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A59247 Solid philosophy asserted, against the fancies of the ideists, or, The method to science farther illustrated with reflexions on Mr. Locke's Essay concerning human understanding / by J.S. Sergeant, John, 1622-1707. 1697 (1697) Wing S2594; ESTC R10237 287,445 528

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Philosophers think the Object being gone that Motion would quickly cease Nor could the same Motion be connaturally reviv'd but by the same Object which is seldom at hand to make it again as oft as we have occasion to remember as Experience shows us Much less could the Remembrance of Sounds or Tunes in Man or Birds be possibly explicated unless those repell'd Atoms lying in Order and striking afresh the Auditory Organ did repeat the same Impression they had formerly For to put Millions of Motions to continue perpetually playing in the Fancy and as they needs must interfering with one another would destroy all Harmony and breed a strange jarring Confusion Note that Reminiscence is oft-times made in us by using our Reason gathering or recollecting former Notions by others that orderly succeeded them in the same manner as we investigate Causes from their Effects Whereas in Brutes it is performed meerly by a new Appulse of the former Atoms to that part in which the Imagination consists which being the most supreme in the Animal has a Power to Agitate the Animal Spirits and move the Body agreeably to those Impressions as is found also in Man 29. The same Excitation of those particles thus imbu'd causes also Reflex Knowledge of our former Operations And indeed Reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as Remembrance of them for we can neither Reflect on a Thing without Remembring it nor Remember it without Reflecting on it But this Reflexion for the reason lately given must proceed from some Object or Cause Extraneous to the Soul that is from Effluviums in the Memory thus reexcited For it is to be noted that as Divines or rather Christian Faith tell us that Christ having two distinct Natures in the same Suppositum all his Operations proper to him as such were therefore Theanthropicae or such as were agreeable and belonging to both the Divine and Humane Natures So Man consisting of both a Corporeal and Spiritual Nature and thence being a Corporeo-Spiritual Thing all his Operations for the same Reason must be Corporeo-Spiritual Whence he has no Act purely Spiritual or uncompounded with the Co-operation of that Corporeal Part which receives those Effluviums call'd by us Fancy or without it's Concurrence Which gives us farther Light to see how our Soul cannot reflect on her own Operations but the Fancy must go along and by what 's said it will be easie to conclude from which of those parts the Operation must begin anew viz. from that part from which it did begin at first Hence came that Saying of the Schools That the Soul has Notions or knows Speculando Phantasmata which are pretty Fanciful Words and tho' they may perhaps have a good Meaning yet 't is very unphilosophically express'd For it makes the Soul to speculate which if it have any Sense at all signifies to know the Phantasms or Ideas in the Imagination when as yet she has no Knowledge in her at all All her Notions which are the first Elements of Knowledge being caus'd in her by those Effluviums previously to her Knowing either them or any thing else 13. From what 's said above 't is seen that those Direct Notions which are thus naturally imprinted are Common to all Mankind in the main however they may in each Man differ in some Degree and consequently the Words we agree on to express those Natural Notions are for the same reason Proper Words whereas those Notions made by meer Reflexion as are those of Spiritual Natures are therefore Improper as having no proper Phantasms to imprint them connaturally on the Mind whence also the Words that express them are such as are taken or Translated from Natural Objects and therefore they are Improper or Metaphorical 31. From this exact Distinctness of our Notions even to an Indivisible or from this that one of them is not another our Mind has an Appendage of a Negation tack'd to every Notion so that it becomes very familiar to her whence she can have a Negative Notion of every thing she conceives while the considers it as limited or reaching thus far and no farther or being This and no other Of which Nature are all the Modes of Ens they being limited Conceptions of it no Notion being perfectly Positive but that of Ens or Being 32. Hence the Soul can have also the Notions of Indivisibility Immortality Immensity and innumerable such like But it is very specially to be remark'd that we can have no Notions of those Negatives as taken abstractedly from the Thing or Subject for otherwise Non Entities formally as such might be the Object of the Understanding which is impossible for Nothing formally as such I add nor Vacuum can have no Effluviums sent from it to the Brain nor consequently any Intelligibility nor can any possible Notion be fram'd of it Wherefore Baldness signifies the Head quatenus having no Hair on it Blindness the Eye quatenus having no Sight Immensity the Thing quatenus not capable to be measured c. Hence 33. The Notion we have of Nothing or Non Ens is only that of Ens in it's whole Latitude with a Negation annexed to it in the same manner as in particular Entities Incorporeal signifies non Corpus or as Indivisible signifies Non-Quantum c. 24. Hence it is that we come to conceive and sometimes express Non Ens as an Ens as Grammarians do when they define a Noun to be the Name of a Thing and yet make Nihil which signifies Nothing a Noun Subjective and put Adjectives to it Whence Philosophers must take very great Care lest seduced by our manner of Conceiving Non-Ens as a Thing they come to fancy or judge it to be formally something as do the Asserters of Vacuum and too many others in like Occasions For then I beg their Pardon for my Plainness their Discourses upon it can be no wiser than are those Ingenious Verses made to shew how rare a Thing Nothing is nor indeed so wise For those Poets did this Ludicrously to shew their Wit but these do it Seriously and make account that in doing so they shew their Skill and Wisdom which I must think is meer Folly 35. The Notions of Genus Species Subject Predicate and generally of all Terms of Art which are not Fantastick but wisely conducing to clear and range our Notions in Order to gain Science are Nothing but several Abstract Notions of the Thing precisely considered according to some Manner of Being it has in our Understanding For Animal and Homo are evidently Abstract or Inadequate Notions of Peter taking him as he exists in Nature But when we call Animal a Genus or Homo a Species or when in this Proposition Petrus est Homo we say Petrus is the Subject and Homo the Predicate we speak of them precisely as they exist in the Understanding For in Nature or out of the Understanding there can be no Universals but only Individuals none
from dumb Animals Besides when a Cat or Dog is hungry and hunts about for Meat how can Mr. L. imagin they long only for one particular sort of Meat and not any sort of Meat in common that is agreeable to their nature I am sure their indifferency to any such Food in case they know at all gives us as good ground to think they have a General Idea of such a sort kind or species of Food as it does for any Knowledge they have of particulars Hence is shown that Mr. L's Criterion or distinctive Mark to know them from Men viz. the having General Idea's quite failing we ought to esteem Horses and other Cattle to be Four-footed Men or else Men must be two-legg'd Beasts Moreover since he grants here § 5. they can compare those Ideas they have tho' imperfectly and but in some circumstances and all Judging and Discoursing must by his Doctrine consist in the comparing Ideas he must think there are some of them who are very judicious Gentlemen and use natural Logick and tho' not very artificially make Syllogisms too In a word if we have no pecular Faculties Intrinsecal to our Nature nor any Primary Operation belonging to it and it only to distinguish us from Brutes but Extrinsecal shape only all Beasts might be Men and Men Beasts And then we ought in duty to consider how to correct our Carriage towards our dear Brethren in Nature Brutes which will bring in the Turkish Charity to Dogs and twenty other Fooleries And 't is an excellent Argument to prove the Identity of our Natures that Mr. L. brings of some Gentlemen he was acquainted with who deny'd themselves to be Men and I wonder he would civilly give them the Lye by passing upon them the Complement that they were notwithstanding very Rational Men for were it possible any Man could be a Beast 't is most certain these Men were such But I wonder not all at such extravagant Conceits for as Reason grounded on our Natural Notions of the Thing is reduced if pursued home to First and Self-evident Principles so Fancy if follow'd close advances at length to pure Folly and ends finally in perfect Madness 8. As for us Men we can certainly affirm that we do truly perceive or know because we know certainly by experience or rather by Reflexion that we do know but we do not thus know that Brutes know and whoever thinks he can gather it by Reason ought I conceive er'e he goes about it to study exactly two previous points First he ought to consider very attentively how or upon what Grounds he can imagin Particles of Matter tho' never so subtil and artificially laid together can be capable of Perception or Knowledge or how this Suits with the Nature of meer Body We can only gather this from Local Motions proceeding from Brutes with some kind of Regularity Now an exact Watch in proportion to its few parts does by vertue of a Spring within which is part of its self afford the same argument to one that is not aware of its contrivance For it shews us and regularly too the Minutes Quarters Half-hours Hours Days of the Month and tells us the time aloud by Striking the Bell Nay a Repeating-Clock does without Missing or Mistake answer the Question as it were which by pulling the String you ask it and tho' you are never so importune in repeating your question often yet it still answers truth with more steady exactness than Banks his Horse could by seeing the Motion of his Masters Eye Yet if any Man had drawn thence a Conclusion that those Engins had perciev'd or known we are satisfied that he had been perfectly mistaken An Italian here had an Engine which would both a wake one at the hour he designed to rise and also strike fire and light his Candle for him which I believe is more than the most docil Brute could ever be taught to perform The Case had been still more difficult had this Watch or Engine which seemed self moving been put into all these Motions by Subtil and Indiscernable Agents as Iron is by the Effluuiums of a Loadstone or as Memnons Musical Statue was by the Rayes of the Sun for in that Case the Vulgar discerning no Material Cause that set it on work would presently have had recourse to some Knowing power in the Engine in the same manner as when they hear noises in a House and cannot find out what caused them they imediately conclude 't is a Spright Whence results this plain Rule that er'e we can with reason conclude or think any thing except our selves has Perception or Knowledge by our seeing it perform any Outward Action we ought first to be certain that we can comprehend all the Operations of Bodies and all the several Combinations and Contrivances of them and that we see that those Actions are impossible to be performed by Bodily parts laid together by an infinitely wise Artificer before we fall to imagin that any meerly Animal Body is more than a Natural Engin or that it does any more perceive think or know than does a Watch or Clock 9. The Second thing necessary to be done er'e we ought to think Brutes have any knowledge is to consider exactly the incredible variety of the several Organical parts found in the bodies of Animals which with the peculiar Uses of each and the Contexture of them with the other parts do swell so many Books of Anatomy already without any hopes or prospect of reaching them all And besides it is necessary also to weigh attentively the Chymical parts if I may be allowed to call them so of an Animal consisting of Blood the Humours in it and especially the Spirits which last are apt to be moved upon every occasion by the least touch of all the Bodies about it nay by the most minute particles of them lodged in the brain and excited there a fresh and are withall apt to be carried thence in convenient Vehicles throughout the whole to set on motion those parts which are more solid When he has done this let him Consider all these diverse-natured parts laid together by the All-wise Contriver of Nature in order to the Animal's pursuing what 's Agreeable to its nature and avoiding what 's Disagreeable to it When I say all these particulars are well weigh'd and duely reflected on I believe we shall be at a loss to pitch upon any outward Notion with such wise Contextures and the Complexion of such innumerable Material Causes may not naturally produce 10. To give some ease to our fancy startled at the Strangeness of many Actions we see done by Brutes let us reflect on what happens to Men walking in their Sleep when the passages to our Knowing Power are intercepted and our wonderment will to a great degree cease How regularly do the Phantasms at that time move our Brutal part the Body Many Authentick Examples of which I could recount worthy our highest admiration they
of Humane Nature which abhors Contradiction reclaims vehemently against such an unnatural Depravation of Common Sense as to take is while thus express'd for is not yet taking the meaning of the Word Existence as it is disguised by another Word which is by consequence Equivalent to it those Deserters of Humane Nature the Scepticks do take occasion from the altering the Expression to misapprehend even what is Self-evident For 't is the same Sense when we speak affirmatively to say a thing is True or Certain as to say it is since nothing can be True or Certain that is not and therefore when these Men talk of Moral and Probable Truth and Probable or Moral Certainty which mincing Expressions mean possible not to be so they in effect say that what is may whilst it is possibly not be Which manners of Expression tho' they may seem to some but a meer Unconcerning School-Speculation and Unreflecting Men may think it deserves no other Note but that of being Ridiculous yet I judge my self obliged to declare that it is moreover most enormously Mischievous and that it quite perverts and destroys by a very immediate Consequence the Nature and Notion of all Certainty and Truth whatsoever and of Being too and quite overthrows all possibility of Knowing any thing at all Had they said I think it true or certain none would blame them rather 't is a Credit for such Men even to think heartily there is any Truth or Certainty at all in Philosophy but to joyn as they do Moral or Probable to Truth and Certainty as a kind of Mode affecting them is to clap these most unconsociable Things Light and Darkness into one Dusky Compound to abet Nonsense and palliate Ignorance 4. The Notion immediately next in order to Existence as that which has the very least Potentiality that can be in the Line of Being is that of Ens or Thing Wherefore the meaning of that word can be no other but that of Capable to be for no Created Thing has Actual Being or Existence in its Essential-Notion but of its own Nature may be or not be as besides what 's proved in my Method is seen in the very Notion of Creature which signifies That which has its Being from Another which therefore can of its self be only Capable of Being That the Notion of Ens is distinct from that of Existence is demonstrated elsewhere and is farther evident hence that the Notion of what has Existence must be different from what 's had by it or from Existence it self All Mankind has this Notion of Thing in them for they experience that every Thing can exist by seeing it does so and they know also they are not of themselves whether they hold a first Being or no because they do generally see that Causes produced them Wherefore all that can be said or thought of the word Ens is that it signifies the Thing precisely as 't is Capable of Being 5. Whence follows that the Abstract Terms Entity or Essence do properly signify A Capacity of Being which is the Abstract Term of Capable of Being Tho' Entity is often us'd as a Concrete for the Thing it self Moreover Essence is the Total Form of Ens its Suppositum or Subject which adequately and intirely constitutes it such as Humanitas is the Total Form of Homo I call it the Total Form to distinguish it from the Partial Form of Body which with the Matter its compart do compound the entire Notion or Total Form of Corporeity 6. To understand which more clearly we are to Note that the Notion and Signification of the word Matter signifies the Thing or Body precisely as it is a Power to be a Thing and Form signifies the same Thing according to that in it which determins it to be a Thing Actually We are to reflect too that Power and Act considered in the Line of Being are the same as Matter and Form only the Former words are purely Metaphysical because they express the parts of Ens as Ens in regard no other conceptions in the Line of Being can possibly be framed of a Body but as it is Determinable or Determinative which are the very Notions of Power and Act whereas Matter and Form tho' in Bodies they signify the same as the former seem rather to incline to the parts of such an Ens or Body Physically consider'd 7. To show literally what 's meant by this saying that Matter and Form constitute the compleat Ens or make the Subject capable of Existing I discourse thus Nothing as 't is Indeterminate or Common to more can be ultimately Capable to be v. g neither a Man in Common nor a Horse in Common can possibly exist but This Man or This Horse Whatever therefore does determin the Potentiality or Indifferency of the Subject as it is Matter or which is the same a Power to be of such or such a Nature which is what we call to have such a Form in it does make it This or That and consequently disposes it for Existence Wherefore since the particular Complexion of the several Modes and Accidents do determin the Power or Matter so as to make it Distinct from all others it does by Consequence determin it to be This and so makes it Capable of Existing that is an Ens or Thing I enlarge not upon this Point because I have treated it so amply in the Appendix to my Method to Science 8. Hence is seen what is or can with good Sense be meant by that Metaphysical or Entitative part called by the Schools the Substantial or Essential Form which they say does with the Matter make up that compound Ens call'd Body and that in Literal Truth it can be nothing else but that Complexion of the Modes or Accidents which conspire to make that peculiar or primigenial Constitution of every Body at the first Instant of its being thus ultimately Determin'd to be This. For this Original Temperature of the Mixt or Animal being once settled by the Steady Concurrence of its Causes whatever Particles or Effluviums or how many soever which are Agreeable to it do afterwards accrue to it are so digested into or assimilated to its Nature that they conserve nourish and dilate and not destroy it Whereas if they be of an opposit Nature they alter it from its own temperature and in time quite destroy and corrupt it To explicate which more fully let us consider how the Causes in Nature which are many times of a Different sometimes of a Contrary Temper to the Compound do work upon a Body and how they make as they needs must preternatural Dispositions in it till when those Disagreeable Alterations arrive to such a pitch as quite to pervert the former Complexion of Accidents which we call its Form a new Form or new Complexion succeeds determining the Matter to be Another Thing till it self also wrought upon in the same Manner comes to be Corrupted and so makes
Will and consequently of its Acts of Love is an Appearing Good and the Lively Appearance of that Good is that which makes the Will prompt to act effectually whence since that which breeds Pleasure in us must needs appear Lively to be a Good to us there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is most Pleasant or most Agreeable to our True Nature Reason such as the best Spiritual Goods are and we may be sure by such a well-made Choice to arrive at that Best Greatest and Purest Pleasure Eternal Glory REFLEXION Twelfth ON The 21th CHAPTER 1. IN this Chapter of Power I find more to admire than confute The Author always Ingenious even when he errs has here much out done his former self Particularly his Explication of Freewill is generally speaking both Solid and Acute and his Doctrine that Liberty is consistent with a perfect Determination to Goodness and Virtue is both Learned and Pious Yet I am forced to disagree with him in some particulars In giving my Thoughts of which I will imitate Mr. Locke's laudable Method in making my Discourses Subservient and in shewing them to be Agreeable to Christian Principles 2. 'T is an excellent Thought that The Clearest Idea of Active Power is had from Spirit For Bodies can act no otherwise than as they are acted on themselves nor can the first mov'd Body that moves the rest push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is not Body or by some Spiritual Agent which therefore has the truest Notion of Agency in it without any Mixture of Patiency because the Body mov'd cannot react upon it Tho' therefore we may have by our Senses the Idea of Action and Passion from the Effects we see daily wrought by Natural Causes on fit Subjects yet the Clearest Idea of Action is given us by our Reason finding out that the Beginner of Corporeal Action is a Separated Spirit or pure Act and therefore not at all Passive from any other Creature nor from the Body it operates on by Reaction as is found in Corporeal Agents And our Reason gives us this Idea as it does many other Reflex ones by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be Processus in infinitum amongst Corporeal Agents nor can they of themselves alone begin to move themselves nor move one another Circularly and therefore the First Corporeal Motion must necessarily be Originiz'd from some Pure Spirit or Angel Now Mr. Locke conceives that the Soul according to her Faculty call'd Will moving the Body gives him this clearest Idea of Active Power which Tenet I have in diverse places disprov'd formerly and shown that the Soul by reason of her Potential State here cannot principiate any Bodily Action nor the Man neither unless wrought upon by some External or Internal Agent which is in act it self 3. He Judges with good reason that the Vulgar mistake of Philosophers in making every Faculty or Power a Distinct Entity has caus'd much Obscurity and Uncertainty in Philosophy which humour of Multiplying Entities I am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand in making the Understanding and Will to be one and the same Power and affirming that they only differ formally in Degree He shows clearly how in proper Speech the Will is not Free but the Man unless it be signified with a Reduplication that by the Word Will is meant Man according to that Power in him call'd the Will For Powers as he discourses well belong only to Agents and are Attributes only of Substances and not of the Powers themselves Perhaps this reason of his will abet my position that the Understanding and Will are the same Power Those who make them two do this because they find in the Notion of Will only a Power of Acting and not of knowing and in the Notion of Understanding only a Power of knowing and not of Acting But the same Men make the Understanding direct the Will which they call a Blind Power by which they make one of those Powers formally as such to work upon the other as if the former were an Agent and the latter a Patient I add moreover that they do this with the worst Grace that is possible for what avails it the Will to be directed by the Understanding if it does not know how the Understanding directs it And to make the Will to know is to make it a knowing Power which is to make the Will tho' they never meant it to be the Understanding Not reflecting in the mean time when our Understanding is full of any Apparent Good the Man pursues it and so becomes or has in him a Principle or Power of Acting which is what we call Will. 4. Perhaps a Philosophical Discourse beginning from the Principles in this affair if exprest Literally and pursu'd home by Immediate Consequences may set this whole business in a Clearer Light and show us very evidently how Man determins himself to Action and therefore is Free as also how he is Predetermin'd to determin himself than any particular Reflexions on our own Interiour Which tho' they may oftentimes have some Truth in them yet not beginning from the bottom-Truths that concern the point in hand they can never be steady but are now and then liable to some Errours 5. Beginning then with the Animal part in Man and considering him barely as an Animal and wrought upon as other Animals are I discourse thus Particles agreeable to the Nature of the Animal being by the Senses convey'd into the Brain do if they be but Few lightly affect it and work no other effect but a kind of small Liking of it If more they make it as we say begin to Fancy it But if they be very many and sent from an Object very Agreeable or Good to such a Nature they will in proportion to their Multitude and Strength cause naturally a Tendency towards it and powerfully excite the Spirits so as to make the Animal pursue it that is they will become such a Principle of Action which in meer Animals we call Appetite To which Action that meer Animal is not carry'd thro' Choice or Freely but is naturally and necessarily Determin'd to Act for the Attainment of that Good in the same manner as Iron follows the Load-stone But if we consider this Animal as having now a Rational and Knowing Compart join'd to it things will be order'd after another manner For those Impressions are carry'd farther than the Region of the Brain even into the Soul it self which is endow'd with a Faculty of Reflecting upon those her Notions whence she gains exacter Knowledge of those Bodies that imprinted them Nor only so but she can reflect upon her own Operations too and know that she knows them by which means she comes acquainted with her own Nature and comes to see that Knowledge and Reason is that Nature of hers which she finds is a Nobler part of the