simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
with greater dexteritie facilitie and alacritie in acting than virtuose Principes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Alacrite is defined Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A manifestation of practic election and who manifest more free practic election than such as act virtuosely Frequence of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facilitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Customes are defined by Galen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superadded Natures and Arist Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome is akin to Nature whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome makes every thing sweet Now virtuose exercices frequently repeted breed a divine spiritual custome which is attended with divine suavitie and delight The frequent repetition of the same exercice makes it more facile dexterous and sweet Experience teacheth us that whatever is long customary turnes into our natures even diseases and poisons How much more then spiritually natural and sweet are divine customes and habits attending virtuose acts Thence Heb. 5.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heb. 5.14 Virtuose customes and habits make the exercices of spiritual senses most familiar pleasant and sweet and therefore most free for the freedome of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them than virtuose exercices O! what sweet inspirations what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings Frequence of acts makes bitter things sweet and is not the bitter crosse sweetened by virtuose exercices are not the most difficult services made facile hereby Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure and therefore of libertie in it And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it For al joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation and the more raised and spiritual the operation is the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end for the nearer things come to their first Principes the more joyful and free they are and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than virtuose Acts Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious real solid pure spiritual strong self-sufficient and permanent pleasures and delights as Psal 119.14 16 20 35 3. The Libertie of moral Acts consistes much in their Vitalitie Virtuose Exercices most lively The more excellent and noble the life is the more free the acts are and the more virtuose the acts are the more of the divine life they carry in them Thus Plato Charmid pag. 171. Sin being banisht from the Soul and Rectitude presiding in every act it 's necessary that those who are thus disposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do act wel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that those who act wel do live happily The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor discretely to lead our lives and act that so we may live blessedly Whereby he intimates that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To live wel is to act wel The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests it self most in that operation which is most proper to it and unto which it is most naturally inclined and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state What is life but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the bodie And what more promotes this Actuositie than exercice Is not also the life and Actuositie of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercices Where there is natural life there wil be some pulse and motion of the Spirits So where there is a moral life of Virtue there wil be exercice Quantò perfectiùs quis à se movetur tantò perfectior est modus vivendi Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by it self by so much the more perfect it mode of living is and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves Plato tels us Phaedr pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By which he shews That it is proper to life to move it self by it self And when doth the Soul most freely move it self by it self but when it acts virtuosely And as al life consistes in action even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions A virtuose Soul as it has Principes of life above Nature so also actings for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is by so much the more excellent is the operation The life and motion of virtuose hearts is upward like that of fire which is of al the most noble active and free life Thence in facred Philosophie Life is frequently put for a noble comfortable free blessed condition of life Psal 34.12 13. consisting in virtuose exercices So Psal 34.12 What man is he that desireth life i. e. a blessed free sweet life And how may such a life be acquired That he tels you vers 13 14. Depart from evil and do good c. The like Psal 22.26 69.33 Psal 119.77 Eccles 6.8 1 Pet. 3.10 And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred Phraseologie namely because there is no true life but what is virtuose blessed and free So that as there is no moral libertie without a divine life so there is no divine life without virtuose exercices Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts by so much the more divine and free its life is 4. Virtuose Exercices most ample The moral Libertie of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude And are not virtuose Acts of al most ample and great Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law importes not only subjection but also enlargement and libertie Thence Psal 119.96 the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample and why because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Wil which is most ample Whence the Soul by actual adherence to the divine Law rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Libertie Thus Psal 119.165 Great peace have they who love thy law Or Psal 119.165 ample peace with libertie as to walking Thence it follows and nothing shal offend them Or they shal have no stumbling block ie They shal walke in the Kings high-way according to the royal Law of Libertie with al manner of libertie and boldnesse Liber ab infinito ad infinitum super infnitum
not that these Sins appear in al but because they may be yea are in al although latent A man may be nocent although he do no hurt Al Sins are perfect i. e. in corrupt nature before they break forth into effect These and such like great confessions touching the Vitiositie of human Nature made Jansenius break forth into a rapture of admiration that Socrates Plato and other poor Heathens should leave us truer and better Philosophemes hereof than the Pelagians and later Schole-men Yet it cannot be denied but that many of the ancient and moderne Schole-men have given us great notices of this natural Vitiositie specially such as were Sectators of Augustine as Aquinas Ariminensis Bradwardine Alvarez c. We may reduce the explication of the whole to the following Propositions 1 Adams personal actual Sin becomes the natural original Sin of al his Posteritie This the Gentile Philosophers were ignorant of they had some notices of the corruption of nature but were ignorant of the originarie cause and manner of its traduction as Augustine hath wel observed Iste Tullius rem vidit causam nescivit August Peccatum introivit non per modum imitationis sed per modum originis This Traduction of original Sin from Adam to his posteritie is wel demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gentiles lib. 4. cap. 50. where he demonstrates from Rom. 5.12 19. against the Pelagians That this original Sin infects al Mankind not only in a way of imitation which the Pelagians grant but by propagation and traduction And Cap. 52. he farther explicates how Adams personal actual Sin by imputation becomes our original and natural sin This original Sin is termed natural because congenite with proper to and inseparable from corrupt nature as to any power of its own It consistes formally in the privation of original Righteoùsnesse which privation is both our punishment and sin as original Righteousnesse upon the imputation of Adams Sin is by divine Justice denied to us so this privation is our punishment but as it ought to be in us and is wanting by reason of Adam's Sin become ours so it is our sin 2 The Vitiositie of Nature or original Sin is said to be voluntary as it inheres in the Wil and corrupts the same Aristotle tels us Acts are voluntary because they passe from the Wil but habits because they are received into the Wil and impressed thereon Such is original Sin as to its Vitiositie which is as an habitual Pondus impacted on the Wil and inclining it to al manner of vitiose acts Others make original Sin to be voluntary with respect to the commun representative Wil of our first Parent whose Wil as he was a commun Head politically included ours So Davenant and the Schole-men 3 The Vitiositie of corrupt Nature is seminal radical and universal both extensively and intensively As every man naturally considered is a Microcosme or little abridgement of the greater World so morally considered he is a Macrocosme or a great World of corruption Yea al that is of contagion in the greater World comes from the superfluitie of Vitiositie shut up in the heart of man If corrupt human Nature were not on the earth there would be nothing in the World but what was good Yea farther there is more of Vitiositie in one corrupt Nature than a world of Sinners can vent Every man hath sin enough in his own nature to defile the whole Creation And this corruption of nature is so deep that al the fire in the World yea of Hel wil not fetch it out It is universal both as to extension of parts and degrees The man is infected with it from top to toe it poisons his eye ear tongue hand and every part it dogs him from place to place This Plague of corrupt Nature is greater in some than in others and usually greatest in those of greatest condition Al sins in the heart do not act alike at al times yet al are there in the seed and root of corrupt nature Many lusts worke indirectly as Principes that lie low men act in the power of them and yet observe them not 4 This universal Vitiositie of corrupt Nature is the soverain reigning Sin which breeds foments and influenceth al other Sins Adams person first corrupted our Nature and human Nature being corrupted corrupts our persons and our persons being corrupted corrupt al our actions and thereby encrease the corruption of our Natures It is a great Question in practic Theologie What is a mans reigning Sin But if we consider reigning sin simply and absolutely it is no other than corrupt nature It 's true there are in particular persons according to their particular inclinations tentations and circumstances particular sins that bear sway and rule but these are but as Viceroys and Vicegerents under the vitiositie of corrupt nature which is the supreme Soverain and Lord as a cruel beste nourished in our bowels ever ready to devour us The main part of our enmitie against God and his enmitie against us lies in the vitiositie of our natures and its contrarietie to God Rom. 8.6 § 3. The first product of Original Sin Practic Error the cause of al Sin and that which has a maligne efficacious influence on al sin is practic Error or Ignorance How great universal and venimous the Ignorance of al Mankind by nature is Plato frequently inculcates He gives us a lively description hereof in his Repub. 7. pag. 514. Suppose saith he a subterraneous Dungeon in which men should be from their infance bound neck and heels together so that they can see nothing but some glimmerings of light or rather shadows just before them such is the barbaric ignorance of Mankind by Nature It 's true many attain to great speculation and contemplation of things divine even by natures light and heat assisted by commun illuminations yet how defective are they as to al practic knowlege which is the worst ignorance Thus Plato Leg. 3. pag. 689. What is the worst ignorance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lo when a man loves not but hates what he knows and estimes to be honest and good but on the contrary loves and embraceth what he knows to be evil and injust Wherein he instructes us that speculative knowledge conjoined with practic error renders our ignorance most inexcusable and dangerous And that which yet addes greater malignitie to our ignorance is when men fondly conceit they sufficiently understand what indeed they are really ignorant of such proud conceits are the worst self-deceits and errors al the use such make of their knowlege is to concele their ignorance from themselves and others their very light addes to their darknesse And their terrible darknesse is by so much the more deplorable in that they take it for light which they follow with pleasure as children do the Ignis Fatuus which leads them to Precipices Thus Plato Leg. 5. pag. 732. From the same sin this a so happens to men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
also Cap. 18. pag. 223. God saith he knows things future by that whereby they are future namely by his Divine Wil. And he urgeth for this that Principe of Aristotle 1. Post 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cause But now God knows al futures certainly therefore by their most true cause even that which virtually contains al other causes and causations and this is no other than his own wil. That God knows althings future in the determination of his own Wil was the commun Hypothesis of the ancient Scholastic Theologues as of Augustin before them So Robert Grosseteste in his M. SS De Libero Arbitrio Thus Scotus assures us That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Wil which determination is not only necessary to cooperate with the free Creature but also to determine the Wil of the Creature to act freely This Hypothesis is also excellently well explicated and demonstrated by Alvarez de Anxil Grat. l. 2. Disp 7. p. 106. God saith he in the absolute efficacious Decree of his own Wil predetermining in particular al future Contingents as also free acts knows certainly and infallibly those to be future as to al circumstances as wel as to their substance Therefore from this Decree there may be assigned a sufficient Reason of the certitude of Divine Science as to al futurs which are not morally evil And he thus proves his Hypothesis A determinate cause which is so efficacious as that it cannot be hindred by any other cause must needs infallibly produce its effect but such is the Divine Decree Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows sin God certainly and infallibly knows al future sins in that Decree whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Wil to the entitie of the act of sin so far as the act is ens and to permit the moral evil of sin as sin c. as before 3. The Jesuites superadde to the two former Sciences of simple Intelligence and Vision Scientia media Scientia Media a middle Science whereby God is supposed to foresee such or such events to be future on condition that such or such causes he so or so constituted This Middle Science 1. supposeth that some events are certainly future independently as to the Wil of God which is altogether impossibly for a thing merely possible cannot pass from its state of possibilitie to a state of Futurition without some cause of that transmutation now there can be no cause of futurition but the Divine Wil as we shall prove hereafter Nothing can be future either absolutely or conditionately but what the Divine Will has decreed shal be future therefore the object of this Middle Science cannot be things future but only possible Doth not this Middle Science by feigning that future which is only possible overthrow the very foundation of the Divine Science as to things future Is it not impossible that the prescience of a thing future should precede the decree of its futurition So Avarez de Auxil l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoscible as future but what gives futurition thereto And what gives futurition to any thing but the decree and determination of the Divine Wil 2 It supposeth Gods Science to depend upon its object which also is impossible because then it should be variable and mutable as the object is Yea to speak properly the object of this Middle Science is not at al cognoscible or knowable For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with some degree of necessitie at least as to essence or existence what is not either necessarily existent or future cannot be known now the object of this Middle Science is not either existent or future therefore not cognoscible Again God takes not the reason or idea of his cognition from the things themselves or any Hypotheses they fal under which are al variable but from the invariable determination of his own Wil as before It 's true our Intuition and Cognition is formed by a passive reception of species from its object Nostra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis non sic intuitio divina and therefore it is murable and variable according to the variations of the object but can we imagine that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intuition and Cognition Should the principe and reason of the Divine Cognition procede from and depend on its finite object must not God also be finite passive and dependent Is not the Divine Idea before its Ideate yea eternal How then can it depend thereon 3 This Middle Science supposeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain For such as the object is such is the Science thereof a contingent object cannot give a necessary certain Science al Logic scientific necessitie is founded in physic necessitie That which may otherwise be cannot be necessarily known as Gods knowlege would be false if he knew those things to be future which shal never be so would it be incertain if the object be not certainly future if the object be certainly future it must have a certain cause of its futurition which can be no other than the Wil of God But now according to this hypothetic Middle Science God cannot divine which way mans Free-wil wil incline it self before it hath inclined to this or that object and doth not this render the knowlege of God only conjectural yea no knowlege at al For how can a thing be certainly known to be future without some cause determining it to be such That Gods knows althings future though never so contingent in themselves most certainly in the determination of his own Wil see Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. also Grosseteste de Libero Arbitrio Wherefore if God has a certain prescience of future contingents as without al peradventure he has we must search for the causes of this Divine Prescience not in the extrinsec objects which can never give it but in God himself and in the determination of his own Wil in regard of which al future contingents are necessary not absolutely but hypothetically on supposition of the said determination 4 This Middle Science enervates and destroyeth the Grace of God 1 It destroyes the Grace of Election in that it supposeth that Peter could from his own free-wil consent to the Cal of God provided he were put under such circumstances and invested with such commun aides even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glorie which they make to follow the prevision of his Faith by this Middle Science And thus the whole of Election dependes on the improvement of Free-wil and the prevision thereof by this Middle Science 2 It enervates and dispirits the whole of Christs Redemtion in that it makes al the efficace of Christs Death dependent on the prevision of mans assent and consent to him as Lord. It supposeth that Christ died for no man absolutely but only on
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
8. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s 5. L. 3. c. 4. BREVIARIE OF CONTENTS The COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie Preface THE first Reformers of Philosophie Wiclef Wesselus Savonarola Picus Mirandula Lud. Vives Melanchton Stapulensis and Ramus 1. The Right Vse and Abuse of Platonic Philosophie 4. The Designe of this Discourse to render Philosophie subservient to Christian Theologie 6. A Proemial Scheme of Reformed Philosophie Philosophie Considered 1. Generally 1 in its Historie 2 In its generic Nature Cognition Which includes nine Intellectile Habits 3 In its Ends Adjuncts Differences Right Vse Abuse Parts and Characters c. 1. 2. Particularly 1. As Notional or Logic. Wherein consider 1 Its End the Refinement of the Intellect 3. 2 Its Parts touching 1 Simple Ideas or Notions both Objective and Subjective and these both first and second 4 5. 2 Propositions and Judgements 6. 3 Syllogisme and Discourse its Mater and Forme Figures and Modes 8 9. 4 Method which regardes the former three Parts 12. 2. Real Philosophie 13. 1 Natural Physiclogic and Mathematic Ib. 2 Moral Ethic or Private Oeconomic and Politic. Ib. 3 Metaphysic or Prime 14. BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophie CHAP I. Of Prudence the last End and chiefest Good Use Fruition and Delectation MOral Philosophie its Genus Prudence 2 Prudence its Nature and Object Ib Its Offices and Parts 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3. 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 4. The Subject of Prudence Conscience 5. The Law of Conscience Ib. Synteresis and Syneidfies what 6. The Rule of Purdence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 7. 1 Subjective right Reason Ib. 2 Objective right Reason 8. The Last End its influence in Morals 9 The last End as extensive as the First Principe and but one 10. The last End desired infinitely 11. God the Last End of al. 12. Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie the Last End of Man 13 To adhere to God as our Last End speakes Perfection 14. The Chiefest Good its Proprietles Ib. 1 It 's the Idea of al Good 15. 2 It 's the Preme Beautle Ib. The Nature of Beaurie Explicated 16. The Soverain Beautie of God 17. 3 The chiefest good most proper 18. Vse and its Regulation Ib. What Temperance is 19. The Vtilitie of things in reference to their Last End 20. Concupiscence the Fruition of created good for itself 22. Intention of God as the Last End how it must be ever actual 23. Fruition its Difference from Vse 25. Al Fruition importes 1 Love 26. 2 Vnion and Possession 28. 3 Communion with the best Good 29. By Contemplation and Love 30. 4 Delectation and Joy 31. Which requires 1 a sweet Good 32. 2 Possession thereof 33. 3 Action thereon 34. Adjuncts of Delectation 1 Realitie 35. 2 Connaturalitie and Agreament 36. 3 Vniformitie and Harmonie 37. 4 Puritie 5 Force 39. 6 Infinitude without excesse 40. The Effects of Delectation 1 Amplitude Ib. 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 41. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie THE Moralitie of human Acts. 42. Moral Bonitie in Conformitie to the Divine Law 46. The measure of Moral Good Perfect 48. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Ib. Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good 50. No human Law a perfect Rule Ib. The Divine Law the rule of Moral Good 51. Right Reason Objective Light 52. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule 54. The Parts and Causes of Moral Good 55. The Mater of Moral Good 56. Things Indifferent in Genere and Specie 57. No Action Indifferent in Individuo 58. A Virtuose Wil the Effective Principe of Moral Good 60. The best End Essential to Moral Good 62. The Forme of Moral Good in Conformitie to the Moral Law 63. How the Forme of Good Consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wel-doing Ib. How far Circumstances Moralise 64. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of Good 68. Al Good and Virtue Supernatural 69. The Difficultie of Moral Good 70. The Virtues of Pagans only lesser Sins 71. The Distribution of Virtue into Pietie and Justice 72. CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie MOral Virtue an Habitual Perfection 74. Moral Libertie as to State in Virtuose Habits 76. Virtue gives 1 Dominion 78. 2 Life Health Vigor and Force 79. 3 Amplitude and Enlargement 80. 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 82. 5 Beautie and Glorie 84. Moral Libertie as to Exercice 85. 1 Contemplation of God 86. 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 87. 3 Dependence on the first Cause 90. 4 Conformitie 1 To Gods Precept 93. 2 To his Providential Wil. 95. 5 The reference of althings unto God as the Last End 96. Moral Libertle of Exercice the highest demonstrated 1 From its Order 98. 2 From its Spontaneitie and Suavitie 99. 3 From its Vitalitie 101. 4 From its Amplitude 103. 5 From its Purgation of Sin Ib. 6 From its Stabilitie 104. 7 From its Improving Virtue 105. 8 From its Formal Beatitude 106. CHAP. IV. Of Sin and Moral Servitude SIN a Transgression of the Law 108. Sin as to its formal Reason Privative 110. The Causes of Sin 1 Mans Defectibilitie 111. 2 The Vitiositie of human nature 112. The Nature and Influence of Original Sin 114. 3 Practic Error 115. 4 Self-love 119. Sins of Ignorance Passion Wilful 121. The Moral Servitude of Sin 122. 1 Sin repugnant to human Nature 123. 1 As a Falling from God Ib. 2 As it strips of the Image of God 124. 3 As Enmitie against God 125. 4 As it divestes men of Humanitie 126. 2 Sins repugnant each to other 127. 3 Sin most Impotent 128. 4 Sin the defilement of the Soul 129. 5 Sin ful of Shame and Reproche 130. 6 Sin the Tyrannie of the Soul 132. 7 Sin ful of Penurie and Want 133. 8 Sin the Fetters of the Soul 134. 9 Sin Folie and Madnesse 135. 10 Sin makes Men Bestes 136. The Adjuncts and Effects of this Servitude 137. The Servitude of Sin 1 Voluntary Ib. 2 Necessary the Degrees and Kinds of this sinful Necessitie 138. 3 Infinite as to Number and Magnitude 141. 4 Penal with the Nature of Punishment 142. 5 Sin in it self the greatest Punishment 144. 6 Other Punishments of Sin 145. 1 Sin breeds Fear and Shame Ib. 2 Sin ful of Instabilitie 146. 3 Sin ful of Anxietie and Torment Ib. 4 Eternal Punishment of Sin 147. Sinners Dead in Sin 148. 1 The Death of Sin not Metaphoric or Hyperbolic but Real 149. 2 No Seeds of Virtue or Spiritual Life in Corrupt Nature 150. 3 The Impotence of Corrupt Nature to what is Good Vniversal and Total 152. 4 Man cannot prepare himself for the Reception of Virtue 153. 5 No Freewil in Nature to Moral Good 155. CHAP. V. Of Plato's Politie its Essential Constitution and Administration POlitic Philosophie what 158. Politie its Forme in Order 159. The Object of Politie the Multitude or Communitie 161. God the Founder of al Polities 162. Man's
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniforme but al Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme Hence Plato asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above proper Nature as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and
of Virtue did indeed come under the Apostles condemnation Rom. 8.6 c. of living after the flesh because they made their carnal Reason Free-wil and Self the only measures and springs of their pretended Virtue Lastly al moral Virtue according to philosophic Placits is but one so that the Virtues of Pagans must be supernatural or none at al as before Thence Greg. Nazianzen Orat. 3. in Julian speaking of the Platonists Stoics and peripatetics saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue to them is only a speciose name and in nothing more lasting than this life Thus Chrysostome Hom. 27. in Joan. It is not yet apparent to me that the Gentiles lived wel For if the hope of the celestial Kingdome and the commination of Hel with other such like sollicitude 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can scarce keep men in Virtue those who are persuaded of none of these things wil not embrace Virtue But if some of them counterfeit the same this they do out of desire of Glorie c. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated by Augustine and he grounds it on that eternal Veritie of our Lord Mat. 7.18 Mat. 7.18 Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit So contra Julian l. 4. c. 3. The unbelieving wil as every Christian grants is an evil tree which cannot produce any other than evil fruits i.e. sins only The like Cyril in Hos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Probitie in those that God hates is without its reward and good manners tending not to true good shal be always reprehended by him Not but that many Heathens as Christian Hypocrites may performe Acts and Offices materially good which yet may be deservedly as they are by the Ancients termed Sins as they procede not from Faith in Christ and Love to God the main Principes of al true moral Good So Chrysost Tom. 17. Hom. 17. Edit Paris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They are good workes i.e. materially but dead because they have not Faith 5. The distrioution of moral Good or Virtue into Justice and Pietie Albeit al Virtue according to its formal Idea and Reason be but one yet according to its objective material consideration it may be variously distributed Thus in sacred Philosophie moral Good or Virtue is distributed as to its object or mater into Holinesse and Righteousnesse Ephes 4.24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In Righteousnesse and Holinesse Righteousnesse comprehends al Second-table-duties which regard men and Holinesse al First-table-duties which regard God This distribution is most ancient and I presume was communly received among the Jews Sure I am Plato has it and as I conjecture from the Mosaic Institutes Thus in his Gorgias pag. 507. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now he that comports himself decently towards men doth righteous things but he that behaveth himself aecently towards God doth holy or pious things but he that doth both rightcous and holy things must necessarily be righteous and holy Wherein observe 1 That he distributes al moral Good into just or righteous and pious or holy 2 That he makes Justice or Righteousnesse to regard men but Pietie or Holinesse to regard God 3 That some may seem to be righteous towards men who yet are not pious or holy towards God as on the other hand some may pretend to be pious towards God who yet are not just and righteous towards men But 4 he that is just and righteous towards men in giving them their due as also pious and holy towards God in giving him his due such is indeed a virtuose man morally good just and pious Thus also Serranus on Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 136. takes notice how Plato distributes Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into Pietie and Justice the former relating to the Worship of God the later to men whereby our whole life is duely framed and regulated these being two seminal roots or commun heads of particular Offices and Duties Lastly Plato in his Minos pag. 319. saith That we should take diligent heed first that we offend not in word or deed against God and then that we offend not against men specially such as are divine A Golden Rule for moral Duties CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection Moral Libertie as to state in virtuese Habits Virtue gives 1 Dominion 2 Life Health Vigor 3 Amplitude 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 5 Beautie and Glorie Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in virtuose Acts. 1 The Contemplation of the first Truth 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 3 Total actual dependence on the first Cause 4 Conformitie to the divine preceptive Wil as also submission to his providential Wil. 5 Vsing althings in subordination to the Fruition and Service of God Moral Libertie as to exercice the greatest because it brings 1 Order 2 Spontaneitie and suavitie 3 A Divine Life 4 Amplitude 5 Freedom from Sin 6 Stabilitie of Spirit 7 Improvement of Virtue 8 Formal Beatitude § 1. Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection THE general Idea and Nature of Moral Bonitie having been discussed we now procede to the discussion of Virtue as it is the origine and cause of moral Libertie Plato discourseth of Virtue in his Meno the title of which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue properly according to its orgination signifies a Power or Efficace it being derived from Vir which primarily signified among the Ancients a stout valiant man answering to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Hebrews So the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily and properly signifies warlike Virtue or Courage from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mars and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arits terrible valiant potent or as Vossius from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 marats to waxe strong Hence in the N.T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to expresse the Divine power and efficace of God as 1 Pet. 2.9 and 2 Pet. 1.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i.e. by his gloriose power Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is expounded by Hesychius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a divine power So the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies the gloriose power of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Hab. 3.3 Zach. 6.17 Neither is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used in the N. T. more than once if ever to denote a virtuose disposition of mind namely Phil. 4.8 So curiose were the sacred Pen-men in avoiding philosophic termes which had been so much abused But by moral Virtue we here understand an habitual disposition of Soul conforme to the Rule of Moralitie the Divine Law In which strict notion it has one and the same formal idea or reason with supernatural Grace as Jansenius Amesius and others understand it For that there is no real moral Virtue but what is supernatural has been sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Section § 4. Whence true moral Virtue is nothing else but a certain perfection whereby man is ordained and disposed towards God as Aquinas 1. Quaest 95. Others cal Virtue the
its chiefest good Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bonitie or the chiefest Good convertes althings to it self i. e. althings tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection 6 The more the Wil is conformed to the Divine Wil the more free it is and whose Wil is more conforme to the Divine Wil than his who actually and resolutely adheres to God Doth not such a Wil touch the Divine Wil in every point as two strait Lines 3. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in an actual Dependence on the first Cause total and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of althings Every Creature having something of Nothing or passive Power either physic or metaphysic and obediential it thence fals under the Law of Mutabilitie which is the root of Dependence Novitie of Being Deficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature as Eternitie of Being Immutabilitie and Independence is to the Creator For every Creature being only Being by participation hence Dependence becomes intrinsecal to it and inseparable from its nature as Suarez Metaph. Disp 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates Yea Disp 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates That Subordination or Dependence of a created Being both in acting and causing formally belongs to its essential reason as such because this dependence is founded not in any qualitie or proprietie of the Creature extrinsecal to its Essence but in the very intrinsecal limitation thereof So that the very Essence of the Creature as such is the root of this dependence and to suppose a Creature and not to suppose it to be dependent in essence and operation implies a contradiction Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only but also moral on its first Cause We find both mentioned by Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shews That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of al Beings whose conduct he that follows shal be happy And Epinom pag. 980. he assures us That he who praying to God doth trust in his Benignitie shal act wel So in his Timaeus pag. 27. he tels us That al who have any thing of an awakened mind when they attemt any mater either great or smal are always wont to cal on God Which is an high act of Dependence Thence Theages pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▵ AIMONION For there is a certain DEMON which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do c. What this Demon of Socrates was is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers who have written Books concerning it That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. § 4. It certainly importes his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power either Real or Imagiuary Yea Planto in his Timaeus saith That Beatitude or moral Libertie is nothing else but to have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Demon dwelling in him Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shekinah i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men Thence the Greek Fathers terme efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon in imitation of sacred Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indwelling Grace Which alludes to that of Paul 2 Cor. 12.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 12.9 that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwel on me It evidently alludes both name and thing to the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitation of God with and in men which denotes the highest Dependence And indeed herein consistes one main part of moral Libertie as to exercice Look as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause so doth al true moral Virtue on its first Cause Virtuose persons who are most feeble in themselves are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe Where there is a subordination of Causes either moral or natural it is the libertie of the inferior to depend on and receive from the superior Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual dependence on him If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences how soon do al moral Virtues wither and die away What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first Where there is a limited essence is there not also a limited dependent Activitie Can a dependent cause produce any more than a dependent effect Must not every mutable variable defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause That which had not Being from it self may it have Operation independently from it self Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first If the created Wil cannot subsist of it self may it expect the privilege of acting from it self independently as to the first Cause Is not the human Wil a mere passive though vital instrument as to the reception of divine influences albeit it be active as to its own operation Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be absolute and total Yea is not this Dependence immediate And O! how is the Soul enlarged according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult but with it the most difficult are most facile The Soul is wel compared to a Glasse without a foot which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken but if God withdraws his hand it soon sals to the ground and is deshed in pieces he need not take it and throw it against the wal it wil break of it self Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Munudaction also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and cooperation of God Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al manner of energie Cyril 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the aide from above Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the auxiliant or assistent Power Greg. Nyssen in Psalm saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue And Chrysostome in Gen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole of good is from the Grace of God Whence God is termed by Cyril in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Creator and Framer of al good and his efficacious Grace is termed by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficacious Aide as by Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence Of which more hereafter The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause but continual effusions and insusions into
movetur It 's a great Saying of the Platonists That one free is moved from infinite to infinite upon infinite i.e. a virtuose man in al exercices of Virtue is moved 1 From God as the first Cause and original Spring 2 To God as the last End and infinite Good 3 Vpon or according to the infinite Wil and Law of God as the measure and rule of al his virtuose exercices Whence also they tel us That the motion of a free Soul is circular from God as the first Cause to God as the last End and by God and his divine Wil as the measure Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in al the exercices of Virtue So that it fals under no coarctation or confinement either in regard of Principe or End or Rule but partakes in its measure of that Amplitude which its Principe End and Rule rejoiceth in For such as a mans first Principe last End and Exemplar is such is he as to libertie or servitude Quantò finis altior tantò actus volunâ—â— est libeâ—â— By how much the more ample and sublime the end is by so much the more ample and free is the Act. Again the virtuose Soul adhering to and depending on God as the first Cause obteins great enlargement Whereas sin being an aversion from God our first Principe and last End puts fetters chains limits and confinement on the Soul 5. Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes in the freedome from vitiofe Inclinations Affections and Motions Plato in his Timaeus 〈…〉 persuades us That the culture and cure of every thing consistes in giving it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 its proper diet and exercices and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitiose humors and maladies than to give it its proper virtuose exercices When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful than when it is most in virtuose exercitations Althings are purified by perfective fermentation and is not the Soul also purified from its noxious peccant humors by the divine fermentation of virtuose affections Thus Rom. 12.11 Rom. 12.11 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fermenting or boiling in spirit Syr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is spoken of boiling waters Job 41.22 So Job 30.27 LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 My bowels fermented or boiled The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuose exercices the more free they are to serve God and lesse obnoxious to the service of sin By how much the lesse we serve sin by so much the more free we are And who serve sin lesse than they who are most deeply engaged in virtuose exercices Plato Tim. pag. 89. tels us That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic exercitation What is health but the spirituose vigor of Nature And what more promotes this spirituose vigor than exercice And doth not this hold true as to the Soul Is not its most healthful purgation by virtuose exercitation Doth not this most promote the spirituose vigor and health of the Soul What makes the fire to conserve it self in its puritie but its grand and perpetual activitie Doth not also the running stream keep it self pure whiles the standing Pool gathers mud Are althings in Nature purified by motion Quantò virtus aliqua intensiùs tendit in aliquid tantò fortiùs repellit omne contrarium Aquin. and shal we not also allow the same efficace to virtuose exercices It 's true virtuose exercices do not purge out sin by their own innate force as Physic purgeth out il humors but by the divine promisse concurrence and benediction By how much the more intensely the virtuose Soul actually tends to its last end by so much the more strongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto 6. Virtuose Exercices most stable and permanent Virtuose Exercices are most stable firme and permanent Therefore most free Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes much in the firmitude stabilitie and permanence of such exercices Whence Plato in his Cratylus pag. 415. derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is always in fluxe or motion whence he makes it to be synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a facile and expedite progresse For saith he it always flows in an equal stable manner The Soul according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ever-moving Principe and therefore it ought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be always in action Now it is most certain that no acts of the Soul are more stable firme and permanent than virtuose acts Thus Arist Eth. l. 1. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtuose exercices are most permanent And he gives this reason of it Because blessed Souls live and dwel always in such Acts without tediousnesse or oblivion And Plato in his Cratylus tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sloth is the greatest bond and fetter of the Soul which obstructs al virtuose exercices The firmitie and stabilitie of every thing ariseth from its adhesion to its first Principe and last End and by how much the more the Soul departes from these by so much the more instable and sluctuating it is To stand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God under al the vicissitudes and various changes of this World argues great moral libertie as to exercice and wherein consistes the Souls adhesion to God as its first Principe and last End if not in virtuose exercices 7. Virtuose Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue Virtuose Exercices improve Virtue and so by consequence moral Libertie Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. assures us That when the faculties of the Soul grow sluggish and lazy they are rendred more infirme and impotent but by continual action they are made more robust and vigorous And doth not this Philosopheme hold valid in Morals as wel as Naturals Doth any thing render the virtuose Soul more robust and vigorous than virtuose exercices So pag. 103. The Soul is nourished and corroborated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by labors and exercices And are not virtuose labors of al most nourishing and corroborative Thence saith Seneca Labor nourisheth generose minds O! Generosos animos labor nutrit Sen. then how are virtuose minds nourished by the labors of Virtue As the native heat is preserved by the Pulse or twofold motion of the heart so is Virtue by its exercices It 's a trite Saying in the Scholes Cessation from acts diminish habits but continuance therein emproves the same It 's true there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits and virtuose which come by infusion because acquired habits are the natural products of their acts but virtuose habits are not naturally produced by virtuose acts but given in by God of mere Grace God rewards virtuose exercices with farther degrees and advances of Virtue or Grace and that of mere Grace So Mat. 13.12 Mat. 13.12 For whosoever hath to him shal be given 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 here doth not signifie the mere having of a Talent but the employing using or occupying the same for it is a good Rule among Grammarians That Verbes which primarily signifie to have or possesse oft denote the using of what we have So here Hath notes to use occupie or traffic with what we have To such it shal be given and he shal have more abundance i. e. God wil reward his diligence in using and occupying his Talent be it natural or supernatural with much more in the same kind If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations he shal receive more in that kind if true moral supernatural Virtues his stock shal encrease in its kind Whence it follows But whosoever hath not i. e. employes not by exercice from him shal be taken away even that he hath i. e. his Talent shal be taken from him his commun gifts and seeming virtues shal wither Yea virtuose exercices in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper Heb. 12.11 12. Thus Heb. 12.11 Every chastisement for the present seems not to be joyous but grievous but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousnesse to them that are exercised thereby 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exercised as in the Gymnade whence it follows v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intension firmitude strength It here denotes sloth and remisnesse as to labor whereof the hand is the instrument Thence he addes and the feeble knees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the paralytic knees such as are as it were struck with a Palsie and therefore unapt for motion This later clause seems to refer to the Race which required the exercice of the knees as labor that of the hands 8. Formal Beatitude in virtuose Exercices A great and main part of moral Libertie consistes in virtuose exercices because herein consistes formal Beatitude Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations Thus Plato in his Conviv pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicitie to consiste in contemplating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. the most sincere uniforme divine Beautie c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus pag. 250. So Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude the exercice of the rational Soul according to the best and most perfect Virtue in the most perfect life And Cap. 8. he addes That to act wel and live wel makes man happy And the demonstration hereof is most evident For 1 Operation and exercice is the end of al virtuose Habits and Principes and therefore their perfection for every Forme Power or Habit is ordained to its act as to its perfection Whence Basil termes Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 completive or perfective of Nature Which chiefly belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues that formal Beatitude cannot consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in possession of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in use and exercice For a man may possesse the chiefest good and have habitual likenesse thereto and yet not formally happy as virtuose men asleep 2 The more Virtue is in exercice the more it ressembles the Divine Libertie and Perfection The Divine Being and Libertie is a pure simple Act without the least habit or passive power either physic or metaphysic and therefore the more actuose Virtue is the more like it is to God 3 Virtuose exercices bring most satisfaction with them Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us That virtuose Acts are of themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-sufficient They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul as before Chap. 1. § 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophie Yea we are herein assured that by virtuose exercices we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude even in this life This seems the import of that Exhortation 1 Tim. 6.12 1 Tim. 6.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exercise thy self in that famose contest of Faith Our Apostle alludes to those famose Olympian Games specially that of the Race wherein they contended for a Crown Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lay hold of eternal life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here as v. 19. is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Cor. 9.24 Phil. 3.12 in which places the Apostle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race who when they came to the end thereof laid hold on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Crown on the top of the Goal Thus Christians by virtuose exercices lay hold on eternal life as the Crown at the end of their Race Thus he speaks of himself 2 Tim. 4.7 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 4.7 8. I have exercised my self in that famose contest The double Article addes a great Emphase and shews with what vigor and activitie he had dispatcht his Christian race and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown Such efficacious and soverain influence have virtuose exercices on mans formal Beatitude and moral Libertie CHAP. IV. Of Sin and moral Servitude Sin a Transgression of the Law Sin as to its formal reason privative The causes of Sin 1 Mans defectibilitie 2 The Vitiositie of human Nature 3 Practic Error 4 Self-love Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful The moral Servitude of Sin as 1 Repugnant to human Nature 2 Repugnant each to other 3 The Disease of the Soul 4 Defilement 5 Shame and Reproche 6 Tyrannie 7 Penurie 8 Captivitie 9 Folie and Madnesse 10 It makes men Brutes The Adjuncts of this Servitude It is 1 Voluntary 2 Necessary 3 Infinite 4 Most penal Sin the worst punishment Other punishments of Sin It brings 1 Fear and shame 2 Instabilitie 3 Anxietie 4 Eternal punishment Al naturally Slaves of Sin No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature Natural impotence to what is good No moral Free wil. A sum of the Pelagian Historie § 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good Virtue and Libertie we now passe on to the discussion of moral Evil and that Servitude which attends it It 's a good Notion of Aristotle Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parallel opposites illustrate each other So in his Ethics l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary Which holds true here in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformitie of moral Evil. Sin a Transgression of the moral Law Doth al moral Good consiste in conformitie to the moral divine Law What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law as 1 Joh. 3.4 That al moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law is an Hypothesis frequently inculcated as wel in Platonic as in sacred Philosophie Thence Definit Platon pag. 416. 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without a yoke which the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which truly is not yet not simply
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens or nothing And such is sin not simply and purely nothing yet according to its formal reason not a positive real Being but a moral privation or as others a privative relation That Sin according to its formal Idea and Nature is privative was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers both Platonists and others Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the moral cause of sins because there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a positive idea of sin So Proclus argues from this place That there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Idea of sins because then it would follow that God should be the Cause and Author of sin And Plato himself informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an irregular affection and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of order also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice against Law Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privative Being and lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of moral Being as the night is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the privation of the Suns light But among the ancient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis than Simplicius on Epicbet cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin really is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of good Of which see Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Among the Schole-men this is strongly proved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dâ—st 34. Quaest 1. Suarez in 1.2 Tract 3. Disput 7. sect 3. pag. 275-278 Barlow Exercit. 2. § 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin we now procede to its Causes among which Mans Defectibilitie the first Origine of Sin if we wil ascend up to its first Origine we must reckon first the Defectibilitie of the human Creature as the original cause of al sin For to speak in the Platonic mode Man as al other Creatures being composed of something and nothing yea more of nothing than something hence passive power and defectibilitie is essential to his Being For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing Where there is place for Proficience there also remains a capacitie of Deficience Every Creature because made by God is capable of Proficience but because made out of nothing it is also capable of Deficience It 's true Man as made by God was void of al moral deficience or sin yet as Man he was never void of Defectibilitie and Mutabilitie he had a moral free-wil for good but a natural free-wil or defectibilitie as to sin which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin This is wel explicated by Suarez In a free Agent saith he the mode of failing in an act ariseth from the dominion he has over his act hence sin in a free cause doth not always suppose the like sin in the same cause for it may arise merely from the libertie of the Creature which is good That the Wil of Adam in his innocent state was capable of sinning was a natural defect conjoined with a natural perfection for it was also capable not to sin and this mutable capacitie being drawen forth towards a prohibited object was the first origine and root of al sin Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural libertie in it self good but evilly applied Adam's person being vitiated by that first Sin The Vitiositie of human Nature he thereby vitiated his own and our Nature Yea his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation whence there adheres a vitiositie to our natures whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato and other Philosophers Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in our head which I understand of Adam whereby our nature from the first generation is corrupted And Timaeus Locrus from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes pag. 103. explicates the origine of this Vitiositie thus Vitiositie comes from our Parents and first Principes rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners because we never depart from those actions which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents A great confession of a Pagan beyond what many that professe Christianitie wil allow So Plato in his Critias saith That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men i. e. in the state of Innocence but at length it being mixed with mortal i. e. upon the Fal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 human custome or sin prevailed to the ruine of mankind and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men So Leg. 5. pag. 731. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest Sin is ingenite in mens Souls And Grotius assures us That the Philosophers confessed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin whence the Platonist makes mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of an evil nature which Definit Plat. pag. 416. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Vitiositie in nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the natural disease or disease of nature Thence Plato in his Politicus pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Politie gives this demonstration of its necessitie because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved and al manner of disorders infeste human Nature and men being impotent are torne in pieces by their own lusts as by so many wild Horses And thence he concludes That from this plague of vitiositie men were driven to great straits and confusions The like Stobaeus Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus's Dictates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Phy how depraved is mans nature altogether otherwise there were no need of Laws Dost thou thinke that man is any thing more excellent than Bestes Truly but little except only in figure Brutes look towards the earth but man has an erect countenance Thus also Plato Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirmes That Souls living on the earth are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a brutish nature And it is said of Democritus that he affirmed The diseases of the Soul to be so great that if it were opened it would appear to be a sepulchre of al manner of evils Yea Aristotle albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiositie Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturally repugnant to right reason But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive our selves our evil is not from without it is fixed in our very bowels Again Al Sins are in al men but al do not appear in each man He that hath one Sin hath al. We say that al men are intemperate avaricious luxurious maligne
〈◊〉 that every one counts his ignorance his wisdome Hence it comes to passe that whiles we know nothing we thinke we know althings And are not those greatly to be pitied who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant Is any thing more worthy of compassion than the blindnesse of such as seem most quick-sighted and sage in the World And whence comes this proud affected ignorance but from mens not knowing God and themselves Is it not a strange thing that the Soul which knows althings else should be so ignorant of it self and of its Maker Thence Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 144. saith It is no wonder that they who are ignorant of God should account that which is worst best Whence he concludes That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil And as to the ignorance of our selves he openly affirmes Theaecet pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they thinke they are not i. e. ignorant by how much the lesse they thinke they are so And that this proud affected practic Ignorance of God and our selves is the root of al sin he further demonstrates Alcibiad 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance whereby a man thinkes he knows what indeed he is ignorant of And he subjoins the reason Those are left under error 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who knowing nothing thinke they know every thing Confidence of knowlege is a sure marque of ignorance Whence he concludes pag. 118. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This very ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins and most opprobriose Lastly Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us That when we attemt those things whereof we are ignorant we grossely erre Such a venimous maligne efficacious influence has proud conceited practic Error on al sin Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darknesse or ignorance practic Errors foment and maintain lusts The mind like a silk-worme lies intangled in those errors that came out of its own bowels when lust hath put out Reason it soon takes the Chair men of corrupt minds are men of sinful lives Mind and Wil do reciprocally vitiate each other whiles lust bribes conscience out of office it cooperates with sin Divine light is a burden to a corrupt conscience which delights to spin out of it self sick dreaming errors thereby to create its own chains and fetters a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons al good convictious of dutie surely there is no dutie done by that man whose conscience doth not its dutie for there is nothing in man active for God when conscience is not first active It 's evident then that practic error of conscience opens the door to al sin And as Plato so Aristotle his Scholar hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on al sin Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance and ignorant Sins A drunken man that kils another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance because that ignorance was voluntarily contracted Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and from what he ought to abstain and by this they are made unjust and wicked And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds 1 There is saith he an ignorance the cause of which is in our selves As when drunken men sin ignorantly which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkennesse 2 There is an Ignorance of Right or Law when men are ignorant of their dutie which they ought to know 3 There is an ignorance from our own neglect which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided 4 There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custome in sinning We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowlege the one universal the other particular a defect in either of these causeth sin Whence it follows that a man may have an universal knowlege that this or that is sinful in general and yet want a particular judgement of its sinfulnesse in this or that case So that particular ignorance is very wel consistent with universal knowlege But now sithat universal knowlege though most certain is not so influential on our actions as particular because actions are about singulars hence it follows that particular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin than universal knowlege has to prevent it This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent or that which is consequent to the act Yea al ignorance which ariseth from the Wil may be looked on as voluntary For what is involuntary if it arise from some precedent voluntary act it may be judged voluntary according to moral estimation As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard whose ignorance is voluntary because arising from the act of his own Wil. For it is a good Rule of Aristotle That those Acts whose Principe is in us may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us Lastly we may with Aristotle distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin and such as are cum ignorantia i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners wil The former are those which we cal sins of ignorance but the later not because the ignorance is voluntary Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do as wil to do what they know Reason may rightly discerne the thing which is good and yet the wil of man not incline it self thereto as oft as sensual passions prejudice or affected ignorance prevail So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin either because men do not practically consider al circumstances or if they do consider them yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil but instead thereof they foist in another false Conclusion That this or that sinful Act is sweet or profitable A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises and yet dissent from the conclusion yea consent to a bad conclusion Lusts pervert Conscience and sil it with partialitie and prejudice in its inquiries The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as wil not distaste its lusts nor yet its lusts molest it There is a peace between the lust and light of a carnal heart It 's easie for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison and detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse to believe as
it list not as it ought A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings various coverts and hiding places for lust Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin as Mat. 23.14 Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing or a bad designe is justified by a good end or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule men bring down the rule to their lusts Again sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors Mens lusts make many controversies about sin they make great sins little and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. § 4. Not only practic Error Self-love a radical cause of Sin but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme So Repub. 9. pag. 574 c. he describes to the life the servile condition of a wicked person under the Tyrannie of Self-love how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into al sin So also in what follows pag. 577. of which hereafter Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ingenite evil in which they who indulge themselves have no remedie against sin Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to speak the truth self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils in which the life of man is involved And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves and thence misjudgeth things just good and honest being in this opinion that there is more honor due to him than to truth And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-lover acts a for himself according to his profit Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self which he makes his God and the only Centre in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet Self is the last end of self-lovers even in their highest acts of self-denial if they give their goods to the poor or their bodies to be burned for Religion it is al to please self They may crosse their own wils but never crosse self as their last end if they seek after God it is to advance self self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie mortifie and with so much severitie torment their bodies but thereby to exalt their inward excellences And as self-lovers make self the last End so also the first Principe of al they do Self-love ever affects self-dependence it would fain have a World of its own to live act and breathe in it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie as wel as interest It 's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with and thereby merit divine favor And alas how soon are men overcome by tentations when they are self-dependent and self-strong He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength wil soon be overcome by it Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of al sin Every self-lover is his own Idol and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself he is soon overcome thereby and so hurried into sin Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal vile and abominable to God Where self is predominant the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten and a bad intention makes the best workes bad Where self rules it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts wherefore he that cannot depart from self wil soon depart from God and tumble headlong into al sin Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence and most directly opposite to divine love The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God yea the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it the more tyrannie it is Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself his carnal self which is so potent to draw him into sin It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deifie it self not by being equal in nature with God but by being its first Cause and last End which is the spring of al departure from God and conversion to the Creature And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policie and many artifices to concele its self and sin How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love and thereby delude the Soul into sin There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal whence the later oft conceles it self under the vizard of the former The more a man loves himself the lesse he conceits he loves himself as the more mad a man is the lesse he judgeth himself so Self-love is so artificial in its colors as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice and vice with virtues face Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin it greatly advances sin The members of self-love are principally three 1 Concupiscence or adherence to the Creature as our last end 2 Carnal confidence or dependence on self as the first cause 3 Spiritual pride or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 8 9 10. § 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful or voluntary again involuntary into sins of Ignorance or of Passion We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato Phileb pag. 22. where he saith That those who choose sin do it either involuntarily and ignorantly or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie 1. As for involuntary Sins they are 1 Sins of Ignorance when the ignorance is not affected either from prejudice voluntary neglect or custome in sin as before § 3. 2 Sins of Passion or Infirmitie when the passion is antecedent to the wil and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil being vehement and violent For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil or but a languid remisse motion such as doth not force the wil the sin is not so much of passion as voluntary whence passions
that arise from evil customes and follow the wil do not constitute a sin of passion Thence Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 3. saith That every sin from passion is not involuntary Thus also Suarez 1.2 Tract 5. Disp 4. pag. 395. Now involuntarinesse in sins either of ignorance or of passion takes away something of their aggravation where there is real unaffected ignorance passion or perturbation there is lesse of sin Where there is involuntary Ignorance there is want of that which might help the understanding where antecedent involuntary passions hurrie men into sin there is voluntary dissent or subsequent repentance Hence the Disciples of Aristippus said That they who sin from perturbation not voluntarily deserve pardon as Laertius 2. Voluntary wilful Sins are such as procede from a strong bent of wil without ignorance or passion as the original cause thereof Such sins are of greater aggravation because of lesse provocation and excuse From a perseverance in voluntary sins and frequent repetition thereof procedes a fixed custome and rooted habit of sin touching which we find many good Philosophemes in Plato of which hereafter § 7. of the necessary servitude of Sin § 6. The Nature The moral servitude of Sin Causes and Kinds of moral Evil being laid open we may with more facilitie explicate and demonstrate what that moral Servitude is which attends it That al moral Evil or Sin is attended with the highest moral Servitude is evident from sacred Philosophie as also the Philosophemes of Plato and others There were three ways whereby men were brought under civil servitude among the Ancients some were made servants by being taken in war others were bought with a price others became such by being borne in the house of servants as Ishmael Sacred Philosophie in treating of the servitude of sin alludes to al these three kinds of service 1 Sinners are said 1 Kings 21.20 2 Kings 17.17 To sel themselves to worke evil i.e. deliberately and voluntarily to commit sin and that with a ful bent of heart which is opposed to Pauls being sold under sin Rom. 7.14 2 The servants of sin are said to be led captive by sin 2 Pet. 2.19 3 Al men by nature are said to be borne slaves of sin Ephes 2.2 5.6 Eph. 2.2 Children of disobedience i.e. addicted devoted given up to it So Ephes 5.6 Col. 3.6 This is an Hebraic Idiotisme for among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Son being put in the state of Regiment and construed with a Noun signifying an inanimate thing is emphatically used to note that such a person or thing is addicted or given up to that which is predicated of it Thus a child of disobedience is one that is a perfect slave or devoted to it And Plato Rep. 9. pag. 575. tels us That he who is subject to the Tyrannie of his own Lusts is the greatest slave imaginable for he cannot do what he would but is shut up in the prison of his own unbridled lusts Therefore in his Cratylus as he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 always to flow which importes libertie so he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vice from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because a wicked man is ever fettered and chained by his lusts But to illustrate the miserable vassalage and slaverie which attends al Sinners by nature we shal consider this servitude of Sin 1 In regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin 2 In the proper Adjuncts or Attributes that attend this servitude First as to the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin we shal draw them forth according to the mind of sacred and Platonic Philosophie in the ensuing Propositions 1. Al moral Evil or Sin is repugnant to human Nature The Civilian Sin repugnant to human Nature Justin Institut l. 1. tit 3. defines Civil Servitude a constitution of the Law of Nations whereby one is subject to the Dominion of another against Nature And is not this most true of the moral servitude of Sin What more against human Nature than to be subject to the tyrannie of irregular passions Yea doth not Sin make not only the Creatures an enemie to man but also himself the greatest enemie to himself That Sin is most repugnant to human Nature may easily be evinced out of Plato's Philosophie Thence he cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discord and Confusion because it causeth an intestine war discord and confusion in human Nature Thus also in his Lysis he saith Al good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proper and agreable to human Nature but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evil is aliene and repugnant to it Good albeit it slow not from Nature yet it inclines us to what is most for the perfection of human Nature whereas al Sin tends to its ruine As al moral Libertie consistes in Virtue which gives an elevation and advance to human Nature so al moral servitude arising from Sin implies a depression of human Nature Thus Psal 106.43 And were brought low for their iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies attenuated depressed Psal 106.43 Vitium contra naturam est ut non possit nisi nocere naturae Non itaque esset vitium recedere à Deo nisi naturae cujus id vitium est potiùs competeret esse cum Deo August de Civ Dei l. 11. c. 17. It 's here spoken of their being brought down from an high to a low condition Then follows the cause of this their being brought down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for or in their iniquitie Their iniquitie was not only the meritorious cause but also the instrument or machine by which they were brought down Nothing doth so much empoverish and bring down human Nature as Sin So Psal 107.12 Therefore he brought down their heart with labor they fel down and there was none to help 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with toilsome labor The toilsome labor of Sin is most potent to bring down human Nature 1 Sin brings down human Nature and is most repugnant to it in that it importes an aversion and falling from God who is our most laudable and excellent Being our first Principe and last End This is implied in that dreadful interrogation of God to Adam Gen. 3.9 Gen. 3.9 Where art thou In this Question we may consider 1 That it regards not Adams place but state Where art thou Not in what place but in what state How is it with thee now Adam How doest thou do Is al wel What is the condition of thy Soul Art thou in that state I placed thee in 2 It 's a question not of ignorance as to God but of conviction as to Adam it is the question of a Judge making inquisition after the Malefactor Where art thou Where is now thy confidence in thine own strength Doest thou see unto what a condition thy pride thy unbelief has reduced thee Thou aimedst to be as God free from my yoke
of what he has Man is then said to live when he useth and enjoyeth things as he ought which sin deprives him of in that it makes him use things that are to be enjoyed and enjoy things that are to be used Thus it invertes the order of things Hence it was a commun Saying with Socrates as also the Stoics That al Vice is against Nature because human Nature as such was made to adhere unto God as its first Cause and last End which state man by sin doth relinquish and so by consequence lose the right use of his Being Life Reason Wil Affections and al human Acts. Such is the Repugnance of Sin to human Nature 2. Moral Evils or Sins are not only repugnant to human Nature Sins repugnant each to other but to themselves This greatly demonstrates the servitude and bondage of Sin for al moral Libertie implies Order Harmonie and Vniformitie which ariseth from Virtue but Lusts are extreme jarring dissonant and opposite each to other Oh! what strange discords confusions and seditions are there among lusts in the heart How is the heart distracted and as it were torne in pieces by them Lusts are extreme mutinous and lawlesse they keep no order Thence in sacred Philosophie it is said The corrupt mind cannot subject it self to the law of God Rom. 8.7 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 8.7 cannot keep the place order and ranke the Law of God has put the Soul into It alludes to Military order for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily denotes the order and discipline of Soldiers Yea it 's added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither indeed can be namely because the Law is the rule of order but Lusts are al for disorder they disagree among themselves as wel as from the Law of God Lusts have no end bounds measure what is sin but a confused Chaos of al manner of disorders How do sensual passions fight not only against Gods Law but against each other And oh what a slavery ariseth herefrom Thence sinners are described Tit. 3.6 Tit. 3.6 Serving lusts and diverse pleasures These sinful pleasures are not only diverse as to Number but also as to Qualitie as different and opposite each to other Thence Jam. 4.1 Lusts are said to maintain an intestine war in mens Souls whence al externe wars and contests arise Thus Plato makes frequent mention of the discords and intestine wars of Lusts So Repub. 5. pag. 444. he makes injustice to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Sedition of the Soul or Insurrection So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pag. 214. he makes al virtrose persons to be like each other and friends but as for profligate wicked men they differ as wel from themselves as each from other And in his Phaedo pag. 92. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al sin is ful of discord but virtue is harmonious The reason of this Discord and Repugnance among lusts is this Al concord and agreament in the Soul ariseth from its adherence to God who is the first Unitie so far as men depart from this prime Unitie so far they fal under confusion Nulla major poena nequitiae est quà m quod sibi suis displicet Sen. Epist difformitie and disorder And what greater punishment of sin is there than this that it is displeasing yea repugnant to it self How oft do men relinquish the lusts they longed for and then reassume what they relinquished What a conflict is there between avaricious and prodigal lusts But of this more in what follows 3. Sin most impotent and infirme Sin is the Disease of the Soul ful of impotence and infirmitie Al moral Libertie implies health vigor force and strength and wherein consistes the vigor and strength of any thing but in adherence to its first Principes The more any thing departes from Vnitie the more Division Contrarietie Dissolution and Infirmitie And is not God the first Principe or Cause of the Soul Doth it not by departing from him depart from its first Unitie and strength O! then how impotent and infirme is sin This is every where intimated in sacred Philosophie Ezech. 16.30 So Ezech. 16.30 How weak is thy heart i.e. how sick faint and impotent by reason of lust Yet it follows Seing thou doest al these things the workes of an imperiose whorish woman She had potent imperiose lusts but a weak heart to resist tentations Sin is said to be a poisonous bitter root which sheds its maligne influences on al our Affections and Actions Deut. 29.18 Thus Deut. 29.18 Apostasie is said to be a root bearing gal and bitternesse The Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rendred Gal signifies a poisonous herbe and so it must be rendred here a root whose influences and fruits are poisonous and bitter Thence the LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 springing up in gal or poison and bitternesse For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both gal and poison answerable to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the poison of some Serpents lies in their gal Act. 8.23 Peter alludes hereto Act. 8.23 where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the bitter poisonous root of corrupt nature So Heb. 12.15 Heb. 12.15 Root of bitternesse i.e. poisonous root of sin Nothing so poisonous and killing as sin Whence sinners are said to be Jer. 17.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick even unto death So Esa 24.4 languisheth as a feeble crazy consumtive bodie as v. 5. Basil in Psal saith That men are rendred by Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without wound and blemish whence they become 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inexpugnable and free as before Chap. 3. Thence it necessarily follows that sin is the wound and blemish of the Soul that which renders it most impotent and servile That sin is ful of impotence and infirmitie Plato once and again inculcates So Repub. 4. pag. 430. he saith An intemperate man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 weaker than himself whereas a temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more potent than himself i.e. than his sensual appetite Thus in his Timaeus pag. 86 87. he proves That the irregularitie of our affections is the worst disease So Repub. 10. pag. 608. he informes us That evil is that which dissolves and corrupts things but good conserves and relieves And thence he concludes That a servile Sinner hath nothing sound Lastly Repub. 1. he saith Vnrighteousnesse is the disease of the Soul 4. Sin is the spot stain and defilement of the Soul Sin the defilement of the Soul and therefore the greatest servitude Virtue gives a Nitor Lustre Splendor Beautie and Glorie to the Soul but Sin is the Blot and blemish of human Nature indeed nothing can pollute and defile the Soul but Sin and sinful Idols Hence we find mention Deut. 29.17 Ezech. 23.7 Deut. 29.17 Ezech. 23.7 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gillulim filthy Idols The word signifies both filth and Idols or sordid dunghil
condition that men by their corrupt Wil embrace him 3 It overthrows efficacious Grace in the vocation and conversion of sinners in that it resolves al into a moral capacitie or power in corrupt Nature to convert it self 4 It subvertes the Covenant of Grace in resolving the whole of it into a Covenant of Workes 5 It destroyes the Grace of Perseverance in that it makes the perseverance of the Saints dependent on their own mutable Free-wil § 3. As for the Wil of God The Wil of God although it be not really different from his Vnderstanding and Essence yet we may in regard of its effects conceive of it as in some manner distinct The Wil of God is taken either properly for the Divine Volition Intention or Decree whereby althings receive their Futurition and Existence or else improperly for the legislative declarative significative Wil of God which is the measure of our dutie The former is that which we are first to discourse of whereof we find lively notices in Sacred Philosophie and something also in Plato Phileb p. 16. where being about to Philosophise of the Divine Wil as the original Exemplar or Idea of althings future he makes this Preface 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For althings that ever were invented being joined together by a certain affinitie and cognation with Art by means hereof are declared His meaning seems to be this that look as althings made by Art have their Idea in the mind of the Artificer according to which they are framed so althings of Nature have their Idea in the Divine Mind and Wil according to which they are accurately formed Thence he addes And truly the Ancients who were better than we and lived nearer to God delivered to us this report or Tradition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That althings consist of ONE and MANY which are said ever to be 1 That by these Ancients whence this Oriental Tradition came we must understand primarily the Hebrews has been sufficiently demonstrated P. 2. B. 3. C. 2. and elsewhere 2 That by this ancient tradition of One and Many we must understand the Divine Essence and Ideas or Decrees of the Divine Wil seems also manifest Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That we ought things being thus constituted alwaies to inquire after one Idea of every thing in particular and accurately to observe the same c. That by this ONE IDEA which we are to inquire after must necessarily be understood the Decree of the Divine Wil I think wil be evident to any that seriously considers Plato's Philosophemes of the Divine Ideas delivered in his Timaus and Parmenides of which before P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. § 4. And indeed he seems positively to assert Parmenid p. 134. That the Origine of these Ideas cannot be in the object but must be in the Divine Essence and Wil. We shall reduce the whole of our Philosophemes about the Divine Wil to the following Propositions 1. Prop. God primarily Wils himself and althings else in subordination to himself The Object of the Divine Wil. 1. That the Divine Essence is the primary object of the Divine Wil. is most evident 1. because the principal thing willed is to every one the cause of willing if therefore God should have any other principal object of his Wil besides himself he should have something besides himself as the cause of his willing which is impossible for nothing can move the Divine Wil but his own Bonitie 2 The Divine Essence is most amabile and appetible for it self therefore the primary object of the Divine Wil. 3 The primary object of the Wil ought to be equally proportionable thereto for the virtue and efficace of a facultie is measured by its commensuration and Adequation to its primary object and what is equally proportionable to the Divine Wil but the Divine Essence Hence 2 God by willing himself wils althings else in subordination to himself For he that wils an end wils althings else in order thereto God wils althings in order to his own Bonitie The Wil of God terminates on other things so far as they relate to the Divine Bonitie and participate thereof God wils himself Necessarily but althings else so far as they relate to himself Hence 1 God wils al singular Goods so far as they partake of goodness For God willing himself as his last end wils althings so far as they conduce to himself but every thing so far as it is good participates of and tends to the Divine goodness therefore as such it is willed by God Hence 2. Prop. The Wil of God considered in it self is but one simple indivisible pure Act. The Divine Wil one pure Act. Thus Plato Phileb 16. saith we ought always to inquire after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one idea of althings Whereby he notes that the Divine Wil as the origine of all things is but one The multitude of objects willed is no way repuguant with the Unitie and Simplicitie of the Divine Wil for God by one simple act wils himself and althings else Althings are one in the Divine Wil and Bonitie in as much as the Divine Bonitie is the exemplar of al Bonitie and the Divine Wil by one and the same act wils both the Divine Bonitie and al other Bonitie It is otherwise with the Humane Wil which by one act wils the end and by another the means conducing to the end whence the willing the end is the cause of willing the means but in the Divine Wil there is no such causalitie of end and means to be found in as much as by one and the same simple act it wils both end and means and al grant that the same thing cannot be the cause of it self Thence Suaxez Metaple Disput 30. § 16. p. 127 c. proves That Gods Wil is not a real power but the last pure Act for there is no receptive power in God althings that are in God are as actual as his effence and as pure from all Potentialitie Hence 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is most Soverain and Independent The Divine Wil Independent Thus the Platonistes generally assert that the Divine Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without cause and Independent and Plato makes his Divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-subsistent and Independent because althings else depend on them but they on nothing else This Independence and Self-subsistence of the Divine Wil is set forth in Sacred Philosophie under the notion of a Foundation 2 Tim. 2.19 2 Tim. 2.19 The foundation of the Lord standeth sure the Lord knoweth who are his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes the firm purpose of the Divine Wil As those that build great Palaces lay a firm foundation which dependes not on any part of the Structure but the whole Structure dependes on it so God being to build a Celestial House layes the eternal purpose of his own Wil as a self-subsistent independent foundation on which the whole
Nature and not from free election there could nothing be contingent as Suarez and others prove But here occurs a knotty objection What indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God which is thus urged How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent libertie of election when as they are the same with the Divine Essence and so attended with the same natural necessitie This objection has greatly perplexed the acutest Wits among Scholastic Theologues Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. answers thus That between the state of possibilitie and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a prioritie of origination not of time but of nature But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he explicates in what sense it may be said that God could before nil what he now wils It is manifest saith he that God could not either in regard of Time or Eternitie before nil privatively or positively what he now wils but only by a prioritie of Nature or Cause namely by a prioritie of the volutive power in relation to its act By the volutive power we must understand Gods Wil as the effective Principe not that it is really a power in God So Gregor Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 45. pag. 161. answers sundry objections relating to this Hypothesis and at last concludes That the Wil of God as the first Cause of things may be said to be both necessary and contingent necessary as the same with the divine Essence and yet contingent as it might not have willed the futurition and existence of things Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. Disp 7. pag. 114. saith That we may conceive signum rationis a moment of reason before the Decree of the divine Wil determing what should be future And Disput 116. pag. 913. he distinguisheth indifference into privative and negative Negative Indifference he makes to be that which in it self is not more determined to this object than to that or to act than not to act and in this regard addes he the divine Wil was before it determined to create the world in that signo rationis moment of reason indifferent to create or not create the world c. which negative indifference importes no privation of perfection in God Al these solutions are much of the same import and may be resolved into this That the divine Decrees may be considered as they are in themselves and with respect to the divine Essence and so they are necessary or as they terminate on the Creatures and are the cause both of their futurition and existence and so we may ascribe to them a moment of reason nature or causalitie in which they might not have been And this we stile Antecedent Libertie or Libertie of Election which importes no mutabilitie in the divine Wil but only a prioritie of Causalitie which very wel accordes with the necessitie of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Libertie of the divine Wil Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grantes That a necessitie of Immutabilitie agrees to the Divine Wil and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Libertie 9. Prop. Gods Wil is most efficacious and irresistible Gods Wil irresistible This Adjunct of the divine Wil is expressely laid down in sacred Philosophie So Esa 46.10 My counsel shal stand Esa 46.10 and I wil do al my pleasure The like we find in Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The counsel of Jupiter was fulfilled Thus also Rom. 9.19 Who hath resisted his Wil By which the Apostle excludes al manner of resistence not only actual but also possible That the divine Wil is most efficacious and irresistible may be demonstrated 1 from Gods prime universal Causalitie God according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most soverain Cause and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of al second Causes which are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ministerial instrumental Causes of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who gives essence to althings Now the first universal Cause of althings cannot be resisted by any second particular cause For herein lies the difference between the first universal cause and second causes these may fail of their effect by reason of some other cause impeding but the first universal cause can never fail of his effect because he contains under his Jurisdiction and Soverain Power al other causes he that gives Being and Power to althings can be resisted by nothing Now how is God the first universal cause of althings Is it not by his Divine Wil We may not conceive any other causal executive Power in God but his Divine Wil he effectes and operates immediately by his wil without any distinct executive power as we shal prove anon 2 From the Omnipotence of the Divine wil. The Psalmist informes us Psal 115.3 Psal 115.3 and 135.5 6. That God doth whatsoever he pleaseth So Psal 135.5 6. Gods Soverain wil backt with Omnipotence is invincible The Psalmist shews the transcendent universalitie and efficace of the Divine wil above the human men wil what they can do but God can do what he wil because his wil is omnipotent If Gods wil were not Omnipotent he could not do whatever is possible for he workes althings by his wil neither is he on any other account stiled in the Creed Omnipotent or Almighty but because he can do what he wil. The Divine Omnipotent wil alwaies obtains its effect because its volition is its operation it s fiat is its factum esse its word its deed Thence that of Augustin Gods wil is most certain because most potent Of which see more fully Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 46 47. and Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. I wil not saith he have him for my God who is not Omnipotent in Acting who has not a most Omnipotent Dominion over my infirme wil who cannot in the most Omnipotent manner make me to wil and do what he wils who hath not a wil universally efficacious infrustrable indefectible and necessary in causing yea whose wil is not to me necessitie 3 From the Beatitude of God Aristotle as reason assures us that al men do what they wil if they can because herein their Beatitude seems to consist So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And if he could and would he hath also done it for al when they can and wil act for there is no impediment Beatitude is the supreme end of al rational Appetition therefore what men desire they do if they can as Aristotle subnectes Hence the Divine wil if it could not do what it would it should not be blessed because Beatitude is the ultimate terme of al volition So Bradwardine l. 2. c. 27. Yea I constantly and freely avouch I wil not have him for my God whose most blessed wil poor miserable sinful I can when I please pul down from the Throne of his Dignitie and subjugate c. 4 From the Infinitude of
thou wilt thou canst make me clean as elsewhere whereby not only the Deitie of Christ is acknowleged but also the Identitie of his power with his wil that his power is as extensive as his wil or that his wil is omnipotent This Hypothesis touching the Identitie of Gods executive Power with his Wil has been avouched and defended by the most acute Scholastic Theologues Thus Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 10. pag. 197. where he proves That Gods Wil is of it self operative neither may we place in God any other executive power And his reasons are cogent For 1 if there were any thing more required to the production of an effect than the Divine Wil it would thence follow that the Divine Wil is not of it self sufficient to act contrary to the forecited Textes 2 It 's evident that the Wil of God is in some manner operative of it self even as our wils are in moving our own bodies And if the Divine Wil be in one degree operative why not in every degree Doth it need any executive virtue for the supplie of its deficience Is it not omnipotent 3 If any such executive power be placed in God it must naturally mediate between the Divine Wil and effect but this cannot be because the effect necessarily follows upon the Divine Volition The same Hypothesis is defended by Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. conclus 1. We may not place in God besides his Intellect and Wil any third executive power eminently or formally distinct for the production of things But of this more in Gods Efficience Sect. 4. § 3. Prop. 2. § 5. Prop. 4. The object of Gods Power is every thing possible The object of Gods Power every thing possible For every power must have some object adequate thereto and by how much the higher and more universal the power is by so much the more universal is the object and is not the active power of God the first Cause most supreme and universal Must it not then comprehend under its object al possible Entitie And the more fully to understand this we are to understand that a thing may be said to be possible two ways 1 Positively and so that is possible which may be produced by a power Things possible are not said in this sense to be the object of Gods power for then the same thing would be explicated by it self for to say the power of God is extended to althings positively possible is the same as if we should say it is extended to al such things as are by it denominated possible Wherefore 2 a thing may be said to be possible negatively in a way of non-repugnance as it implies not any repugnance of existing and so althings are possible which implie not a contradiction And in this sense things possible are said to be the object of Gods infinite Power What things are impossible which extendes it self to whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of existing For in as much as nothing is more repugnant to Ens than non Ens Ens and non Ens being contradictories it thence follows that whatever involves a contradiction cannot come within the comprehension of Ens possible possible Being but must be simply and of it self impossible God cannot verifie contradictions because they have not a passive power or possibilitie of being verified for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other they cannot be both true because they should not be contradictions if the truth of the one did not necessarily make the other false That what involves a contradiction comes not within the latitude of the object of Gods power is not from any defect of power in God but because the thing has not in it self any possibilitie of existing or of being reduced into act for no power can be denominated such in relation to a terme or effect which implies an impossibilitie of existing as what is contradictorie doth Al power extendes it self to that which can be actuated thereby as al sensitive power is conversant about sensible objects so far as they may be actuated thereby so the power of God is conversant about al possible things so far as they are capable of being actuated thereby Whence it appears that the impossibilitie of contradictions ariseth from the incapacitie of the mater not from any defect in the power of God Now the impossibles which implie a repugnance of being done by God are either such as regard God himself or the Creature or both 1. The Impossibles that regard God himself are either absolutely such or only in some limited sense 1 The Impossibles which regard God himself absolutely are al such as are simply repugnant to the Divine Essence As God cannot deceive or be deceived he cannot sin or be the moral cause of sin he cannot condemne or punish though he may afflict yea torment the innocent or justifie the wicked without a satisfaction 2 The Impossibles that regard God in a limited sense are such as implie a certain mode of acting or a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence 1 Such as implie a certain mode of acting as God cannot exert the natural or vital acts of an animal bodie he cannot eat drinke speak c. in that mode we do c. 2 The Impossibles under a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence are such as these not to do what he has decreed or promised 2. The Impossibles which regard the Creature or the externe object of Gods power are such as destroy the essence of the object Thus God cannot make a Creature independent or not to depend on himself both as to Being and Operation For dependence is essential to a Creature and therefore to suppose a Creature not to depend on God as wel in Operation as Being is to suppose a Creature not to be a Creature as Suarez strongly demonstrates against the Hypothesis of Durandus who denies Gods concurse to the material act of sin Again to suppose that God in the Eucharist should Transubstantiate or commute the Bread into the Bodie of Christ and yet the Quantitie and visible Accidents of the Bread stil remain implies a contradiction because Quantitie or Extension is essential to a bodie Besides this Popish Hypothesis of Transubstantiation implies other contradictions in that it supposeth two bodies to be in the same place or space and the same bodie of Christ to be in two places at once c. In like manner we say God cannot according to the Lutheran Consubstantiation make the bodie of Christ to be at the same time in the Heavens and circumscribed thereby and yet in and with and under the Bread 3. Things impossible both in regand of God and the Creature are such as are repugnant to the Essence of both Thus God cannot by his infinite Power produce an effect equal to himself infinite in Essence For by making an effect infinite he should make his own Essence finite it
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
most extensive as to al effects Doth not every cause by how much the higher it is by so much the more extend it self to varietie of effects Must not God then by being the first Cause necessarily extend his Concurse to al effects 4 From the Providence of God That althings fal under the Providence of God Plato as wel as Scripture greatly proves as we shal hereafter Ch. 8. § 2. shew and if so must not then the Concurse of God universally extend to althings so far as they partake of Being either natural or moral 4. Prop. Gods Concurse in regard of al second causes and objects is principal Gods concurse principal The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophie Esa 53.11 So it 's said of Christ Esa 53.11 He shal see the travel of his Soul Which assures us that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature as wel as of the old and that al Ministers or other Instruments are but as it were Midwifes unto Christ Thence Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 151. brings in Socrates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philosophemes Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus one of his Disciples of great ingenie the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence he professeth That for his part he was but as his Mother a Midwife to assiste the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God compels me to play the Midwife but forbids me to generate Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God reserving only a ministerial subservience to man So great was the modestie of this poor Philosopher beyond many that professe Christianitie Thus Plato Repub. 6. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first and most soverain cause of althings whereas al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were children or effects and products and therefore al their efficience and causalitie is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by commistion with and participation from God the first Cause Thence in his Phaed◠pag. 99. he affirmes that second causes if compared with the first deserve not the name of causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cal these causes is very importune or absued Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is a cause indeed is one thing and that without which a cause is not a cause another Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes 1 One which is truely a cause i. e. the First cause 2 Another which is only causa sine qua non a cause without which the effect is not produced such are al second causes whose ministerie the First cause makes use of yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause in respect of which second causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concauses or subservient causes employed by God for the production of things So in his Timaeus pag. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These are concauses whose ministerie God useth to perfect so far as it may be the idea and forme of what is best But very many estime these to be not concauses but causes of althings But he subjoins Such have no reason or sense for what they assert 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we must say that there is a Soul of althings that existe to whom only belongs the power of Vnderstanding but he is invisible Whence in what follows he expressely distinguisheth between the first and second causes ascribing principal causalitie to the former and ministerial or instrumental to the later There are in these Philosophemes of Plato observable 1 That God is the principal prime cause of althings 2 That al second causes if compared with God deserve not the name of causes but are only concauses or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect 3 That such as ascribe any causalitie to second causes more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause have neither sense nor reason on their side 4 That there is an universal Spirit or Soul which diffuseth it self throughout al create Beings and gives vigor determination and motion to al second causes and effects But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurse of God the first cause How second Causes are Instruments of the first and the ministerial or instrumental causalitie of second causes we must first distinguish and then state and determine our Hypothesis We must distinguish 1 between principal causalitie simply considered and that which is such in its kind and in some respect 2 Between the second cause its respect to the first and its respect to the effect 3 Between an instrument taken in a laxe notion and in a strict also between a moral and a physic Instrument again between an active and passive Instrument lastly between a pure Instrument and a vital elevate Instrument 4 Between effects natural and supernatural These distinctions being premissed we shal state and determine our Hypothesis in the following Propositions 1 The Causalitie of God is simply and universally principal yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind The concurse of God is so far principal as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurse of second causes but second causes can never produce their effects without the concurse of God the first Cause Hinc est quod omnes operationes hominis bonas quantumcunque fiant à libera voluntate tribuere solet augustinus ipsi Deo tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instrumentum quod pro libero suo beneplacito agit impellit flectit vertit inclinat quoliber motus ipsius voluntatis operetur Ipse inquit cantat in nobis cujus gratia cantamus Nempe dicuntur ista non ut homini libera voluntas sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tollatur ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it alone for his omnipotent concurse reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction without the least dependence on any second cause the second cause needs the first in al its operations but the first cause needs not the second in any Yea where the first and second cause concur to the same effect the concurse of the first cause is infinitely more principal than that of the second because the second cause actes not but as acted by the first cause The Excitation Application Determination and Actuation of the second cause is from the first Yet we may not denie a principal efficience to some second causes so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects as it wil appear by what follows
2 Al second Causes if compared with the first are but instruments of his principal concurse Thus not only Aquinas Bradwardine and the more sane Scholastics but also Averroes de Somno Vigilia where he affirmes That second causes are moved by the first as instruments by the Artificer But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Scholes Whether the Wil in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause According to the former distinctions I should answer 1 That according to the general notion of an Instrument the Wil may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument yet as it actes Grace it is an active instrument 2 That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Instrument a rational Instrument an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God In receiving the first Grace the Wil is only naturally remotely and passively vital as it is a piece of human Nature but in the actuating what Grace is received it is a spiritually vital instrument Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitalitie and Instrumentalitie for the acting of Grace Hence 3 the Wil may as to the acting of Grace so far as it is clothed with Divine habits be termed in some respect a principal Agent under God specially if compared with the effect produced It 's true if the Wil be compared with God even in the acting of Grace received it is but a mere instrument because both Habit and Act are received from God yet if we consider the Wil as invested and qualified with supernatural habits which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Bodie whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects in this regard we may stile it a principal cause though I must confesse the notion of an Instrument used by Aquinas and others seems more adequate and genuine to expresse its causalitie by in as much as al is from God by supernatural infusion § 3. Having inquired into the Concurse of God in regard of its object Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with Gods Wil. we now procede to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature The Scholastic Theologues in their debates about the concurse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Wil are greatly divided some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or motion of God whereby the Wil is determined to consent and act others in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a transient qualitie together with the operation of the Wil others in the very operation of the second cause or Wil as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination whereby the first cause makes the second to act others place this concurse as to gratiose effects in certain pious inspirations cogitations and indeliberate motions of love injected by God Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place if we consider the concurse of God with relation to its passive Attingence or as it terminates on the second cause and effect yet if we take it strictly according to its formal Idea I conceive no one of these opinions explicate the true nature thereof Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurse we must consider what relation it has to the Divine Wil whether it be really distinct therefrom or not And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. § 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil which being supposed as it has been demonstrated it naturally follows that Gods concurse as to is active Attingence and effective principe is nothing else but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God For Gods executive power being the same with his Effective Wil it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is the same also Hence Sacred Philosophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made and governed or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal 39.9 and 115.3 and 135.6 Mat. 8.2 3. 2 Chron. 20.6 and elsewhere as before C. 5. § 4. Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades that Athenian Gallant in this manner Doest thou know saith Socrates by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind Alcibiad Yes Socrat. How Alcibiad If thou wilt O Socrates i. e. by thy precepts and institutes Socrat. Thou mayst not say so Alcibiad How then Socrat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if God wil. Meaning that Gods wil was omnipoten and so could without more ado merely by his act of volition worke virtue in young Alcibiades But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis namely That the Divine Wil is of it self operative we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God as the first cause of althings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered Gods concurse not his essence absolutely considered For 1 If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered he should act althings by a natural necessitie not with any precedent Libertie and then Gods making the world yea things most contingent would be as absolutely and naturally necessary as his loving himself It 's true Gods loving himself and al other immanent Acts have a concomitant Libertie or Divine spontaneitie attending them yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind But now Gods workes ad extra such as terminate on the Creature have not only a Concomitant but also Antecedent Libertie or some kind of Indifference so that God could according to a signum rationis or prioritie of nature not have willed them 2 If God should worke althings by his Essence absolutely considered things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future and so Gods Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision And the reason of the consequence is most evident because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible which shal never be as to things future which are to be 3 Again Gods Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate and his Sufficience the same with his Efficience if he wrought al things by his Essence absolutely considered 4 Hence also it would follow that God should alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in al operations For Causes that worke from a Necessitie of Nature worke to the utmost of their power 2. Prop. Gods concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God No executive
And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent What then can we suppose should impede Divine Providence 3 Al providence supposeth an Act of the Wil and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious Bradwardine frequently assertes and demonstrates That God permits nothing but what he wils It 's true man oft permits things that he neither wils nor doth because he cannot hinder them but there is no mere permission with God without some Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie Efficacitie and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282 c. spends a whole Chapter to prove That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God not only permitting but actually disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative As 1 Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner 2 The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence c. And then Cap. 33. he demonstrates That where-ever there is any permission of God there also is his actual Volition Hence 2. 2. Immobile and fixed Gods Providence gives to al second Causes and Events a most immobile immutable fixed and certain order things most contingent and free as to second causes are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence Hence the Stoics as also Plato expressed this fixed order of providence by Fate which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternitie whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence That providence puts into things a fixed immutable order is evident because 1 nothing fals out but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wisdome and an omnipotent Wil. 2 Al particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient to the Universal Cause and therefore subject to his Order Yea this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain because it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil Efficience and Gubernation as more fully anon 3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it workes upon The Necessitie and Immobilitie 3. Connatural and agreable that attendes the Providence of God doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes but confirme the same Therefore men act freely because the Providence of God determines them so to act So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence because it determines althings to act according to their Natures it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Wil but sweetly though necessarily moves it to the end appointed Gods manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them For 1 Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power Virtue and Efficacitie to worke 2 Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigor imparted 3 Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence 4 Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly yet powerfully order the manner of working as also perfect the same Is it not then most sweet and connatural in al its Executions Hence 4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect 4. Beautiful and perfect al its executions are in Number Weight and Measure Doth not the Wise Man assure us Eccles 3.11 That every thing is beautiful in its season Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God What are al the travels and births of time but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light Have not al issues and events not only natural and necessary but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits constituted by Divine Providence which renders them most beautiful and perfect Are not those very products which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed most beautiful in their time and place as they relate to Divine Providence Is not God infinitely wise to order althings in the best manner And is he not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees Is not that which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed in regard of Gods Providence and Execution most beautiful as Christs Crucifixion What must we say of al that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches Persons and Things Doth it reach the Providence of God Is it not only in regard of second causes and our mistakes as to the first cause Cannot yea wil not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of al this confused chaos It 's true Sacred Philosophie tels us of evil dayes which should come to passe in this last Scene of the World but whence springs the evil of these later days Is it not from the Lusts of Men not the Providence of God Are not the worst of days Naturally good yea Morally also to those who are good and do good Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil If Men were better would not the Times soon prove better Yea are not those very Disorders and Confusions that arise from the Lusts of Men ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole As in Nature varietie addes Beautie so in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beautiful It was a great saying of a Stoic He that wil take upon him to mend things let him first take upon to mend God Certainly nothing is done by God but that which to leave undone were not so good Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts are not so if we consider the whole Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved that God provides and governes althings according to his most wise Wil he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature or Essentially As therefore he is good he provides for he that provides not for such as are under his care is not good but as he is wise he takes care to provide the best things Therefore it becomes us attending to these things to admire al to praise al to receive without curiose inquisition al the workes of Providence albeit they may seem to many injust because incognite and incomprehensible as in what follows That the Providence of God is most perfect see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 28. p. 270. 5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible 5. Mysterious The Providences of God are much like his Being very ful of mysteries So Psal 36.6 The Judgements of God are said to
which being cast out of the neast by their Parents and very much affected with hunger slie up and down the Air making loud cries Which seems to agree to that of Job 38.41 Thus Aristotle and Elian tel us that the young Ravens are expelled from their neast by the old ones To this sense Vossius Mcy and others incline The former sense of the Hebrews is refuted by Calvin as also by Bochart de Animal Tom. 2. p. 203 c. who makes this case of the young Ravens the same with that of the young Lions Job 39.39 Psal 34.10 and 104.21 both of which by reason of their vehement appetite and unskilfulnesse to acquire food suffer great hunger and are in a more than ordinary manner supplied by the Providence of God What extraordinary provision God makes for the conservation of his own People wil hereafter occur in the Gubernation of God 6. Prop. The Conservation of a Creature and its first Creation or Production as they refer both to God differ only mentally Conservation continued Creation Creation gives Being and Existence unto things Conservation Continuation in Being Something 's are conserved immediately by God becuase subject only to him as Spirits That the conservation of such differs only mentally from their Creation is evident Other things are conserved by God not so immediately as to exclude Means yet so as that God conserves them immediately in and by those means Now that the conservation of such things also as to Gods immediate conservative influxe differs not really but only mentally from thier first production is manifest because conservation as to God whether it be by means or without means is but one act continued from the first instant of its Creation or Production not that there is any real intrinsec succession in Gods Active Conservation which is no other than his most simple volition but we conceive Gods Passive Conservation as successive in regard of the Creatures Duration Thonce Aquinas and his Sectators hold That Conservation is a continued Creation Which must not be understood of proper continuation but according to our manner of understanding or by reason of its coexistence to true continued succession For continuation properly so termed is only in things divisible but Creation and Conservation are one indivisible act without any successive duration or real continuation as to God but only a most simple indivisible permanence as Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. Sect. 2. p. 343. demonstrates Hence we may easily understand how Creation or the first production of things and their Conservation as to God differ only Mentally For the difference is only according to the different mode of our conception and expression Things are not said to be conserved in the first moment of their production nor to be Created in regard of their subsequent continuation For Creation connotes a negation of precedent Being but conservation on the contrary connotes the possession of Being before produced Creation includes a Novitie of Essence which conservation excludes and conservation includes precedent Existence which Creation excludes Nehem. 9.6 Thus Conservation is continued Creation as Nehem. 9.6 where God is said to preserve althings made by one and the same Act. John 5.17 So John 5.17 My Father hitherto worketh and I worke i. e. for the Conservation as wel as the first production of things neither are these Acts as to Divine Efficience really distinct albeit we may distinguish them as to second causes and means used by God for the production and conservation of things 7. Prop. Divine Conservation as to its Objects and Effects is various The Object of Divine Conservation Albeit the Conservation of God be in it self one simple Act not different from the first production of things save by some connotation only yet it admits various Objects and Effects 1 God conserves Individuals some to al Eternitie without the least corruption or alteration as Angels and Human Souls Other Individuals shal be conserved for ever yet not without some alteration and resinement as the celestial Bodies c. 2 Pet. 3.10 12. 2 Such Individuals as are the effects of Natural Generation or Production God conserves in their Species and in the whole for the corruptions and defects of some parts belong to the Constitution and Continuation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the whole Vniverse unto which there is more regard to be had than to any part albeit the parts also are conserved in their Species when they decay as to their individual Natures 3 God conserves also the vigor virtue and efficacitie of al second causes together with their Operations so long as they are existent CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin God the Supreme Gubernator The end of Divine Gubernation It s Order most perfect and immobile It hath the force of a Law Its use of means It s extent to althings Gods Gubernation as to Men particularly as to Sinners and Sin The Origine of Sin and its causes God not the Author of Sin How God is the cause of the material act of Sin How far Sin fals under the Divine Wil. Gods Wil about Sin Permissive not merely Negative but Ordinative Gods Judicial Gubernation of Sin What Attributes of God are most illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin § 1. HAving discussed the Conservation of God Divine Gubernation we now descend to his Gubernation whereof we find illustrious notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophemes touching Divine Gubernation they are very many and great as it may appear in the particulars thereof I shal at present give only the mention of Platonic Contemplations concerning it Thus Plato Phileb p. 28. What O Protarchus may we determine that althings and this which is called the Vniverse are governed by a certain temerarious power void of Reason as Fortune wil Or rather on the contrary should we not affirme with our Ancestors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the eternal Mind and a certain admirable Wisdome ordering al in the most accurate manner doth governe He saith that according to the Opinion of the Ancient Wise Men the Providence of God governes and moderates althings in the wisest manner and with the best order Thus also Iamblichus saith That the Egyptians when they introduce God under the Symbolic Image of one that governes a Ship thereby signifie his Domination and Empire as Gubernator of the Universe For as a Gubernator of a Ship in one moment doth easily move governe and direct the Ship so doth God the world We find the same similitude used by Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 as before Hence this Gubernation of God is that act of Divine Providence whereby he directes governes and brings al his Creatures to their proper ends in the most orderly manner This general Idea of Divine Gubernation may be resolved into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God is the Supreme Moderator God the Supreme Gubernator Eccles 8.4 Soverain Gubernator and absolute
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars 1 God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace and means of restraint Thus Gen. 6.3 My Spirit shal not always strive with man How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace as Zach. 7.12 14.17 18 Hence 2 God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts which is Plato notes is the worst judgement 3 God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World Thus Balaam Num. 22 c. 2 Pet. 2.14 15. 4 God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan 2 Cor. 4.3 4. 2 Tim. 2.26 5 God so orders and disposeth his providences as that al do accidentally by reason of their corrupt hearts tend to their induration Rom. 11.9 10 11. 6 Yea God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death 2 Cor. 2.16 Esa 28.12 13 14. 7 Yea the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death Esa 8.14 15 16. 38.13 8 God leaves them to a spirit of slumber or spiritual occecasion Rom. 11.8 Esa 19 11-14 44.18 19. 60.1 2. 2 Thes 2.10 11. 9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdome Justice and Sanctitie Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent 1 Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God he turnes to the advance of his Glorie We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato Theaetet pag. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good and to seem such as a wise Physician turnes poison into a medicament which similitude he useth 2 The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be 3 Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous in that those very acts which are morally evil in regard of God are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God but of the Creature that comes short of the Divine Law The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner that violates his Law The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause Duo cùm faciunt idem non est idem Proverb but only to the second particular cause Here that commun Proverbe holds true When two do the same it is not the same i. e. the same sinful act whereto God and the Sinner both concur is not the same as to both but morally evil as to the Sinner and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse not a privation of any thing due neither doth God wil sin simply as sin under that Reduplication but only as good and conducible to his Glorie The reason of Gods willing and governing sin both in the Elect and Reprobate is univocally one and the same namely the advance of Divine Glorie For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it which God wils and orders for his Glorie There is nothing in the world purely simply and of it self evil if there were God who is the chiefest good could not wil it Lastly man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive ordinative and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose men and Angels Supernatural Illumination from God The Infusion of Virtues Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World The Angels Law Obedience and Disobedience Good Angels their Communion with Saints The Ministration of Angels 1 At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation 2 For the Protection of Saints 3 For their Conduct 4 Their Sympathie with Saints Their Ministration at the final Judgement Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels Satans power to temt and his Limitation § 1. Supernatural Illumination from God HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof as it belongs to Christian Theologie but only as it fals under metaphysic or prime Philosophie termed by some Natural Theologie 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue Thus in his Theages he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If it please God thou shalt profit much and speedily otherwise not So in his Philebus he assures us That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God to men The like Epinom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How is it that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things and not much more of wisdome which is the best good But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination we are to know that as there is a twofold spiritual Darknesse the one objective in the things to be known the other subjective in the mind that is to know them so proportionably there is a twofold Light the one objective whereby God reveles the things to be known the other subjective whereby God takes off the veil from the mind and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end 1 God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light or Divine Revelation of his Wil whereby he reveles mans supernatural end and the means conducing thereto Some imperfect fragments or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens Pythagoras Solon Socrates Plato which gave them sufficient cause to admire and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws as the Fountain of the best Wisdome as it was foretold by Moses Deut. 4.5 6 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts Whence we find mention in Plato Minos pag. 317. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word which if I mistake not refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God for its conduct unto eternal life 2 As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective so also by a subjective Light which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507 508. where he
makes an incomparable parallel between natural Vision and Divine Illumination In natural Vision saith he there must be a visive Facultie an Object visible and Light to discerne the Object This Light is derived from the Sun which is the principal and next cause of Vision For addes he as oft as the eyes are converted to such things as are illustrated by the Sun vision in the eyes is very apparent Then he draws up his parallel pag. 509. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus also thinke of the mind For when that in which Truth itself and Being itself shines forth inheres in it it doth consider and understand the same and then it seems to have an illuminated Mind and Divine Intellect Wherein observe 1 That God who is Being itself as also Truth itself or the first Truth 2 That before there can be any true light in the mind this first Truth must shine forth and irradiate the same 3 That when God illuminates the mind there is not only a transient but a fixed light firmely impressed on it This Divine Light doth become one with the mind and so formes conformes reformes yea transformes it into the things known 4 That the Intellect thus illuminated becomes truely Divine Thence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That therefore that gives truth to those things that are known as also a facultie to know them cal thou the IDEA OF GOOD namely the cause of Science and Truth which is understood by the Intellect Note here that 1 he cals God considered as the Fountain of al Illumination the Idea of Good i. e. the supreme Idea of al Perfection and Truth in whose light alone we can see light 2 He saith that this Idea of good gives truth to those things that are known i. e. al objective wisdome impressed on things as also al objective Revelation whereby things mysterious are reveled 3 Also a facultie to know things intelligible i. e. subjective Illumination and Light both habitual and actual 4 Hence this Idea of good is the cause of al Science and Truth which is understood The sectators of Plato thus explicate his mind about Divine Illumination 1 They make God to be the true essentia Wisdome Thus Plotinus En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The true Wisdome is Essence and again the true Essence is Wisdome i. e. God who is Essence itself is Wisdome itself 2 This essential Wisdome or Light doth illuminate al but is illuminated by none as the Sun gives light to althings but receives not light from any thing 3 The create finite Intellect being irradiated by this essential light of life is invested with true formes and Ideas of things and is thereby conducted into the knowlege of things mysterious and Divine This Divine Illumination is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophie and generally acknowleged by the Greek Theologues Chrysostome stiles it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The illuminant Intellect the superne Grace the gift of the Grace of God not of human Nature Greg. Neocaesar Orat. Panegyr 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest gift of God and the illustrious afflate from Heaven And the reasons which enforce the necessitie of such a Divine Illumination for the apprehending of supernatural Truths are taken from the sublimitie of the Object and the imperfection of the human Intellect we find both conjoined 1 Cor. 2.14 The animal man is not capable of the things of the Spirit 1 Cor. 2.14 c. By the animal man we are to understand every man void of supernatural light by which alone things spiritual are discerned for al knowlege supposeth some proportion between the Object and the apprehensive Facultie now what proportion is there between the natural Intellect and supernatural Truths Can an animal facultie take in spiritual objects Is it possible then that the natural mind may by its own force without Divine Illumination reach supernatural Mysteries Thence saith Augustin de Trinit l. 14. c. 7. Tho human intellect cannot apprehend sublimer intelligibles unlesse it be fortified and perfected by a stronger light And Greg. Nyssenus 2. in Eunom assures us That it appertains to the Father Son and holy Spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to illuminate minds with the light of Divine knowlege Whence this Divine illumination is stiled by the Greek Theologues 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 illumination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 irradiation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 illustrant Grace 2. Having explicated Divine Illumination The Infusion of Virtues we now procede to treat of the infusion of al other supernatural Habits or Virtues whereby the Rational Creature is governed and conducted to his last end That al true moral and supernatural good is no way attainable but by Divine infusion is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophie Thus also in the Theologie of the Grecians it was frequently inculcated 1 That no one could 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 avoid the snares of sin but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he who was assisted and fortified by God as Basil Eth. c. 3. So Greg. Nyssen Orat. 3. in Orat. Domin Tom. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that wil avoid domineering sin must cal God for his succur alwaies having him in his eye who exerciseth him by tentations 2 That al true moral or supernatural good comes from God by Divine infusion This gratiose infusion of Virtue by God was by various and emphatic notions illustrated by the Greek Fathers who terme medicinal efficacious Grace the Spring of this supernatural Infusion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the salutarie Grace also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 manuducent and assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine infusion or inspiration For say they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we can do any thing morally good is from the impulse of God Yea they make not only the first infusion but also the prosecution and conservation of al moral good to be from God Whence Divine Grace is termed by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persequent or actuating and conservant Grace Hence 3 the Act whereby the Soul is turned from Vice to Virtue is termed by the Greek Theologues 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Restauration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Revocation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discession 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 putting off the old man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Progresse from a bad state to a good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transmutation of Soul Of which see more in what precedes of efficacious Concurse c. 7. It was a great Question among the ancient Philosophers Whether Virtue came by institution or by Divine afflation and infusion The Cynics and Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Virtue was teachable as Laertius But Socrates and Plato his sectator held the contrary So Plato Protag pag. 361. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is not a thing that may be taught or gained by institution This he more copiosely demonstrates in his Meno pag. 89. where he proves 1 That men are not good or virtuose