denie that it is from God Yea Strangius lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 569. grants That God is the cause of the act though he doth not absolutely predestine or decree the same and then to that objection of Alvarez That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extendes itself to al those things unto which the causalitie and efficience of God extendes he replies That God decrees althings either absolutely or respectively But this is a very poor Pelagian evasion for respective or conditional Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God as our Divines particularly Davenant Animadvers against Hoard pag. 226. have proved against the Arminians Lastly Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 576. denies That God decrees al sins specially the first sin which we shal in its place endeavor to prove with the solution of his objections against it Hence 2. Prop. The Decree of God gives futurition to the substrate mater or material entitative act whereunto sin is annexed The Antithesis hereto is defended by Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he affirmes That it is not repugnant to the nature of God or of the thing itself that something be future which God has not predefined So c. 9. p. 628. he denies that God hath decreed al futures namely the fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost This Proposition is also violently impugned by Le Blanc de Concord Libert Hum. par 1. thes 55 c. But specially I can no way approve of what Twisse doth in many places assert That the Decree of God and his wil is the sole and only cause of the futurition of every event And he instanceth in the fal of Adam and the Angels His Arguments against the futurition of the substrate mater of sin from the Decree of God we shal examine in what follows Chap. 5. § 1. 3. Prop. The permissive Decree of God about sin is not idle but efficacious This Proposition is opposed by Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 556. Neither do we grant what some affirme that the permissive Decree of God whereby he permits al sin is efficacious albeit not effective For so the fal of Adam and al other sins should procede from the efficace of the Divine Decree which is an hard saying Neither is that lesse hard which some affirme that God hath absolutely decreed that men do not more good than what they do and omit not more evil than what they omit This Hypothesis is so far from being hard as that I conceive Strangius's opposite persuasion is most dangerous and destructive of the Divine Decrees as we shal shew in its place Yea Strangius himself in what follows pag. 557. grants what Lombard lib. 1. dist 47. assertes namely that the wil of God is always efficacious c. 4. Prop. Gods Prescience of things future and particularly of acts whereto sin is annexed is founded on his Decrees Thus Hilarie de Trin. lib. 9. What God decreed to do those things he knows in his wil. This sentence of Hilarie Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 576. ownes as orthodox but yet denies that the absolute Decree of God is the reason of knowing althings So Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes â—3 I see no reason why we should denie unto God the knowledge of those things which are freely future under a certain condition albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cause to this or that But Scotus and his followers fully espouse our Hypothesis asserting That God certainly knows al future contingents because his Divine Essence which is the reason of knowing representes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil. And then as to the prescience of sin they hold That albeit God doth not predefine sins as such yet he predefines the permission of sins in which he knows them to be future Which is orthodox and that which we shal demonstrate hereafter Chap. 5. § 2. 5. Prop. It belongs to the Perfection of Gods wil and providence to predefine and predetermine al the free acts of the wil. This predefinition and predetermination as to gratiose acts Strangius lib. 2. c. 8. p. 188. and the rest of the new Methodists excepting Baronius grant but they denie it as to the Fal of Adam and other acts intrinsecally evil So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 568. But if it be said that God predefined and predetermined that Adam should at that very time eat abstracting from the object which he did eat of that cannot be Then he gives his reasons why God could not predefine and predetermine Adam to the act of eating abstracting it from the reference it has to its object And then he addes Moreover we denie that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Providence that he absolutely predefine al free acts and predetermin the Wil unto them The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antithesis we shal endeavor to solve and demonstrate our own hypothesis in its due place Chap. 6. § 1. 6. Prop. Gods predefinition of and predetermination to the substrate mater of sinful Acts destroys not their Libertie Strangius and his Sectators grant That Predefinition and Predetermination destroyes not that Libertie which is essential to the Wil but only that which consistes in Indifference So Strangius l. 3. c. 14. p. 681 682 683 685 686. and c. 16. p. 711. But how frivolous this opinion is and how unapt to serve the designe for which it was coined we have already intimated c. 1. § 3. and intend more fully to demonstrate Chap. 6. § 5. 7. Prop. Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination in time of those entitative Acts whereunto sin is annexed do not make God the Author of Sin This is the principal point in controversie the Antithesis whereof is strongly urged though weakly defended by our Opponents Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. But I judge it no way consentaneous to the natural sanctitie of God that he wil and decree sin to be the vitiositie to exist and that he predefine such acts whereunto the vitiositie is necessarily annexed specially the Fal of the evil Angels and our first Parents from whence al sins sprang So c. 5. p. 579. Whether it be said from the permission or from the Decree of God permitting or from the action of which God is the cause that sin is necessarily inferred truely the necessity of sinning is ascribed to God as the Author namely because he decreed and caused that from which sin necessarily follows The like p. 587. Neither hath God predetermined the wil of Adam to the very act of eating the forbidden fruit which yet as to its entitie is reduced to God as the first cause neither was that act or its vitiositie necessarily inferred from the permission of God That this Antithesis of Strangius and his Sectators is most false
Wil to the entitative act of sin 1 From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree the objections against this argument solved 2 From the certitude of Divine Prescience with the solution of objections 3 From the Decree of Reprobation Davenants Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees 4 From Divine Concurse 1 It s Principe and Origine 2 Its Nature Totalitie Vniversalitie Particularitie Immediation Prioritie and Independence 3 Its Efficace as to al natural and supernatural Acts and Effects Al the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin strike as much against Predetermination to what is good 5 From the nature of sin its substrate mater and formal reason 6 From Gods permission of sin which is natural negative and positive 7 From Divine providence about sin both conservative restrictive gubernative 8 From the absolute immediate essential dependence of al creatures on God as the first cause § 1. HAving given a scriptural Demonstration as also the unanimous testimonie of such as undertook to defend efficacious Concurse in al Ages of the Church for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we now procede to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principes and evidence which we shal reduce to the following Heads 1. Arg. From the Futurition of althings in and by the Divine Decree which we thus forme That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence But the substrate mater of al sin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition therefore it necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence The major is granted by our Adversaries particularly by Strangius who oft assertes That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event And what more rational than this assertion Yea what is predetermination of the event but predefinition in the Decree The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree and predetermination as to actual concurse and execution in time differ only as active and passive Creation as active Creation gives futurition to things and passive actual existence so predefinition and predetermination and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to predefine and predetermine So that our major seems so clear as to carrie with it its own evidence Wherefore we passe on to demonstrate the minor which our Adversaries principally strike at and therefore needs our strongest forces This we shal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature without some cause of its futurition How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie contingence and indifference but by some cause Do not possible and future differ and must there not be some cause of this difference 2 Prop. Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal This is most evident because whatever is future was so from Eternitie for God foreknew it to be so otherwise how could his knowlege be certain Hence 3 Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God For is there any thing but God eternal 4 Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil. His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things for things are not future because God foreknows them but he therefore foreknows them because future Hence it follows that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. § 9. whence also it necessarily follows 5 That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowlege but the wil of God which gives futurition to althings And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against this Argument by Responses and Objections 1 They replie to our minor That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but from the wil of man that gives existence to it Thus Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove That it is not repugnant that something should be future which God hath not absolutely predefined but left to the wil of man to effect So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremtorily assertes That God hath not decreed al futures namely the Fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost c. So pag. 631. he saith Nothing hinders but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God namely the create wil. The like Le Blanc Concord Libert Hum. p. 1. thes 55 57. where he endeavors to prove That what is the cause why things existe in time the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie but mans wil only is the cause why sin existes in time ergo c. A poor Response indeed or rather begging of the Question For is it possible that the second cause loged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternitie Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie yea in Nature that the cause is ever at least in order of nature before the effect and is the second cause confined by time before the eternal futurition of its effect 2 But Le Blanc answers hereto thes 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason and an extrinsec denomination of the thing which is said to be future not something really distinct from the thing future c. But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident for hereby it follows that the thing is not future before it is existent can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence How many absurdities would follow hereon But our Adversaries have one grand Objection which they lay much weight on against our minor and that is this If the wil of God gives futurition to sin then sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the wil of God and so the futurition of sin must be God This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius Le Blanc and a Divine of name among us So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631 632. having pag. 626 c. recited Twisses argument from the eternal futurition of sin he replies thus Herein saith he lies the whole force of the argument that there can be no other cause of a
futurition made from Eternitie but what is eternal To which he answers with a scoffe thus A pretty argumentation indeed why may we not by the same reason prove that the futurition of sin is God The same is urged by Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes 55 56. pag. 454. where he endeavors to prove against Twisse That if the futurition of sin be from the wil of God it is God which makes God manifestly the Author of sin The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us But in answer hereto I must confesse I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned and in other points judicious on such infirme and rotten grounds For when we speak of the futurition of sin which is a complexe aggregate thing we must distinguish its material from its formal part 1 If we speak of the material entitative part of sin which is in itself a natural good so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme that its futurition is the same or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof and why not is not the futurition of al natural Beings good And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good Yea was not al good from Eternitie loged in the bosome of God and sonot really distinct from him So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the wil of God strikes at the futurition of althings even the most gratiose acts from the same wil for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the wil of man as its first cause why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel resolved into the same human wil specially in Adams innocent state who had then perfect free-wil But yet 2 if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its formal nature consisting in its vitiositie and obliquitie so we utterly denie that its futurition is the same with God for the futurition of sin as to its vitiositie is not from the effective wil of God but permissive God decrees to effect the entitative act but only to permit the vitiositie appendent thereto which follows on the act as other privations do on the absence of their habit To make this evident by a parallel instance God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun and that at night it shal retire into the other Hemisphere whence darknesse necessarily follows may we thence argue that the futurition of darknesse or darknesse itself is the same with God Would not any Fresh-man in Logic hisse such a consequence out of the Scholes And yet who dares denie but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God as also its futurition The like may be instanced in al other privations which have no real being and therefore no real efficient of their existence or futurition for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition but what has a real efficient cause of its existence what is the first efficient of the existence of things Is it not the wil of God and is it not also the same Divine wil that gives futurition to things Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition give them also in their appointed periods of time their existence So that in this regard the Rule of Strangius and Le Blanc is most true That the same cause that gives things their existence gives them also their futurition this I say holds true of the first cause but not of second causes as they would needs persuade us So that to conclude this argument in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al sin the effective wil of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin and the permissive wil of God to the formal reason or vitiositie of sin hence it necessarily follows that the predeterminative Concurse of God whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin § 2. Our second Argument shal be taken from the certitude of Gods Prescience and we may forme it thus God can certainly foreknow nothing but what he certainly decrees predefines and predetermines to be But God certainly foreknows al sin Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none that I know except Atheists and Socinians Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he seeth al his goings Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God but what has some certain Reasons Principes and Causes of such a foreknowledge Now there are three causes that give certitude to al Science and Prescience 1 A certitude of the Object for if the object be uncertain the Science can never be certain can the Structure or Edifice be firme if the foundation be infirme 2 A certain Medium which is the principal fundamen of al Science 3 A certitude of the Subject for be the Object and Medium never so certain yet there can be no certain Science unless the Subject apprehend the same And doth not the Prescience of God include al these degrees of Certitude Must there not be a certitude of the Object Medium and Subject 2 Prop. The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree 1 How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future but by the efficacious Wil of God making it so 2 What certain Medium can there be of Divine Prescience but the divine Wil and Decree 3 And thence how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Wil Hence 3 Prop. Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists but also of the most sober Scholemen in al Ages Scotus Ricardus Hervaeus Bradwardine Johannes Major and others not a few as Le Blanc de Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 33. p. 443. confesseth Yea Strangius himself grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Prescience as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea Le Blanc De Concord Libert Hum. Par. 1. Thes 59. c. p. 455. proves strongly That according to Strangius's opinion there can no contingent i. e. sinful act be foreknown by God as absolutely future but what God first decreed to be absolutely future His words are these But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future and as such to be foreknown by God without any Decree
the act but also to the goodnesse thereof 16. Sin is committed against Gods wil of complacence and approbation but not against his wil of natural permission 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin is very wel consistent with the natural libertie of the wil and its natural passive remote power of receiving Laws and obeying the same 18. Gods predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin may very wel be reconciled with his wisdome veracitie and sinceritie in the prohibition and punishment of sin 19. God punisheth one sin by leaving men to another yet without being guilty of the least sin 20. Sin by Divine wisdome is made a means accidentally utile and subservient to Divine glorie albeit it hath no moral bonitie in it 21. Al Gods invitations comminations exhortations and promisses argue in God a real wil of approbation and Evangelic intention that Sinners repent and live albeit they never repent 22. Gods physic complacence is towards the entitative natural act of sin and yet his moral displicence is against its obliquitie and vitiositie The false Hypotheses and Consequents imposed on the Predeterminants by Molinists Arminians and New Methodists 1. GOds absolute Decrees which give futurition to things take away al power from the creature of acting contrarily yea make the contrary naturally and simply impossible 2. The futurition of sin is from the effective wil of God yea very God Str. 631 632 635. Le Bl. Concord Libert par 1. Thes 55 c. p. 454. as before c. 5. § 1. 3. The Decree of God giving futurition to sin necessitates men to sin 4. The existence of sin is from Reprobation as the proper cause thereof 5. God impelled and necessiated Adam to fal Baron Metaphys 150 151. 6. Gods efficacious Decree to permit sin makes him the Author of sin 7. God wils and decrees sin as sin yea simply wils and intendes the damnation of Sinners 8. Gods absolute Decree of Reprobation impels men to sin 9. In acts intrinsecally evil the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act considered in its individual nature 10. Predeterminative concurse brings men under a fatal and Hobbian necessitie of sinning 11. In acts intrinsecally evil God predetermines the wil to the act as sinfully relating to its object Strangius pag. 206 234 240 c. 12. Gods predetermining the wil to the material entitative act of sin makes him the cause of sin Strang. pag. 341 342. Baron Metaph. 150 151. 13. The Sinner doth not determine himself to any sinful act any other way than God Strang. pag. 242 243. 14. God doth more than temt men to sin in that he predetermines the wil thereto Strang. pag. 269. 15. Predeterminative concurse to the entitative act of sin maketh God to afford as much influence and concurrence to the worst of actions as to the best Strang. pag. 277. 16. God doth not only permit sin but approve of it yea take complacence in it 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin destroys the libertie of the wil introduceth a fatal necessitie and makes the mater of al Gods Laws to Adam and his posteritie a natural simple and absolute impossibilitie Strang. 567. Bar. Metaph. 150. 18. Gods predetermination to the entivative act of sin is irreconcileable with his wisdome and sinceritie in prohibiting and punishing sin Baron Metaphys pag. 151. 19. God in punishing sin by efficacious dereliction or leaving men to sin becomes guilty of sin 20. God wils sin and approves of it as a means naturally and morally conducing to his glorie 21. That Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin makes him not really to intend what he pretends to by al his invitations promisses comminations and exbortations to repent 22. God takes not only physic complacence in the entitative act but moral complacence in sin by predetermining the wil to the entitative act thereof § 2. Having given the proper Hypotheses of the Predeterminants with the false Hypotheses and consequences imposed on them by their Adversaries we now procede to lay down the proper Antitheses of the Antipredeterminants and more particularly of the New Methodists and the dangerous consequences which naturally result therefrom The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants 1. THE Futurition of althings is not from the Divine wil and decree Strang. 628 631. 2. The futurition of althings is not simple but complexe Strang. 640. 3. The futurition of althings is not eternal 4. The same particular cause that gives existence to any thing gives futurition to it 5. The futurition of the entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but the wil of man Strang. 585 628 631 632. Le Blanc 454. 6. Whatever God wils he approves or complacence is essential to al acts of Gods wil Strang. 546 548. 7. God decrees not the entitative act unto which sin is intrinsecally appendent Strang. 562 587. 8. There is a twofold Decree in God one absolute the other respective conditionate and consequent Strang. 546. 9. Al Gods Decrees are not particular but some general only Strang. 558. 10. Reprobation is not absolute but conditional dependent on the prevision of mens actual sins 11. Gods prescience of mens sins is conditional and dependent on mens free-wil not on the Decree of God Strang. 642 647. 12. Gods permission of sin is only privative and inefficacious Baron Metaphys 157 158. 13. God wils only his own permission of sin not the existence of sin by his permission Arminius 14. There is a twofold Concurse of God the one predeterminative the other only general 15. It doth not belong to the perfection of Gods Providence absolutely to predefine and predetermine al free acts of the human wil Baron Metaphys 147. Strang. 568 584. 16. Al positive real Beings and acts are not from God as the first cause of Nature Strang. 584 630. 17. God predetermines to what is good but not to the material entitative act of that which is intrinsecally evil 18. What is predetermined is naturally and simply impossible 19. Man in his lapsed state has a moral power to close with Divine exhortations and offers 20. Unregenerate men may prepare themselves for the entertainment of Grace 21. To predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin is to impel men to sin 22. Divine predetermination to the entitative act of sin puts an end to human libertie 23. Some human acts are indifferent in individu◠and so neither good nor evil 24. Some human acts are so intrinsecally evil that the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act The dangerous Consequents of those Antitheses 1. NOthing is certainly and infiallibly future 2. Complexe Propositions are in order of Nature before their simple termes 3. God did not from al Eternitie foresee althings future 4. Nothing is future before it is existent at least in its particular causes 5. The futurition of sinful acts is a mere contingence to God 6. There is in
the presence of althings in Eternitie Wherein he follows the Dominicans and so must by consequence resolve the futurition of sin into the wil of God permitting it which overthrows his Hypothesis Yet cap. 8. pag. 622. he resolves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events into the more Essence of God And pag. 626. he resolves it into the actions themselves and their determinate causes Lastly cap. 10. pag. 646. he in down right termes confesseth That the science of future sins is referred to the science of Vision Which is al that we contend for and that which necessarily resolves Gods prescience of sin into the act of his wil permitting it Some of our Opponents resolve Gods certain prescience of sin into the infinitude of his science Thus Le Blanc De Concord Libert p 444. Thes 39. As for the fourth opinion which secketh the certitude of Divine prescience in the infinitie of the Divine Intellect and in the determinate veritie of those things which are contingently future it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate Yet Thes 40. he confesseth That this opinion doth not satisfie the Question nor take away the principal difficultie For that which is here most difficult to be understood is how future contingents do from Eternitie passe from mere possibles into the nature of futures that so under that reason they may be perceived by God Which knot he endeavors to untie by telling us that the same causes that give existence to things future give them also their futurition But this is a very jejune and poor evasion as we shal hereafter shew Chap. 5. § 1. 3 Others refer Gods certain prescience of sin to the Jesuites middle science whereby God foresees that if the wil of man come under such a connexion of causes circumstances and providential concurrences the effect wil certainly follow albeit in itself merely contingent Thus Lud. Crocius Dyodec Dissert Dissert 7. where he largely but weakly defends this middle science which Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 449. Thes 26 c. makes to be the opinion of Baronius and others Le Blanc himself pag. 444. Thes 42. confesseth That it wants not great difficultie how a thing which is supposed to depend on a cause in itself indeterminate should be certainly knowen by the Divine Intellect for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot see what is not nor yet change the nature of its object Whence he concludes Thes 43. That seing there is so much darknesse on al sides our safest and most ingenuous course is to confesse our own ignorance herein The like subterfuge Strangius makes use of l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. c. 6. p. 591. with this pretexte That the mode of Divine prescience is not reveled in Scripture A poor refuge indeed why then do they so daringly sift and prie into the Divine prescience and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reason We easily grant that the mode of Divine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals and therefore can content our selves with scriptural descriptions thereof but this we assert that it is impossible the Divine prescience which is in itself most certain should depend on the most incertain ambulatory wil of man and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate 2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves about the futurition of sin and Gods predefinition thereof Strangius l. 3. c. 11. holds That some free acts are absolutely future and knowen of God as such without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts and yet he denies that those free contingent futures can be knowen by God according to any Hypothesis which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create wil and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futurition Whence it wil follow that God can foreknow no contingent sinful act as absolutely future but what he first decreed to be absolutely future which yet Strangius admits not Herein he is opposed by Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 455. 3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves touching Gods concurse its immediation totalitie prioritie efficace and predetermination as to sinful acts 1 How many of them incline to the sentiments of Durandus denying al immediate concurse to sinful acts And of those that grant immediate concurse in termes how many yet denie it in realitie Among those that grant immediate concurse both name and thing do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith yea repugnant thereto 2 Our Adversaries also differ much about Gods total particular concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin Some grant a total concurse to the physic entitative act in the general but not in particular others grant a total concurse to the entitative act in particular abstracting the reference it has to its object Thus Strangius lib. 2. cap. 3. who grants that God doth concur by a special concurse to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically which is al that we contend for Others on the contrary make Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin only partial and general asserting with Molina Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Disp 6. That God is only a partial cause of the entitative act of sin So a Divine of name among us yea he asserts that God never totally permits sin 3 Our Opponents differ also among themselves touching the Prioritie of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Some grant Gods concurse hereto previous though not predeterminative so Strangius but others make it to be only simultaneous asserting that God concurs with the wil of man in the same moment of nature and reason to the same act So Baronius wherein he also follows Lud. Molina and the Arminians 4 Lastly the principal difference among our Adversaries is about the Efficacitie and Predetermination of Divine concurse as to the substrate mater of sin Some make the concurse of God to be only general and indifferent and so determinable by the second cause as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 73 74 75. pag. 142 c. where he makes Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts to be the same with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horse Wherein he follows the Remonstrants and Jesuites more particularly Molina Concord Liber Arbitr cum Grat. donis c. Quaest 14. Disput 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among our selves openly asserts that Gods concurse is determinable by the creature But Strangius albeit he too far fals in with the sentiments of Baronius against predetermination yet he rejects this Hypothesis of a general indifferent concurse as too grosse and Pelagian So l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. We say not therefore that God concurs only by a general concurse as the Sun concurs in the same manner to
the generation of a man and of an horse and of a mouse but we determine that the influxe of God is special to special effects as they are physically distinguished specie and unto al kind of entitie but not to the reason of moral iniquitie which consistes in privation Strangius here seems to oppose Baronius's Hypothesis touching a general indifferent concurse but yet I must confesse upon a more accurate research I cannot find that he differs materially from Baronius herein for although l. 1. c. 11. p. 61. he cals this concurse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficace yet he makes it be but commun and no way determinative and therefore only indifferent The like l. 2. c. 19. p. 373. And I am very positive in this that no man living can rationally exemt themselves from the imputation of the Jesuites indifferent concurse and assert an efficacious special concurse but what is determinative as to the subject it workes on And thence Le Blanc Concil Arbitr part 3. thes 36. p. 434. confesseth That Strangius ' s opinion as to this point differs but little from that of Baronius Lastly Baronius denies al predetermination both as to good and evil actions as Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78 c. p. 146. Strangius allows predetermination to al acts moraly though but imperfectly good and to many other acts of the wil whensoever God pleaseth or need requireth yet he denies it to al acts of the creatures specially to such as are intrinsecally evil as lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162. and elsewhere Herein he is followed by some Divines of note among our selves who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their singular Hypothesis but wil at last be driven to the opinion of Baronius the Remonstrants and Jesuites or else fal under the lode of al those black consequences they clog our Hypothesis with of which hereafter Chap. 5. § 4. 4. Our Adversaries differ much among themselves about Gods permission of sin its nature and efficace 1 A Divine of repute among our selves assertet◠that no act of sin no not the active selling of Joseph or crucifying of Christ was willed by God but only the passive vendition and crucifixion or effect yea he saith That God doth not wil sin as a punishment in a proper sense but others allow that God wils the acts of sin as penal or conducible to his own glorie though not as sinful acts Thus Strangius l. 4. c. 2. p. 773. where having refuted that distinction at first framed by Bellarmine and of late reassumed by a Divine of great name among our selves of active and passive vendition and crucifixion he concludes thus Therefore here was not an otiose or idle permission but an efficax operation in the selling of Joseph which is more orthodoxe and consistent with itself than the former Hypothesis which seems to be contradictory to itself as hereafter Chap. 3. § 2. 2 Some of our Opponents assert Gods permission of sin to be altogether inefficacious yea idle and unactive but others allow it an efficace and energie for the limiting directing and ordering of sinful acts to their proper ends albeit not about the act itself which I conceive no better than a modest contradiction for how can Gods permission limit direct and order sinful acts but by influencing the very act itself materially considered See more of this Chap. 5. § 6. 5. Our Adversaries also differ greatly among themselves about the Nature of sin its formal Reason c. Some and those of no smal repute among our selves hold sin as to its formal reason to be a positive real Being which indeed is most agreable to their Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which they denie to be as to their substrate mater or entitative act from God I must confesse this opinion would carry somewhat of probabilitie with it if we could with the Manichees hold two first Principes or Causes one of good the other of evil but for us that assert but one first Cause of al create positive Beings I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypothesis of the positivitie of sin without making God the Author of sin or making mans corrupt wil independent and so the first cause of a real positive act Therefore Strangius lib. 1. cap. 13. to avoid these black consequences strongly argues with the Orthodoxe that the formal reason of sin consistes in privation But withal we are here to note that this Hypothesis utterly overthrows his other Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which he denies to be from God as to their substrate mater of which more hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. There are other points of moment wherein our Antagonists differ among themselves as wel as from us namely touching the natural or moral libertie of the wil natural impossibilitie and possibilitie Gods decretive and approbative wil of which before Chap. 1. And indeed we need no way wonder that our Adversaries thus differ among themselves sithat their Hypothesis is liable to so many inconsistences and contradictions for how is it possible that they should agree among themselves when as their principal Hypothesis is so disagreeing from itself But more of this when we come to the demonstrative part Chap. 5. § 3. We procede now to shew Wherein we differ from those of the new method Strangius Baronius Le Blanc and others about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of Dort wherein the Antitheses and sentiments of the Arminians were so strongly and fully refuted there sprang up some Divines who gave their assent and consent to the Canons of the said Synod but yet contrived a new method specially as to universal Grace Reprobation and Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin in order to a coalition with the Arminian partie as we shal hereafter demonstrate And the principal Agent who undertook the new modelling this last head was Strangius which he has copiosely treated of according to the new method in his Book De Voluntate Actionibus Dei circa peccatum whose sentiments we are to examine in what follows but at present we shal only lay down in several Propositions wherein we differ from him and those who follow his method in the stating Gods Concurse to the mater of sin We assert 1. Prop. God has an absolute efficacious Decree about the substrate mater or entitative act of al sin This Proposition Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547. grants to be true in althings but sin specially the first sin and such acts as are intrinsecally evil which sufficiently proves our Proposition for we say and are ready to demonstrate that the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed is not in itself or its natural entitie sinful but naturally good What there is of sin annexed to it ariseth from its moral estimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby in which regard we peremptorily
much malice murder and hatred of God and his People annexed Yea God did not only send Nebuchadnezar to afflict Israel but also give him a reward for his service as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon my servant God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against Israel The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be added to shew how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally considered and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin 2. To mention one or two Scriptures which speak of Gods using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans and Caldeans yea of Satan himself to afflict Job and yet he saith v. 21. The Lord taketh away He saw by faith Gods hand moving yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs materially considered albeit not to the vitiositie So Psal 105. 25. He turned their heart to hate his people to deal subtilely with his servants Here it 's said expressely that God turned i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel God's turning their hearts doth expressely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the entitative material natural act of hatred albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof So much also the next clause importes and to deal subtilely with his servants i. e. al their subtile strategems machinations and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Israel by putting to death their Males oppressing them with hard labors c. al these were as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God who turned their hearts thereto And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus What is said Psal 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people it must be understood that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians but by doing good to his people whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred 1 We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians that 's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us But 2 We avouch that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating by his doing good to his people Is not this a strange Comment God turned their heart to hate his people i. e. gave occasion of hatred by doing good unto his people Doth not Gods turning the heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his efficaâ—… predeterminative concurse in applying the wil to its act 〈◊〉 it 's said Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he wâ—… is it not meant of an efficacious concurse Do not also the following words Psal 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts predetermining them to their act Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts As for the other Texts Strangius's general answer p. 774 775. is That God is the Cause of the act in those sins but not of the pravitie of the Instruments c. And what do we say or desire more But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his for he addes p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure but what he approves as Good i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin because he doth not approve of it Wherein note 1 How he doth with the Pelagians and Arminians confound Gods Decretive Wil with his Approbative complacential Wil. 2 We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts but the Question is touching objects Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit This we peremptorily denie and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place § 4. Another Head of Arguments contains such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan that for his folie committed with Vriah's wife and murder Behold I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes and give them unto thy neighbour c. This threat we find fulfilled 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin Here Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth 1 That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact But 2 then he answers that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned namely by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation Moderation and Direction which he afforded according to the modes already explicated about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel and their actions in this wickedness which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20 c. For this is usual that the effect which ariseth from two causes whereof the one is effective and the other directive be ascribed to both but in a different respect c. This is the commun answer which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures which speake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer 1 Take notice that he allows Gods Gubernation Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed but not the production of the act This is evident by the Conclusion wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause but God the directive only But I replie how can God efficaciously Govern Moderate and Direct the Act unless he be also the effective Cause thereof Take his own instance the sinful wils of Absalom and Achitophel how is it possible that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils but by influencing their wils and efficaciously predetermining them to act If God did as he grants efficaciously govern moderate and direct their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust certainly he must necessarily produce those acts 2 Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie for suppose we grant that God doth only efficaciously govern moderate and direct the sinful act not produce the entitative mater thereof yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of sin as our effective predeterminative concurse For Gods
efficacious Moderation and Direction of the sinful act denotes his efficacious Preservation of the act which is as sinful as the effection or production of the Act. But more of this hereafter Chap. 5 6. Another Scripture which speaks Gods immediate predeterminative concurse in the entitative act of Sin is 2 Sam. 16. 10. where David saith of Shimei That the Lord said unto him Curse David And v. 11. Let him curse for the Lord hath bidden him Now the force of this argument dependes on the explication of this word or command of God to Shimei which must be here taken either morally for a divine precept and injunction or physicly for an efficacious Concurse and influence 1 That it cannot be here taken morally for a preceptive word is most evident because had God commanded Shimei to curse David he had been the moral cause and so the Author of his sin 2 Therefore it remains that it be here taken only physicly for Gods efficacious Concurse secretly and powerfully inclining and applying Shimei's wil to the entitative act of this cursing And in this sense the Word of God is frequently taken in Scripture namely for his efficacious predeterminative concurse in the Creation Conservation and Gubernation of things Now what doth Strangius replie to this Why l. 4. c. 4. p. 786. he saith That Shimei's Cursings being intrinsecally evil we may not say that God did move or impel him thereto in a proper manner of speech neither that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions as they were determined to such an object but only as directed by God to his just judgements and that most certain direction of God with the administration of Circumstances and Occasions was as a Precept In which Response note 1 That he grants that Shimei his cursing was an action intrinsecally evil which is a great concession and wil clearly overthrow his own Hypothesis and prove ours That God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil For if Shimei's Cursing was an action intrinsecally evil then surely such also was the Vendition of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord which were both as to their entitative acts predetermined by God But 2 he denies that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions as determined to such an object In the last clause of this Antithesis lies the spirit and force of al his objections against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin which we intend more fully to examine Chap. 6. § 1. at present we say 1 That Shimei was not the instrument of any moral but physic influence from God the precept or bidding here specified was not moral but physic and real God did not morally command Shimei to curse David but physicly and naturally incline him to the entitative act of Cursing him which was as a Precept this Strangius grants in the close as to Gods direction 2 Hence if we consider Shimei's cursing as physicly determined to such an object it was not morally evil but good and so from God It 's true as it was morally determined by Shimei the moral Agent to its object David so it was intrinsecally evil but as it was physicly or naturally determined by God for the punishment of David so it was both naturally and morally good and from God 3 He placeth the whole of Gods Influence to this act in directing his Actions to his just judgements c. To which I answer 1 How could God direct these actions of Shimei specially the immanent acts of his wil which were the worst part of his malediction but by an efficacious predeterminative influence on his wil and its acts 2 He grants that this Direction of God was most certain and efficacious if so then certainly predeterminative and if the direction be predeterminative is not Gods concurse to the sinful act considered materially and entitatively predeterminative 3 If Gods directive concurse be predeterminative as Strangius must by his concessions grant wil not those ugly consequences which he lodes our Hypothesis with be al retorted on him Did not Gods efficacious direction termine on Shimei's cursing as determined to such an object namely David And was he not the Instrument of this efficacious direction Baronius Metaph. S. 8. Disp 3. p. 158. answers this Text thus To that malediction of Shimei it is answered That God commanded Shimei to curse David not by bending his wil but by opening to him the way to this evil and by shutting it to al other evils i. e. by permitting him to act this only whenas he was ready for many other evils A poor evasion indeed and such as if admitted would make the whole Scripture but as a Nose of Waxe 1 Doth not David say categoricly that God bid i. e. not morally but physicly Shimei to curse And what can this implie but the bending his wil to the substrate mater or entitative Act 2 Can it be imagined that David could mean only a mere otiose and speculative permission and not an active concurrence to the act it self entitatively considered 3 Doth not Baronius confess that God opened to him the way to this evil And if so must he not then open Shimei's heart to the mater of it Did not the main act of malediction arise from his wil And if that were not opened to the entitative act would the way to this evil have been ever opened Again Gods immediate predeterminative hand in those acts whereunto sin is necessarily appendent may be demonstrated from 2 Sam. 24. 1. And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel and he moved David against them to say Go number Israel and Judah Here it is expressely said that God moved David to number the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and he moved or excited i. e. efficaciously determined and applied his wil to the substrate mater of this command to number the people Hence Strangius pag. 790. answers 1 That the He here must be meant of Satan who is said 1 Chron. 21. 1. to stir up David to number the people And he cites for this Comment Junius with others But alas what poor subterfuges wil men flie unto to avoid the force and evidence of Divine light Doth not Grammatic construction as wel as the mind of the words utterly reject such a glosse The Particle He here is not a distinct Pronoun as our English Version reads it but included in the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is by the Copulative ו joined to the former part and the anger of the Lord was kindled so that if the passive was kindled belongs to the Lords anger then also must what follows and he moved Neither is this sense aliene from other Scriptures for 1 Sam. 26. 19. David saith That God had stirred up Saul against him i. e. efficaciously moved him to the entitative act of persecuting David Thence 2 Strangius fearing the ruinous downfal of this refuge flies to another thus But if
ours 2 How doth God judicially punish one sin by another but to use his own words by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error And if so then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God Of this hereafter § 6. But 2 I passe on to his second answer whereon he seems to lay the most weight though indeed most feeble But saith he because those words Rev. 17. 17. are immediately subjoined to vers 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which points out the reason of that which next follows namely that those ten Kings having changed their opinion should destroy the Whore and Antichrist it seems to me more commodious if in that vers 17. there be a reason given of this famose change that they who were before the friends and vassals of Antichrist should be afterwards enemies and adversaries to him namely because God hath put this into their heart And the first words of vers 17. sufficiently accord to this Exposition But what is subjoined That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste until the word of God should be consummate I should think ought to be expounded negatively c. Thus Strangius A strange comment indeed let us a little inquire into it 1 How infirm is his argument from the rational particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make what follows the fulfilling of Gods wil to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist whereas the particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seems rather to refer to the whole verse and more particularly to the last clause until the Word of God shal be fulfilled and so it notes that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil 1 In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste and 2 When the words of God were fulfilled i. e. Antichrists reign expired then to hate the Whore c. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident So that v. 17. is not only a reason of the change mentioned v. 16. but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to and enemies against Antichrist 2 As for what is subjoined v. 17. That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste I cannot but admire with what shadow of reason Strangius can understand this negatively as if they should not give their Kingdom to the Beste certainly if such glosses should be admitted we might easily find in Scripture subterfuges for the worst Heresies and Immoralities Why may not the most profane debauched wretch when he is pressed with those Commands Thou shalt not commit adulterie Thou shalt not kill c. replie that these Scriptures must not be taken negatively but affirmatively Thou shalt commit adulterie c But Strangius saw ful wel that the affirmative sense of those words That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste would quite subvert his forced sense of the foregoing words and therefore he saw no way left but to secure himself by reducing this later affirmative clause to a negative though contrary to the expresse letter and mind of the words But 3 being after al his glosses sensible of the infirmitie and invaliditie of this response he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge telling us That if any shal think this exposition of the last member not sufficient but that beyond it there must be also signified that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdome to the Beste I have no mind to contend about this mater sithat the sense is sufficiently sane which ever way the words be understood In evil works God is not the cause of the moral evil but of the substrate act and punishment or Judgement which is annected to the sin but in good works not only of the substrate act but also of the moral Bonitie c. Who of us denies this would our Adversaries but stick here how soon would our Controversie be ended But here lies the sting even in this plausible concession Strangius with the rest would fain perswade us that there are some acts of sin so intrinsecally evil as that you cannot separate the physic natural act from its moral Vitiositie § 5. We descend now to such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious Permission of sin The former Heads regard only the substrate mater or entitative act of sin but this sin in its formal nature Our Adversaries the Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and Semi-Arminians or New Methodists al grant Gods permission of Sin but only such as is otiose speculative negative and naked without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act or direction of it to its proper ends But the sacred Scriptures ascribe to God a positive efficacious directive and ordinative permission of sin arising from his positive absolute volition to permit it So it 's said of Eli's Sons 1 Sam. 2. 25. They hearkened not to the voice of their father because the Lord would slay them The conjunction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is Causal and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Wil of God The Soverain Lord had by an absolute peremtorie decree predetermined to leave the Sons of Eli to this sin of Disobedience both against their Father and God which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruine and thence it 's said they hearkened not because the Lord would slay them the wil of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Wil efficaciously permitting it to be I am not ignorant that some of late have endeavored to give the causal particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a more soft as they phrase it Version and among these some make it conclusive and so render it ideo idcirco quapropter others render it quamvis as Turnovius others otherwise But certainly our English Version which renders it causally because seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Versions So the LXX who render the words thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them In willing willed i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiome peremtorily efficaciously immutablely and absolutely willed Thus also the ancient Syriac and Arabic Versions with some later Munster Pagnine Arias Montanus Junius and Tremelius Osiander Piscator Malvenda with the Tigurine and Belgic Versions yea Castalio not excepted render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 causally because according to our sense and interpretament Let us examine now what Strangius returns in answer to this Text lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809 c. He answers 1 That the sons of Eli were for their flagitiose impieties destined and devoted by God to ruine 2 That the punishment of death here mentioned seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal not eternal 3 That however it be as it is manifest that sin precedes damnation and the inflicting
of punishment so it 's necessary that the prescience of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God of damning and inflicting punishment whether temporal or eternal 4 That the particle Quia Because here used doth not alwayes denote a proper cause but a reason of consequence which may be taken from the effect and other arguments besides the cause c. Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text but to answer briefly 1 We say that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianisme in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil The Sons of Eli were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruine as if their flagitiose Impieties were causative of and influential on Divine destination but the Soverain God destined by an absolute decree to leave them to those flagitiose sins and for them to destroy them What are the dangerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation we intend more fully to shew hereafter c. 5. § 3. 2 That the Death here intended and inflicted was only temporal is too crude a notion for a Divine instructed in the knowledge of divine wrath Yea Strangius confesseth that they merited eternal wrath and how then could they be exemted from it who had rejected the Merits of their Messias 3 What he addes touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins yea of final Impenitence be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Damnation of men then it wil by a paritie of reason necessarily follow that the prescience or prevision of mens Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men for if Reprobation be conditional Election must be so also as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate Davenant in his Animadvers against Hoard invictly proves p. 226. and elsewhere That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil. But of this more in what follows c. 5. § 3. 4 As for the Particle Quia Because 1 We grant that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cause but a reason of Consequence and that taken sometimes from the effect But 2 that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text is most evident because Gods Wil to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods wil to slay them 3 Take notice that we do not say that Gods wil was the cause of their disobedience or ruine but only that the later was the consequent of the former God in his most soverain wise and efficacious purpose decreed to leave the sons of Eli to such flagitiose sins as should prove the cause of their ruine both temporal and eternal and hereupon their sin and ruine followed as Darknesse is the consequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior Hemisphere Again Gods efficacious permissive wil about sin may be demonstrated from Job 12. 16. The deceiver and deceived are his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived i. e. he doth in just judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived as Vatablus on this Text. Which Mercer thus more fully explicates I understand this not only of false Worship but also of al errors that are committed every where although more specially in Polities and Cities to be governed where God stirs up some who draw others into error that they might follow their fallacious counsel and enter on a perniciose course for their own dammage God therefore impels and draws some into error not that the Lord is the Author of Error or Sin but that their sin and defection from God leads them thereto God not only merely permitting but also ordaining c. Whence it 's added v. 17. He leadeth counsellers away spoiled and maketh the Judges fools spoiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. of their wisdom and counsel as it follows So it 's taken Psal 76. 6. The valiant are spoiled of their heart i. e. deprived of their courage And maketh the Judges fools 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 infatuat or ad insaniam adigit as Mercer He infatuates them Again v. 20. He removeth away the speech of the trusty and taketh away the understanding of the aged 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Judgement Discretion Counsel Prudence Sense Hebr. the savor or experimental tast So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth and causeth them to wander in a Wildernesse where there is no way The like Deut. 28. 28. and Esa 19. 11 12 13 14. Now let us see what answer Strangius l. 4. c. 9. p. 836. gives hereto It must be observed saith he that Job in this Chapter doth in an illustrious manner discourse of Gods Providence so ordering things that nothing comes to pass casually or fortuitously nothing without his destinated counsel that nothing is done but what he wils either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it as August Enchirid. c. 95. so that God doth effect and procure whatever things are good and also wisely foreknowing the future event doth permit sins which he directs to good ends ordained by him Deservedly therefore Job among other things observes that it is from Divine Providence that some erre and draw others into error and that both as to maters of Religion and in other maters of this life not that is he the Author of seduction and errors but because God for the contemt and abuse of his light delivers them destitute thereof into a mind void of judgement and presenting objects and occasions opens a way wherein they wander c. Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypothesis and subvert his own Antithesis For 1 he grants That nothing happens casually without Gods destinated counsel according to that of Augustin That nothing is done but what God wils c. Now certainly Gods destinated counsel or determined wil is most efficacious and irresistible so that if the permission of sin be from Gods destinated counsel it must be also determined by his efficacious wil. 2 He grants that God wisely foreknows al future events even the sins of men and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own wil to permit the same neither Strangius himself nor any of his sectators could ever yet make out 3 He grants also That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts and permission of the vitiositie 4 He yet further grants That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement
of further grace 4 Whereas he saith That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto is not sin but ruine the consequent of their sin the word stumbling and falling signifying their destruction it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words for both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie according to our precedent explication of them primarily their sin and then their ruine or destruction as the consequent of their sin This also is evident from that parallel Text Jude 4. For there are certain men crept in unawares who were of old ordained to this condemnation ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse and denying the only Lord God These ungodly men are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 designed and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination to be given up to this condemnation of turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse c. So that it is evident that God foreordained and decreed not only their destruction but to leave them to those sins which should cause the same But to sum up the whole of this Head we grant 1 That absolute Reprobation is not the cause either of mens sins or damnation It 's true elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damnation 2 That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated Yet we denie 1 That it is injust for God by an absolute efficacious Decree to reprobate some for the glorifying of his own Justice For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of justice yet it is not injust for God to reprobate any 2 We denie also that there is any motive cause or condition of Reprobation as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence also 3 we denie that the act of Reprobation is merely negative but affirme that it is positive and absolute of which see Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprobat p. 113. Hence 4 It necessarily follows that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation he predestines and preordains in like manner by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil to leave men to their own sinful courses and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins See more Chap. 5. § 3. CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin 1 Fathers Augustin Prosper Fulgentius 2 Such as succeeded in the Roman Church Hugo de Sancto Victore Aquinas Scotus Ariminensis Holcot Altissiodorensis Bradwardine his Conversion Parts both natural and acquired zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin How God wils Sin How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin The Dominicans and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conforme to our Hypothesis The concurrent perswasions of Jansenius and his Sectators also of the Tridentine Catechisme 3 The Sentiments of Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Zuinglius Beza Chamier Lud. Crocius the Synod of Dort and Church of England Davenant Sam. Ward c. 4 Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin more ancient Durandus his proper Hypothesis and who may be accounted his Sectators Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and designe Arminius and his Adherents the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes The New Methodistes Camero Amyraldus Placeus Le Blanc Baronius Strangius How these New Methodistes fel into these Sentiments and who may be estimed such § 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis touching the efficacious predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti-pelagians in al Ages of the Church and withal to shew who have in al Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries First among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illustrious name and mention than Augustin that great Propugnator or Champion of efficacious Concurse I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries as Strangius by name are so confident as to cite Augustin's testimonie in defense of their Antithesis but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of Augustin whose sentiments touching this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works Thus de Grat. Lib. Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture saith he be diligently inspected it wil appear that not only the good wils of men but also the bad are so in Gods power that he can incline them where and when he wil to performe his benefices or to inflict his punishments by his most secret yet most just judgement Again in the same book he saith That God workes in the hearts of men to incline them which way he please either to Good out of his Mercie or to evil according to their deserts by his Judgement sometimes open sometimes secret but always just So De Praedestinat Sanct. c. 16. It is saith he in the power of wicked men to sin but that by sinning malitiosely they do this or that is not in their power but of God dividing the darkness and ordering it that so hence what they do against the wil of God might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God Again De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto c. 5. Some things saith he God makes and orders other things he only orders righteous men he makes and orders but sinners as sinners he makes not but only orders i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good and of the action but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin but only of the act ordering it for his glorie Again De Civitate Dei l. 13. c. 22. he saith That Sin as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law that is the Divine Wil or Decree Moreover Augustin frequently asserts that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another So Contra Julian l. 5. c. 3. de Civitate Dei l. 15. c. 6. libro de Natura Gratia from cap. 20. to the end To these Testimonies we may adde several Hypotheses of Augustin which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin As 1 He asserted that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Wil and so in it self positive and absolute 2 He held That Excecation and Obduration is the consequent of Reprobation of which see Jansenius August de Gâ—…t Christ l. 10. c. 3 4. 3 He maintained That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary because punishments as Jansen de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Lastly that Augustin held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians who
and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God without any force impressed on the second cause as our Country-man Compt. Carleton in his Philosophie Disp 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel stated it But 3 Scotus in 4. Sentent Distinct 49. Quaest 6. § 14. pag. 522. edit 1620. has these very words Est contra naturam ejus scil voluntatis determinari à causa inferiori quia tunc ipsa non esset superior non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori quia cum hoc stat quòd sit causa in suo ordine It 's against its nature namely the wils to be determined by an inferior cause because then it should not be superior but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause because it is consistent herewith that it be a cause in its own order Wherein Scotus doth most acutely though briefly state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively 1 Negatively That the wil cannot be determined or predetermined by any inferior cause because then it were not superior for whatever cause predetermines another to act is so far superior to it it being impossible yea a contradiction that the inferior should predetermine the superior 2 Positively That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause i. e. by God the first cause who gave it being and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation and Scotus's reason is invincible because to be predetermined by a superior cause is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order Yea we may raise this reason to a greater height therefore the wil is a cause in its own order i. e. a particular proper principal or lesse principal cause according to the nature of its causalitie and effect because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil even such as have sin appendent to them is according to Scotus's sentiments so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting as that it corroborates and confirmes the same 4 Lastly Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. q. 2. saith expressely That albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful yet the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God but to the create wil because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action but God is not bound by any such obligation c. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines albeit opposed by the new Methodists as wel as Arminians and Molinists Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes Thomas and Scotus we now passe on to their sectators whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis who was by profession a Dominican and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine whom Bishop Vsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men and Dr. Barlow as the acutest His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find in Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. where he demonstrates Gods immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus 1 Every evil act when produced is conserved by God Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God but be independent and so by stronger reason the wil itself which is more perfect than its act should be independent Again if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same 2 The wil is of itself indifferent to any act therefore it must be determined to every act by God 3 If God be not the immediate cause of the act which is evil he is not the Maker of al Beings 4 Al good that is not God is from God as the Efficient thereof but the act morally evil is yet naturally good Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus 1 If God produce the same evil act which man produceth then he sins as man sins Whereto he answers by denying the consequence and that on this reason because man doth not therefore precisely sin because he doth an evil act as it is Ens or act but therefore he sins because he doth it evilly i. e. against right reason or the Law of God but now God produceth the same act according to right reason and therefore wel So the same man borne in fornication is produced by God wel but by the fornicator evilly But 2 it is farther objected by his Adversaries then as by ours now thus Thou wilt say that those things that are per se in themselves or intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like can never be wel done therefore neither by God I responde saith he as we that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done albeit not by every Agent e. g. man envieth but God although he produce the same act of envie with man yet he doth not envie For al such acts beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing do connote something on the part of the Author who is so denominated which agrees not to God So to steal besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it but God translating the same thing doth not translate what is not his own and therefore is not said to be the thief c. But here we are to note that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin it is not to be understood as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act for so he makes God to be a total cause but he cals God a partial cause of sin as he produceth only the entitative act not the vitiositie whereof man only is the moral cause Thus also Holcot our Country-man super Sentent lib. 2. Dist 1. q. 1. makes God to be a partial cause of sin yet not the Author of it whereby he plainly means as he explicates himself that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater or entitative act only but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also This I mention because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot would persuade us that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis in Sent. 2. where he proves by strong arguments namely from the Passion of Christ c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil of which more in
what follows touching Bradwardine I now come to Thomas Bradwardine our pious learned and profound Bradwardine whom might I be allowed my libertie I should rather reckon among our first Reformers than among the Sons of Antichrist for indeed he was a zelose Patron of and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion specially efficacious free Grace which he with so much courage strength of argument and flaming zele defended against the Pelagians of those days This Thomas Bradwardine borne at Hartfield in Sussex flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigiose natural ingenie which he greatly polisht by al manner of acquired Sciences specially the Mathematics and scholastic Theologie He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphysic Contemplations which in his first studies he greedily drank in even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures because they favored not of a metaphysic style as he himself informes us in his Book de Causa Dei When saith he in the state of my unregeneracie I came into the Scholes and heard Lectures on Pauls Epistles of free Grace c. it did no way relish with me quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum because it savored not of a metaphysic style It was with me as it was with Augustin of old nothing would please but scholastic discourses for free wil c. But after his Conversion he was as another Augustin the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace Balaeus de Script Brit. cent 5. cap. 87. tels us That John Baconthorp that famose Divine and English-man returning from Paris had a great contest with Bradwardine about the points of Gods Prescience and Predestination to whom at last Bradwardine assents in al those points as the same Baconthorp declares in Sent. lib. 4. Dist 1. q. 4. Afterwards he was called to be Confessor to King Edward III. and thence made Archbishop of Canterbury without any desire of his own thereto He was indeed a good Mathematician a great Philosopher and excellent Divine being communly stiled Doctor profundus the profound Doctor Neither was he lesse renowned for his Pietie and Zele in the Cause of God against the Pelagians which he defended with great fervor as wel as acumen of spirit which also is greatly illustrious in his defence of Gods efficacious Concurse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts This he frequently inculcates in his most excellent Book de Causa Dei specially lib. 1. c. 30 31 32 33 34. He demonstrates 1 That al voluntary actions are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence cap. 30 31. p. 271 c. 2 That althings which have any natural Entitie or Being procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciously disposing them and not merely permitting Which he demonstrates many ways as 1 Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate by any inordination precedent to the divine wil. 2 Because otherwise the whole Vniverse would not be disposed in the best manner 3 Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testments ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names Thus cap. 32. p. 288. 3 That about whatever Gods Permission is his actual Volition is also employed about the same And he gives this demonstrative reason hereof For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good yet it is good that there should be not only good things but also evil For unless it were good that evils be the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be as Cap. 33. Hence 4 He comes l. 34. to the state of the controversie How God wils sin and how he wils it not 1 He proves p. 294 295. That God must necessarily wil the existence of Sin because he permits it also God doth voluntarily provide for yea act al the voluntary acts of the wil both good and evil with al their positive circumstances which necessarily import sin Again This Proposition Sin is is true and therefore there must be some cause of its truth which can be no other than the divine wil from which al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origination Again ` Whatever is good must procede from the first good but that Sin existe is good according to Augustin So Hugo saith That God wils that sins existe because this is good Moreover he brings in Hugo speaking thus which deserves a great remarque If it be said God wils sin this seems harsh and scandalous to the ear and therefore some pious mind doth refute this not because that which is spoken is il spoken but because that which is wel spoken is il understood 2 Thence Bradwardine procedes to refute Lombard who asserts That God wils sin as a punishment not under this reason as it is sin i. e. materially or entitatively considered which Hypothesis of Lombard he refutes by shewing That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with the Sin so that if God wils sin as a punishment he must necessarily wil the existence of sin Also whoever knows two things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined and wils that they should be so conjoined and knowingly and rationally wils one the same person wils also the other specially if about both he employ an act of his wil But now God knows and wils that those two Sin and Punishment be conjoined together and rationally wils the one namely the punishment of sin therefore also the sin Again he that wils an Antecedent wils also the Consequent at least in an universal albeit not in a particular for he that wils a whole wils al the parts necessary thereto 3 Thence he procedes p. 300. to shew how God wils sin God saith he doth no way wil Sin simply but only in some limited respect For to say that God wils something simply is according to the commun manner of speech to say that he loves it and approves of it as good Yea addes he may it not be said that in the whole Universe there is no such thing as Inordination Deformitie or Sin simply considered but only Sin in some respect Because in regard of the prime and supreme Cause al Beings both positive and privative are sweetly disposed with the highest wisdome beautie and justice Whence 4 He gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to sinful acts and to such as are good p. 302. God saith he is not the Author of sin as of that which is done wel For of this he is the Author so as that he alone doth supernaturally create and give to the wel-doer Faith Hope and Love c. But it is not so as to sin i. e. As to good God produceth not only the natural act but also the moral Bonitie but as to Sin he produceth only the natural entitative Act. 5 He thence p. 302. explicates how the Apostle Paul and the Fathers denied that God wils Sin When saith he Augustin and the other holy men denie that God wils Sin the cause of this negation seems
this Because the Apostle and Augustin and other holy men placed Predestination Prescience and the like on Gods part the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins and retort the cause and blame on God who so predestinated or foreknew therefore these holy men would say that God by his Predestination Prescience or such like doth not compel them against their wil to sin but that they sin freely and by their own wil and that God by predestinating foreknowing or willing sins doth not sin nor do unjustly neither is he the first imputable or culpable cause of sins but the first imputable and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner This indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day Then he addes pag. 303. But if it yet be said that it always hears il with many to say That God doth any wise wil sin it is certainly true and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited not because that which is said is not wel said but because that which is wel said is not wel understood I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdome and savor and understand the truth which is savory to a sane tast and that they would know that there is no evil in the world which is not for some great good why therefore should we substract from the World and from God the Author of the World this way of doing good or of benefaction which is so admirable and great Yea it seems more miraculose and great to worke good out of evils than out of goods or to worke good only And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many if it be said that God wils and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daughter of the Son with the Mother of Parricide Sedition Blasphemie and other like sins and yet not only the Saints but also the Philosophers speak thus For who in such an incest prepares the seed and moves creates and infuseth the soul into the foetus but God and however it may sound thus the Saints of God speak yea the Spirit of God who speaks in them What could be said more acutely demonstratively and divinely for the deciding our controversie would men but receive it 5 Again Bradwardine l. 2. c. 20. p. 542 c. proves out of Altissiodorensis super 2. sent That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altissiodorensis's arguments are these 1 From the Passion of Christ which was good and proceded from a good cause namely the Wil of God 2 From the act of Fornication whereby an holy Prophet is begotten which act is the cause of good and therefore good and yet it is also evil and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God Thence he addes the Testimonie of Thomas in Quaest de malo q. 19. where he demands Whether the act of sin be from God and he answers thus It must be said that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater some said more anciently that the action of Sin was not from God attending to the very Deformity of Sin which is not from God but some said that the action of Sin is from God attending to the very Essence of the Act which must be granted to be from God and that on a double reason 1 Commun because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence and his very Essence his Being it must thence necessarily follow that whatever doth participate of Being must be derived from him who is Being by Essence 2 Special for it is necessary that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover who is God as p. 554. 6 Bradwardine l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher and proves strongly That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God of himself properly actually and specially applying it to act and moving of it Which he demonstrates many wayes as 1 Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith 2 Because al natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause 3 Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self therefore neither can it act of it self as c. 24. p. 563. 4 Because God by reason of his infinite Actualitie permits nothing but what he wils 8 Bradwardine l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher and demonstrates That God albeit he impel no man violently against his wil yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously and draws them to al their free acts even such as have sin annexed to them But further addes he it may be probably said that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin as to the substance of the act yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin or to the deformitie of sin as it is sin or the deformitie of sin for the omnipotent God may as it appears separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformitie of sin and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good without such a defect and privative malice Specially sithat Sin Deformitie Vitiositie or defect is not essentially the very act nor of the essence of the act nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act Therefore the good God acting rightly pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act according to its substance and nature good the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily follow whence therefore doth it follow but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient and from the wil of the Sinner What could be said more acutely more judiciously more demonstratively and more piously to put a period to this controversie had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth I have been the more prolixe in rehearsing these illustrious and demonstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries but what I find rationally solidly and convictively solved by him above three hundred years since As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then and ours now we shal produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis Ch. 6. § 1 2. Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we might now descend to the later Scholemen specially the Thomists but these lie under the same criminal accusation and imputation with our Adversaries as the orthodoxe Calvinist and it deserves a particular remarque that look as the Pelagian Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calvinists so the Arminians and New Methodists oppose the Calvinists in the same point under the Bears skin of being Dominicans and indeed no wonder sithat the Dominicans and Calvinists in this
possibilitie to a state of futurition c. Whence he concludes Thes 43. Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have when they see themselves involved in so many self-contradictions and absurdities to professe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience Yea some of them procede so far in this pretended modestie as to professe That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniscient is put out of dout but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressely delivered in Scripture The like others But is it so indeed Doth not the Scripture declare expressely the mode of Prescience Why then 1 are our Adversaries so dogmatic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages How comes it to passe that they contend with so much heat and passion for that which they confesse is not expressely delivered in Scripture Were not a modest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession But 2 We easily grant them that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out as indeed al Divine Perfections are but yet must we thence necessarily conclude that nothing of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressely delivered in Scripture 1 Doth not the Scripture evidently declare That the mode of Gods Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Mans science as much as Heaven is above the Earth yea infinitely more 2 Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience al manner of Imperfections much more Contradictions And is not the mode of Gods Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man But see more hereof Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 2. § 3. We passe on to our third Argument which shal be taken from the Divine Wil and Decrees and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation And here we shal lay down this Principe which is granted by Strangius and others of the New Method That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We easily grant saith he that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that if God doth absolutely predefine any particular and singular act to be brought about by us he must also determine our Wil to the same This he inculcates c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Demonstration on for we no way dout but to demonstrate That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin Which we shal endeavour to make good in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive proper condition or cause This Proposition is generally denyed by the New Methodists who grant That God decrees al good absolutely but as for Sin say they God decrees that only respectively and conditionally So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548 But we no way dout but before we have finisht this Demonstration to make it evident that Gods Decree of Reprobation whereby he determines to leave men to sin is absolute as wel as the Decree of Election Yea it is to me a thing altogether impossible to defend an absolute Decree of Election and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and respective for if the absolute good pleasure of God be the only cause why some are elected must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected Doth not the Election of the one necessarily implie the Reprobation of the other It 's true our Divines that follow the Sublapsarian mode as Davenant c. speak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole masse of corrupt nature yet they allow not of any distinctive condition or formal cause or motive which should incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another for nothing can move the divine Wil but what is some way antecedent to it Now the consideration of al sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. 2 Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative but positive and efficacious It 's granted that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation which they terme Non-election or Preterition yet hereby they intend not a suspense act of the Divine wil but include also a positive efficacious act Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Augustin That Gods negative Reprobation is positive So Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprob p. 113. But we must take heed saith he lest with Scotus we think that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates which he electes not but passeth by is merely negative for in this very act which we expresse by a Negation is contained an expresse and affirmate Wil of God So in his Determinations Quaest 25. p. 117. he tels us That it 's most certain there can be no Decree permitting sin to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree And p. 118. he instructs us That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious not in a way of efficience but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil 3 Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a soverain Absolute Lord not as a Righteous Judge The Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge not as a supreme absolute Lord whence they conclude that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins not considering that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment but of denying Benefits wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended according to that of the Apostle Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay c What is soverain Dominion but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay Is the soverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law more than what is in his own nature and wil Hence it follows 4 That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Augustin That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Reprobation And Augustin complains That it is a great injurie to God when men search for causes of things superior to his soverain Wil for his Wil
God should immediately produce this act of the wil without applying the wil to the act Do not the very Jesuites Suarez Carleton with others grant That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil not only simultaneous as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56 Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect but also the wil itself as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries touching immediate concurse that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin Can we imagine that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil and yet God not applie the wil to its act which is al that is meant by predetermination Yea doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act but also influence the wil in the production of that act as Strangius and others grant and yet not applie it to act How is it possible that God should influence the wil in the production of any act without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act doth he not applie it to the act and so predetermine the same Again doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act as Strangius also grants and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration that God predetermines the wil to that act Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act but what is predeterminative Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause and if so must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument Lastly if we allow with the Jesuites unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination may with the same facilitie be reflected on them for if they make God by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we More of immediate Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 5 The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts We shal here reassume a Principe already established and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists namely That the action of the first cause concurring with the second is not as to passive attingence distinct from the action of the second cause This is generally granted by the Molinists as Le Blanc Concil Arbitr par 3. thes 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius August tom 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It 's true the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second as to active attingence or principe because Gods concurse actively considered is the same with his wil yet as to passive attingence the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause This being premissed we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse and that in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward Determinat de Concurs Dei pag. 116 c. And the arguments for it are invict for 1 where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie which is proper to every second cause there posterioritie is essentially appendent Again 2 al second causes in regard of God are but instruments as Aquinas proves yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal Agent But here we are to remember that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence we denie not but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause as Alvarez lib. 3. de Auxil Disput 19. num 4. Twisse Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat part 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous and that 3 because this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect Yea some of the Jesuites grant That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely without respect to this or that second cause so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause So Fonseca Metaphys lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest 5. sect 13. The like Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60 61. Thus also Burgersdicius Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 11. grants Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous which is most absurd for the active concurse of God being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 416. Hence 2 Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect For how is it possible that the second cause should act unlesse the first move and applie it to its act Can a second cause move it self to an act unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause Whence 3 Prop. This previous Concurse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Wil and God concurs in order of nature before the wil yea premove and applie it to the act must he not necessarily predetermine the same Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never extricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil and yet not predetermine it to the act Indeed to speak the truth the Sentiments not only of the Arminians but also
Privation only An acute and excellent Decision of this Controversie were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices the sum whereof is this The Act of sin entitatively and substantially considered is naturally good and so wel-pleasing unto God the Author of Nature yet if we consider it morally in regard of its Vitiositie so it is infinitely displeasing to God This is as a Key to open the dore to a more ful solution to al objections against us so that at present we need say no more than this that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions than that of our Adversaries Is not the Divine Sanctitie as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the substrate mater of Sin as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concurse thereto Are not those very Acts which are morally evil as to the Sinner both naturally and morally good as to God Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin yet must we thence necessarily conclude that he predetermines men to sin formally considered Must not the sinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause and not to the first universal cause It 's true the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law and therefore sins but doth God come short of any Law Has not his Wil the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy even because he wils it The sin which he governs is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures wil not in regard of his wil It is confest that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered but yet is their Concurse the same Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other Doth Sin as to Gods Concurse include any more than a natural act which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good but doth it not as to mans Concurse speake moral vitiositie Again what doth Gods permission of sin implie but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act Is there any thing in the world purely simply and of it self sinful without some substrate mater naturally good What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege why God may not predetermine the wil to the said substrate mater without prejudice to his Sanctitie § 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the Word of God both Preceptive and Promissive which divine Predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin doth according to the Antithesis of our Adversaries render uselesse impossible yea collusive and unsincere For say they Gods Precepts Promises and Comminations whereof mans Nature is capable should be al made Impertinences through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them 1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge That our Hypothesis renders them altogether uselesse yea naturally and simply impossible This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flourishes which are the best armes they have to defend their declining cause with But having God and Truth though naked and simple on our side we no way dout but to stand our ground against al their fiery or venimous darts And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions we answer 1 That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is possible or impossible which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguitie and confusion Chap. 1. § 4. with endeavors to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature as to divine Commands 2 We are to know that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel as to the heirs of Salvation to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator i. e. to subserve his ends which principally regard the Elect. 3 Yet we grant that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates 1 In that it lays a great restraint on them not only as to wicked actions but also as to lusts in some measure as Exod. 34. 24. The Autoritie and Majestie of Divine Precepts backed with many severe Curses leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debaucht spirits and so keeps their lusts from open violences 2 The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates albeit they have no power to observe them in that they are thereby instructed how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it whereby they are left without al Apologie or Excuse The Precept shews us what we ought to do not what we can do it is always imperative albeit not always operative and may not the Soverain Lord require of man the payment of his debts although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humor he hath disabled himself from the payment of them What excuse is it for the Sinner to say it is impossible for him to obey the Precept whenas the impossibilitie lies in his own wil not in any force or defect on Gods part Doth he not in that very moment wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin voluntarily espouse and wil that act And doth not this leave him without al shadow of Excuse Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved wil which electively and freely determines it self to the Sin in the same moment of time though not of nature that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act 4 We affirme that Gods certain Prescience of Mens sins with the conditional Decree of Reprobation Gods immediate previous Concurse to the entitative act of sin and mans universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good which are al granted by our Adversaries bring sinners under as great impossibilitie of obeying Gods Commands as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concurse to the mater of Sin asserted by us This is wel demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Author in his late Letter touching Gods Providence about sinful Acts c. from p. 67. to 74. But because he is a party I shal mention only the Response of Davenant Animadv p. 341. As for Gods Law which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace we say that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Augustine and by the Church of England as considered under the conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius And p. 418. he strongly proves That Divine eternal Prescience of future Actions or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossibilitie of
2 There is also a libertie strictly so termed which consists in the Indifference of the wil to this or that object also to act or not to act and this Libertie is most proper to this our imperfect state as Strangius p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewise Le Blanc p. 435. and others There were some first lines of this distinction drawn by Camero who makes libertie strictly so termed to be about the means not the end yet his Notions about Libertie are tolerable in that he makes Divine Predetermination consistent with human Libertie But the first creator of this distinction touching a two-fold Libertie among those who owned the Synod of Dort was Strangius who asserts a two-fold Libertie one considered in its own Nature which is essential to the wil and the other as limited to lapsed man which includes Indifference c. as in places above cited What these new Methodists mean by this new-coined distinction of Libertie unless it be a gratification to the Pelagians I cannot conjecture Certain I am that I never could find it among the ancient Philosophers Primitive Fathers Scholastic Theologues or any other but these new Methodists or their Sectators Do any of the Greek Philosophers make mention of any libertie but what is essential to the wil and al human acts Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this two-fold Libertie Yea do not the very Jesuites herein concur with us that Liberty is essential to al moral acts both in the future as wel as the present state of the Soul Is not Libertie constituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of al Moralitie Doth not Amyraldus de Libero Arbitrio as wel as we make Libertie properly taken essential to the wil and al its Acts Of what use then can this distinction of a two-fold Libertie be Wil it satisfie the Pelagians Jesuites or Arminians No because they al make Libertie strictly taken essential to al Moral Acts. Or wil it any way relieve the Calvinists in their conflicts both with Jesuites and Arminians to say the wil is sometimes free and sometimes not If it be supposed that Indifference be essential to libertie in this imperfect state wil it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians that the wil is not according to these new Methodists free in Conversion because not indifferent It were not difficult to demonstrate how invalid this new-coined distinction of Libertie is and unapt to reach those ends for which it was designed by the authors thereof As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Libertie we have with what studie and diligence we could inquired into and discussed the same Court of the Gentiles P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 11 12. B. 4. c. 1. § 29 32. also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. S. 4. § 2. the sum whereof may be drawn forth in these following Propositions 1 Natural Libertie as it denotes a power has one and the same Idea or Nature with the Wil. This is copiosely demonstrated in the forementioned places Hence 2 Al acts of the Wil have libertie in the strictest notion essentially appendent to them 3 The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not absolute but limited and conditionate 4 The necessitie which ariseth from the concurse of God the first cause no way diminisheth but establisheth the Natural Libertie of the Wil. For nothing offers violence to the Wil or is injuriose to its Libertie so long as the act it puts forth is voluntary so long as the wil doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto the act is in its own power and free for as Aristotle Eth. l. 5. c. 12. wel observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nothing happens to such an one but what he wils 5 Actual Indifference to varietie of Objects or Acts is no way essential to natural Libertie but only an Accident resulting from its imperfection 6 The formal native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Libertie both as to state and exercice includes no more than a rational spontaneitie This last proposition which is the principal Strangius owns and Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit Thes 19. p. 405. confesseth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines even of Amyraldus Placeus and other new Methodists That this also is asserted by our Judicious Davenant see his Determinations Quaest 22. That the Divine Decree takes not away Libertie These Propositions about natural Libertie we have in the forecited places more amply demonstrated because the whole Pelagian and Arminian controversie and particularly this about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin depends thereon and he that shal undertake this Province of resolving our present Question without a clear Explication and Demonstration of the Wils natural Libertie doth nothing to purpose § 4. Next to the natural Libertie of the Wil we are to consider Moral Libertie or Free-wil as also what is possible or impossible to corrupt Nature By Moral Libertie or Free-wil is generally understood the moral potence or spiritual abilitie of the Soul to do good This moral and spiritual Libertie our Adversaries the Pelagians Arminians and new Methodists confound with natural Libertie and from our denying the later in corrupt Nature they falsely charge us with denying the former therefore to remove this confusion of the termes and those false imputations which are charged on those that defend efficacious concurse the following Propositions wil be of use unto us 1. Natural Libertie is essential to the Wil and al its acts but moral Libertie or free-wil to good only accidental and separable The Wil is not a Wil if it be not naturally free in al its acts whatever act is voluntary is for that very reason free Voluntary and free being in Scriptural estimation as also by the determination of the best Philosophers termes synonymous and equipollent as we have demonstrated Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. § 1. But now as for Moral Libertie and free-wil to good that is only accidental to the human Soul it may come and go be present and absent without the natural destruction of the Soul or violation to natural Libertie It 's true that Moral Libertie consisting in virtuose Habits Inclinations and Exercices is the Perfection of Man yet so as the Essence of the Soul is not diminished or destroyed by the loss thereof 2. Our first Parents in their innocent state were invested not only with natural but also with moral Libertie or free-wil to good This is granted on both sides and therefore needs not further demonstration 3. Since the fal corrupt Nature in its unregenerate state lies under a total universal and naturally moral Impotence as to al Moral and spiritual good I cal this Impotence total and universal as it overspreads the whole soul and has stript it of al seeds of or inclinations to any
1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore
it must be moral and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause and Author of them and is not this an high piece of blasphemie We are so far from asserting that God determines men to the most wicked actions as that we say he determines men to no wicked action no not the least Yea we adde further that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good and in part sinful albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodnesse of the action and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act yet he predetermines not to the vitiositie of the act or the act as sinful So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie 1 Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Predeterminants agree 2 The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience Futurition Divine Concurse and Gods permission of sin 3 The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees the Futurition Divine Permission Prescience Providence Predefinition and Predetermination of Sin THE prolixitie we have used in explicating and stating our Question wil render our subsequent work more facile and concise For here that old Proverbe holds true A good beginning is half the work But before we enter on the Demonstration of our Hypothesis it wil be necessary to manifest 1 Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree 2 Wherein our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis differ among themselves 3 Wherein we differ from them The explication of these Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determination of our Question § 1. Wherein we and our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis do agree Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are others on the contrary make them lesse our first work therefore wil be to shew wherein we agree which I shal endeavor to lay down in the following Propositions 1. Prop. That God hath decreed althings that come to passe Herein our Adversaries generally concord with us albeit they differ from us as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. But also we confesse and say that God doth truly decree althings that happen but not althings in one and the same manner but some things effectively other things permissively which is the commun opinion of Theologues according to that famose Axiome of Augustin There is nothing done which the Omnipotent doth not wil either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it Yet the said Strangius in what precedes gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees It is not needful saith he that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God touching his Concurse to be afforded as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice whereby he hath determined to concur with al the actions of the creature as he hath given them a power to act c. This general Decree foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis is most unworthy of the Divine Being in that it overthrows the Prescience of God imposeth imperfection on the Divine Wil and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianisme 2. Prop. That Election of some to Grace and Glorie is absolute and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man This Proposition although it be denied by the Pelagians Socinians and Arminians yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius Le Blanc and others For these albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans sin yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glorie which to me seems very strange and inconsistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation For if the Decrees of God be absolute as to Election why should they not be also estimed such as to Reprobation Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itself Are not conditional Decrees inconsistent therewith Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee al acts and events of the human wil Must they not then be al decreed absolutely by God See hereafter Chap. 5. § 3. 3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin as wel as of al other Events This Proposition is universally granted by al the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius c. as also by most Arminians although it be utterly incompossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t'other Partie For al the wit of man yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils wil never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees I must solemnely professe I can see no way left to evade the force of Socinus's argument against the certaintie of Gods prescience if we resolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events of which more in what follows Chap. 5. § 2. 4. Prop. That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternitie he predetermines in time This Proposition the New-Methodists seem generally to grant So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. When we speak of absolute predefinition we willingly grant that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that whatever particular singular Act God hath absolutely predefined should be done by us to the same he doth determine our wil For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined it is necessary that he effect the same or cause that it be done because the Decree of God seeing it is absolute and efficacious must necessarily have its effect which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefinite act otherwise if the wil should not act that which is predefined the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustrated which is absurd A good concession which wil be of use to us in what follows Chap. 5. § 3. 5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good as also to some other commun acts and effects This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians as also by Baronius yet the New Methodists who have chalked out a middle Way generally entertain it Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. We have shewen that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil namely not in actions intrinsecally evil and to which Vitiositie is necessarily annexed albeit in things lawful not only in works of
Actions and particularly to the substrate mater of sinful acts 1 We may consider the object althings i. e. whatever is clothed with the Notion and Idea of real positive entitie althings must be here taken distributively into al singulars there is no Being that partakes of real entitie but is wrought by God 2 Here is to be considered the Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who worketh energetically or efficaciously for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to work with an invincible efficace and thence it is oft joined with words denoting infinite power and activitie as before c. 1. § 6. It notes here Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse working in and with althings according to their natural propensions Thence 3 follows the original principe of this predeterminative efficacious operation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the counsel of his own wil. Which notes that Gods efficacious predeterminative wil is the supreme and first cause of althings there is no executive power in God distinct from his Wil his Concurse in regard of its active attingence is no more than his simple volition so that divine Predetermination is the same with divine Predefinition as we have largely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. c. 7. § 3. Whence also it follows that Gods working althings according to the counsel of his wil has one and the same Idea with his predetermining al actions and effects even such as have sin appendent to them Strangius p. 560. replies to the Argument drawen from this Text thus From this place nothing more can be collected than that God has decreed those things that he worketh as it is certain that God hath decreed nothing which he doth not execute not that God worketh sins c. 1 This Text speaks more than what Strangius allows it to speake namely that God has not only decreed those things that he worketh but also that he works by his Decree or omnipotent Volition for we owne no other executive power in God but his divine Wil as Scotus Bradwardine and some of the greatest Scholastic Theologues demonstrate 2 Who saith that God worketh Sins surely none but Marcion or Manes or such as hold Sin to be a positive real Being 3 But yet we do with the Orthodoxe affirme and prove from this Scripture that God worketh that entitative natural Act whereunto sin is appendent for otherwise how can he be said to worke althings Is this good sense or Logic to say God workes althings not only according to their generic or specific distribution but also according to their distribution into each singular for so the Syncategoreme Al is here taken but yet he worketh not al singular entities namely the substrate mater of Sin Doth this amount to less than a down-right contradiction He workes althings but yet doth not worke althings What Logic or wit of man can reconcile these Notions 2. Unto our first Head we may also reduce such Scriptures as in a more particular manner mention Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to al human actions and effects even such as are most contingent and dependent on the ambulatory wil of man Thus Psal 33. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike he considereth al their works 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who fashioneth formeth frameth as the Potter doth his clay it notes not only yea not so much the first Creation of the human Soul as its actual figments frames imaginations and thoughts this is evident from the scope and contexture of the words for what is the Psalmists intent and undertakement but to demonstrate Gods infinite prescience and its perfect comprehension of al the figments frames thoughts intentions and affections of the heart as vers 13 14 And how doth he prove this Why because he fashioneth their hearts alike i. e. puts al the first thoughts inclinations intentions and movements of the heart into what forme frame or fashion he pleaseth There is also a great Emphase and significance in that terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render alike but may be as properly rendred together as it is by the Latine simul neither is it to be referred to the Verbe frameth but to the object Hearts and so it notes an universalitie distributive into al singulars without the least exception of any And then the sense wil be who fashioneth formeth or frameth the hearts of al mankind in al their very first motions conceptions imaginations resolutions end interests contrivements ebullitions affections prosecutions and fruitions or other actions whatsoever Whence he addes He considereth al their works what works doth he mean Surely not only the works and labors of mens hands but also the workings movements and figments of their hearts and how can God consider them if he did not forme frame and fashion them Yea there yet lies a deeper notion in the coherence of these parts namely that Gods forming framing and fashioning the hearts of al men is the ground and cause of his considering their works For how God can perfectly consider and know the works of mens hearts unlesse he be the former framer and fashioner of them al as to their real entitative acts al the wit of man can never devise or make clear unto us So that Gods Science of Vision or Prescience as to the figments of mans heart ariseth from this that God is the framer former and fashioner of mens hearts and al their natural movements which also implies his predefinition and predetermination of mans heart and al its first motions inclinations and affections So then to forme and sum up our Argument from this Text Doth God indeed fashion forme and frame the hearts of al men in al their natural motions imaginations and affections And may we without apparent contradiction to the light of this Text exclude the entitative acts of any sins though never so intrinsecally evil What is this but to exclude the far greatest part of human acts from being formed and framed by God Or how can the omniscient God consider al the works of mens hearts if he be not the former and fashioner of them al as to their natural entitie I must confesse the validitie of this argument from Gods prescience is to me so firme and great as that should it be baffled I see no way left but to turne Socinian and so to denie the certaintie of Gods prescience as to the contingent imaginations of mans heart which implies much Atheisme Another Text that proves Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse as to al human acts is Prov. 21. 1. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water he turneth it whithersoever he wil. 1 He mentions the Kings heart as the measure of al other mens because Kings generally have a greater Soveraintie and Dominion over their own hearts than other men if any mens hearts may plead the privilege of exemtion from Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse surely Kings may specially such as Solomon was who obtained from God such an amplitude
of Soul and self-Dominion yet he grants that the Kings heart was not exemted therefrom 2 By the Heart we must understand according to the Hebraic mode the whole soul and al its movements imaginations ratiocinations contrivements purposes and undertakements 3 In the hand of the Lord i. e. under his efficacious predeterminative influxe or concurse The Hand being the instrument of our most potent operations it 's usually put in Scripture for the energetic potent and predeterminative Concurse of God So Hab. 3. 4. He i. e. Christ whose brightnesse was as the light had hornes i. e. beams as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes coming out of his hands i. e. most potent wil the spring of al his efficacious operations whence it follows and there was the hiding of his power i. e. his most potent efficacious predeterminative concurse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil. So Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power So Solomon saying That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God it must be understood of Gods puissant predeterminative Concurse whereby he applies the heart to its acts conduceth and guideth it therein and determineth it as he pleaseth So it follows 4 As the rivers of waters he turneth it whithersoever he wil. How easie is it by Aquaducts to turne waters this or that way as men please And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipontent God to turne the hearts of men and al their natural conceptions products and issues which way he listes Al this may be evinced from Strangius's glosse on this Text lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions he addes a third and more special mode of Divine influence whereby God doth bend impel and incline human wils which way he please not by proper compulsion but by sweet inspiration and motion For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is essential to the wil yet he doth at times and when he please efficaciously move and impel the wils of men and what Solomon predicates of the Kings heart Prov. 21. 1. that very same may on a greater account be affirmed of the heart of every man So Augustin de Grat. Liber Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture be diligently inspected it shews that not only the good wils of men but even the bad are so in the power of God that where he wil and when he wil he causeth them to be inclined either to performe benefits or to inflict punishments by a most secret yet just judgement So again August de Corrept Grat. cap. 6. God hath in his power the wils of men more than they themselves without dout having most omnipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaseth What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse to al the natural products and issues of mans heart even such as have intrinsecal evil as they cal it appendent to them Yea Strangius lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182. grants That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and predetermine the wils of men not only to supernatural workes but also to natural and civil as oft as it seems good to him to performe certain ends which he has preordained So Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him And how so Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the sinful movements Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of Esau to embrace his brother Gen. 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Israelities Exod. 11. 2 3. 12. 35 36. Thus God determined the wil of Cyrus to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews 2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of Darius and Artaxerxes to grant the Jews libertie for the rebuilding the Temple Ezra 6. 1 c. 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4. So God dealt with Jeremy's enemies Jer. 15. 11. Al these predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by Strangius whence we argue That it is impossible but that God should predetermine to the substrate mater of sinful actions for al these actions being exerted by wicked men had nothing of moral or supernatural good in them albeit God made use of them for the succour of his people yea they were ful of hatred against God To these Scriptures we may adde Act. 17. 28. For in him we live and move and have our being Not only Being in general and Life which implies more than simple being but also al our movements or motions are from God as the prime Motor which Paul demonstrates out of one of their own Poets for we are also his off-spring As if he had said Do not your own Poets tel you that we are the off-spring of God Is he not then the first Cause and Motor of al our motions Doth not Aristotle Phys 8. also strongly demonstrate That al our natural motions must arise from one first immobile Motor And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God Must not then the substrate mater of al sinful motions even such as are intrinsecally evil be reduced unto God as the prime Motor I shal conclude this first Head of scriptural Arguments with Jam. 4. 15. For that ye ought to say If the Lord wil we shal live and do this or that There were a number of Free-willers who proudly conceited that they had an absolute and plenary dominion over their own wils and actions whom James rebukes and tels them they ought to say If the Lord wil c. So that he plainly resolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God as the original Cause and Principe But let us see how poorly Strangius shifts off the force of this Argument lib. 2. cap. 10. pag. 227. he saith Who ever understood these words if God wil i. e. if God predetermine my wil to do this or that Then he addes his own glosse But truly nothing more can be understood by that condition IF GOD WIL than this if God shal permit or wil permit as it is elsewhere explicated Act. 16. 7. 1 Cor. 16. 7. I must confesse I cannot but wonder that a person of so great reason and under so many advantages and assistances from Divine Revelation should satisfie himself with so slender an evasion which not only Reason and Scripture but even Pagan Philosophemes contradict For 1 it is most evident that James here as Luke Act. 16. 7. and Paul 1 Cor. 16. 7. speakes not of a mere permissive wil but of an efficacious influential concurse arising from the wil of God which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concurse for al actions both natural civil and supernatural
must be resolved into the wil of God as their prime cause so that If God wil here is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elsewhere if God concur if he assiste if he by his efficacious predeterminative wil without which we can do nothing concur And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is most evident by the use of this phrase among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans Bensyra that ancient Hebrew Sent. moral xi thus speakes Let man never say he wil do any thing before he hath prefaced this If the Lord wil i. e. assiste or concur not permit So among Pagans Hom. Iliad B. vers 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The like Demosth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil. But none speakes more fully to this point than Plato Alcibiad pag. 135. where Alcibiades demanding How he ought to speak touching Divine efficacious concurse Socrates replies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil and in his Laches But I wil do this and come to thee to morrow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil. Whence it 's evident that this formule of speech was ordinary even among the Heathens as wel as Jews and Christians noting not only a permissive or Directory but Decretory and predeterminative wil. So the same Phrase must be understood Act. 18. 21. If God wil and 1 Cor. 4. 19. If the Lord wil. Is it possible that these Phrases should be understood of a mere permissive wil Do not al mankind need an efficacious concurse and predeterminative wil to conduct them in al their affaires Again 2 Gods permissive wil is either natural or moral it cannot be meant of Gods natural permissive wil because that regardes only sin which there is no mention of in these Textes neither is it necessarily included Neither can it be meant of Gods moral permissive wil because that was already declared and manifest in the Laws of God for al moral permission belongs to Gods Legislative wil declared in his word It remains therefore that this phrase If God wil be understood of Gods efficacious wil whereby al natural motions and so the entitative acts of sin are predetermined § 2. I now descend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demonstrations namely That God doth predefine predetermine and fore-ordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed I shal mention only two Actions The Selling of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord whereof the former was but a Type of the later 1. I shal begin with the Selling of Joseph mentioned Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Joseph saith v. 5. Now therefore be not grieved nor angry with your selves that ye sold me hither for God did send me before you to preservelife Joseph here has a double aspect on his Brothers sin the one regards their hand in the sin which he out of a noble generous principe of fraternal Love passeth by the other regards the special hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin which he admires and adores in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concurse brought so great a good out of so great an evil which no finite power could do men may make good use of what is in it self good but who can bring so great good out of so great evil but a God omniscient and omnipotent 1 Let us remarque their Sin in selling Joseph and of what a black Idea it was 1 It sprang from Hatred yea a deliberate rooted hatred as Gen. 37. 4. They hated him and could not speak peaceably unto him Their hatred was grounded on his fathers love to him Yea 2 There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred as v. 8. Shalt thou indeed reign over us c. whence v. 11. and his brethren envied him c. 3 There was in like manner bloudy Cruelty yea intended Murther in this sin as v. 20 21 22 24. 4 There was also notorious Lying evident in this sin v. 32 33. 5 That this sin was of a very crimson bloudy guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confessions when God began to awaken their Consciences as it is conjectured about fourteen years after Gen. 42. 22. Behold his bloud is required 6 By al which it is most evident that this vendition or selling of Joseph was a sin intrinsecally evil For certainly if a sin of such bloudy Aggravations deserve not the name of intrinsecally evil I know not what sin doth Hence 2 We are to demonstrate that God did predefine and predetermine Josephs Brethren to the entitative act or substrate mater of this Sin And this Province we no way dout but to make good out of the Texte Gen. 45. 5 7 8. compared with other Texts 1 Joseph saith v. 5. 7. God did send me before you to preserve life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sent me forth by his efficacious predeterminative hand which conducted me hither The LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies to send forth with a mighty hand as Captives into Libertie Luke 4. 18. also to send forth with commands autoritie and power Mat. 10. 16. 11. 10. as elsewhere again to send forth executioners Mat. 2. 16. lastly to direct the course of a Ship In al these notions Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse in sending Joseph into Egypt is necessarily included This also appears 2 by what is added v. 5. God did send me before you to preserve life Note here that God certainly and absolutely foresaw the Famine and Josephs being sold into Egypt which he intended to turne for good even for the preservation of Jacobs Familie and the Elect seed in him Now how could God foresee this absolutely and infallibly but in the predefinition or fore ordainment of his own Wil And Strangius grants this that where there is Predefinition there also follows Predetermination Must we not then conclude that this Vendition of Joseph was both predefined and predetermined by God Yea 3 Joseph addes v. 8. So now it was not you that sent me hither but God c. You see here Joseph makes a three-fold mention of Gods over-ruling hand in this their sin and that for their as wel as his good And he tels them plainly that it was not they that sent him but God As if he had said You indeed sent me to be a poor Vassal in Egypt but did not God send me to be a Ruler over Egypt You sent me to destroy me but why did God send me but to preserve both you and me You sent me out of Hatred and Malice but did not God send me out of great Love and pitie both to me and you And what could be spoken more emphatically to illustrate and demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin than this It was not you that sent me hither but God Why doth he use this manner of speech was it not they that sold him Yes but because they were but as mere passive Instruments or Midwifes
gives to this distinction of Bellarmine thus However it be in the Text there are two things to be observed 1 That Joseph there cannot distinguish the Action from the Passion as if the Passion were to be ascribed to God not the Action for it 's plainly said and repeted in the Text according to the Hebraic veritie Gen. 45. 5 7 8. that God sent him 2 Thence c. 50. 20. he doth plainly distinguish between the good work of God and their evil in the same mater from the diversitie of the Intention You designed evil against me but God designed that for good Then he addes Here the various operation and provident administration of God is seen that he might bring to pass what he had presignified before by the dreams of Joseph c. And p. 773. he subjoins There is no incommoditie if it be said that God elected and also procured the Vendition of Joseph as a means to the end fore-ordained by him and that may be understood not only of passive Vendition but also of active which truely can never be separated For if God willed that Joseph be sold he willed that some one should sel him and that no other should sel him but his brethren For neither was that Vendition a thing in it self evil if it be considered apart from the vitiositie and defect of the second Causes Then he concludes The Permission of God here was not otiose but an efficacious operation in the tradition of Joseph subministration of occasions out of the concurse which he made both by the direction of al circumstances and moderation of the wil of his brethren that their purpose of killing him being changed they might do no other than what God intended And the same efficace and force of Divine providence shines brightly in working disposing and directing al other things that relate to this Historie This Answer of Strangius to Bellarmine I have been the more prolixe in reciting 1 because the fore-mentioned Divine of so much repute among us makes great use of this distinction touching active and passive vendition or crucifixion endeavoring thereby to solve al our Arguments from the vendition of Joseph and crucifixion of Christ whereas Strangius one of his own partie rejectes it as spurious and frivolous 2 Because the concessions of Strangius in this his Answer to Bellarmine do indeed give a mortal wound to his own cause For if the active vendition of Joseph was from Gods efficacious providence and wil decreeing the same then actions intrinsecally evil are as to their entitative act or substrate mater naturally considered from God albeit their moral vitiositie is to be ascribed to no one but the sinner 2. I now passe on to demonstrate That God doth predefine or foreordain and predetermine such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed from the Crucifixion of Christ And the Textes that confirme this part of our demonstration are so great and illustrious that I cannot but greatly wonder how any Christian that assentes to the veracitie and authoritie of Scripture can evade the evidence thereof or dissent from our Hypothesis 1 I shal take the Scriptures as they lie in order and begin with Mat. 26. 24. The Son of man goeth as it is written of him but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed 1 Note here that Christs death was infallibly predicted or foretold so much as it is written of him necessarily infers Now how could the death of Christ be infallibly predicted if it were not predefined and preordained by God Yea if the death of Christ were not necessarily predefined and preordained by God how could God infallibly foreknow the salvation of any one elect soul which necessarily dependes on the death of Christ So that it remains most certain that the death of Christ was predefined and foreordained by God and that in every the least circumstance thereof the whole series of intentions and actions in Judas's betraying his Lord and the Jews malitiose and bloudy crucifying of him was predefined and preordained by God 2 Hence also it follows that al the bloudy contrivements barbarous and cruel executions with al the particular circumstances in the betraying and crucifying of Christ were predetermined by God Thus much reason strongly evinceth and Strangius with others grant that eternal predefinition or predestination and predetermination in time are parallel and commensurate each to other whatever is eternally predefined or preordained by God is predetermined by him in time Indeed if we wil take the true Idea of Divine Predetermination what is it but the eternal act of the Divine wil whereby God predefined or preordained al persons actions and effects to existe in such or such a period of time So that to speake truth predefinition and predetermination differ not really and originally as to their active principe albeit we may out of compliance with the Scholes put this difference between them by understanding Predefinition Preordination or Predestination of the eternal active Decree of God and Predetermination of the execution of the Decree or its passive Attingence in regard of the effect But take predetermination in what sense you please it must necessarily be applied to the Crucifixion of Christ and al the most minute circumstances thereof And so much indeed is implied in those words The Son of man goeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Where or to what Surely to die and how without al peradventure as efficaciously conducted moved yea predetermined by the Divine wil. There was not the least step he took to the Crosse the least intention action or circumstance in the whole complexe or systeme of Christs Crucifixion as wel active as passive but was predetermined by God But 3 note also hence that this Crucifixion of Christ although it were predefined and predetermined by God yet this Divine predefinition and predetermination did not at al diminish the guilt of those bloudy instruments who had their hands embrued in that immaculate blood This is particularly specified in those words but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed Judas neither did nor could justly plead Divine preordination or predetermination as an excuse for his treacherie No his own conscience told him that he had voluntarily yea malitiosely betrayed innocent bloud neither could the Jews plead the same in as much as their own malitiose and bloudy wils were as deeply engaged in this Crucifixion as if there had been no predetermination which doth no way diminish the libertie of the wil. Hence 4 it is most evident that this Crucifixion of our Lord was a sin intrinsecally evil For was there not a world of enmitie and hatred of God in it Did there not much blasphemie attend their wicked deeds Is not the shedding innocent bloud yea the bloud of God as it is stiled Act. 20. 28. a sin intrinsecally evil And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate that the substrate mater of an act intrinsecally evil is predefined and
God to al and singular actions of the wil The like a reverend Divine of estime among our selves would fain persuade us namely That albeit the Dominicans are for such an universal predetermination yet Aquinas is not c. But let us a little examine the reason of this subterfuge 1 Was not Thomas Aquinas himself a Dominican of the Order of Dominic And are not al the Dominicans sworne Thomists Albeit they are in regard of their Order Dominicans yet are they not al in regard of their Doctrine Thomists How comes it to passe then that they should contend so hotly for physic predetermination of the wil by God in al its natural actions even such as are sinful and yet Thomas their Master against it 2 Take the character of impartial Writers and who ever denied this to be Aquinas's sentiment See learned and acute Dr. Samuel Ward Professor of Theologie at Cambridge his Determinations pag. 117 118. where he proves Gods predeterminative Concurse to al actions of the wil out of Thomas But because Dr. Ward seems to be our friend we shal appele unto our Adversaries for the decision of this Controversie namely to Le Blanc and Baronius Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. par 3. thes 10. pag. 430. assures us That Thomas and his sectators the Dominicans teach for the explication of Divine Concurse That God doth premove and applie the very second causes to their worke for this the dependence of the second causes on God their first Mover doth require For according to their mind God is therefore said to be the first Mover because he doth antecedently move and applie al other causes to their operations c. What could be said more evidently to explicate Aquinas's mind herein Thus also Baronius who in his Metaphysics Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 78. pag. 146. imputes this celebrious Opinion of Gods previous predeterminative concurse to al actions unto Thomas Aquinas as the principal Founder thereof So § 79. pag. 147. And § 82. pag. 149. he urgeth That from the opinion of Thomas it follows that God is the Author of sin The like § 85. pag. 151. But 3 to let passe the testimonies of others if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own senses and the reflexions of our own reason thereon it is to me most evident that Aquinas has copiosely and nervosely defended our Hypothesis and impugned the Antithesis of our Adversaries Thus 1. 2. Quaest 79. Art 2. The act of sin is both Ens and Act and in both regards it is from God for it 's necessary that every Ens or Being be derived from the first Being c. And whereas Strangius and a reverend Divine among our selves pretend that this includes immediate concurse but not predeterminative it is most evident that Aquinas owned no concurse but what was predeterminative For what is predetermination of the wil but the application of it to its act as Strangius pag. 244. grants And is not this the proper notion whereby Aquinas describeth the Concurse of God to al acts of the wil What more commun with him than this grand Effate That God applies al second causes to their act Thus in his sums par 1. Quaest 105. Art 5. he layes down this conclusion That God actes in every Agent finally effectively and formally yet so as they also act And then in the explication hereof he saith 3 That it is to be considered that God doth not only move things to work as by applying the formes and virtues of things to their operations as also the Artificer applies the axe to cut who yet sometimes gives not the forme to the axe but also gives formes to creatures acting and preserves them in being and because the forme is in the thing and God is properly the cause of the universal Being in althings which among althings is more intime it follows that God workes intimely in althings and for this reason in sacred Scripture the operations of nature are ascribed unto God as working in nature according to that Job 10. 11. With skin and with flesh hast thou clothed me c. What could have been said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis He saith 1 That God actes in every Agent not only finally and effectively but also formally 2 That God moves things to worke by APPLYING i. e. predetermining the formes and virtues of things to their operations Yea 3 That God applies the second cause to act as the Artificer applies the instrument to worke Whereby he makes al second causes the wil not excepted but a kind of instrument of Gods principal efficience For the wil albeit it may be termed a principal cause of most of its acts yet in regard of the Divine concurse which it receives and in virtue whereof it actes it may safely be termed a vital Instrument 4 That God acting most intimely in althings the very operations of nature are ascribed unto him which notes predetermination in the highest point So also Aquinas Quaest Disp q. 3. de Potentia art 7. speakes fully of this predeterminative application of al second causes by God And indeed how frequently is this Hypothesis demonstrated by him So that I cannot but wonder that any learned man should urge Aquinas's testimonie against us We descend now to Scotus the Head of a Sect opposite to the Thomists yet who hath given evident and strong confirmation and demonstration to our Hypothesis I am not ignorant that a learned and pious Divine makes use also of Scotus's name to patronise his Antithesis and I shal not denie but that Scotus has in many points too much favored the Pelagian interest which has inclined the Jesuites to follow him rather than Thomas yet this I no way dout but to make good that as to our Hypothesis touching Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Scotus is fully of our persuasion This wil appear evident 1 if we consider his notion of Divine Prescience of things future which he makes to arise from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them as Le Blanc de Praescient thes 33. pag. 443. confesseth And certainly such as hold Gods prescience of sins future to be from his own Decree efficaciously determining their futurition cannot with any shadow of reason denie Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 2 Scotus and his sectators generally hold That God efficaciously concurs to al second causes and their acts not by any influence or impression on the second cause which the Thomists assert but by his absolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the second cause to act Which we judge to be the very truth as it hath been demonstrated by us Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. So that the Thomists and Scotists differ not really as to the point of predetermination but only as to its origine and principe the Thomists making it to consiste in a physic intrinsec influxe impressed on the creature
point about Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord And let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans it 's certain that in this mater they have done great service to the cause and interest of Truth and particularly Alvarez who is principally struck at by the adverse partie deserves great honor and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for our Hypothesis or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations Strangius and a Reverend Divine of Name among our selves have laid upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defense of our Hypothesis but the Jesuites themselves who are his most puissant Impugnators give him a more candid and favorable treatment For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jesuites rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregorie Ariminensis and Estius whom they judged more severe they pitcht upon Alvarez as the more moderate to whom they required the Jansenists to conforme in those points controverted in order to an accommodement and the reasons they allege are of moment For say they Alvarez having assisted at the Congregations de Auxiliis there is a grand apparence that he and those others who writ at the same time and since took up this mode of speech to salve Libertie according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had albeit they made no Decree on this mater of which see Refutat de Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. and Idea of Jansenisme p. 82. wherein remarque 1 That the Jesuites Alvarez's sworne enemies give him a more favorable character as one who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the Congregations de Auxiliis for the composing the differences in those points in controversie between the Dominicans and Jesuites about Predetermination Yea 2 That the Popes themselves Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had the same sentiments with Alvarez Is it not strange then that the Jesuites who are professed enemies to Predetermination and the Popes themselves who have been generally favorers of Pelagianisme should have a greater kindnesse for Alvarez's sentiments about Predetermination than Protestant Divines whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuites can never be defended but by those principes on which Alvarez bottomes his Predetermination For mine own part I cannot but confesse that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination I read Alvarez with al possible diligence and exactitude of spirit and found therein so penetrant an acumen so profound soliditie and such masculine Demonstrations as that I never met with his equal excepting Bradwardine and Ariminensis This Justice I conceive my self under an essential obligation to do him to wipe off those undeserved clamors and aspersions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us have loaded him with His own Sentiments in the defense of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent Disputations de Auxil l. 3. Disput 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate That God doth by a previous motion truely and efficiently or according to the mode of a physical cause premove free-wil to the act of sin as it is an Act or Being His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible namely from the Participation Limitation and Dependence of every Second cause c. Of which hereafter c. 5. Lastly that the Scholemen generally besides such as are Pelagian assert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin see Twisse Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress 2. I now passe on to Jansenius and his Sectators who are brought upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Antithesis but this is so great a mistake in mater of fact that I cannot but admire any learned man should take refuge under it Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Jansenius opposing Augustin both to the Dominicans and Jesuites as to the point of Predetermination The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of repute among us But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers For 1 It 's evident that Jansenius rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans not the thing it self as asserted by Augustin Thus in his August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77 c. he proves That there is no manner of speech among the Scholemen so efficacious and pregnant to expresse Predetermination by but Augustin useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concurse And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine Adjutorie and thence the true opinion of Augustin Again cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressely that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with physic Predetermination that the office of physically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract but also in the concrete Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very terme of physic Predetermination to expresse efficacious Concurse by albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Scholemen So that it 's evident he was not averse from the thing albeit he but seldome used the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues as also to confine himself to the termes used by Augustin 2 That reverend Divine among us who makes use of Jansenius's name against physic Predetermination doth yet grant that Jansenius held the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment Wherein he opposeth Jansenius and also Augustin who held that sin as a punishment was willed and caused by God as before 3 Jansenius August de Statu Nat. Laps l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. assures us That men in their lapsed state before Faith be introduced are under the captivitie of lust and can do nothing but sin which captivitie is the same with that foresaid necessitie and coaction whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin And Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi l. 10. he stoutly maintains these following assertions about Reprobation which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 1 He proves cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is also positive 2 He demonstrates cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation according to its comparative consideration is the absolute wil of God This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter Cathol Theol. part 3. Sect. 7. § 22. pag. 93. in these words Jansenius's Doctrine is that the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute wil of men in original sin and the effect of it excecation and obduration This being his proper opinion it necessarily follows that he asserted Gods predeterminative
herein Whence in the following Chapters 9 10 11 12. he answers the Objections and Arguments of the Papists whereby they endeavor to prove That the Calvinists make God the Author of sin which imputations are stil fastened on us by the Arminians and new Methodists We may adde hereto the sentiments of Ludovicus Crocius Professor at Breme and a Member of the Synod of Dort who in many points specially that of middle Science and universal Grace follows the new method yet in this of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin seems orthodox and concurrent to Calvins Doctrine So in his Duodecas Dissertat Exegetic De voluntate Dei Dissert 8. thes 74. pag. 415. where he tels us That the fundamen of clearing God from being the Author of sin is the distinction of the material and formal part of sin namely of the action and the vitiositie which is in the action for that not this he wils and decrees and this not that he permits And his reason is invincible for otherwise there should be an action independent as to God and the efficacious providence of God should be denied which is Epicurean And then thes 99. pag. 426. he tels us That as to the act of the Divine wil about sin the Scriptures seem to contradict themselves in that some Scriptures assure us that God doth not wil sin but hate it with those that commit it as Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures say that God wils creates and effects sins as Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. Then he solves these seeming contradictions by distinguishing between the act and the vitiositie of the act also between the act as it procedes from God and as from the Creature lastly between the decreeing wil of God and the preceptive wil of God Whence he concludes thes 100. thus ` For God both wils and produceth the act as an act of it self indifferent to moral bonitie and evil c. And he addes thes 101. ` That this act in itself essentially good even as it is contaminated by the creature God wils it as a punishment and useth it as an ordained convenient means for the best ends The like thes 112. p. 430. where he shews how God wils sin not as sin but as a punishment c. of which more fully hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. These sentiments of Lud. Crocius I rather chuse to cite because he in other points follows the new method and is cried up by some of that partie As for the Judgement of the Synod of Dort touching our Hypothesis it is sufficiently evident by their Determinations as also by the oppositions the Arminians made against them in this point both whiles they sate and afterwards I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries are so confident as to cite the Synods testimonie in favor of their Antithesis but this is so false an imputation as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point than their stout defence of absolute Reprobation of which see Davenants Animadversions on Gods love pag. 242. We might adde almost an infinitude of Testimonies from Reformed Divines Churches and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypothesis but in what remains we shal confine our selves to the Doctrine and Testimonie of the Church of England and those renowned Professors of Theologie who have maintained and vindicated our Hypothesis The Church of England as to Doctrine imbibed even in her first Reformation the sentiments of Calvin and the Reformed Churches in France Holland Helvetia and Germanie albeit as to Discipline she stuck unto Episcopal Jurisdiction This is evident by that noble designe of Cranmer and our first Reformers to reduce the Doctrine of al the Reformed Churches unto one Confession I shal here only cul out a few Testimonies of some great Professors of Theologie both in Oxford and Cambridge who were of an Episcopal Judgement as to Discipline yet stout Champions for our Hypothesis We shal begin with Davenant a great Master of Reason and one that went as far as he could and I think as far as any ought in compliance with those of the New Method yet he stil asserted and with great strength of reason defended absolute Reprobation and Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Thus in his Determinations when Professor of Theologie at Cambridge Quaest 22. In evil acts saith he God hath decreed to permit the event to concur with the Agent as an universal Motor and lastly to order the event itself according to that of Hugo de sacr fid lib. 1. cap. 13. God wils that sin be and yet he wils not sin i. e. with a wil of approbation So Quaest 25. pag. 118. he grants That Gods decree to permit sin is efficacious so as to extract good out of it But he speakes more fully for the defense of our Hypothesis in his Animadversions on Gods love to mankind pag. 72. But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own free wil as the proper efficient cause and the existing or coming of such actions in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente ordinante are in no error at al. But if any shal go about to set mans wil at libertie and to tie up short the decreeing and determining wil of God as if this had not the determining stroke amongst al possible evil actions or events which shal infallibly be and which shal infallibly not be he may avoid the suspicion of Stoicisme and Manicheisme but he wil hardly avoid the suspicion of Atheisme For the greater number of mens actions being wicked and evil if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree human affaires are more over-ruled by mans wil than by Gods What could be said more acutely and distinctly for the demonstration of our Hypothesis He here alsertes 1 That the existence of evil actions is from Gods decree permitting and ordering of them 2 That Gods decreeing wil doth determine or predetermine al possible evil actions or events which shal infallibly be And do or need we assert more than this And frequently in that Book Davenant assertes and demonstrates That the decree of Reprobation is absolute determining sinful acts and events yet so as that it leaves no man under a compulsion to sin So pag. 253. he saith Gods decrees carrie with them a necessitie of infallibilitie as to the event but not a necessitie of compulsion as to the manner of acting And elsewhere he frequently inculcates That let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and the same libertie to the Agent So pag. 333 340 341 351 360. Yea he proves That the Arminians must and do grant immutable absolute decrees which admit the same objections and difficulties as those of the Antiarminians So pag. 354 400 418 419. Lastly he proves
That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ◠de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the
with that of Durandus c. So Thes 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts one externe and the other interne as for the externe act he placeth it in two things 1 in proposing objects 2 in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace The interne act of God consistes according to him in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil obscure or remove the one or cause some other object to be offered which is most taking In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted Yea in his Speciminis special p. 468. he saith in down-right termes That the wil of God dependes on us not we on the wil of God which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points see Pet. Molinaei de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro Judicium praesat Placeus another Salmurian Professor albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method yea in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin he seems pendulous and in suspense Thus De libero Hom. Arbitr p. 174. edit 1656. What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is the Papists sharply dispute It is truly confessed by al that God doth concur with every cause so as to operate conveniently with its faculties but this concurse some make immediate proxime and altogether the same with the very action of second causes but others denie it But we according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majestie of God dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is it sufficeth us that provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God too much cannot be ascribed unto God c. Le Blanc also Professor of Theologie at Sedan though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie Concil Arbitr thes 55. yet thes 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius and others That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But yet thes 57. he recals himself and saith That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted And thes 58. he addes this as most certain That the aide and efficace of Divine providence even about sinful acts may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse c. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland Baronius and Strangius who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin As for Baronius he is accused of rank Arminianisme and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts Thus in his Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78. pag. 146 c. he endeavors to prove That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians Jesuites and Arminians namely that this previous motion and predetermination 1 destroyeth human libertie pag. 147. 2 That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts pag. 148. 3 That it maketh God the Author of sin pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways 1 Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie pag. 150. 2 Because the action then as of such a species must be from God 3 Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel as pag. 151. 4 That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments urged by Pelagians and Arminians to which we shal answer more fully hereafter chap. 6. § 1 c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument That the second cause doth not act but as moved by the first and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse It 's true § 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants which is wel observed by Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 35. pag. 434. This at least without al dout is the opinion of Robert Baronius in his Metaphysic where touching the Concurse of God and so of its concord with human libertie he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action neither is it needful that God premove second causes but it is sufficient that together with them he influence their actions and effects And indeed Baronius's own illustration Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters in itself indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians Lastly pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege Whence it is to me apparent that it would not be an act of injustice should we reckon him among the Arminians whose sentiments and cause he has espoused yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius Professor at Glascow who as they say having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford writ a great Volume in four Books Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans Twisse and Rutherford who in his influences of the life of Grace both Preface and Book oft animadvertes thereon as if these al by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts made God the Author of sin I must confesse he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences yea contradictions that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions But this I impute not to any defect in naturals but in his cause which admits not any solid reason for its defense And that which yet seems more strange to me is this that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus Molina
total and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin For if God totally concur to the substrate act of sin must he not also concur to the wil that puts forth that act And if God concur to the wil in the production of the act must he not also necessarily determine the wil to that act That Gods total concurse doth not only reach the act and effect but also the wil itself is granted by Strangius lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171. Neither faith he do we say that the Concurse of God doth reach only the effect but not the efficient cause sithat the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Energie of the second cause must be from God and the action is not lesse an effect than the work c. 2 The Vniversalitie of Divine concurse as to al effects whatsoever gives us a further demonstration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of sin That Divine concurse is universally extensive to al acts of the wil as wel as to al other objects by giving forces and assistances to faculties exciting and appling them to their acts and ordering them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. § 2. pag. 296 297. And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be predeterminative Yea to speak properly is there or can there be any real efficience influxe or concurse sent forth by God as the prime universal cause of althings which is not predeterminative To talke of an universal general concurse of God which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts and yet doth not predetermine i. e. excite and applie the wil to its act what is it but pure non-sense and virtual contradiction 3 The Particularitie of Gods concurse as to its manner of working doth also invictly demonstrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of sin Divine concurse albeit it be universal as to the extent of its object yet it 's most particular and proper as to its manner of working Our Adversaries generally both Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists talke much of a general indifferent concurse alike commun to al effects and determinable by its substrate mater as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on But alas how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is such a general indifferent concurse Doth not this make the first cause to be second because dependent and the second cause first because independent And doth it not hence also necessarily follow that the first cause may by the indisposition of the mater or resistence of second Agents be frustrated of its intended effect What more expressely overthrows the soverain Dominion and universal Concurse of God than such a general indifferent Concurse And yet is not this one of the most plausible subterfuges our Adversaries have to shelter themselves under They object If God should by a particular predeterminative concurse determine the wil to act in sins intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like then the specification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God and so God inevitably should be the Author of sin This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming against our Hypothesis to which we intend a more ful answer in the next Chapter § 1. at present let this suffice 1 We say not that God is a particular cause but universal working in and by a particular concurse suitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on 2 We say not that this particular Concurse of God doth morally specifie or determine the sinful act to its object but only physically individuate or naturally modifie the substrate mater of the sinful act This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. Samuel Ward that great Professor of Theologie in his Determination of Gods Concurse pag. 117. where he strongly demonstrates That the previous Concurse of God as the first cause doth in its way modifie and determine al the actions of second causes and if so then surely the substrate entitative act of sin as hereafter 3 That general indifferent concurse which our Adversaries so warmly contend for sithat they grant it to be causative and influential on the sinful act doth equally infer God to be the Author of sin as our predeter minative concurse For if it be causative and effective of the act then surely of that individual act as determined to such an object for to talke of its concurrence to the act in genere in the general and not in individuo in its individual determination to its object is such an absurditie in Philosophie that al awakened Philosophers wil decrie it for what Tyro cannot informe us that al physical acts are suppositorum of individual singular substances and so without al peradventure individual and singular and if so then must not their general concurse reach not only the action in general but also individually considered as relating to its object not morally but physically And wil it not hence follow that their general concurse is causative of the entitative act as determined to its object and so makes God the Author of sin as much at least as wel as our predeterminative concurse as more fully Chap. 6. § 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 4 The Immediation of Divine Concurse strongly demonstrates the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of sin thereby Our Adversaries generally both Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists excepting some very few that adhere to Durandus grant an immediate concurse to the entitative act of sin which if wel followed wil necessarily infer predeterminative concurse specially according to the concessions of the new Methodists who say That this immediate concurse reacheth not only the effect and act which the Jesuites and Arminians grant but also the very wil itself as the immediate efficient of the act Touching this immediate Concurse see Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54 c. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jesuites none has more acutely demonstrated this than Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. and our Country-man Campton Carleton in his Philos Vnivers Disp 28. Sect. 2 3. pag. Disput 29. Sect. 1 2. pag. 323 324. where he demonstrates strongly against Lud. à Dola That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of sin Now hence we thus argue If God together with the human wil immediately produceth the very act of sin then certainly he must of necessitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act For suppose the sinful act be motus primò primus as they phrase it or a mere simple volition of the wil how is it possible that
of the new Methodists Baronius Strangius and others about Concurse fal in with those of the Jesuites for a simultaneous Concurse only albeit some of them in termes disown it 6 Lastly the soverain and absolute Independence of Gods Concurse gives us further demonstration of his predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods Concurse is not Conditionate but absolute and independent we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 412 c. And indeed what more absurd yea impossible than such a conditionate Concurse whereby the Molinists and Arminians suppose Gods concurrence to depend on mans Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progresse into infinite For if God concur on condition that man concur doth God concur to that condition or not If not is there not then some act of the creature produced without Gods concurse If God concur to the working of that condition then absolutely or conditionally if absolutely then his former Concurse is not conditional if conditionally then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence We take it then for granted that Gods Concurse is not conditional but absolute and independent And hence we thus argue If God concur absolutely and independently to the substrate mater of sin then he doth predetermine the wil thereto the consequence is rational and clear For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the same action and effect the one must necessarily depend on the other and that which depends on another must be determined by that other for every cause that is dependent on another is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby It 's true natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun without being determined thereby because the Sun is a limited cause and has not efficace sufficient to determine the mater is workes on but is rather determined thereby and so in that respect dependent thereon But as for God the first cause whose wil the principe of his concurse is omnipotent and most efficacious it 's impossible that he should have any dependence on or be any way determinable in his concurse by the mater he workes on he being the most universal cause infinitely perfect and void of al potentialitie or passive power must necessarily predetermine al second causes to their acts but be determined by none But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurse 3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the Principe and Nature of Divine concurse we now procede to demonstrate the same from the Efficace thereof Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurse whereby he concurs to the mater of sin to be predeterminative yet he grants it is efficacious calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the force and efficace of God whereby he subordinates second causes to himself so that whatever they are or act they essentially depend on him in both respects And this ingenuous concession touching the efficace of Divine concurse is al that we require to build our present Demonstration on which we shal distribute into two branches 1 Gods efficacious concurse unto al natural acts and effects 2 Gods efficacious concurse to al supernatural acts and effects 1. We shal demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the efficacitie of Divine concurse as to al natural acts and effects which evidently appears in the following particulars 1 Gods concurse to al physic or natural causes motions and effects is most efficacious This Proposition the sacred Scriptures do abundantly confirme as Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. § 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us as before c. 2. § 1. 2 The efficace of Divine concurse dependes on the efficace and determination of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurse considered actively but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act so or so To presume that active concurse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to crosse the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 3 Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al second causes to al their natural actions and effects Is it not impossible but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of mans wil the said action or effect must necessarily follow Is not the wil of God sufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil so great that not only those things are done which God wils shal be done but in that manner as he wils them Doth not Strangius confesse so much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266. Whence if God in his own wil purpose and determine that the human wil should produce such or such an action suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed is not the human wil necessarily in regard of the Divine wil and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord expressed Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by the decreed fixed determined wil of God The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 4 The efficacious concurse of God modifies and according to its mode determines al actions of second causes not only necessarily but freely Doth the Divine wil determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect and may it not yea must it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al such faculties acts and effects as are subject to its Empire and has not the Divine wil which is infinitely more efficacious power to determine al inferior powers acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion And doth it not hence follow that the soverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurse predetermine al the free acts of the human wil which necessarily fal under its Empire and modification See this wel demonstrated by that judicious Professor Sam. Ward Determinat de Concursu Dei pag. 118 c. Whence 5 The efficacious predeterminative concurse of God equally extendes itself to al natural good even to the substrate mater of sinful acts Strangius and others of our Opponents grant That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurse extendes it self not only to al supernatural good but also to al natural good that has not sin intrinsecally annexed to it whence we may by a paritie of reason demonstrate divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of al actions though never so intrinsecally evil for
is from the Creature 3 Between the wil of God decreeing and the wil of God commanding Whence he concludes Thes 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth by the Creature as the first Cause by the second the Act as an Act of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie and Vitiositie and wils and effectes the same albeit depraved by the Creature as invested with his moral rectitude because he produceth it by his own power from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause Whence he addes Thes 101. And this act essentially good even as defiled by the Creature God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment or of exploration or exercice and as an ordinate convenient Medium according to his Justice for the best ends Thes 102. In this sense God is said To create evil to produce it out of his mouth to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren to rob Job of his goods to command Shimei to curse David to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles Thes 103. For God decreed to produce those acts as acts and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners and to use them albeit depraved wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions as Ch. 1. § 2. we have more fully explicated Whence we thus argue If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins and if of some why not of al even such as are intrinsecally evil That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident and that from the concessions of our Adversaries who grant That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good which also according to their own confessions are modally sinful Whence we thus argue The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful When we say That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil As here may not be taken reduplicatively but only specificatively i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good and sinful which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act so that our Opponents granting that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good how can they possibly denie that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful When I can see a rational solution given to this argument which I despair of I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause But they replie If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions it doth not thence follow that he concurs to actions intrinsecally and in the substance of them evil But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor if we consider wel 1 That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it any more than the greatest the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here dare our Adversaries say that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God or the like Whence 2 The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason If God doth concur yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the like imputation Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin as in the greatest And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins Whence if we can prove what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove yea what they approve of namely that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is imperfectly good but modally sinful it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument § 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission which is either legal or natural Natural Permission is either divine or human and both either negative or positive 1 God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin but on the contrary severely prohibites it and that on pain of death 2 Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation It 's true Divine Permission regardes not only the substrate mater of sin but also sin formally considered and so sin under that reduplication as sin yet not simply considered but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie and so much is confessed by Strangius l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin it 's true that sin as sin is permitted by God physically not morally Yet I adde not simply but respectively as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Government And Lud. Crocius Duodec Dissert 8. Thes 74. pag. 415. assertes That God albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin yet unbelieving and disobedient both Iews and Cananites c. 2. Whereas he tels us that the Mythologists say Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs c. This may as well refer to Joshua as to Nimrod For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater or Babylon yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites or Phenicians till Ioshua's time who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories might well be reputed the God of War Mars or Hercules 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is that the Mythologists whom Diodorus
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ere 's i. e. the Earth unto the number of their Gods by what ceremonie Namely according to the old Grammarian rule changing Era into Rea. After the same manner Aer began to be Hera for this origination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we have from Plato I should rather derive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the Chaldee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hera Libera which was Juno her name whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cora or Hora and Ceres as before C. 2. § 1. C. 5. § 1. c. 2. As for Minerva Vossius de Idololatr lib. 1. cap. 17. makes her to be the same with Naamah Tubalcains sister Gen. 4. 22. Her name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Stephanus makes to be Phenician 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Bochart derives from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to move war whence the Oncean Gates at Thebes The fable of Minerva her being borne out of Jupiters head they generally refer to the generation of Christ the Divine wisdome 3. Ceres is by Bochart substituted and made parallel to Adam or Cain the first tillers of ground 4. Niobe is by some made the same with Lots wife who was turned into a pillar of Salt i. e. of Sulphureous bitumenous and salty matter wherein she was partaker of Sodoms judgement which overtook her whence the fable of Niobe her being turned into a pillar of stone c. 5. As for the Sirenes which according to the fable were in number three partly Virgins partly Birds whereof one sung with voice the other by pipe and tother by Harpe Bochart Can. lib. 1. cap. 28. makes the name to be purely Phenician or Hebrew in which tongue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sir signifies a song whence Solomon's Song of songs thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Siren a singing monster c. 6. As for Juno Jana from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thence also Diana Astarte Venus c. we have fully handled them before chap. 2. § 9. Thus much for the Theogonie of the Grecian and Roman Gods and Goddesses which will receive farther evidence from what follows touching the Genealogie of the Phenician and Egyptian Gods For that the former were but the product of the later is evident Thus Sandford de descensu l. 1. § 6. We may not fetch the names of the Gods from the Grecians but from the Phenicians or Egyptians It remains therefore that we treat of the Apotheosis of the Barbarian names which among those Ancients had not one and the same origination For either some thing was coined out of forrein letters the name being relinquisht or the name together with the thing was traduced unto some mysteries of Religion This again was accomplisht two manner of waies either when a forrein Name so far as the nature of the Tongue would admit it the right order of the Letters being relinquisht was referred unto the Gods or else the Letters being transposed or changed a new name was composed out of the old which thence according to the same laws of Tongues was invested with the Rite of some Deitie Thus all those appellations of the Gods which Greece borrowed from the Barbarians may be digested into 3 ranks 1. Either they flow from the sole explication of Nature as from Abaddon sprang Apollon or if you will rather according to the sacred Phraseologie Apolluon or 2. from the pronunciation of the name thus from Japhet was made Iapetos or lastly from an Enallaxis of the Letters according to which for me it is as clear as the light that from Adamah first sprang Hadam and hence Hadan Thus Sandford of the origination of the Grecian Gods from the Egyptian Phenician or Hebrew names See more of this Chap. 7. § 12. CHAP. VII The Theogonie of the Phenician and Egyptian Gods with their Hebrew origination Baal from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Bel from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El. Beelsamen from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beelzebub 2 King 1. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal Peor Pf. 106. 28. Numb 25. 1 2 3. Moloch the same with Baal Adramelech and Anamelech 2 King 17. 31. Esa 30. 33. Tophet and Gehinnom whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Samothracian Cabiri Phenician Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God's name Ps 119. 137. Cabiri from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Axieros 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Axiokersos from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cadmilus from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the minister of God Eliun from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God's name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jud. 8. 33. Plautus's Paenulus Alonim c. from Gen. 14. 19. Ilus from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Heliogabalus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gen. 28. 18. The Egyptian Gods their original Hebrew Apis a symbol of Joseph so Serapis from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gen. 45. 8. Osiris the same with Moses or Adam as Isis with Eve from Ischa Mnevis the same with Joseph Of Orus Remphan c. The Metamorphoses of the Gods in Egypt The causes of Mythologick Theologie § 1. HAving gone through Hellenisme or the Grecian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we now passe on to the Oriental Gods with endeavors to demonstrate how their Genealogie Names and Attributes received their derivation from the sacred Language and Oracles We shall begin with the Phenician Gods which were the first if not as to time yet as to dignitie whence the Grecians traduced the chiefest of their Gods And amongst the Phenician Gods the chief was Baal Bel or Belus concerning which there is some difference amongst Philologists yet all unanimously concur in this that its origination was from some Hebrew and sacred name which will evidently appear from the notation thereof Damascius in the life of Isidore mentioned by Photius tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Phenicians and Syrians call Saturne El Bel and Bolathen Vossius makes Bel the contract of Beel from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal the Lord which name belonged originally to God as it appears from Hosea 2. 16 17. But Servius on Virgil supposeth Bel to come of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El Gods name whence the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El and the Digamma being added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bel and so Belus Bochart in a personal conference he favored me with gave me a good conciliation of these two opinions by affirming that there was originally a twofold Belus the one Assyrian from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 originally 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Assyrian God whence Nimrod the first of the Assyrian Monarchie was called Belus the other Belus was a Phenician from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal the Phenician God whence Ithobaal King of Tyre and Jezabel his daughter as also many of the Phenician Kings who were
Sin Yea let them but grant as they do Gods certain prescience of sin and the same black Imputations which they lode us with wil al fal with as much weight on themselves as before Chap. 5. § 2. 2. As for what they urge from the Justice of God that our Hypothesis is contradictory thereto in that he cannot in Justice punish that Sin which he predetermines men unto we answer 1 That Gods Predetermination lays no violent force or compulsion on the wil to sin he doth only as the first cause and God of Nature sweetly though potently applie the wil to its act 2 The wil doth in the very same moment wherein it is predetermined by God voluntarily and freely as a deficient depraved facultie elect the very act it is predetermined unto so that it doth as freely deliberately and fully espouse the act as if there were no Predetermination on Gods part and what more just than that the Sinner should be severely punished for that sinful act which he doth deliberately and voluntarily exert 3 Here is in this objection a poor Sophisme which they cal No-cause for a cause For Gods predeterminative Concurse is not the cause of mens sins albeit mens sins be a necessary consequent thereof 4 The same difficulties which our Adversaries urge us with in point of Divine Justice return on them who assert an immediate previous Concurse to the Mater of Sin neither can they without apparent violence to their own Reason impute this objection to us which their own Hypothesis is as much obnoxious unto 3. They urge us with an Imputation on the Clemence and Mercie of God in that predeterminative Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin makes the blessed God to be cruel towards his poor Creature and this two ways As 1 In that it makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment without regard to their Sins 2 In that it supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal Torments and yet irresistibly to predetermine yea impel men thereto as Baron Metaph. p. 151. This Objection our Adversaries adorne and exaggerate with many specious and plausible pretextes for the Vindication of Divine Clemence and Mercy as they pretend and for our confusion Yet we no way dout but to make it appear that al is but as emty vapor before the Meridian Sun Therefore to answer 1 to the first branch of the Objection That our Hypothesis makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment without regard to their sins 1 We grant that the Decree of Reprobation is and must be according to our Hypothesis absolute because there is an adequate commensuration between absolute Predefinition and Predetermination as our Adversaries also maintain of which before Chap. 5. § 3. 2 Yet we peremtorily denie that God reprobates or predestines men to eternal punishment without any regard to their sins Divines say that albeit sin be not the motive or ground moving God to reprobate men yet it is considered in the Decree of Reprobation as that for which God wil at last condemn men It 's true the Supralapsarian Divines who make man as labile the object of Reprobation differ somewhat from those of the sublapsarian perswasion who make the corrupt masse or lapsed man the object of Election and Reprobation yet they both take in the consideration of sin in the Decree of Reprobation and they both make the Decree of Reprobation in it self absolute for the Sublapsarians make sin only a commun condition of the corrupt Masse not distinctive or discriminative of Reprobates from the Elect as Davenant Animadvers on Gods Love p. 84. proves That the Supralapsarians charge not Gods Reprobation with mans destruction Though he himself goes the Sublapsarian way But 3 Here lies the bitter root of this forged Imputation affixed on us by our Adversaries that they consider the Decree of Reprobation as an act of Divine Justice which regards the object as already constituted and not the constitution thereof This is incomparably wel observed by judicious Davenant in his answer to Hoard Animadvers p. 229. For those Inferences therefore That if absolute Reprobation be granted God may be properly called a Father of Crueltie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I marvel how he trembled to thinke of them and how he never trembled to utter them That wherein he perpetually is mistaken is the making of Non-election or Negative Reprobation a Vindicative act the confounding it with the judicial Sentence of Damnation the conceiving it to worke in the Non-elect an invincible necessitie of committing Sin with such like monstrous fansies which he takes for Principles needing no proof whereas they are such grosse errors as need no confutation 2 The second part of the Objection which supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal torments and yet irresistibly to predetermine and impel men thereunto has been sufficiently refuted in what precedes § 1. and indeed throughout this whole Discourse and wil also come under consideration in what follows 4. Our Adversaries charge also our Hypothesis with a Repugnance to the Sanctitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature in that by asserting Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin we make the act of sin to be wel-pleasing to God This objection is greatly aggravated by a Reverend Divine among our selves who in the confutation of Twisse argues thus If God willeth that sin existe by his Permission 1 He willeth Sin Yea 2 God wils sin as much as man Yea 3 This makes God equally to wil Sin and Holiness Yea 4 Then God takes complacence in Sin Answer These are high charges indeed and if they could be made good against us we should not deserve protection from any wel-governed Kingdome or State for what more inconsistent with civil Government than to make the Supreme Rector and Governor of Mankind equally to wil Sin and Holinesse But these Calumnies and Reproches are not of yesterday but have been time out of mind imputed to the assertors of Efficacious Concurse and therefore we have been more large in the refuting of them § 1. of this Chapter Thus Bradwardine De Caus l. 2. c. 28. p. 572. When it is argued saith he that the sinful act doth please God Wel 1 The Adverbe Wel may determine the Verbe to please God in regard of the Divine complacence and so there is no dout but that as the evil Act entitatively considered doth please him so it is highly wel-pleasing to him or 2 in regard of the Act that is wel-pleasing and that either in regard of the substance of the act or in regard of its vitiositie 1 If we regard the act naturally so it 's true that it is wel-pleasing to God but if we regard it morally so it 's false 2 If we regard the vitiositie of the act so it is not properly effected by man nor yet by God it being not properly an effect but pure
the contrary as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do of which hereafter § 8. 2. As for the later part of our Opponents Objection From the Promisses and Invitations of God which are made uselesse and collusive by our supposed divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin we answer 1 That al Gods Promisses and evangelic Invitations which are but branches of the Covenant of Grace are primarily intended for the elect Heirs of Salvation to whom they are many ways useful notwithstanding Divine Predetermination For the blessed God promiseth life and happinesse on the condition of Repentance and Believing not as if there were any potence or abilitie in corrupt nature by its own free-wil to accept of these offers or performe the Condition on which the offers depend but thereby convincing the Soul of its extreme impotence he doth together with the offer and invitation made conveigh Grace into the elect Soul for the inabling of it to performe the Condition So that these general and conditional Promisses are in reference to the Elect for whom they are primarily designed operative of Grace albeit as to others they are only exactive of dutie whence the impossibilitie which attends corrupt Nature is taken off as to the Elect by Divine Grace 2 Neither are those general evangelic Promisses and Invitations uselesse as to Reprobates for 1 They declare the infallible and essential connexion which there is between the condition and the thing promised therein namely Life and Salvation And to make this more clear we are to remember that both Logic and rectified Reason assures us that a conditional enunciation doth not always note a possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent but only their necessary connexion that in al conditional Propositions on which evangelic Exhortations and Invitations are founded there cannot be supposed an indifferent and indeterminate possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent but only the connexion of the Antecedent with the Consequent is evident from that of our Lord John 15 6. If a man abide not in me he is cast forth c. Whence it is apparent that a solid and serious Invitation unto Sinners may be built on a Condition in some mode impossible The God of al grace has by his evangelic Constitution and Covenant established an inviolable connexion between Faith and Salvation so that this Proposition is infallibly true If thou believest thou shalt be saved and the holy God has given his Ministers Commission to preach it to al Mankind neither is there the least collusion or fraudulent intention on Gods part albeit he doth predetermine the Most of men to the substrate mater of Unbelief for the sinceritie of Gods intention appears in the realitie of the offer which consistes in the infallible connexion of the Consequent with the Antecedent grounded on the evangelic Pactum or Ordination as Davenant wel observes Animadvers on Gods Love p. 377. where he shews That the Decree of God permitting Pharaoh to abuse the gifts of God to his own destruction was not contrary unto the end or use whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting ordination in their own nature So p. 387 388. he demonstrates That Divine eternal Decrees whereupon may infallibly be inferred the abuse of Grace temporally offered do not crosse the end for which such Grace is administred to persons not elected And he gives this reason for it p. 352. God meaning must be always interpreted according to the known nature of the Means and not according to the unknown Wil of God concerning the infallible event or successe of the Means Gods meaning when he offers any Grace unto men is that they should performe such actions whereunto such grace conduceth and his meaning when he promiseth glory unto any man if he believe and persevere is truely to performe it if he so do But it is not always Gods absolute wil to cause men to use his Grace to their own good If the Remonstrants wil have nothing termed Gods meaning but his absolute Wil in their opinion as wel as in ours it wil follow that God had no meaning to give Cain or Judas saving Grace or Glorie Lastly p. 392 393 394. he proves That God doth by his wil of Approbation and Complacence unfeignedly wil what he commands and exhorts men to albeit he decree the contrary event Hence 2 These general Promisses and Invitations have this use also as to Reprobates that it leaves them without the least shadow of pretence or Excuse for their unbelief for if God doth by such Promisses and Invitations declare his real intention to save men if they believe and withal an expectation that they accept his offers yea his complacence in such an acceptation in order to life with a provision of al means necessary thereto what excuse can men have for unbelief Wil they say that Gods predetermining men to the entitative act of unbelief contradicts such a real intention Take the Replie of Davenant Animadv p. 271. We answer that God is no otherwise said to intend outward events than by providing orderly means for the producing such events Non-election provideth no means of making men sin and therefore it includeth no intention of God to make men sin though it include a prevision of sinful Events and a Decree to permit them c. 3 The Hypothesis of our Adversaries in granting Predetermination to what is good and Divine Prescience of sinful acts doth as much dispirit and destroy the use of Divine Promisses and Invitations as ours For 1 In that they assert none can performe the condition required and so embrace the evangelic offer made without efficacious predeterminative grace do they not leave al Reprobates under as great an impossibilitie of Believing as we do Are not al offers for want of this predeterminative Grace altogether uselesse to them for whom it never was intended 2 So also as to Gods certain Prescience of their Sins did not God according to their Concessions certainly foreknow that they would never yea never could accept of the offers made to them without predeterminative Grace which he decreed never to give them Hence doth not this certain Prescience infer as natural and absolute impossibilitie as our predeterminative Concurse to the entitative act of Sin This is wel argued by Davenant Animadv p. 242. His Hoard's nibbling at the Synod of Dort and charging them with mantaining a fatal Decree is to little purpose If he cal that fatal which is certain and immutable we are not afraid to affirm that al Gods eternal Decrees are certain and immutable and that very eternal Decree of Reprobation which he imagines to follow upon the foresight of mens final impenitence is as absolute and immutable and in this sense as fatal as that which we defend Thus also p. 332. The Remonstrants we adde also the New Methodists dare not promise Salvation to any persons reprobated according to their decree founded upon the prevision of