a long answer B. Not as Paul meant it but as our troublesome Contenders use it in Even those that found the infallibility on scientia media make congrous Grace ex proposito convertendi to be the cause of the difference So Malderus 1 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 517. Quod hic credat prae alio indubie venit de misericordia Dei ipsum siâ— vocantis ut accomodet assensum misericordia inquam qua nos in Câ—risto elegit Totum est miserentis Dei ipse vocat ipse facit â—t vocatus veniat ipse â—t currat ipse nolentem praevenit ut velit volentem subsequitur nâ— frâ—fira velit vi sua Gratia it a sibi aptat liberum arbitrium ut a nâ—llo dâ—ro corde respâ—â—tâ—r quod diciâ—â—s provenire ex â—o quod meris inâ—â—â—abilibus occultis modis noverit Deus ita hominis â—over sensum ut accomodet assensum Fatemur Dei omnipotentiam Dominium quod habet in voluntates hominum manifestari in gratiae effâ—catia Et consensus homiâ—is est donâ—m Dei descendens a Patre luminum â—llumque consensum Deâ—â— vult â—acit quia facit â—ominem viribâ—â— gratiâ—â—acerâ— Yeâ— he yieldeth to â—radwardines Doctrine supposing him only to intend necessitatem quandam consequentiae necessarium esse hominem libere velle illâ—d ipsum quod Deuâ— cujuâ— omnipotentia quaecunque voluit facit praevoluit ipsum ville libere Item gratiam efficacem derâ— intuitâ— meritorum Christi non tantum quatenuâ— est sufficiensâ—sed etiam quatenus est eâ—â—iâ—ax dum seeundum propositum â—â—â—â— â—â—â—m cura Dâ—â— non est aqualis do omnibus another sense the answer must be suited to the question And here note that really it is the state of both parties compared and not of one of them that constituteth the dissimilitude as is said And the efficient causes of both states are the causes of the difference And so truly the cause of Nero's unbelief and the causes of Paul's Faith which are many as aforesaid all set together are the causes of the differences or rather all make up one cause of it This no Logician can deny But yet in vulgar speech we use to say that that person or thing is the cause of the difference 1. Which is the cause of the singularity 2. Or which causeth the state of the second person compared supposing the state of the first person to be already existent And so you will find yet several senses of the question C. Explain it by some instances B. 1. As to the cause of singularity If one man be born an Ideot or a Monster when we ask what made him differ from other men though really the causes of the dissimilitude be to be assigned on both parts yet we mean only on his part why is he not like others So if one Child be unlike to all his brethren or one Scholar in the School be much better or much worse than all the rest or if one in a Family be sick he that asketh what maketh him differ doth mean what made him sick c. 2. And so as to Posteriority of State if you suppose one of the dissimiliar parts pre-existent and ask what maketh the other to differ from it as if you ask why the Scholar writeth not like his Copy why the Son is so unlike to the Father why this age is so unlike the last c. We mean only what causeth the difference ex parte subsequente C. Apply it to the case in hand B. If you ask what made the difference between the Devils and the persevering Angels In the full and proper answer you must assign the reason on both parts But according to the usual sense of the question you must say The wilful sin of the Devils made the difference For the equal state of uprightness went before the difference So if you ask what made the difference between the world after the fall and before it vulgarly we must say sin because that came last So if you ask what made the difference between Noah and the world between Lot and Sodom Ans Indeed that which made one part sinful and the other righteous But according to the vulgar sense of the question it was the Righteousness of Noah and Lot and the causes of that righteousness So what made the difference between Judas and the eleven Apostles Ans Judas his wilful sin and Wickedness though indeed the cause is on both sides So what maketh the difference between Believers and the Unbelieving world Really the unbelief of the world and the Faith of Christians with their causes But it 's like the speaker meaneth only ex parte credentium And then the cause of their Believing is the cause of their differing But now if it hold true that God giveth a sufficiency of Grace ut causa universalis ex parte donantis antecedently to mens accepting or rejecting equally then if one ask what maketh the difference you would understand him why have not unbelievers Faith as well as others And then the answer would be wilful resisting or refusing Grace or the moral special indisposition of the Recipients makes the difference or else all would be alike believers But note that we ask not What maketh the difference between Believers and unbelievers but do particularize the subject and ask what maketh the Believer differ from the Unbeliever or what maketh the unbeliever differ from the believer It is then supposed that we mean only ex parte nominata And thus in the vulgar sense the questions what maketh the believer differ from the Infidel and what maketh the Infidel differ from the believer must have various answers C. I understand you thus in brief 1. You say that constitutively it is Faith that is the difference on Paul 's part and unbelief on Nero ' s. 2. The causes of the said Faith and unbelief are the causes of the difference As the causes of the whiteness of one wall and of the blackness of the other cause their difference 3. That to ask why the Believer differeth from the Unbeliever is but to ask why he is a Believer when the other is not 4. Here you say the two Relations of dissimilitude in two ubbjects make the questions two in one viz. 1. Why or whence is Paul a Believer 2. Whence is it that Nero is an Unbeliever 5. You say that Nero is an Unbeliever through his own wilfulness and illdisposition resisting Grace Satans temptations concurring And that Paul is a Believer from many conjunct causes 1. Gods Grace by his Spirit 2. Christs Merits 3. Christs donation of that Spirit 4. The means by which he worketh 5. The concurse of Pauls will To which efficients you add in most a competent Receptive disposition in genere causâ— materialis both passive and active 6. You say that in all this Gods Grace is incomparably the greater cause than man's will 7. But yet not the sole cause and that some free-not-necessitated concurse of mans
them that which they are deprived of So that this Language is not unfit while we speak of Moral Subjects and of God after our manner But in strict speech it cannot be proved that any Nothing is the proper object of a Volition of God 309. The opinion of Scotus and his followers is known this way And subtile Albertine To. 1. princ 4. qu. 4. p. 297. saith that Congruentius dicitur Deum non actu Positivo velle negationes Resp Deum non See after the Additions of Divine Nolitions habere actum positivum non concurrendi sed negationem actus Volendi dare concursum efficacem â—uxta hunc modum melius intelligitur quomodo se habet Voluntas Dei circa peccatum Nam Deus non vult peccatum actu positivo sed tantum negative se habet circa concursum efficacem dandi remedia illa per quae efficaciter impediretur peccatum Vid. caet 310. III. The third distinction is between Gods Love and Hatred his Volitions and Nolitions And this must be used But Hatred and Nolition in man have more of imperfection than Love and Volition importing some-what contrary to us and either hurtful troublesome feared or that possibly may be so Therefore we must confess here that we speak of God with greater impropriety and must disclaim the imperfection in the sense 311. But if you would not be abused into many errors swallow not the name Love and Hatred without distinction Lest the fore-cited reason of Pennottus cheat you viz. God Loveth a man converted whom he Hated while wicked Ergo he can decree or predestinate a man to salvation whom before he decreed and reprobated to damnation And all rose from this falshood that Love is nothing but the Willing of salvation to us and so the same with Decree Whereas Love is also yea most properly a Complacency in Good as Good and Hatred a Displicency in Evil as Evil. Benevolence is sometime Antecedent and sometime an effect of this in man 312. IV. The Immanent and Transient acts I need say no more of 313. V. But Divines use to omit the next distinction of Transient D'Orbellis in 1. d. 4. Quando quaeritur utrum Electio vel Reprobatio rationem Meritoriam habeant hoc non intelligitur quantum ad Voluntatem divinam auâ—â—jus actum qui est Deus sed quantum ad transitum ejus super obâ—ectum seu quantum ad ordinationem ad ipsam Voluntatem acts so much that few of them let you know whether that which is but Objectively Transient be numbred by them with Immanent or with Transient acts Briefly 1. As Gods Will is the first efficient and with his Wisdom and Executive Power doth effect ad extra it is effectively Transient though Essentially Immanent in it self 2. But as Gods Will is as aforesaid the Final Cause or End of all things and willeth things only Complacentially supposing all that is Complacent to be Existent in esse reali vel in esse cognito so is it only Objectively Transient and not effectively and therefore by many is numbred with Immanent acts And as God may be said to know and will the creature in himself and to Love the Idea of it in himself the phrase is not to be blamed But as the Creature in it self considered by fore-knowledge or present knowledge if we may so distinguish is the object it seemeth unfit to call the act Immanent though it do nihil ponere vel efficere in objecto 314. But Gods Will as it effecteth Relations ad extra is even effectively Transient as well as that which altereth qualities e. g. his Pardoning Justifying Adopting acts of Will 315. VI. * * * How far Gods Volitions of creatures are free the subtilest confess to be unsearchable Vasquez ut supra in 1. Thom. q. 19. disp 80. p. 504. Licet assignemus in Deo libertatem comparatione facta cum objectis rebus creatis tamen non assignamus sufficientem rationem ex parte Dei cur nunc actu libero efficaci reseratur ad has potius quam ad illas Siquidem Idem omnino manens in sâ— poterat eas non velle quas vult Quare cum rem exactius enodare contendimus difficultatem praedi â—am eâ—adere nâ—â— possumus See more of him before Gods Natural Volitions are those which ex natura rei could not be otherwise that is All his Volitions of his own being and perfections To which some number natural necessary objects in the creatures As his Volition that Contradictions shall not be true that two and two shall be four or two more than one c. His Free Volitions are those which might have been otherwise as to the nature of the thing and as to the power of the Divine will Such is the Volition of the being of all the Creatures 316. The Schoolmens contention whether the Son be freely begotten and the Holy Ghost freely proceed ariseth from the ambiguity of the word free which I will not trouble you with 317. Yet all agree that Gods Volitions are all eternall and therefore eternally necessary necessitate existentiae 318. And some think it best to say that they are respectively to be called both Necessary and Free Because Gods will chose that which his wisdom saw was Best and he must necessarily choose the Best But we must not be here too bold in our Conclusions 319. VII The distinction of an efficient and permissive Will is no better nor other than that of a Volition and no Volition But to distinguish the Efficient and Permissive Act implyeth a falshood That Permission as such is an Act. 320. Yet Gods Law may be said to have a permissive Act that is He may declare This I permit you to do or leave indifferent as to political permission And as to Physical permission I have shewed before that some positive removal of Impediments are sometimes called non impedire or permission But permission it self as such is no act 321. VIII The distinction of Vol. Beneplaciti signi is old and common But not a distinguishing the Acts of Gods will but rather his Volitions from the signs of them For it is his Voluntas beneplaciti that there shall be such signs 322. The five signs commonly named by the Schoolmen are Praecipit ac prohibet permittit consulit implet And the older Schoolmen say that these are called Gods Will Metaphorically only yea by a remote sort of Metaphor they being not mans will properly but metaphorically Aqu. 1. q. 19. art 11 12. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. A. Voluntas Dei sumitur Proprie tunc signat divinum beneplacitum quod non est aliud quam ipse Deus volens 2. Impropriè metaphorice pro aliquo signo ejus c. only when applyed to man and accordingly called Gods will But some of the latter say that they are proper signs of Gods real will The truth is they that first used this distinction
answer that the consequence holdeth not of a metaphorical improper Instrument who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God besides the nature of a pure instrument such are sinners to God Therefore it holds not that the horse halteth ergo the rider halteth no nor causeth it Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove and the very same that I say The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all but only as it is Motion in genere so doth God by sinful acts That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another is not at all of God but that they are Actions in genere is of God 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer nor the effect as from that fault nor of the Saw to the Sawyer And so of the Sabeans robbing Job And he asserteth p. 257. that Diabolus Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi And what need we more Remember then that sin is an effect and hath a Cause and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deifie him And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent he were the principal cause of sin But if you mean by moral impulse only commanding it let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command And whether I cause not my pen to write though I command it not And quoad terminum to impel a man physically to moral acts is moral impulse 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin * * * Vid. Aureol in 2. d. 37. p. 300 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin without God's willing the sin But if we make it sin he will make it be a punishment ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be And indeed Augustine saith much contr Julian to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin But I answer this 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati but the materiale And forma dat nomen ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment in proper sence 2. Sin it self though denyed by many Arminians is verily a Punishment and more to the Sinner himself than to any other †††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth 1. Omne peccatum est poena 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena viz. non prima 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris causa nisi ultimum fuerit posterioris And Bonavent there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni sensus And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment the formale peccati being first and the formale poena next in the same act And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former as being an effect of it For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin Biel. ib. In a word God antecedently so formed nature that if we will sin that sin shall be our misery and as a voluntary self-wounding cause our pain and let out our blood and life And it is the most difficult part of the question how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself which yet I have plainly opened before and here repeat it To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities but are two Relations of one and the same Act but not as referred to one and the same correlate God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful in its forbidden mode and circumstances as Claudicatio equi before said but only in genere actus or hujus actus when two sins are compared But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment God is the Cause of both That is he maketh mans nature first and in that and by revelation his Law by which he first maketh mans duty and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it And next he doth by his threatning tell him that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it As if as aforesaid God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei And then commandeth him to avoid it And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it Here now God maketh the Man and the Law God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique or as that circumstantiated act But when the act is caused by Man God by his Law causeth two Relations to result first that of sin and then that of punishment So that man first causeth the sinful act and then that it is quid prohibitum and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to our selves he causeth not that which is a punishment to others And yet supposing it he maketh it a punishment to us and them on several accounts 639. But though God cause not the sin yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin without which grace and spirit we will sin If God now for former sin do deny us or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it and so permitteth it as is said 640. The Arminians grosly erre if he cite them justly Remonst in Script Synod art 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins nor increase their guilt unless the word sin be used equivocally For to have sin and no sin are contraries Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others as he doth Bruits I leave to others 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute As to his controversie Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them or he will them because they are good against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good or whether it be good because God willeth it It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easie distinction putteth past all controversie Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient and then the ultimate end as is oft said Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things or else they could never be
what they are All created Justice and Holiness is such that is Good for Goodness is their essence because Gods efficient will made them so And then Gods final will taketh complacency in them or Loveth them because they are so But if they talk of Goodness or Justice c. as it is in God there is in him no effect and so no cause of himself or any thing in himself 642. But some things God maketh moral duties by the very work of Creation and Ordination of the World without any other Law And these are called Duties by the Law of Nature because the very Natura rerum is a Law that is a signification of Gods will constituting mans duty It is mans essence to be an Intellectual-free-agent It is impossible that such an agent Created of God should not be Gods Creature and Gods own and dispositively a Moral governable agent and that he should not owe God all that he is and hath and can do and that God should not have the Jus Dominii Imperii over him and Jus ad summum ejus Amorem * * * Deus non posset obligare nos ad hoc quod teneatur sibi non obedire Quaero enim an tenetur obedire an non si sic habetur propositum quia tenetur non tenetur quod est impossibile Consequentia patet Quia teneri non obedire est teneri ad aliquid Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. T. Yet after he thinketh it possible for God to have made a Reasonable creature not obliged As if his very nature were not obligatory His instance of the Mad is vain for they are not actually Reasonable Ockam presumptuously concludeth that God could command a man to hate God and make it meritorious it being no contradiction His follower Greg. Arim. confuteth him And Cameracensis invalidateth the confutation and leaveth it doubtful But it is a contradiction to be a man and not obliged by Nature to Love God And a contradiction to be bound by nature to Love him and yet stante natura bound to hate him And a contradiction to hate God and be good or happy It is a contradiction to be a Created Man and not Gods Own and his obliged Subject and Beneficiary Therefore it is a contradiction that submission obedience and Love should not be his Moral duty and good and that self-alienation rebellion or disobedience and hatred should be no sins 643. To dispute then as he doth with Camero and his followers Whether it be good ex natura rei or by Gods meer free-will is a strange dispute and of most easie resolution Either they speak of Gods creating will or of some other subsequent Volition Man is made man by Gods free creating will And the foresaid Relations and duties are made such by making him Man And the duties of Love and Justice to others are made such by his Creators placing him in a world where his Neighbours are about him who are due objects as a part of the society This he himself confesseth pag. 329 330. like a Wheel in a Clock The Creators will is before Nature and therefore before natural duty as the Cause before the effect God could have made beasts instead of men who had owed him no more than beasts can do But from the Nature of a Man coexistent with God his said duties to God so necessarily result that it could not be otherwise nor did there need any subsequent act of Gods will to make that duty 644. But those that are not Duties by Nature must have moreover a Vid. Durand 1. d. 38. qi 4. n. 9 10 11. Scot. 3. d. 37. q. 1. Gabr. 3. d. 37. a. 2. Suarez de Legib. l. 2. c. 15. Aquin. 1 2. q. 94. a. 5. q. 100. a. 4. further act of Gods will as signified to make them so As the Mosaical Ceremonies our Sacraments c. 645. And many Natural Laws and duties are mutable towards one another because the very Nature and Natural Location or Order of the Things from which they did result are mutable And a word of God can make a change when yet before such antecedent mutation the duty must be duty still 646. As to Mr. Rutherfords oft saying that Omnis actus entitativus simplex est moraliter de se indifferens neque bonus neque malus And then that per actum simplicem he meaneth such as include not the object It is ludicrous or vain talk There is no such Act as hath not an object any more than physical form without matter Quicunque movet aliquid movet Quicunque intelligit aut vult aliquid intelligit aut vult vel seipsum vel aliud An Act without its object is but a partial or inadequate Generical conceptus of that Act which hath an object or an abstract partial notion of an act Why then doth he talk of that which is not Had he said that every act is in the first instant rationis or abstract-partial conception an Act in genere before it be intelligible as this or that act about this or that object he had spoken intelligibly as other men do 647. Such another question many called Arminians much use Whether Whether Justice c. be eternally good or have rationem boni aeternam Justice c. be eternally good Or An dentur rationes boni mali aeternae indispensabiles which needs no other solution than this last There is no such thing as an Universal existent per se and not in some Individual And so no such thing as Love Justice c. Bonum Malum which is not alicujus Justitia Bonum c. There was no Creature from Eternity being Just or unjust good or bad But Gods perfect Nature But that Gods own eternal perfection hath in it that root of humane virtue truth justice c. which therefore analogically have the same name our holiness being Gods Image I would prove to the Reader by this weighty reason Because else we have no certainty that Gods word is true For all our certainty is hence that God cannot lye But if Veracity be not in God we cannot prove that And if he have not that which is eminenter Justice mercy c. how can we prove that he hath Veracity might be called Eternally Just in that he must necessarily be Just if he had been a governour And necessarily was Just when he freely became a governour And also this proposition was Eternally true if there were eternally propositions Si Homines existerent Justitia in ipsis debita foret quandocunque Homines fuerint Justitia in ipsis debita fuerit But when all the sense of these questions is no more but what Duties are natural and what superadded called Positive and what natural duties are immutable and what mutable it 's an unhappiness that the world must be troubled with such uncouth forms of speech as make the question unintelligible till unravelled 648. As to
There is no Place where any Corporeal being is where some Active created Nature is not with it so that considering the proximity and the natures we may well conclude that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun which God effecteth by himself alone without any second Cause § 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken Gods presence with the Creature in operation to the fire in a red hot Iron where you would think all were Fire and all Iron But the similitude is too low The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx God and the Sun do what the Sun doth and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth that 's corporeal without it § 7. But the Sun moveth nothing as the Cartesians dream by a single Motive Influx alone but by emission of its Threefold Influx as every Active Nature doth that is Motive Illuminative and Calefactive which are One-radically in Three-effectively § 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui But causeth wonderful diversity of effects without diversity in God the prime Cause or in it self The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet some things to live and some to dye some things to be soft and some hard c. In a word there are few changes or various actions below in bodies which the Sun is not the Cause of without difference in it self But not the specifying Cause § 9. The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures Recipitur ad modum recipientis So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock c. § 10. God operateth on second Causes as God Omnipotently but not ad ultimum potentiae but Freely as he pleaseth § 11. God worketh by second Causes according to the said Causes aptitude so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth § 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies And whether God work on all our souls by superiour Spirits as second Causes is unknown to us It is not improbable according to the order of his providence in other things But we know little of it certainly § 13. But certain we are that superiour Voluntary Agents Angels and Devils have very much to do with our souls and operate much upon them It is a wonderful power which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination or Thinking faculty of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee And it is not like that good Angels have less power skill or will § 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by which is JESUS CHRIST As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion Light and Heat to Inferiour creatures and God operateth by the Sun So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to mens souls and there is now no other conveyance to be expected § 15. Christs Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified is by the Office of Mediator Authorized and by Personal Union and the Fulness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind § 16. Object A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost who is God the Creator Sending is the Act of a Superiour But Christs humanity is not superiour to the Holy Ghost Answ 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God for that hath no Cause But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation as it signifieth the effect 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul and 3. Of the ordering of these effects why rather on this soul than on that and at this time measure c. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superiour sender of the Spirit but a Ministerial and a second cause As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth § 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls that is As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons measure time conditions of the Communication of the Spirit But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself as the Sun giveth us its Influx is all that is disputable That is Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ and pass from his person as his unto us as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members § 18. This question may be put either of all Natural Being and Motion or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause or whether this be true of this Lower World which was curst for sin or whether it be true at least of Humane nature or whether it be true only of Gracious operations § 19. 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe contained in the words Heaven and Earth the Scripture seemeth to assert 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature and of all other creatures that belong to man so far as they belong to him Angels Devils Sun Air Earth c. is past dispute 3. That the real â—hysical effects acts and habits of the Spirit on mens souls are caused by Christs Moral Causation by his Merit and his Political Mission is past dispute 4. That besides all this the Spirit it self by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ and that as they are such and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ is past dispute 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations is past dispute 6. But whether moreover any Action of Christs own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue which is every where be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass are questions not for me to determine § 20. Christs spiritual Influx on souls is not single but is ever Three in One as the Sun 's aforesaid which are according to
consider that though he be Almighty yet he doth not all that he can do nor do his works equally manifest his Omnipotency And there are these causes for Limiting his operations in the effects § 2. 1. * * * Gemina operatio Providentiae reperitur partim naturalis partim voluntaria Naturalis per occultam Dei administrationem quae etiam lignis herbis dat incrementum Voluntaria vero per Angelorum opera hominum Vid. catera August de Genesi ad lit l. 8. cap. 9. plura li. 9. cap. 15. The chief cause is his Wisdom and Free-will It is his Will to do what he doth and to do no more which hath no cause § 3. 2. Another cause is that God operateth by Jesus Christ whose Humanity is finite being a Creature and God worketh according to the Instrument or medium As he shineth by the Sun Moon or Stars according to their several natures and not according to his meer omnipotency so doth he communicate Grace by Jesus Christ § 4. †††Mark 6. 5. He Christ could there do no mighty work because of their unbelief and 7. 24. He could not be hid and 1. 45. Jesus could no more openly enter into the City with many such places all speak of an Ordinate power working not ad ultimum posse And Christ by Office being King and Prophet will operate upon certain terms which in his Sapiential Government he sets down And God will not violate those terms § 5. 3. Also under Christ there are many subordinate Causes There are his Word Preachers and all the forementioned means and helps and Christ will work according to these means Though he tye not himself from doing more or otherwise I have proved that this is his usual way And the effect will be limited according to these second causes § 6. As the Sun shineth on us first in and through the air which abateth somewhat of its force and then through the exhalations and then through the glass window and each maketh some alteration as to the effect on us so is it in this case § 7. 4. But the notable limitation is the foresaid Indisposition of the Receiver Every eye hath a tunicle which the Suns light must penetrate But he that hath a suffusion or he that winketh hath a greater impediment to limit the effect so is it with the various degrees of Indisposition or moral incapacity which yet be nothing if God did work ad ultimum posse and did not as aforesaid work according to his free will and second causes SECT VII Of the Resistibility of Grace § 1. TO Resist Grace signifieth 1. Either Not-to Receive it Passively * * * Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 1◠§. 6. p. 187. distinguisheth of Gods will 1. As to its ratio totalis including not only the viâ— aut causalitas effectiva but also the formal reason of Volitio effiâ—ax which includeth the prescience of future contingents And so he saith It is never resisted 2. Secundum partialem inadaequatam rationem praecise ut causa efficiens nostrorum actuum liberorum prout offert motiva confert causas secundas suum concursum abstrahendo à formalissima ratione Volitionis efficacis quae quidditativè supponit formalissimam rationem praescientiae c. Et ita etiam in sensu composito cum tota causalitate illius in actu primo ut praecisus ab actu secundo potest non sortiri effectum as a stone receiveth not the rain ad intus or as oyl resisteth water or hard things receive not impressions as the soft 2. Or Not-to-Receive-Actually which is Receptio Moralis as a man receiveth not a gift who consenteth not or as he resisteth the light who will not open his eyes The bare Not-Consenting with the Will or not using the senses or organs not opening the hand c. is such a Resisting 3. Or an Active opposition which is more As a man resisteth an Enemy with heart or hand or a man by Nolition and not only Non-volition resisteth a suiter § 2. Mans sinful soul resisteth Gods gracious operations all these wayes 1. It is Passively become undisposed to Reception And thus he is said to have a hard heart of stone and a seared conscience and to be dead and past feeling Eph. 4. 18 19. 2. 1 2. 2. It doth not do what it can do morally to receive grace that is it doth not Conari or suscitate it self to be willing of it 3. Yea it doth Positively resist by Action and is unwilling of Gods gracious operations And this is twofold 1. By willing the contrary and prosecuting carnal interest over-loving the pleasures of the flesh and so turning away from the motions of grace 2. And therefore by an enmity to that grace and work which would †††Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor 8. p. 5. proveth that Gods will is universaliter efficax nec impedibilis frustrabilis aut defectibilis which we grant as to his will as it is efficient and not meerly final and complacite But yet the Schoolmen that say he is not Omnivolens give reason for it convert him and take him off his chosen Idols § 3. No creature by resisting God doth abate or retund his essential Power or Activity nor make any thing properly difficult to him § 4. All the Elect resist Grace before it overcome and convert them And all our lives after we resist it too commonly when it exciteth us to duty and draweth us from sin § 5. He that repenteth not of his Resisting of Gods Spirit and Grace doth not understand and well repent of his sin § 6. All Resisting is not Overcoming All Resist grace but all overcome it not that is do not frustrate it as to the due effect § 7. There are several Degrees of yielding to Gods motions and operations and so several degrees of overcoming He is fully overcome by it who yieldeth to it wholly He overcometh it in some part who yieldeth to it but in part And because Gods grace moveth us to more than we ordinarily yield to therefore we do ordinarily overcome it in too great measure even when we are happily overcome by it § 8. God worketh not alike on all sometime as on Paul he so suddenly changeth the mind and will as that at once he both produceth the Act of mans consent and also taketh away even the moral though not the natural power to the contrary in the antecedent instant So that no man ever denyeth consent who is so moved And sometimes he procureth Actual Consent by such an operation as in the antecedent instant might have been resisted and overcome there being a Moral Power to the contrary So that there is Actually-Converting Grace which was superable in the antecedent instant as to Moral power and there is such a converting Grace as no man ever doth overcome § 9. Gods grace when it prevaileth doth not take away but determine
to Angels nor to Brutes For as God made one sort of creatures naturally determined to things sensible and another sort necessarily though freely determined to things spiritual so it pleased him to make a middle sort endued with Reason and free-will undetermined as to their choice and able freely to determine their own Volitions without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other That so they might be fit subjects to be governed in this Life by Laws and other moral means § 4. God as Creator maketh substances with their necessary Accidents and as the Natural Orderer of them placeth them in their natural order and as Motor or Actor he causeth Action as such But as Moral Rector he causeth only the Moral Order of Actions as far as belongeth to a Rector the rest being presupposed in Nature and leaveth it to man to cause the rest § 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making such a creature as man of a middle defectible undetermined Will left to his free choice with necessary helps it being part of the beauty of his works to be diversified He is not then to be blamed for any of the sins of such a creature because he supporteth his Being and his Active Nature and is his first cause of Action § 6. God could prevent all future sin if he absolutely willed so to do either by destroying the World or disabling the sinner or by withholding his Moving Influx or by such a change of his nature as should make him indefectible But he that made man in this Middle state will so continue him and not make a change in the frame of Nature to fulfil our wills § 7. No Act as an Act no Vital Act as Vital no Intellection no Volition as such is Virtue or Sin And therefore to cause it as such is not to cause either moral good or evil § 8. As God is Related to us as our Owner Ruler and our chief good efficiently as our Benefactor and finally as our End so to consent to these Relations and to the Duties of our correlations and to Practise them is the summ of all Moral Good even Dispositively and Actually to be Resigned and devoted to God as our Owner to obey and please him as our Ruler and to be Thankful to Him and totally Love Him as our Benefactor and our ultimate End All Moral Goodness lyeth in this § 9. By which it appeareth that Morality consisteth in the due or undue ORDER of our actions and dispositions as they are a Moral Agent 's related to God himself in these three Relations and to his Actions therein viz. his Disposals his Laws and his Attractive final Goodness with his Benefits § 10. In these the Morality consisteth as simpliciter talis in all three inseparably as Gods Relations are inseparable and our correlations But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them is Morality secundum quid § 11. And among them all our Action submission resignation patience to God meerly as our Owner is Moral but in the slenderest initial sense And our Actions as related to him as our Rector are Moral in the fuller formal sense And therefore by most accounted the only formal Morality as being a relation to a Law But yet our Actions as Related to God our Benefactor Lover and End are Moral in the highest most perfective notion § 12. It is not only sub rationâ— obedientia as it is a thing commanded by a Law that Love to God is Morally good but also in that superiour sense formally as it is the Love of God And therefore Love is called the Law of Laws and the fulfilling of the Law not only as commanded by a Law but as being the End of the Law and the state of perfection above it as Christ is to the Law of Moses and also as being a Law eminenter something greater though not formaliter § 13. But as there is an Order in these Relations so is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them So that the Last still includeth the rest foregoing All Love is Obedience and all Obedience is submission to our Owner But all Obedience is not Love nor all Submission or Resignation formal obedience to a Rector Though they must all concurr and not be divided when they are formally distinguished § 14. I have thought it necessary though I be guilty of some repetition to open here the Doctrine of formal Morality Virtue and Vice because we cannot understand how God is vindicated from being the Author of sin till we know what sin is which we cannot do till we know what Virtue is which we cannot do till we know what Morality is And also because the Schoolmens most subtile elaborate enquiries into this point especially de naturâ— peccati are generally too little subtile or accurate as comparing it with this little you may perceive § 15. From all this it is plain 1. That God as the meer Author and Motor of Nature doth not cause us to Obey or Love him And therefore that these must be caused by another superadded operation § 16. Yet when we Obey and Love him the Generical Nature of the Act is from God as the God of Nature viz. as it is Intellection Volition Action But that these Actions are so duly ordered as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded is otherwise caused For though the Generical nature of Action Intellection and Volition as such be seldom found but in some Moral species and that be never found but in singular acts yet can one causality procure the Generical nature and another the Specifical and another the singularity in the same action As the Sun is the Generical Cause and the Virtus Seminalis the specifying and the Individuatio seminis the Individâ—â—aâ—ing of Plants Animals c. § 17. As God is the God of Nature so he hath setled Nature in such a constant course of motion as that we have small reason to expect that he should there make any ordinary mutations And therefore as the Sun aforesaid he doth by his Generical Influx concurr with all Specifying and Individuating Causes according to their several natures or receptivities § 18. They therefore that suppose that God as the Cause of all Action must of natural necessity ad esse by physical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free to its object compared with other possible objects and that in all its modes and circumstances do confound Nature and Morality and leave nothing for God to do in causing Holiness but what he must needs do to cause all action that is caused allowing the difference of the second effects â— yea but what he doth in causing every sin For his Pracept is not with them the Causing predetermination § 19. Jesus Christ and his Gospel with all the fore described frame of moral means and the Spirit to co-operate are the proper second causes by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily
Opinion hold it will allow no other Religion in the World but this much To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil which God doth cause aâ— a free Benefactor differencing his Gifts in various proportions as he seeth meet as he differenceth Stars from Stones and Men from Dogs and equally causeth the wisdom of Man and the poyson of the Toad or Serpent and so will make such differences in this World and the next if there be any as pleaseth him as he doth here between one Horse that 's pampered and another that is tired out with labour Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way It hath pleased God by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills necessitation unto its proper practice thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Authors sake than we could have expected if none but such excellent persons as Alvarez * And more plainly yet Bradwardine who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell that God will have it so and none can resist him and his Brethren Dr. Twisse and Rutherford had maintained it But as Davenant well saith It is an Opinion of the Dominicans which Protestants have no mind to own And there are two sorts that thus subject the Will to absolute caused necessity 1. Those aforesaid the Dominicans who assist the predetermining premotion of God as necessary to every act natural and free 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural second Causes which is Hobbs his way and alas the way of great and excellent healing Câ—mero For they hold That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect and the Intellect by the Object â— and God made both Will and Intellect and Object and Law And so Camero hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of Adams sin into but the Devil But who necessitated the Devil to sin This will be all one when it is discussed And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible it will be impossible in the Angels for they are not Gods Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess that God made Man's Will at first with a natural self-determining power and freedoâ— suited to this earthly state of government and that Adam's Will by that same measure of Grace which he had could have forborn his sin at the instant when he sinned II. The other extream which I reconcile not but confute * Yet I am not â—â—â—tating the old way of anaâ—â—â—â—a thing all the hard sayings or opinions of others that being it that I write this against of which course the Epistles of Joan. Antioch 5. 6 c. and of cyril Aâ—ix to Proâ—â—â—s against his so using Theoaâ—â— Mops in Proâ—â—â—â—â—â—â— are worth the reaâ—â—ing besides the fore named T is the Pelagians who deny Original Sin and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier And how far this also subverteth Christianity you may perceive A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions as you may see in the Domâ—nâ—oans on one side and Hobbes against Braâ—hall and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor his Treâ—â— of Repentance on the other and therefore are not to be so slighted B. I do not slight them but confute them I confess that the cases are not without difficulty yea not a little But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced than they can be of the truth of their Opinions And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of â—â— liâ—n Porphyrie or Celsus against Christ that they would not have spoken as plausibly and made the case seem as difficult at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do A. Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned what they are B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me 1. To distinguish Names and Words from Things and * Vasâ—u in 1. Tho. q. 2â— a. 3. d. 4â— c. 1. Bona pars hujuâ— controversiâ— an reprobationis detur causa ex partâ— reprobi dâ— vâ—ce est nominal Controversies from real and to that end to open the aâ—biguity of words as I go along And to â—â—ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion or an enâ— rationâ—â— only that men contend about instead of a reality 2. I may be allowed when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one to distinguish them that each may have its proper answer 3. I may be allowed to â—ast by as unfit for contention all those unâ—evealed and unsearchable Points which none of the Contenders know at all nor ever will do in this World 4. And I will take leave to lay by the rash words of particular Writers as not to be imputed to any others nor to the main Cause or as that which I am not obliged to defend reconcile nor at all to meâ—dle with 5. And when all this is done you shall see what Aâ—toâ—â— the remaining differences will prove A. Begin then with the first Article of Prâ—dâ—stination B. Remember my â—ndertaking that it is not to justifie every â—â—â—â— words that hath written on the Point and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors But produce you all your Accâ—sations as against the Cause of the sober moderate Calâ—â—â—ists and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do The first Crimination A. 1. My first Charge is That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men without respect See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort where this very Charge is denied with detestation And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves Episcop Justit Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur Deum cos secundum â—perasua judicare â—b rebellionem contumaci-am corum dolere irasci c. damâ—are c. cum tamen non modo absolute eos perirâ— peccare voluerit sed originario tali labe infectos nasci fecâ—rit unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat Quod quid aliud esse potest quam histrionica quaedam scâ—nica actio to any fore-seen Sin or cause in them but meerly because â—â—â—â— pleaseth him to do it This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation B. That words may not deceive us let us in the beginning onâ—â— for all know what you mean by the word Decree A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will de eventâ— thaâ— this shall be B. And I suppose we are agreed 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity
Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fulness of time demonstrate his Justice and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency and to pardon Sin And therefore not Christ's Death it self but God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate was the cause of the Promise and of the New Covenant made with Adam and of the Salvation of Believers then Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word A. But at least Sin fore-seen is causa sine qua non B. Call it by what name you please as long as you confess it to be no Cause for causa sine qua non is called Causa fatua and is none But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non for it is no sin from eternity A. It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non B. Yet more notions what is futurity any thing or nothing nothing certainly For quoad ens it is terminus diminuens and nothing is no cause But it is Gods knowledge that Sin will be which is to be called the Cause of Gods Decree as sine qua non if any be But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is your self B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it But not by making other mens worse but by opening the reconciling truth 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said Predestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2. to have an extrinsick cause without change in God 1. Know therefore that Gods Essence is his Will but not as Essence To say that God is God and that God willeth this or that are not terms of the same signification 2. Gods Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will 3. As God willeth himself the Act being perfectly immanent his Will is called himself much more properly than his Will of things extrinsick which is ever either effectively or at least objectively transient Because it is God that willeth and that is willed or loved which made many Ancients say That this was the third Person in the Trinity 4. But as God willeth things ad extra though it is his Essence that so willeth them yet it is unfit to say simply that this Will is God e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God because the name Will here includeth the thing willed 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts it is less inconvenient to say simply that this Will is God than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra By this time you may see that though Gods Will as his Essence hath no cause yet his Will as denominated extrinsecally from the Object may have some kind of Cause that is * Alvarez himself saith that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act. Objective which is quasi materia actus and the terminus sine quo non that is Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent or in Peter regenerate * This is all that Ruiz his Reasons prove De Vol. Dei disp 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who saith that there is more than extrinsick denomination Et relatio rationis â—um realis formalitas But he doth but shew by his quodammodo that he knoweth not what to say or his understanding a seeing that the World was good before any of these things did exist So that by extrinsick denomination without any change in God he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent to be past to will things as existent with complacency or will them with displicency But not to will the futurity of mens damnation de novo but yet his Will of the futurity of mens damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause from whence it is denominated As in esse cognito the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man a subject and then a Sinner and a Despiser of Mercy and then a damnable Sinner And so these are indeed conditions in the Object or Causae sine quibus non or Objective material-constituent causes not in themselves but the fore-sight of them not of Gods Will as his Essence nor of his Will as a Will but of his Will as extrinsecally denominated a Decree to damn Judas e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsick denomination to Gods Will. II. Both you and I hold and must hold that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Conclusio quod Deus aliquos reproâ—at est de fide constat â—nim ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari Vid. Ruâ—z de prâ—de fin Tract 2. per totum But it is false that we hold that he doth it without any respect to fore-seen sin For 1. He fore-seeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation what he doth in time that is it which he decreed to do from eternity But in time he damneth no man but for Sin therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin For sin I say as the cause of damnation which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of Gods Volition or Decree yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object as fore-seen in the Mind of God and so as aforesaid is an Objective Cause as fore-seen III. The execution of Justice and glorification of it and Gods Holiness thereby is good and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree But in the word Reprobation is in most mens sense included much which we hold not which is to be opened further anon IV. And as to the absoluteness of Gods Decree to damn those that are dammed I think you will not deny it your self supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners God doth not only will that all the finally impenitent shall be damned nor only that e. g. Judas shall be damned if he be finally impenitent But also that Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent shall certainly be damned So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object it is no longer a meer conditional Decree but absolute supposing that condition In all this we are agreed The second Crimination A. II. But that 's not all But you hold That God eternally decreed mens sin yea all the sin of Men and Devils some say That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act and