that is wholly depraved and defiled with lust he thinkes then that lust might be seated in the will nay 〈◊〉 himselfe though he thinke that concupiscence hath it's chiefe residence in the flesh by which he meanes the body and the sensuall powers of man yet he withall 〈◊〉 that there is something like unto it in the superiour part of the soule for even that is prone immoderately to desire honours vaine glory and the like vanities and therefore Paul Gal. 5 having said that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lusteth against 〈◊〉 spirit he nameth not only fornication drunkennesse and the like carnall sinnes but also idolatry heresies envyings c which were spirituall sinnes sinnes of the upper region of the soule thus you see that a great part of concupiscence is placed in the supreme the rationall faculties of man and extended unto spirituall and immateriall objects and hereupon it will follow that at least this part of concupiscence cannot 〈◊〉 from the condition 〈◊〉 the matter A third argument is because this assertion that the resultancy of this concupiscence from the nature and matter of man would have been besides the intention of God strikes against either the omniscience or omnipotency of God for either God foresaw this resultancy or not to say that he did not foresee it takes away the infinitenesse of his knowledge if he foresaw it then I demand whether he could not or would not prevent it to say that he could not prevent it denieth the infinitenesse of his power if he could but would not prevent or stay it then it followeth that this resultancy was not besides but agreeable unto his purpose and intention Secondly this answer is repugnant unto Bellarmine his own principles I shall instance in two First it is apparent that he maketh this concupiscence to be chiefly the naturall and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties unto their proper and naturall object and from this I thus argue Naturall and necessary propensions of the naturall faculties of any thing unto their naturall and proper object cannot be besides the intention of God the creatour for such propensions must needs be positive qualities and of every positive being God is the cause and author But now concupiscence is by Bellarmines discourse the naturall and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties of man unto their proper and naturall objects And consequently t is not besides the intention of the Creatour flowing as a naturall defect or disease only from the condition of the mould or matter of man A second thing in Bellarmine with which this his answer clasheth is his confession that concupiscence is contrary to the nature of man de gratiâ primi hominis cap. 7. From hence I thus argue Nothing that is against the nature of man can 〈◊〉 naturally and necessarily from the principles of his nature But Bellarmine confesseth that this concupiscence is against the nature of man And therefore he contradicts himselfe when he affirmeth that it results from the principles of man's nature the condition of his matter As for the similitude of the Smith and the Iron sword that will be nothing unto the purpose for First no Smith whatsoever can make Iron that is the matter of a sword but God alone is the author of the matter of man and consequently is the cause of all the naturall sequels thereof Secondly a Smith if he could would frame such a sword as might not be subject or inclined unto rust but it is not a thing in his power for he cannot alter the nature of Iron so that if he will produce an Iron sword it will be lyable unto rust The Papists seeme to ascribe such an impotency unto God himselfe for they suppose all along that God cannot make man to be compounded of a reasonable soule and sensible matter but that besides the intention of God the naturall and necessary result of such a composition will without supernaturall prevention be a headlong inclination unto sensible objects against the dictates of right reason but the falshood of this supposition I shall anon at large detect A second answer of Bellarmin's which we frequently sind also in Dr. Taylor is that this concupiscence is not a sinne but only a disease languer infirmity or 〈◊〉 of nature and therefore though God had been the cause of it it would not yet have followed that God was the author of sinne Unto this I shall oppose the cleare testimony of Paul who in 6 7 8. chapters of his Epistle unto the Roman's cal's it sinne fourteene times as Bishop Davenant and Dr. Francis White after Bishop of Ely calculate the places But unto all these places Bellarmine replyeth in which reply he is seconded by Dr. Taylor that concupiscence is called sinne by the Apostle not properly and formally but 〈◊〉 because it is the effect and cause of sinne the effect of Adam's first sinne and the cause of our sinne But that concupiscence is properly and formally a sinne I shall prove against both Bellarmine and his confident second Dr. Taylor from it's influence subject adjuncts opposites First from it's influence mediate and immediate First from it's mediate influence it is the cause of all actuall sin whatsoever whensoever we are tempted to any sinne we are enticed and drawne away by our own lust this is the mother that conceiveth and bringeth forth all sinne Jam. 1. 14 15 and doubtlesse the daughter resembleth the mother the cause and the effect have the same nature that which as a habit or quality is the cause of sinne must needs be sinne too but concupiscence or the originall pronesse of our natures unto sinne is the roote of all sinne and therefore to use the Apostles expression 't is exceeding sinfull Rom. 7. 13 for nil dat quod non habet vel formalitèr vel eminenter But for confirmation of this argument we have the testimony of him who is the truth it selfe Mat. 7. 17 18. A corrupt tree bringeth forth evill fruit a good tree cannot bring forth evill fruit now concupiscence or an inclination unto sinne bringeth no fruit but that which is morally evill and corrupt and therefore 't is a tree morally evill and corrupt but this argument I shall insist on more fully hereafter in opening Jam. 1. 14 15. Secondly from it's immediate influence it naturally and directly produceth as it 's immediate effects those first motions unto sinne which are without consent and therefore if we can prove these first motions unto sinne to be sinne our adversaries will confesse that concupiscence is sinne also now that they are sinne may be concluded from the Apostles description of sinne 1 〈◊〉 3. 4. Sinne is the transgression of the law for the first motions unto sinne trespasse against that which our Saviour cal's the first and great commandement thou shalt love the Lord with all thy soule might mind and strength for if sinne God's greatest enemy hath any motions or inclinations of the soule any thoughts of the
of Tyranny hence also it is ordinary for men whilst they are in a low condition to declaime most bitterly against the arbitrary and unjust government of magistrates but when they themselves get into places of authority they prove so injurious and oppressive unto all under them as that one may justly thinke that power is hardly capable of being abused unto greater wrong and unjustice then they have practised The Consirmation shall have two parts first that our own lust is a cause secondly that 't is a principall cause of temptation unto sin First that 't is a cause of temptation unto sin and that these following scriptures evince Matth. 15. 19. Out of the heart that is out of that bottomelesse evill treasure of the heart Matth. 12. 35. Concupiscence proceed the smallest sinnes evill thoughts and greatest murders adulteries fornications thefts falsewitnesse blasphemies Rom. 7. 8. sin that is originall sin taking occasion by the commandement wrought in mee all manner of concupiscence to wit actuall concupiscence those passions or motions of sin spoken of in verse the fifth the commandement is only a cause per accidens of them not properly a cause but only an occasion an occasion not given but taken 't is the imbred corruption of our nature originall sinne alone that is the causa per se of it 2 Pet. 1. 4. All the corruption and naughtinesse that is in the world is throw lust flesh in scripture is the same with lust and what abominations the flesh produceth you may see Gal. 5. 19 20 21. Now the workes of the flesh are manifest which are 〈◊〉 adulterie fornication uncleannesse lasciviousnesse Idolatry witchcraft haired variance 〈◊〉 wrath strife seditions 〈◊〉 envyings murders 〈◊〉 revellings and such like Secondly that 't is a principall cause of temptation unto sinne and that is evident by three reasons because it tempts first internally secondly effectively thirdly perpetually First it tempts internally whereas Satan and the world are but external tempters this is domesticus hostis a traitour and tempter in our own bosomes Secondly Satan and the world tempt only objectively by their proposall of objects but our concupiscence tempts effectively and physically by way of reall efficiency really inclining and disposing unto sin I meane so far forth as sinne is capable of reall efficiency quoad materiale Thirdly concupiscence is the principall cause of temptation because it tempts perpetually resist the divell and he will flee from you Jam. 4. 7 but make never so great resistance against this lust it will never flee from you nor can yee ever flee or runne from it it is as restlesse an adversary as Hanibal said Marcellus was who would never be quiet whether he was a conquerour or whether he was conquered men may retire themselves from most of the vanities and temptations of the world but 't is impossible whilst here in this mortall body to withdraw our selves from the temptations of our own lusts of these Hermites have complayned in a wildernesse and Anchorites in their cels The uses that may be made of this point are of information 〈◊〉 and exhortation First of information and they are three First we may hence learne what a great difference there is betwixt the temptations of lapsed man unto sinne and the temptation of our first parents unto their first sinne every man that hath sinned since their fall is tempted by his own lust wheras Adam and Eve had only an outward tempter it was only by the abuse of their free will that they consented unto his temptations it is said of Eve Gen. 3. 6 when she saw that tke tree was good for food and that it was pleasant to the eyes and a tree to be desired to make one wise shee tooke of the fruit thereof and did eat here indeed shee was tempted by her own lust by those three sorts of lusts that John speakes of 1 Joh. 2. 16 First the lust of the flesh when the woman saw that the tree was good for food secondly the lust of the eyes and that it was pleasant to the eyes thirdly the pride of life and a tree to bee desired to make one wise but this was not before her fall but a degree and part thereof Dr. Taylor I know teacheth another doctrine in his unum necessarium pag. 374. concupiscence saith he was actuall before the fall it was in Adam and tempted him and in his further explication of originall sinne pag. 462. by rebellion and prevailing of concupiscence it was that Adam fell but the answer unto this might easily be foreseen to wit that the rebellion and prevailing of his concupiscence was a cause of a part of his fall viz of his outward eating the forbidden fruit wherein his fall was compleated as also of his resolution to eate thereof but yet notwithstanding it was not the cause of the first act of his fall his first sin for concupiscence as I have proved is sin and by this man should sin before he had sinned Secondly we may hence be instructed what a wide difference there is betwixt our temptations unto sinne and the temptations of Christ every one of us is tempted by his own lust but lust is so filthy a thing as that it was utterly repugnant unto the perfect full and unspotted purity and holinesse of the Lambe of God the prince of this world commeth and hath nothing in 〈◊〉 saith Christ Joh. 14. 38 nothing in mee to side and comply with his temptations hence was it that that sygnall temptation of him by Satan Matth. 4 did not could not make so much impression upon him as the waves of the sea upon a rocke the divell tempted him unto all those branches of lust mentioned by John in the now quoted place 1 Joh. 2. 16. first unto the lust of the flesh Matth. 4. 3 when the tempter came to him he said if thou be the Son of God command that these stones be made bread secondly unto the lust of the eyes vers 8. 9. Againe the Divell taketh him up into an exceeding high mountaine and sheweth him all the kingdomes of 〈◊〉 world and the glory of them and saith un-unto him All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me Thirdly unto the pride of life to purchase unto himselfe renowne by his miraculous preservation in his fall from the temple vers 5. 6 then the Divell taketh him up into the holy city and setteth him on a pinnacle of the temple and saith unto him if thou be the Son of God cast thy selfe down for it is written He shall give his Angels charge concerning thee and in their hands they shall beare thee up least at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone none of these temptations could fasten on him for the Hypostaticall union the all-fullnesse of his grace and the beatificall vision secured him from the danger of all temptations and rendred the prevaling of them a thing utterly impossible
Mr Hord 〈◊〉 149. 150. who makes the like objections against him from another place 7. You are the unmeerest man in the world to 〈◊〉 me with the 〈◊〉 of my party sor the rigid Zelots of your party in your doctrine of originall sin are such whom you may be ashamed to name Indeed in 〈◊〉 point there are very few of your party save the Pelagians of old and now the worthy 〈◊〉 of the Racovian denne and their followers unto whom the best and the most learned of Protestants will hardly vouchsafe the name of Christians The Arch-Bishop of Armagh 〈◊〉 them in a sermon of 〈◊〉 that I heard a company of 〈◊〉 Turkes and indeed Turkes and 〈◊〉 can hardly be greater enemies unto the divine person and nature of Christ unto his offices and unto his great and glorious worke of redemption and satisfaction than these wretched miscreants are Dr Taylor Your second charge of blaspemy is that my reason does by implication involve Christ in the guilt of sinne because whatsoever is essentiall he had but 〈◊〉 If you remember that I say not that sinne is 〈◊〉 and that I bring the reverse of this very argument against your party and opinion in some of my late discourses you have reason to shake the fire out of your own 〈◊〉 not to tell me that I burne for is inclination to 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 naturally and derived from our Parents I 〈◊〉 whether or no 〈◊〉 not Christ all naturall desires if he had not he was not a 〈◊〉 man If he had 〈◊〉 all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not naturall 〈◊〉 sor is you say they be you are the 〈◊〉 by the consequence of your 〈◊〉 not I but God sorbid that 〈◊〉 of us should 〈◊〉 First here is no 〈◊〉 of my argument for none of my party or opinion hold that inclination unto 〈◊〉 is essentiall unto man Flaccius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 sinne was the 〈◊〉 or substance of the soule but I never heard that 〈◊〉 sollowers were considerable he hath I am sure both Papists and Protestants 〈◊〉 and Lutherans for 〈◊〉 opponents but perhaps you confound naturall with 〈◊〉 and make them all one if you doe your reason will be 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. I believe you here play with the 〈◊〉 of the word naturall a thing though it may be tollerated in a Sophister altogether unworthy of a 〈◊〉 Inclination to 〈◊〉 may be said to be naturall either 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 That inclination to 〈◊〉 is naturall 〈◊〉 that it flowes and 〈◊〉 Physically and necessarily from our nature I slatly deny and if you can direct me unto any place in your bookes where you prove it to be naturall in this sense I shall take it into 〈◊〉 Indeed to say that it is in this sense naturall is to throw a reproach upon God the Author of nature But it is naturall 〈◊〉 together with our nature derived unto us from our first Parents and yet not in Christ who had not his nature from Adam in an ordinary way of Generation but was miraculously conceived by the holy Ghost and 〈◊〉 in the wombe of the 〈◊〉 Mary This inclination unto evill is a 〈◊〉 blemish of 〈◊〉 nature because it is a cause of sinne qualis causa 〈◊〉 est effectus A good tree saith our Saviour cannot bring forth evill fruit Matth. 7. 18. This inclination to evill bringeth forth much 〈◊〉 fruit and therefore it cannot be good and consequently it is bad and sinfull and therefore could not be in Christ who even as man was the most holy one of God Indeed if Christ had wanted any propriety of man's nature he had not then been a perfect man but that inclination to evill is a propriety of our nature sc proprium 4 to modo you are never able to make good But Sir in good earnest doe you thinke that Christ was inclined unto evill if you doe not your 〈◊〉 of Christ is impertinent if you doe I shall conclude your opinion to be blasphemous and unto it shall oppose this following argument He in whom dwelled an all-fullnesse of the Godhead bodily he in whom dwelled an all-fullnesse of habituall grace he who enjoyed the 〈◊〉 vision was not could not be inclined unto evill But in Christ dwelled an all 〈◊〉 of the Godhead 〈◊〉 in him also dwelled an all 〈◊〉 of habituall and sanctifying grace he enjoyed the 〈◊〉 vision Therefore he was not could not be inclined unto evill The Minor will not be denied by any Orthodox Divine and we may say the same of the Major for he that shall thinke that the grace of personall union the 〈◊〉 of habituall grace and the beatificall vision are not sufficient to exclude from Christ all inclination untoevil wil render both 〈◊〉 learning religion too suspected But to put the matter out of doubt take this following argument for confirmation of the Major there could not be the least inclination unto evill in that person in whom there was an utter aversenesse from evil in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for of contraries that which is in a 〈◊〉 degree is not consistent with the other in the highest and most intense degree but in that person in whom there was an 〈◊〉 of the Godhead on all-fullnesse of habituall grace and the beatificall vision there was an utter aversnesse from evill and that in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore impossible that there should be in him an inclination to evill in the least degree The Papists extenuate the malignancy of concupiscence as much as may be affirming that in the regenerate it is no sinne and that it had been 〈◊〉 Adam if he had been created in his pure naturalls yet they thinke not so well of it as to ascribe it unto Christ. Indeed 〈◊〉 is accused for speaking somewhat suspiciously this way but he is contradicted by the generality of the Schoolemen who hold that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concupiscence was neither 〈◊〉 primo nor 〈◊〉 in Christ. 1. Not in actu primo and for this they alledge three reasons 1. The absolute perfection of his virtues and all-fullnesse of grace 2. The perpetuall vigilancy and advertency of 〈◊〉 reason 3. The government of his humane nature and actions by his divine and infinite person 2. Not in actu secundo because in him the very first motions unto sinne would have been voluntary and consequently sinfull Unto this purpose 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Scholast Tom 5. cap. 12. 〈◊〉 5. pag 200. observeth that the first motions of concupiscence may be said to be voluntary two manner of wayes 1. Antecedently when one willingly admits them when he may avoid them 2. Consequently when one yeelds consent unto them after they are crept in in the former way or manner they had been voluntary in Christ because Christ could have avoided them by reason of the government of the person of the word if he had not therefore avoided them but willingly admitted them they had in him been blameworthy Dr Taylor 〈◊〉 third reason also is as pretty for first I demand whether a possibility to
unto our everlasting perdition this were folly and madnesse that would want a name But in the third place the signes and appearances of sinne are not only a baite by which he enticeth us an argument by which he perswades unto sinne but withall an encouragement by which he is heart'ned to goe on in tempting of us for they make him gather heart and hope that we are coming on to sinne it selfe and this hope will breed diligence make him a more importunate solliciter make him to double and strengthen his assaults to plie us even thick and threefold with temptations A dog will not runne from a man as long as he throwes bread unto him and can any man suppose the Divell will flie so long as he gives place unto him as long as he throwes himselfe upon temptations by practising such things as have a manisest shew of evill for though in themselves they be never so small yet will they serve to usher in farther and greater matters being then preparatives unto sinne they cannot be as some have imagined good sences against sinne seeming to be evill is not cannot be a meanes to sheild us from being so no more then the opening the Gates of a City can be the way to raise the seige of it or letting go the sluces of a river can be the course to stop its current You have seen arguments from Satans temptations of us to sin take next one from his temptations of us to despaire or at least discomfort for sin a temptation of so hideous a nature as that me thinks our actions should not 〈◊〉 it the least advantage His First labour is by the appearance of sin to make us offend God but when he cannot proceed so farre his Second endeavour will be to make us disquiet our selves when he cannot wound us by them he will vex us for them for he will wrest and misconstrue all that we have done unto the worst sense he will swell motes into beames mole-hils into mountaines appearances of evill into realities and thunder unto us that there is not a pinne to choose betwixt those and these unto which our soules beeing distracted by the violent importunity of this temptation will be over apt to give credence And for a man to be thus tossed between Satans powerfull suggestions and his own feares and suspicions cannot but even crush his spirits and quite eclipse the peace and joy of his heart Abstinence from all appearances of evill is thirdly needfull in regard of our selves for by them we may incurre a double danger a danger of beeing infected with a danger of being punished for sinne First a danger of being infected with sinne what Bernard spake of Eves beholding the forbidden fruit is true concerning every appearance of evill Et si culpa non est culpae 〈◊〉 indicium est si culpa non est culpae tamen occasio est indicium commissae causa est committendae Although it be not in it selfe a sinne yet it is a token yet it is an occasion of sinne a token that sinne hath been committed a cause of committing it for the future Now our natures are strongly bent to evill when this then our naturall inclination is furthered by outward occasions we may soone be led to the realities of sinne though the occasions of themselves are weake they working but as objects and the objective causality being of all most imperfect yet Satan is strong our lusts are strong these occasions are sutable to our lusts our soules therefore by a little helpe from Satan will quickly catch infection from them For this reason were the Israelites in the time of the passeover prohibited not onely the eating but the very having of leavened bread in their houses For this reason too were the Nazarites forbidden to eat so much as the huskes of the grapes for if that had been permitted they would perhaps have soone proceeded to the eating of the grapes and thence to drinking of the wine it selfe hence also grew that precise resolution of David Psal. 101. 3. I will 〈◊〉 no wicked thing before mine 〈◊〉 well may the world and Divell set wicked things before mine eyes but for mine own part I will not invite temptations I will set no wicked thing before mine eyes as much as I can I will decline the objects examples and shewes of wickednesse do but put fire unto flax and it will presently be on flame so present wee unto our loose and corrupt natures the shewes which as you have seen are also the occasions of evill and how suddenly will they take fire This Joseph knew and therefore when his Mistris sollicited him to that foule act of uncleannesse he harkned not unto her to lie by her or so much as to be with her Gen. 39. 10. but fled and got himselfe out of her presence ver 12. doubting lest the very sight of her might kindle lust Nay to the shame of many secure and venturous Christians of this even Scipio an Heathen and Souldier too was apprehensive and fearesull and therefore would not suffer certaine captive Virgins though of an exquisite beauty to be brought so much as into his presence Nè quid faith Florus de virginitatis integritate delibâsse saltem vel oculis vid rotur That he might not seeme to have sipt or skimmed the honour of their chastity so much as with beholding them As Apelles then by drawing the picture of Campaspe fell in love with the patterne of his worke Campaspe her selse so we from retaining from affecting the shew of sin will soone proceed to a delight in sin it selfe Some indeed are so strangely confident of their abhorrencie from sinne as they doubt not infection from appearance of it they can venture into the loosest company yet so bridle their appetite as that they feare no excesse be present at an Idolatrous Masse and yet be in no danger of being affected with it unlesse it be with dislike of it Surely these men are dropt from Heaven never borne in sinne or conceived in iniquity for they whose originall is from men may possibly be drawn away by sinfull objects and shewes but these men forsooth are above gun-shot beyond the reach of temptation Their professed hatred of sinne brings me in mind of Pigmalions aversenesse from women he was a profest almost a sworne enemie to woman kind yet drawing but the picture of a woman he fell in love with it and he hug'd and kist it so long till at last by the power of Venus as the Poët fables it it became a woman Their case is like they professe detestation of sinne and yet delight in some things that have the appearance the resemblance thereof let them take heed they dote not so long upon these as that at length by the power of Satan and the strength of their own lusts they be transformed into reall sins I will end this reason with that of Chrysostome in his fifteenth Homily unto the
of it first negatively that God is not the cause of it for he made man upright secondly affirmatively that man himselfe is the cause of it But they have sought out many inventions If it be objected that the Divell was also a cause of the corruption of man's nature and therefore the Preachers resolution of it into man alone is defective he might have found that Satan propounded unto our first parents many inventions as well as that they sought out many inventions For answer Satan was the cause of our first parents fall or sin only per modum suadentis not per modum 〈◊〉 determinantis he was only a counselling and perswading cause and that 's only an imperfect cause only a morall cause he was not of sufficient efficacy to make them sinne for nothing can be the sufficient cause of sinne unto man besides his own will as Aquinas rightly 2 a. 2ae q 43. Ar. 1. ad 3 m nothing can compell or determine him thereunto so then notwithstanding Satans temptations the Preacher saith truely touching the causation of that pollution which is in our nature that 't is only to be attributed to the fall of our first parents because they of their own accord have freely sought out many inventions There 's a second 〈◊〉 of the word translated only that makes it to amount to no more than chiefly and indeed some Logicians say that exclusive particles sometimes exclude not à 〈◊〉 à 〈◊〉 but only à summitate 〈◊〉 and if the particle may be thus interpreted then Solomon by the addition thereof signifies that the principall thing that is to be remarked touching the sinfullnesse of men is that God was not the cause of it by his creation of man's nature but that our first parents were authors thereof by their fall from that rectitude in which God created them God hath made man upright but they have sought out many inventions now the preheminence of this above all other doctrines touching the sinfulnesse of man is very evident unto those that looke upon sinne as the scripture describes it for 't is the foundation of all true sincere sorrow for sinne and mortification of it the knowledge of an effect is ever confused untill we understand it's cause so our sight of sinne is never distinct and accurate untill we come to a veiw of the originall of all sinne and when this fountaine of sinne is found out originall sinne both imputed and inherent it will be then a farre more easy worke than formerly to discover the streames of actuall sins There 's a third interpretation of the particle yet behind which renders it seorsim apart or severally and by this exposition Solomon professeth that he hath separated in his consideration God's worke from man's worke God's work in the creating of man's nature upright and mans worke in the defiling of his nature by his fall wherein he sought out many inventions and 〈◊〉 separation of God's act and man's act being 〈◊〉 made may sufficiently instruct concerning the cause of 〈◊〉 irrectitude in men and women of which he complaines in the verse preceding that 't is not God but man himselfe Having thus briefly run over the praecognita proceed we next unto the conclusions themselves The first conclusion concernes originall righteousnesse the second concernes originall sinne The first conclusion concernes originall righteousnesse God made man upright not only with an uprightnesse of innocency but also with an uprightnesse of sanctity but of this before at large The second conclusion concernes originall sinne peccatum originale originans the fall of our first parents they have sought out many inventions these words describe the fall of our first parents not as 't is considered formally in it selfe but metonymically by it's motives or effects by it's motives if we understand them only of our first parents by it's effects if we extend them unto their posterity also First by it's motives if we understand them of our first parents only they sought out many 〈◊〉 that is plurima 〈◊〉 many reasonings as Junius and Tremelius render the word they found out many reasons arguments or motives to eate of the forbidden fruit and what they did in this their first sinne is reckoned to be done by us their off-spring because we were represented by them and contained in them even as Levi is said to pay tithes in Abraham because he was in the loines of his Father Abraham when Melchisedech 〈◊〉 him Heb. 7. 9 10. Against this interpretation there are two doubts The first these reasons or motives were first propounded by Satan and therefore not sought out by them they were his temptations and not so properly their own inventions Answer They are said to be sought out by them as their inventions because they so greedily and speedily embraced them their acceptation of them answer'd Satan's temptations as an eccho and there is such resemblance betwixt a voyce and an eccho as that standers by sometimes can hardly discerne betwixt them A second doubt is concerning the multitude of these inventions or reasons they have found out many inventions now Moses in his history mentioneth but a few motives or arguments that induced them to this fact Gen. 3. 6 and when the woman saw that the tree was good for food and that it was pleasant to the eyes and a tree to be desired to make one wise shee took of the fruit thereof and did eat and gave also unto her husband with her and he did eat improbable therefore that the Preacher speakes of these reasons or motives Answer These motives were very comprehensive though they were formally and expressly few yet they were implyedly many that one designe to be wise to have their eyes opened knowing good evill virtually comprehended many other plots dependent upon it or concomitant with it they hoped that their knowledge and wisdome would be backed or accompanied with an equall power and so able to effect whatsoever they desired they projected then not only to be as knowing but also as powerfull and in every thing as happy and glorious as Gods But some may thinke that this exposition is somewhat strayned and far fetched and therefore I shall propound a second which extends the clause not only unto them but to all their posterity also that descend from them in an ordinary way of generation and so the fall of our first parents is here set forth by it's mediate effects the inventions of them and their progeny touching their actuall sins which issue from originall corruption inherent in both as streames from a fountaine and branches from a tree they have all sought out many inventions First for the committing of sinne Secondly for the defending of sinne Thirdly for the extenuating of sinne Fourthly for the concealing of sinne First for the committing of sin so the clause may be verified either of the same or of several men both again of the same or several sins First of
sufficient 〈◊〉 First To say that that which is 〈◊〉 is positive is nonsense Put to say that 〈◊〉 is essential unto man either à priori or à 〈◊〉 is to say that 〈◊〉 which is privative is positive for the essentials of man are positive and the sormality of sin is a privation Therefore to say that sin is 〈◊〉 unto man either à 〈◊〉 or à posteriori 〈◊〉 nonsense Secondly To say that that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉 ac 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of man in primo or secundo modo dicendi per se is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se per accidens are opposite ways of predication But to say that sin is predicated of man in primo or secundo modo 〈◊〉 per se is to say That that which is predicated of man per accidens is predicated of man per se sor that sin is predicated of man per 〈◊〉 will be questioned by none who know what primus modus dicendi per accidens is Therefore to say that sin is predicated of man in primo or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se is nonsense Thirdly To say that that which is predicated contingently of man is predicated 〈◊〉 of him is nonsense But to say that sin is predicated of man in primo or secundo modo 〈◊〉 per se is to say That that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉 is predicated of 〈◊〉 necessarily for sin is predicated of man contingently because man and sin cohere 〈◊〉 man might not have been a sinner and when he shall not be a sinner he will still be a man and then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se est gradus necessitatis Therefore to say that sinne is predicated of man in 〈◊〉 or secundo modo dicendi per 〈◊〉 is nonsense If these arguments satisfy you not you may command more of me when you please as also any further enlargement of these Yea but you say that sinne is essentiall is 〈◊〉 to say but to say so is not non-sense To this I answer that however it may be 〈◊〉 in Grammar yet 't is nonsense in Logick because 't is a 〈◊〉 for in 〈◊〉 every contradiction not only expresse but that also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and implyed is nonsense a 〈◊〉 as we usually speake thus 't is nonsense to say that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that a spirit is corporeall that a body is 〈◊〉 without quantity or extension that an 〈◊〉 subsists or that a substance properly inhereth Now my three arguments above irrefragably prove that to say that sinne is 〈◊〉 to man is a contradiction for 't is in effect as much as to say that that which is privative is positive that that which is predicated of man per accidens is predicated of him per se that that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉 is predicated of man necessarily and these are grosse and palpable contradictions and therefore not only false but most pitifull and 〈◊〉 nonsense You accuse me of uncharitablenesse and unreasonablenesse in supposing that you say that sinne is essentiall unto man but from this accusation I have 〈◊〉 vindicated my selfe by beating you from all your miserable shifts And unto what I have said herein I shall referre both your selfe and the Reader Dr Taylor In the next place you charge me this with blasphemy if I 〈◊〉 said or meant what you 〈◊〉 you had reason but then I pray consider how your charge will 〈◊〉 really 〈◊〉 your selfe for if it be 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 God to be the Author of sinne 〈◊〉 what I derived from Adam is no sinne for that Adam's sinne should 〈◊〉 upon me I demand who was the Author of that If you please you may take time to consider it but in the interim if you be pleased to 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 discourse of 〈◊〉 called Deus justificatus you shall find my question not to be answered by you if you 〈◊〉 any regard to the authority or to the reason of Mr Calvin Dr Twisse and some other of the 〈◊〉 of your party Jeanes 1. Here you tempt me to a digression and you may with as good reason call upon me to answer all the reproaches that Bellarmine in this particular 〈◊〉 upon the Protestant Churches and some of the most eminent members thereof as propound this question unto me 2. However yet I briefly answer to it that Adam was the author of the descent of his sinne upon me not God for to be the Author of sinne is to be a desicient culpable cause thereof and it is impossible that God should be defective in a culpable manner and that our doctrine of originall sinne maketh him to be such you may boldly affirme but can never prove 3. Bishop 〈◊〉 in the doctrine of 〈◊〉 sinne is one of our party and he speaks that which will abundantly 〈◊〉 your demands in his animadversions upon Hord pag. 323. 224. It was not sayes he God's absolute decree of 〈◊〉 but Adam's voluntary act of rebellion which brought sinne and the guilt of sinne upon himselfe and all his posterity God having justly 〈◊〉 that Adam's children should participate with him 〈◊〉 his state of 〈◊〉 did as justly 〈◊〉 that they should also participate in the state of sinne If this Author deny the propagation of 〈◊〉 from Adam he must acknowledge 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 c. His whole discourse concerning originall sinne and the propagating 〈◊〉 unto all mankind is 〈◊〉 in that he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the divine 〈◊〉 must needs be 〈◊〉 or causative of all the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereas if the events be actions sinfull God's decrees are 〈◊〉 and ordinative not 〈◊〉 of causing much esse necessitating such evill 〈◊〉 as hath been often told him 4. I have seene your little 〈◊〉 called 〈◊〉 justisicatus and must say of it as Florus did of the Ligurians lib. 2. cap. 3. Major 〈◊〉 labor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vincere The Rhetorick of it is so rank as that it will be a very hard matter to find out the Logick and reason that is in it If you please to put your arguments into forme you then may command me to consider them but otherwise I shall be very loath to adventure upon any thing of yours for I find by this present debate about two or three lines that I shall not without great difficulty search out what is your meaning 5. I wonder why you say that by this discourse I shall find your question not to be answered by me why pray Sr could I answer it before you propounded it but your meaning is I suppose that I shall find that your question cannot be answr'd by me but the event will 〈◊〉 that 6. That which you meane in Mr Calvin and Dr Twisse are I 〈◊〉 those places which you quote pag. 32 of that your 〈◊〉 and then unto the place in Calvin you have an answer in Dr Twisse 〈◊〉 gra lib. 2. dig 2. cap. 3. pag. 42. where he cleares it from the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 And then for the place in Dr Twisse you may gather an answer from that he saith unto
Taylor That Original righteousness was in Adam 279 280 277 b 278 b 279 b 2. A double quid sit of original righteousness is inquired into 1. Quid nominis Why the righteousness of the first man is called original righteousness 280b 281 2. Quid rei What is meant by the thing it self And for the clearing of this seven particulars explicated It s 1. Materiale matter or foundation 282 283 2. Formale or formality 283 3. Subject in which seated 283 284 4. Causation or production 284 5. Effects 285 286 6. Difference from sanctifying grace 286 287 7. The relation unto the first man Whether it were natural or supernatural to him Which disficult and important question is at large handled against Papists Arminians Socinians and Dr. Taylor 288 usque ad 318 The malignant influence or causality of Concupiscence Jam. 1. 14 15. But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed Then when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin and sin when it is finished bringeth forth death LUst is not here taken for the act of lust nor for contracted acquired habitual lust But for original lust 318 Concerning it we have remarkable 1. The propriety of its inherence 〈◊〉 own lust 319 2. The force of its influence it tempteth draweth enticeth to sin c. ibid. Here we have of this influence 1. The extent 320 2. The branches ibid. 3. The degrees 320 321 322 323 324 325 The words being analized and expounded are in the next place cleared 〈◊〉 two 〈◊〉 inferences of Papists The first That Concupiscence is not sin 325 326 The second That there are venial sins 326 327 One observation pitched upon That every mans lust or 〈◊〉 is the principal cause of his temptations unto sin 327 The point deduced from the Text is briefly explained confirmed and applyed 1. For Explication two distinctions 〈◊〉 The first Of an immediate and medi ate cause of temptation 327 The second Of an universal and particular cause of temptation 327 328 2. The Confirmation hath two parts 1. That our own lust is a cause 328 329 2. That 't is a principal cause of temptation unto sin because it tempts 1. Internally 2. Esfectively 3. Perpetually 329 3. The uses that are to be made of this Point are Of Information Of Reprehension Of Exhortation 1. Of Information and they are three 1. We may hence learn what a great difference there is betwixt the temptations of lapsed man unto sin and the temptations of our first Parents unto the first sin 329 330 2. We may hence be instructed what a wide 〈◊〉 there is betwixt our temptations unto sin and the temptations of Christ. 330 331 3. We may from the causality or influence of lust infer its obliquity against Papists Socinians and Dr. Taylor 331 332 From this there may be refuted three other Points of Popery 1. The absolute perfection of the good works of the regenerate 332 2. Their Justification by them ibid. 3. Their possibility of fulsilling the Law 332 333 From speculative practical uses are proceeded to 2. The next Use is of reprehension of all such as excuse or extenuate their sins by discharging them upon the importunity violence of outward temptations c. 333 334 3. Lastly Divers Exhortations may be inferred srom the causality and influence of our Concupiscence We may hence be 〈◊〉 unto 1. Humiliation for it 334 335 2. Mortification of it 336 337 338 339 340 341 3. Watchfulness against it 341 342 4. Thankfulness for deliverance from it 342 343 344 There be also some duties regarding our brethren 〈◊〉 which we may from this 〈◊〉 efficacy of 〈◊〉 be pressed 1. We may hence be exhorted to be careful in our watch over them diligent in our admonition of them frequent in our prayers for them 344 345 2. We may hence be perswaded to sugar and sweeten our reproofs of brethren with meekness and moderation The created and lapsed condition of man Eccles. 7. 29. Loe this onely have I found that God hath made man upright but they have sought out many inventions THe Coherence of the words wherein inquired in what sense Solomon saith That he found not one woman amongst a thousand 346 In the words two Conclusions unto which is premised a Preface 〈◊〉 this onely have I found Wherein three things remarkable 1. The weight and importance of these two Conclusions implyed in the Particle Loe. 347 2. The means by which Solomon came to the knowledge of these two Points diligent search and study into the word and will of God This have I found 347 348 3. We have a comparison of these Conclusions with other points of Doctrine hinted in the Particle onely This onely have I found this and nothing else 348 Against which an Objection and unto it three Answers 348 349 350 Having 〈◊〉 over the praecognita the Conclusions themselves are next proceeded to Conclus 1. Concerns Original righteousness God made man upright 350 Conclus 2. Concerns Original Sin peccatum originale originans the fall of our first Parents They have sought out many inventions These words describe the fall of our first Parents not as 't is considered formally in it self but Metonymically by its motives or effects 1. By its motives if we understand them onely of our first Parents 350 Against this interpretation two doubts propounded and resolved 350 351 2. By its effects if we extend them unto their posterity also they have all sought out many inventions 1. For the committing 351 352 usque ad 355 of sin 2. For the defending 355 3. For the 〈◊〉 355 356 4 For the concealing 356 357 The words as hitherto expounded run of sin considered indefinitely There be also that restrain them unto one particular sin Mens erroneous inventions concerning their supream end and happinesse and the ways and means leading thereunto 357 358 Divers other rendrings of the words considered 358 359 360. By this Table the Reader may correct the mistakes in the running Title A TABLE of the Scriptures explicated in this Book Genesis Cap. ver pag. 1. 2. 275.  12. 29. 281.  26. 27. 279. 280.  26. 28. 278. b.  26. 27. 280. b.  31. 280. 293. 313. 2. 19. 20. 274. b. 3. 6. 329. 330. 351.  12. 13. 355. 17. 1. 58. 20. 6. 321. 322. 39. 10. 12. 159. 341. Exodus 20. 25. 275. Leviticus 6. 13. 267. 19. 17. 97.  28. 146. 147. 21. 11. 166.  25. 146. 147. Numbers 6. 3. 146.  6. 166. Deuteronomy 14. 1. 146. 147. 22. 12. 18. 27. 5. 275. Judges 7. 2. 275.  20. 274. 1 Samuel 15. 3. 353. 1 Kings 10. 18. 239. 2 Kings 16. 10. 11. 144. 17. 15. 146. 18. 4. 138. 139. 140. c. Cap. ver pag.  5. 141. 142. 23. 13. 139. 140. 141. 142. 1 Chronicles 21. 7. 60. Ezra 8. 22. 98. 9. 13. 272. Esther 4 14. 227. Job 1 4. 5. 57. 58. 29. 16. 232. 233. 31. 33.
it selfe but also when it hath a manifest shew of sin for the bare and naked shew of sin may praebere alteri occasionem ruinae morally lead another to sin may be the morall cause of anothers sin as well as sin it selfe the actions in which there is onely an appearance of sinne may yet provoke another unto the practise of sin as the performance of the sinfull action it selfe To see a Christian sitting at meat in an Idols Temple at an Idols feast may tempt a raw convert unto Idolatry as well as to behold him knceling before an Idoll For this I could muster up the suffrages of all the schoolmen a generation yet of divines that are none of the precisest either in positions or practise But I will not trouble my Reader with the testimonies of above two of them Opus malum saith Suarez vel 〈◊〉 speciem mali quod de fe inductivum est ad pecc andum vitandum est nam illud est verè scandalum activum ut patet ex desinitione ejus moraliter enim inducit hominem ad malum Quod 〈◊〉 non operteat esse verè malum sed satis sit apparere patet 2 Thes. 5. 22. 1 Cor. 12. Ratio est quia tenemur rectè operari non selum coram Dco sed ctiam coram hominibus Secundo quia cum opus habet speciem mali inducitur proximus ad malum opus non selum suâ malitiâ sed etiam ex vi mei operis ex quadam fragilitate 〈◊〉 op de triplici virtute tract 2 disp 10. sect 3. Quotiescunque datur occasio scandali saith Vasquez malo opere aut habente speciem mali semper imputatur scandalum tribuenti occasionem sive scandalum 〈◊〉 ex malitiâ sive infirmitate aut ignorantià Tunc enim qui 〈◊〉 occasionem scandali peccat peccato scandali activi quod nullâ ratione licet Ratio vero est quia nullâ justâ aut rationabili causâ excusari potest aliquis â peccato qui coram alio peccat vel exercet opus habens speciem mali ideo jure optimo dicitur tribuere occasionem peccandi quia tale opus ex se occasio est peccandi Vasquez opusculis Moralibus tract de scandalo But now to proceed unto a second reason besides the evill of scandall in actions that carry a reall appearance of evill there is also reductivè the guilt of that evill of which they have an 〈◊〉 for that command which forbids such a sin forbids all the shewes and occasions of it all the preparatives unto it as is usually observed by Commentators upon the Decalogue Thus the prohibition of adultery takes in all the causes and signes thereof by this rule to sit at meat in the Idols Temple at the Idols feast was not onely a sin of scandall as being a provocation unto and so a participation of the sin of Idolatry in weake and ignorant spectators but also a sin of Idolatry by way of reduction a sinne against religion a transgression against that worship which God requireth Suarez expresseth this though somewhat obscurely yet more fully first he layeth down this conclusion Quando aliquis indirectè inducit alium ad peccandum per actionem malam vel habentem speciem mali etiam incurrit specialem malitiam scandali against this conclusion he propounds amongst others this objection Sequitur eum c. per actionem non malam sed habentem speciem mali contrahere duas malitias Vnam scandali contra charitatem aliam illius speciei peccati ad quam proximus inducitur Consequens est contra divum Thomam hic et sumitur ex Paulo primo ad Corinth 8 12. Vbi manducantem scandalosè sacrificata Idolis non reprehend reprehendit ut Idolatram sed ut scandalosum Sequela autem patet quia ille est 〈◊〉 talis malitiae ergo incurrit illam Unto this his answer is that an action onely evill in appearance may have a double obliquity in it to wit that of scandall and that of which it is an appearance unto which it induceth Concedo inquit ibi esse duas malitias Est tamen advertendum 〈◊〉 contra aliquam virtutem peccari Vno modo per se primo quia 〈◊〉 agitur contra objectum ejus vel circumstantias illi ex se debitas hoc modo actio solum mala in apparentia nullam virtutem 〈◊〉 Alio modo peccari potest tantum ex consequenti connexione virtutum Nam ut dictum est 1. 2 quia actus virtutum sunt undique boni quando hic nunc actus alicujus virtutis 〈◊〉 esse contrarius alteri virtuti quamvis in suo objecto vel circumstantiis quasi intrinsecis 〈◊〉 habeat defectum non potest prudenter sicri atque adeo neque est actus virtutis simpliciter ideo participat malitiam contrariam utrique virtuti sed alteram per se alteram quasi per accidens consequenter Sic etiam propria malitia scandali ferè semper fundatur in alia malitiâ tamen ex consequenti per accidens sempèr habet aliquo-modoillam conjunctam ex defectu circumstantiae debitae saltem propter aliam virtutem propter quam non 〈◊〉 prudenter cessandum 〈◊〉 ab opere hic nunc habente speciem mali quamvis ex se esset alias honestum Suar de triplici virtute Theolog. tract de charitat disp 10. 〈◊〉 2. 'T is of this reall appearance 〈◊〉 believe that the Apostle is here onely to be understood But yet to make this our discourse compleate I shall also take in consideration that appearance of evill in an action which is but imaginary and this is ascribed thereunto from our own or others 〈◊〉 and censures thereupon First from our own And here if a man be in his own Conscience stedfastly fully and firmely perswaded that such an action is evill and unlawfull which yet in truth is not so but lawfull what ought he to doe These times afford many instances by which we may exemplisy this case There are many Sectaries that professe they thinke it unlawfull to frequent the publique Ordinances to pay tithes unto the Minister Contribution unto the Magistrate and there be some that thinke it unlawfull to sweare in any cause though called thereunto by a Magistrate and yet all these particulars are not onely things lawfull but bounden duties For 〈◊〉 we must premise two things First we must take into our consideration the nature of the action and the condition of the person that harbours this misperswasion of the action the action in its nature may be either necessary or indifferent and arbitrary and the person misjudging it may be in respect thereof either sui juris or determined therein by the lawfull command of some superiour power Secondly we must with Durand distinguish betwixt 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 to bind and to bind unto Sciendum saith he lib. 2. dist 39. qu. 5. quod aliud est ligari aliud
is bound to know such an errour is at least indirectè voluntary and sinsull and cannot oblige A Second exception Conscience hath no power to oblige but what it deriveth from God and therefore what it obligeth unto God also obligeth unto and God is the morall cause and consequently the Authour of whatsoever he obligeth to but he cannot be the morall cause and authour of that which is sinne and unlawfull either per se or per accidens and therefore neither he nor his deputy Conscience can oblige so much as per accidens unto that which is unlawfull A Third exception shall be the objection of Durand in the place above quoted Sola vera notitia de re 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 magis confirmat sed vera notitia de eo quod 〈◊〉 conscientia dictat tollit 〈◊〉 ergo obligatio nulla suit To be well informed and to have a true knowledg of a thing cannot take away any obligation to it But to be well informed and to have a true knowledg concerning that which an erroneous Conscience dictates takes away all obligation to it Therefore there was never any such thing as an obligation to it The most considerable objection is that of 〈◊〉 Sum Theol. 2. part p. 1. tom 2. tract 1. cap. 4. Durandus còncedit illum p 〈◊〉 qui operatur contra hanc conscientiam Ergo debet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hanc conscientiam obligare Nam ubi non est 〈◊〉 ibi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Durand grants that he sinneth who acts against an erroneous Conscience therefore he ought also to grant that an erroneous conscience obligeth for where there is no obligation there can be no sin But the answer hereunto is very easy by distinguishing concerning obligation which is twofold either as touching the 〈◊〉 or manner of actions Though there be no obligation as touching the matter of such actions concerning which an erroneous Conscience dictates yet there is a generall obligation as 〈◊〉 the manner of all actions that they be done without the Contempt of conscience and therefore in every action where conscience is contemned sin is committed Quaevis voluntas saith Aquinas 2 dae q. 19. art 5. à ratione sive 〈◊〉 sive errante discordans semper est mala Which brings me unto my third conclusion Allthough this erroneous conceit of the unlawfullnesse of this action 〈◊〉 to be necessary either in its nature or at least in its use because lawfully commanded by authority doth not obligare that is so bind as that I must follow it yet it doth ligare so intangle and perplex as that I cannot without sin oppose it and for this I shall alledge these following reasons First because whosoever goeth against his Conscience whether ill or well informed it matters not goes against the will of God although not for the thing he doth yet for the manner of doing it although not 〈◊〉 yet formally and interpretatively because whatsoever the Conscience 〈◊〉 a man takes for the will of God each mans Conscience being 〈◊〉 Deputy God to informe and direct him Looke as he who reviles wounds kills a private man mistaking him for the King is guilty of high treason against the King himselfe so he that ' thwarts the judgment of even an erroneous Conscience fights against God warres against Heaven because what his conscience saies he thinks to be the voice of Heaven Thus you see that he who acts against an erroneous Conscience in such an action 〈◊〉 himselfe as disaffected towards God for he knowingly adventureth upon that which he thinketh will infinitely displease him And in a second place such an action is an argument of disaffection towards that rule of our morall actions which God hath appointed he that hath an erroneous Conscience supposeth it to be right and well informed and therefore if he act against it he slights that which he takes to be the rule of his working and therefore his action is for the 〈◊〉 of it lawlesse and irregular Thirdly in such an action there is a depraved affection towards sin and that in Morals is the fountaine of all ilnesse If a mans conscience be right and well informed and he act against it every one will grant that such an action proceeds from the love of that which is sinne and there is the same reason to say as much of that action which is against the dictate of an erring Conscience Besides these reasons I shall alledge Scriptures to omit Rom 〈◊〉 23. allready spoken of 〈◊〉 quotes also Rom. 14. 14. To him that esteemeth any thing to be uncleane to him it is uncleane The learned Dr Hammond alledgeth for the same purpose the 1 Cor. 8. 7. For some with Conscience of the Idoll i e. 〈◊〉 resolved in mind that it is not lawfull to eat or taste of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 part or portion of the Idol-feast whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the idol table or having bought it at the shambles as it seems was the fashion of those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be sold there at second hand chap. 10. 25. 〈◊〉 it unlawfull to eat any meat consecrated to that use do yet eat that which is of this nature and by so doing their weake i. e. uninstructed Conscience is polluted i. e. they sin against their Conscience do that which they are perswaded they may not doe which although it be never so innocent and harmlesse thing in it selfe an Idoll being simply nothing yet to them which do it when they thinke it unlawfull and all have not knowledge saith he in the beginning of the verse i. e. are not sufficiently instructed in their duty it is pollution or sin I shall proceed unto the fourth and last conclusion The only way then for a man to rescue himselfe out of these difficulties is to rectify his Conscience to depose and correct the errour thereof so he shall escape contempt of the judgment of his own Conscience on the one hand and breach of either Gods or mans lawes on the other This Rayunaudus from whom I know none do dissent expresseth as followeth Moral disc dist 4. q. 3. art 1. n. 247. Unum igitur illud subsidium superest ut judicium de malitiâ vincibilitèr errans abjiciatur Si enim neque adhaerere ei licet ut primo loco monstravimus neque illi obsistere ut nunc diximus non aliud superesse potest quà m ut homo errorem depellat quod posse supponitur 〈◊〉 de malitiâ sensum induat alioqui quocunque se vertat in culpâ erit An imaginary appearance of evill issues Secondly from the supposals of not only ourselves but others that censure it whose judgments are either misled by ignorance and weaknesse or else blinded through pride and prejudice such was that in the moving of Hannah's lips not afforded by her fact but only fastned on it by old Eli his hasty censoriousnesse no other appearance of evill was there in our
cause of a passive scandall so that he who scandalizeth another partaketh of and is accessary unto the sin of the party scandalized and we are not to partake of or be accessary unto the sins of any 1 Tim. 5. 22. We must have no fellowship with unfruitfull works of darknesse in any whomsoever 〈◊〉 5. 11. A third argument is fetcht from the effect of an active scandall 't is of a soule destroying nature so a kind of spirituall murther destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died Rom. 14. 15. for 〈◊〉 destroy not the 〈◊〉 of God vers 20. and who should not tremble at the guilt of the murther of any soul whatsoever for there is no soule so wicked but may for ought thou knowest be one of those for whom Christ shed his most divine and precious blood The last argument is taken from the Opposite of scandall Charity and its act beneficence We are to love all even our most malitious and persecuting enemies Matth. 5. 44. We are to do good unto all though especially to the houshold of saith Gal. 6. 10. We are to exercise patience and meeknesse towards even those that oppose themselves 2 Tim. 2. 14 15. And from this it will inevitably follow that we are to scandalize none Here we have usually objected the example of our Saviour who slighted the scandall of the Pharisees Matth. 15. 12 13 14. Then came his Disciples and said unto him knowest thou that the Pharisees were offended after they heard this saying but he answered and said c. let them alone they be blind leaders of the blind c. The objection concernes onely the scandalizing of them in things indifferent and unto it I shall give an answer in the words of Parker part 2. part 57. If this be all the warrant we have not to forbeare in a thing indifferent for the malicious then have we no warrant at all because the scandall there not cared for is when the Pharisees are 〈◊〉 at his abstaining from their washings and his preaching of a true doctrine both of which were necessary duties for him to doe And when he defendeth his healing on sabbaths and his Disciples plucking eares upon this reason they are duties of necessity and charity he plainly insinuateth there is no defence for deeds unnecessary when the malitious are scandalized In a second place I shall alleadge the Objection of the Schoolemen which by Gregory de Valentia is thus urged Tom. 3. disp 3. q. 18. punct 4. 〈◊〉 qui non ex ignorantiâ aut infirmitate sed ex malitiâ 〈◊〉 non laborat tali aliquâ necessitate spirituali cui non possit ipse sine ope alterius proximi facile prospicere mutando pravam suam voluntatem Ergo alter non tenetur tunc cum ali quo suo detrimento prospicere Pharisees the wicked that are scandalized out of meere malice and not out of ignorance or weaknesse are not in any such spirituall necessity or danger but that they can casily provide for the safety and indemnity of their soules without the help or assistance of others by changing their depraved will and therefore others are not bound to 〈◊〉 any detriment for the prevention of their scandall The answer unto this may easily be foreseen for here is nothing but Jesuiticall dictates that are alltogether proofelesse First Pharisees the wicked that are scandalized out of malice are in a greater spirituall necessity and danger then those that are scandalized out of ignorance or weaknesse for they are in the snare of the divill taken captive by him at his will 2 Tim. 2. 16. And therefore Secondly they are more unable to help themselves and prevent their own falling into sin for their hearts are altogether destitute of any gracious habits there is not in them the spirit a renewed principle to make head or resistance against the flesh the sinfull corruption of their natures there is need then of all help possible to keepe them from falling and all will be uneffectuall unlesse God also put in his helping hand Whereas he talkes that 't is an easy matter for a wicked and malitious man to provide against all danger and need of his soule by changing his perverse and naughty will this is a very grosse Pelagian conceite for it ascribes that unto the power of mans corrupt will which can be wrought only by the omnipotent grace of God By this time I hope the Reader is sufficiently satisfyed that the active scandals of the most wicked and malitious are not to be contemned But yet there remaineth a great difficulty in the point to be cleared and that is when an active-scandall is committed towards them in our duties and indifferencies First we actively scandalize them by our duties when they are not rightly circumstanced seasonably performed in due time and place when they are not expedient unto those ends for which God enjoyned them now when this is cannot be determined by any generall rule but every one must be left to be guided by his spirituall prudence and wisdome But for this hereafter I shall allot a peculiar digression by it selfe Secondly we actively scandalize them by our indifferencies when 't is probable they will occasion their passive scandall their falling into sin But now this generall rule is to be limited and I shall give you three limitations of it The first limitation this rule is to be understood when the use of our indifferencies is likely to prejudice and obstruct the propagation of the Gospell and the forbearance of them will in all probability conduce unto the advancement of the Credit of the Gospell and not otherwise ordinarily upon this account it would have been scandalous in Paul to have received maintenance from the Corinthians but t is now unscandalous in Ministers to accept and challenge that maintenance which is due unto them by the lawes of the land for a generall forbearance thereof now would soone be followed with the utter ruine of the Gospell A second limitation the sorementioned rule is to be understood when the forbearance of our indifferencies is likely to win upon the wicked and malitious so as to further their conversion and not otherwise when it onely exposeth unto their contempt scorne and derision 1 Cor. 9. 19 20 21 22. Though I be free from all men saith Paul 〈◊〉 have I made my selfe servant unto all that I might gain the more And unto the Jews I became as a few that I might gain the Jewes to them that are under the law as under the law that I might gaine them that are under the Law To them that are without Law as without Law being not without Law to God but under the Law to Christ that I might gaine them that are without Law To the weake became I as weake that I might gaine the weake I am made all things to all men that I might by all meanes save some Here t is very remarkable that Paul was made in things
people of Antioch 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It will be to 〈◊〉 the occasion or ground of greatest security if we do not only flee sins but such indifferent things also which are meanes whereby they doe supplant us for as he who goeth upon the edge of a steepe and craggy rock though he falleth not yet with feare trembleth and so fals through his trembling so he who leaveth not sinne a loofe and a farre off but approacheth close to the brink of it hath just cause to live in feare seeing he hath just cause to feare to fall into it Secondly danger of being punished for sinne not by God for he is an Omniscient Judge and therefore cannot mistake the appearance of evill for evill it selfe he is a just Judge and therefore will not punish the appearance of evill for evill it selfe but by man by the 〈◊〉 Magistrate with temporall punishments by the governours of the Church with Ecclesiasticall censures and by all men generally with shame and obloquie 〈◊〉 you know in the apparell of Ahab was like to have been kild for Ahab 〈◊〉 having on the Cloake and armour of Pyrrhus was slaine for Pyrrhus even so many times some men for the bare appearance of some crimes are as hardly thought of and as severely handled as if they had committed the crimes themselves Tiberius Gracchus was butchered by the Romans because it seemed unto them that by touching his head with his hand he had demanded a Diadem when he thereby as a signe only exhorted them to stand upon their defence Because the Island of Creete seemed to have favoured Mithridates for this seemings sake the people of Rome tooke revenge by the sword Favisse Mithridati videbatur hoc placuit armis vindicare Indeed the Lord seeth not as man seeth he looketh on the heart and thereunto squareth his judgment but man looketh on the outward appearance 1 Sam. 16. 7. and according to it censureth and so he may doe and yet often times judge righteous judgment For if when there is wanting sufficient evidence of fact Judges and Juries should not sometimes proceed upon pregnant signes and strong presumptions howmany villanies would passe unpunished And if Ecclesiasticall Governours should not take the same course too how could they possibly stop the spreading mischeifs of scandall This abstinence from appearance of evill is lastly expedient in regard of our brethren to avoid scandall unto them First as it is taken by Thomas and the School-men for that which occasionally leads unto sin which puts a stumbling block or an occasion to fall in the way of others Rom. 14. 13. for so doe all evill shewes and that both in the way of the weak and in the way of the wicked First in the way of the weake for they are misguided and drawn unto the practise of that evill the appearance whereof they see in us Secondly in the way of the wicked for first hereby the obdurate are heartened confirmed and comforted secondly hereupon adversaries take occasion to speake reproachfully of that holy name and profession which we beare to blaspbeme the Crosse Truth and Gospell of Christ. Secondly as 't is used vulgarly and commonly for sorrow greife dislike or displeasure at an action for it matters not much whether our facts be evill or beare shew of evill they equally would wound the hearts and vexe the righteous spirits of the Godly and therefore are both violations of Saint Pauls precepts Rom. 15. 2. Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification Valerius Publicola saith Florus nè specie arcis offenderet eminentes aedes suas in planâ submisit he levelled with the ground his high and losty building lest he should offend the people with the appearance of a Cittadell and wilt not thou throw aside a vanity an excrement some idle if not monstrous fashion rather than offend thy brother for whom Christ died with the appearance of an evil A 〈◊〉 shame were it that popularity should prevaile more with a Roman than Charity with thee who art a Christian. But some will be ready to object that this doctrine is prejudiciall to our Christian liberty For that reacheth to the use of all things that are of an indifferent nature and such are these actions charged with the appearance of evill and therefore if you streighten us in the use of them you injuriously deprive us of that liberty which we have in Christ Jesus unto the use of all indifferent things For answer First those actions in which there is a reall appearance of evill are not indifferent in their nature but evill and sinfull forbidden first by the generall prohibition of scandall they are per se scandalous of themselves and in their own nature and therefore 〈◊〉 for à per se ad de omni valet argumentum prohibited secondly by those precepts which are against those evils of which they have a reall appearance because they are a step unto and occasion of them whereas 't is usually said that they are evill only in appearance this is not to be understood so as to exclude evill from them but to restraine the evill of them unto this particular that they have a reall appearance of evill the meaning is they are evill in no regard but this and this regard for the reasons abovesaid is sufficient to denominate them evill they are allwaies temptations unto evill so that there is allwaies committed in them an active scandall This was the opinion of the vulgar translater who translates 1 〈◊〉 v. 22. ab omni specie 〈◊〉 abstinete vos abstaine from every evill appearance this reading Cornelius à Lapide and other Popish Expositors think equivalent with 〈◊〉 translation abstaine from all appearance of 〈◊〉 according to it then every appearance of evill is evill if it be reall and not meerly imaginary Unto this let me adde that of Suarez allready quoted an action saith he onely evill in appearance transgresseth some virtue though not per se primo yet 〈◊〉 consequenti connexione virtutum by reason of the mutuall connexion and commerce of one virtue with and dependance upon another But to come to secondly those indifferent actions in which there is only an imaginary appearance of evill two things are here to be answered First however they be in thesi in their generall nature indifferent yet they do in casu and in hypothesi become to be accidentally evill because done against Conscience when they appeare to be evill to our selves against charity when they appeare to be evill unto others and then we are bound to abstaine from them though notlege communi yet lege particulari by reason of particular circumstances Secondly Although our Christian liberty extendeth to the use of all things indifferent yet ought we in godly wisdome and discretion to abridge our selves of the outward exercise of this our liberty whensoever 't is very probable that it will become dangerous
a morall goodnesse righteousnesse and true holinesse without it impossible that man should obtaine the end prescribed unto him that he should performe the duties injoined him and it was against the justice and goodnesse of God and so a grosse contradiction to appoint unto man an impossible end to impose upon man impossible commandments Gods chalking out such an end for man to seek implieth that he supplyed him with meanes for assecution hereof his injunction of lawes argueth that he gave power and ability to yeeld obedience unto them but of this allready more fully and distinctly in the first part of the question Unto what is there said 〈◊〉 me adde what Dr Feild in his learned booke of the Church pag. 251 252 253. hath in resutation of this fiction of the Papists that man might have been created in his pure naturals in a state of neutrality and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 grace or sin his argument may briefly be thus summ'd up It was impossible for the nature of man without grace to performe its principall actions about its principall objects the sirst truth and the chiefest good without grace 't was impossible for man to know God as he ought to love him as he should amore amicitiae with a love of friendship for himselfe and his own sake and without such a love all a mans actions would have bin sins for they could not have been done unto the glory of God because t is such a love only that referreth mans actions unto Gods glory and that state cannot but be a sinfull state wherein all that a man doth is sin breifly thus without the grace of God 't is impossible to love God and without the love of God all our actions will be evill and sin and therefore à primo ad ultimum without grace all our actions will be sin and hereupon 't will follow that there can be no state of nature sinlesse without grace and consequently that there can be noe state of pure or meere nature For the surther clearing of this I shall lay downe two 〈◊〉 which cannot reasonably be denied First that God decreed that man should act rationally that he should performe rationall actions Secondly that all his rationall actions were under the law of nature some for their substance as to love seare prayse and glorify God and others for their 〈◊〉 and other the like 〈◊〉 whether a man did eate or drinke whatsoever he did he was to doe all unto the glory of God to deny this were to uncreature man take away his dependance upon and relation unto God and from this grant it undeniably followes that all a man's rationall or voluntary actions were capable of morall goodnesse or badnesse and consequently that how ever some of them might be indifferent in their generall and abstract 〈◊〉 yet considered actu exercito as singularized and cloathed with circumstances they were all either morally good or evill for morall goodnesse and badnesse are privatively opposite and 't is an unquestioned rule in Logick inter privativè opposita non datur medium in subjecto capaci Between privative opposites there can be no middle either of abnegatien or participation in a capable subject every subject capable of privative opposites must necessarily have one or the other thus a sensitive creature must be either seeing or blind the aire must be either lightsome or darke now if there could be no indifferency or neutrality in the rationall actions of man but that they must all necessarily be either good or bad then it was impossible there could be any such state of indifferency and neutrality in the rationall faculties of man they must also be morally either good or bad holy or sinfull and therefore the possibility of man's existence in a state of pure naturals without grace or sinne hath no foundation in sound reason The second conclusion It was absolutely impossible for man to be created with the contrary of originall righteousnesse concupiscence a pronenesse or inclination of all the faculties of man unto sin This conclusion is thus confirmed if man had been created with this concupiscence God had been the author of it but 't was impossible for God to be the author of it the Apostle John saith it is not from the Father but is of the world 1 John 2. 16 we may goe farther and say it could not bee from the Father and therefore it was 〈◊〉 for man to be created with it The Minor is thus prov'd it was impossible for God to be the author of sin but concupiscence is sin and therefore God could not be the author of it Unto this argument we find in Bellarmine two answers First that God would not have been the author of this concupiscence though man had been created with it Secondly that this concupiscence is not sinne and therefore though God had been the cause of it yet it would not have therefore followed that hee had been the cause of sinne First that God would not have been the author of concupiscence though man had been created with it but it would have been besides his purpose and intention for it would saith he have flowne naturally from the condition of the matter of man and so it would have been naturall unto man not as a good gift or ornament of nature but as a defect disease or infirmity of nature he endeavoureth to illustrate this by the similitude of a Smith though a Smith frame a sword of Iron and the sword grow rusty yet the rust is not caused by the Smith but proceedeth as a sequele from the nature or quality of the Iron that is the matter of the sword But this answer is first dissonant from the truth secondly repugnant unto Bellarmines owne principles First dissonant from the truth and that I shall cleare by three arguments The first argument Causa causae est causa causati in 〈◊〉 subordinatis the cause of a cause is the cause of its effects in things essentially subordinate but God is the cause of the nature and matter of a man and by the opinion of Bellarmine concupiscence is essentiall to the nature and matter of man 〈◊〉 and a 〈◊〉 for it would naturally and necessarily thinks he have resulted from the nature and matter of man but that it was supernaturally prevented by the gift of originall righteousnesse and consequently God must needs be the cause and author of it A second argument is because this concupiscence is not only in the sensitive and inferiour but also in the rationall and superiour faculties in the understanding and will St. Paul Coll. 2. 15 speakes of a fleshly mind vainly puft up by his fleshly mind so then there is flesh in the very mind of man the carnall mind or the minding of the flesh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is enmity against God Rom. 8. 7 remarkable is that saying of Augustine voluntas sine charitate est tota vitiosa cupiditas without love the will is as it were wholy turned into lust
mind God is not loved with all our soule and mind and the soule is faulty when 't is divided betwixt God and sinne their heart is divided saith the Prophet now shall they be found faulty Hosea 10. 2. This argument Dr. Abbot Bishop of Salisbary brings in his defence of Mr. Perkins his reformed Catholique against Dr. Bishop pag. 187. 188. He erreth saith he in that be maketh Originall 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 only in the integrity of the will and the forme of sin to stand only in the aversion of the will from God by the 〈◊〉 of the same originall justice whereas originall justice was in truth the integrity of all the parts of 〈◊〉 not subjecting the 〈◊〉 to the mind and the mind to God but 〈◊〉 whole man to God the image whereof is set forth unto us in the commandment Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart with all thy mind with all thy soule with all thy thoughts and strength The forme of sinne therefore is not only in the aversion of the will but in the aversion of any part or power or faculty of the soule if in any of these there be a declining from the law of God it is the sinne of man Now 〈◊〉 so long as there is any matter of concupiscence to be yet 〈◊〉 and restrained God cannot be loved with all the soule for how can 〈◊〉 have all the soule so long as concupiscence hath any part therefore in the 〈◊〉 of any matter of concupiscence there is sinne because it is sinne when either there is not love at all or it is lesse than it should be when it is not with all the soule But further as these first motions and agitations of concupiscence are virtually and implyedly contrary unto our Saviour's summary of all the commandements of the first table so they are particularly and expressely forbidden by the last commandement of the second table the tenth commandement that God here dealeth with the first motions and thoughts of the heart is the sense of Bishop Andrewes upon the commandements and Dr. Taylor cannot say that he was a Calvinist or Presbyterian But this his exposition hath for it very good 〈◊〉 because those motions unto sinne which are consented to are forbidden in the severall commandments as appeareth by our Saviour's glosse upon the seventh commandment Matth. 5. 28. Now if they be forbidden in the severall commandments 't is unlikely that there should be alloted for the prohibition of them a distinct commandment considering how short a breviary of man's duty the 〈◊〉 is Indeed Ames rightly holdeth that the first motions unto unjustice are here only expressely forbidden but from the forbidding of them we may conclude by way of proportion the prohibition also of the first motions which are against the duties of religion and 〈◊〉 commanded in the first table But though the first motions of concupiscence had not been forbidden by any written law yet 't is sufficient to make them sinne that they are repugnant unto the light of right reason for this is truly properly and univocally the law of God the law of nature written in the hearts of all men and as for the repugnancy of the first motions of concupiscence unto right reason it cannot be denyed if we instance in those which are in the sensitive powers of man against the dominion of his mind and so much may be gathered from what Aquinas acknowledgeth concerning concupiscence it selfe part 3. quaest 15. art 2. Ad rationem fomitis inquit pertinet inclinatio sensualis appetitus in id 〈◊〉 est contra rationem and againe afterwards ad 1 m ratio somitis consistit in resistentiâ sensualis appetitus ad rationem and ad 2 m fomes peccati importat concupiscentiam delectabilium praeter ordinem rationis This reason is urged by Augustine to prove concupiscence to be not only a punishment and cause of sinne but also sinne it selfe the concupiscence of the flesh against which the good spirit striveth is a sin saith he quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis by reason ther 's in it disobedience against the dominion of the mind A second argument to prove that concupiscence is a sinne and not a sinlesse infirmity is taken from the subject of it It is only found in sinfull men such as are descended from Adam in an ordinary way of naturall generation Hence now I thus reason All sinlesse infirmities so they were generall unto our nature and not personall were found in the humanity of Christ for he was made like unto us in all things sinne alone accepted But concupiscence was not in the humanity of Christ as is confessed by the generality of Papists And therefore 't is not a sinlesse and naturall but a morall and sinfull infirmity Unto the Major the Papists give an answer I confesse which I have upon another occasion replyed unto in my treatise of the incarnation pag. 103. 104. The Minor Dr. Taylor seemes to deny in his further explication of originall sinne pag. 494. his words I shall transcribe and then give what reason I have for my suspicion If concupiscence which is in every man's nature be a sinne it is certaine Christ had no concupiscence or naturall desires for he had no sinne But if he had no concupiscence or naturall desires how he should be a man or how capable of law or how he should serve God with choice where there could be no potentia ad oppositum I thinke will be very hrd to 〈◊〉 understood Christ felt all our infirmities yet without sinne All our infirmities are the effects of the sinne of Adam and part of that which we call originall sinne therefore all these our infirmities which Christ felt as in him they were for ever without sinne so long as they are only naturall and unconsented to must be in us without sinne for whatsoever is naturally in us is naturally in him but a man is not a man without naturall desires therefore these were in him in him without sinne and therefore so in us without sinne I meane properly really and formally Here I expect to be cold that the Dr hath explicated concupiscence by naturall desires But now I demand whether by naturall desires he understand the desires of the sensitive appetite after meat drinke and and the like if he doth then he speakes nothing to the purpose but fights with his own shadow for those whom he opposeth 〈◊〉 and Calvinists hold such desires to be lawfull and indifferent and never affirme that they were in themselves sinne unlesse vitiated by circumstances but to prevent his shifting and to sift out his meaning I shall propound unto him this following Dilemma either he speakes of concupiscence in that sense it is understood by Protestants and Papists in this controversy or not If not then he playeth the egregious 〈◊〉 and runnes away 〈◊〉 the question and whither such a trifler be meet to reforme the Divinity of Christendome
inquit naturae ex spiritu rationali corpore naturali facta sit modo perfecto subordinationem infert unius propensionis ad alteram quae pugnam omnem excludit The union betwixt the body and the soule of man was perfect and therefore inferred a subordination of the propensions and operations of the body unto the soule and subordinatorum nulla est pugna subordination excludes all opposition this argument strikes chiefly against such as make the body to be the proper subject of the sensitive powers But there be some as you may see 〈◊〉 Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 5. tit 6. art 1. who in man make all sensitive powers to be seated in the soule and unto them too this argument may be applied the conjunction betwixt the sensitive and rationall faculties in the same soule supposing them to be both there which now it is not pertinent to dispute was a most perfect and orderly conjunction made by God the author of all good order who abhorreth all ataxy and confusion and order still requireth a subjection of those things or persons that are inferiour unto those which are their superiours the sensitive faculties therefore being the more ignoble were by God who made man subjected unto the rationall and they never had rebelled if man by his fall had not perturbed this order indeed we may now apply unto the powers of lapsed man that of Solomon Eccles. 10. 7. I have 〈◊〉 servants upon horses and Princes walking as servants upon the earth those powers which by the law of creation were servants made to serve and obey have the throne and supremacy in the soule and those unto which God gave the regency are dethroned and become servile but it was impossible for any such disorder or confusion to be in the soule of man by creation there could not then but bee a most perfect sweet and blessed harmony betwixt all man's parts and powers without any the least clashing or disagreement for othewise how could man be made as Solomon saith he was straite or upright Eccles. 7. 29. A second reason I have borrowed of Tilenus syntag pag. 1. cap. 33. s. 40. the specificall forme of man his reasonable soule doth so limit determine and restraine his generall formes vegetative and sensitive as that it makes their operations not only agreeable but proper unto man it maketh the operations of the vegetative soule which of themselves are common unto men with plants and beasts so proper unto man as that they are in man after a sort only humane and therefore man groweth and encreaseth not as a tree or beast but after a humane way even so also it maketh the operations of the sensitive soule which are common unto men with beasts proper and peculiar unto man so that whilst man's nature was uncorrupted he naturally coveted sensuall and corporeall things not after a bruitish but humane manner that is conformably unto right reason his nature then as 't was created by God for so you must still understand me was without any repugnancy between his sensuall and rationall appetites As for the other objections of Bellarmine I shall wholy passe them over because some of them come not nigh the question as stated by me others of them are triviall and receive an easy solution and unto all of them the Reader may find sufficient answers in Ames Rivet Gerard Maccovius and other writers upon popish controversies It may now be expected that I should make some application of this point and in particular that I should shew how far we are to be humbled for Originall sin whose formale is the privation or want of originall Righteousnesse and I had prepared a great deale of matter upon this subject but shall now wholy lay it aside because I am happily prevented by the learned and elaborate work of Mr. Anthony Burgesse concerning originall sinne whither I shall referre the Reader and all that I shall doe more shall be to annexe a briefe exposition and application of some few scriptures that conduce to this purpose Jam. 1. 14 15. But every man is tempted when he is drawne away of his own lust and enticed Then when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sinne and sinne when it is finished bringeth 〈◊〉 death IN the foregoing verse the Apostle James denyeth God to be the authour of temptation unto sinne in verse the 15. he opposeth unto this deniall an affirmation that man himselfe is the cause thereof and this Antithesis is denoted by the particle but. There is no doubt can be made but that lust is here taken in an ill sense but even so it hath a twofold acception it signifieth either the habit or the act Habituall lust againe is twofold either originall or acquired and contracted 1. Lust is not here taken for the act of lust because actions are here ascribed unto it to draw entice conceive bring forth it draweth 〈◊〉 to sinne eonceiveth bringeth forth sinne and actionis non est actio actions are better and more fitly ascribed to an habit than to an act 2. Lust is not here 〈◊〉 for contracted and acquired habituall lust because the lust here spoken of is the cause of all temptations into sinne whatsoever Every man whensoever he is tempted into sin he is drawne away of his own lust and enticed and men may be tempted sometimes into some sins not by any contracted and acquired habits of lust as is plaine in the temptation of Noah into drunkennesse of Lot into both drunkennesse and incest 〈◊〉 Peter into a cowardly deniall of his Master and Saviour The lust then which is the Theme that the Apostle James here treates of is that which is called originall sinne Aquinas 1 a. 2ae q. 82. a. 3. Well observeth that there be two things considerable in originall sin the formale and the materiale of it 1. The formale and that is nothing else but the privation and want of originall righteousnesse 2. The materiale is an inordinate conversion or inclination of man's faculties especially of his two appetites rationall and sensuall unto the creature and so it is called lust or concupiscence which saith Cornelius Jansenius in his Augustinus Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 7. is nihil aliud quà m pondus habituale quo animus inclinatur ad sruendum creaturis 〈◊〉 ut Augustinus loquitur rebus 〈◊〉 it is as it were an habituall weight whereby the soule is inclined and carried downewards unto the fruition of the creatures as it 's supreame end Concerning this originall lust we have here remarkeable 1. The propriety of it's inherence his own lust 2. The force of it's influence it tempteth every man unto 〈◊〉 c. 1. The propriety of it's inherence by his own lust 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indeed originall lust is one and the same specifically for sort or kind in all men unto which some apply that of Solomon Prov. 27. 19. As in water face answereth to face so the heart of man to man but yet every
were recoverable Prov. 9. 7 8. If sin be here taken as these worthies determine only for the whole course of sin then it is said to be finished not only 〈◊〉 in it selfe but also extrinsecally by extrinsecall denomination from God's decree of permitting it and 't is when men are come unto that fullnesse of sin that extent number and measure of sin which God hath purposed to suffer them to runne into when men arrive unto the utmost bounds and limits that God by his decree hath prefixed unto their sins then sin being thus finished bringeth forth death both temporall and eternall The words thus analyzed and expounded we shall in the next place cleare them from two false inferences of the Papists first that concupiscence is not sinne Secondly that there are veniall sinnes we have here set 〈◊〉 saith Bellarmine Tom. 4. de amiss grat statu pecc lib. 1. cap. 9. lib. 5. cap. 7. foure things lust and three of it's 〈◊〉 one involuntary two other voluntary one involuntary without all consent of the mind and that is 〈◊〉 lust draweth and 〈◊〉 unto sinne the two other are voluntary one imperfectly and the other perfectly one imperfectly voluntary and that is such a delectation wherein there is but an imperfect consent lust when it conceiveth it bringeth forth sinne the other perfectly voluntary when there is a full and perfect consent sinne when 't is finished bringeth sorth death These things thus presupposed first he concludes that 〈◊〉 is not sinne because the Apostle doth not call it sin but only affirmeth that 't is the cause of sinne lust 〈◊〉 it conceiveth it bringeth forth sinne But this argument is very weake for First though it be not expresly here called sinne yet 't is expresly called sinne by the Apostle Paul and that fourteen times as Commentators generally reckon in three chapters of his Epistle to the Romans viz chap. 6. 7. and 8. Secondly though it be not here called sinne expresly yet 't is imply'dly for 't is made the cause of sinne and such as the fruit is such is the tree Adde unto this thirdly that if the place prove concupisence not to be sinne it proves it not to be so in those that are unbaptized unjustified and unregenerate as well as in the baptized justified and regenerate for it speakes universally of all men every man when he is tempted c and therefore 't is fallaciously done to beare his Readers in hand as if he limitted his conclusion only to those that are baptized justified and regenerate In a second place he endeavoureth from the words to prove that there are veniall sinnes there are saith he two birthes of lust one imperfect lust when it conceiveth bringeth forth sinne but 't is a veniall sinne for 't is distinguished from the consummate birth of lust sinne finished unto which it is appropriated to bring forth death to be mortall to deserve hell and damnation the argument may thus be reduced into forme every mortall sinne bringeth forth death deserveth hell and damnation but the sinne that lust ingendreth or bringeth forth when it hath conceived doth not bring forth death doth not deserve hell and damnation therefore 't is not a mortall but a veniall sinne The minor is confirmed because 't is appropriated to sinne finished to bring forth death and sinne brought forth is distinguished from sin-finished The Answer shall be unto the Minor and it's confirmation and it standeth in two particulars First to bring forth death in regard of issue or event is appropriate unto sinne consumate or finished but to bring forth death in point of merit agreeth unto the least sinne for every sinne merits the curse of the law Galat. 3. 10. Mat. 5. 19. Secondly the sinne which lust when it hath conceived bringeth forth and sinne finished are not distinguished as diverse sorts and kinds of sinnes but only in regard of severall considerations the very same sins that lust bringeth forth may be said to be finished when they are unmortified unsubdued lust bringeth them forth as they are externally committed or accomplished and they are 〈◊〉 to be finished when they are 〈◊〉 and unsubdued and so raigne in the soule without repentance The words afford many observations But I shall pitch upon one for which I made choice of them and 't is that every man's originall lust or concupiscence is the principall cause of temptation unto sin and hereupon 't is called originall sinne because actuall sinnes are unto it their rise and orignall est peccatum actuosum seu agens licet non sit actuale saith Tuke pag 50 indeed Satan and the world tempt unto sinne but James here makes no mention of them and what better reason can be assigned for this omission than this that they have not so great a stroke upon our temptations as our own lust This point being thus deduced from the Text I shall briefly First Explaine Secondly Confirme Thirdly Apply it First for explication we must distinguish of an 〈◊〉 and a mediate cause of temptation secondly of a universall and particular cause of temptation First of an immediate and mediate cause of temptation originall lust is not alwayes the immediate cause of prevailing temptations unto sinne for we are many times tempted immediately by our contracted and acquired lusts but yet of such temptations our native concupiscence is the mediate and remote cause Secondly we must distinguish of a universall and particular case of temptation originall concupisence is an universall not a particular cause of our temptation unto sinne now the influence or causality of universall second causes as if the heavens and starres is determined much diversified by diverse particulars in the subjects upon whom it is and thus the influence of originall lust upon mens temptations unto sinne is much differenced according to the variety that is in the complexions dispositions conditions and relations c of men it tempt's a chollericke man unto wrath and hatred a man of a sanguine constitution unto good fellowship riot and luxury a phlegmaticke man unto idlenesse a melancholy man unto envy unto darke mischeivous plots a rich man unto pride and covetousnesse a poore man unto impatience discontent and murmuring subjects unto disobedience sedition and rebellion Princes unto Tyranny and oppression but this influence of concupiscence varieth not only in severall men but in the same men as their 〈◊〉 varieth not only in severall men but in the same men as their conditions and relations alter when 〈◊〉 came to the scepter of Syria it quickly tempted him unto that belluine rage towards the people of Israell which when he was a servant of Benhadads he thought he had abhorred his 〈◊〉 heart misinformed him that he was scarcely capable of so great a guilt 2 King 8. 12 13 it made Caius Caesar Caligula when he was a subject to be a base and servile flatterer of Tiberius and when he himselfe came to the empire it rendred him intollerable for all kind
Thirdly wee may from the causality and influence of lust infer it's obliquity aganist Papists Socinians and Dr. Taylor that 't is not only a naturall but a morall disease of the soule not only vitium but peccatum that which as a quality or habit tempts drawes and entices unto sinne conceiveth and bringeth forth sin must needs be sinne but lust doth all this and therefore 't is sinne to wit properly and formally The Minor is affirmed in terminis by the Apostle in the text and for confirmation of the Major I shall lay openly three things First the testimony of our Saviour Matth. 7. vers 17. 18 a corrupt tree bringeth forth evill fruit a good tree cannot bring sorth evill fruit but the fruit of lust is morally evill it bringeth forth sinne therefore 't is a tree morally corrupt A second thing is that knowne Maxime in Logick Nihil dat quod non habet vel formaliter vel eminenter that which is the principall cause of the obliquity and deformity of sinne must needs have in it selfe that deformity or obliquity 〈◊〉 formally or 〈◊〉 it must either have the same deformity or obliquity or else some deformity or obliquity which is more eminent than that but no deformity or obliquity can transcend that of sinne and concupiscence is the principall cause of sinne whether efficient or deficient it comes all to one therefore concupiscence containeth the obliquity or deformity of sinne formally and consequently is formally a 〈◊〉 A Third particular which I shall alleadge for confirmation of the Major is the manner of lusts causality of and influence upon sinne it tempts drawes and enticeth unto sinne not outwardly as an object but inwardly as a quality or habit it incâ—lineth unto sinne as habits dispose unto their acts now habits impart both their name and nature unto their most accomplished and compleat acts concupiscence therfore communicates unto it's most consummate acts their nature and name and therefore hath as they both the name and nature of sinne Ames thus urgeth this argument against Bellarmine Concupiscentia dicitur parere peccatum eo modo quo interna animi rectitudo quae est justitia parit justitiam id est completum actum de quo nomen natura totius motus principii ejus usitate proprie maxime praedicatur Bell. enerv tom 4. pag. 36. From this there may be refuted three other points of popery First the absolute perfection of the good workes of the regenerate Secondly their justification by them And thirdly their possibility of fulfilling the law First the absolute perfection of the good workes of the regenerate for concupiscence worketh in all the actions of man and therefore seeing 't is a sinne it distilleth sinfullnesse into the best of them and rendreth them peccaminosa though not peccata sinfull though not sinnes the flesh lusteth against the spirit so that yee cannot doe the things that yee would Gal. 5. 17 the good things that yee would so exactly or perfectly as yee desire Secondly we may hence conclude against justification by goood workes at least in a meritorious way for it so distaineth them as that it disableth them to satisfy for the least sin against God to merit the least good from God and this may discover the necessity of a Christ for our justification who was God as well as man and in his man-hood had such an all-fullnesse of grace as was utterly exclusive of and inconsistent with the least degrree of concupiscence lust therefore did not could not mingle with any of his actions and sufferings to impede the all-fullnesse of their satisfaction and merit Thirdly we may hence inferre the impossibility of fullfilling the law in a legall way for though we may keep it evangellically in such a measure as God for Christs sake will accept yet concupiscence doth so immixe it selfe with all our actions the very best of them as that they must needs prove gradually defective and come far short of that exactnesse and perfection which the law requireth and so consequently every man is a sinner a transgressour of the law But to passe from speculative unto practicall uses The next use is of reprehension of all such as excuse or extenuate their sins by discharging them upon the importunity and violence of outward temptations the text in hand teacheth us that the principall cause into which we are to resolve all the prevailing temptations unto sin is our own lust so that God may say to those that perish in their sinnes as the Prophet unto Israel Hosea 13. 9 thou hast destroyed thy selfe it is thy owne concupiscence hath undone thee hath damn'd thee oh Beloved 't is our own lust that hath conceived and brought forth all our sinnes 't is this internall tempter in our hearts that hath betrayed us unto all forreigne and externall suggestions unto sinne by opening the gate of our consent unto them and therefore it would be injustice to lay our sins at any others doores externall tempters are never totall but only partiall causes of sinne they doe never more than cooperate with that sinfull lust within us the goodly Babylonish garment the two hundred shekels of silver and the wedge of gold of fifty shekels had never enticed Achan unto sacriledge if he had not been also tempted by his own lust the lust of the eyes coveteousnesse David had never by the beauty of Bathsheba been allured unto adultery with her but that he was tempted by his own lust the lust of the flesh though Satan provoked him to number Israel 1 Chron. 21. 1 yet he could never have drawne him thereunto but that he was tempted by his own lust the pride of life ambition and haughtinesse and hence was it that he did not throw the blame upon Satan but charged himselfe alone 2 Sam. 24. 10. Davids heart smote him after that he had numbred the people and David said unto the Lord I have sinned greatly in that I have done when Scipio's invasion of Africa drew Hannibal out of Italy it is said that Hannibal brake out into this expression it is not Scipio but mine own country men Hanno and his faction in the Senate of Carthage that hath thwarted and contradicted all my designes and hindred my recruits and supplies 't is he only that hath driven mee out of Italy So every regenerate man may say when he is drawn or driven from his communion and fellowship with the Allmighty it is not so much Satan the world evill company the badnesle of times or places in which I live outward provocations and allurements the infelicity of my condition relations and the like it is not so much these the traitour in my heart the flesh lusting against my better part the spirit hath tempted and seduced me hath drawne me from my God and Saviour and hath enticed me unto sinne Lastly diverse exhortations may be infer'd from the causality and influence of our concupiscence we may hence be exhorted unto First 〈◊〉
themselves are liable Dr. Taylor But I shall for this once consider the particulars 1. You charge it with 〈◊〉 sease but with your 〈◊〉 you prove it most pitisully Your reason is that to say 〈◊〉 is predicated of sin in either of the two ways dicendi per se is such 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 non-sense that you think it not worthy of any serious 〈◊〉 So that this is your Argument To say that sin is Essential is prodigious and pitiful non-sense therefore it is prodigious and pitiful non-sense Surely a good 〈◊〉 or thus that which is such non-sense that you think not worthy of refutation is certainly non-sense But to say that sin is Essential is such non-sense that you think not worthy of refutation therefore it is non-sense I do not say your Argument is non-sense but I am sure it is no Argument unless a bold 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 proof in your Logick But to the 〈◊〉 That sin is Essential is indeed 〈◊〉 to say but to say so is not non-sense And whereas you will suppose me to say so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uncharitable and something unreasonable in it for I was to prove That inclination to sin was not a sin of our nature as was pretended because what was natural is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essential as 〈◊〉 to a man which because to be 〈◊〉 to sin is not 〈◊〉 it is not a sin viz of nature Jeanes First Here is a gross and 〈◊〉 falsification of my 〈◊〉 and that without any advantage to your cause Your reason is say you That to say Essential is predicated of sin in either of the two ways 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 se is such pitiful and prodigious nonsense that 〈◊〉 think it not worthy of any serious refutation Whether these words be justifiable or no I need not inquire for there are no such words in my Paper neither can you with all your wit and learning infer any such matter therefrom Secondly To make 〈◊〉 for your followers you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 my Argument and first clap it into a single Enthymeme and then into one 〈◊〉 both of your own 〈◊〉 in both which you leave out two mediums that are in my Argument which reduced unto form will make up two 〈◊〉 To convince you of 〈◊〉 unfair injurious and 〈◊〉 ingenuous dealing I shall insert my words at large To say as the Doctor doth by consequence that sin is essential to the nature of man is an assertion guilty of nonsense a thing may be said to be essential to another à priori and then it is predicated of it in primo modo dicendi per se 〈◊〉 else à 〈◊〉 and then it is predicated of it in secundo modo dicendi per se. And to say that sin is either of these ways essential to 〈◊〉 nature of man is 〈◊〉 pitisul and prodigious non-sense as that I cannot think 〈◊〉 worthy of 〈◊〉 serious resutation The learned Reader will soon perceive how 〈◊〉 alliance your Enthymeme and Syllog 〈◊〉 have with my Argument and to him I appeal to judge of 〈◊〉 unworthy and unscholarly injury that you have herein done me but yet for the 〈◊〉 stopping of your mouth I shall Analyze this my Argument My conclusion 〈◊〉 that to say as you do by consequence that sin is essential unto the nature of man is an assertion guilty of nonsense this I prove from a distribution of essential whatsoever is essential is such either à priori or à 〈◊〉 But to say that sinne is essential either à priori or à posteriori is non-sense Therefore to say that sin is essential to man is nonsense 〈◊〉 Syllogism is grounded upon a known and received Maxime Negatis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subjectis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de aliquo subjecto 〈◊〉 ipsum 〈◊〉 universale 〈◊〉 cunctis membris 〈◊〉 negatur ipsum divisum The major I presumed none would deny and as for the minor that I proved from a description of both ways of being essential That which is essential to a thing à priori is predicated of it in primo modo dicendi per se that which is essential to a thing à posteriori is predicated of it in secundo modo dicendi per se. Now to say that sin is predicated of man in either primo or 〈◊〉 modo dicendi 〈◊〉 se is nonsense Therefore to say that sin is essential to man either à priori or à posteriori is nonsense The major I thought undenyable and as for the minor here indeed I stopped too in the proof thereof as thinking all further proof of it needless because I took it and still do take it to be propositio per se nota which needs no proof but a bare explication of its terms propositio per se nota dicitur quae non est nota per 〈◊〉 as Lychetus quae suis tantum terminis cognoscibilis as Collegium 〈◊〉 gather out of Aristotle quae tales terminos habet 〈◊〉 ii 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notitiam totius propositionis fine addito omnis propositio 〈◊〉 est per se 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 aliquod medium sed solum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contentus est so Scheibl r. Now for the terms of the minor 〈◊〉 I presumed that all explication of them was needless unto a Scholar of so great a repute as Dr. Taylor And therefore without more adoe I inferred that to say that sin is 〈◊〉 of these ways essential either à priori or à posteriori is such 〈◊〉 and prodigious nonsense as that I could not think it worthy of any serious refutation And now Sir I shall entreat you to review my Argument being thus truly Analyzed and I shall appeal unto 〈◊〉 conscience when you are next upon your knees before God whether you have not deeply wronged me to represent my Argument thus defectively that I say not 〈◊〉 on purpose I am afraid to 〈◊〉 it and me ridiculous Suppose any 〈◊〉 should be so absurd as to say That a Stone is animal and I to refute 〈◊〉 should thus argue Omne animal est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who is endued with reason as well as sense or Brutum which is endued with sense but not with reason but to say that a stone is either homo or brutum is such 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as that I cannot think it 〈◊〉 of any serious refutation Now he that shall say 〈◊〉 is no Argument but onely a bold affirmative will goe a degree beyond 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 plain that here are couched and implyed two 〈◊〉 First a distribution of animal in hominem brutum Next a description of each member of the 〈◊〉 and my Argument is exactly paralell'd unto 〈◊〉 But Sir though I thought that before you I might have spared my labor to prove that 〈◊〉 nonsense to say that sin is essential unto man either à priori or à posteriori that it s predicated of man either in primo or secundo modo dicendi per se yet because you 〈◊〉 to blame mine omission of such proof I shall now give you herein I hope