doubting his Armie would leave him for want thereof
within his dominions because his men are not so well disciplin'd in the wars as to keep the enemy from entring into the heart of their Country Whence it proceeds that to keep the enemy off he allows some provision of moneys to those Princes or people that border upon his Country And thereupon those States make some resistance upon the confines only which when the enemy hath past they have no kind of remedy left and they perceive not that this their manner of proceeding is quite contrary to all good order for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be arm'd and not the extremities thereof for it can live without those but if these be hurt it dyes but these States keep the heart disarm'd and arme their hands and feet What this disorder hath done at Florence hath been and is daily seen for when any Army posses the frontiers and enters near to the heart of the Country there is no further remedy Wee saw not long since the same proof of the Venetians and had not their City been begirt by the waters we should have seen an end of it Wee have not so often seen this tryal in France because it is so great a Kingdom that it hath few enemies mightier than it nevertheless when the English invaded that Country in the year 1513. the whole Country quak'd and the King himself and every one thought that one defeat alone would have been sufficient to lose him the State The contraty befell the Romans for the nearer the enemy approached to Rome the more able he found the City to make resistance And it was evident when Hannibal came into Italy that after three defeats and the slaughters of so many Captains and soldiers they were not only able to sustain the enemy but to vanquish him All this proceeded from that they had well armd the heart and made small account of the extremities for the foundation of their State was the people of Rome and the Latins and the other Townes their allyes in Italy and their Colonies from whence they drew so many Soldiers that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world And that this is true it appears by the question Hanno the Carthaginian put to Hannibals agents after that great overthrow at Canna who having exceedingly magnified Hannibals great acts were asked by Hanno whether any of the Komans were yet come to demand peace or if any Town of the Latins or any of their Colonies had yet rebelld against the Roman and they denying the one and the other Hanno reply'd Then is the warr yet as intire as it was at first We see therefore by this discourse and what wee have otherwhere said what difference there is between the proceedings of Republicks now adayes and those of the ancients Wee see also hereupon every day exceeding great losses and wonderfull great conquests for where men are but of small valour and resolution fortune shews much power and because shee is alwaies various therefore do Common-wealths and States change often and will alwaies change till at length some one stand up who is so much a lover of antiquitie as to regulate her that she take not occasion to shew at every turne of the Sun how great her power is CHAP. XXXI How dangerons a thing it is to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country MEthinks it is not out of purpose to treat among these other discourses how dangerous a thing it is to trust those that are banished out of their Country these being matters that every day are practis'd by those that are Rulers of States especially seeing it may be prov'd by a memorable example out of T. Livius in his history though this thing be out of his purpose quite When Alexander the Great passed into Asia with his Army Alexander of Epirus his kinsman uncle came with certain troopes into Italy being cald upon by some outlawd Lucans who put him in hope that by their means he might become master of that whole Country Whereupon it came to pass that he being come into Italy upon their word and assurance was slain by them their Citizens having promisd them their return into their Country if they slew him Therefore should it be consider'd how vain their words and promises are who are banished their Countries for in regard of their word it is to be thought that whensoever by other means than thine they can be restord to their Country they will forsake thee and cleave to others notwithstanding all the promises they have made thee And this is the reason why there is no hold to their word because so extream is their desire to return to to their native homes that naturally they beleeve many things that are false and some things out of their own cunning they adde so that between what they think and what they say they think they put thee in such hopes that grounding thereupon thou art brought to a vain expence or to undertake somwhat that proves thy destruction I will satisfie my self with the aforesaid example of Alexander and only this other of Themistocles the Athenian who being outlawd fled to Darius in Asia where he promised him so much when he should invade Greece that Darius undertook the enterprise But Themistocles not being able to make good his promises either for shame or fear of punishment poisoned himself And if Themistocles a rare man committed this error what should we think but that they do much more erre who because of their less vertue will suffer themselves to be more violently drawn by their own passions and desires And therefore a Prince ought to proceed very slowly in undertakings upon the relation of exil'd men for otherwise he suffers either great shame or dammage by them And because it seldom comes to pass that Towns and Countries are taken by stealth or by intelligence that any one hath in them methinks it is not much out of purpose to treate thereof in the Chapter following adding thereunto by how many waies the Romans got them CHAP. XXXII How many waies the Romans used to make themselves masters of townes THe Romans applying themselves all to the war did evermore make it with all advantage possible as well for the expence as for every thing else belonging thereto From hence it proceeded that they were alwaies aware of taking of townes by long sieges thinking it a matter of great charges and incommodity that surpasses far the profit their conquest thereof can bring And for this cause they though it more for their own advantage to take a town any way else then by siege Whereupon in such great and so many wars we have very few examples of sieges made by them The waies then whereby they got their townes were either by conquest or yeilding And this conquest was either by force or open violence or by force mingled with fraud Open violence was either by assault without beating the
them for their execution maugre the power of those that break them The executions whereof before the sacking of Rome by the French were notable the death of Brutus his sons the death of those of the Decemvirate that of Melius touching the laying down the price of their corne after the taking of Rome was the death of Manlius Capitolinus the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus the execution which Papirius Cursor did upon the Commander of his Cavallerie the accusation of the Scipios which things being they were extraordinary remarkable whenosever any of them did chance caused men more strictly to conforme themselves to the exact rule and when these began to fall out seldom then began they to give men more leisure to grow naught and become more dangerous and tumultuous for from one to another of such like executions there should not pass more than ten years time for after such a time men begin again to change their manners and trespass against the lawes and unless something chance which anew calls the punishment to memory and puts them in fear thereof there meer together so many delinquents that without danger they cannot be punished To this purpose they who govern'd the State of Florence from 1434. to 1494. said it was necessary every fift year to reforme the State otherwise it was hard to maintain it and they call'd reforming of the State to put that terror and fear in men which they caus'd in them at the first founding of the lawes having then severely punish'd those that had offended against their manner of living But when the memory of that punishment is once extinguished men again take the boldness to attempt some innovations and speak ill of the present State and therefore it is necessary to take order for it by reducing it to the first grounds Also this bringing back of Republiques to their beginnings arises sometimes from the plain vertue of some one man without dependance on any law inciting thee to any execution yet are they of so great reputation and of such remarke that the good men desire to follow them and the bad are asham'd to live contrarily to them Those that in Rome particularly worked these good effects were Horatius Cocles Scevola Fabritius the two Decij Regulus Attilius and some others who by their rare and worthy examples in Rome wrought the same effect that good lawes and good orders could And if the forenamed executions of lawes together with these particulars examples had succeeded every ten years in this City it had been of necessary consequence that it could never be corrupted but as the one and the other of these two things began to fall out seldome the corruptions multiplied for after Marcus Regulus the like example was never more seen And though in Rome there arose the two Catoes yet such was the distance between him and them and between them from th' one to th' other and they remained so alone that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing and especially the last Cato who finding a great part of the City corrupted could not prevaile so by his example as to better his Citizens And this may suffice for Republicks But touching Religions wee see also these reformations are necessary by example of our Religion which had it not been reduc'd again to its principles by Saint Francis and Saint Dominique it would have been quite defac'd for these by their poverty and their imitation of Christs life made a new impression thereof in mens minds which was quite blotted our thence and their new rules were so powerfull and now are the cause that the dishonesty of the Prelates and the heads of the Religion do not ruine it partly by their living in poverty and partly by the great credit they have in confessing the people and preaching to them whereby they give them to understand that it is evill to speak evil against him that is evill and that it is good rather to live in obedience to them and if they are faulty to leave them to the chastisement of God And so they offend the most they can for they feare not the punishment they see not and beleeve not This reformation then hath and does maintain this Religion Kingdomes also have need of reforming and restoring their laws to their first beginnings And wee see how much good this does in the Kingdom of France Which Kingdom is governed more by its lawes and customes than any other Kingdom else Of which lawes and customes the Parliaments are the principal maintainers and especially that of Paris which restores them again to life whensoever it makes any execution against a Prince of the Realm and that they condemn the King in their sentences and till this present it hath maintained it self by being an obstinate executioner against that Nobility but whensoever it should suffer any of their faults to escape unpunished and they chance to multiply without doubt it would come to pass that either they were to be corrected with great disorder or that Kingdom come to a dissolution Therefore we conclude that there is nothing more necessary in a politick government Sect Kingdom or Commonwealth that it be than to restore it to that reputation which in its first beginning it had and take a care that either the customes be good or the men good that they may rather work this effect that it be not left to some forraign force to do it For however that sometimes it be an excellent remedy as it prov'd to Rome yet is it so dangerous that it is in no case to be desir'd And to make it appear to any man how much the actions of particular men served to advance Romes greatness and wrought many good effects in that City I will come to the narration and discourse of them within the bounds whereof wee will conclude this third Book and last part of this first decade And howbeit the Kings actions were great and remarkable being the History sets them down at large we shall omit them nor speak of them otherwise unless it be touching some thing they did belonging to their private advantage and here we will begin with Brutus Father of the Roman liberty CHAP. II. It is a very great part of wisdome sometime to seem a fool NO man was ever reputed so sage or wise for any thing that ever he did as Junius Brutus deserves to be accounted for taking upon him the person of a fool and though Titus Livius expresses no other but one reason to induce him thereto which was to live in security and preserve his patrimony yet if we consider his manner of proceeding we may beleeve that he thus dissembled to the end he might be less observed have the more conveniency to suppress the Kings and free his Country upon any occasion offered And that he thought upon this it appears first in the interpretation he made of Apolloes Oracle when he fained to fall down that he might kiss
them the other is that though they were of such resolution and force as might serve to do it yet would that general good will of men to that Prince withhold them from it The injuries must be either touching the fortunes lives or honors Of those that are touching mens lives the threats are more dangerous than the execution or rather the threats are very dangerous but in the execution there is no danger at all for he that is dead cannot think upon revenge and those that remain alive most commonly leave to think of him that is dead but he that is threatned and sees himself put to a point either to do or suffer becomes a very dangerous man to the Prince as we shall say particularly in due place The fortunes and honours of a man are those two things which excepting this necessity touch men more nearely then any other offence where of a Prince should be wel aware for he can never strip a man so bare but that he may find a kinfe to revenge himself nor so much dishonour any one but that he may still hold an obstinate resolution of vengeance And touching honours the dishonoring of women is of most importance and after this the scorne and disgrace of their persons This armed Pausanias against Philip of Macedon and this hath put weapons in many others hands against divers Princes And in our dayes Julius Belanti had no other motive to conspire against Pandulphus the tyrant of Siena but onely for that he had given him one of his daughters to wife and afterwards taken her away from him as in its place we shall relate The greatest cause the Pazzi had to conspire against the Medici was the inheritance of John Bonrosnei whereof they were dispossess'd by their order And another cause and a very great one too why men plot treachery against a Prince is a desire which they have to free their countrey which hath bin seis'd on by him This mov'd Brutus and Cassius against Caesar This incited many others against Falaris Dionysius and such other usurpers of their Countries Nor can any Tyrant free himself from the danger of his humor by other means then by laying down his Tyranny And because we find none will doe this there are but few of them that come not to ill ends Which gave Iuvenal occasion to say Few Tyrants unto Plutoes Court do goe But that are thither sent by bloody blow The dangers that as I said before accompany conspiracies are great and continual for in such cases there is danger in plotting them in executing them and after they are executed too Those that conspire are either one or more that of one cannot be termed a conspiracy but a setled resolution bred in a man to slay a Prince This alone of all the three dangers which conspiracies hazard is free from the first For before the putting it in execution it carries no hazard with it being none is made privy to his secret nor is there any danger that his purpose come to the Princes eare A resolution after this sort may happen to be found in any man of any condition little or great Noble or ignoble familiar or not familiar with he Prince for at some times it is permitted to any man to speak with him and he that comes to speak with him may vent this passion of his minde Pausanias of whom we have otherwhere spoken slew Philip of Macodon as he was going to the Temple environ'd with a thousand armed men and between his own son and son in law but he was one of the Nobles and well known to the Prince A poore and abject Spaniard strook Ferdinand King of Spain with a knife in the neck however the wound was not mortal yet hereby it appeared that he had both courage and opportunity to do it A Turkish Priest nam'd Dervis drew a scimitarre against Bajazet father of this present Turk but hit him not yet wanted he neither courage nor commodity for his purpose Of this sort of resolutions thus bent I think there are many that would do it for in willing this there is neither punishment nor danger at all but few venture to act it and of those that do exceeding few or none there are that are not slaine in the act Therefore no man willingly will thrust himselfe upon a certaine death But let us leave these single resolutions and come to consider the conspiracies have bin made by great men or those that are very familiar with the Prince for others unless they be stark mad will never offer to conspire for mean men and not familiar with the Prince want all those conveniencies which are required in the executing of a conspiracy Firstâ— mean men cannot find those that will be true to them for no one man can apply himself to their wills for any of those hopes which cause men to adventure upon desperate dangers so that when they have enlarged themselves to two or three persons some one of them becomes an accuser and ruines all But in case they should be so happy that none should discover their plots yet in the execution are they beset with such difficulties having not free access unto the Prince that it is impossible but that there in they must perish for if great men who ordinarily come near him are oppress'd with such difficulties which we shall presently mention it must needs be that with those these difficulties must perpetually increase Therefore men because where there is losse both of life and fortunes they are not stark mad when they find themselves weak are well aware of what they do and when they are very weary of a Prince they are contented onely to curse him and expect while those that are of higher quality then themselves do avenge them And yet in case that any of such like as these should have assailed any thing the design they had might well be laudable but not their wisdome We see therefore that those that have conspired were all great men or familiar with the Prince Whereof many have conspired as well being mov'd by too many favors as by too many injuries As Perennius was against Commodus Plautianus against Severus Sejanus against Tiberius All these were by their Emperors so enriched with wealth and dignified with titles and honours that it seemed there wanted not any thing to perfect their power but the Empire it self which they meaning not to fail of betook themselves to conspire against their Prince and their treasons all had that end which their ingratitude well deserved However that among those of this sort in these latter times that of Iacob Apianus against Petrus Gambacorti Prince of Pisa succeeded fortunately which Iacobus having had his education and breeding and credit too from him afterwards took the state from him Of this sort was that of Coppola in our dayes against Ferdinand King of Arragon which Coppola having attained to that greatness that he thought he wanted nothing but the
envy and what order is to be given for the defence of a City upon the enemies approach THe Romane Senate having notice that all Tuscany had made a new levy of souldiers with purpose to endammage Rome and that the Latini and Hernici who formerly had been their friends were now joyned to the Volsoi the perpetual enemies of Rome considered that this war might prove perillous And Camillus at that time being Tribune with Consular power thought all might be well done without creating a Dictator if the other Tribunes his collegues would yeeld up unto him the sum and whole command of the Empire which the said Tribunes willingly did Nor thought they says T. Livius it any thing derogated from their Majesty what they had yeelded to his Whereupon Camillus having taken this obedience upon their words commanded they should inroll three Armies Of the first he would be general to go against the Tuscans Of the second he made Quintus Servilius Conmander whom he would have to abide near about Rome to withstand the Latini and the Hernici if they should stir He gave Lucius Quintius the command of the third Army which he levied for the guard of the City the defence of the gates and the court of justice in case any chance should happen besides this he ordained that Horatius one of his Collegues should make provision of arms and corn and other things requisite in time of war He made Cornelius also his Collegue chief of the Senate and over the publike Councel to consult upon those things which in general were to be executed Thus were the Tribunes in those times disposed for the good of their Country to command and to obey It is noted by the text here what a vertuous and prudent man may do and what great good he may because of and how much he may be able to advantage his country when by means of his goodness and vertue he hath quite extinguished all envy which many times is the cause that men cannot effectuate a good work the said envy not allowing them that authority which it is necessary they should have in matters of importance And this envy is quite put out two ways either by some strong and difficult accident where every one seeing themselves ready to perish laying ambition aside willingly run to obey him whom they believe by his vertue able to deliver them as it befell Camillus who having given so many proofs of his being an admirable man and having been thrice Dictator and performed that place alwayes with the advantage of the publike and no way to his own profit had now caused men not to be afraid of his greatness And because he was so magnanimous and of such great credit they thought it no shame to them to be inferiors to him And therefore saies Titus Livius very wisely these words Nor thought they it any things c. Another way is envy blotted out when either by violence or by course of nature they dye that have been thy competitors in attaining to any reputation or greatness who seeing the more esteemed then they it is unpossible they ever should be at rest or have any patience And when they are accustomed to live in a corrupted City where their education hath not bred any goodness in them it is unpossible let what accident will fall out that they should ever go back from any thing and without doubt to have their wills and satisfy the waywardness of their minds they would be contented even to see the ruine of their native Country To overcome this envy there is no other remedy but the death of those that bear it and when fortune is so favorable to that vertuous man as that those men dye a natural death he becomes glorious without giving any scandal when without any obstacle or offence he may display his vertues But when he hath not this good luck he must devise by any means to take them out of his way And before he can do any thing he must practise those wayes whereby to overcome this difficulty And he that reads the Bible with understanding shall see that Moses was forced if he would have his lawes and ordinances proceed to put a great number of men to death who provoked by nothing else but envy withstood his purpose This necessity Fryar Jerom Savonarola knew very well and Peter Soderini chief standard-bearer of Florence knew it also The one could not overcome it because he had not power to do it which was the Fryar and because he was not well understood by those that followed him who might have had power to have done it But it was not his fault and his sermons are full of the blames he lays upon the wise men of the world and of invectives against them for so he terms those envious men and all that opposed his ordinances That others believed that in time by his goodness and good fortune and doing good turns to some of them quite to extinguish this envy seeing himself young enough too and then wearing so many new favors which the manner of his proceeding afforded him so that he thought he was able to overcome those many that enviously opposed him without any scandal violence or tumult And did not know that time cannot stay goodness is not sufficient fortune changes and there is no gift can appease malice So that the one and the other of these two went to ruine and their ruine proceeded either from their ignorance or their disability to overcome this envy The other thing remarkeable is the order which Camillus took both within and abroad for the preservation of Rome And indeed not without reason the good Historians as ours here is set down particularly and distinctly certain cases to the end posterity should learn how in the like accidents they are to defend themselves And it ought well be observ'd in this text that there is not a more dangerous nor unprofitable defence then that which is confusedly made and with out order and this appears by this third army which Camillus caused to be inrolled and to be left at Rome to guard the Town for many would have judg'd that part superfluous where the people is most commonly arm'd and warlick and for this cause a man would not think it needfull to have them inroll'd otherwise but only that it sufficed to cause them to be in armes as occasion should require But Camillus and who else were wise as he was think otherwise who never allow a multitude to take armes unless by certain order and appointment Wherefore upon this example he that is appointed over the guard of a City should avoid as a rock the arming of men in confusion but ought first have those chosen and registred which he would have in armes and whom he would have them obey where their rendezvous and whether to go and command those that are not inrolled to abide every man at his own house for the safeguard thereof They that
which after his death when the Duke was taken away was the heir of all his pains Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius and found the Church great having all Romania and all the Barons of Rome being quite rooted out and by Alexanders persecutions all their factions worne down he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys never practised before Alexanders time which things Julius not only follow'd but augmented and thought to make himself master of Bolonia and extinguish the Venetians and chase the French men out of Italy and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church and in no private regard he kept also the factions of the Orsins and Colonnesi in the same State he found them and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration yet two things have held them quiet the one the power of the Church which somewhat affrights them the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them nor shall these parties ever be at rest while they have Cardinals because they nourish the factious both in Rome and abroad and the Barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons And now hath Pope Leo his Holiness found the Popedome exceeding puissant of whom it is hoped that if they amplified it by armes he by his goodness and infinite other vertues will much more advantage and dignifie it CHAP. XII How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercinary soldiers HAving treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain and hold them it remains now that I speak in general of the offences and defences that may chance in each of the forenamed We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack The Principal foundations that all States have as well new as old or mixt are good laws and good armes and because there cannot be good laws where there are not good armes and where there are good armes there must needs be good laws I will omit to discourse of the laws and speak of armes I say then that the armes wherewithall a Prince defends his State either are his own or mercenary or auxiliary or mixt Those that are mercenary and auxiliar are unprofitable and dangerous and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary armes he shall never be quiet nor secure because they are never well united ambitious and without discipline treacherous among their friends stout among their enemies cowardly they have no fear of God nor keep any faith with men and so long only defer they the doing of mischief till the enemy comes to assul thee and in time of peace thou art despoyled by them in war by thy enemies the reason hereof is because they have no other love nor other cause to keep them in the field but only a small stipend which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers till thou goest to fight but then they fly or run away which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade for the ruine of Italy hath not had any other cause now a dayes than for that it hath these many years rely'd upon mercenary armes which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service and among themselves they may have been thought valiant but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared they quickly shewed what they were Whereupon Charles the King of France without opposition made himself master of all Italy and he that said that the causes thereof were our faults said true but these were not those they beleeved but what I have told and because they were the Princes faults they also have suffered the punishment I will suller shew the infelicity of these armes The mercenary Captains are either very able men or not if they be thou canst not repose any trust in them for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper advancements either by suppressing of thee that art their Lord or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose but if the Captain be not valorons he ordinarily ruines thee and in case it be answered that whoever shall have his armes in his hands whether mercenary or not will do so I would reply that armes are to be imployed either by a Prince or Common-wealth The Prince ought to go in person and performe the office of a commander the Republick is to send forth her Citizens and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities she ought to change him then and when he does prove valorous to bridle him so by the laws that he exceed not his commission And by experience we see that Princes and Republiques of themselves alone make very great conquests but that mercenary armes never do other than harme and more hardly falls a Republick armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own Citizens than one that is armed by forrein armes Rome and Sparta subsistâ—d many ages armed and free The Swissers are exceedingly well armed and yet very free Touching mercenary armes that were of old we have an example of the Car thagians who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers when the first war with the Romans was finished however the Carthagians had their own Citizens for their Captains Philip of Macedon was made by the Thebans after Epaminondas his death General of their Armies and after the victory he took from them their liberty The Milaneses when Duke Philip was dead entertaind Francis Sforza into their pay against the Venetians who having vanquisht their enemie at Caraâ—aggio afterwards joyned with them where by to usurp upon the Milaneses his Masters Sforza his father being in Joan the Queen of Naples pay left her on a sudden disarmed whereupon she to save her Kingdom was constrained to cast her self into the King of Arragon's bosome And in case the Venetians and the Florentines have formerly augmented their State with these kind of armes and their own Captains and yet none of them have ever made themselves their Princes but rather defended them I answer that the Florentines in this case have had fortune much their friend for of valorous Captains which they might any way fear some have not been victors some have had opposition and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way He who overcame not was John Aouto of whose faith there could no proof be made being he vanquisht not but every one
dangerous in the auxiliaries their valonr Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes and betaken himself to his owne and desired rather to loss with his owne than conquer with anothers accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes I will not doubt to alleadge Caesar Bargia and his actions This Duke entred into Romania with auxiliarie armes s bringing with him all French souldiers but afterwards not accounting those armes secure bent hinselfe to mercenaries judging lesse danger to be in those and tooke in pay the Orsini and the Vitelli which afterwards in the proof of them finding wavering unfaithful and dangerous he extinguishd and betook himselfe to his owne and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes confidering the difference that was between the Dukes reputation when he had the French men alone and when he had the Orsini and Vitelli but when he remaind with his own and stood of himselfe we shall find it was much augmented nor ever was it of grate esteeme but when every one saw that he wholly possessed his owne a mes I thought not to have parted from the Italian examples of late memory but that I must not let passe that of Hiero the Siracusan being one of those I formerly nam'd This man as I said before being made general of the Siracusans forces knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings as our Italians are and finding no way either to hold or cashier them made them all bee cut to peeces and afterwards waged warre with his owne men and none others I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament serving just to this purpose When David presented himselfe before Saul to goe to fight with Goliah the Philistims Champion Saul to encourage him clad him with his owne armes which David when he had them upon his back refus'd saying he was not able to make any proofe of himself therein and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword In summe others armes either fall from thy shoulders or cumber or streighten thee Charls the seventh Father of Lewis the eleventh having by his good fortune and valour set France at liberty from the English knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes and settled in his Kingdome the ordinances of men at armes and infantry Afterwards King Lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry and began to take the Swissers to pay which errour follow'd by the others is as now indeed it appeares the cause of that Kingdomes dangers For having given reputation to the Swissers they have renderd all their own armes contemptible for this hath wholly ruind their foot and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes for being accustomed to serve with the Swissers they think they are not able to overcome without them From whence it comes that the French are not of force against the Swissers and without them also against others they use not to adventure Therefore are the French armies mixt part more naries and part natives which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries and much inferiour to the natives and let the said example suffice for that for the Kingdome of France would have been unconquerable if Charles his order had been augmented and maintaind but men in their small wisdome begin a thing which then because it hath some favour of good discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder as I before said of the hâ—ctick feavers Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischiefes but as they grow up is not truely wise and this is given but to few and if we consider the first ruine of the Romane Empire we shall find it was from taking the Goths first into their pay for from that beginning the forces of the Romane Empire began to grow weak and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them I conclude then that without having armes of their owne no Principality can be secure or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune not having valour to shelter it in adversity And it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men that nothing is so weak and unsetled as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces which are those that are composed of thy subjects or Citizens or servants all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary and the manner how to order those well is easie to find out if those orders above nam'd by me shall be but run over and if it shall be but consider'd how Philip Alexander the Great his Father and in what manner many Republicks and Princes have armd and appointed themselves to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly CHAP. XIV What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline A Prince then ought to have no other ayme nor other thought nor take any thing else for his proper art but warr and the orders and discipline thereof for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands and is of so great excellency that not only those that are borne Princes it maintains so but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity And it is seene by the contrary that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights than to the warres they have lost their States and the first cause that makes thee lose it is the neglect of that arte and the cause that makes thee gaine it is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte Francis Sforza by being a man at armes of a private man became Duke of Milan and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those imployments of Princes became private-men For among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee it causes thee to be contemnd which is one of those disgraces from which a Prince ought to keepe himselfe as hereafter shall be sayd for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion and reason will not that he who is in armes should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them and that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed vassalls for there being disdaine in the one and suspicion in the other it is impossible these should ever well co-operate And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienc'd in matter of warre besides the other infelicities belonging to him as is said cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers nor yet trust in them Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre which he may be able to doe two wayes the one practically and in his labours and recreations of his body the other theorically And touching the practick part he ought besides the keeping of his own subjcts well traind