and deserved it by sin In a word that mans destruction is of himself but his help of God who resolvedly chooseth some to salvation and helpeth them accordingly with that effectual grace and especial perseverance which he justly giveth not to others though if he would he could SECT XXIII Healing Principles and Concessions of the Synod of Dort c. 666. I Know not how to conclude this discourse more suitably to my ends than by opening to the Reader who is sensible of the Churches sin misery and danger by our contentions and divisions how much the parties whom I endeavour to reconcile are agreed in judgement about these matters and that in their own words Remember still that it is not some few that run further than the rest either Episcopius Curcellâ—â—â— c. on one side or Maccovius Rutherford or Dr. Twisse or Alvarez and other Predeterminants on the other side whose particular opinions I cannot undertake to reconcile But only the generality of the Calvinists who go no further than the Synod of Dort which is my test of the party and the moderate Arminians Lutherans and Jesuits in these points on the other side And let none reproach me for putting in the Jesuites for as I know that very few Calvinists fly near so high for Predetermination as the Dominicans do so I know that though Arminius himself was a sober man and Episcopius is cryed up by some as Volkelius and other Socinians are by others as most clearly rational yet there is none of them all that equal in accurateness of search and clearness of reason either many of the ancient Schoolmen or Suarez Ruiz Vasquez Albertinus and many other latter School Jesuits 667. The first thing that I will desire of the Reader is to peruse those many healing concessions contained in the writings especially Irenicons of many Learned Calvinists already extant Especially Davenants two dissertations Dr. Sam. Wards works the Judgements of Davenant Morton Hall to Dury about this Bishop Robert Abbots and Bishop Carltons works oft on the by Bishop Usher of Redemption c. Mr. Fennâ—r of wilful Impenitency and Hidden Manna Joh. Bergius for Reconcil Iâ—dov Crocii Syntag. Conrad Bergii Praxis Can. Junii Irenicon and of predeterm Paraei Irenicon Amyrald Defens doct Calv. Irenicon Testard de nat Grat. Hotton de toler Theses Salmur but above all Le Blanks Theses Vossii Thess Histor Pelag. Musculi Loc. Commun And the geral Irenicons as all Durie's Hall's Peacemaker and Pax terris Burroughs Iren. Acontii stratagem Satana an excellent book c. 668. Next I will insert some words to this end in the Synod of Dort I. About the first Article of Predestination they open free election but mention no other Reprobation but Gods not-electing or passing by some whom he found in sin and in the misery in quam se suâ culpâ praecipitarunt c. and not giving them effectual grace of Conversion but leaving them in their sin And can any doubt of this or do any Jesuits or Arminians deny it Where also they declare that God is no cause of mens sin but themselves And that the Children of the faithful are by Covenant so holy that their salvation who dye in infancy is not to be doubted of And that those that find not saving grace in themselves but yet use the means have no cause to be cast down at the mention of Reprobation 669. II. About Christs death they say that His satisfaction is of infinite value and price abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of all the world And that the promise is that whoever believeth shall not perish which is to be preached to all And that many yet repent not believe not but perish is not through any defect or insufficiency of Christs sacrifice but by their own fault And that others believe is of undeserved grace 670. III. In the third and fourth Art sect 8 9. they say that the fault is not in Christ or the Gospel that many that are called are not converted and come not nor in God that calleth them and giveth them many gifts but in the called themselves that receive not the word of life c. And that you may see that they hold a conditional will or decree not only of future but of non-future contingents they say that As many as are called by the Gospel are seriously called and God seriously and truly sheweth by his word what would be acceptable to him viz. that the called come to him So that here is a serious declaration of Gods will to those that never will come to him conditionally if they would come These kind of notions please or displease men as the interest of their opinions requireth 671. And the confession of Pet. Molinaeus received by the Synod is worthy observation pag. 290 291. where he saith Sin is the Meritorious Cause of Destination to punishment And Though natural corruption be cause sufficient for Reprobation as we kill new spawned Not only of punishment it self Serpents before they hurt any yet there is no doubt but that for what cause God damneth men for the same he decreed to damn them But he damneth reprobates for sins committed For they suffer in hell not only for original sin but for all actual sins whence is the inequality of punishment Therefore God Decreed to damn them for the same sins For nothing hindereth but that God who considereth men in natural corruption and pravity may consider them also polluted in the actual sins which they will thence commit And among the sins for which any one is Destinated to punishment no doubt is unbelief and rejection of the Gospel No reason suffereth that he should be Reprobated for rejecting of the Gospel to whom the Gospel was never revealed That God destinated any to eternal punishment without consideration of impenitence and unbelief we neither say nor think And though God predestinate the Elect to faith he doth not predestinate the Reprobate to unbelief For we must distinguish the media which God findeth in men from those which he maketh He findeth in men unbelief the means of damnation But faith he findeth not but maketh Therefore he predestinateth to faith but not to unbelief For he predestinateth but to that which he decreed to make Lastly Impenitence in order goeth before Reprobation but faith is after Election as being its effect Is not here enough to reconcile And next of Christs death he saith that It is abundantly sufficient to save all men in the world if they would believe And that all are not saved by it is not through the insufficiency of Christs death but of their pravity and unbelief 672. And pag. 295. he saith that Arminius holdeth irresistible grace and that the Elect are drawn of God by effectual grace whose effect is most certain and infallible by Congruity 673. The Brittish Divines in their Suffrage say that Pag. 11. Th. 1. Expl. God in the decree of Election prepareth Glory
but so far yield to as they can have a tendency to thâ—â—â— recovery All these twenty sorts of means and mercies Christ giveth to all or to more than the Elect. 96. It being certain de re that Christ so far died for all as to procure them all such Benefits as he giveth them the question remaining iâ— de nomine whether it be a fit phrase to say that Christ died for all And this is put out of question by the Scripture which frequently useth it as is proved by the fore-cited Texts We may well speak as God ordinarily there speaketh 97. There are certain fruits of Christ's death which are proper to the Elect or those that are in a state of Salvation As 1. Grace eventually Rom. 8. 30 31. Act. 26. 18. 1 Joh. 5. 11 12. Joh. 15. 1 2 6. Eph. 1. 22 23. Col. 1. 19. Eph. 3. 17. Act. 5. 31. 13. 38 39. Col. 1. 13 14. Rom. 5. 1 c. Tit. 3. 5 6 7. 1 Pet. 1. 3 4. Psal 50. 15. 46. 1. Rev. 22. 9. Heb. 1. 14. effectual working them to true Faith Repentance and Converâ—â—on 2. Union with Christ the Head as his true living members 3. The actual forgiveness of sin as to the grand spiritual and the eternal punishment Rom. 4. 1. 7. 8. 1. 33 34. 4. Our actual Reconciliation with God so as to be beloved as his peculiar people 5. Our Adoption and Right to the heavenly Inheritance Psal 4. 6. 8. 16 17 18. 6. The Spirit of Christ to dwell in us and sanctifie us by a habit of Divine Love Rom. 8. 9 13. Gal. 4. 6. Col. 3. 10. 1 Pet. 1. 16. 2 Pet. 1. 4. 1 Joh. 4. 15. Joh. 3. 5 6. 1 Cor. 6. 19. Gal. 5. 17 18 22. 2 Cor. 6. 1. 7. Imployment in sincere holy acceptable Service where they and their duties are pleasing to God Heb. 11. 5 6. 1 Pet. 2. 5 9. 8. Access in prayer with a promise of being heard in all that 's good for us in Gods measure time and way through Christ Joh. 14. 13 14. Heb. 10. 19 20 22. 9. Well-grounded hopes of Salvation and peace of Conscience thereupon Rom. 5. 1 2 3 4 c. 10. Spiritual communion with the Church-mystical in Heaven and Earth Heb. 12. 22 23 24. Eph. 2. 19 20 21 22. 1 Cor. 3. 22. 11. A special interest in Christ's Intercession with the Father Rom. 8. 32 33 c. 12. Resurâ—ection unto Life and Justification in Judgment Glorification of the Soul at Death and of the Body at the Resurrection Phil. 3. 20 21. â— Cor. 5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7. Rom. 8. 17 18 30 32 35 36 37 c. All these Benefits Christ hath made a conditional Deed of Gift to all the world But only the Elect accept them and possess them From whence we certainly infer that Christ never absolutely intended or decreed that his death should eventually put all men in possession of these Benefits And yet that he did intend and deâ—ree that by his death all men should have a conditional Gift of them As Dr. Twisse doth frequently assert 98. Christ therefore died for all but not for all equally or with the same intent design or purpose So that the case of difference in the matter of Redemption is resolved into that of Predestination and is but Gods different Decrees about the effects of Redemption 99. The particle For when we question whether Christ died For All is ambiguous 1. It may mean In the strict representation of the â—ersons of all as several so that they may be said to have died or satisfied â—n and by him as civilly in their own persons though not naturally And thus Christ died not for all or for any man which yet is in some mens conceits who thence say that Christ died not for all because he did not so personate all 2. It may signifie to die by the procurement of all â—ens sins as the assumed promeritorious cause And thus Parâ—â—â— himself in his Irenicon saith That the sins of all men lay on Christ and so he died for all that is for all mens sins as the cause of his death And you may tell any wiâ—ked man Thy sins killed Christ what-ever the deniers say to excuse them 3. Or it meaneth that Christ died finâ—lly for the good of all men And that is true as afore explained He died for the good of all but not equally that is not with the same absolute Will Decree or Intention of attaining their Salvation 100. But the conditional New Covenant without any difference in the tenor of it doth equally give Christ Pardon and Life to all Mankind antecedently to mens rejecting the offer on condition of acceptance And Christ equally satisfied Gods Justice for all the lapsed Race of Adam so far as to procure them this Gift or Covenant and the other foresaid common mercies But not equally as to his Decree of the success For there Election differenceth 101. It is a thing so contrary to the nature of Christianity and the Spirit of Christ in his Saints to extenuate Christ's Merits Purchase Interest or Honour or rob him of his due that doubtless so many sincere Christians would never be guilty of such injurious extenuations and narrowing of Christ's successes but that they cannot reconcile special Grace with universal and mistakingly judge them inconsistent Nor durst opprobriously reproach his universal Grace as they do by calling it vain lame imperfect a mockery c. if the conceit of their defending some truth by it did not quiet and deceive their Consciences Whereas indeed universal Grace and special do as perfectly and harmoniously consist as Nature and Grace do and as the foundation and the building and as any generical and specifick Natures And so doth a general Decree that All who will believe shall be saved and that this Promise shall be made to the world with a special Decree that Paul shall believe and be saved But on two accounts I pass by all the rest about the extent of Redemption 1. Because I must give you a special Disputation or Tractate on that subject 2. Because the most Judicious of English Divines so far as I can know them by their works Bishop Davenant hath said so much in his two Posthumous Dissertation de Redempt Praedestinat Published out of the hands of Bishop Usher as might suffice to reconcile contenders on these two points were not men slothful in studying them or partial or incapable in judging of these matters SECT VII The Antecedent and consequent Will of God c. 102. The distinction of Gods Antecedent and Consequent Will used by Damascene is by many applyed to this controversie but by none that I have read sufficiently explained which is the cause that so many good men reject it because they misunderstand it It 's truly said that by his Antecedent Will God would have all men to believe repent and be saved but by his Consequent Will
circumstantially but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency as the first Cause besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances or can forbear to act when so predetermined is by consequence to say that such a creature is God the first cause For it is as impossible as to be God or to make a World III. Yea the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to must be stronger than God and overcome him or do contradictions IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion he could not have known any future acts No though with Scotus we say that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience it would not serve unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them V. Yet we will say that the Will is free but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth and his Willing is not a Nilling VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis rationis â—d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum ad agendum unum vel alterum sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur That is it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will by making it will yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive but also Active because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth God predetermineth the will to determine it self VII We will call this the wills Power but it is but hypothetically a Power viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it else not at all As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them or rather as the hand can move if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it VIII The will is said to be free partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God and then by it self ad utrumlibet and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction IX The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God is not constrained because it willeth not unwillingly that is so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant X. Yet the will that was one way enclined habituated and acted in the precedent instant is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant which it could not resist As he that in this instant wilâ—eth Chastiâ—y may in tâ—e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipâ—tency to will fornication or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment But we will not call this irresistible efficiency coaction because it is ad Volendum and so in ipso actâ— there is no reluctancy or resistance XI When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill or not will to will this or that and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such yet the moral specification of that Act to this proposed object rather than that as to hate God rather than to hate sin or to this Act rather than to that as to hate God rather than to Love him or to speak a lye rather than the truth hath so much Entity in it that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say that man can do it without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion XII God made the Law which forbiddeth sin and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law and God made and ordereth all the objects temptations and concauses and God by the said efficient physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances As when David was deliberating Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it or else he could not possibly have done it And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum fundamentum terminum nor can it possibly be but it must exist per nudam resultantiam hisce positis And yet though God make the man the Law the act the object and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a meer relation we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin XIII Yea though the Habits of sin are certain Entities and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature according to our principles who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity yet we are resolved to say that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin XIV Yet we will say that he is an enemy to Gods Providence that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness unless God thus predetermine both Will Tongue Hand and every active part to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale but not as to the formale And yet we must confess that the Relation is caused by causing the subject foundation and term all which God principally doth and can be caused no otherwise XVI But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation which is nothing Therefore man and not God is the cause of it For God cannot be a deficient cause nor have any privation And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience in curvity as in rectitude in disconformity as in conformity 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations such as death is though not a subject of them even such a cause as they can have 3. Nor that some of ours even Alvarez say that sins of commission and habits are positive in their formale 4. And sin is such a Nothing as is mans misery and he is damned for and by And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause man can no more be the cause of it than God 5. And that the Reason of non existences negations or privations is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the first necessary cause of the contrary as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency And if a man cannot
become parties in such daring medlings with the Consuming Fire Notes on some passages of Mr. Peter Sterries Book of Free-will § 1. IT is long since I heard much of the name and fame of Mr. Peter Sterry long Chaplain to Robert Lord Brook and after to Oliver Cromwel when he was Protector as then called His common fame was that his Preaching was such as none or few could understand which incensed my desire to have heard him of which I still mist though I oft attempted it But now since his death while my Book is in the Press unfinished a posthumous tractate of his cometh forth of Free-will upon perusal of which I find in him the same notions for so far as he meddleth with the same subjects as in Sr. H. Vane and somewhat of what Dr. Gibbon seemeth to deliver in his Scheme but all handled with much more strength of parts and raptures of highest devotion and great candour towards all others than I expected His Preface is a most excellent Perswasive to Universal Charity Love was never more extolled than throughout his Book Doubtless his head was strong his wit admirably pregnant his searching studies hard and sublime and I think his Heart replenished with holy Love to God and great charity moderation and peaceableness toward men In so much that I heartily repent that I so far believed fame as to think somewhat hardlier or less charitably of him and his few adherents than I now hope they did deserve Hasty judging and believing fame is a cause of unspeakable hurt to the world and injury to our brethren § 2. But I find that it is no wonder that he was understood by few For 1. His sublime and philosophical notions met not with many Auditors so well studied in those things as to be capable of understanding them It is a great inconvenience to men of extraordinary discoveries and sublimity that they must speak to very few 2. And though he cloud not his matter with so many self-made names and notions as Behmen Paraâ—elsus Wigelius and some others yet those few that he hath do somewhat obscure it 3. But above all the excessive pregnancy of his wit produceth so great a superabundance of Metaphors or Allegories that about the description of Christ especially they make up almost all his style so that to any ordinary Reader his matter is not so much cloathed in Metaphors as drowned buried or lost And though I confess my wit being to his but as a barren Desart to a florid Meadow may be apt to undervalue that which it attaineth not yet I do approve of my present judgement in thinking that seeing all metaphorical terms are ambiguous he that excessively useth them befriendeth not the Truth and the hearers intellect but while he is too much a Rhetorician he is too little a good Logician aâ—d as he is hardly understood by others I should fear lest he feduce his own understanding and can scarce have clear mental conceptions of that matter which he utters by a torrent of ambiguous Metaphors if he think as he speaketh and his words be the direct expressions of his mind I had rather be instructed in the words of the most barbarous Schoolman adapted to the matter than to be put to save my self from the temptation of equivocations in every sentence which I hear and to search after that Truth which is known only naked under so florid a disguise and paint § 3. But I cannot deny that though my temptations before were very great to doubt whether the Doctrine of Universally-necessary Predetermination as delivered by Bradwardine the Dominicans Dr. Twisse Rutherford and Hobbes were indeed to be rejected the Reading of Mr. Sterry increased my temptation not by any new strength of argument which he hath brought but by the power of his pious florid Oratory by which while he entitleth God to the necessitating causation of all sin and misery he seemeth to put so honourable and lovely a cloathing on them from their relative order to God to the Universe and to their End as that I felt my hard thoughts of both to abate and I was tempted to think of them as part of the amiable consequents of the Divine Love and of the Harmâ—nious order caused by the manifold wisdom of God § 4. And by this I see of how great importance it is in the world not only what Doctrine is taught and with what proof but who speaketh it and in what manner For as I found the same things reverenced in Dr. Twisse and Rutherford which were not so in Alvarez or Jansenius or Thom. White so I found the same Doctrine of Predetermining Necessitation almost commonly brought into greater dislike by Hobbes and Benedictus Spinosa's owning it and applying it to it s too obvious uses than all In Tract Polit. Theol. argumentations had ever before brought it And I see it as likely to recover its honour by the pious and florid dress put upon it by Mr. Sterry as if some new demonstrations for it were found out § 5. If I should recite Mr. Sterries mind in his own Metaphors the Reader may not understand it If I Epitomize him and change his words some may say that I misunderstand and wrong him But I will not do it willingly and if I do it necessarily his stile is my excuse He that would be seen must come into the light § 6. The summ of that which I am now concerned in in Mr. Sterry's Treatise is That the Freedom of all things is to act according to their natures and so is that of the will of man and that in God and man Necessity and Liberty concurr and that whatever we do or will we do or will it necessarily as being moved to it by the first causâ— and a chained connexion of necessitating causes by which all things in the world are carryed on That a will not determined by God but left to a self-determination without Gods predetermining causality is not to be asserted as contrary to Gods Goodness Wisdom power c. That sin is a privation formally and all that is positive in it is directly and not by accident of Gods positive causation else with the Manichees we must hold two first causes And that the formal privation is from the wiâ—lidrawing of necessary Divine causation of the contrary and God is the Negative necessitating cause of it Even as he causeth Light by the shining of the Sun and causeth darkness by its setting or not â—hining or as he causeth substances and shadows Life and death And that all sin thus as necessarily followeth Gods not giving the contrary or his leaving the defectible Creature to itself as the darkness folâ—oweth the Lights removal And this was the entrance of sin into the world the Woman being Necessarily deceived necessarily sinned and all good and evil is thus as to necessity equally to be resolved into Gods causing and not causing Will what he will cause cannot but be and what
but God himself 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man nor of the same formal Conception And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man and not as in God and so this to us is the prius significatum 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sence formaliter but only eminenter 6. And lastly That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man All this you must grant me or be singular and ignorant A. All this is past denial but proceed to the Case B. Do you differ from us de eventu whether there be a Hell or yet of the number of those that are damned A. No or if we do about the Case of Heathens that belongeth not to this Point B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of mens Damnation We say that God damneth no man but for Sin yea for Sin impenitently continued in to the last against all the mercy which tended to their Cure A. So far we are agreed But it 's not the cause of damnation which I speak of but the cause of the Decree B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth he willeth to do A. Yes God doth nothing without a will to do it at least consequently B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day which he willed not yesterday and so from eternity A. No we do not with Vostius make God mutable B. Good still you grant then that God damneth men that he damneth them for sin that he doth it willingly that he willed it from eternity And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity A. Not in esse reali but there was in esse cognito B. So now the game begins Thus the World is cheaâ—ed and troubled by Logical Notions and meer words Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing If nothing it is no Cause If any thing is it God or a Creature It can be no Creature because it is eternal If God you do but say That God caused his own Will A. It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin which causeth his Decree or Will B. 1. Even fore-knowledge it self say the Schools is but the same with knowledge and spoken say they but to the respect and sense of man There being neither priâ—s vel postoriâ—s before or after in eternity But this I now insist not on 2. It is commonly taken for blasphâ—my to talk of a Cause of God or any thing in God If Gods Will be his Essence it hath no Cause He causeth not himself being no Effect 3. If this were so as you say yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge * Vasquer in 1. Thâ— d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree Divinâ— voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem motivam per modum objecti sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud sed solam suam bonitatem Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem causam alterius italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam quia â—na est causa altâ—rius Non ergâ—â—â—â—â— mus an aliud â—â—â—â— ratio â—â—tiva Deo per modum â—â—â—â— ut velit nos prâ—dâ—stinare praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest Id. ib. disp 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujâ—s gratia ratio nolendi aliquid sed propter quod câ—tera esse vult Deus For Siâ— fâ—re-seen is no Sin and nothing is no Cause so that you your self resolve all into God And indeed what can be a cause of the first Cause or any thing in him Use not tergiversation and vain words now and tell me what you have to say A. A thing not existent but fore-seen may be â— moral Cause though not a physical and so fore-seen Sin may be to God B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God There is nothing in God but God To be a cause of his Will is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence And shall so base a thing aâ— Sin cause God 2. We are still at the cheating Game of playing with â—rbitrary Notions What mean you by a moral Cause If a true cause of moral Being that 's one thing If any thing that is not physically or properly but by moral imputation only a cause of any event that 's another thing The first you dare not own as if any thing which is nothing Sin not existent were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica It is really no Cause but that for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that â—â—â—â— equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word Cause equivocally your rule is false Nothing is no moral Cause You will instance in good destrâ—d in fine nondum existente c. But I answer you Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes which are never found but in an existent entity or subject A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum That which is not is not good or amiable Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause But if we will let go the toy and come to the matter It is no other good but the desire of good or the apprehension of the â—â—â—â—rity of good which causeth so that all the Cause is in the Agent 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge that when any mâ—n saith That sin which is no sin and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will he must needs mean no real cause Because to be a cause is tertium Adjectum and presupposeth to be That which is not is not a cause much less of God or of his Will A. I can shew you that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick For if this hold true then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings c. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin and save Souls to â—hose under the Promise before the Incarnation B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter but advantageth you not at all Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this that nothing can do nothing nor cause nothing It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering not yet existent that caused Gods Will tâ— pardon Sinners Nor had Gods Will any proper cause But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another he willed that
Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fulness of time demonstrate his Justice and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency and to pardon Sin And therefore not Christ's Death it self but God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate was the cause of the Promise and of the New Covenant made with Adam and of the Salvation of Believers then Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word A. But at least Sin fore-seen is causa sine qua non B. Call it by what name you please as long as you confess it to be no Cause for causa sine qua non is called Causa fatua and is none But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non for it is no sin from eternity A. It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non B. Yet more notions what is futurity any thing or nothing nothing certainly For quoad ens it is terminus diminuens and nothing is no cause But it is Gods knowledge that Sin will be which is to be called the Cause of Gods Decree as sine qua non if any be But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is your self B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it But not by making other mens worse but by opening the reconciling truth 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said Predestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2. to have an extrinsick cause without change in God 1. Know therefore that Gods Essence is his Will but not as Essence To say that God is God and that God willeth this or that are not terms of the same signification 2. Gods Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will 3. As God willeth himself the Act being perfectly immanent his Will is called himself much more properly than his Will of things extrinsick which is ever either effectively or at least objectively transient Because it is God that willeth and that is willed or loved which made many Ancients say That this was the third Person in the Trinity 4. But as God willeth things ad extra though it is his Essence that so willeth them yet it is unfit to say simply that this Will is God e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God because the name Will here includeth the thing willed 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts it is less inconvenient to say simply that this Will is God than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra By this time you may see that though Gods Will as his Essence hath no cause yet his Will as denominated extrinsecally from the Object may have some kind of Cause that is * Alvarez himself saith that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act. Objective which is quasi materia actus and the terminus sine quo non that is Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent or in Peter regenerate * This is all that Ruiz his Reasons prove De Vol. Dei disp 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who saith that there is more than extrinsick denomination Et relatio rationis â—um realis formalitas But he doth but shew by his quodammodo that he knoweth not what to say or his understanding a seeing that the World was good before any of these things did exist So that by extrinsick denomination without any change in God he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent to be past to will things as existent with complacency or will them with displicency But not to will the futurity of mens damnation de novo but yet his Will of the futurity of mens damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause from whence it is denominated As in esse cognito the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man a subject and then a Sinner and a Despiser of Mercy and then a damnable Sinner And so these are indeed conditions in the Object or Causae sine quibus non or Objective material-constituent causes not in themselves but the fore-sight of them not of Gods Will as his Essence nor of his Will as a Will but of his Will as extrinsecally denominated a Decree to damn Judas e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsick denomination to Gods Will. II. Both you and I hold and must hold that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Conclusio quod Deus aliquos reproâ—at est de fide constat â—nim ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari Vid. Ruâ—z de prâ—de fin Tract 2. per totum But it is false that we hold that he doth it without any respect to fore-seen sin For 1. He fore-seeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation what he doth in time that is it which he decreed to do from eternity But in time he damneth no man but for Sin therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin For sin I say as the cause of damnation which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of Gods Volition or Decree yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object as fore-seen in the Mind of God and so as aforesaid is an Objective Cause as fore-seen III. The execution of Justice and glorification of it and Gods Holiness thereby is good and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree But in the word Reprobation is in most mens sense included much which we hold not which is to be opened further anon IV. And as to the absoluteness of Gods Decree to damn those that are dammed I think you will not deny it your self supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners God doth not only will that all the finally impenitent shall be damned nor only that e. g. Judas shall be damned if he be finally impenitent But also that Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent shall certainly be damned So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object it is no longer a meer conditional Decree but absolute supposing that condition In all this we are agreed The second Crimination A. II. But that 's not all But you hold That God eternally decreed mens sin yea all the sin of Men and Devils some say That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act and
Ministers and serious Christians not only for Ceremonies but for holy practices of life Being under these apprehensions when the Wars began though the Cause it self lay in Civil Controversies between King and Parliament yet the thoughts that the Church and Godliness it self was deeply in danger by Persecution and Arminianism did much more to byass me to the Parliaments side than the Civil interest which at the heart I little regarded At last after two years abode in a quiet Garrison upon the Invitation of some Orthodox Commanders in Fairfax's Army and by the Mission of an Assembly of Divines I went after Naseby Fight into that Army as the profest Antagonist of the Sectaries and Innovators who we all then too late saw designed those changes in the Church and State which they after made I there met with some Arminians and more Antinomians These printed and preached as the Doctrine of Free Grace that all men must presently believe that they are Elect and Justified and that Christ Repented and Believed for them as Saltmarsh writeth I had a little before engaged my self as a Disputer against Universal Redemption against two antient Ministers in Coventry Mr. Cradock and Mr. Diamond that were for it But these new notions called me to new thoughts which clearly shewed me the difference between Christs part and Mans the Covenant of Innocency with its required Righteousness and the Covenant of Grace with its required and imputed righteousness I had never read one Socinian nor much of any Arminians but I laid by prejudice and I went to the Scripture where its whole current but especially Matth. 25. did quickly satisfie me in the Doctrine of Justification and I remembred two or three things in Dr. Twisse whom I most esteemed which inclined me to moderation in the five Articles 1. That he every where professeth that Christ so far dyed for all as to purchase them Justification and Salvation conditionally to be given them if they believe 2. That he reduceth all the Decrees to two de fine de mediis as the healing way 3. That he professeth that Arminius and we and all the Schoolmen are agreed that there is no necessity consequentis laid on us by God in Predestination but only necessity consequentiae or Logical but in Election I shall here suspend 4. That the Ratio Reatus in our Original Sin is first founded in our Natural propagation from Adam and but secondarily from the positive Covenant of God 5. That Faith is but Causa dispositiva Justificationis and so is Repentance These and such things more I easilier received from him than I could have done from another But his Doctrine of Permission and Predetermination and Causa Mali quickly frightned me from assent And though Camero's moderation and great clearness took much with me I soon perceived that his Resolving the cause of sin into necessitating objects and temptations laid it as much on God in another way as the Predeterminants do And I found all godly mens Prayers and Sermons run quite in another strain when they chose not the Controversie as pre-engaged In this case I wrote my first Book called Aphorisms of Justification and the Covenants c. And being young and unexercised in writing and my thoughts yet undigested I put into it many uncautelous words as young Writers use to do though I think the main doctrine of it sound I intended it only against the Antinomians But it sounded as new and strange to many Upon whose dissent or doubtings I printed my desire of my friends Animadversions and my suspension of the Book as not owned by me nor any more to be printed till further considered and corrected Hereupon I had the great benefit of Animadversions from many whom I accounted the most judicious and worthy persons that I had heard of First my friend Mr. John Warren began next came Mr. G. Lawson's the most judicious Divine that ever I was acquainted with in my judgement yet living and from whom I learned more than from any man next came Mr. Christopher Cartwright's then of York the Author of the Rabbinical Comment on Gen. chap. 1 2 3. and of the Defence of King Charles against the Marquess of Worcester Answers and Rejoinders to these took me up much time next came a most judicious and friendly MS. from Dr. John Wallis and another from Mr. Tombes and somewhat I extorted from Mr. Burges the answers to which two last are published To all these Learned men I owe very great thanks and I never more owned or published my Aphorisms but the Cambridge Printer stole an Impression without my knowledge And though most of these differed as much from one another at least as from me yet the great Learning of their various Writings and the long Study which I was thereby engaged in in answering and rejoyning to the most was a greater advantage to me to receive accurate and digested conceptions on these subjects than private Students can expect My mind being thus many years immerst in studies of this nature and I having also long wearied my self in searching what Fathers and Schoolmen have said of such things before us and my Genius abhorring Confusion and Equivocals I came by many years longer study to perceive that most of the Doctrinal Controversies among Protestants that I say not in the Christian World are far more about equivocal words than matter and it wounded my soul to perceive what work both Tyrannical and unskilful Disputing Clergie-men had made these thirteen hundred years in the world And experience since the year 1643. till this year 1675. hath loudly called to me to Repent of my own prejudices sidings and censurings of causes and persons not understood and of all the miscarriages of my Ministry and life which have been thereby caused and to make it my chief work to call men that are within my hearing to more peaceable thoughts affections and practices And my endeavours have not been in vain in that the Ministers of the Countrey where I lived were very many of such a peaceable temper though since cast out and a great number more through the Land by Gods Grace rather than any endeavours of mine are so minded But the Sons of the Coal were exasperated the more against me and accounted him to be against every man that called all men to Love and Peace and was for no man as in a contrary way And now looking daily in this posture when God calleth me hence summoned by an incurable Disease to hasten all that ever I will do in this World being uncapable of prevailing with the present Church disturbers I do apply my self to posterity leaving them the sad warning of their Ancestors distractions as a Pillar of Salt and acquainting them what I have found to be the cause of our Calamities and therein they will find the Cure themselves II. I Have oft taken the boldness constrainedly to say that I doubt not but the Contentions of the Clergie have done far more
God do intendere finem and what is his End The Order and Objects opened p. 57. Sect. 16. What Election and Reprobation are The order of the Decrees called Reprobation and of the Objects Of Negations of Decree p. 66. An Additional Explication of Divine Nolitions p. 76. Sect. 17. Whether God Will Decree or Cause Sin Five Acts of God in and about Sin What Sin is Many wayes God can cause the same thing that the sinner causeth and so fulfil his Decrees without Willing or Causing the Sin Objections answered God freely not idlely or impotently restraineth his own possible operations sometimes that he do not such or such an act at all and sometime that he do but so much towards it and no more Whether God be ever Causa partialis p. 84. Sect. 18. A Confutation of Dr. Twisses Digress 5. li. 2. sect 1. Vindic. Gratiae where he asserteth that God Willeth the existence of Sin and that sins are a medium sua natura summe unice conducibile to the Glorification of his Mercy and Justice p. 92. Sect. 19. The same Doctrine in Rutherford de Providentia confuted Whether things be good because God willeth them or willed by him because good resolved Whether there were eternal rationes boni mali Dr. Field vindicated p. 106. Sect. 20. The old Doctrine of Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius thought by some Jesuits too rigid but indeed Conciliatory for absolute Election to Faith and so to Salvation and for no reprobating Decree but only of Punishment for Sin foreseen but not decreed Prosper ad Cap. Gall. Sentent translated p. 115. Sect. 21. The summ of Prospers Answer to Vincent 16. Object p. 118. Sect. 22. Fulgentius words to the same sense p. 121. Sect. 23. The healing Doctrine and Concessions of many called Calvinists of the Synod of Dort Pet. Molinaeus c. p. 124. Sect. 24. And of Petr. á Sancto Joseph Suarez Ruiz c. on the other side especially Bellarmines at large and others p. 127. ERRATA PART 1. pag. 10. l. 38. in marg for Reason Being r. Relation being p. 24. l. 25. r. those Causes l. 26. r. first Case p. 27. l. 2. r. Of predetermination Reader Pain and Greater business forbad me to gather the Errata some are gathered by a Friend out of the first Book many more I must leave to your ingenuity I see in the Premonition p. 4. l. 22. for Mr. W. Mr. D. l. 47. for Armatus Annatus Also Dial. 11. p. 231. l. 30. r. refuse Dial. 13. p. 291. l. 13. for not r. done Catholick Theologie The First BOOK PACIFYING PRINCIPLES Collected from the common Notices of Nature the certain Oracles of GOD in the Holy Scriptures and the common Consent of Christians For the RECONCILING OF THE CHURCH-DIVIDING and DESTROYING CONTROVERSIES especially about PREDESTINATION PROVIDENCE GRACE and FREE-WILL REDEMPTION JUSTIFICATION FAITH MERIT WORKS CERTAINTY OF SALVATION PERSEVERANCE and many others In Three Parts I. Of Gods Nature Knowledge Decrees and Providence about Sin with Mans Free-will as the Objects of the former II. Of Gods GOVERNMENT and MORAL Works III. Of Gods Operations on Mans Soul By RICHARD BAXTER An earnest Desirer of the UNITY LOVE and PEACE of Christians For endeavouring of which he expecteth with resolved Patience still to undergo the Censures Slanders and Cruelties of IGNORANCE PRIDE and MALICE from all that are possessed by the Wisdom and Zeal which are from beneath Earthly Sensual and Devilish the Causes of Confusion and every evil work James 3. 14 15 16. LONDON Printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons at the Princes Arms in S t. Pauls Church-yard MDCLXXV The First Part OF THE NATURE KNOWLEDGE WILL AND DECREES of GOD As far as is needful to the intended CONCILIATION and CONCORD SECT I. Of our Knowledge of God as here attainable THough it be about the Knowledge Will and Decrees of God that our Controversies are agitated yet because the consequent Verities are scarce ever well understood without the understanding of the Antecedents out of which the Consequents arise and without the just order place and respect which the later have unto the former and unless things be understood in their true Method I will therefore expose my self to the obloquy of those who will call it Over-doing so far as to premise somewhat of the Deity it self But not what is necessary to the full explication of the Divine Attributes as we are capable as must be in a Method of Theologie which I have attempted elsewhere but only so much as lyeth under our Controverted Subject And when I have done that I shall leave the rest Thes 1. To Know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent is Life Eternal * * * John 17. 3. Bradward l. 1. c. 11. p. 198. The first necessary incomplex Principle is God and the first complex simply is of God Deus est c. But yet it is not to us the primum cognitum 2. To †††Exodus 20. know GOD is to know his Being Nature and Relations For though those Relations that are to Man be not essential to his Divine Nature yet are they essentially contained in the signification of the name GOD as he is the object of our Faith and Religion For to be OUR GOD doth speak his Relations to us as well as his Nature As the name KING and FATHER doth among men 3. We neither have nor can have here in flesh any one proper formal Conception of the Divine Nature that is formally suited to the truth in the object But only Metaphorical or Analogical Conceptions borrowed from things better known 4. Yet nothing beyond sense at least is so certainly known as GOD so far as we can reach though nothing be less perfectly or more defectively known or less comprehended Even as we know nothing Visible more certainly than the Sun and yet comprehend nothing Visible less 5. It is not true which many great Metaphysicians assert that the Quiddity of God is totally unknown to us For then it could not be life eternal to know him nor would a meer Negative knowledge cause in us a sufficient Positive Love or Joy or Trust c. But to know that we cannot know him would but inferr that we cannot Love him For we Love not an unknown Good 6. Nor is it true that Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza in fine Disput and some others say that the Notions of Life and Intellect are all that we have of the Quiddity of God and that the Divine Will is not a Quidditative notion 7. God is here seen in the Glass of his Works with the Revelation of his Word and Spirit And from these works we must borrow our conceptions * * * The doubt is How Imperfect works can notifie the perfect God And the Schoolmen manage it as an insuperable difficulty Whether God could have made the World or any thing better than it is If you will pardon me for making
Possible and Future we must be very fearful and not unreverent and rash in ascribing such a dance or lusus of notions to God unless as used with great impropriety after the manner of weak man 70. God knoweth his own Power Knowledge and Will And so knoweth what he can do what he knoweth to be eligible and what he will do And if any will call this knowledge of God by the name of the Possibility or Futurity of the thing known or will denominate Nothing as an Imaginary something as Possible and Future relatively from Gods Power Will or Knowledge Let them remember 1. That Nothing hath no relation 2. That properly they should but give the denomination to that which is that is to Gods Power Will and Knowledge and say God Can e. g. make a World or Will do it and not to that which is not And when they say that e. g. the world is eternally possible or future they can justly mean no more but that God can and will make it 3. And that this is but lis de nomine and not a real difference whether futurition be thus from Eternity 71. And especially let them remember that nothing in God is Caused There are no effects in God Therefore as there is nothing from Eternity but God and therefore possibility and futurition must needs be names of God himself or some Divine perfection or conception which is himself if they be said to be eternal so such Possibility and futurity can have no eternal cause For God hath no Cause nor any thing in God 72. If the Futurity of sin must have an eternal Cause then God causeth Pennot l. 3. c. 14. citeth many Fathers saying that things are not future because fore-known but fore-known because future And Augustine Greg. M. Boetius Ansâ—lm Lomb. Aquin. saying the contrary And he citeth the four wayes of the Schoolmens reconciling them and concludeth that in regard of the Creatures being the first is true and in regard of free acts the second I think that in regard of sin neither is true Unless Because signifie only rationem denominationis objectivam And even if so it is dubious whether they be not simultaneous as Relations are the futurity of all sin But that is not so For none is the Cause that sin will be but he that mediately or immediately causeth the being of it when it is 73. Imagine per possibile vel impossibile that a thousand years hence a free created agent that can do otherwise will cause such an act It may be denominated Future without the taking in of any antecedent cause into the notion It is called Future because it will be and not because there is at present existent any cause from whence it will be mediately or immediately 74. Though Futurity be Nothing yet this Proposition is something This or that Will be And to know the futurity of a thing is most properly to know the truth of that proposition It will be 75. God knoweth not by Propositions for that is the imperfect mode of man But he knoweth Propositions when they are existent as humane instruments or conceptions And therefore he knoweth the truth of all true propositions of futurity 76. What man knoweth by Propositions God knoweth otherwise by a more transcendent perfect but incomprehensible way Therefore God knoweth that every thing will be which will be 77. There were â—o Propositions from Eternity For man that useth them was not And God useth them not though he know them as used by man Therefore this proposition Hoc futurum est was not from Eternity Because non entis non sunt affectiones 78. But if there had been such Propositions from Eternity as The world will be made Christ will be incarnate c. they would have been true And so the eternal Futurity of things as commonly disputed of can be nothing but the Eternal Verity of a Proposition de futuritione which was no proposition because then there was none only in time mans brain Imagineth or feigneth that then there might have been Creatures who might have used propositions de futuritione rerum which if they had they would have been true 79. All Verity is either 1. Rei 2. Conceptus 3. Expressionis And 1. Ubi non est Res ibi non est Veritas Rei The thing which was not from Eternity was not a True Thing from Eternity 2. The Divine knowledge that such and such things will be was True from Eternity by an incomprehensible way above propositions 3. If there had been any Propositions Mental or Verbal de rerum futuritione they would have been true And this is all that can truly be said of the Eternity of futurition 80. Only this being added that so far as Gods will was the first Cause determining of any thing that will be so far he was eternally the Cause of the truth of this proposition Hoc erit when such a proposition shall be 81. But where Gods Will is not the first cause of the Thing which will be there it is not his causing the truth of the proposition that is the cause that it will be Though his Knowledge be a medium from whence it may Logically be inferred that it will be 82. Moreover whatever is from eternity must be Res or modus rei or Relatio But from Eternity there is no Res futura no modus rei futurae no Relatio rei futurae * * * I know that the Judicious Greg. Arim. 1. d. 28. q. 3. pag. 122 c. asserteth these four things 1. That aliquid potest reserri realiter ad non ens 2. Non ens potest realiter referri ad ens 3. Quod Deus aeternaliter referebatur ad Creaturam quae non erat 4. Quod Deus realiter reserlur ad creaturam ex tempore And his reasons are very considerable for three of them But as to the second which concerneth our case he faileth For 1. his first reason that relations are ever mutual or convertible I deny his proof as vain as to the reality of the relation 2. And that res non existens is causa I deny Fuit causa non est 2. And remember that he instanceth only in things as caused or foreknown Sin therefore can be called future but as fore-known 3. Remember that his Master Ockam hath oft in Quodl proved that Relations are Nothing besides the quid absolution and Reason Being nothing but Comparabilitas all is but to say that God fore-knew what would be and therefore had there been such a proposition from Eternity as This will be it had been true Vid. Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. a. 1. Bonav ib. a. 1. q. 1. 2. Durand 1. d. 38. q. 1. Scot. ib. q. 1. Cajet Bannes Rip Zumel Nazar Molin Vasqu Arrub. c. 1. p. q. 14. a. 8. Greg. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. q. 14. punc 5. s 3. Alvar. de Auxil disp 16. Snarez de Aâ—xil l. 1. c. 13.
Ledesm de Aâ—xil dis 2. Ruiz de scient d. 15 16 33 36 c. For non entis non est Modus vel Relatio If you add that it is Denominatio extrin eca I answer it must be then God himself only as denominated Knowing or Willing that This or that shall be which is not properly the futurity of the thing For otherwise it must be a denomination of Nothing 83. Obj. The Object is before the Act of Knowledge Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future Answ 1. To be future is a word whose sound deceiveth men as if it signified some being which is not so 2. God cannot know that a thing will be unless it will be But this signifieth no more but that he cannot know this proposition to be true This or that will be unless it be true But 1. there were from eternity no propositions 2. And the proposition is not true before it is a proposition 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind whence it hath its first being 4. But if you might suppose God to have eternal propositions their Being is considerable before their Verity and the Verity hath its Cause But that cause is nothing but what is in God himself which is either his Decree of what he will Cause or his foreknowledge of what will be caused by a sinning Creature And neither of them as a cause of the truth of the proposition causeth that the Thing will be nor yet is any other existent Cause supposed but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent knoweth also that this agent will freely sin In all which the futurity is Nothing nor is any existent cause of it necessary But only the truth of the proposition would result from the Infinite perfection of Gods knowledge 84. Obj. The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not Answ 1. Futurity being Nothing is neither true nor false * * * According to Greg. and the Nominals sence of Relations before cited two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other One as a future Cause and another as a future effect And if there were now no Being but hereafter per impossibile a Being would arise of it self it is future though there be none to know it But this futurity hath no Cause And it is no more but that this Proposition Hoc erit would be True if there were any to conceive it 2. But all that you can truly mean is but this that whether it be thought on or not this is a true proposition Hoc vel illud futurum est Which is true when there are propositions extrinsecal which no man thinketh of But 1. God hath no propositions 2. Much less extrinsecal from Eternity But if he had any they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge 3. And they have no Cause 4. If they had been uttered by words they needed no Cause but his perfect knowledge 85. Obj. Futurity is the Object of Gods knowledge and the object is a †††To the Question An praescientia Dei sit Causata à rebus Bonavent answereth in 1. dist 38. q. 1. a. 1. Praescita Causa sunt praescientiae Divinae non essendi sed aut Inserendi aut Dicendi Secundum rationem essendi Praescientia potest esse Causa aliquorum praescitorum licet non omnino sed nullo modo è converso Secundum rationem Inferendi sunt mutuo causae quia mutuo antecedunt consequuntur antecedens est causa consequentis Secundum rationem Dicendi futurum est causa praescientiae non è converso Nam praescientia dicitur scientia ante rem constat ergo quod importat ordinem ad posterius si scitum esset semper praesens esset scientia sed non praescientia Bonavent 1. dist 38. dub 3. saith Gods knowledge called Approbation connoteth effectum bonitaâ—em but when it is called simplex Notitia it connoteth only the event but in it self is one Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many wayes diversified both of Knowledge and Will cause of the act God knoweth things to be future because they are future as he knoweth existents because they exist Answ Still I say 1. Futurity is Nothing and Nothing hath no Cause 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God and God hath no Cause nor is an Effect 3. At least that which is Nothing cannot be the Cause of God 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things because they will be but only that he fore-knoweth that they will be 86. Gods meer fore-knowledge nor his meer Will without efficient Power or Action causeth not the thing future and therefore is not the Cause that It will be But where Knowledge and Will with Active Power cooperate they are true Causes of the thing And nothing is a proper Cause that It will be but what will Cause its being 87. By all this it is evinced that God Causeth not the futurity of sin And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin pass è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum And consequently that the Learned and pious Dr. Twisse his Achillean argument which is the strength of his Book de Scientia Media is but delusory As the excellent Strangius also hath fully manifested And his admired Bradwardine is as weak in his attempts on the same subject and proveth God the Cause of all futurition by no better reasons than he proveth that without him there would be no impossibles yea that non posset esse impossibile When it were impossible any thing should be were there no God and yet that impossibility is nothing and needeth no cause It 's strange how some Learned men confound Things and Nothings and the Notions and Names of Nothings with the Nothings named So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 18. p. 221. will tell us how God knoweth complex objects and distinguisheth those that are antecedent to Gods Intellection from those that are consequent The former sort are such as these God is God is eternal omnipotent c. These he saith are the Causes that God knoweth them being before his knowledge of them The other about Creatures are after it and caused by it Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface Non proprie distincte sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio ignarus homuncio excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare But see how the world is troubled with this prophane * * * Hervtus in his Quodlib puts the question Whether it be not a Mortal sin in a Divine to omit things necessary and to treat of curiosities But he was too guilty himself to answer it as plainly as he ought presumption and how justly Paul cautioned us against seduction by vain Philosophy and what danger the Church is in of losing Faith Religion and Charity and peace in a game
at words What is this Complexe object Deus est Is it any thing or nothing If nothing it is not before Gods knowledge and the Cause of it If any thing Is it God or a Creature A Creature is not before God nor a cause of his knowledge which is God himself If it be God is it his Essence as such or his Essential properties or the Persons None of these For Gods essence is the prime Incomplexe Being and not a Complexe proposition Dens est His Properties primary are Omnipotent-vital-power Intellect and Will But these also are the same Incomplexe essence and not propositions And his Intellect as an object of it self is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himself nor the cause of it All the sense he can make of it is that this proposition Deus est est Aeternus c. if it had had an eternal being would in order of nature have been conceivable to us before this Deus scit se esse or before his knowledge it self or that if man had been the Knower it had been first a true proposition that He is before he knoweth that he is But God knoweth not himself by propositions Words in mente vel ore are but artificial organs for blind creatures to know by And doth God need such to know himself Doth he know by Thinking and by Artificial means as we do Hath he Entia rationis in his Intellect as man as Propositions are And had he an Intellect and these Entia rationis or propositions in his Intellect Deus est c. before he knew them yea and his self-knowledge which in Act is his pure eternal necessary Essence caused by these All that you can say is that poor creatures know by Propositions and phantasms and diverse thoughts and that God knoweth man and therefore knoweth all our propositions and thoughts as ours but not that he had the like eternally in himself and knoweth them in himself and that Himself as a proposition is the Cause of himself or self-intellection as in Act. He can know that you see by Spectacles and yet not eternally use Spectacles himself as the Cause of his sight But Bradwardine saith that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt per solam suam essentiam sicut alia vera incomplexa Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota sed per suam voluntatem vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate c. More presumption still He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe And who knoweth what sense those words have What meaneth he by complexa but Notions that is names and propositions as distinct from the Things And what is it to know propositions complexe but to know them as they are And what is it to know them incomplexe unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is or to know that it is no proposition that is to err If God know a Complexum or a proposition that Proposition is in being And where was it in being before God knew it If in God or no where 1. God then is a proposition 2. And God is before he knoweth himself 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge it is to say that God knoweth that he is before he knoweth that he is and his knowing that he is causeth him to know that he is If it be said that by complexa he meaneth not organical notions words nor propositions but the Verity of Gods Being Eternity c. I answer To know things is said to be to know some Truth because by knowing the thing we can make this proposition This is or This truly is But Gods knowledge of Things is not as ours but by pure perfect intuition and so maketh not propositions in himself by knowing things But if it be the Truth of this proposition Deus est that you mean it supposeth that proposition to exist for quod non est non verum est and so to exist in God which is denyed And it is that proposition that Bradwardine speaketh of But if by Truth you mean nothing but Gods Essence that is not a Complex object which he speaketh of And he saith not that God knoweth suam essentiam creata vel futura but that he knoweth per suam essentiam quod Deus est est Omnipotens Aeternus c. per suam essentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus est So that it 's a proposition that he calleth complexum incomplexè cognitum by contradiction when he cannot prove that Gods Intellect made propositions in it self and that antecedently to themselves and the Causes of themselves And all this which men talk in the dark about God is non-sense to trouble themselves and the world with on false suppositions that Gods knowledge is such as ours or that we can have formal conceptions and descriptions of it when we should tremble to read men thus prophanely take Gods Name in vain and pry into unrevealed things I have purposely been the larger on this instance to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholastick Word-mongers who would obtrude on us humane entia rationis or Thoughts as real Divine entities and would perswade us that every nothing which they make a name for is therefore something yea some of them God himself What I have said of Divine Intellection I say of his Volitions of which cap. 20 21. Bradwardine saith that Voluta priora viz. Deum esse omnipotentem esse bonum cognoscentem c. sunt Causa But 1. It is too bold to say that Gods Will is an Effect 2. If it were so it must be his Essence Omnipotency and Intellect that is the Cause of his Will and not a Complex verity as Deus est omnipotens bonus est c. For Gods Will is not caused by Propositions 3. If you say that his Volition as terminated objectively on his Essence Goodness c. is his Will in act se Velle which some call the third Person yet here would be no Cause and Effect but our distinct partial conceptions of that incomprehensible simplicity which hath no real diversity or priority SECT VI. Of Gods Knowledge and the Co-existence of the Creature 88. AUgustine well and truly saith that fore-knowledge in God is the same with the Knowledge of things present Past present and future through his Infiniteness and Eternity being alike to him even all as present 89. But this dependeth upon the Indivisibility of Eternity in which all the things of time are included and co-exist 90. Thus saith Augustine li. 2. ad Simplic q. 2. Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum Quid autem futurum est Deo qui omnia supergreditur tempora Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet non sunt ei futurae sed praesentes ac
Volitum is not esse existens And therefore to know the former is not formally to know the latter 129. Yea it is here disputed Whether there be indeed any contingency Read the dispute of Pet. Alliac Camerac m. 1. q. 11. ar 3. R. S. and Gregories and Okams and his own opinion about the possibility of Gods not knowing what he knoweth and that it is in the power of the Creature to make God not to have known them and much more such like I confess I tremble to read not the falshood but the boldness and presumption of such disputes as fearing they are prophane or not which the Doctrine of Hobs and the Dominican Predeterminants must needs exclude which make all events to be necessitated by God The Reasons against it are 1. Whatever God fore-knoweth must necessarily be but he fore-knoweth all that will be ergo 2. All things future are from eternity determined in Gods will to one part of the contradiction ergo necessario erunt 3. All the acts of the Creatures will is to be done by the physical efficient necessitating insuperable predetermination of God the first cause ergo there is no place in such necessity for contingency which is a posse tendere ad esse vel non esse 130. Many and different answers are given to these and those of the Thomists and Dominicans are mostly shuffling and vain But plainly and briefly 1. Gods fore-knowledge 2. And his meer will when they are not joyned efficiently with power or a will de efficiendo do no whit at all Cause or necessitate the effect or event or ponere aliquid in objecto It is only a Logical necessitas consequentiae in ordine probandi that ariseth Vid. D'Orbellis in 1. d. 38. dub 1. Bonaventur and saith Dr. Twiss all the Schoolmen say the same from them which consisteth with contingency and not a physical necessity in ordine essendi as from a Cause called consequentis or effecti And 2. Gods Knowledge and Will rather prove contingency For he doth not only know and will hoc futurum but hoc contingenter futurum Therefore it will be 3. And the last argument from necessitating predetermination I shall elsewhere confute and shew their contradiction who say that God doth predetermine the thing contingently to come to pass 131. But it cannot be denyed but that Gods will is from Eternity determined about every contingent event And therefore that Necessitate existentiae the determination of it is eternally necessary And therefore that which we call Its Liberty is but the perfect manner of its determination as Bradwardine confesseth 132. But what is all this stir about The great business of all is to shew how God fore-knoweth sin For saith Rada It 's easie from Gods Ibid. ar 3. p. 503. Volition to shew how he knoweth things that are not sin but how knoweth he sin from eternity seeing this was never in esse volito And Vid. 1. d. 36. q. 1. a. 2. Bonav ib. q. 1. a. 3. Durand ib. q. 1. Cujet Bannez Zumel Ripâ— Gonzal Mâ—lin Vusqutz Arrub. Fasol Aluiz 1. p. q. 14. a. 10. Tanner 1. p. disp 2. q. 8. dub 8. Granad 1. p. Cont. 2. d. 5. here the way of the Scotists proveth utterly insufficient Dr. Twisse and Rutherford and some Dominicans say that God fore-knoweth it because he Decreed to Cause all the Entity of the Act with all its circumstances from which the form of sin is but a resulting relation But this subverteth Religion Rada ibid. and Twiss oft say he Decreeth to permit it and that it shall come to pass ipso permittente saith Twiss Quâ— permissio saith Rada non accipitur in communi sed pro eo quod est permittere Ibid. art 3. p. 503. de facto deficere in peccatum ruere subtrahendo efficacia auxilia quibus positis non foret peccatum Quare haec est bona consequentia quantum ad illationem prcaise Deus permittit aliquem peccare hic nunc de facto ergo peccat ergo valet consequentia Deus voluit ab aeterno permittere ut Petrus peccaret de facto tali tali occasione oblata ergo peccabit Dixi quantum ad Illationem praecise Quia quantum ad Causalitatem non est bona illa consequentia * * * Vid. Ruiz de scient d. 17. Gr. Valent. p. 1. disp 1. q. 14. punct 7. Alarcon 1. p. tr 2. disp 3 4. But to pass by their supposition of Gods knowing consequences by argumentation I shall confute all this anon 133. And here the Thomists and Scotists have another skuffle on the Vid. Aquin. 1. p. q. 14. art 13. ad secundam Scot. â—â— 1. d. 39. q. 4. Rad. li. 1. Coâ—t 30. art 5. pag. 310 311 c. See Lychet Confutation of Cajetan and Ockam at large in 1. p. d. 39. q. 1. fol. 254. ad 268. Leg. Pennot li. 3. c. 11 12. p. 118 119 c. question Whether this knowledge of future contingents and the conditions of existency in God be Necessary in him or free and contingent The Thomists thus conclude 1. Si futurum contingens secundum se suam propriam naturam consideretur necessitas nullatenus ei convenire potest sed sola contingentia 2. Si futurum contingens consideretur secundum quod subest Divinae scientiae est necessarium absolute 3. Haec propositio Deus scivit Antichristum futurum est simpliciter absolute necessaria sed hoâ— consequens Ergo Antichristus erit non est absolute necessarium sed contingens si secundum se consideretur At ut divinae scientiae subest est absolute necessarium 4. Scientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium prouâ— jam ad ipsa est terminata est simpliciter necessaria And they prove the affirmative thus 1. Gods knowledge is Immutable therefore necessary 2. To know future Contingents is Perfection therefore necessary in God 3. This Can be in God therefore it necessarily is in him 134. The Scotists thus express their sense after much explication 1. Futuro contingenti secundum suam propriam naturam consider ato nullâ— necessitas conveire potest 2. Futura contingentia etiam ut subsunt Divinae scientiae non sunt necessaria 3. Futurum contingens etiam at subest Divinae scientiae est qâ—oad esse simpliciter contingens secundum quid necessarium 4. Propositio haec Deus scivit Petrum futurum sive sit de praesenti vel de praeterito non est simpliciter necessaria sed ex suppositione 5. Praefata propositio omnia futura contingentia sunt necessaria necessitate immutabilitatis 6. Scientia Dei respectu omnium creaturarum quoad esse existentiae earum est contingens ex suppositione necessaria I recite the words of Rada only that I may not weary the Reader by referring him to peruse too many Authors and because no man better discusseth the differences See also his answers to the
in Heylin's Life of Archbishop Laud and which you may still hear in all parties in their ignorant censures of one another by the names of Calvinists and Arminians And yet the Church of Rome is justly condemned by us for its uncharitable Cruelty against Dissenters when thus we thereby condemn our selves SECT VIII More of Gods Fore-knowledge and of Permission of Sin 140. BUt to leave this Wilderness and speak more of things certain or such as belong to us in our measure to know It is certainly unknown to mortals formally what knowledge is in God as is aforesaid and much more in what Manner he knoweth either Futures or Contingents or any Creatures ex parte scientis 141. If any particular manner therefore offer it self to your minds as that which probably seemeth to be the right it may afford you reason therefore to suspect that it is not the right Because it is certain that the Manner is past our reach And what man can comprehend is infinitely below God 142. If the Case of Aarons Sons the Bethshemites Uzzah Uzziah and others that presumed too boldly to meddle with holy Rituals and Ceremonies was so dreadful what is theirs that profanely toss Gods own Name and pretend to know that of himself which they know not and turn his secrets profanely into matter of Contention against the Churches of Christ 143. Either Futurity as such is Intelligible in it self to God or else the things future are Intelligible as in Eternity or else futurity is intelligible only in its Causes We can think of no other way but God hath more than we can think of If it be Intelligible in it self or as things are In Eternity the Controversie is mostly ended The perfection of Gods understanding then is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible But if it be only in the Causes it is either as those Cases necessarily will Cause or else as freely and contingently The first Cause reacheth Pennottus propugn l. 3. c. 11. n. 1. noteth that even the reconciling of the certainty of Divine pre-science with contingency was quite past the power of mans understanding in this life in the opinion of these subtile Schoolmen Gabriel 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ockâ—m ibid. q. 1. Marsil 1. q. 40. How much more difficult will it be to reconcile Gods Dâ—crees and most of all his premotion if pre-determining with contingency Plainly and honestly saith Bonaventure in few words in 1. d. 37. q. 2. Divina Cognitio quia à re non Causatur nec dependet ideo potest esse certa de re contingenti not our Controversie For sin hath no necessitating Cause but free The second is the same difficulty with that in question viz. How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cause mans Will will this or that way determine it self Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cause which hath no antecedent reason to prove its future self-determination to this more than to that 144. If we go to the Jesuites Scientia Media as it deserveth not that name so it is insufficient to this use For all those circumstances in which God sore-knoweth that the will shall determine it self are such as necessitate the will so to do or not If they say the first they give away their own cause and the cause of Religion speaking of sinful Volitions If the latter the case is still as difficult and the same as if they had never mentioned those circumstances or conditional knowledge viz. How God knoweth that a will still free and not necessitated will choose sin rather than duty For from non-necessitating circumstances it followeth not 145. If we go the way of Scotus and say that he fore-knoweth it in the determination of his own will de rerum futuritione either that will is supposed to be a Causing efficient will or not If it be it reacheth not the case of sin seeing Gods will doth cause no sin But if not then still the difficulty is the same as before How God that willeth the Event but causeth it not doth know that his Will shall be done For it is not from the Cause to the Effect To say that his own Immutability proveth it is no proof For if his Immutability Cause not the Effect ariseth not from it And to say that his Omnipotency or Absoluteness inferreth it is no proof unless his Omnipotency Cause it And to say that it followeth Logically Necessitate Consequentiae though not Causally necessitate effecti vel consequentis that what God willeth to be shall be is most certain And so is it from his fore-knowledge which medium yet the Scotists say is here insufficient But that is because it is here supposed that what God so knoweth or willeth to be future he willeth to be future by the causation of some Cause for he willeth not any thing to be without a Cause Besides that still sin is not willed by him to be future at all * * * See in Alliaco after cited the notable reasons by which the Nominals confute Scotus in this opinion which yet Dr. Twisse Praef. ad l. de scient Med. saith did first invite him to School-divinity 146. And here I am to confute the foresaid reason of Rada recited Thes 130. God saith he fore-knoweth sin in that he knoweth that he decreeth to permit it And Dr. Twiss often saith that all confess that Permission certainly inferreth the event of the thing permitted I answer †††This also Annatus de Scient Media cont Twiss granteth him cap. 5. §. 1. But not as ex ratione permissionis but by hypothetical Connotation Because we use the word Permission about that which aliunde will be if permitted So that it is a Compound notion when thus used There is not so much as any great appearance of the Truth of the consequence unless limited To Permit is nothing but non-impedire not to hinder And if a thing will come to pass because it is not hindered then the world would have been made without God and man saved without God if he would not hinder it Try if your work will be done meerly by your not hindering it 147. Indeed the word Permission is oft used as a complicate notion signifying both the permission and the event permitted But that 's nothing to the nature of proper permission it self 148. A man may be hindered 1. Morally and that 1. By Commands 2. By Threats 3. By Promise and perswasion 4. By Gifts 5. By terrifying stripes on himself or others In all these respects God permitteth not sin but hindereth it by them all 149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Physically And that 1. By toâ—al restraint and disabling 2. Or by lesser impediments which make not the act impossible but difficult God doth not alwayes thus hinder sin and therefore thus he permitteth it He doth not disable the sinner e. g. to lie And he doth not alwayes render it difficult to
him But it followeth not necessarily that this will be done because it 's possible no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done 150. * * * Ruiâ— de praedet Tr. 2. diâ—p 12. §. 1 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed viz. Increatam permissionem Deus non praedâ—finit Creata permissio simul complecâ—itur quâ—rundam rerum productionem aliarum rerum negationem quibus positis peccatum permittitur And if by permission they will mean quid positivum it must have a positive Will and Cause but what 's that to the Negative or meer non impedire Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguoâ—s words His reason §. 2. is Permission of sin is good 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum And he said that permissio increata is not decreed 2. Negatio motivorum c. 3. Prodâ—ctio Constitutio circumstantlarum 4. Generalis concursus Ans 1. Nothing is not Good meer Negations are Nothing 2. Moral Negations or Logical that is Denyal and restraints are something and have a Cause 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause but so is not a meâ—r non-impedition which is proper permission But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent and an indifferent agent and a contrarily disposed agent To permit a stone to ascend will not make it ascend To permit the Air to move will not make it move But to permit a stone in the Air to fall I think with Durandus is enough to make it fall supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin 151. But yet here we must distinguish 1. Between a necessary and a free agent 2. Between Adams sinning and ours 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly or that hath many disswasions or but few 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general that is of not living innocently yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth nor is it a valid consequence He is a bad man Ergo he will do this and that and the other Sin Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin than to the contrary So that bare permission will not inferr the Certainty of all sin atleast and therefore will not here serve turn 152. But saith Rada it is not common permission but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin Answ 1. God did not so by Adam at first 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn as well as effectual If so then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin as to live without God But if not so then while Necessary Grace called sufficient is continued the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him till Adam cast it away It is therefore no good Illation Deus permittit aliquem peccare ergo peccat unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help which is more than proper permission 153. And it must be remembred that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin He alwayes hindereth it so far as to forbid it to threaten damnation to affright men from it to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it Only by doing no more nor effectually changing or restraining sinners but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means he permitteth sin 154. But it is also confessed that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited some of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given And so some are without that Teaching those mercies or those corrections which others have But yet they are still under a Law of Grace 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity Truth and Goodness which is Natural doth continue Otherwise it is confessed that Permission would inferr sin materially but no sin formally if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason Free-will or executive power 156. But I easily confess that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * * * Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass in sinful actions could be proved that would certainly inferr the event of sin And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will sin may be fore known in that decree And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind they had never omitted that easie solution of the Case How God fore-knoweth sin But this I have elsewhere confuted and shall add a little here 157. But first having disproved all these presumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future sin I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfie us which is That Gods Understanding is Infinite and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible But How his understanding reacheth them what Idea's he hath of them how they are Intelligible to him with such like are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men who know not their own ignorance And no manner of understanding is properly Divine which mortals can comprehend SECT IX Of Predestination and Free-will of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford 158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution and be after his Volitions in order yet because I am now only to speak of it as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin and as quid decretum I shall touch it here It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of besides himself Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties and a Power to Act or not act at this time or to choose this or that and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency So that when ever any Act is done as an Act in genere God is the first Cause of it For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth and by his Vital Influx And there is
no Power used to produce it which is not given by God 160. An Act as such hath no Morality in it but is quid naturale And so it is from God as he is fons naturae But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it referred to Gods Governing Will or Law and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is mans End And Materially it is not the Act as such but the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one or to an undue End rather than a due End or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object which is the sin and the fundamentum of the sinfulness and so è contra 161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such In Omissions of Loving Trusting Fearing Serving God there is no Natural Act but a privation of it In committed sins to Love this Object rather than that hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such A modus Entis is not Ens But this Comparative choice is but the Modus Modi entis For an Action is but Modus Entis and this is but a modus actionis 162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans that Man should be a Causa prima and so be God if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such 163. If any will litigate de nomine entis let them call it Being or no-being as they please but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that under Divine Universal Influx without Divine pre-determining pre-motion on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it is bolder against God than I shall be And if God can do it we have no reason to doubt whether it be done 164. Men seem not in denying this to consider the signification of the word * * * It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twisse who oft saith that God denyed to Adam no grace ad posse but he denyed him grace necessary ad agere For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is necessary to the act Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art 1. pag. 457. POWER when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it without the said pre-motion If so It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it He that hath a proper Power to Choose is Able to Choose and Can Choose by that Power 165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-agents and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions by all that he doth by his Laws Providence and Grace to make them good But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil 166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis * * * Bellarmin's Universal Cause seemeth the same wiâ—â— what Durandus meaneth And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion saith l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia Multi enim Philosophi ut Plato Aristot â—gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium essâ— causam immediatam omnium esseâ—luum Causarum secâ—ndarum the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction A Cause is called Universal 1. In praedicando Logically And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis Statuarius est Causa particularis Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae 2. In causande as to the effect And so that is an Universal Cause whose causality extendeth to many effects And this is two-fold 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects but not of all that is proper to each unless its causality be otherwise as by the dispositio recipientis determined And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose and the stink of the Dunghill c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae by his common sustaining and moving Influx of all sinful actions 2. When it is the Cause of those actions not only as to that which is common to them all but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another and that of it self and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis or by any other cause And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is meerly physical in all beings and actions As in Generation c. which is properly to say that he is at once both Cause universalis particularis singularis And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause but only a meer Universal as aforesaid 167. They that denying our self-determining power do make Volition and free-Volition to signifie the same and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act do seem rather to jeast than seriously dispute And to define Free-will to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem is no other For Velle juxta rationem is no more than Velle the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one why do we blind the World with words and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will and not whether his Will be free And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition or not the Volition of another thing the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous If the will be not forced as long as it willeth or willeth juxta rationem then to question whether it can will by constraint is to question whether it can at once will and not will †††Of this see Ie Blanks excellent Theses de lib. arbitrio absolut The definition of Alvarâ—â— of Free-will is lib. arbitrium est facultas voluntatis
rationis ad utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum agendum unum vel alterum which Rivet resteth in and fitteth the doctrine of necessitation but I think expresseth not Liberty strictly taken It may be ad utrumlibet if Satan had a power to move it as I move my pen. Bellarmine's is lib. arb est libera potestas ex his quae ad finem aliquem conducunt unum prae alio eligendi aut unum idem respuendi vel acceptandi pro arbitrio nostro ad magnam Dei gloridm concessa which Paraeus dissenteth not from But all defining is vain â—ill the ambiguous word Freedom be distinguished and the sense accordingly variously stated yet is this description only of Liberty and constraint too common with some 168. But if this were so then ☞ 1. The suspension of the will might be nevertheless by force or restraint which is a non velle And so when they say Voluntatem ab ipso Deo non cogi posse because when it acteth it acteth willingly that is when it willeth it willeth the consequence holdeth not because it may be forced from all action unless they mean that it cannot nolle non agere at once 2. And if this were so then either they mean that God cannot naturally necessitate the will to act or that such a natural necessitation consisteth with its Liberty If the first they destroy their doctrine of Predetermination For what is that but Gods Physical irresistible efficacious premotion determining the will to act And what is natural necessitation if this be not If the latter then they contradict their own definition of Liberty which they oft give us that it is Liberty from natural necessity which Twiss calleth Libertas naturae distinct from Libertas conditionis vel civilis And what more natural necessity than that which refulteth from that premotion of God as the first cause of all action without which no agent natural or free can act and which none can resist 169. Their opinion of Liberty also leaveth no difference between bruitish appetite or spontaneity and free-will save only that this doth follow reason which indeed is a difference of Guides but not of Liberty 170. And according to this opinion if God gave Satan power to move any mans will to sin by as true a physical motion and as unresistible as I move my pen it were no constraint nor loss of natural Liberty because it is moved to be Willing 171. And if they lay all on the Acts congruity to the Habit or Inclination then if Satan could infuse unresistibly into the Will an Inclination to hate God or to any sin and then physically determine it according to that inclination it were no force or loss of natural liberty 172. But I think he that by irresistible efficiency makes a mans will wicked both in its Inclination and Acts doth incomparably more against him and his liberty than he that could force his tongue or hand against his will or he that only tempted and perswaded him 173. The grand Reasons why we cannot receive the Dominicans doctrine of predetermining premotion are elsewhere given I now name but these three 1. Because whatever vain talk is used to blind men it maketh God the sole-total-first-necessitating cause of all the sin that is committed in the world or can be 2. It unavoidably destroyeth the Christian faith For if God be really the said determining Cause of all lyes and other sins in the world then his Veracity which is the formal object of faith is gone And no mortal man can tell whether Prophets and Apostles are predetermined to speak true or false nor when God moveth them to the one or the other For to Call their motion by the name of Inspiration will satisfie no man that Gods Inspiration can do any more at least to interest himself in the act than his necessary physical premoving determination 3. Because it feigneth God to damn most of the world for not-conquering God who insuperably predetermined them to the forbidden act that is for not being Gods or greater than God And that he sent Christ to die only for those sins which he thus pre-moved us to irresistibly and it was as impossible to forbear as to touch the Moon 174. In the issue of all these Controversies the sharpest contenders seem agreed whether they will or no Arminius granteth that all events of sin or damnation are from eternity necessary necessitate consequentiae * * * Bonavent in 1. d. 38. q. 1. Resol Praescientia Dei rebus praescitis necessitatem non imponit cum â—o modo res cognoscat quo futurae sunt Duplex est necessitas Absoluta quae opponitur Contingentiae dicitur necessitas consequentis Respectiva dicitur necessitas consequentiae haec non opponitur contingentiaeut si ambulat movetur In praescito non est necessitas absoluta sed solum consequentiae Nicol. D'Orbellis 1. d. 38. dub 1. Duplex est necessitas Consequentiae consequentis Bene sequitur necessitate consequentiae Deus novit me cras sessurum ergo sedebo consequens tamen est contingens ut homo currit ergo movetur Nos concedimus Liberum arbitrium in â—o quod agit liberum esse ab omni necessitate ut proprie non possit necessario agere quoad exercitium sui actus quamvis respectu Divinae ordinationis certo infallibiliter agat Ames Bellarm Enervat To. 4. l. 4. c. 1. He meaneth it of a caused physical necessity no doubt which is as is said but a Logical necessity in ordine probandi that is It is a good consequence This God fore-knoweth ergo it will come to pass And it is only the necessitas consequentis which he denyeth which Rob. Baronius Metaph. calleth necessitas causata and I had rather call necessitas effecti which is in ordine productionis And Dr. Twiss doth sharply reprehend him for feigning that he or any others do assert any more than necessitas consequentiae And bringeth in the testimony of many Schoolmen professing concordantly that there is no more than this which also fore-knowledge it self will inferr It 's worth the reciting Vindic. Grat. Li. 2. p. 1. Digres 5. Quid quod ab eruditis eadem statuitur necessitas ab utraque profluens tam à praescientia Dei quam ab ipsius Voluntate Nam licet Arminius voluerit necessitatem à Dei voluntate profectam esse necessitatem Consequentis à praescientia verò promanantem duntaxat Consequentiae aliter tamen visum est magnis Theologis Sic enim Durandus Non bene dicunt illi qui dicunt quod omnia de necessitate eveniant per comparationem ad Voluntatem divinam quia omnia respectu Voluntatis Divinae eveniunt libere ideo absolute loquendo possunt non evenire Expressius Bonaventura Dei voluntatem absolutam necesse est impleri conditionalem verò minime sed advertendum quod est necessitas consequentiae sicut praedictum est
de praescientia Ipsa enim non habet necessitatem consequentis sed consequentiae Quia necessario infertur sequitur Deus praescivit hoc Ergo hoc erit Sed tamen non necessario praescit quia in actu praesciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens Sic intelligendum est quod Voluntas Dei absoluta connotat eventum rei ideo est ibi necessitas consequentiae sed non consequentis quia non mutat eventum rei unde sicut praescientia quia necessario infert effectum non potest falli sic voluntas absoluta quia necessario infert that is in arguing non potest impediri Annatuâ— de scient Med. cont Twiss de Libertate cap. 6. seemeth not to understand him as to this Necessity consequentiae which is not at all Causal of the event but of the Conclusion in arguing Leaving it out from whence the event is Ita Trigosius in sum Theol. Bonav Effectus contingentes liberi si comparentur ad scientiam providentiam Voluntatem Dei dicuntur necessarii secundum quid sive ex suppositione quae necessitas vocatur conditionalis consequentiae non tamen absoluta consequentis Quoniam istae consequentiae sunt optimae Deus praescivit hoc futurum Ergo erit Deus vult aliquid fieri Ergo fiet eo modo quo voluerit quando voluerit Quia non stat dari antecedens verum consequens falsum Istis ad amussim congruentia sunt Aquinatis illa Quamvis Voluntas Dei sit immutabilis invincibilis non tamen sequitur quod etiam effectus sit necessarius necessitate absoluta sed solum conditionata sicut de praescientia dictum est But the word effectus here is more than the rest say And more fully ibid. sect 18. pag. Vol. min. 230. Quid quod Scholastici nominatim vero Aquinas Durandus nec quenquam novi aliter sentientem N. B. non aliam agnoscunt necessitatem rerum ratione Voluntatis Dei quam quae dici potest necessitas consequentiae And yet plainer ibid. sect 18. pag. 332. c. 2. At ea necessitas quam juxta nostram sententiam oriri putat Arminius ex Decreto Dei revera non tam ex Decreto Dei fluit quod monuit Perkinsius vere quam ex suppositione decreti divini in Argumentatione scilicet quoties scilicet posito decreto Dei de re aliqua futura legitime infertur necesse esse ut suo tempore futura sit At hujusmodi necessitas nihilo minus evincitur ex suppositione actus liberi cujuscunque quam ex suppositione decreti Divini etenim posito quod existat actus liber necesse est ut existat 175. We are all agreed then what Necessity it is that fore-knowledge decree and providence inferr as to the acts of sin viz. of Logical consequence Let them now but make it good that their Physical efficient predetermining premotion causeth no other and I will contradict it no more 176. But whereas they constantly say that God predetermineth mans will to the mode as well as to the act that it be done freely as well as that it be done if Willingness and freedom were all one I would grant it on their grounds But if an Immediate-Physical-predetermining efficient premotion and an invincible causation of Habit and Act by the first Cause bring no other necessity but of Logical sequel and be no real cause of the thing it self I confess I understand not what they mean nor know what Liberty is if the will have not a Power to act without such a Predetermination 177. The same I say of Camero's and others way of predetermining by Vid. Bellar. de lib. arbitr l. 3. c. 8. prop. 6. Pennot propug li. 1. c. 23. p. 46 47 c. Scot. 2. d. 25. Henric. quodlib 1. q. 16. Bannes 1. p. q. 83. a 1. dub 2. Cont. 2. Suar. Met. q. 19. sect 6. Vasquez 1. p. d. 67. n. 14. a chain of necessitating Causes viz. that God by the object necessitateth the act of the Intellect in specie 2. And that the Intellect necessitateth the will For all cometh to one if all sinful Volitions be necessitated Nor will it satisfie any man well that Camero doth resolve all mans sin into the Devils temptation as a necessitating cause till he know into what to resolve the Devils sin And he may turn Manichee in time that can believe that God gave the Devil power to necessitate innocent man to sin and bring all sin and misery on the world much more he that saith that God did all this himself 178. As there is Libera Voluntas and Liberum arbitrium or Libertas Voluntatis Libertas hominis so there is a coaction or constraint of the Co-action in sensu composito is a contradiction and impossible but not in sensu diviso to be forcibly or by unresistible power made willing of unwilling Yet in a large sense I confess that Voluntarium quà tale est liberum Will and of the Man I should take my Will to be constrained if by an unresistible power it were suddenly made impious in act and habit or either But the man is not said to be constrained so long as he hath his Will 179. The unhappy descriptions of free-will which I mentioned Jansenius hath To. 3. li. 6. de Grat. Salvat cap. 5. 6. And Annatus de Incoacta Libertate confuteth them at large As Implicat contradictionem ut Voluntas seu Volitio non sit libera sicut implicat ut Volendo non velimus Latet Contradictio in eorum dictis qui dicunt Voluntatem id est Volitionem esse posse quae non sit libera Apud Augustinum esse liberam esse aliquam hominis Angeli Voluntatem seu Volitionem pro iisdem prorsus usurpantur Voluntas seu Volitio libera Voluntas idem est sicut Velle libere Velle Impossibile est ut Velle non sit liberum Lege etiam Annatum Petavium Cont. Vincent Lerinens Pennoti propugnacul haec plenius tractans 180. The Liberty of the will consisteth not in such an Indifferency as Leg. Guil. Camerar Scot. Disp. Philos Moral qu. 4. for Gibieâ—fs sence of Liberty as not involving defectibility leaveth it in aequilibrio equally inclined to this or that As Macedo against Tho. White confesseth with others For then all Habits or Inclinations to this rather than that destroyed Liberty But in an Indetermination with a Power of self-determining which power is called Indifferent because it is a Power to this or that and not because it is equally inclined no nor equally a Power to either For there may be inequality 181. When Dr. †††Twiss de Scient Med. l. 2. c. 3. p. 265. Annat de Scient Med. Disp. 1. c. 6. §. 5. p. 135. Twisse with Bradwardine * * * Vid. Bradward l. 3. c. 10 11. passim about the definition of free-will which
futurition A conditional proposition de futuro is as true of that which will never come to pass as of that which will And if they mean that God Decreeth e. g. that Judas shall sin if he be so and so tempted it will lay the cause of Judas sin more on God in their own apprehension than their Cause or the Truth will bear For if God Decree that unnecessary Causes shall certainly effect the thing sin let them take heed of the consequence 267. I could never see how the Doctrine de scientia media doth at all Pennot l. 4. c. 23. saith 1. Scientiam Mediam maxima cum probabilitate defendi posse 2. Hunc modum reconciliationis decretorum cum Libertate principaliter immediate non inniti Scientiae mediae sed solum remote quia principaliter illa non ponitur in Deo ad conciliandam arb libertatem cum Div. decretis sed ut Deus provide sapientissime omnes actus maxime liberos disponere possit dirigere ad opt fines serve their turn seeing they use it to shew how God knoweth that Determinately which he foreseeth but in Conditionibus sine quibus non or in unnecessary and not determining causes And their own answer signifieth nothing more to the purpose but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his understanding which is most true But that he knoweth them ever the more for the supposition of circumstances they never prove Therefore the doctrine of Gods knowledge of such Conditional propositions and contingents as so circumstantiated seemeth True materially that They are the Objects of Gods knowledge but false efficiently as if they were any Causes of his knowledge which hath no Cause but only extrinsecal denominaters of it in that act And it seemeth useless and needless to their purpose 268. For I confess I think that we need no more and are capable of no more to satisfie us how God knoweth any thing Intelligible than to say By his Infinite perfection Man knoweth by Reception ab extra but so doth not God And if the Quest How doth God know this suppose extrinsick efficiency or reception it is blasphemous And I confess I hear men dispute How God knoweth with horrour as I hear men curse and swear and blaspheme knowing how uncapable such Moles as we Mortals are of understanding the intrinsick manner of Gods knowledge And I detest the very question and am but perswading others to detest it thus understood 269. Much more do I think it arrogant presumption in those that dispute pro scientia media to say that God Can no otherwise know future contingents As Annatus de scient med p. 85. contr Ab omiibus conâ—â—sâ—â—â— est nullam veritatem fugere intellectum Diâ—inum ac proinde propositiones de fuâ—â—ris contingentibus c. Blank de Concord lib. cum Decretis 1. Thes 49 50 51 Twiss D. 1. c. Seclusa Scientia Mediâ— non remanere in Deo praescientiam absolutam futurorum contingentium Et cap. 6. Seclusa Scientia Media non posse praedefiniri à Deo liberas creatae voluntatis actiones O Man O Worm Who art thou that in cases so unsearchable darest assert a non posse upon the Almighty God thus in the dark 270. And it is no less arrogant in the adversaries of Scientia Media such as some of our own and the Scotists who dare say that God Rada â—â—i â—â—pr who was one of the Congregation where it was disputed before P. Clem. 8. and was against it as Pet. à S. Josiph and others tell us cannot know future contingents but in the predefinition and decrees of his own will As if we had seen into all his Powers and Acts who dwelleth in the unaccessible light Whereas we know little of the smallest of his works 271. And as audaciously do the Dominicans plead that God cannot otherwise know our future free acts but by decreeing by immediate identificate premotion to predetermine them as the total first efficient cause Nothing can be more certain than that we know not How God knoweth who scarce know How we know our selves 272. He that hath read but one half what is said upon this subject by Zumel Ripa Gonzal Fasol Arrub. Aluiz Alarcon Alvarez Tanner Ruiz Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin Cantarel Navar. Curiel Cabrera Mascaren Verdu Fonseca Mendoz. Lessius Diotalev Moncaeus Theophil in Theolog. Natur. Aegidius Conink Pennottus Petr. à S. Joseph Annatus Twisse c. yea or but any two Contenders and is not convinced that they talk presumptuously of things which are unknown above their reach Non dâ—sunt ex nostris qui scientiam mediam aliquateâ—us agnosâ—unt inquit Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p. 675. naming even Gomarrus Walaeus and Lud. â—â—ocius as also Jacob. Martinius and other Lutherans and are we further from Arminius than Gomarrus was doth not think reverently enough of God nor knowingly and humbly enough of man And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which Durandus his third opinion casteth in the way and doth but try to solve well all Lud. à Dola's Questions Part 1. cap. 9. p. 96 97 c. and to answer well all his arguments against the usefulness of Scientia Media Part 2. and against the truth of immediate physical Predetermination Part. 3. and against Identificate Concurse as to evil actions Part 4. may soon find that much of these matters are so far above us as to be nothing to us and unfit to be thought necessary to our Peace and Concord 273. The old doctrine of Gods Prevision and this de Scientia Media in all that is within our reach come all to one And they erre that hold it to run pari passu equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not evil Acts because he willeth them or the futurity of them nor because he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act in specie which is sin But he willeth to effect that which is Good and may so far know it SECT XIII Of Gods Will and Decrees in General 274. GOds Decrees de futuris and his Will de praesentibus are in themselves the same save as to the extrinsick denomination from the divers state of the connoted objects 275. Gods Decrees are not his works in themselves considered but only That Gods Decrees are not to be taken for a thing past and ceased but as a thing still doing Pennot li. 4. c. 24. thinketh is the best notion to reconcile them with liberty But ab extrinseco Connotative they must be denominated past though without change in God Of this Dr. Twisse hath animadverted when with his executive power they operate ad extra and then his knowledge and will are his working being productive of the effects 276. As in point of simplicity Gods Acts are all One and yet many that is One ex parte agentis as his Acts are but his Essence and yet many ex parte effecti objecti inde
a Means 2. Making one little parcel of that means to be the end 3. Inserting two acts or parts only of that which they themselves confess to be but Means For what should the names of Salvation and Damnation do in the description of the end Are they any part of the end Why is not Redemption Justification Sanctification Preservation Resurrection c. as well put in Is he not Glorified in them as well as in final salvation or damnation Yea and in Creation and the frâ—me of nature too Yea why is not the glory of Angels and all the world put in as part of the same means to his end 406. If it be said that it is only Gods Glory of Mercy and Justice in menâ— salvation and damnation which is the end of Redemption Conversion Preaching Ordinances Sanctification Adoption c. 1. I deny it His Power Wisdom and Goodness and his forementioned subordinate attributes are thereby Glorified also 2. It is an injury to God unworthy of a Divine to make God to have as many distinct ultimate ends as they think there are particular aptitudes or tendencies in the means 407. For undoubtedly we must feign in God no more ultimate ends than one And undoubtedly the means consisting of innumerable parts make up one perfect whole in which Gods Glory shineth so as it doth not in any part alone And he that will cut Gods frame into scraps and shreds and set up the parts as so many wholes will more dishonour him than he that would so mangle a Picture or a Watch or Clock or House or the pipes of an Organ or the strings of a Lute and tell you of their beauty and Harmony only distinctly Well therefore did Dr. Twisse reduce all the Decrees de mediis to one But they are one in their apt composition for one end And the Glory of Sun and Stars and Angels and the whole Creation is a part and the Glory of our salvation and damnation is but another part 408. The order therefore of Gods Decrees in respect of the Execution is onâ—y fit for our debate Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end and his Glory shining in the perfection of his intire works is the perfect means And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert And about this our Controversie is next to none at all Here we may well enquire what is prius vel posterius quid superius quid inferius c. and that to our edification 409. Seeing then that we are agreed as is said with Aquinas that * * * Ruiz de Voâ—â—n Dei disp 15. §. 4. p. 163. prettily argueth that Si non potest dari ratio ipsius â—olitionis divinae sed solius denominations extrinseâ—ae resultantâ—s ab eâ—â—â—â—lis creatâ—â— sequitur â—anas esse plurimaâ— Thâ—oâ—ogorum de ordine dependâ—â—tia vel ratione diviâ—â—â—um volitionum post quam inter illos constat quem ordinem dependentiam vâ—l rationâ—m habeant externa objecta inter se The conscquent is true They are vain indeed though he deny it And all his reasons p. 161 162 c. to prove that dantur iâ— creatâ—â—a rationes finales moventes divinam voluntatem are but triflings with the ambiguities of the word Ratio and abuses of the word Causa having before confessed that there is no Real Cause And are there Causes that are not Real 1. We grant the Creature is an Object of Gods will and the object is bâ— some called the material cause of the act in â—â—â—â—â—â—â—â— numero 2. It is the Terminus and Recipient of the divine influx 3. It may therefore â—e causa materialâ—s of the diversity of the effects of Gods influx as Received in patiente ex diâ—ersitate dispositions 4. Our acts may be the effects of Gods Volitions 5. And may be second Causes of other effects 6. Those other effects may be said to be Gods nearer ends speaking of him after the manner of imperfect man 7. Where our acts are not causes they may be conditions sine quibus non of many of Gods acts quoad effectus as sin is of punishment at least 8. In all these respects Gods Volition which is One in itself may and must be denominated divers from the diversity of these effects and objects which therefore are the Ratio nominâ—â— And he that would prove any other Ratio or Cause of the first Cause the will of God or any of his acts as in himself must first renounce all natural and Scholastical Theologie at least He citeth Durand Major Richardus c. But Durandus 1. d. 41. q. 1. doth but say that Gods Acts are thus to be reckoned secundum rationem as likening Gods reasoning or thoughts to ours ut n. 7. and not â—uxta rei veritatem Richard is full for what I say 1. d. 45. Voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur non est aliud Velle aliud Esse But yet his Velle hoc speaketh not his esse quà esse and therefore he addeth that when God is said scire aut velle it is his Essence but to say Hoc aut illud scit aut vult is but to say Hoc aut illud est subjectum scientiae vel voluntatis quae ipse Deus est Et Voluntas Dei est prima summa Causa omnium cujus Causa non est quaerenda non est diversa Voluntas sed diversa locutio de ea in Scripturis And Richardus in loc p. 141. saith but this that Ipsius divini Velle nulla est ratio motiva cum realiter idem sit quod Deus Tamen Ordinationis quae est inter divinum velle ipsum volitum bene est ratio aliqua respectu alicujus voliti Which is no more than I have said And as to Major Ruiz did ill to cite him who there professeth that Predestination and Volition is but Relatio rationis denominatio extrinseca as to God And his ordo signorum in mente divina is but the Scotists assimilating Gods acts to mans Deus non propter hoc vult hoc sed vult hoc esse propter hoc that which we have to do is but to enquire 1. De re how one thing is a Cause or other means of another 2. And so how God Decreed it to work and be 410. And 1. It is agreed that the Creation was Gods first work that we know of or have any thing to do with This had as to the first part no Antecedent Object but produceth its effect which some call its object But the latter dayes works had an antecedent object and also a produced effect And accordingly God Decreed from Eternity that this should be his first work From whence by connotation that may be called his first Decree 411. That sin or the Permission of sin or other meer Negatives are not to have place among the asserted Means and Decrees I am anon in due place to
God is Morally and most fitly said to Nill such Nothings it is not as Nothings but as Possible Evils For only Evil is the proper object of Positive Nolition so that it may be spoken fullier of sin than of other Nothings even fitly in a Moral sense 494. VII Lastly Acts of Will are ordinarily ascribed to God when it is meer operations or privations that are meant and so the phrase is as they say ab effectu ad affectum When a man 1. Denyeth his aid 2. And actually hindereth it is a sign of nolition And so from Gods 1. Not causing 2. And his hindering he is said to Nill that Nothing that never shall be So much of the phrase 495. Now for application 1. Non-dare fidem aut gratiam not to convert is Nothing Therefore it is not Positively willed or decreed of of God or at least no man can prove it so to be So not-to give the Gospel the Spirit c. 496. Yet note that when mans sins have so forfeited such gifts that they are penally withheld this non-agency hath the denomination of a Moral Act. And also that the making of the Penal Law which maketh this Privation due as a punishment was a positive act of God and had a positive Volition But Negations not-penal are not so 497. 2. Not to hinder sin or to Permit sin barely as permission is Nothing As elsewhere I have proved Therefore it hath no Positive Decree or Will save that when it is penal and the execution of a Law that Law being a real natural being and the Jus thence resulting a real relation and the executive Privation quid Morale they are Willed and Decreed answerably as they are To permit a man to be spiritually Dead is not-to make him alive To permit his Darkness or Ignorance is not-to give him Light or Knowledge To permit his unbelief is not-to cause him to believe To permit his want of Love is not-to give him Love To permit his positive sins of Malignity or Carnality is but not-to cure and hinder them by Grace or Providence supposing the Natural support and concurse whith the Author of Nature giveth to all things 498. Therefore when Gods Acts in themselves are his Essence and all one and are diversified but by connotation of divers objects relatively and denominatively when he knoweth all things uno intuitu and willeth all that he willeth unica Volitione when nihil physicum is no denominating terminus of a physical act though so far as it may be called Moraliter id est Reputative aliquid as a Privation it may be said to denominate reputatively as a quasi aliquid and that which is moraliter vel imputative nihil cannot morally denominate when both Non dare spiritum gratiam fidem vitam c. and permittere infidelitatem peocatum c. are truly Nothing and even in Reputative Moral sense are wihil morale when they are not penal And as antecedent to sin they are not penal Judge now impartially whether 1. Those men deal not presumptuously with God 2. And troublesomely with his Church who assert the Being of Positive Decrees and Volitions in God about such Nullities and raise Controversies about the Reasons and the Order of them yea unto dangerous inferences when as 1. They can prove no such thing in God as they assert 2. Nay when we say so much to prove the contrary 499. And here consider whether Scotus himself assert not without all need or proof that God hath a positive knowledge and reflexive Volition of his own Non-Volition and so that a Nullity as to his own act must be the terminus of a positive act When that Nullity is neither God nor a Creature nor aliquid vel Dei vel Creaturae and so seemeth to be no denominating terminus of a distinct act Yet no doubt God is not to be called Ignorant of such Nullities or Idle for those are terms of privation If God be said either not to Know nothings or not to Wilâ— or Nill them it is because it signifieth his Perfection And no part of perfection is wanting to him But we must not place his perfection in a conformity to our imperfect mode of knowing or willing 500. For we dare not here presume peremptorily to determine Negatively that God doth not positively Will his own non-agency or non-volitions because we know how dark we are and distant from God and unfit to say any thing but certainties of him as certain truth But we abstain from the contrary assertion as utterly unproved and we will impute no needless acts to God as his Perfection Though we yield to reputative moral denominations 501. And so I contradict not the language of Aquinas 1. q. 14. 9. who saith that God knoweth such non-entities as never will be ut possibiliâ— And esse in potentia quamvis non in actu is more than nothing But remember that esse in potentia speaketh the esse Potentiae but the possibile is a pure nothing So that this is but to know the Potentia and not any thing else Yet no doubt but God knoweth all things as they are in himself that is he knoweth that he can do all things and knoweth what he knoweth and willeth but this is no esse creatum but God himself at least as to that which never will be But if any will call it a knowing of things possible which are nothings when God knoweth his own Power to make them we quarrel not with words while the sense is known 502. But remember that it is not the Knowledge but Decrees and Volitions of God that our enquiry now is about And Aquinas and his followers commonly say that Gods will goeth not so far as his knowledge and that he knoweth indeed mala ex bonâ— of which they are the privation as no doubt he doth so far as it is not imperfection to be said to know them or as they are objects of knowledge but yet that Mala neque vult neque â—â—lit sed tantum non-vult as Lombard said 503. Ockam Quodlib 3. q. 6. hath the question Utrum Cognitio intuâ—tiva potest esse de objecto cognito And he 1. concludeth that per potentiam divinam potest esse de objectâ— non existente but he meaneth only quod fuit vel fuerit 2. That naturally it cannot be And faith that Contradictio est quod visâ—o sit tamen illud quod videtur non sit in effectâ— nec esse possit Ideo contradictio est quod chimaera videatur intuitive fed non est contradictio quod illud quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra caâ—som suam dummodo possit esse in effectu vel aliquando fuerit in rerum natura Unde Deus ab aeterno videt omnes res factibiles tamen â—unc nullâ— fuerunt By which it is plain that he meaneth as Aquinas that it is not as Nothings but as Possibles and Futures they are known even by God saving that Aquinas and
it may be said that consequentially he willeth or decreeth a thing when he willeth or decreeth that from which it necessarily followeth though it could not be proved that the will of God is directly terminated on that consequent thing it self And so it may be said that Qui vult quid majus consequenter vult minus illud quod in majore includitur And so as when God commandeth duty he doth more than politically permit it he may be said eminenter to permit it and so he may be said to will or decree his own permission of it But that is not formaliter as permission or a negative non-impedition but eminenter because he formally willeth the quid majus viz. the command 30. So God may be said eminenter to will his non dare gratiam aut Gloriam when he penally as a Judge denyeth it to a sinner But here the thing formally willed is a positive judicial denyal rejection or exclusion of the sinner which the privation followeth And now for the application of all this to our case it may be perceived 1. That the very Controversie is such as a sober Christian should be afraid to resolve on either side ††††††Aristot ad Nichom inqâ—it Est hominis modiâ—ati non majorem in disputando certitudinem aut subtilitatem explicationis disâ—derare quam rei ipsius de qua disseritur natura â—â—â—â—tur Hanâ— sludiosis in mâ—â—oriam râ—â—â—co â—t quâ—â— sit â—imis arguâ—â—â— in disserendo contra Ecclesia dâ—â—riâ—an de causa peccati contingentiae Strigelius in Melanâ—th Loc. pag. 297. Quisquâ— plus â—â—sto non saâ—it illâ— sapit It is a tremendous thing to poor sinful worms who know not the nature of one arenula or pile of grass or the soul of an insect nor how the perceptions of a poor Bee is ordered in gathering her Honey and Wax and making her Combes c. to determine insolently and contentiously in what order God conceiveth of things or willeth them which first and which second and what reasons move him and for what use and end each thing is willed and whether he have positive Volitions of every non-entity that it shall not exist then c. I am afraid lest my very opposing and rebuking of this presumption should be found guilty of bold prophaneness while I so much meddle with so unsearchable a thing which I should avoid had not disputers and railing censurers made it necessary 2. That though while we talk together familiarly and popularly men may leave each other to liberty to say that God Decreeth non-entities or willeth that Infinite species and individual nothings shall never be yet to make this the matter of a Church-dispute and censure those that say not as they say and calumniate them as favouring some perillous errour seemeth to me no better than diabolical 3. All men that have the brains hearts and faces of Christians who hold that all these distinctions signifie no true diversity in Gods will exparte sui should openly tell the world in the beginning middle and end of such disputes that It is but about words that we dispute even what Logical terms Artists must use in distinguishing of that which hath no real diversity even about the dreadful Majesty of God and what Names to put on his simple volition 4. And they should well bethink them how far it is safe to think of that as divers which is not divers and to multiply conceptions and distinctions of Gods simple essence beyond true necessity and whether then to contend about the priority of such conceptions be more holy or prophane 5. For all the reasons before given If they will say that God Decreeth penally to deny or not to give Grace or Glory or any good thing to them that forfeit it there is reason for the expression according to Scripture after the manner of man But if they will fly higher and say that Gods Simple essential will is to be called A positive Decree or Volition that Judas e. g. shall not be named John Thomas c. that there shall be millions of distinct non-entities c. or that any positive Volition is of necessity to non-futurities or non-existences in meer physical respects where no positive action is necessary save only that by consequence he that decreeth and willeth to make such and such finite creatures may consequentially and improperly be said to will that there shall in general be no more in that he willeth not that there shall be more and they cannot be without his will I fear such are over-bold with God And so are they that say that he hath a Positive Decree or Will non dare Christum ante lapsum Adami non dare fidem non impedire peccatum in such instances or cases wherein the dare is no Act of a Rector nor the negare the positive Law judgement or penal denyal of a Judge but only the dare belongeth to a free Dominus-benefactor Bannes ubi sup p. 272. argueth Omne ordinabile in bonum finem quod invenitur existens est volltum à Deo sed Permissio peccati est c. Ans Permissio illa quae nihil est neque exiestens est neque ordinabile De permissionâ— autem activa verum est So Ruiz de Praedef Tract 2. disp 12. copiously proveth a positive will or decree of Permitting sin But then he defineth Permission so as to include both Production of circumstances and general concurse And who denyeth that such positive beings must have positive Causes But what 's that to meer non-impedition Thus still words are the matter of our quarrels Yet sect 7. he confesseth that he findeth none of the ancient Schoolmen that expresly say that the Permission of sin is fore-decreed nor that the Later deliver it sub iisdem verbis Adrian in q. de Clav. sol 982. Retâ—nere nihil positivi dicit sed solum non solvere ergo non oportet Claves esse sicut nec Deum causam effectivam esse See Alliaco before cited shewing that Lombard took Permission of sin to be no Act either Velle or Nolle but a non-velle non-efficere which he himself contradicteth not Penal permission or non-impedition of sin and denying or not-giving grace may be said to be decreed or willed because God threatned them antecedently by a Positive Law which should make them due and that Law was the product of Gods will Though strictly it is but the Positive Law and the Debitum poenae here that God willeth which the non-impedire non-dare gratiam follow But Gods not making men Angels or Stars or Suns and his making us men free and defectible and his permitting the first sin and his giving men no more grace antecedently before forfeiture as free benefactor dominus suorum none of these have the same reason on which to found such denominations of Gods will and essence And seeing Nolitions in man are the results of his Insufficiency and war against
noxious evils we must not ascribe such Imperfections to God but only such Nolitions as his Actions as Rector per Leges Judicia have made to signifie no imperfection as being not contra nocumenta but only contra injurias as against himself contra nocumenta as against his creatures i. e. contra peccatum And now I may answer the solitary argument of Vasquez mentioned in the Margin that non entia non dare gratiam non impedire peccatum c. may have aliquam rationem boni amabilitatis and so may be Willed Loved or Decreed Answ 1. In meer Naturals Negations are not properly any way good or evil but Privations are Natural Evils and not good 2. To be occasio sinè qua non of good as sickness is of the Physicions honour and sin of Gods is not any true ratio boni vel amabilis The bonum amabile is only the good that on that occasion is done The occasion is neither efficient constitutive or final cause of any good nor any causal proper medium 3. In Morals meer Negations are neither good nor evil nor have any Morality but only Positives and Privations 4. In morals God judicially doth that whence Penal privations follow and he may penally non agere non dare gratiam to execute his Law and demonstrate his truth and Justice on sinners and occasion the perception of his mercy to others And here the non-agere non-dare permittere being loco materiae volitae may after our mode be said to be Volita seu decreta bona But properly it is not the non-entity that is bonum or Volitum but the positive Law and Judgement and the relatio debiti pâ—nae and the ratio poenae in the privation and the demonstration of truth justice holiness c. therein 5. But sinful privations that is sinful Volitions nolitions or non-Vâ—litions of the Creature are not properly per se or per accidens propter se vel propter aliud good or amiable or willed or decreed of God And they that prove that God cannot be the Author of sin because he cannot be Causa deficiens must mean as much or speak impertinently and deceitfully It is not impertinent which Judicious Strangius saith Lib. 3. c. 13. p. 677 678. If Scientia Media be an useless conceit how much more cum extenditur ad ejusmodi infinitas vanissimas connexiones rerum disparatarum quae nunquam futurae sunt He instanceth in many and addeth De hac re Ariaga disp to 1. d. 21. sect 7. dicit non sibi videri in Deo esse scientiam harum quia talis scientia videtur plane impertinens Ad quid enim nosceret Deus quid Chimaera esset factura sub tali conditione impossibili c. Et ipse D. Twissus de Scient Med. p. 472. Si plures Angelos Deus condidisset certe decrevisset ut etiam illi agerent aliquid in Gloriam Dei Nec tamen decretum aliquod hujusmodi Deo decenter tribui potest c. I know the case is not just the same with that before us but the reason is the same for both But still I profess that If it be not an injurious imputing imperfection to God to assign him positive Volitions of every negative I shall concurr with them that do and extend Gods Volitions as far as ever the object and his perfection will allow And say of them as Judicious Blank doth of Gods knowledge De Concord lib. cum decret 1. n. 64. Saltem ille minus periculose errat qui putat Deum scire ea quae forte scibilia non sunt quam qui negat Deum scire quae revera scit quae intra Divinae omniscientiae objectum continentur So here so be it that God be not feigned to will sin I contend the less against them that say He positively willeth Infinite numerical Nothings and his own non-acting ††††††Bradward l. 1. c. 13. Cor. 10 11. brings in too profoundly like one of Thom. Anglus his Ergo's that God is the Causa prima of every nothing non esse because he is so of negations As if Nothing could be an effect and have a Cause or as if a negative conception or proposition were not something viz. a Thought or a Word as well as an affirmative Such workmen make the world with words 509. BEing afraid of wearying the Reader I pass by other School-controversies here and only propound to each mans Conscience whether 1. He that is the affirmer of unproved acts of God 2. And that about his secret unsearchable Volitions 3. And of such acts as make the difficulties inextricable about Gods being the Cause of sin be not on the far unsafer side than he that only saith Quae supra nos nihil ad nos If these be not certainly false they are certainly unproved and therefore not to be here received 510. And I say here as Buridane saith about the forementioned nature of Liberty Ethic. li. 3. qu. 1. p. 152. Simpliciter firmiter credere volo quod Voluntas caeteris omnibus eodem modo se habentibuâ— potest in actus oppositos Et nullus debet de via communi recedere propter rationes sibi insolubiles specialiter in his quae fidem tangere possunt aut mores Qui enim credit se omnia scire in nulla opinionum suarum decipi fatuus est De festuca enim tibi sensibiliter praesentata formabuntur centum rationes vel quaestiones de quibus contraris sapientissimi doctores opinabuntur propter quod in qualibet harum deceptus erit alter ipforum vel ambo Ideo non miror si in hac altissima materia non possum per rationes solutiones satisfacere mihi ipst 511. To proceed in the application * * * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 1. Sunt non-nulli Thomistae qui tam severe hanc sequuntur opinionem ut affirment â—undem ordinem servasse Deum in reprobatione quem in praedestinatione tenuit scil ut ante praevisa peccata sola sua Voluntate decreverit quosdam à regno Coelorum excludere licet non ad poenam sensus destinaverit Deinde quos voluit excludere permiserit labi in peccatum ea intentione ut eos excluderet à regno sicut decreverat Et c. 2. Parum ab hac sententia dissert Scotus qui qu. 1. d. 41. asserit in Deo duplicem esse Reprobationem alteram vocat Punitivam alteram permissivam Et punitivae dari causam ex praevisis peccatis factam fuisse Permissivae non dari causam quia quod homo permittatur labi in primum peccatum nulla ex parte illius datur causa hujus enim solum nititur Scotus causam negare Hinc ordinem hune in mente Divina assignat c. ut alibi Scotum sequuntur Bassolis Corduba c. Objicit Bradward Privationes ut eclipses mors c. habent
positivas causas To which what I have said is a sufficient answer And 1. Sometimes they have not but only the cessation of a causation 2. They never have a positive efficient of themselves for nothing is not made but only a positive remover of the cause of that which the subject is deprived of or an interposer or hinderer of the causation of it e. g. of Light or life And death hath no cause but that which ceaseth the causes of life Reprobation is commonly looked at in the two most notable parts as called 1. Gods Reprobating men to unbelief and impenitency 2. His Reprobating men to final damnation The last of these also is considered in the execution 1. As Privative 2. As Positive called Poena damni sensus And both especially the Privative part are considerable 1. As executed by man himself on himself freely 2. Or as executed by God Concerning each of these observe 512. 1. Not to Believe and Repent is no real entity And not to Give faith and Repentance as is said is no real entity And to Permit Infedelity and Impenitency is no real entity as is proved And not to Decree the Giving of saith and the hindering of unbelief is nothing And most clearly besides these four nothings nothing can be proved either existent or needful All that cometh to pass will come to pass without any more ado Therefore 513. As far as any mortal man can prove God hath no such Act of Reprobation at all as is 1. Either a Decree that a man shall not eventually Repent 2. Or a Decree not to give him Repentance 3. Or a Decree to Permit his Impenitence 4. Nor can we prove an after Volition of his own former non Volition which is asserted by Scotus But the three first we have great reason to lay by and so not only to say as Davenant that this part of Reprobation is an Act negative quoad objectum but that it is no Act and there is no other Reprobation as to this part save 1. Gods not decreeing to give faith 2. And his not giving it 514. 2. And as to Damnation so much of it as consisteth in sin it self God no otherwise causeth than as he doth all sin which is properly not at all It being but the Act as an act which he causeth as the Cause of Nature and not as sinfully qualified and so no more decreeth this than other sin 515. And most men little think how much of damnation lyeth in sin it self and the privative consequents which need no other cause 1. To be ignorant of God and Goodness 2. To be void of the Love of God and Holiness and Holy persons and all the Holy employment of Heaven 3. To be thereby void of all the Delights of Holy ones which consist in such Knowledge Love and Employment Praise Obedience and holy Communion 4. To be uncapable of the Reception of Divine complacency as he that maketh himself blind is uncapable of the light or he that maketh himself unlovely is uncapable of immediate Love 5. To be defiled and diseased with all kind of sinful lusts and malignity and made like the Devil 6. To have all sorts of Lusts in violence when they can have no fewel or satisfaction and so to be tormented with these lusts To have extream selfishness and Pride when they have cast themselves into the utmost shame and misery 7. To see that no Creature can deliver them and to despair of ever being better as having no hope from God or any other 8. To see or know that others enjoy the Glory and everlasting felicity which they have lost 9. To think how easily once they might have attained it and how it was offered freely to their choice 10. To think of all the solicitations of mercy that importuned them and all the time and means they had 11. To think for how base a vanity they lost it and that misery was their wilful choice 12. To be tormented with envy and malice against God that forsaketh them and against his Saints And to feel conscience awakened setting home all their former folly All this is nothing but sin and its own effects which hath no Causation at all from God but to continue the nature which he gave them and is not bound to destroy And how great a part of hell is this 516. Nay we know not how much sensible Pain may be the consequent of their own sin without any other Act of God than his common continuation of nature it self As a man that eateth Arsnick or unwholsome meat is tormented by it without any other act of God than as the universal Cause of Nature 517. All this much of Damnation then being meerly the work of the sinner himself so far as there is no Act of God in the execution so far no man can prove any Positive Act of Volition or Decree 518. But 1. As God in these is the universal cause of Nature and so of natural acts 2. And as in other instances he actually further punisheth them 3. And as he actually made that Law which made these penalties the sinners due so far God hath a Positive Decree and Volition that these persons shall be damned And moreover as improperly or morally his not sanctifying them and not saving them is called his Act and is really their penalty even so may his not-willing to save or glorifie them be called his Decree and will to damn them if you will 519. By this time we are ready to answer our first question What are the objects of these several acta of God so far as connotatively we must call them several And 1. * * * Besides all before cited against Volitions de nihilo see Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 6. §. 1. p. 36. Antiquorum gravissimi sentiunt Deum non omnia Velle sed ea duntarat bona quae in aliqua differentia temporis existunt proinde possibilia que nunquam futura sunt non amari à Deo â—â—â—â— Mala inde Deum not esse omni-volentem nâ—llam creaturam à Deo amari necessario Ita Albertus Alexand. Boâ—â—vent Richard Gaby Bannez Zumel Molina Valentia Scotus Against which he bringeth frivolous reasons and asserteth that God willeth as a material object the Goodness which the Creature would have if it were made and this as to all Creatures which never will be What putid contradictions are here to will Goodness which is no Goodness of all Creatures which are no Creatures as material objects which are nothings God willeth his own Power whence man calleth that Possible which is nothing But was there from Eternity any Possibles not-future to be willed What was there from Eternity but God And are all theâ—e Nothings God himself Gods not giving the Gospel to any persons is no Act and so hath no object But reductively or improperly the object is Man sinning against the grace of the first edition of the Law of Grace that is These are the
subject de quo of which it is truly said They are without the Gospel 520. 2. Gods not converting effectually some that have the Gospel is no Act and hath no object But the subject of the Privation called the Object is Some part of those men who have forfeited the helps of special Grace by their abuse or neglect of the Gospel and the Commoner grace which was given them 521. 3. Gods not Pardoning Justifying Adopting and Sanctifying men is no Act and hath no object But the subject of the Privation and object of the Laws contrary sentence is Impenitent Unbelievers or the non-performers of the condition of Justification c. in the Covenant 522. 4. Gods not Glorifying men is no Act nor the damnation which consisteth in sin as aforesaid is none of Gods act But the sentence of condemnation is Gods Act and no doubt some other Positive Execution And the object of these is All finally Impenitent Unbelievers and unholy ones that is who performed not the Condition of that Edition of the Covenant of Grace which they were under 523. And it being past all denyal that these are the objects of the Executive Acts we must say that these also are the objects of the Decrees accordingly where a Decree is proved and when we speak of them only juxta ordinem executionis and not Intentionis which I laid by before 524. And lest you recurr to it once more I will recite more of Davenants words de ordine Intentionis De Praed Reprob cap. 1. p. 107. 1. Sciendum tenendum est si Dei naturam perfectionem in se consideremus illum non prius unum videre deinde aliud neque prius hoc decernere aut velle deinde illud sed unico simplicissimo actu c. 2. Ex parte tamen Rerum quae decrevit signa quaedam prioritatis posterioritatis distingui possunt Hic tamen observandum est inter ipsos Scholasticos non admodum certam constantem esse hanc doctrinam de hisce signis seu instantibus prioritatis Scotus qui primarius est ad haec signa fabricanda artifex videtur non-nullis non solum eadem posuisse priora posteriora secundum nostrum intelligendi modum sed etiam statuisse unum esse in ipso Deo prius naturâ alio But from this he vindicateth him Ex adversa parte Occamus noster haec signa quocunque modo considerata negavit in 1. d. 9. q. 3. Et Biel ejus sententiam amplexus haec signa oppugnavit in 3. d. 2. q. 1. dub 3. Prioritates in Divinis non sunt ponendae sicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum Unus est enim Actus in Divinis re ratione indistinctus qui est ipsa essentia Divina ne secundum nostram quidem considerationem talem ordinem Prioritatis posterioritatis concipi posse in decretis Divinis ut talis consideratio non sit falsa speculatio If this hold our Controversie of the order is at an end 525. And he added the words even of a rigid Thomist Domin Bannes quamvis non omnino explodat haec signa cum Biele perpendens tamen discordiam Theologorum in his assignandis Animadvertendum est inquit quam pro libito in negotio praedestinationis reprobationis multiplicentur instantiae à Theologis quam parum illa conferant ad assignandam rationem differentiae inter praedestinatos reprobos Liceat itaque hic paucis monere non esse nimis confidendum aut certo dogmati adhaerendum ulli certo ordini decretorum divinorum sive à Protestantibus sive à Pontificiis assignato cum difficile sit duos reperire sive inter nostros sive inter adversarios qui ad amussim per omnia consentiant in hac serie decretorum divinorum describenda Caveat it aque unâ—squisque ne talem considerationem praedestinationis reprob inducat quae vel Divinae justitiae vel gratiae gratuitae adversetur tâ—m non multum refert quo ordine prioritatis c. SECT XVII Of Gods Causing and Decreeing Sin 526. BUt because it is the avoiding of Gods Causing and Willing sin Of too many such enquirers it may be said with Augustine de Utilit Credâ—ndi cap. 18. Dum nimis quaerunt unde sit malum nihil reperiâ—nt nisi malum Obj. Omnis determinatio diâ—ina est immutabilis Omnia siuâ—t Deo determinante Ergo omnia siunt immutâ—hiliter Respondet Mâ—lanâ—th Ad maj Est immutâ—bilâ—s necessitate conseqâ—entiae Ad minor Dissimilâ—s est determinatio in bonis malis actionibus Mala siunt 1. Deo praesciente non impediâ—nte non autem adjuvante vel impellente Item Deo sustentante naturam suum opus Item Deo eventus certos decernente Strigel in Melancth pag. 296. Carbo Compend Thom. 1. q. 19. a. 9. Malum ut malum nullo appâ—titu potest appeti nisi per aâ—â—idâ—ns Deus â—ullo modo vult malum Culpae Deus neque vult siâ—ri malum â—â—que non vult sed permitti Ruiz de praedesin Tr. 2. disp 13. §. 3 4. would prove a decree to permit mortal sin in the unjust and just ex destitutione circumstantiis And d. 16. §. 3. he tellâ—th us of many wayes by which God maketh sin the occasion of his Grace without causing or willing sin in form or nearest matter which is a great reason of these Controversies I shall say somewhat more particularly of that About which there are various Opinions 1. Some think as Hobbs that no acts of the will are so free as not to be necessitated as the motions in an Engine though unobserved by our selves who see not the Concatenation of Causes 527. 2. Some Dominicans and our Dr. Twisse and Rutherford held that no act natural or free can be done by any creature without the Predetermination of Gods Physical efficient immediate Premotion as the first total Cause of that act But yet that this standeth with Liberty because God causeth contingentia contingenter fieri And that he so causeth every Act of sin in all its circumstances and the totum materiale peccati and all that the sinner causeth But yet that he is not the Author of sin nor causeth the form Because 1. They say that sin hath no efficient cause but a deficient which God is not being not obliged to act And sin is nothing but a privation 2. Because God is under no Law and therefore though he do the same things that man doth it is sin in man but not in him And saith Holkot he is the cause of sin but not the Author because he commandeth it not by his Law 3. At other times they say that sin is formally a Relation of disconformity to the Law of God and God causeth the whole act as circumstanced but not the relation which resulteth from it 4. And God causeth not sin as sin but as a means to his Glory or as a punishment of former sin
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
arbitrii postulat sive prius sive posterius sive simul non sequitur malitiam Deo esse tribuendam cum illa solum ex modo operandi creaturae sequatur Vasquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. cap. 4. the general nature of action when existent hath So that this Moral specification addeth not to the natural generical entity 543. It is therefore 1. Acting 2. Not acting 3. Moral disposition which are Commanded and Forbidden by God And not any one only and these not in themselves but about the Materials commanded or forbidden Objectively in the Law To Act on a forbidden object Not to Act on an object when commanded and to be viciously disposed to either is a sin 544. You may see then that sin is a Connotative notion yea and a Relative notion It connoteth a Ruler a Law and End a Subject and is thus variously Related 545. As Subjection is the Root of Obedience and all obedience Virtually being A Consent to obey and Love is the Root of benefits so to forsake God simply as our Rector or our End or our Owner is Atheism practical and all sin in one But to violate only a particular precept de mediis is but a particular sin 546. God is the Cause of the Law which commandeth and forbiddeth and God is the Cause of Nature and Objects and Action as Action That therefore which he hath made mans part is to Love God and Holiness and not to over-love the creature nor to love it as our End or in his stead and to do all that he commandeth and not to do the particular acts about such particular objects as he forbiddeth 547. The remote subject or relatum then of sin is the person sinning But the nearest is the Act Omission or disposition The fundamentum or ratio referendi is the said Acts Omissions or dispositions as such or such about such or such objects commanded or forbidden which is a Relation And the form of sin is the Moral Relation of Disobedience or Disconformity to the Law So that if you must needs have it in Logical notions Sin is a Moral Relation resulting from a Physical relation of Actions Omissions or dispositions of Gods subjects which are modified contrary to his Law 548. It is a Moral Relation as it is Disobedience found in a Moral agent against a Law and Rector as such It is a Physical Relation as the Act c. is prius naturâ quid naturale about an object that is quid naturale It s fundamentum of both relations And one Relation may be sounded in another is the Mode of the Act Omission or disposition as to an undue object c. as it is forbidden by the Law Of the subjects and relatum I have spoken before 549. So that the form of sin being Relative can have no Cause but that which causeth its fundamentum and cannot possibly but result when that is laid 550. It were an injury to God to feign him to make such a Law as should say Though thou hate me see that that hatred be not Related formally as a breach of my Law or I forbid thee not to commit Adultery but only forbid that thy Adultery be quid prohibitum or a sin For if God forbid not the act it cannot be a sin and if he forbid it it must needs be sin And so of omissions 551. They therefore that tell us that sin is nothing but a Privation speak not satisfactorily nor altogether truly It is no substance indeed nor any such Reality as Man cannot Cause without Gods Causing it supposing his Universal Natural Support and Concurse But the thing forbidden is often Acts and Dispositions as well as Omissions and the form of sin is a Moral Relation which hath so much reality as a Relation hath if that be any And that Relation hath a positive name It is not only a meer Non-conformity but also a Disconformity becaused founded in See Dr. Wallis against the Lord Brooke of this very well Actual Volitions and Nolitions as forbidden and not only in Omissions 552. Subtile Ockam Quodl 3. q. 15. disputing Utrum rectitudo deformitas actus differant à substantia actus denyeth it and after a Confutation of the common saying that Deformitas est carentia rectitudinis debitae distinguitur ab actu quod in peccato Actus est materiale carentia justitiae debitae inesse est formale concludeth Quod deformitas non est carentia justitiae vel rectitudinis debitae inesse actui sed est carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse voluntati Quod non est aliud dicere nisi quod voluntas obligatur aliquem actum elicere secundum praeceptum Divinum quem non elicit ideo rectitudo actus non est aliud quam qui debuit elici secundum rectam rationem But I conceive 1. That the rectitude of the Will can be nothing else but the rectitude of its acts suspensions and dispositions 2. That Ockam here describeth only sins of omissions whereas the Rectitude of the Will is ofren also materially in not doing or willing what is forbidden And with these two animadversions I am reconciled to Ockam who addeth Ad aliud dico Quod illud dictum de Materiali Formali est falsum Quia aut est peccatum commissionis aut omissionis si primo modo est Materiale sine formali quia ibi non est carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse actui si secundo modo tunc est ibi carentia quae est formale sine materiali Resp 1. To the first I add that It had been true if it had been the Act as an act that had been forbidden or else the species of the act as quid naturale But it being the Act not as an act in genere but as this act thus modified or specified by an undue object that Act with its Relation as quid physicum are presupposed as the relatum to the moral relation of Pravity or Disconformity And to the second I say that it 's true that Omission is not Materia Physica but it is an inadequate first conception of sin and so is materia moraliter dicta vel loco materiae And the Omission being considerable 1. Quatenus Non-agere 2. Qua privatio naturalis 3. Qua Privatio disconformitas moralis these three inadequate conceptions take up the whole nature of the sins of omission 553. The same Ockam Quodl 1. qu. 20. Utrum actus exterior habeat propriam bonitatem vel malitiam moralem even as dependent on the Will And he denyeth it against Scotus who affirmeth it I will not trouble the Reader with their reasonings not doubting but Ockam erred and that it 's true 1. That no exterior act is Morally good or evil primarily 2. But that secondarily and participatively as it is voluntary there is a morality in the acts Words and deeds and passions are under Law next to the Will and in dependance on it As the body conjunct with
the soul is a secondary part of the man so are our exterior acts of sin 554. The conceit that making sin a meer nothing doth seem to justifie God as not Causing it is a meer vanity For 1. It justifieth the sinner more who no more is the Cause of nothing than God 2. Either man is able to do that Something or Act which sin is the privation of without any other Power than he hath or not If he be then even the Act of sin is not imputable to God If he be not then every sin is like our not making of a Sun or Moon or World which if it be a culpable defect they make God the first deficient 555. He that would see more of this question of the essence of sin may read Rada lib. 2. contr 16. who first ingenuously confesseth that Tho. and Scotus differ but in words and not in sense and then layeth down eleven conclusions of little use And Marius Scribonius Cosmo disp 18. Scotus in 2. d. 37. Bonavent in 2. d. 35. dub 6. Henric. Quodl 1. qu. 25. Almâ—in Moral tract 3. cap. 17. Richard in 2. d. 34. ar 1. qu. 7. Alex. Aleâ—s 2. q. 94. memb 2. Durand 2. dis 31. q. 2. Medin 12. q. 71. ar 6. Specially Vasquez 12. disp 95. cap. 9. Guil. Camerar Scot. Disput Philos Part. 1. Mor. q. 3. pag. 162 c. Argent in 1. d. 35. q. 1. ar 2. Gabriel Biel 2. d. 36. q. unica Valent. 1. 2. d. 2. q. 14. p. 3 c. Suarez 1. 2. tract de act hum d. 2. sect 2. Azor. li. 4. c. 24. Tanner 1. 2. disp 2. q. 5. dub 2. 3. disp 4. q. 1. dub 1. Vega in Trident. 6. c. 39. li. 14. c. 13. Cordub l. 3. q. 10. Cajet Zumel Curiel alios in 1. 2. q. 19. ar 4. q. 71. ar 6. And who is usually sounder than most of them Lombard himself Dist 35. Ripalda opening him and citing others dist 34 35. But the ordinary Christian that understandeth but what Disobedience signifieth needeth none of them all 556. * * * It is not only Dr. Twisse after confuted that supposeth sin to be willed of God as conducible to the perfection of the World but even Ruiz the Jesuite de Provid dis 2. secâ— 4. p. 27. maintaineth that Minus perfectus evasisset Mundus si nulla permitterentur peccata nune autem â—â—asit perfectior occasione peccatorum and citeth Aquin. Alexand. Albert. Bonav Richard Agid. Caiet Ferrar. Marsil for the same But 1. An occasion is no cause nor medium as such and therefore never the more willed if that were true 2. But I have before briefly confuted the Schoolmen on both sides about this question viz. Particular Creatures would be to themselves better were there no sin but whatever possible alterations were made by God the Universe would be neither worse nor better than it is as to that proper Goodness which must absolutely denominate it For the Goodness of all Creatures is to be conform to the Creators Will which is the denominating measure of fundamentum And so they are and so they would be were they altered But sin is disform to his Commanding Will and not conform to his Complacence or Efficient Will He argueth Had there been no sin there had been no such exercise of Liberty no Saviour c. Answ And are tâ—e Angels worse than man And had not all this been as good if God had willed it Though the five acts of God forementioned about sin are as far as we need to go to the common Ends which we agree in yet many objections are made against this much as not sufficient but God must have a greater hand in sin And 1. They object that to make God but an Universal Cause is to put something in being viz. the Act in specie morali which God is not the Cause of And so 1. To make Him idle and unactive as to that 2. To deifie man by making him a first Cause of that moral species To which I shall lay down such answers as I think will satisfie the considerate to this Objection which is indeed their All But I am sorry that the subject occasioneth me to repeat what I said before 557. 1. Remember that even an Act in genere is not a substance And that the moral specification is less as to natural entity than it indeed making no addition of Entity to it as was shewed And Dr. Twiss asserteth that this moral specification is not a proper specification of acts 558. 2. Note that few dare say that God is not Able to make a free agent with Power to choose or refuse without Gods further predetermining premotion And if God can do it we have no reason to debase his work and think he did not 559. 3. Note that for God to make a self determining agent that shall act without his predetermination is but to put forth his own Active Power with limitation or suspension that is To Will and Act or Operate so far and no further 560. 4. And note that this restriction of the Divine operation is not from any finiteness of his power as if he could do no more but from the freedom of his Will and the Conduct of his Wisdom who seeth it good to do no more 561. 5. Above all note that as all Divines agree that God doth not Act ad ultimum posse as natural agents do so the truth is most evident in the finiteness of the World and the effects of his Power For God doth not make as many men or other creatures as he could do He doth not make every man as strong or wise or good or long-lived as he could do He doth not make every Stone or Clod or Tree as Active as he could do nor move every thing as swiftly as he could do Now all that is undone which God could do all possibles which are not existent or future do tell us plainly that God doth freely suspend the action or operation of his Power totally as to them which is much more than to suspend it but in part with free agents and to give them a Natural self-determining power without further pre-moving predetermination of them If all the World tell us that he hath the far greater suspension why should we think the less absurd 562. 6. And Reason telleth us what the Schoolmen oft say that God who sheweth us that he delighteth in wonderful variety of his creatures doth very fitly thus beautifie the Universe by a middle rank of creatures that stand between Confirmed Angels and the Brutes viz. Intellectual-free-agents left to a natural Power of free choosing or refusing without necessitation in the midst of various objects to prepare them by tryal for a better state 563. 7. And note too that we say not that Gods predetermination of mans will destroyeth its best Liberty God can predetermine the will to Good as he doth the Angels as a great
just so here the question is Whether Gods Causation and Mans be more than Gods alone And I will not say that Gods is a Part nor yet that Mans is none nor that it is the same with Gods But that Gods acting and concurse are quite above the reach of Mortals 568. But here again note what I said even now 1. That it is no more sign of finiteness in God nor dishonour to him to be a limited or Partial Cause than to be no Cause and limited totally by suspension of the whole act And yet so he is as to all Possibles which he doth not make or move 2. And that it is his own free will only that thus limiteth him As it doth from giving all men more grace c. So that really here is matter of satisfaction 569. Though he offend me by making God the Cause of sin I will here cite the words of our Countrey-man Holkot Quodl lib. 2. qu. 1. Est sententia omnium Theologorum quod Deus est Causa immediata omnis rei productae sic quod omni creaturae agenti sive sit Natura sive Voluntas Deus coagit sic imaginandum est quod in omni actione creaturae qua aliquid producit Deus Creatura sunt duae causae Partiales illius producti Non sic imaginando quod Deus producit unam partem effectus creatura aliam ob hoc dicatur Causa partialis sed ideo quia concurrunt in agendo vel causando Unde tam causa universalis quam particularis dicitur communiter causa partialis ideo etiam Sol Homâ— sunt duae causae partiales hominis generandi similiter Vir Mulier Quia ad hoc quod aliquid dicitur causa partialis sufficit quod sit tale quod propter ipsum quoddam aliud vel quaedam alia res ponatur in esse sit quod illis positis res est aliquo istorum ablato res non fiet 570. Further I desire that it may be specially noted that God is our Creator in order of Nature before he is our Ruler And that Nature is before Morality obedience or sin And that God as Creator first setled the order of Nature so as that the Alteration of that Law or setled Order should not be ordinarily expected by us though he can alter it And therefore that man is man and hath a Natural Power of Self-determination and that God upholdeth him and concurreth as an Universal Cause belongeth to this fore-setled natural order and is presupposed to moral determinations and specifications either as from God or man 571. And note that to Good Acts we have need of more Help from God than this meer Natural Causality and Concurse And therefore God affordeth us more accordingly but not to all alike 572. It is further objected against this way that our making Reprobation to Infidelity Permission of sin not-giving faith c. to be no Acts of God cometh all to one as to mens sin and damnation because man cannot believe nor avoid sin without those Acts of Grace which God withholdeth Answ I confess it were all one if the supposition were true as it is not For we have proved after that man hath power without those acts of Grace which God suspendeth by that Common Grace which he giveth to do more good and forbear more evil than they do Of which in due place 573. It is objected also that while we make Gods Providence to fill the World with occasions of sin which he fore-knoweth men will take to their damnation yea as long as God could prevent all sin and save all souls and yet will not it cometh all to one which way soever you go in these Controversies I answer 1. Undoubtedly Gods Judgements are unsearchable But when we come into his Light we shall be perfectly reconciled to them all 2. And undoubtedly God doth whatsoever he will and all that he thought meet to Decree or Will shall come to pass in despight of sin 3. And when we have said all flesh and blood will be unsatisfied till faith and the will of God do satisfie us 4. But yet be it known to you that there is a great difference between Gods permitting sin after great means against it and his causing it Between the making of a free agent and putting life or death in his choice and his causing men unavoidably to sin and then to damn them for it The Holiness of Gods Nature will stand with the Being of sin by mans causing but not with Gods causing it And the Truth of Gods Word must be considered 574. If this were all one to Damn men unavoidably and to give them their free choice of Heaven or Hell in the means it is strange that so many Learned men as among the Jesuits Arminians Lutherans and Greeks do hold no other Grace at all but what leaveth man to such a free Choice could ever be so satisfied when others hold that the Elect have more SECT XVIII A Confutation of Dr. Twisse 's Digr 5. l. 2. sect 1. Vind. Grat. 575. I Come now to consider of what is said by them that go further about Gods will or Causality as to sin And because Dr. Twisse hath a peculiar Digression Vindic. Grat. li. 2. p. 1. Digr 4. I will somewhat animadvert upon it He beginneth Sententia nostra haec est Deum hactenus dici posse Velle peccatum quatenus vult ut peccatum â—iat viz. ipso permittente And so he maketh the question An Dens Velit ut peccatum eveniat ipso permittente Arminius thought God willed only his own Permission of the sin Twisse saith that he willed that sin should come to pass God permitting it Arminius his concession cannot be proved as I have shewed But Twisses must be disproved And 1. I will give you our Reasons against it Bonavent in 1. d. 46. q. 3. resolveth this question very plainly and truly Mala â—ieri nullatenus bonum esse potest sed bene occasio boni And shewing the difference between Causa Casus Occasio he saith that Causa est procedens intendens Casus pâ—ivat Intentionem sed non operationem Occasio privat utrumque And he distinguisheth Occasion into that which hath ratioâ—â—m Actiâ—i excitat agentem and that which hath but rationem passivi as one by anothers evil exciteth himself to do good And also between the evil and the ordinability to good And saith the evil is but the occasio passiva of the good and the ratio boni quod substernitur is occasio aliquo modo activa Vide locum 576. Let the Reader remember that what the Author saith of Gods Willing he also in the point of Predetermination saith of his working viz. that he Causeth as much as he willeth But I pass that by now because I have largely confuted it elsewhere And to speak to One is to speak to both 577. 1. All sober Christians are agreed on what side
soever that God is not the Cause of sin except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia whom the Synod of Dort rejected Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod Beza himself in Rom. 8. 28. passim abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin Yea more very much more than wicked men or Devils are which is not true 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved predetermined Cause of the Act of Volition and Execution whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin His saying Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin when they are committed which they would not be without the Law 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat and is the first predetermining Cause even the total Cause of all that is in the act and all its circumstances without which predetermination it could not be So that man doth but will what God first willeth and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act as the pen in my hand 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result and hath no other cause 579. And note here what Estius before cited after Aquinas saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat is all that the Sinner himself doth when he willeth sin And therefore it 's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin and willing the event futurity and existence of it ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction For he willeth sin who willeth the existence of it or that it be or come to pass 580. And note that it is both matter and form Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat For it is sin And forma dat nomen It is not sin but by the form of sin But if they had said otherwise it had been all one For he that willeth the fundamentum relate and correlate Saith Twisse Vindic. Graâ— li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. Posito quod velit perâ—ectiones istas manifestare necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati sed permittat 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws and Illuminating men to know them without execution by the occasion of sin 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical should not give so much to sin which were it a means as it is not but a Passive and opposite occasion is but a moral means And himself saith page 136. Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi â—inem à Deo praefixum At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae sive justitiae Media enim ejus sunt naturae ut ad ea facienda movâ—atur quis ex intentione finis Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium as stone and Timber to an House And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae it is not so to Christs Rather if a beggar Want a house is that Want the Materia domus no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propriâ— dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordiâ— sive iâ—stitiâ— potiâ—s quam medium Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this 2. Permission it self is nothing being but non-impedire And is nothing or non-agere a proper means But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed that it is the Permission of sin and not the sin that is the Divine medium only one saith Praedestinationis and the other providentia And yet they will differ while they agree And I that differ from both would agree with both willeth the Relation 581. There is nothing left to be said then but that God willeth that sin be done but not as sin or because it is sin But this is nothing For 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination or for seeming good 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God so doing is but one of their sins which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it and predetermined them to it so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice and so do not wicked men but for wicked ends or in enmity to God I answer That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente non faciente Answ The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law And why then do they put in the word permittente Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do but only permit when they mean no such thing For that is my second reason against them 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin which is false For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause he cannot be said to Permit To do a thing and
move another to do it will not stand with proper permission 585. Obj. But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting Answ 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingness as such that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the same act Which is but to say that God causeth me to Will sin and not to Will-nill-it 2. If you mean more I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and phâ—sical premoving predetermination of the first cause 3. But if all this were so it 's nothing to the present case and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin but only that man is a Cause also caused by the first Cause and that God Willeth and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely 586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cause our Holiness and our sin For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness than to Will it and to predetermine the will of man to it besides commanding it which is a moral act and we speak only of proper efficiency He doth but will that Holiness be and cause all that hath any entity in it And so they say he doth about sin 587. Obj. He loveth our Holiness for it self and so he doth not sin Answ The first is denyed by themselves if you speak of Gods end For they confess that God only is his own end for which he loveth all things 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition 1. The efficient which is all that is now in question they must confess is equal to both if he equally will the existence of both Object But he hath a Complacence in Good only Answ 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient Therefore if sin be the fulfilling of his Will he hath a complacency in it The formal reason of a pleasing object to God is as it is the fulfilling of his own Will And to break his Law they make to be such ergo pleasing 2. But if it were not so that 's nothing to our Case of the efficient Will 588. 4. To avoid tediousness in sum This opinion seemeth to me to leave very little or no place for the Christian Religion For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei which is Veracitas Divina and leaveth no certainty of any word of God For if he do will and predetermine by premotion ut fiat omne mendacium quod fit then we have no way to know that he did not so by the Prophets and Apostles 2. It maketh the Scripture false which saith so much of Gods hatred and unwillingness of sin 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holiness which is made the great reason of our holiness 4. It maketh mans Holiness to be no Holiness but a common or indifferent thing 5. It maketh sin so little odious as being a Divine off-spring as will destroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly sorrow repenting confession and all practice of means against any sin 7. It will hardly let men believe that Christ came into the world and did and suffered so much to save men from sin and to destroy it 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctifie souls and mortifie sin 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell and that God will damn men for ever for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination unavoidably 10. It seemeth to give Satans description to God and more For Satan can but tempt us to sin but they make God absolutely to will that it be and physically to predetermine us to it And so Christ that came to destroy the work of the Devil the father of lies malice and murder should come to destroy the work of God 11. It taketh away the reason of Church discipline and purity and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedness 12. It would tempt Magistrates accordingly to judge of vice and vertue good and bad in the Common-wealth 589. Now to their arguments 1. Rev. 17. 17. God put it into their hearts to do his will and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beast Answ 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome with the effects will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark as not to be fit to found such a doctrine on 2. It was the effect of the sin that God willed and not the sin 3. He is not said to put the sin into their hearts whether pride covetousness cruelty c. but only to do his pleasure and agree or make one decree to give up c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts which with their own sins would have that effect which he willed If a thief have a will to rob God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way 590. But for brevity besides what is said I shall farther direct the â—mpartial Reader how to answer all such objections And withall let the â—onfounding cavillers against distinguishing see what blasphemy and subversion of Religion may enter for want of one or two distinctions which â—onfused heads regard not 1. Be sure to distinguish the name of sin from the nature 2. And â—emember that no outward act is sin any further than it is Voluntary by privation or position of Volitions 3. Distinguish between the Act as it â—s Agentis and as it is in Passo 4. And between the Act and the effect 5. Between the effect of a single cause and of divers causes making a compound effect 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the â—ontrary and one forbidden object compared with another 591. And then all this satisfying Truth will lye naked before you 1. That the same name usually signifieth the sin and the effect of sin or the Act as Acted and as Received Adultery Murder Theft usually signifie the Acts of the Adulterer Murderer Thief as done and as received â—n Passo and as effecting 2. That the former only is the sin viz. first the Volition Nolition or Non-Volition and secondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will And no more The reception of this act in Passo is not sin as such nor the most immediate effect of this act It is but the effect of sin 3. And you will see that the same effect may have several causes a Good and bad And so God may be a cause of that effect which mans sin also concurreth to cause And God doth not therefore Will or Cause the sin 4. And you will see that God may morally cause the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden though both make the act sinful and yet
not Cause it as it is exercised on either of those objects compared with such as are not forbidden 592. And you will here plainly see that God hath many wayes to Cause the effect without willing or Causing the sin As for instance 1. He can do it by adding as I said before a good act to the sinners bad one As when Caiaphas is willing to kill Christ God can put into Caiaphas's De hoc vid. Ockam ubi supra thoughts the jealousie of the Romans over the Jews and the visible danger they are in if they should be thought to have another King which thoughts in themselves are true and good So he can put into Pharaoh's thoughts the loss of the Israelites service which was not sinful of it self The wise Reader that can impartially receive truth without respect of persons may find much in Episcopii Institut Theol. li. 4. sect 4. de provident in his answering all these Texts of Scripture as mis-expounded by some And his moderate opinion expressed in Conclus 2. in the end of that Section how far doctrines are or are not damning which subvert the foundation is laudable and his reason very good and clear viz. so far as they actually prevail with the will and practice Even as our faith is saving as effectual and practical and not as a dead opinion so is error damning I think as he doth 593. And 2. God can set that object before a sinner which he is most inclined to abuse Which is not to Will his sin But may proceed from Gods Willing the Effect As if Absalom be by Pride and Lust enclined to Adultery his Fathers Wives may be in his eye and way And God may will to punish David by their passive pollution without willing his act of sin at all interior or exterior 594. 3. And God can remove other objects out of the way so that this object shall be solitary or most obvious to the sinner As if a drunken man were resolved to kill the next he met God can keep Peter John c. out of his way and so Judas shall be the next 595. 4. Yea God can suspend his own intrinsick concurse as to some one sinful act by which it will follow that it will fall upon another object Many other such wayes God hath which are unknown to us 596. And if you suppose a man so inclined to Murder or Adultery as that he will exercise it on the next most provoking object if God now did Cause the Act as exercised on a forbidden object compared with another it were to Cause the sin But if he only be the moral Cause that he e. g. kill Judas rather than Peter this is not to Cause sin For to choose Judas rather than Peter for the object is no sin For as I said God câ—â— do it only by removing Peter and Willing that he shall be preserved 597. Suppose a King that hath made Laws against Murder foreknoâ— that a Robber is waiting in such a Road for a prey and that a Traytor broke out of Prison will go that way and so will be rob'd and kill'd He may will or desire the Death of the Traytor as a punishment He may restraâ—â— some that would travail that way before him and may restrain some that would lay hold on the Robber or drive him away that so this Traytor may be killed And yet only Permit and not Will at all the Robbers Will or Acâ— as it is Agentis but punish him for it and hate it and Will only the effect 598. The next Text cited is 1 Pet. 2. 8. Whereunto also they were appointed viz. to stumble on the rock of offence Resp 1. This hath respect to Luke 2. 34. he is set for the fall of many c. and of Christs own words that he that falleth on this stone shall be broken in pieces And no more can hence be gathered but that God hath decreed that as a Punishing Judge 1. He will leave the rejecters of Christ to go on iâ— their own sinful way 2. And that their opposition to him shall be theâ—â— ruine So that 1. He doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ that deserved it 2. He speaketh not at all as willing their sin but only as one that penally denyeth them further grace 3. But the thing that he is said to Ordain them to is not sin but Ruine the consequent of their sin The word stumbling and falling signifying their destraction 599. The next Text is 2 Thes 2. God shall send them strong delusions or the acting of deceit that they should believe a lye Answ Here is nothing signified but 1. That God shall permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits 2. And permit wicked men to believe them which is mentioned as a permitted consequent and not as an end intended by God And the word sending is used because the permission was Penal for their sin And his punishing-providence might morally cause the deceivers rather to go towards these men than towards others 600. The next is Rom. 1. 24 26 28. God gave them up to uncleâ—â—ness to vile affections to a reprobate mind c. Resp Here is nothing at all said but a Penal desertion and permission and no Will or Cause of sin in God 601. The next is Act. 4. 28. To do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done Answ Here is nothing said of sin at all but of the effect of it All that was done on Christ even all the effect in passo God fore-determined should be done But the Act ut volentis agentis he neither willed nor caused as on this forbidden object And though elsewhere the Doctor deride this answer that God decreed Christ should dye or be sacrificed and yet decreed not that the Jews or any one else should do it It is a great and necessary truth He that willed the effect and did much himself to cause it willed not the murderers sinful act And permitting and foreseeing it was enough 602. The next is Isa 10. 6. and so Amos 16. 17. Prov. 22. 14. 2 Sam. 12. 11. 1 King 11. 31. 12. 24. God sends the Assyrian as his rod. Thy Wife shall commit Adultery and thy Children fall by the sword They that are hated of God shall fall therein David was foretold his Wives should be vitiated The ten Tribes fell from Rehoboam It was of God that he took not good counsel Pharaohs heart was hardened by God Answ The first is only a Prophesie and a penal effect of sin and nothing of Gods Willing or Causing sin And so is the second Though God can send afflicters by the wayes before mentioned without willing their sin The third speaketh only of a penal permission of sin And the rest all speak only of Gods penal permission of the sin and his decreeing and foretelling the effects of it and his occasioning the sinner to take one sinful object not as such
but rather than another 603. As the Wind hath its natural course and so hath the Water and the Miller Causeth neither of them but supposing them doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient they shall fulfil his will and he is the Cause of the effect viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn so is it easie for God to use mens sins permitted to his ends without willing them * * * Even Vasq in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of mens non respondere vocationi God is Causa per accidens ut removens prohibens dum negat auxilium efficax congruum But this is but a Controversie about a Logical name causa per accidens which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applicable to God as to mans sin 604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons And the first is because †††Pet. Alliac Cam. 1. q. 14. A. Secundum Bradward alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle nec habet solum non velle Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri sed ideo secundum hunc modum dicitur permittere quia non approbat ea neâ— impedit ea fieri cum possâ—t sed secundum Magistrum Deus permittit ea quia nec vult ea fieri nec vult ea non fieri quia si nollet non fierent sed solum non vult per consequens non habet actum voluntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri Saith Bonaventure that plain and honest Schoolman li. 1. dis 47. dub 2. Diâ—â—ndâ—m quod non est sigâ—um quod Deâ—â— velit illud quod â—â—â—â—â—iâ—â—itur sed quod velit illud quod ex â—o elicitur Alliâ—co â—â— q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec prâ—cipit nec â—â—â—â— nec consulit sed indulâ—â—t talis Permissio est signum Voluntatis Dei quia aliquem actum significat in siâ— permittente ita Deuâ— non permittit mala culpae â—â— Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle nec habet nolle sed solum non Velle ut flat Et talis Permissio non est signum Divinâ— Voluntatis quia â—ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command And what is permitted and that for good infallibly cometh to pass Answ All this is before confuted * * * If he really holâ— with Bradward li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale seeing he permitteth it But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my self obliged to regard nor do I coâ—sent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardinâ— than in him See Alliaco before of Bradward It 's false that non impedire efficaciter is a sign that one wills the thing The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties could also lock up or guard some men and effectually keep them from the sin And doth he Will it because he doth not so And it 's false that all cometh to pass that is not hindered 605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grosly viz. Both sides confess that the substrate act is done God not only willing it but effecting it v. g. Absalom 's congress with his Fathers Concubines Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act but that the Volition of congress the internal elicite act was efficiently and Principally of God why then should it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done God willing it though not effecting it or any way failing of his duty Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessarily follow the substrate act in respect of the Creature though not of God Answ Hobbes could desire little more But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified that is as it is exercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalom to Will that Congress with his Fathers Concubines nor to Act it The nature of the Wind and Water and God as the Cause of Nature cause the wind and water to act and to act as they do on their own part But that they turn this wheel and milstone and run in this Channel rather than another is long of the Miller Absalom's Motus qua motus and qua cupido ordinata was natural from God but not as acted hic nunc towards this object And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action might be morally and penally from God 606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head and tell me that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature and so dependent I confidently answer you for God 1. No man is injurious to himself And God did not wrong himself when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power he resolved so far partially to suspend his own operation so as not to necessitate the will no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension in making no more Worlds or Creatures 2. You quite mistake We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx nor determine it but terminate it and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes God and Man and cannot be ordinarily by one alone because God hath otherwise appointed And again I beseech the adversaries to note How great and innumerable changes are made in the world by the various Disposition of Recipients The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill do not at all Change the Action of the Sun but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause that its Act hath such various effects And it is the Millers work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel Wheels c. which causeth the variety of effects And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx 607. His third Argument is God giveth not that effectual Grace without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided ergo he is willing that it be done Answ I deny the Consequent It only followeth that he doth not Absolutely and effectually Nill it If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poyson And his Children he effectually keepeth from it one he locketh up another he committeth to a Keeper another he keepeth the poison from But to a Traytor he saith I once forgave thee and saved thy life and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison and if thou do not it will torment and kill thee but if thou wilt take
no warning take what thou gettest by it Can you prove that it is his Will that this man eat the poyson prohibited 608. Next he citeth Augustines thred-bare sayings and blameth Aquinas and Arminius for denying his Authority and commendeth the greater reverence of Bellarmine And so Anselm Hugo c. Answ 1. We stick not on one mans Authority God holdeth not his Holiness and the Church its Religion on Augustines authority 2. Augustine hath ten times more plain enough for what I hold See the places cited in Paul Eiren. Triad Patrum 3. He knew it's like that Estius and many more expound Augustines words as terminating Gods Volition on his own permission and not on the sin or fieri 4. I think plainly that Augustine there spake not of inward Volitions but outward Acts and that not as Agentis but in passo or the effects And so it is true that no murder theft treason or other effect is produced in the world but what God positively decreeth shall be produced either by doing some effects himself as drowning the world or permitting sinners to do them while he causeth not their act but the Receptivity of the Passum and so the effect c. 609. Pag. 194. Retorting on Aquin. he thus argueth Because God doth will his own Goodness therefore it is necessary that God will that sin be done he permitting it For it is not to will his essential Goodness which needeth no acquisition but he willeth to manifest his Goodness But the evil of sin is not opposite to the manifesting of Gods Goodness Yea nothing is more * * * So Twiss contr Armin. pro Junio pag. 91. dissenteth from Jâ—niuâ— that saith peceatum ad rationem universi facere per accidens and saith Mibi vero dicendum videtur Peceatum conducibile esse per se ad bonum universi quatenus conducit ad illustrandos tales divinae majestatis radios And if so it must per se be Loved of God as Good Yet contr Corvin he saith that No sober man saith that sin is a medium of the execution of Reprobation but only the Permission of sin Reconcile them that can conducible to it than this I say to the manifesting of Gods Goodness by way of mercy in sparing or by way of Justice in punishing Answ Horresco recitans 1. Gods Volition of his Essential Goodness is his Necessary Volition 2. God hath no End to acquire but alwayes hath his end and is never without it 3. If God had necessarily willed the particular way of manifesting his Goodness then he doth all things necessarily and could do no otherwise and it seems by you could not manifest it without sin 4. Doth he not manifest his Goodness as much to the Innumerable Glorious Angels who never sinned And would it not have been as much manifested to us if we had been as they 5. The very indetermination of the will and its mediate Liberty is not the highest excellency of his Creatures It is better than the sensitive Necessity of Bruits and lower than the confirmed Necessity of the blessed It is our defectibility And the excellentest or Best of his works most honour Gods Goodness 6. Is it not the strongest temptation that men have in this world to doubt of or dishonour the Goodness of God to think how he permitteth the world to be drowned in wickedness and be so like to hell 7. Doth not Christ turn the Prayers of all Christians against your doctrine viz. that Gods name may be hallowed his Kingdom come and his will done on earth as it is in Heaven which is not by any sin 8. Do not your words tempt men to be indifferent to sin if not to love it if nothing be more conducible to honour Gods Goodness 9. Is not that conclusion a great wrong to Christ Scripture Ministry and Holiness as being no more conducible to manifest Gods Goodness than sin is 10. It is not true that sin is any Cause or true Means at all of glorifying God or doing any good It is but a presupposed Evil by delivering us from which God is glorified As your eating poyson may occasion the honour of an Antidote and Physicion It is no Cause or proper medium of it but only an occasion and mischief sine quo non But if God had not saved us from sin committed he could have glorified himself in saving us from committing it God loveth and is glorified most in that which is most like him as his Image which is the Holiest sinless soul To be a medium to Gods glory is to be good To be as conducible to it as any thing is to be as good as any thing save God and his glory But sin hath no Good much less such good Why else doth not God equally delight in sin and in the death of the wicked as in holiness repentance and our life seeing all things are for himself and that which glorifieth him most is best 11. Here also confusion causeth mischief one distinction might have scattered this mist viz. Between sin indeed and sin in notion Sin indeed or essence and existence never did good nor honoured God Sin in notion or in esse objectivo is no sin but the Matter of Vertue and 80 Joh. Ã Combis compend Theol. l. 3. c. 1. tells us that sin is profitable three wayes 1. Ut bene ordinatur ut fur in patibulo 2. Propter co-actionem amaritudinem 3. Propter mall considerationem And many popular Books say the like But this is but abusive language tending to deceive As if sin did good because punishing sin and repenting of it and hating it do good As if hating sin were sin Thus unhappily is the world troubled by abused words Holiness and doth much good When you say God knoweth sin from eternity you 'l say with Scotus that in esse cognito sin was in God from Eternity But so sin is not sin David saith My sin is ever before me Psal 51. And we daily Repent of it and confess it But this is but to have the Idea or conception of it in the mind and so it is not sin indeed but the notion of it which is in esse objectivo Else it would defile us to think of it and repent of it whereas thus sin objectively is the matter of the grace and duty of Repentance Hatred fear watchfulness prayer confession c. And so sin in esse objectivo as a grace may glorifie God 610. To Aquin. that saith Malum non est appetibile he saith that Malum moris quod opponitur bono est proprium uniuscujusque meum malum bono meo Though the sin of a man willing that which is forbidden him be his sin yet it followeth not that God may not will this Evil of another The Reason is because it is not forbidden to God to will it wherefore though it be evil and dishonest in man to will it to whom it is forbidden yet not to God And seeing
that Moral Evil or sin is summè conducibile chiefly or most conducible to make way to represent Gods Goodness this abundantly sufficeth to prove it desirable to God We say that this evil which we affirm to be willed of God is not at all evil as it is objected to the will of God but as to the will of the creature being forbidden the creature but not forbidden God Answ Shall we preach thus to the people Will this Doctrine convert souls to repentance or faith in Christ 1. The question is not Whether to will sin be sin in God But Whether he will and cause the sin of man which you sadly assert 2. Gods Glory is our End and to forbear things prohibited is but the means If sin conduce as much as Christ and Holiness to Gods Glory why may we not desire it sub ratione medii though not as praeceptum We must desire that which is most conducible to Gods Glory 3. Though God be under no Law his Perfection of Nature and Will is the fountain of all Laws and instead of a Law to him And we must be Holy because our God is Holy 4. It is still false that sin is any Medium to Gods Glory or desirable or hath any good 5. God is Good and delighteth to do good And he is the Just Ruler Of which vid. Gibieus at laâ—ge of the World And I would not have Kings take such Justice for a pattern as you describe as if God vehemently forbad sin and sent his Son and Spirit and Ministers as an Army against it into the World and will daâ—â— men for it for ever and yet willeth and causeth it as summè conducibils August de Nat. Grat. c. 25. fol. 314. Non hoc eis dicimus quod sibi iste Pelagius opposuit ut esset Causa Misericordiae Dei necessarium fuisse peccatum Utinam non fuisset miseria ne ista esset misericordia necessaria Id. ibid. cap. 31. Et altius Dei consilium fateor me ignorare cur etiam ipsam superbiam quae in reâ—â—e factis animo insidiatur humano non cito Deus sanet pro qua sananda illi piae animae cum lacrymis magnis gemitibus supplicant ut ad â—am superandam quodammodo calcandam obterendam dextram conantibus porrigat Even Vasquez the Jesuite saith of Gods denying men grace and of non-entities that God willeth them thus Non-esse alicujus rei secundum se quatâ—nus malum quoddam ipsius rei est non placet Deo Sed sub alia ratione placere potest nec enim in eo est omnis ratio mali Nam in non-esse alicujus rei potest comparatione ad reliquum universum vel ad justitiam vel ad potenâ—iam Dâ—ialiqua ratio boni apparere ob quaÌ„ non tantum potest placere Deo simplici complacentia sed etiam efficaci voluntaâ—â— qua discernat rem illam non facere Similiter cum Deus alicui negat gratiam suam auâ— gloriam non placet ut maluÌ„ quoddam ipsâ—â—s est â— Quia sicut non dispâ—â—cet persona sic nec malum illius ut ilâ—ius est placet â—â— sed placet sub alio respectâ— sub quo etiam non potest non placere quiâ— sciliâ—â—t oâ—tenditur in eo potentia Dei miserâ—cordia in elcctos c. By this he will teach men to say so of sin But 1. He confesseth that this controversie is not of any thing real in God as if he had distinct real acts but only of the extrinsecal denomination of Gods Essence 2. He can give no reason why the malum poenae of a â—reature as such may not â—e willed of God as much as non-entity though not finally for it self 3. Non-entity hath not omnem rationem mali but it is enough that it hath nullam rationem boni 4. It is the imperfect conception of man that taketh Nothing to be any way Good A nâ—gatione subjecti ad negationem modi valet argumentâ—m Non-entities are no true modes of the Universe It is improper to say that Gods Power Wisdom or Mercy is glorified by any nothing or non-entity It is by some being that God is glorified 5. It 's a contradiction to say Voluntate efficaci vult aliquid non esse How is that efficax quae nihil efficit But God doth efficaciously hinder many inclined agents to act according to their inclination And that impedition may be a Positive act So disp 95. c. 9. he saith that the end of Gods Permitting sin is oftendere divitias gratiae suae liberalitatem quâ— usus fuit erga praedestinatâ—s denegans congruas vocationes reprobis ostendit praedestinatis easdem vocatiâ—nes quibuâ— fuâ—runt ad gloriam praeparati gratâ—â— omnino ipsis fuisse donatas But 1. Mans act comparing himself with another is quid reale vâ—lltum à Deo And the proposition that the other hath no grace is quid reale or â—ns rationiâ— But nothing declareth nothing â— If Gods will be his simple essence only diversly denominated from effects and objects how can nothing denominate it but as non-efficient or not-willing Indeed it might denominate a Nolition existentiae if an Act of Gods were necessary to hinder existence but not where non-efficere is enough Antonine better saith l. 1. §. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Ut quantum ad Deos attinet ac suggestiones adjutationes inspirationes ab ipsis profectas nihil obstet omnino quo minus juxta naturae praescriptum confestim vivam nisi ipse tandem in culpa sim qui Deorum submonitiones tantum non claras praeceptiones neutiquam observem I marvel the Doctor insisteth not on his own great Reason viz. Futurity is eternal and therefore hath an eternal cause which is God And he that willeth the futurity of sin willeth the sin that is that sin shall be This seemeth stronger than all the rest if the antecedent were true And so he might prove that the futurity of the very form of sin is God For nothing is eternal but God But the futurity of the form of sin according to these men is eternal or ab aeternâ— Ergo it is God But saith excellent Le Blank de Concord lib. cum decret 1. n. 55 56. Praesertim nullo modo probare possum quod Gu. Twisâ—us pluribus locis asserit Decretum Dei ejus Voluntatem esse solam unicam Causam futuritionis cujuslibet eventus e. g. inobedientiae Adami c. At inquit doctus ille vir Futuritionis quae ab aeterno fuit nulla Causa dari potest quae ab aeterno non fuit Resp Hoc supponit futuritionem esse aliquid reale à re ipsa distinctum quod causam aliam habeat quam res ipsa futura At hoc falsissimum Nam futuritio nil aliud est quam respectus quidam rationis extrinâ—eca denominatio rei futurae Recte ponitur argâ—mentum Ab aeterno nihil fuit praetâ—r Deum Ac
proâ—â—de futuritiâ— quae ab aeterno fuisse dicitur vel nihil reale fuit vel fuit ipse Deus Quod est Causa cur res in tempore existat idem plane Causa est cur res ab aeterno extitura fuerit Sicut quod Causa est quod res aliquando fuit Causa est cur in aeternum dicetur praeterita Ad effectum futurum sufficit Causa futura sicut ad praeteritum sufficit Causa praeterita This is plain and easie truth to his Ends and saith It is not evil to me though it be to you I 'le â—â—â—ment you for doing it though it was by my Will and predetermination And what Justice should Kings rather imitate than Gods 6. Sin is not malum Deo so as to Hurt him or make him Guilty But it is so as to be a Violation of his Laws and a contempt and dishonour to his Wisdom Goodness Greatness Authority Justice Mercy Truth c. If all the World joyned in hating and blaspheming God that made them though you say that this is not malum Dei but malum nostri and therefore God may will it ut fiat as a desirable thing we cannot be content with such confusion Malum is either Physicum vel morale and either in aliquo or contra aliquem God is not capable 1. Of Physical Evil in himself and therefore we cannot hurt him 2. Nor of Moral Evil and therefore he can have no sin or malignity 3. But he is capable objectively of Injury we can wrong him when we cannot hurt him 4. And we are capable of being Reputativè vel moraliter Hurters and destroyers of God whom we cannot hurt Because the sinner doth it quantum in se and therefore is called an Enemy to God It is no thanks to the wicked that there is a God who would have none as to his Holiness and Justice if it were in his power Moreover God is Good and doth good And though he made Man freely yet supposing that he will make him Man a Rational free agent in his Image to Know and Love him it necessarily followeth that he must make him Holy God cannot make a man in the Image of the Devil and call it his own As Parents generate Children in their own likeness so God doth regenerate his own in his Image He that thought it a good argument What Communion hath light with darkness Christ with Belial c. would sure have taken our part in this that God cannot be the Author or Cause of the Image of the Devil and of the works of darkness 611. Therefore where he addeth that God Willeth Malum esse that sin be as the Matter of exercising his mercy and justice not as his sin but tantum vult fieri malum alterius I deny it with horror as a reproach of Gods holiness The terminus à quo is not the Materia misericordia vel justitiae exercendae God willeth the glory of his Mercy and Justice in pardoning and punishing foreseen presupposed sin But he willeth not the sin but only our deliverance from it or punishment for it Suppose per impossible that the King had power to restrain all men from offending him and yet saith I will do only what is Congruous to the Rational free nature of my subjects as such and not all that I can do and therefore will restrain them only by Laws except some few beloved ones but I will honour my Mercy and Justice on offenders Can you hence prove that he willeth decreeth or loveth ut appetibilia all the Treasons Rebellions Murders and Blasphemies that are committed It is not these that he willeth ut Materiam but deliverance from these as from the malum à quo If your prodigal Son be addicted to Robbing and you could lock him up but you resolve that you will try him once more and if he roâ— you will let him suffer imprisonment and come to the Gallows and then beg his Pardon that suffering may hereafter be his warning Here if you choose rightly it is not his Robbing that you will no not ut sit vel fiat for you had rather he would forbear But only his forsaking it and his suffering to that end on supposition that he rob again 612. Pag. 105. He saith that By the same reason as God might not will the being of sin by his permission he might not permit it Answ A raw unproved assertion God might not make an Indifferent free-will left to its own liberty with a thousand warnings and helps against sin unless he may also Desire them to sin Prove this else you say nothing 613. He addeth that sin be or exist is not only Bonum per accidens because God will make it the matter of glorifying his mercy and justice but it is ex natura sua quoddam ordinabile ad Gloriam Dei consequenter Bonum est ex natura sua in genere conducibilis Answ All unproved and false 1. Sin is not so much as Bonum per accidens 2. God doth not make it the Matter of glorifying himself but only glorifyeth his Mercy and Justice against it as the terminus à quo and not by it as the matter though it may be called an Occasion sine qua non as to this particular act and way of his said glorification 3. Much less is it conducible hereto which implyeth a Medium that hath some natural or moral causality 4. And least of all is it ex sua natura conducibile It is not sin but 1. Some effects or consequents of sin 2. Our deliverance from sin and the punishing of sin which are conducible to Gods glory 614. Next he insulteth over Aquinas twice as unhappy and vain in his censures with a Magna est Veritas praevalebit laborare potest vinci non potest And argueth that because ex permissione infallibiliter sequitur peccatum therefore to permit sin is the same as to will that sin shall be ipso permittente Answ 1. It 's pity that sin should have so good an Advocate and Gods Holiness so good an Adversary through mistake And that so unhappy a Cause should be managed so confidently and triumphantly though it 's well that it 's done so weakly 2. The falshood of his assertion about permission as general I have opened before 1. Three sorts of things may be said to be Not hindered which is all that Permission signifieth 1. Things bent to a certain motion 1. By Natural inclination as a Stone in the Air to descend 2. Or by Moral Vitiosity as the Will of a wicked man 2. Things meerly indifferent 1. Naturally as some think the Air is to motion 2. Morally as suppose a Will such to Good or Evil. 3. Things averse to that Motion as 1. Naturally a Stone to ascend 2. Morally as the will of an Angel or Saint to hate God or the will of a wicked man to Love him Also you must distinguish between Not-hindering at all and not hindering effectually And so
willing â—is at all And we have hitherto thought that Gods holy Wisdom and will is the Cause of his holy Law and much more against sin than mans is And that God willeth not and causeth not the sin of man And is it now come to â—his that sin is contrary indeed to our right reason but not to Gods because â—e is no subject You may next say that Holiness is meet for man but not â—or God 618. Pag. 197. Again he is at it Bonum esse ut sint mala Quia bonum est ut Deus finem sibi praefixum assequatur At hoc sine interventâ— mali peccati nullo modo potest Repl. 1. It is not per peccatum ut medium though not sine peccatâ— 2. Interventus therefore implyeth a falshood For in esse cognito sin is antecedent or presupposed to the way of glorifying Justice and Mercy upon sinners sinners are the object And consequently you must take it as before proved for antecedent to the Volition or simultaneous 619. He urgeth Oportet haereses esse ut qui probati sunt manifesti fiant Answ That neither meaneth that men ought to be Hereticks nor yet that God loveth willeth or approveth that there be heresies But only 1. God decreeth to manifest the difference between the sound Christians and the rest 2. And he foreseeth that there will be heresies 3. Therefore he decreeth to try them by the occasion of those heresies which he foreseeth and hateth The same is the case of all tryal by persecutions And God willeth not the sin of active perâ—ecution but only the effect or passive part So that the oportet by your own confession of it signifieth no more than a Logical necessitas consequentiae which â—ore-knowledge without Volition will inferr 620. He addeth Obj. It sufficeth that God permit sin and not will it Resp But either the existency of sin infallibly followeth the Permission of it or not If not Gods Intention may be frustrate If yea What matter is it whether God will that sin shall be he permitting or sâ— permit it as that infallibly it will be so we obtain either of these it 's all one to our cause of predestination Repl. 1. If it be all one take up with that agreement and make â—â— further difference with them that grant you enough 2. In case of veâ—â—ment Inclination to a sin it would follow upon Gods total permission but God never totally permitteth sin But in other cases it will not follow that is It is not a good consequence that This or that sin will be done because God doth no more to hinder it than that which sometime hindereth it not And yet Gods Intention is not frustrate For â—â— will infallibly come to pass from its proper cause which God foreknoweth And the consequence is good from his fore-knowledge And is not that all one as to the certainty of Gods intentions 3. You phrase it as if sin followed Gods permission as a deficient cause or as that which cannot be otherwise unless God do more to hinder it and so weâ—â— necessary thence necessitate consequentis or as others call it necessitate â—â—tecedente which is false and oft denyed by your self 4. The very truth is Permission is a word of so great ambiguity and laxity as relating to so many sorts of Impedition that it is but delusory withâ—â— much distinguishing to say sin will or will not follow it If you restraâ— it to a non efficaciter impedire as is usual it taketh not away the ambâ—guity much For still the question is What must make it effectual unless you call any impedition effectual meerly ab eventu whatsoever it be â—â— it self 621. He saith that the Universe would not be perfect if there werâ— perfect holiness and no sin and so no pardon or punishment But â—â— giveth us no proof but confident assertion at all I need not say thâ— It would be more perfect if there were no sin It sufficeth me to say thaâ— It would be as perfect And so that it is not Necessary to the World perfection that there be sin or Hell God could have freely willed the contrary And Gods Goodness could have been as fully manifested if iâ— had so pleased him and his Holiness too without sin or Hell It 's unpleasing to me that this good man pleadeth so hard against a necessity of Christs satisfaction for sin in another digression and yet pleadeth as hard for a necessity of sin As if it were more necessary to Gods Glory than Christ 622. It is very observable in all this controversie that he asserteth pag. 198. That it 's past all controversie that neither God nor the most sinful creature do will any thing but as Good And that no man can be instigated to malice or evil but only to the Act which is evil because he that is instigated is instigated to do something But to the evil of an act no efficiency is necessary but deficience only How far this is true or false I have opened before I here only note that he confesseth that he that causeth the Act of sin which he saith God doth more than man causeth all that is causable 623. Yet p. 199. he saith Sin is of man only as the cause when he professeth that man doth nothing but what God doth to cause it yea as the first total cause and that as to Deficiency man can do no more than he doth without predetermination which if God withhold man can no more help it than make a World So that all the mysterie of his language is this that because man is under a Law and God is not therefore man doing the same act as moved by God must be called the only cause of sin because it is no sin in God But if we spake as plain men ought to do should it not rather be thus exprest by you God is the chief cause of sin in man but not in himself 624. Pag. 200 201. he hath the same over and over again that Non abhorret à recta ratione Dei velle peccatum fieri ab hominibus Quod ex se habet quod conducibile est ad â—onum tanquam Materia scilicet non tantum idonea sed necessaria exercendae divinae justitiae misericordiae and that this manifestation conjunct with sin is Deo multò appetibilius than that Good which sin depriveth us of that is Holiness Because this Holiness is only the Creatures Good and the other is the Creators Good Answ But as the assertion is all false so the reason is vain For if he distinguish the Creator and Creature as subjects he is quite mistaken For both is the Creatures good and neither the Creators For to manifest Justice and Mercy is not Gods Essence as in it self but his Work of Punishment and Mercy And the glory of this is but the resplendent excellency of it as it is the appearance or Image of God And all this is in the Creatures
Holiness The Holiness of Christs Humane Nature and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators as is his Works of Mercy and Justice And Gods glory shineth as much in them And it is the glory of his Goodness if not of Mercy which preventeth sin and misery yea and of Mercy too For though mercy relate to misery it is as well to possible misery prevented as to existeâ—â— misery removed And if he speak not of Subjects but Proprietors the Boâ—um Creaturae is also Creatoris SECT XIX The same doctrine in Rutherford de providentia confuted 625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digression of Dr. Twisse which is contrary to the commonest doctrine of Protestants and The summ of their opinion I think soundeth not well in Christians ears The summ of which is this Neither God nor Devil do will sin as it is evil but God is the first willer of its existence because it is in its own nature summe unice conducibile to the manifestation of his Justice and mercy And willing and Loving being all one in God he thus singularly Loveth the existence of sin above its contrary holiness for this end And by Predetermining premotion which he much more largely writeth for elsewhere he causeth as the first total Cause all that man Causeth But it is sin in man because forbidden him but not in God because not forbidden him And therefore God is not to be said to cause sin though he cause all that is caused but to permit it because he causeth it not in himself nor is he to be called a Deficient cause of our omissions because he is not bound to Actuate us but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cause because he is under an obliging Law Though God made that Law And though he can no more than a stone act without physical predetermination nor forbear acting when so acted yet he is to be called free because he is actually willing or his will doth act and because he is predetermined by none but God This is the true sence of their opinion as opened by themselves I shall now briefly consider what Rutherford saith to the same sence 626. Cap. 15. pag. 186. To Annatus charging Twisse as denying Gods permission of sin because he maketh him the * * * Nec omnino negari potest Voluntatem Dei esse Causam rerum omnium quas fieri velit Twiss recitante etiam Rutherf de Prov. c. 15. p. 186. See all their Reasons for Gods causing sin or willing its existence answered by Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 26. p. 262 263 264 265. As also against Gods predetermining to the immediate materiale peccati disp 27. p. 270 c. disp 28 29 30 c. usque ad p. 580. As to the common saying that God willeth not sin as sin all men will confess Dr. Twiss often that neither doth a wicked man do so Peccans ut sic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod est formale in peccato seu carentiam conformitatis sed intendit actum ut est in genere moris inquit Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319. I will not conceal a more difficult argument than most of theirs which may occurr to others God caused e. g. in Nathanaâ—l Peter c. this act of saith before Christs coming the Messiah is to come hereafter When Christ was come this was false and so evil God still caused the faith which he gave them Therefore he caused an untrue belief and evil and that supernaturally But I answ 1. God caused the habit of their faith and the act The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations and in special A belief in the promised Messiah The termination of the act on the Messiah as future rather than as Incarnate required nothing positive in the Habit The same Habit served to both acts unless the latter being for the nobler act had some addition but the former needed none 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumstance no more was necessary but 1. Gods word Christus venturus est 2. And Gods influx on the habited faculty to cause it to act according to that habit So that when God had reversed that word Christus venturus est he was no longer the cause determining the mind to believe that word but only the cause that the habit of faith was still towards Christ But not at all sub ratione venturi For the determining word was called in and it was an imperfection not to know so much where it was not a sin Cause of the Act the Liberty and the Prohibition and to Cause is not to Permit he hath no better answer than to say that God doth not permit the Act nor the Evil of the Act but he permitteth the evil act and 2. To say that the Dominicans and Jesuits hold the same as he Which is to jest with holy things and not to argue As if he said God made neither the soul nor the body and yet he made the man What! is it as it 's said that non animased unio est vita so Doth God permit the Union of Actum and Malâ—m No that he pretendeth not 627. To prove that God willeth the existence of sin he bringeth the instance of Joseph's case Gen. 45. To which I say that the text saith not at all that God willed the Will or Act or Sin of Joseph's brethren but only the Venditio passiva or effect and the consequents Nay only the consequents are mentioned in the Texts His replyes to the answers prove no more than the five things which I before asserted about sin Nothing so much deceiveth them as not distinguishing between the sinful act and the effect or passion when they are called by the same name as Selling Killing c. 628. His next instance is of Christs death of which I said enough before But 1. He understandeth his adversaries as ascribing only the Consequents of Crucifixion to Gods will which is his mistake It is Crucifixion it self passivè sumpta which they ascribe to it some of them at least And let men too wise against God deride it as much as they will God can will and Love that Christ be Crucified and yet hate and not will the will and act of the Crucifiers but only foresee it as aforesaid And let them jeer God as Idle or asleep if he neither will nor effectually nill the sin we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty which they so deride 2. And whereas he addeth that Active Verbs are used as Gen. 45. Misit me Deus Isa 53. Deus voluit eum conterere Zech. 13. Ego percutiam Pastorem and God delivered Christ to death I answer It is too too gross to perswade us hence that any of these Texts say that God willeth the sinners will or Act. God sent me speaketh Gods act that is his disposal
answer that the consequence holdeth not of a metaphorical improper Instrument who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God besides the nature of a pure instrument such are sinners to God Therefore it holds not that the horse halteth ergo the rider halteth no nor causeth it Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove and the very same that I say The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all but only as it is Motion in genere so doth God by sinful acts That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another is not at all of God but that they are Actions in genere is of God 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer nor the effect as from that fault nor of the Saw to the Sawyer And so of the Sabeans robbing Job And he asserteth p. 257. that Diabolus Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi And what need we more Remember then that sin is an effect and hath a Cause and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deifie him And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent he were the principal cause of sin But if you mean by moral impulse only commanding it let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command And whether I cause not my pen to write though I command it not And quoad terminum to impel a man physically to moral acts is moral impulse 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin * * * Vid. Aureol in 2. d. 37. p. 300 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin without God's willing the sin But if we make it sin he will make it be a punishment ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be And indeed Augustine saith much contr Julian to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin But I answer this 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati but the materiale And forma dat nomen ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment in proper sence 2. Sin it self though denyed by many Arminians is verily a Punishment and more to the Sinner himself than to any other †††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth 1. Omne peccatum est poena 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena viz. non prima 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris causa nisi ultimum fuerit posterioris And Bonavent there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni sensus And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment the formale peccati being first and the formale poena next in the same act And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former as being an effect of it For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin Biel. ib. In a word God antecedently so formed nature that if we will sin that sin shall be our misery and as a voluntary self-wounding cause our pain and let out our blood and life And it is the most difficult part of the question how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself which yet I have plainly opened before and here repeat it To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities but are two Relations of one and the same Act but not as referred to one and the same correlate God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful in its forbidden mode and circumstances as Claudicatio equi before said but only in genere actus or hujus actus when two sins are compared But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment God is the Cause of both That is he maketh mans nature first and in that and by revelation his Law by which he first maketh mans duty and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it And next he doth by his threatning tell him that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it As if as aforesaid God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei And then commandeth him to avoid it And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it Here now God maketh the Man and the Law God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique or as that circumstantiated act But when the act is caused by Man God by his Law causeth two Relations to result first that of sin and then that of punishment So that man first causeth the sinful act and then that it is quid prohibitum and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to our selves he causeth not that which is a punishment to others And yet supposing it he maketh it a punishment to us and them on several accounts 639. But though God cause not the sin yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin without which grace and spirit we will sin If God now for former sin do deny us or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it and so permitteth it as is said 640. The Arminians grosly erre if he cite them justly Remonst in Script Synod art 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins nor increase their guilt unless the word sin be used equivocally For to have sin and no sin are contraries Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others as he doth Bruits I leave to others 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute As to his controversie Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them or he will them because they are good against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good or whether it be good because God willeth it It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easie distinction putteth past all controversie Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient and then the ultimate end as is oft said Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things or else they could never be
Rutherfords charge of Camero and his followers in France Amyraldus c. with Semipelagianism and Arminianism and filthy opinions it is but the effect of the good mans overweening and conceitedness of his own apprehensions which must be allowed or endured in most of these contenders And the fruits of such disputes is like to be little better But the worthy praises of Blondel Dallaeus Placeus Capellus Amyraldus Testardus c. shall survive such reproach And a thousand pitties it is to read a good man Voluminously proving God to be a Willer of sins existence and a prime-predetermining Cause of all prohibited Volitions and acts and reproaching the Jesuits Lutherans Arminians and Socinians as the great enemies of Gods Providence for denying this As if he would tempt the World to think that Socinians were in the right and that Jesuites Lutherans and Arminians were the only defenders of the Holiness of God whilst Calvinists made him the Lover of all the sin in the World as the most appetible conducible Medium to his Glory 649. But to proceed his next Argument is cap. 23. Sin conferreth something to the splendor ornament and plenitude of the Universe Eâ—go See Bonavent well confuting this in 1. d. 46. q. 3. Malum fieri nullatenus bonum esse sed bene occasio boni God willeth its existence This is answered before The antecedent is utterly unproved Sin addeth nothing to the ornament or perfection of the World His word is no proof 650. Afterwards he heapeth up many frivolous arguments against that which he calleth reproachingly The Idle Permission of sin and saith that it frustrateth the prayers of the Saints and their patience their gratitude trust hope fear joy alloweth the arrogance of the persecuters fighteth with Gods Wisdom Clemency Justice Providence with the Ministry of the Word the Promises Threatnings with Ministers confirming â—â—â— against sufferings and it is blasphemously injurious to God and contrary to the order of things in the world that he should permit sin and not will the being of it Resp What is it that a man yea a pious man in a blind zeal of God and self-conceit may not pour out confident words for What a case is the poor Church in when the unlearned people must be on both sides charged by their Teachers with blasphemy what way ever they go This man will tell them that they are * * * Pag. 370. blasphemous and overthrow all reason and Religion if they say that God only Permitteth sin and doth not himself will the being of it and move unavoidably all wills and tongues and hands to all the blasphemies persecutions and murders that are done and damn men for it when he hath done And others will as confideâ—â—ly say that he is a Blasphemer for charging God to be much more the cause of all forbidden acts of wickedness than Devils and men are and theâ— damning them for it and for putting God into the shape of the Devil and painting him odious to humane nature that man may not love him What shall poor people think when they are thus torn and tormented by their holy Guides But all his arguments are before answered when I shewed him how many wayes God hath to secure the Effects and Events in the world and attain all his Ends and yet only Permit and neither Will nor Love nor Cause the sin 651. Cap. 26. he cometh to plead for Predetermination and saith p. 385. God predetermineth us to the Act of hating God in linea meâ—â— physica non morali Meer delusory words He maketh it by the Law of Nature a sin to hate him and then he maketh men hate him â—â— linea physica non morali as if the moral sinfulness resulted not from the Law and act that is here from Nature it self viz. of the Man and act both which God made 652. Pag. 386. he saith that Directa expressa efficax Dei Vâ—litio qua Vult ut sit seu fiat actus Dei odii non facit Deum Malitia qâ—â— I confess Gab. Biel in 2. d. 37. speaketh too like these several atheological assertions as do many others per accidens sequitur actum authorem Resp But that per accidens is no reason of the denyal if God cause that accident also as the first cause If he make a Law and make the forbidden act the relation of sinfulness is an Accident indeed but ariseth from the said fundamentum so necessarily that it cannot be otherwise But it should have made a holy Divine to tremble to have said that God directly expresly and effectually willeth mens Act of hating God viz. that it exist or be 653. And it is false that he saith that God is equally the Cause that men hate him if he will the Act hypothetically ineffectually and determiâ—ably by anothers will as if he willed it efficaciously And so when he maketh the Doctrine of Universal Concurse and Causation as guilty as â—is predetermining pre-motion As if God could not make man a free-â—iller and agent and as the spring of Nature enable him and concurr â—o his Act as an Act in genere without causing it to terminate on the forbidden object in specie As if it were impossible for the Sun to be â—n universal cause of the stinking of a Dunghill and Weed without being â—he special or as if God must be made the cause of every blasphemy unless â—e will make the blasphemer speechless and of every villany unless he will strike men dead to prevent it This is not reverent and holy judging of the most holy God the Judge of all 654. The summ of all his Vindication of God from being the chief Author of all sin pag. 387. passim is but this one reason God is under no Law But if this be all why do you not speak out what you mean but hold that which you dare not name viz. That God is the chief So Bannes in 1. q. 23. â— 3. p. 270 271. Voluntas hominis malâ— est quia exercet actum odii Dei sine regula rationis immo contra legem Dei Deus autem bona vol untate vult fieri illum actum permittens defectum Causâ— secundâ— in ipso ut inde aliquod majus bonum faciat which is true of the act in genere but not as it is Odium Dei. For so if he will it and cause it he doth more than permit and the defectus Causae secundae is that very odium as against God And doth God cause the greatest sin that he may do good by it He can do as much good without causing the evil â—nsuperable cause of all the sin of Devils and men for which he damneth â—hem and that both as to the matter and form but yet thus to do is no sin in God himself because he is under no Law This is your most â—lain undoubted sense or else your Book is non-sense What need we then any further enquiry what you hold It is
delusion to pretend that you are accused for making God a sinner We charge no such thing on you But only for making him the chief insuperable cause of all the sins of men and Devils 655. Pag. 400. he plainly professeth that the Will as a physical agent is the cause of the act as physical and as under a Law and that act is against the Law so he is the cause of the Malitia actûs and culpablo So that God causing by his own confession both Act and Law there is no modest subtersuge left for his not openly professing that he asserteth God to be the cause of all sin the principal cause both as to matter and form 656. The rest of that Disputation striketh me with such horror in the reading that I confess I have not the patience to proceed any further â—n it nor shall further thus exercise my Readers patience The case is plain Either Hobbs or Free-will permitted must carry the cause in the case of sin There is no middle way He that will read Ruiz and Rutherfords answer impartially needeth no more of mine for the confutation of his vain responses 657. But cap. 29. p. 484. he falleth also on our most Learned and Judicious Dr. Field because in his lib. 3. c. 3. of the Church he contradicteth his opinion and it must move just indignation in the Reader that he addeth idque probare conatur contra reformatas Ecclesias Unworthy injury to the Reformed Churches more than to the worthy Dr. Field How falsly are they interessed in your unhappy cause See the Synod of Dort where there is not a word for it Is one Twiss with his Rutherford or Maccovius or a few such the Reformed Churches Let the Reader peruse the Articles of the Churches of England Scotland France and all the rest and see where he can find your Doctrine of Predetermination unto sin Even Jansenius himself is against it among the Papists when his Dominican Predecessors are the Fathers of it Nothing more common with English Divines than as you did before your self to explicate Gods causing the acts of sinners by the similitude of the Riders spurring a halting Horse or the Suns making a Dunghill stink which only speak the cause which we call universal and is the very thing which we assert And it is most unsavourily done to get into the Chair and magisterially say Fieldus vir alioqui doctus in his controversiis minime se versatâ—â— esse prodit Zumelem * * * Zumel in Disp 1. Thom. de Voluntat hom lib. arb pag. 219 220. Quod Dâ—â—s non sit causa peccati though he speak cautesously and as in other mens names yet concludeth plainly that God is but the Causa Universalis of sin and that man is the specifying determining cause even que universalem determinat ad speciem concursus actus ipsius sive solum determinet eam formaliter ad speciem c. Yet this is a high Thomist and defender of absolute grace non satis intelligit quippe non satis gâ—â—rus controversiarum Arminianarum scripsit dum aulam Arminiâ—â— plus aequo faventem haberent †††Thus magisterially did good Dr. Twisse censure Junius and Vossius his Son-in-law as men unskilled in Scholastick Divinity who were both most excellent men and hit upon the reconciling truth above most in their age Junius his Discourse of predetermination is one of the first that ever I found that excellency in and with his Irenicon is most worthy of great esteem But how easie is it for a man to overvalue himself and contemn another I highly value the piety in Mr. â—â—therfords Letters I am no fit arbiter ingeniorum But when I hear other men say that one Field was more Judicious than many Rutherfords I câ—â—fess by reading their several writings I find no temptation to deny it And why should Field and consequently Davenant Usher Carlton Mâ—ton Hall the Synod of Dort and I think the far greatest part of Protestants I verily think fifty if not an hundred for one who are against you be made odious by the supposition of being not far enough from Arminians rather than Maceovius Twisse and Rutherford take it for a disgrace to hold the same opinions against Gods Holiness which the Dâ—â—nican Fryars hold who have been the bloody Masters of the Inquisition and murdered so many thousand Protestants or Waldenses and Alligenses And that which he saith of Fields writing when the Court favoured Arminianism is notoriously false and such insinuations unworthy of so good a man as the speaker Fields Works were printed singly before they were printed together in Folio And his fifth Book was printed Aâ—no 1610. and the words cited are in the third printed before And the Synod of Dort was called An. 1618. and sate 1619. also And King James was a zealous suppressor of Arminianism and sent five or six Divines thither to that end And long after in King Charles his dayes Pet. Heylin in the life of Archbishop Laud will tell you that the Arminiâ—â— Bishops then were but five Neale Laud Buckeridge Corbet and Howsâ—â— to whom Learned Montague was after added So that they durst not trust their Cause with a Convocation Field then shall be a most Judicion worthy Divine when partiality hath said its worst 658. And what is his error Why he saith that it 's a contradiction to say that God causeth the Act in all its state which is the Materialâ— peccati and causeth not the formale which is inseparable A foul error indeed to tell you that he that causeth the subjectum fundamentâ—â— rationem fundandi terminum causeth the relation and that he that maketh an European white and an African black causeth the dissimilitâ—de and so doth he that maketh the straight Rule and the crooked line thâ— forbidding Law and the forbidden act 659. Were it not that the necessity requireth such work because such Books are in mens hands I should think I had injured the Reader by thâ—â— much For my work is not to confute Books but to assert sure reconciling truths Otherwise the confutation of the rest of that Book for Gods willing and causing all forbidden acts in their full state and the existence of sin is most easily answered SECT XX. The old Reconciling Doctrine of Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius And first Prosper ad Gallorum Qu. 660. IT is a strange thing to me that when Pelagius Julian Faustus c. thought Augustine a Novelist and as Usher asserteth would have fastned the title of Predestination-Hereticks on his followers and almost all confess that Augustine was if not the first yet the most notable publick Vindicator of absolute Predestination and Grace yet the Judgement of Austin with his Disciples Prosper and Fulgentius doth not serve turn to quiet if not to end these controversies among those who profess to be their followers when as they have so copiously and plainly written upon the
case 661. I intreat the Reader that is inclining to any extreams but to read â—over first those short answers of Prosper ad Capitulâ— Gallorum and ad Objectiones Vincent And most of the Sententiae de Capit. I shall think it worthy my labour to recite to force them on the Readers observation and let him see the highest old Doctrine of Gods Decrees Sent. 1. Whoever saith that by Gods Predestination as by fatal necessity men compelled into sins are constrained to death is not a Catholick For Gods Predestination doth by no means make men bad nor is the cause of any mans sin Sent. sup 2. He that saith that the Grace of Baptism received doth not take away Original sin from them that are not predestinated to life is not a Catholick For the Sacrament of Baptism by which all sins He meaneth that those that sincerely covenanted with God in Baptism were truly pardoned though he thought some of them fell away and perished are blotted out is true even in them who will not remain in the truth and for them that are not predestinated unto life Sent. sup 3. He that saith that they that are not predestinated to life though they were in Christ regenerated by Baptism and have lived piously and justly it profitteth them nothing but they are so long reserved till they fall to ruine and they are not taken out of this life till this happen to them as if the ruine of such men were to be referred to Gods constitution is not a Catholick For God doth not therefore prolong the time of any mans age that by long living he should fall to ruine and in his long living fall from the right â—aith seeing long life is to be numbered with the gifts of God by which a man should be better and not worse Sent. sup 4. He that saith that all are not called to Grace if he speak of such as Christ is not declared to is not to be reprehended Sent. sup 5. He that saith that they that are called are not equally called but some that they might believe and some that they might not believe as if to any man the Vocation were the cause of his not believing saith not right For though faith be not but by Gods Gift and Mans Will yet Infidelity is by mans will alone Sent. 6. He that saith that Pree-will in Man is Nothing but it 's Gods predestination which worketh in men whether it be to good or to evil is not a Catholick For Gods Grace doth not abolish mans choice or free-will but perfecteth it and revoketh and reduceth it into the way from error that that which was bad by its own liberty may by the operation of Gods Spirit be made right And Gods predestination is alwayes in Good which knoweth how either to pardon with the praise of mercy or punish with the praise of Justice the sin which is committed by mans will alone Sent. 7. He that saith that God for this cause giveth not Perseverance to some of his Children whom he regenerated in Christ to whom he gave faith hope and Love because by Gods fore-knowledge and predestination they were not differenced from the mass of perdition If he mean that God endowed these men in Goodness but would not have them remain in it and that he was the cause of their tâ—rning away he judgeth contrary to the Justice of God For though Gods Omnipotence could have given the grace of standing to them that will fall yet his grace doth not first forsake them before they have forsaken it And because he foresaw that they would do this by a Voluntary desertion therefore he had them not in the Election of Predestination Sent. 8. He that saith that God would not have all men saved but a certain number that are predestinate speaketh hardlier of the altitude of Gods unsearchable grace than he should speak Who would have all men to be saved and to come to the acknowledgement of the truth and fulfilleth the purpose of his will on them whom being foreknown he predestinated and being predestinate he called being called he justified and being justified he glorified Losing nothing of the fulness of the Gentiles and of all the seed of Israel for whom the eternal Kingdom was prepared in Christ before the foundation of the World For all the World is chosen out of all the World And out of all men all men are adopted So that they that are saved are therefore saved because God would have them saved and they that perish do perish because they deserve to perish Sent. 9. He that saith that our Saviour was not Crucified for the Redemption of the whole World looketh not to the Virtue of the Sacrament that is Sacrifice but to the part or participation of the unbelievers When as the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ is the Price of the whole World From which Price they are Aliens who being either delighted in their Captivity will not be redeemed or when they are redeemed return again to the same Captivity For the Word of the Lord falleth not nor is the redemption of the World evacuated For though the World in the vessels of wrath knew not God yet the World in the vessels of mercy knew him Which God without their preceding Merits took out of the power of darkness and translated into the Kingdom of the Son of his Love Sent. 10. He that saith that God substracteth from some the preaching of the Gospel lest perceiving the preaching of the Gospel they should be saved may decline the envy of the objection by the paâ—â—onage of our Saviour himself who would not work Miracles with some that he saith would have believed had they seen them And he forbad his Apostles to preach to some people and now suffereth some Nations to live without his Grace Sent. 11. He that saith that God by his Power compelleth men to sin is deservedly reprehended For God who is the Author of Justice and Goodness and all whose Statutes and Commands are against sin is not to be thought to compell any to sin and precipitate them from innocency into crimes But if there be any of so profound impiety as that they are reckoned to be beyond the remedy of correction they receive not an increase of their iniquity from God but are made â—â—â—â— by themselves because they deserved to be left of God and given up to themselves and to deceivers for their former sins that so their sin should be a punishment of their sin Sent. 12. He that saith that obedience is withdrawn from some that are called and live piously and righteously that they may cease to obey doth think ill of Gods Goodness and Justice as seeming to constrain the godly to ungodliness and to take away good mens innocency from them When as He is the Giver and Keeper of godliness and innocency He therefore that adhereth to God is acted by the Spirit of God but he that departeth from God doth fall from his obedience
do Gods will and yet pray Let thy will be done are heard in that which is Gods will that the imitaters of the Devil be judged with the Devil For they that have despised Gods inviting will shall feel his revenging will SECT XXII The words of Fulgentius to the same sence 663. I Must crave of the Reader that he remember that my reciting the Judgement of these Fathers for the falling away and perishing of many that were in a state of Life is not at all as declaring my own judgement but Theirs none then that I read of thinking otherwise * * * Except Jovinian be truly accused by Hierome the brevity and obscurity of whose accusation and confutation leaveth us very uncertain what it was that Jovinian held But we are sure that the spirit oâ— uncharitableness and concention though in a good â—â—â—â— learnâ—d man had no â—â—all hand in the stigmâ—â—zing of him and Vigilantius as Hereticks I shall for the End sake be yet a little more â—edious in citing some of the sayings of Fulgentius Fulg. l. 1. de Verit. praedest cap. 6. To good men God giveth what good they have and keepeth it But to the wicked and ungodly God neither ever could prepare or give evil works which they should damnably serve nor did he ever put into them evil wills by which they should culpably will things unjust but he prepared for them the punishment of Hell that they might feel revenging justice in endless fire An evil will is not of God And therefore the just Judge doth punish it in men because the good Creator findeth not in it the order of his Creation And perseverance and contumacy in sin and pride because it is not of Gods giving is condemned by God revenging Et l. 1. ad Monim c. 26. He will punish in the wicked that they are bad which he gave not nor did he predestinate them to any iniquity and that they willed unjustly was none of his gift And because the persevering iniquity of an evil will ought not to remain unpunished he predestinated such to destruction because he prepared just punishment for them Observe that God predestinated wicked and ungodly men to just punishment not to any unjuâ—â— work to the penalty not to the fault to the punishment nâ—â— to the transgression to the destruction which the anger of a just judge requiteth sinners with not to that destruction or death by which the iniquity of sinners provoketh Gods wrath against them The Apostle calls them Vessels of wrath not Vessels of sin Cap. 27. The wicked are not predestinated to the first death of the soul but to the second death they are That which followeth the sentence of a just Judge not that which preceded in the evil concupiscence of the sinner Ibid. c. 23. It beseemeth believers to confess that the good and just God fore-knew indeed that men would sin for all things to come are known to him For they were not future if they were not in his fore-knowledge But not that he predestinated any to sin For if he predestinated man to any sin he would not punish man for sin For Gods predestination prepareth for men either the godly remission of their sins or the just punishment of them God therefore could never predestinate man to that which he had resolved both to forbid by his precept and to wash away by his mercy and punish by his justice God therefore predestinated to eternal punishment the wicked who he foreknew would persevere to the death in sin Wherein as his fore-knowledge of mans iniquity is not to be blamed so his predestinatioâ— of just revenge is to be praised That we may acknowledge that he predestinated not man to any sin whom he predestinated to be punished deservedly for sin And ad Monimum li. 1. pag. edit Basil 68. reciting Augustiâ—â—â— words he saith He taught that only pride was the cause of mans iniquity and that God predestinated not men to sin but to damnation and that they are not helped by God the cause is in themselves and not in God The same he reciteth again ex lib. 2. Aug. de baptis parvul that their wills be not helpt by grace the cause is in themselves and not in God The same he again repeateth pag. 69. 70 71 72. and that Augustine's mind was that good works God both fore-knew and predestinated But evil works that is sin he foreknew indeed but did not predestinate or decree For there is not Gods work but his judgement Therefore in sin Gods work is not because that sin should be done was not decreed by him But therefore there is his judgement because it is not left unrevenged that an evil man worketh without God working And ib. li. 1. pag. 15. That which is not in his work never was in predestination Therefore men are not predestinated to sin So p. 29. And p. 31. and forward And p. 29. No man justly sinneth though God justly permit him to sin For he is justly forsaken of God who forsaketh God And because man forsaking God sinneth God forsaking man keepeth justice 664. I am loth to weary the Reader with more Should I do the like by Augustines words it would be too wearisome His judgement is the very same as theirs I will only cite one passage out of him about mans Power to believe Tract 53. in Johan having shewed that God only foreknoweth mens sin and foretelleth it as the Jews but causeth it not he cometh to answer John 12. 39. They could not believe c. If they could not how was it their sin saying You hear the question brethren and see how deep it is But we answer as we can Why could they not believe If you ask me I quickly answer Because they would not For God foresaw their evil will and foretold it by the Prophet He blinded their eyes c. And I answer that their own wills deserved this also For God blindeth and hardeneth by forsaking and not helping which he may do by a judgement secret but not unjust This all religious piety ought to hold unshaken Far be it from us then to say that there is iniquity with God If he help he doth it mercifully if he help not he doth justly 665. By all this the Reader may see past all doubt that Augustine and his two disciples than whom none known to us in the whole world then went higher for Predestination and Grace did plainly take up with this that 1. GOD NEITHER CAUSED OR WILLED SIN no not ITS BEING or the forbidden ACT. 2. That OUR SIN was of OUR SELVES 3. That ALL GRACE and perserverance was OF GOD. 4. That ELECTION was ABSOLUTE of GOD's meer will and not upon his foreknowledge of any merits of mans 5. That God predestinated none to sin but predestinated men to Punishment ONLY ON THE FORESIGHT of their wilful sin 6. That he hardened men but by deserting them 7. That he never forsook them till they forsook him first
and effectual Rom. 9. 11. 15. 21 Joh. 10. 26. Rom. 6. 21. grace intending that it shall be effectual This he doth not for the Reprobate and besides this negation they know no act of Reprobation as opposite to Election And they say that the Gospel and grace are denyed to none but the unworthy sinners And that God damneth none nor destinateth none to damnation but out of the consideration of sin 674. The Hassian Divines ibid. Par. 2. pag. 34. say The just Judge God doth not for one cause Decree to punish and for another execute it on the guilty but both have the same cause that is both original and actual sin 675. The Helvetian Divines there say p. 37. § 12. Which is the Order and Number of Gods Decrees seeing Gods thoughts and wayes are not as ours and none of us are of his Council we leave to Him alone whose understanding is infinite 676. The Embdan Divines ibid. p. 75. say No one is predestinated by God to sin which they there prove 677. On the second Art the Brittish Divines say p. 78. God having Act. 10. 43. Rom. 3. 24 25. Maâ—k 16. 15 16. mercy on faln mankind sent his Son who gave himself a price of Redeâ—ption for the sins of the whole world Thes 4. In this Merit of Christs death is founded the Universal Gospel Promise Th. 5. In the Church where for this Gospel-promise salvation is offered Isa 59. ult 2 Cor. 3. 6. Tit. 2. 11. 2 Cor. 5. 19. Luk. 10. 9 11. Joh. 15. 22. Heb. 2. 3. 4. 3. 6. 4. Mat. 10. 15. to all there is that administration of Grace which is enough to convince all the impenitent and unbelieving that they perish and â—oâ—e the offered benefit by their voluntary fault and neglect or contempt of the Gospel 678. On the second Article p. 103 104 c. there is the suffrage of the famous Matthias Martinius in 26 Theses of universal Redemption and seven Theses of special Redemption and seventeen Errours rejected so sound so full so accurate that I know not whither to referr the Reader to see the whole controversie more shortly yet clearly and soundly opened And therefore intreat him to peruse it seeing I may not be so tedious as to transcribe it all and know not how to leave out any 679. To the same sence have Iselburge and Lud. Crocius adjoyned theâ— suffrages the last being both brief and full 680. The same Breme Divines say no more of Reprobation but these three Thes 1. That there is a Decree of preterition as to special saving Rom. 9. 12 19 c. Mat. 7. 21. Deut. 4. 34. grace 2. That none are condemned but justly for their sins 3. That others as unworthy are converted in Mercy And if others had said no more of this it had been never the worse And of Infants they say Of only Believers Infants who dye before they are capable of doctrine we determine that they are beloved of God Pâ—tavius chideth Gerson Biel Cajetan Catherinus for their found opinion of Infants salvation without Baptism and saved as holy by Covenant-relation which Baptism is a Confirmation of SECT XXIV On the other side 681. ON the other side read but Suarez and Ruiz to save me transcribing and see what they grant besides that Ariminens and many old Schoolmen go as far as the Synodists as the Dominicans do much further Petr. à S. Joseph Suav Concord writing for Scientia Media summeth up the difference between them and the Thomists that is the Arminians and Calvinists so briefly as is worth the reading In which he granteth 1. That God from eternity antecedently to any absolute foresight of merits or preparation in us did freely and of meer mercy elect all those to Glory that are saved But denyeth that God antecedently to the absolute foresight of sin did absolutely decree to exclude any from glory or to addict them to eternal punishment or that the Creation of Reprobates and all natural or supernatural good conferred on them are the effect of reprobation 2. He granteth that the Decree of Predestination is certain and immovable in three respects 1. In that just so many shall certainly be saved as God hath predestinated 2. In that the same species of men shall be saved whom God predestinated to glory so that both materially and formally the number of the predestinate is certain 3. In that by the force of Predestination anteceding all Merits * * * That is Rewardable actâ— of man yea and Causing them God giveth to the predestinate effectual helps of grace by which they shall infallibly come to glory And is not here a fair concession for peace And must not the remainâ—ing differences be only 1. About words 2. Or unsearchable Orders of Gods Decrees and Modes of operation Read him further and see 682. Dion Petavius the Jesuite is too large to transcribe Vol. 1. Theol. Dogm lib. 9. of Predestination is worth the reading especially to know what the Father 's held of Gods Decrees who generally agreed that God Which he largely sheweth in their own words better than any that ever I saw and may save the Reader much labour in the investigation of the sense of the Antients herein decreed none to Hell but upon foresight of their own sin Though he himself doth furiously rail at Calvin and Amyraldus yet he so far acquitteth all other Calvinists save Beza and Piscator and a few that he calleth meer fools that he saith They have all forsaken his opinion and instanceth in the whole Synod of Dort who he saith desert him And he professeth that Augustines judgement may safely be held which is it indeed that those now called Calvinists own except in the point of perseverance See his lib. 10. c. 1. 9 10 11. But what a plague livor and faction is to the Church and the owners souls let but these ugly words of his be witness lib. 10. cap. 14. p. 728. Calvinus nocentem nullum innocentes omnes damnari statuit When â—e had made Amyrald an impudent lyer for proving Calvin to think otherwise O take heed of the spirit of a Sect. 683. Suarez de Auxil l. 3. cap. 6. about sufficient and effectual grace See Zumel reciting the opinions of Molina Bellarmine and Suarez de Gratia efficaci Part â—â—â—â— pag. 50 51 c. into which all the other controversies fall confesseth that Sufficient grace is that quod satis est ad efficiendum supernaturalem actum quod tamen non facit non ex insufficientia auxilii sed ex libertate Voluntatis But effectual grace is called such not only ab eventu effectu sed etiam quia vires praebet efficacissimas Voluntati singularem vim habet ad agendum And is here no ground for Christian Concord in this point But of this subject I must speak more particularly in the Third Part. 684. Bellarmine himself hath enough I think to convince any man
ipsius Voluntatis rectitudinem Sic dicit Scotus quod licet non videatur aliqua ratio praedestinationis à parte praedestinati aliquo modo prior praedestinatione Reprobationis tamen est aliqua ratio propter quam scilicet ista actio terminatur ad hoc objectum non ad illud Cum Reprobare sit Velle Damnare Reprobatio habet ex parte objecti rationem scilicet peccatum finale praevisum Non videtur autem dicendum conformiter de Praedestinatione Reprobatione Quia Bona Deo principaliter attribuuntur Mala autem nobis Quia tamen Apostolus videtur totum hoâ— imperscrutabile relinquere Rom. 9. O altitudo c. ideo dicit Scotus quod eligatur opinio quae magis placet Dum tamen servetur Libertas Divina absque injustitia Hoc autem debet fieri absque assertione pertinaci Rationes namque particulares propter quas ex parte diversorum Divina inferuntur judicia sunt imperscrutabiles But note that as to the first part of Reprobation non velle dare gratiam Scotus Mayro c. hold it to be nothing or no act at all 702. And what D'Orbellis next addeth of Bonaventure setteth us at no further odds Bonav dicit quod licet non sit aliqua ratio Causalis seu meritoria praedestinationis à parte praedestinati quia siquis posset de condigno mereri primam gratiam tunc Gratia non esset Gratia Potest tamen esse aliqua ratio congruitatis condeoentiae praedestinationis Non quantum ad significatum quod est Volitio Divina sed quantum ad Connotatum quod est Gratia Gloria Potest enim dici quod Deus praedestinat istum proper praevisionem bonorum operum ut aliquo modo sunt à libero arbitrio Licet enim Gratificatio vel Justificatio sit principaliter à Divina Voluntate hoc tamen est cum cooperatione praeparatione liberi arbitrii quia ut Aug. Qui fecit te sine te non justificabit te sine te Unde cum peccator facit quod in se est meretur de congruo justificari seu secundum quid ex condecentia Divinae liberalitatis But the true meaning of this is no more than Protestants commonly hold that God giveth special Grace usually to such only as are prepared for it by more common Grace and so this preparation is quid praevisum in Gods decree but no Cause of his Act of Volition or decree 703. And in the next words he granteth that even this Preparation to special grace is not alwayes necessary Deus tamen sine aliqua praeparatione cooperatione aliquos justificat ut patet de sanctificatis in utero de parvulis post baptismum ad coelum evolantibus aliis sine baptismo decedentibus c. 704. And though they oft say that God would have all men saved quantum in se they mean not that God doth all to it that he can but that he maketh all capable of salvation and so far helpeth them that the failing shall not be on his part For so Bonavent ubi supra in 1. d. 47. a. 1. q. 1. explaineth it plainly adding that here Gods will connoteth not salvation it self but only the said Capacity and helps 705. Obj. But many say that Predestination doth not necessitate the eveâ— Answ Twisse told you before that we are agreed all in this It inferreth a Logical Necessity Consequentiae though not a physical Consequentis As Bonavent 1. d. 40. q. 2. Ex parte rei evenientis nullam ex parte Deâ— praescientis aliquam scilicet immutabilitatis certitudinem Yea as to grace and salvation it is certainly Causal as they confess 706. Obj. Many say that a predestinate person may be damned Answ Even as D'Orbellis in 1. d. 40. a. 2. Ista propositio Pradestinatus potest damnari est falsa in sensu composito vera in sensu divise Vide explicat It is unchristian and unmanly to revile men that say the same that we do meerly through distaste or because we will not be at the labour to understand them 707. Obj. We cannot be reconciled to them that give so much to mans free-will Ans How much do you mean It 's a dreadful thing to hear some good men ignorantly blaspheme God as the chief cause of every villany in the World meerly â—poh a factious prejudice and partial opposition to other men whom they never understood Would it please you to hear that God draggeth men into sin as by the hair of the heaâ— when the Devil himself can but allure them I know it would not Dâ— but make it plain as a granted thing that God doth not Will or Love sin and do more to Cause it than the Devil or the wickedest sinner himself doth and you can scarce tell how to differ from the greater part of the Schoolmen themselves or sober moderate Lutherans that are thought to be dissenters Let it be the Devils work and no good Christians to paint God in the shape of the Father of lies and all iniquity Our God is Holy and Holiness becometh all that draw near him and is the mark of all that shall see his face Dear Brethren let not us that daily and justly condemn our selves for sin and take such odious titles to our selves make our selves yet Holier than God and make God a far greater Lover and Causeâ— of sin than we are I will add one description of Free-will out of the last named Schoolman D'Orbellis a Scotist in 2. sent d. 25. dub 2. And tell me what the most rigid opposer of Free-will can desire more Q. Whether Free-will be equally in all that have it Ans Free-will may be compared 1. To that which it is free from 2. And to that which it is free to 1. In the first sense there is a threefold Liberty 1. From constraint 2. From sin 3. From misery Liberty from sin is not equally in good and bad nor in man on earth and in Heaven As Aug. Enchir. That 's the freest will that cannot at all serve sin And Liberty from misery is not equally in all But Liberty from constraint is equally in all because the will cannot be forced Though in God and the blessed there be a Necessity of Immutability yet not of Co-action And necessity of Immutability repugneth not Liberty For the will is called Free simply not because it so willeth this as that it can will the contrary but because that whatever it willeth it desireth it by its own Empire Because it so willeth any thing that it willeth to will it And therefore in the act of willing it moveth it self and useth dominion on it self And so far it is called Free though it be immutably ordained to it * * * But it were not so if it were immutably ordained and moved to sin 2. But if free-will be compared to that to which it is free viz. To do right for as Anselm saith It is a faculty or
power to keep rectitude so it is not equally in all For this Power is in God of Himself and in the Creatures received from God And it is more in the confirmed than the nonconfirmed and in the good than in the bad And seeing to be able to sin is a diminution of Liberty therefore according to Anselm to be able to sin is no Liberty nor part of liberty taking Free-will according to the Common Reason of it But to have power as to the Act which deformity is annext to may well be a part of Liberty not simply but of Created Liberty And so the deformity in the Act more agreeth with free-will as it is a Creature or as it is of Nothing than as it is Free. Dub. 3. Can free-will be compelled Answ God can destroy it but not force it for that is a Contradiction But he can well effectually incline it and make it move it self freely to which part God will * * * But to sin he will not so incline it I think this is as high as you can desire And yet there is nothing in all this but what both parties may well bear with and it hath indeed much soundness in it But here he treateth only about equality of Liberty but how much of it the unsanctified have he elsewhere sheweth and I have oft told you how much the most are agreed in it 708. To conclude The heart and summ of all our differences is how to make God the total first Cause of all Good and not to make him the Cause of sin and the damner of man for that which he himself insuperably causeth I hope both sides hold fast both the conclusions that our sin and destruction is chiefly of our selves but in God is our help and our good and happiness is all from Him And if they both hold this it is not the difficulty of joyning them together and opening Gods unsearchable methods that must disjoynt us and draw us to withdraw our Love or contemn each other or disturb the Churches peace and unity 709. Gregory Ariminensis and Gabr. Biel have come so near the rigid Dominicans that the Reader may think that they plainly say the same of Gods Causing all the Act of sin as Alvarez Twisse and Rutherford say But let the Learned Reader note these things 1. That over and over they affirm that though God Cause all the Act of sin yet he is but the Causa partialis I like not the phrase my self for the reasons before given but by this they do greatly differ from the aforesaid Authors see Greg. 2. d. 34 35. ar 3. frequently saying that God is Causa partialis And in answering Aureolus ad nonum he thus fully explaineth it Dicendum quod Causa dupliciter potest accipi Totalis Uno modo Totalis totalitate relata ad Causam id est sufficiens Causare effectum absque concursu alterius Causae praecise causando sicut Causat sic neganda est ista Consequentia Quoniam nec Deus nec Creatura est sic Totalis Causa actus mali Nunquam enim talis actus fieret si Deâ—s non Causaret â—um Neque etiam si Creatura non causaret Deus non aliter causaret quam nunc de facto causat concurrendo cum Creatura Alio modo Totalis totulitate relata ad effectum id est totum effectum causaus Et ejusdem possâ—nt esse plures totales Causae ejusdem enim Volitionis secundum totum est Causa Notitia etiam Voluntas Here note that 1. He taketh not Causa totalis for the same with Solitaria 2. That he asserteth only that God causeth the Totum of the Act but not by a total Causation of it And that Gods way or sort of Causation is not sufficient to cause it if man concurred not which they say he freely doth and could do otherwise 710. So that these mens way of freeing God from being the cause of sin is like Scotus his As if as I before made the similitude a Father to try his Childs obedience bids him lift up a Stone which he cannot do of himself and the Father holdeth his hand and joyneth his strength yet not ad ultimum posse but with a purposed restraint so far that if the Child will not put forth his degree of strength it shall not be done But who can comprehend the wayes of Divinè concurse 711. And it is to be noted that when Aureolus argueth that if God immediately concurr either he determineth mans act or man determineth Gods act or neither which are all absurd here Biel citeth Scotus as holding the third and answering Neither as no absurdity But Greg. Arim. that seemeth to go higher yet saith * * * Ubi suprae ad 8. Juxta modum loquendi arguentis dico quod Deus sequitur determinationem Voluntatis non quâ—â— determinatio Voluntatis fit aliqua Entitas distincta à Voluntate actâ— ejus quia primo fiat à voluntate nec intelligendo quod prius natura Viluntas agat actum quam Deus proprie loquendo de priori natura Quoniam tunc sequeretur quod posset illum agere Deo non coagente Sed ad hunc sensum dico Deum sequi Determinationem Voluntatis Quoniam ideo Deus agit illum actum quia †††I think it should be Eum. cum Voluntas agit Et non ideo quâ—â— Deus agit ideo Voluntas agit ideo magis proprie dicitur Deus coagerâ— Voluntati in talem actum causandi quam Voluntas dicatur coagere Deâ— You see that these Nominals do toto coelo differ from Alvarez Tâ—isse and Rutherford And yet Alvarez would fain be moderate in that one Disputation which Dr. Twisse in a peculiar Digression oppugneth 712. And note that the thing which moved Gregory to go so far as he doth is Lest God should be denyed to be the Cause of all Natural Entity But if you set before the will the Creator or Chief Good and the Creature or sensual pleasure the Act in genere as a Volition is an Entity or modus entis But who can prove that comparatively as it is terminated on the Creature rather than on the Creator it hath any Natural Entity more than the act in genere or any modality which God is not able to give a Creature power to cause or not cause withoâ—â— predetermination from God or any other 713. Yea Ariminensis seemeth to mean this himself when ibid. d. 34 35. a. 2. ad 5. he saith Deus â—potest solus actum illum causare actâ—â— odiendi id est qui est odium Dei mendacium etiam potest causare Non tamen potest causare actum odiendi Deum seu odium Dei neqâ—â— potest Causare Mendacium vel mentiri neque potest causare actum â—â—lum Quare quemcunque actum causaret solus licet ille nunc sit Odiâ—â— Dei vel mendacium vel aliquis actus malus
justifie us but condemn us nor Moses's neither nor any but the Law of Grace Your foundation is unsound 2. The imputing of Christ's Suffering is not Gods Language but your own and may be well or ill understood 3. If the Law have nothing against us it hath no Sin of Omission against us Therefore not our omission of Love and Obedience And then we are reputed such as had perfect Love and Obedience 4. But indeed it is not so By the deeds of the Law no Flesh can be justified The Law still hath this against us that we have sinned which he that denieth is called a Lyar 1 Joh. 1. The Reatus Culpae in se or the Reality of this that we have sinned is impossible to be done away But the Reatus poenae culpae ut ad poenam is done away But not by the Law but by the Redeemer and new Covenant The Law doth not say We are sinless or deservers of life But the Gospel saith We are pardoned and adopted and sanctified through Christ's perfect meritorious Righteousness § 31. M. S. Else Sin and Punishment should be the cause of life for Sin is the cause of Suffering and that of Pardon An. This is the grossest passage in this Book A palpable fallacy You may as well say that Lazarus's dying and being buried were the causes of his reviving because antecedent evils from which he was revived Or that the Jews killing Christ were the causes of his Resurrection Or that Peter's cutting off Malchus Ear was the cause that Christ cured him Or that Peter's denying Christ was the cause that Christ pardoned him Sin deserveth Punishment but Punishment as such deserveth not Pardon or Life They in Hell deserve not Heaven If God had threatened but a temporal Punishment As a years sickness c. this had not deserved the following impunity or peace but only interrupted peace the Sin deserving this and no more A Malefactor's scourging deserveth not his after peace And Christ's Suffering merited not our Pardon as reputed our suffering nor meerly as suffering For had we suffered we had not been pardoned But the voluntary Suffering of so glorious and innocent a Person to demonstrate Justice deserved our impunity and more because God would have it so and it was a means most apt for this excellent end to save lost man and to vindicate and glorifie the Wisdom Truth and Justice of the Universal King and to demonstrate the Goodness and Love of our great Benefactor But sufferings as such do merâ—â— nothing even Christs own Sufferings merit but as they are the fruits of Obedience and voluntary consent on the foresaid accounts much less do the sufferings of the Sinner merit For he is supposed involuntary in them and it is God the Judge that is the Author of them as such § 32. M. S. Else the Law should be laid by and life given without it An. The root of all your Error is That God giveth us life by the Law of Innocency or Works and that we are justified by that Lawâ— which is not true God laid none of it by but man by sin made the promissory part which gave life on condition of perfect Obedience and Innocency to be impossible or null It ceased cessante capacitate subditorum by mans mutation and not by Gods But the preceptive part remaineth still as far as it reacheth materially the state of Sinners But man having made it impossible to be justified by the deeds of the Law God made us a new Law or Covenant according to which he judgeth Sinners and by which he first giveth Righteousness and then according to it sentenceth men as Righteous § 33. M. S. Justification of the Posterity of Adam should have been the same for substance as of Believers by Christ Adam's one Act should have confirmed all his Posterity in him as a publick Person The Covenant of Works and of Grace agree in justifying by imputed Righteousness but out of a Head by Generation the other by a divine Person An. This is presumptuous adding to Gods Word in the very substance of the Covenants yea and a flat contradiction of it 1. What Scripture telleth us That all Adam's Posterity should have been confirmed in immutable Holiness if he had obeyed 2. What Scripture saith That one Act should have done this 3. What Scripture saith That his Righteousness should have been imputed to all his Posterity and they all accounted to have fulfilled the Law in him The Scripture tells us nothing of Gods purpose to make so suddain a change of his Law as if he made it but for one man yea for oâ—â— Act and then would make another to Rule the World by ever after The Law said in sense Obey perfectly and live Sin and die Now if the Condition had been performed by one Act or one man for all the World that ever should come of him to the last and they all be born in the fixed possession of the Reward then the Law which giveth that Reward still but conditionally hath no more place As in Hell God doth not say to the damned Obey and live so neither doth he say to them in immutable Glory I give you immutable Glory if you will obey The means cease so far as the end is either attained or desperately lost He that saith Run well and you shall have the prize Fight well and you shall be crowned Overcome and I will give you a Kingdom will not say the same to them when after running fighting overcoming they have received the Prize the Crown the Kingdom though possibly they may have the continuance on condition still if that continuance was not also promised on the first condition alone So that you feign Gods Law to be incredibly mutable if God said by it to Adam Obey in one Act oâ— obey thy self and thou and all thy Posterity for that shall have the Reward For then he can never be supposed to say the same again to Adam or to any man And yet you think you stand so much for the â—mmutability of that Law as that we must all be justified by it to the â—nd Nay it seemeth that after one Act of Obedience all the World should have been under no Covenant any more or no promissory conditional Law but only fixed by necessitating Light and Love as those in Glory â—re For when this Condition was fully performed this Law or Covenant as conditional must needs cease And you imagine not I suppose at least mention not any other conditional Covenant that should â—ucceed it And necessitation is not a Moral Law suited to such as you call cause consilio in this life You would make all the World after one â—ct to be if not lawless yet Comprehensors and not Viators Professors of life eternal and not seekers in a life of trial But I find not but that all Adam's Posterity should have been born and â—ived under the same Law that he was made under And all of them â—hould
Will or Power as if he could do no more But it is his Delight thus to govern the creature according to the nature and rank which he hath made it in and his non-volitions and non-operations of a higher sort are agreeable to his Perfection Wisdom and Liberty Higher action being used on higher creatures 3. Yet hath God placed and kept these free Agents not only under his Moral Government but also under his Dominion and disposal so that he will do with them as his own what he lift and none shall frustrate his disposing Will. 4. It pleased him first to make man perfect under a Law of Perfection making innocency or perfection the only condition of Life and the contrary of Death 5. When Man had sufficient Grace to have kept this Law not sufficient to ascertain the event but sufficient Power to have stood that is as much Grace as was necessary to his standing sine qua non esse potuit cum qua esse potuit he broke it and sinned against that sufficient Grace before God either denyed him any thing necessary or withdrew any from him 6. From whence it is clear that the Nature of Man's Will is such as that it is made to use a Power which doth not necessitate or determine it self or is determined necessarily but freely And that it is no Deifying of the Will nor extolling it above its Nature to say that it can act or determine it self without Gods pre-determinating premotion or by that same measure of help which at another time doth not determine it Though its Nature and its Act as such be of God yet so is its Liberty too and therefore by the Power and Liberty given by God the Will can act or not act or turn it self to this object or to that without more help than the said natural support and Concurse And this Power and Liberty is its Nature and Gods Image 7. From hence also it is evident that there is such a thing or operation of God as Grace Necessary called sufficient which is not effectual For God took no Grace away from Adam before he sinned nor let out any temptation upon him which he was not able to resist nor did he sin for want of necessary Grace but by that same degree of help might have overcome 8. God passing Sentence on faln Man for sin would not forgive him the temporal death nor common calamities of this life but cursed the creatures which he was to use as part of his penalty 9. But the Great evil which sin brought on man was the loss of Gods approbation and complacency and of his Spirits saving Communion and help and of Gods Image on man's Soul and of Communion with God herein and also his right to life eternal All which man 's own sin cast away and man was both the Deserver and Executioner without any change in God 10. Yet was all this privation penal in that God made Man such a creature as that his own sin should become his punishment or ruine if he committed it so that all Punishment is not determinatively of God though Gods Antecedent Will did make that which by man is made a Cause As in argument God saith antecedently If thou sin thy own sin shall be thy torment and misery and man saith I will sin Therefore it is Man that is the determining Cause of the Conclusion My own sâ—â— shall be my torment and misery So it is in Causation God antecedently to man's sin doth resolve I will make Man such a Creature with such a Mind Conscience and Will as that his Holiness shall be his Health and Joy and his immediate Receptive capacity of my favour and of his Communion with me and of his title to my spirit and Glory And that if he forsake me and his Holiness in the very Nature of the thing he shall lose all this Life Light and Love Joy and Communion and title to my Grace and shall feel the torments of his own Conscience telling him of his sin and loss This is Gods Antecedent Law Nay this is Gods Antecedent Creation to make man such a Creature Now if man sin his owâ— sin doth ipso facto become his misery and yet is not caused at all by Gods But yet that his Nature was made such as sin should prove a misery to was Gods Work And from that Antecedent Creation or Constitution the Relative form of a Punishment resulteth to the Sinner Even as God saith If thou Murder it shall be thy sin or Thou shalt not Murder And man doth Murder Here the Act that is sin is of man but that the Relation of sin belongeth to that act resulteth partly from the Law which forbiddeth it and yet God is not the Cause of sin though he Antecedently decreed Murder shall be sin if thou commit it So is it also with this sort of Punishment which is either sin it self or the effect or result oâ— sin immediately By which we see that when sin and punishment are found in one thing God is the Cause Antecedently of the formal Relation of a Punishment without being a Cause of the sin yea antecedently is some cause of the formal relation of the sin by his Law without causing any of the sin it self as the author of it As if God make man of such a temper as that surfetting drunkenness lust will make him sick and hazard his life Here God did no otherwise punish him than by making him such a man which he turned to his own destruction by his sin If a man make a thorn Hedge about his Garden that men may not steal his fruit and those that will shall â—rick themselves it is they that prick and punish themselves If God say He that will leap into the fire shall be burnt or into the water shall be drown'd it is they that do it that cause the evil and yet some formal relation of penalty may result to it from Gods conditional antecedent Law I say not that God executeth no other kind of punishment But these are the most common 11. Man having thus cast away Gods Image and his Innocency could beget a Child no purer holier or better than himself For he could not communicate that which he had lost So that our Nature is vitiated with Original sin and unhappy in the miserable effects Bradwardine hath a shift which serveth them that say man could do no good in Innocency without supernatural Help viz. Making that Help to be Gods Will that it shall be done But is not Gods Will called our natural Help when it is the foundation of Nature working by natural means It 's true that free will without Gods Will could do nothing 12. The promisory part of the Covenant or Law of Innocency became null or ceased with man's first sin cessante subditorum capacitate and so the Condition which is its modus So that no man ever since was under the Obligation of that Law as a Covenant of life
* * * Such as are most of the sober Heathens in the world For the most religious and sober of them are Pythagorears to this day Lege Varenium de divers Relig. post Hist Japâ—n Bless Lord thy own reconciling Truths to the healing of thy Churches or at least of some dis-joynted minds And teach me with patience to bear the Obloquy and Reproach of mistaken zealous Consurers And forgive them that know not what they say or do And wherein I err forgive and rectifie me and better inform both the Reader and me The Third Part OF God's Gracious Operations ON MANS SOUL Their DIFFERENCE and the OPERATIONS OF MANS WILL. For the fuller Decision of the Controversies about EFFECTUAL and DIFFERENCING GRACE By RICHARD BAXTER LONDON Printed by Robert VVhite for Nevill Simmons at the Princes Arms in S t. Pauls Church-yard MDCLXXV THE CONTENTS THE Preface Pag. 1. Sect. 1. The Presupposed Principles briefly repeated p. 7 Sect. 2. The Order of Divine Operations p. 9. Sect. 3. Of the Operations and Principles as compared p. 12. Sect. 4. How far God useth Means p. 16. Sect. 5. Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace and Means p. 18. Sect. 6. Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul p. 20. Sect. 7. Of the Resistibility of Grace p. 21. Sect. 8. What is that Operation of God on the Soul enquired of in many following Questions And whether searchable by man p. 22. Sect. 9. Whether Gods Operation be equal on all p. 31. Sect. 10. Whether it be Physical or Moral p. 32. Sect. 11. What Free-will man hath to Spiritual Good p. 35. Sect. 12. More of Predetermination by Physical Premotion p. 37. Sect. 13. More of Mans Power Natural and Moral p. 43. Sect. 14. Whether the giving of Faith be an act of Omnipotency and a Creation and a Miracle p. 46. Sect. 15. Of the Sufficiency and Efficacy of Grace p. 48. Sect. 16. Of Infused Habits and the Holy Ghost even special Grace p. 53. Sect. 17. Whether Man be meerly Passive as to the first Grace p. 55. Sect. 18. Whether the first Grace and the New and Soft Heart or Faith it self be Promised or Given absolutely or on any Condition to be performed by man ibid. Sect. 19. How God may be said to Cause the Acts of Sin p. 57. Sect. 20. How far God and how far man himself is the Cause of Hell and other punishments p. 62. The Conclusion § 1. The Concessions of the Synod of Dort specially the Brittish Divines More of Divine Motion or Impress p. 67. § 2. The Epitome of Alvarez de Auxil drawn up by himself in Epilogo in Twenty Conclusions considered p. 70. § 3. A Censure of the other three wayes described by him viz. 1. The Jesuits de Scientia Media p. 75. § 4. 2. Durandus's Way p. 76. § 5. 3. That of the Scotists and Nominals Of Gods partial Caâ—sality p. 79. § 6. The true face and Scheme of the Dominican Predeterminant way in the Sense and Consequents in Fifty Propositions and the Reasons of my preferring any before this p. 80. A Summary of all to satisfie sober minds p. 100. Additional Animadversions on Mr. Peter Sterrey's Book of Free-will making God the Author of Good and Evil as he is of Light and Darkness p. 106. The Third Part OF GOD'S GRACIOUS OPERATIONS ON MANS SOUL AND THE SUB-OPERATIONS OF MANS WILL. For the Ending the Contentions about Sufficient and Effectual Common and Special Grace and Free-VVill The Preface THE first Part of this Treatise though largest and fullest of mens contentious Questions and opinions is furthest from the true point of the difference and difficulty which troubleth the Church And is made large by accident by way of disquisition and detection of the many ensâ—aring questions and vain or hurtful wranglings of the Schoolmen The Second Part cometh nearer our chief Controversies and resolveth many other on the by and containeth the summ of that part of Theologie which is most clear and sure and necessary This Third Part which cometh up to the main Controversie is short and troubleth you less with other mens opinions and Schoolmens Wranglings about Grace and Free-will Partly because you had enough of them by the way before And chiefly because I would not by tediousness and recitation of Contentions obscure that which I most desire to make plain nor discourage the Reader by the length I think if I can manifest that there is no real or considerable difference among the Learned and Moderate on each side such as are the Synod of Dort on one side and even Bellarmine Suarez Ruiz c. on the other besides the moderate Lutherans and Arminians who may be ashamed if they go farther from us than the Jesuites besides abundance of Schoolmen that are of a middle strain between the Dominicans and Jesuites few understanding Divines would then think that there were any considerable difference remaining about Predestination or the universality of Redemption Those differences being but respective unto this But about Perseverance I confess that there doth a real difference remain But that it is of less moment than most on both sides say and such as is no way fit to quench Christian Love or alienate Christians from each other or hinder their liberties or peaceable communion I have fully proved in the Second Part and formerly in a peculiar Treatise entituled My Thoughts of Perseverance If therefore I can truly disprove our pretended difference about the â—â—â—rations of Grace or at least prove it to be but as it is no greater not more intolerable than that of Perseverance I shall think that all is done that is thus necessary The main difference seeming or real is about the Power of Mans Will Of which I have spoken much in the First Part and purposely leave much to the Reconciling Praxis in the Second Book which shall dissipate the cloud of ambiguous words Till then it shall here suffice to manifest 1. That we are agreed with them whose conciliation I endeavour that â—â— is not the natural Powers essential to a man which we are deprived of 2. But that these Powers have by our common corruption a sinful Disposition unfitting them for a due exercise for God and against sin 3. And that all men at least at age are not depraved in the same degree 4. That this Ill disposition is called a Moral Impotency when it is such as while it remaineth the sinful Act is ever done or the commanded act is never done There is then no Moral Power 5. That the vitious sinful impotency of the will and its Habitual or dispositive unwillingness to good and proneness to things forbidden is all one 6. That he is Morally Able who without any other grace than he hath can do the thing commanded or forbear the thing forbidden 7. That there is no Power but of God 8. That Nature common grace and special grace give several powers or dispositions 9. That a moral power
There is no Place where any Corporeal being is where some Active created Nature is not with it so that considering the proximity and the natures we may well conclude that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun which God effecteth by himself alone without any second Cause § 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken Gods presence with the Creature in operation to the fire in a red hot Iron where you would think all were Fire and all Iron But the similitude is too low The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx God and the Sun do what the Sun doth and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth that 's corporeal without it § 7. But the Sun moveth nothing as the Cartesians dream by a single Motive Influx alone but by emission of its Threefold Influx as every Active Nature doth that is Motive Illuminative and Calefactive which are One-radically in Three-effectively § 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui But causeth wonderful diversity of effects without diversity in God the prime Cause or in it self The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet some things to live and some to dye some things to be soft and some hard c. In a word there are few changes or various actions below in bodies which the Sun is not the Cause of without difference in it self But not the specifying Cause § 9. The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures Recipitur ad modum recipientis So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock c. § 10. God operateth on second Causes as God Omnipotently but not ad ultimum potentiae but Freely as he pleaseth § 11. God worketh by second Causes according to the said Causes aptitude so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth § 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies And whether God work on all our souls by superiour Spirits as second Causes is unknown to us It is not improbable according to the order of his providence in other things But we know little of it certainly § 13. But certain we are that superiour Voluntary Agents Angels and Devils have very much to do with our souls and operate much upon them It is a wonderful power which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination or Thinking faculty of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee And it is not like that good Angels have less power skill or will § 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by which is JESUS CHRIST As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion Light and Heat to Inferiour creatures and God operateth by the Sun So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to mens souls and there is now no other conveyance to be expected § 15. Christs Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified is by the Office of Mediator Authorized and by Personal Union and the Fulness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind § 16. Object A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost who is God the Creator Sending is the Act of a Superiour But Christs humanity is not superiour to the Holy Ghost Answ 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God for that hath no Cause But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation as it signifieth the effect 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul and 3. Of the ordering of these effects why rather on this soul than on that and at this time measure c. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superiour sender of the Spirit but a Ministerial and a second cause As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth § 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls that is As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons measure time conditions of the Communication of the Spirit But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself as the Sun giveth us its Influx is all that is disputable That is Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ and pass from his person as his unto us as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members § 18. This question may be put either of all Natural Being and Motion or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause or whether this be true of this Lower World which was curst for sin or whether it be true at least of Humane nature or whether it be true only of Gracious operations § 19. 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe contained in the words Heaven and Earth the Scripture seemeth to assert 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature and of all other creatures that belong to man so far as they belong to him Angels Devils Sun Air Earth c. is past dispute 3. That the real â—hysical effects acts and habits of the Spirit on mens souls are caused by Christs Moral Causation by his Merit and his Political Mission is past dispute 4. That besides all this the Spirit it self by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ and that as they are such and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ is past dispute 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations is past dispute 6. But whether moreover any Action of Christs own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue which is every where be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass are questions not for me to determine § 20. Christs spiritual Influx on souls is not single but is ever Three in One as the Sun 's aforesaid which are according to
can do no more than this nor this but by the Power given him of God § 7. Vainly therefore do the Dominicans pretend that it is a Deifying of the Will of man to say that God can enable it to Cause the various ORDER of mans Actions by meer moral helps without Gods predetermining premotion to that order For this is to cause no Real being And he that is moved to the Act in genere needeth no more premotion from God to the disorder and sinfulness of the Act. § 8. And they that will call the production of faith a Creation in the strict and proper sense do not understand that Creatio est Rerum non ORDINIS rerum jam creatarum vel existentium An Act is of it self improperly said to be created in a pre-existent Agent That is not called created which is educed è potentia materiae nor that which is produced by the Potentia Activa prae-existentis forma Faith is an Act of the same Natural Power or faculty which we had before And Grace or rather Nature usually suscitateth that faculty to the Act as an Act in genere And Grace doth cause us to ORDER that act aright as to the due object and other circumstances But if any will call it a Creation I contend not about the name § 9. But the whole state of the Man Habitual Relative and Practical set together is called in Scripture a New Creature and the New Man tropically but not unfitly Partly because we are really new though not by another Humanity or Species of Natural Essence yet by many Accidents And partly because those Accidents are so great and make so great a change of our state as that they emulate a natural Essence and we use to say in common things that when an unlearned man is made learned and a poor man a Prince and a dying man healthful he is another man § 10. Though God be one and the same and Christ the same and the Law and Word and many Antecedent means the same to many on whom they have different effects This difference may be caused many wayes The Causes of difference As 1. By the diversity of other inferiour or concomitant second causes 2. By the diverse Disposition of the Receivers a common cause of varieties in the World 3. By the diversity of Impediments and temptations And many other wayes § 11. * * * I know that Bradwardine li. 2. c. 32. Cor. p. 612. saith that Deum non dare scientiam eratiam aut perseverantiam seu quodlibet munus suum creaturâ— capaci est causa quare ipsa non accipit non habet non è contra Et p. 614. Quicquid obex dicatur potest illa respâ—nsio corripi cum nullus possit hunc obicem tollere nisi Deus vel per Deum prius praetollentem si ipse cum voluerit tollere irresistibiliter tollitur Auferam cor lapideum c. The great question is How far the diversity of Receptive Dispositions is from God Answ 1. God made all equal at first in Adam 2. All were equal in sin by his fall 3. Cain and Abel differed from several causes and not one alone Abel differed from Cain in faith and obedience by Gods grace as the chief cause and his own will and agency as the second cause Cain differed from Abel by unbelief and sin by his own will and Satans temptations 4. The sins of later parents as of Cain Cham Esau Achan Gehezi c. make a further difference by depriving their posterity of some means helps or grace which else they had been equally capable of with others 5. It is certain that man hath much to do about his own heart by which he is to be the second cause of his own Receptive disposition and if he fail is the only cause of his indisposition § 12. Difference is but Dissimilitude And an alteration of one of the subjects which soever will make it dissimile or to differ from the other When the good Angels stood and the evil fell if you ask Who made the difference It was the Devils by forsaking their first estate Though Constitutively both their sin and the Angels obedience made the dissimilitude If you suppose Cain and Abel equally under grace at first and ask Who made the difference I answer Constitutively Cains sin and Abels righteousness maketh or is the difference But as to Reputative efficiency Cain made the difference by rejecting grace So if you should suppose two equally qualified with common grace and one of them to lose it the efficience of the difference is Imputable to him But if you suppose two equally lost in sin and one converted and not the other the Constitutive Causes of the difference are ones sin and the others repentance But the Imputable efficiency is Gods grace and mans repentance or will that is recovered § 13. But when Paul doth ask Who made thee to differ he meaneth Who gave thee that good by which thou differest and expoundeth it by What hast thou which thou hast not received And no doubt but all good is received from God And this would have held true if God had by equal operation done as much on the other which had been uneffectual by his indisposition or rejection § 14. Nature and Scripture perswade us that the same measure of help or influx is not enough to make one repent or believe which is enough to make another For the difference of souls and temptations and impediments plainly prove it The same strength will not move a Mountain which will move a Feather nor the same Teaching make an ignorant Sot to understand which serveth a prepared person § 15. Bodily aptitude or ineptitude do much to vary receptivities which are usually Gods punishments or rewards for Parents actions And oft-times for mens own Some by fornication gluttony drunkenness sports and idleness make themselves even next to Brutes § 16. But we have great Reason from Scripture to believe that though Gods Laws be equal and his Judgements where men do not make an inequality yet as a free Lord and Benefactor he dealeth not equally with all that are of equal merit Though he do no man wrong nor deny any what he promised in his Word but keep perfect Justice as a Governour yet he may do with his own as he list and he will be specially good to some though others see it with an evil eye § 17. Whether all that are elect have at first a greater measure of the Divine help and impress than any that are not converted no man can say of which more anon But certainly all the elect were fore-decreed by Gods will to that certain conversion which others were not so decreed to SECT VI. Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul § 1. THat which sticks in the minds of many is that God being Omnipotent all his operations must be equally unresistible and efficacious because none can conquer God But they must
voluntatis à Deo elevatis suo speciali influxu consistere aiunt gratiam praevenientem excitantem Liberum autem arbitrium his duobus motibus gratiae praevenientis adjutum excitatum liberam habet potestatem imperandi aut non imperandi assensum fidei Quod si voluntas fidem amplecti velit actumque credendi imperet intellectui influente simul nutu gratiae praevenientis quam habet elicit in seipsa actum supernaturalem quâ— fidem amplecti vult quóque assensum imperat intellectui simúlque Intellectus motus imperio illo supernaturali voluntatis illustrationéque divinâ adjutus elicit actum supernaturalem assentiendi revelatis Gratia excitans seu praeveniens novo influxu quo unà cum libero arbitrio influit in supernaturalem actum fidei sortitur rationem gratiae adjuvantis cooperantis efficacis Si autem voluntas pro sua innata libertate fidem nolit amplecti gratia excitans praeveniens manet intra limites gratiae sufficientis nec est efficax quia voluntas non voluit fidem amplecti cum potuisset II. The second is Durandus's way Nullum esse necessarium Divinae voluntatis concursum ad actiones secundarum causarum sed saâ—is esse quod Deus eas produxerit in esse ipsas naturas earúmque virtutes postmodum conservet But this is a partial recitation for this sustentation of their Active Virtues is the same with an Universal Influx or Concurse to action as action which Bellarmine is for Read of this Ludov. à Dola III. * * * So Malderus in 1. 2 q. 111. a. 3. dub 1. Hic Dei concursus quod attinâ—t ad identitatem realem ex parte termini nam ex parte principii est ipse Deus aut Dei voluntas est ipsa actio Causae secundae quatenus est à Deo Nihil ponit in ipsa Voluntate sed est influxus Dâ—i in actionem seu effectum So many others The third he saith is attributed to Greg. Arim. Scotus and Gabriel great Wits if any Cooperationem Divinam se tenere ex parte effectus non Causae h. e. Conâ—ursum Dei non determinare Voluntatem nostram nec aliquid in illam imprimere aut operari sed immediate influere in effectum eumque producere illo ipso momento quo à voluntate nostra producitur Ergo Deus non determinat Voluntarem nec Voluntas Deum Nam uterque concursum libere adhibet si alter noâ—â—â— concurrere opus non fiet sicut cum duo ferunt ingentem lapidem Et licet simul operentur tamen Deus operatur quia Voluntas operatur non contra But this is partially recited and it is true only of the effect And his confutation is that then Graetia est pedissequa Voluntatu And why saith he not God is pedissequus hominis because he judgeeth men according to their works I have otherwise opened the matter than is expressed here of any of these But can the sober Reader think that the IV th way which is that of the Dominicans predetermining premotion of all acts good and bad is so much surer than these three as that he dare venture on that supposition to cry down his Brethren as enemies to the Grace of God and to his Providence who would gladly ascribe all to both which belongeth to perfection and are only afraid to deny Gods holiness and the Christian Religion by resolving all sin and damnation into the meer Will and Love and Irresistible Omnipotent efficiency of God SECT IX Whether Gods Operations be equal on all § 1. IF the question be ex parte Dei it is absurd to make a question of it For God is the same whatever the diversity be in his * * * Of Preparation for Grace Medina noteth three degrees of it one which Grace ever followeth which is it that our Divines mean by effectual Vocation and this he saith is never had but by Gods special help the other two are distant and common But that the Schoolmen of the other parties think otherwise he confesseth and saith In hac quaestione Durand Scot. propemodum omnes Nominales quos sequitur Adrian Quodlib 7. q. 4. tenent partem affirmativam scilicet quod homo per sâ—as vires sine speciali auxilio Gratiae potest se ad Gratiam praeparare sic ut consequatur gratiam infallibiliter ex merito de congruo D. Tho. tenet contrarium Medin ib. p. 593. But then by sufficiens praeparatio ad Gratiam he meaneth Conversion it self dimovere animum ab iniquitate st in Deum convertere sicut convertere faciem ad solem ut quiâ— illuminetur works And Gods acts as in himself are God And there is no Virtue or Efflux from God but what is a creature or effect of God § 2. If the question be of second causes and of Gods operation in and by them I answer 1. Some things God Giveth and Doth as Rector of the World by a Law or according to a Law And herein God doth equally till man make a difference as is aforesaid viz. in his Legislation though not in the promulgation and in his Judgement 2. Some things God Giveth and Doth besides as Owner and free-Benefactor and here he primarily maketh a difference So that there is a certain sort and measure of grace given equally till men make a difference And there is a sort and measure given unequally by the meer will of God as he diversifieth Natural things § 3. But if the question be of the effects on the soul those effects are 1. Mans predisposition 2. The divine Impress 3. The Acts 4. The Habits as is said And as to the first God equally disposed man at first But two Causes have filled the World with very unequal dispositions One is mans sin corrupting themselves and their posterity more than as they are the seed of Adam and this God is no Cause of The other is Gods free differencing mercy to some of equal ill desert giving them both Greater outward helps and Common Grace and fewer impediments and so more preparing them for special Grace But no man by Indisposition is deprived of special Grace but he that hath contracted more than he had from Adam only And God doth not equally repair and dispose all that have viciously undisposed themselves Though while they are here he giveth such mercy to all as tendeth to their recovery § 4. If the question be of the equality of Gods Impulse or Influx on the soul 1. There may be a diversity of further effects where the Impress is the same in kind and measure because of mens various Dispositions to receive it and their various concurse That may convert one that doth not another But yet God doth not make equal Impressions on mens souls For 1. His own free-will as a Liberal benefactor doth more for some as Paul than for others 2. Mens ill deserts may so forseit grace and quench the Spirit as
cessationem aâ— vaâ—ationem ab aâ—â—u boâ— necessitate naturaliter praecedentâ— cor p. 649. Omnia quâ— sunt fiunt aut eveniâ—â—t sunt â—â—â—â— eveniunt â—â— aliquâ— necessitate ipâ—â— naturalâ—tâ—r praecedentâ— This is just Hobbs Soâ— 5. â—â— 654 that No creature hath simple liberty of Contradiction or Contingency but only secundum quid in respect to second causes but only Gods acts of will ad extra are simply free and contingent As if God had given no creature Liberty to forbear sin or do good but doing it or not doing it were from Gods necessitation though not from the creatures The Dominicans the Masters of the Inquisition and Murderers of the Waldenses and Albigenses of old and therefore faulty as well as the Jesuits though there are very Learned men among them both do commonly hold that No Creature natural or free can act unless God by Immediate physical efficient premotion predetermine it to that act both in the act as such which they call the substance of it and all the modes circumstances and order of it 3. Augustine and Jansenius after him with their true followers hold not this necessity of predetermining premotion to all acts natural or sinful but only to spiritual good acts which is not from the Nature but the Corruptâ—â—n of â—â—an and therefore the predetermination is not made say they by Gods Common Natural Motion but by Medicinal Grace 4. Durandus and his followers as Lud. à Dola and Aureolus partly do hold that if God do but uphold â—ll creatures as compaginate in the Universe in the Nature he made them in and so natural Inclination and media and objects all supposed this sustentation and Influx maintaining their Active Natures and means is sufficient to cause an Act without another particular predetermining premotion of God As e. g. in Naturals they think that if a Rock were violently held up in the Air God continuing its Natural Gravity and all other circumstant Natures and Concauses this Rock if loosed can fall down of it self without another predetermining premotion of God And that a new Act of God supposing the said support of Nature is more necessary to the not-falling than to the falling of it As it was to the fires not burning the Three Confessors Dan. 3. And I am unable to see the error of this Opinion And so in Free agents they think that if God continue the Nature of a free-will with all circumstants and necessary natures it can freely determine it self without another act of predetermining premotion And doth so in each act of sin Though as Jansenius saith by accidental corruption for Conversion we need Medicinal Grace 5. The Jesuits and all others explode this Opinion of Durà ndus as singular but give so little and slender reason of their dissent as would draw one the more to suspect their cause Instead of it they scarce know what to assert But Bellarmine and the chiefest of them under a pretended opposition speak I think the same in other words Even an Universal Concurse like that of the Sun which operateth in specification according to the nature of Recipients which specifie the effect Which Universal Influx no doubt Aureolus and Durandus include in Gods sustentation of Nature For to sustain an Active Nature in all its Active disposition by a suitable active Influx is universally to cause its motion The difference they are unable to assign 6. After these come Hobbs Cartesius and Gassendus with a swarm of Epicureans a Sect commonly despised even in Cicero's time and yet called Wits in ours by men that have no more wit than themselves and some of these say that Motion needeth no continued cause at all any more than non-movere But when a thing is in motion it will so continue because it is its state without any other continued cause than the motion it self And so they may as well say and some do that when a thing is in Being it will so continue till it be positively annihilated without any continued causation of its being As if esse existere were nothing more than non esse and agere were no more noble a mode of Entity than non agere and so needed no more that is no Cause For non esse non agere need no Cause When this distraction is worn out and shamed the next Age will reproach us for attempting the confutation of it And yet the Wits of this delirant Age have not the wit to understand a Confutation Some of them say that Spirits cannot move bodies for want of Contact as Gassendus Some say that Matter and Motion are eternal and that of themselves As if there were no God but Matter and Motion Some say that there is a God who gave matter one push at first and so set it in that motion by which one body by a knock will move another to the end And some say There is no other Intellect but the wonders of wisdom and order in the World are done by such fortuitous motion But Hobbes meeteth the Predeterminants and saith that the Will is free in that its Act is Volition but that this Volition is necessitated by superiour or natural Causes as much as any motion in a Clock or Watch and that it is unconceivable that any Act or Mode of Act can be without a necessitating efficient cause But he differs from them in his consequents and in the Notion of a Spirit acknowledging no being but Corporeal § 2. The Predeterminants commonly build not their doctrine on Gods free-will but on the Necessity of the thing As if it were a contradiction which God cannot do for God to make a creature that can Determine it self ad ordinem actionis without his particular predetermining premotion or to make a Stone that can fall from the Air of it self unless he move it downwards besides his sustentation of its natural gravity and all other natures by his Influx or universal Concurse § 3. But till they can prove the Contradiction they must pass for the denyers of Gods Omnipotency which is to deny a God § 4. * * * Let the Reader note 1. That all the rest of their arguments save this one are of no value 2. And that Dr. Twisse affirmeth that God is not alwayes the effector of all Good either of Profit or Pleasure which yet he saith are Good Now if there be no such Entity in Bonum conducibile vel Bonum Jucundum as necessarily to require God to be the Cause of them tell us if you can Why there is so much entity in Malum morale as that man is not able to cause it unless God predetermine his will Yea as to Entity there is no more in Bonum honestum than in the rest fore-named His words are Nos tueri poterimus Malum fieri esse Bonum per se neâ—â—pe in genere Boni conducibilis ad certum aliquem fiâ—â—m sed arguit adversarius Ergo Deus esset non modo
returning Israelites 2. And especially that he would have such in the Christian Church as should be sanctified to him by his Spirit and have a new and tender â—eart And Predestination is well proved from the Text. But there is not a word to prove this to be the first Grace nor that Gods promise gave any man right to it but upon condition of believing For if Gods Decree Prophecy or general Promise saying absolutely I will do it did prove it to be the first Grace it would prove perserance such which is false The words prove no more but that God will do it § 7. And as this is no personal promise giving any man a right to the thing promised which he may claim but only foretelling what God will do or give to some so he hath other promises which are part of his Law of Grace and do give men Right to these same Benefits And so the Spirit of Sanctification and a new heart is promised on Condition of believing which therefore is the former special Grace § 8. If any therefore will prove that faith is given Absolutely they must not do it by those Texts which speak of Sanctification which faith is a condition of § 9. But as to the question it self Whether Faith be given absolutely or conditionally I answer 1. There is no absolute promise of faith made to any persons but only promissory predictions of some indeterminate unnamed persons that God will draw them and give them to Christ and they shall believe and live 2. All men have means and duty appointed them for the seeking of that Grace which may convert them 3. They are hereby bound to believe that if they so do they shall not lose their labour For God setteth men on no unprofitable work 4. Those that do this most faithfully and have most preparing grace are the likest to become believers and the ordinary receivers of special grace 5. Whether de nomine this encouragement shall be called a promise or equipollent let them contend that list 6. God can and doth suddenly convert some without such preparations or else give them both sorts of Grace immediately as once SECT XIX How God may be said to Cause the Acts of sin I Have said of this also so much before as that this Breviate here must serve It is ill said Profiteâ— mur incunctanter prorsus impeditum iri quod universi simpliciter Bonum est si impeditetur peccatum quoniam hâ—â— pactâ— impediretur patesactio Divinâ— misericordiâ— parcentis justitia vindicant is Quâ— quidem patesactio non minus universi Bonum censenda est quam qâ—â—libet alia câ—jusâ—ibet Del proprietatis in ipso tanquam in speculo relâ—cent is Twiss Vindic Grat. li. 1. p. 1. pag. 133. It is dangerous to talk so boldly of these mysteries Here seem to me many errors and confusions 1. It is false that God could not make known to the world that merciful nature which now pardoneth sin and that Justice which now punisheth if there had been no sin His Laws Promises and Threats do antecedently make them known And God could cause blessed Spirits to know all his perfections before there was any sin 2. Gods Holiness and Goodness is called Mercy and Justice by extrinsick denomination and connotation of sin and misery And if his Holiness and Goodness had been known as preventing all sin and misery men will think that he hath not proved that this had been Evil in the Universe or less Good 3. Posita Divina Volitione as the rule of Good it followeth I confess that it were evil not to have that will fulfilled But I deny that God willeth sin or its existence Therefore it is not Good because not Volitum à Deo It is sufficient that it is not so far evil as to be Absolutè Nolitum but only evil 1. As prohibitum 2. As hurtful to the sinner and to others Methinks they that maintain that sin is Privatio should not say that it is Positivè Volitum à Deo 4. All this dependeth on that curious question Could not God have made the World better than it is or at least as good with many alterations from what it is They that hold the first say that God freely made things no better than they are But had there been no Devils no Sin no Toads no disorder the world had been better that is a perfecter demonstration of Gods perfection But they that are more modest arâ— content with the latter and say that God freely made things as they are and not necessarily But it had been necessarily if no other way had been as good And that if God had pleased to shew his Goodness by preventing all sin it had been as Good and no loss or disparagement to the Universe 5. And he doth through all his Books beg the question Whether a meer occasion be a conducibâ—e medium and so good If he will stretch the word Medium so wide as to extend it to a meer evil sinâ— quo non or presupposed which hath not the least causality efficient material formal or final I will not strive for a word But conducibile noteth some kind and degree of Causality which sin hath not to the glorifying of God It is the destroying of sin that God is glorified by Where the malum amovendum is not the bonum conducibile but the ill state of the matter without which God had not glorified himself by this Act but by some other as well § 1. It must be well considered that God made mans Nature before he made any positive Laws for him And that the Law of Nature it self is in order of Nature after Nature though not in Time Man being first considerable as Man before he be considerable as obliged to duty And also that the Law both Natural and Positive is before mans obedience and sin So that as man is first in order of Nature Man and then Gods Governable Subject and then in order of Time obedient or disâ—bedient so God is first his Creator and then Naturâ— Motor and then his Governour by Legislation and then his Gracious Helper and lastly his Judge and Rewarder § 2. Therefore as Natural Being substance and faculties and Natural Motion are antecedent to Morality so Gods causation of both these is antecedent and therefore to be Creator Preserver and Motor is not to be the Cause of sin or of Virtuous acts as such § 3. God as Creator was not pleased to make all his creatures of one kind nor of one degree of excellence but in such variety as is wonderful to our observation Besides the innumerable species of beings and the innumerable parts of every compound being the dissimilitude of indviduals of the same species is admirable so that no two faces are perfectly like no nor no two Stones in the Street no two Trees Birds Beasts c. And therefore it is but consonant to the rest of his works that MAN is neither perfectly like
to Angels nor to Brutes For as God made one sort of creatures naturally determined to things sensible and another sort necessarily though freely determined to things spiritual so it pleased him to make a middle sort endued with Reason and free-will undetermined as to their choice and able freely to determine their own Volitions without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other That so they might be fit subjects to be governed in this Life by Laws and other moral means § 4. God as Creator maketh substances with their necessary Accidents and as the Natural Orderer of them placeth them in their natural order and as Motor or Actor he causeth Action as such But as Moral Rector he causeth only the Moral Order of Actions as far as belongeth to a Rector the rest being presupposed in Nature and leaveth it to man to cause the rest § 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making such a creature as man of a middle defectible undetermined Will left to his free choice with necessary helps it being part of the beauty of his works to be diversified He is not then to be blamed for any of the sins of such a creature because he supporteth his Being and his Active Nature and is his first cause of Action § 6. God could prevent all future sin if he absolutely willed so to do either by destroying the World or disabling the sinner or by withholding his Moving Influx or by such a change of his nature as should make him indefectible But he that made man in this Middle state will so continue him and not make a change in the frame of Nature to fulfil our wills § 7. No Act as an Act no Vital Act as Vital no Intellection no Volition as such is Virtue or Sin And therefore to cause it as such is not to cause either moral good or evil § 8. As God is Related to us as our Owner Ruler and our chief good efficiently as our Benefactor and finally as our End so to consent to these Relations and to the Duties of our correlations and to Practise them is the summ of all Moral Good even Dispositively and Actually to be Resigned and devoted to God as our Owner to obey and please him as our Ruler and to be Thankful to Him and totally Love Him as our Benefactor and our ultimate End All Moral Goodness lyeth in this § 9. By which it appeareth that Morality consisteth in the due or undue ORDER of our actions and dispositions as they are a Moral Agent 's related to God himself in these three Relations and to his Actions therein viz. his Disposals his Laws and his Attractive final Goodness with his Benefits § 10. In these the Morality consisteth as simpliciter talis in all three inseparably as Gods Relations are inseparable and our correlations But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them is Morality secundum quid § 11. And among them all our Action submission resignation patience to God meerly as our Owner is Moral but in the slenderest initial sense And our Actions as related to him as our Rector are Moral in the fuller formal sense And therefore by most accounted the only formal Morality as being a relation to a Law But yet our Actions as Related to God our Benefactor Lover and End are Moral in the highest most perfective notion § 12. It is not only sub rationâ— obedientia as it is a thing commanded by a Law that Love to God is Morally good but also in that superiour sense formally as it is the Love of God And therefore Love is called the Law of Laws and the fulfilling of the Law not only as commanded by a Law but as being the End of the Law and the state of perfection above it as Christ is to the Law of Moses and also as being a Law eminenter something greater though not formaliter § 13. But as there is an Order in these Relations so is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them So that the Last still includeth the rest foregoing All Love is Obedience and all Obedience is submission to our Owner But all Obedience is not Love nor all Submission or Resignation formal obedience to a Rector Though they must all concurr and not be divided when they are formally distinguished § 14. I have thought it necessary though I be guilty of some repetition to open here the Doctrine of formal Morality Virtue and Vice because we cannot understand how God is vindicated from being the Author of sin till we know what sin is which we cannot do till we know what Virtue is which we cannot do till we know what Morality is And also because the Schoolmens most subtile elaborate enquiries into this point especially de naturâ— peccati are generally too little subtile or accurate as comparing it with this little you may perceive § 15. From all this it is plain 1. That God as the meer Author and Motor of Nature doth not cause us to Obey or Love him And therefore that these must be caused by another superadded operation § 16. Yet when we Obey and Love him the Generical Nature of the Act is from God as the God of Nature viz. as it is Intellection Volition Action But that these Actions are so duly ordered as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded is otherwise caused For though the Generical nature of Action Intellection and Volition as such be seldom found but in some Moral species and that be never found but in singular acts yet can one causality procure the Generical nature and another the Specifical and another the singularity in the same action As the Sun is the Generical Cause and the Virtus Seminalis the specifying and the Individuatio seminis the Individâ—â—aâ—ing of Plants Animals c. § 17. As God is the God of Nature so he hath setled Nature in such a constant course of motion as that we have small reason to expect that he should there make any ordinary mutations And therefore as the Sun aforesaid he doth by his Generical Influx concurr with all Specifying and Individuating Causes according to their several natures or receptivities § 18. They therefore that suppose that God as the Cause of all Action must of natural necessity ad esse by physical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free to its object compared with other possible objects and that in all its modes and circumstances do confound Nature and Morality and leave nothing for God to do in causing Holiness but what he must needs do to cause all action that is caused allowing the difference of the second effects â— yea but what he doth in causing every sin For his Pracept is not with them the Causing predetermination § 19. Jesus Christ and his Gospel with all the fore described frame of moral means and the Spirit to co-operate are the proper second causes by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily
cause Moral Good and hinder Moral Evil and by which as our Lover and End he will draw mans soul to himself in Love § 20. God as Rector though he vary his Laws in some things to several ages and places and promulgate the same Gospel with inequality on several accounts yet according to the respective Laws that they are under dealeth with all men in a certain equality which is called Justice that is His Laws antecedently to mans acts make not difference and as Judge he maketh none but what mans different actions require according to the said Laws and Justice But yet as Owner and as Benefactor he is free not against but above his Laws to make many inequalities which are no injustice they being not acts of formal Government and so he may do with his own as he list And thus though God give all their due according to his Law of Grace yet he giveth to his Elect such proportions of Grace as he gave them no antecedent Right to by his Law or at least to many of them passing by the controversie now whether he do so to them all § 21. God could cure and sanctifie all men if it were his Absolute will but he doth not and will not being no way obliged And he will be no loser nor sufferer by the creatures sin § 22. Gods absolute will is as fully accomplished by mans free acts as if they were all necessitated and Natural And mans actions are as free as if God had made no Absolute Decree of their futurity as in Good he hath done if we may so ascribe futurity to his Decrees § 23. It seemeth that all sin beginneth in the wills omission of what it was able to have done Even when Adams appetite was to the forbidden fruit and some think that this was the first part of the sin it seemeth that it was rather in the Wills not restraining that appetite when it could have done it And then positive sins do follow thereupon § 24. There is more Brutishness in sin and consequently more privative and less positive faultiness of the Reason and Will than many do consider which Paul partly meaneth Rom. 7. For it is certain 1. That a passion e. g. anger or fear may be forced on a man suddenly as â—n a Brute without Reason As if you come behind one and affright him or strike him suddenly no Reason raised that passion and consequently no Rational Will 2. It is certain that this passion without Reason can cause despotically a corporal motion as the fearful will start and run and the angry strike without any reason or rational will but as a Beast doth 3. It is certain that it is the office of the Will to Rule this passion and these motions 4. And that it must have due information from the understanding that so to do is good and best 5. If this information of the understanding did never miss of determining the Will then man would never sin but when the understanding failed of its necessary office before the will which would resolve all sin into the will of God as much as if he directly moved the will to it by necessitating unresistible predetermination For the Intellect as such hath no Liberty but is necessitated by objects further than it is under the Empire of the Will And the Objects and Intellect are made by God 6. Therefore it followeth that there is a certain measure of Intellecâ—â—â—l true apprehension according to which the will can excite and determine it self without â—â—y thing which it hath not and yet can forbear And that this not-willing what and when it should is the beginning of all sin § 25. God is no Efficient or Desicient cause of this first Omission of the will For efficient it hath none And deficient God is not who gave man power to have done it But man is the deficient Cause § 26. Man 's not believing not knowing not loving not obeying not desiring trusting fearing c. being the far greatest part of the sins of his life * * * Which made the worthy Bishop Usher dye with these words as his last But Lord in special forgive my â—â—â— of omission we see by this are not at all of God § 27. Though multitudes of positive Acts of sin do follow such omissions and go before some of them yet they being not sinful as Acts but as Disordered against the Rule and End and upon undue objects and especially comparatively preserring the wrong object before the right it seemeth that in their first instances they are all Omissive and Positive in the second only which maketh the Schoolmen so commonly say that sin is a Privation § 28. Yet the Moral formal Relation of sin is not only Privative but a Positive Disobedience or Disconformity And so as Quid Morale formaliter sin hath as much Relative being as Duty hath viz. 1. As contra Legem significantem 2. Contra Voluntatem Dei significatam 3. Et contra Jâ—â— Divini Dominii Imperii Amoris § 29. If any be unsatisfied in this it is certain that in the Velle hoc prohibitum potius quam hoc imperatâ—m there is no more physical entity than in the Velle imperatum no nor than there is in the Velle indefinitely considered as on any object Or if any deny that it is certain that there is no such addition of Entity it being but ordo modi in any such sinful Act from which as such the formal obliquity or sin resulteth but what man can do and doth without Gods causing the Act as so ordered and terminated So that God is no way the cause of formal sin § 30. †††Bradwardiâ— dealeth more plainly and maketh Gods effectual Volition to be the total immediate cause that man sinneth though it be no sin in God to do so and saith that God willeth it for good uses as the sinner doth or if he do not it is because God maketh him unavoidably do otherwise They that say He causeth all that man causeth and that as the first necesâ—itating or insuperable cause but yet is not the cause of the form of sin contradict themselves seeing that form is but a Relation which resulteth ipso facto from its fundamentam and terminus and nè per divinam potentiam cannot but do so And hath no other cause but what causeth them § 31. And they that say that yet God is not the Author of sin because he is under no Law do but sport with dreadful things And they mean that God is the chief Cause of all mens sins in the world but not of any sin of his own which is none of the question § 32. God doth neither Cause the sin nor the futurity or existence of it as some vainly distinguishing maintain especially Dr. Twisse and Rutherford For as Estius and others truly say to cause the sin is nothing but to cause the existence of it And sin as sin Dr. Twisse often
saith is not willed by the sinner himself § 33. So far as God Causeth not sin he willeth it not and they that say that he Loveth and Willeth the existence of it as a means to his glory abuse Gods Moliness and are confuted before Par. 1. § 34. How God overruleth sinners and the effects of sin and procureth his own ends not by the Means or Causality but Occasion of it I have so largely there opened that I must refer the Reader thither SECT XX. How far God and how far Man himself is the Cause of Hell and other punishments THough somewhat be said of this in the Conclusion of the second Jo. Major in 4. sent d. 50. fol. 289. q. 1. inquit concl 3. Sive actus damnatorum dicantur mali culpâ— vel peccata non patientur aliquam poenam inflictam ratione illorum actuum Quia non sunt in statu merendi demerendi sed addit Signanter de poena inflicta loquor quae à culpa distinguitur ejus est reordinativa per cruciatum De poena enim acta non est possibile dare culpam quin suam poenam habeat annexam eo modo quo idem potest habere se Ipsa scilicet peccandi continuatio est poenae miseriae continuatio Nec mihi probabile videtur quod Demerendi ratio cessat apud inferos Praemium quidem mereri non possunt At quare non Poenam commereri sunt putandi Nonne adhuc sunt subditi etiam ipsi daemones sub quadam Lege ideâ—que peccandi adhuc capaces nonne omne peccatum suâ naturâ meretur poenam Ipsius scilicet Joh. Majoris ibid. Conclus 1. Est Damnati habent multos malos actus in inferno libere An opâ—abilius sit damnà tum esse an non esse vide quae ibidem sequuntur ubi concludit Itaque tenco si daretur viro optio vel non esse vel esse in perpetua flamma quod licitè posset vel alterutrum eligendum est non esse Nam minus malum habet rationem boni See Aureolus in 2. d. 31. a. 2. pag. 301. shewing ten wayes how one sin causeth another and so multiplyeth and continueth it self in the wicked Part I think meet to say more here because I find that the not understanding it doth tempt many to unbelief and others to hard repining disaffected atheistical thoughts of God § 1. Again here consider that God made man such as he is in Nature before either Laws or sins or punishments had any being so that if you can but forgive God for making you men that is Rational Free-Agents you can have no fair pretence of quarrel with him As will appear by these considerations following § 2. Mans Body and sensitive soul are of such a nature as that things inconvenient will be his pain He that will take poison shall be griped and tormented by it and he that will eat unwholsome meat or will surfeit shall be sick and he that will cherish diseases by sloth or excesses or abuses of nature will have the pain of them And he that will wound himself or break his bones will be his own afflicter And he that cuts his throat or hangeth himself must dye And all this without any doing of God besides the making him a man and continuing such a nature under his Government in and with the world § 3. Not only positive hurting but omissions will bring mens bodies unto pain and death As not eating not exercising not keeping warm c. And consequently such a life of prodigality or sloth as tendeth to such wants § 4. The inward senses Imagination and Passions are so constituted as that their inconveniences will be a pain and torment as well as the inconveniences of the outward senses 1. Cares and Melancholy thoughts are distracting 2. Desires breed such care and are themselves like a thirst or hunger to the soul 3. Fears are tormenting 4. Sorrows if deep and long are as a living death 5. Anger is a vexatious feaver of the mind And revengeful malice and envy do prolong it 6. Despair anticipateth eternity of misery c. 7. And Love it self how pleasing soever at first is the strength of them all § 5. The superiour faculties as they are more noble are capable of greater misery and their corruption and disorder is the worst To have an ignorant erring mind that taketh evil for good and good for evil To have a carnal malignant wicked obstinate froward Will and sinful Affections and by these to have mens actions misguided and so the sensitive soul it self brought into the foresaid misery through bad government is a misery to man in the Nature and immediate effects of the thing § 6. Man liveth among multitudes of fellow Creatures in the world which will all be tormentors of him if he will make them such As a post will hurt him if he knock his head to it The fire will burn him if he touch his flesh with it The water will drown him if he will leap into it over-head The Sun will scorch him the frost will pain him if he expose himself to them A Lyon or Mastiff will tear him if he avoid them not His neighbours will hurt him likely if he hurt them and cross their interest Men in power will hurt him if he offend them And all things will be to him as he behaveth himself to them § 7. All this being Natural let us now consider what sin doth to the sinner here and you will find that almost all his calamity consisteth in his very sin it self and the natural effects of it But yet it is sin as mans and it is punishment as from God when yet God is no Cause of the sin § 8. This is plain if you consider that Gods Act by which he maketh sin a Punishment was Before the sin though the Relation of a Punishment come after the relation of sin Here are two Agents 1. God making Nature and a Law therein 2. Man disordering his actions by transgressing 3. Hence Immediately followeth Guilt or the form of sin 4. And with it even in the change or after it the natural pain of loss or hurt 5. And this is Related to man as a punishment for the sin in the last place For instance God made man and God made meat wine and poyson God telleth Man in Nature I have made thee such a Creature as that excess of Meat will make thee sick excess of Wine will make thee mad and Poyson will torment and kill thee I have given thee self-love and command thee that thou avoid all these and I will not deny thee necessary help But if thou wilt not it will be thy pain which I will that thou suffer for and by thy sin I need not further apply it here the application is obvious § 9. All this I speak only of natural punishments which by the Law of nature follow sin what is supernatural is after to be considered §
are wrought by common grace and that it is special acts and habits overcoming the flesh and world which are wrought by special grace So that those firemen that are resolved that yet differ they will and implacably differ and their adversaries shall be enemies of Gods Grace whether they will or not are yet defective in that acuteness and pregnancy of wit which is necessary to pretend a real disagreement and are forced to say that they disagree when they have not wit enough to seem to prove it to any but those that take their cholerick zeal and reproach for proof For in this there is no difference among us 6. Obj. At least we can prove that we differ in this about the effects that one side make Gods gracious habits given to believers to be such as may be lost and dye and the other do not Answ That is no difference You still want wit to make differences though you want not will For both sides are agreed that perseverance ariseth not from the meer nature of the Habit of grace but from Gods superadded sustentation For Adam and the faln Angels had as is commonly held such kind of habitual grace as we though objectively differing 7. Seeing there is no difference on Gods part as they all conclude Resistible grace and irresistible sufficient and effectual can have no difference but in the very effect or event and the connotation of mans Power or impotency to the contrary I know as I have said that not only the Dominicans and Calvinists but Suarez and other Jesuits say that Effectual Grace is such ex parte principii as is forcibler for faith as the effect But they contradict themselves who confidently say that besides that effect it is nothing but Gods essence which hath no degrees or real differences And mans power of Resistance and frustration is none as to Gods will and essence but only as to the effect When he could have done otherwise 8. The same Vanity they declare in the question Whether the same degree of Divine Grace help or operation would Convert one man as doth another or would Convert as doth not Convert When they are agreed that the effect is not the same and that the cause hath no degrees of difference 9. And though it 's past mans understanding to comprehend how all the various effects in the world should be produced without the least diversity in the Cause Will or Action ex parte agentis and that Velle salvare Petrum velle damnare Judam should be perfectly the same Volition ex parte Volentis yet it is the liker to be true because man cannot comprehend it as long as he hath no evidence to prove that it is not true For God is incomprehensible 10. Seeing then that we must concent 1. That God Decreed to do all that he doth and properly and absolutely no more 2. And that Christs death is the cause of all that it effecteth and properly of no more Of which the conditional gift of pardon and life is part And so that all the Controversie 1. Of Decree 2. Of Redemption is resolved into that of the effects 3. And seeing all the effects are such whose difference we little differ about if at all and ex parte Dei agentis they agree that there is no difference where then is the Difference among all the contenders §. II. Alvarez his Epitome in Twenty Propositions considered BUt that all this may more plainly appear I will recite the Twenty Conclusions which Alvarez in his Epilogus giveth us as the summ of all his Book one hundred twenty one Disputations And I shall tell you how far they are all to be consented to * Thus Bradwardine concludeth his Book with thirty six errors and as many verities which he would have the Church especially that of Rome determine But leaving out the most unsavoury parts or expressions of his own judgement Whether God be the chief necessitating Cause of all sin is none of them I. Free-will in lapsed nature cannot without the help of grace do a moral work which by co-operation of the supernatural End shall be truly good and a work of Virtue so as that by the doer it be referred to God beloved simply above all as to the ultimate natural End Answ It is granted and more that though all natural men have one sort of Grace given them yet I think this cannot be done without special saving grace II. Man by the sole strength of nature cannot assent to all supernatural mysteries propounded and explained to him as revealed of God or because revealed of God so as the formal reason of his belief is Divine revelation Answ It 's true He must have commoner grace to believe them dogmatically and uneffectually and special saving grace to believe them practically and savingly III. Not only faith it self but also the first beginning of faith proceedeth from the help of grace and not from the strength of Nature only Answ Very true IV. The free-will of man in lapsed Nature cannot without the help of Grace Love God above all simply even as he is the author of Nature Answ It 's true V. Man in lapsed Nature without the help of Grace cannot fulfill all the precepts even of the Law of Nature nor overcome any great difficulty and temptation even for any little time which it is necessary to overcome for the keeping of that Law Answ True Therefore they have some Grace that do it VI. There is no Law nor ever was made by God of his giving the actual helps of preventing grace to them that do all that is in them by the sole faculty of nature nor hath Christ merited or would have any such Law Answ True For he giveth some common grace to all men antecedently without any condition on their part And though he give to those that use their common grace to the utmost or near it sufficient encouragement to go on and hope that such endeavour shall not be in vain as to the obtaining of peculiar grace yet de nomine vel definitione Whether this encouragement shall be called a Law or a Promise or neither we contend not VII God by his helping grace floweth into free-will by premoving it that it may co-operate and also truly-efficiently together with the same free-will causeth its pious operation Answ It 's true But all adjuvant grace produceth not the second effect which floweth from both Causes of which before and after VIII When God by his exciting Grace striketh and toucheth the hearts of men he doth not expect that the will by its innate liberty begin its motion by Consenting But God by adjuvant grace effecteth that it freely and infallibly Consent Answ It 's true of all that do consent But God hath a degree of exciting and adjuvant grace which are Necessary and give the posse Velle which cause not the act through mans defect And though God expect not that effect as one that is deceived
therefore Gods moving a man to the Act of sin is not a permitting him to sin Motion being one thing and the not hindering of motion another thing or nothing §. V. III. Of the Scotists and Nominals way III. ANd as to the third way ascribed by Alvarez to the Scotists and Nominals I think that de nomine it is not a proper expression to call God causa partialis But if we agree of the sense we may bear Vasqu ubi sup taketh Alex. Al. 1. p. q. 26. n. 7. a. 2. ad 1. Ronavent 1. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. to be for him because they say Actus nostros esse liberos quia Divina voluntas non est Tota Causa sed cum libero arbitrio quod cum sit proxima causa modificatur concursum primâ— But if this be his opinion he joyneth with these Scotists and Nominals de causa non-totali So Pet. à S. Joseph Thos Univ. de Deo saith that God is Causa totius effectus sed non tota Causa sed partialis with improper expressions about God of whom we can say nothing without some impropriety Doubtless God and man are not to be accounted co-ordinate concauses of the act but whatever man doth he doth it in subordination to God But God operateth 1. As the prime cause of Nature in a stablished way by natural causes And so he giveth man his Natural vital power and the Liberty of using it and by this Power and Liberty a man can do more than he alwayes doth So that Gods natural causality and concurse doth not bring all the Power which he giveth men into proportionable adequate Action but men freely exercise the same power sometime more and sometime less 2. And in the like manner God causeth gracious or holy acts Rectifying our Powers and fortifying them by holy habits and preserving and actuating them by the Holy Ghost Yet the Spirit is to Grace as God the prime cause is to Nature He giveth us more Gracious Power than we use and than his own concurse alwayes reduceth into adequate act So that Gods operations in Nature and Grace are not ad ultimum posse Dei nor ad ultimum posse hominis but limited by his most wise and holy will And man as a free agent is not only Able but obliged to use his power further than by all Gods concurse or premotion it is used And in this sense I conceive it is that Scotus and others call God and man Causae partiales in that there is a certain proportion of premotion and help which God as the first Cause of Nature and Grace doth afford to man And there is moreover a certain use of Gods help and Grace beyond what God predetermineth man to as comparative to this object rather than that c. which man can do and is bound to do Not independently or in co-ordination with God but by the Power and Liberty which God only giveth and upholdeth and affordeth him sufficient help to actuate Now if man do this Part which is left to his liberty the effect alwayes followeth If he do not it may not follow though God gave him that necessary help or grace or premotion which is commonly called sufficient And when Scotus likeneth God and man to two drawing a Boat where the strength of both must concurr I believe he meant no more than I have said 1. All the Power is of God as the total first cause 2. All the Grace that rectifieth and disposeth our faculties is of God as the total first cause 3. All the Act as an Act in genere is of God as the total though not the sole cause 4. All the Holiness or Moral Goodness of the Act is of God as the total first cause though not the only cause 5. But all the sinfulness or moral evil of Acts and Habits is from Man 6. And that implyeth that mans free will is not so much freed from sin mutability and infirmity but that it can neglect to use well the power and helps of grace afforded But of total and partial Causality I have spoken more fully in the first Book And of their opinion that Gods Influx puts nothing into the will but only is ad actum seu effectum if it be true it easily endeth the controversie of the difference of sufficient and effectual grace as to that Act But it is to me unintelligible and the thing quite above all our understandings and very unfit for bold disputes or mutual censures §. VI. The true face or Scheme of the Dominican predeterminant way as to the sense and consequents I Do readily confess that as the summ of all the Controversie is Whether man have truly any Free-will that is not moved as necessarily as any natural motions are caused so the arguments of Hobbes and the Dominicans and Dr. Twisse are not easily answered And had we not better proof of all that Morality and Religion which is inconsistent with this opinion I should my self be inclined also to think that we must be contented with the naked name of Liberty there being nothing indeed but Volition necessitated and that man is an Engine moved by God and other causes no less necessarily and physically than a Clock or Watch but only by more invisible causes and to us unknown and therefore our Volitions are called Contingent and free when truly there is nothing contingent in the World We that converse in the body with things corporeal are so much strangers to our selves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits that we are very prone to such gross corporeal imaginations and to think that all action is like the motus projectorum violent and necessitated and that it belongeth to the perfection of the first mover that it should be so yea that he himself should be in all things the most necessary agent and consequently all things necessitated by him But as Alvarez confesseth Free-will is proved by Aquinas and many others by natural proofs and no Predeterminant or Hobbist can give the tenth part so full and certain proof of the necessitation of all Volitions as we can give of all the contrary principles in Morality which are overthrown thereby And therefore whatever some think of the fatum Stoieorum the Light of Nature taught almost all the Philosophers in the World the Freedom of mans will and the morality there founded of which Grotiâ—s hath collected so full a Volume of testimonies in his Book entituled De fato that it shall save me the labour of transcribing any Yet though I think Christianity inconsistent with their opinion I doubt not but many of the Predeterminants are good Christians and excellently learned and acute Divines as not apprehending the inconsistency of their own thoughts And I confess that there is a Religion consistent with their fundamental error which I shall therefore put into the Scheme lest any think that none but Hobbes hath made the right deductions from it And remember that I
think a good thought by any help that God can give him unless he physically predetermine him to it then the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously to be resolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it as the reason why he doth it into his predetermination and as it is night because the Sun shineth not XVII But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin because he is under no prohibiting Law Though it be true 1. That his nature or perfection the root of all Laws is more than a Law 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of man but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it which is none of the question XVIII And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning is not at all caused by God e. g. that we hate him not nor his truth and wayes and servants that we murder not commit not adultery steal not lye not covet not blaspheme not wrong none do no evil c. we need no help of God for this Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them it is impossible for us to do them at all XIX And though we say that God willeth sin to be by his permission only and not by his efficience yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause is the principal efficiency And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum and therefore permitteth not And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin and not because he meerly permitteth it For permission is not de impossibilibus XX. God willeth not sin because he willeth it not as sin in its formale which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not XXI And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future but as he willeth or decreeth them we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale was such as it is quid futurum if it was but futura privatio And therefore this would inferr that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also XXII Gods Will is his Love and what he Willeth he Loveth XXIII God willeth the futurity and existence of sin not only of the materiale but the formale even of all the sin that ever is done XXIV The existence of sin is Good and Amiable not only by accident but per se as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God XXV It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth and Loveth and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid the circumstantiated act and so the resultancy of the relative form And he willeth and Loveth the existence of all and the thing existing so far as he causeth it XXVI God Willeth Loveth and Causeth sin incomparably more than wicked men do For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable dependent will but God with a Divine primary immutable will Man causeth the forbidden act whence the relation resulteth with a Will that is irresistibly moved so to do by God as the pen writeth only sâ—o modo with Volition But God causeth it as the first omnipotent unresistible cause of all that the Creature doth in sinning XXVII The same must be said of God and the Devil who can no more commit one sinful act till God unavoidably predetermine his will to it by his premotion than sinful man can XXVIII God by his Law doth strictly forbid all those sinful acts which he principally and unavoidably causeth And he strictly commandeth all those good acts whose contraries he thus causeth us to do XXIX Though there is nothing in sin which can have a cause of which God is not the Principal cause and though he Willeth and Loveth all that he causeth yet the Scripture saith that God hateth sin and cannot behold it and hateth all the workers of iniquity and that it is abomination to him that he is as one laden with it and wearied provoked and offended by it And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holiness when he will not cause them but doth cause and will the contrary XXX Pardon and salvation is promised and earnestly offered by God to the Reprobate themselves on condition that they will believe and repent when God doth unavoidably as the first cause determine their wills to the contrary acts even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God and holiness XXXI The Law of God is that all the Reprobates shall be damned to hell fire if they will not believe and repent when his omnipotence doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impenitence and if they will not give over those acts of sin to which God doth thus unavoidably move and determine them XXXII Gods executions are answerable to these Laws and all save Christians and all professed Christians saving the sanctified are to be punished in hell fire for ever only for not doing the acts of Faith Love and obedience when God as the first cause predetermined them to the contrary and for doing the acts of sin when God unavoidably moved them to it and made them do it so that consequently all that are damned suffer in hell for not being Gods even the first sufficient causes of their own acts and for not being above God or stronger than he that is for not overcoming or avoiding his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts XXXIII The same must be said of the Devils who sin and suffer on the same terms XXXIV Q. What kind of torment then will there be in Hell Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to that is for not overcoming God when they know the case Or must we not more congruously say that the state of Hell torments lyeth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them and a justifying of themselves Or will every mouth be thus stopt in judgement XXXV Q. Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice and the exemplar of all humane Justice allowing for disparities And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course And how then would they be esteemed XXXVI Q Is not that best which is most agreeable to Gods Will and Love And therefore sin better than
Holiness in all that have sin and not holiness and in the Godly so far as they sin because that it shall be so is more yea only willed by God and caused by his predetermination XXXVII Q. Whether this doctrine tend not to utter Infidelity as to the Christian faith by making it seem to men incredible Is it credible that God sent his Son so wonderfully to expiate those sins which he so loved and caused as aforesaid and to save his people from their sins which God thus unavoiâ—ably moved them to commit and to destroy the works of God under the name of destroying the works of the Devil Must Christ suffer bleed die and bear Gods wrath for that which God unavoidably made man do by his principal determination And is it easie for him that believeth one of these to believe the other XXXVIII Q. How will men preach and hear the Gospel if they do it in congruity with this doctrine Will they say God sent us to beseech and charge you not to do that sinful act which you cannot do unless he make you do it by predetermination and which you cannot avoid if he so make you do it He beseecheth and importuneth you to do all those commanded acts which you can no more do than make a world unless he predetermine you to do them nor can forbear them if he do XXXIX Q. How will men Repent confess resist temptations pray and use the means of Grace if they believe that all sinful acts in the world are thus unavoidably Caused and Willed and Loved of God as good for his Glory XL. Q. Whether they that teach as Dr. Twisse often that sin is not malum Dei sed nostri do not take it to be no injury to God nor displeasing to his will Or is not injury and displeasing evil in respect to God as the terminus though it be no hâ—rt to him nor his evil as the subject or agent And doth not the opinion that it 's Evil only to us and Good to God as conducible to his glory teach men to hate it only out of self-love and not out of love to the glory of God yea to Love it as conducible to Gods Glory more than to hate it as evil to our selves seeing Gods Glory must be preferred above our selves XLI Q. Is not sin thus made a coequal with Christ who is but a means to the glorifying of God to which faith Dr. Twisse sin is summè conductbile XLII Q. Doth not this doctrine make the sanctification of the Holy Ghost to be unnecessary when all that is to be done to save us from sin is for God not to make us sin by his premotion Or doth it not make sanctification to be nothing but this predetermination of God which is made as necessary to sin as to duty and so natural and gracious operations made the same and God to do as much to produce evil efficiently as good XLIII Q. Is it not much worse to man if God by predetermination make him first a sinner and wicked by sinful Habits and then damn him for it than if he should damn an innocent man for nothing For sin and pain is far worse than pain without sin And to compel the will unwillingly to sin were it possible is less than to make it willing XLIV Doth not he that affirmeth that the Devil doth but sin as efficiently predetermined by God and doth not force nor determine any mans will to any sinful act but that God predetermineth all men and Devils to every sinful act committed I say doth he not describe God as worse than Satan horresco quaerens if sin be the denominating evil and the causing of sin be more than tempting to it Had I not rather my will were resistibly tempted to sin than unresistibly made to sin by predetermining efficient premotion XLV Is not the objective Reason in Devils of mans implanted Enmity against them Gen. 3. 15. because they are Enemies to God and us as being themselves Lovers of sin and Tempters of us to sin and misery XLVI Doth not he take the directest course to root out the Love of God and all Religion from the World and to tempt men to hate God and so to begin a Hell on Earth who describeth God in Satans likeness and much worse as much as being the principal cause of all sin in men and Devils is worse than sinning when predetermined and tempting others to it XLVII I think that the Dominican Predetermination directly and necessarily overthroweth all certainty of Divine Revelation by man or Angel and consequently all certainty of the Christian faith even by overthrowing the very formal object the Divine Veracity For if God efficiently premove and predetermine all wills and tongues and pens to all the lies that ever are made in the world then 1. To do so is not inconsistent with his perfections or his will 2. And then we can never know when he doth not so unless by the event This is grounded on these suppositions 1. That Gods revelations to us are not Immediate only by himself but by some Creature Angel or Man or a created voice or sign 2. That the Ratio certitudinis of such Revelations by a Creature is because it is God that is the chief author of them 3. That it is not conceiveable how God can by any way of Revelation be more the author of it than by physical efficient immediate adequate predetermining both will and tongue to the act with all its circumstances Call it by what name you please Inspiration Vision Illumination Impulse c. it can speak nothing more of Gods Agent efficient Interest than this predetermination doth 4. If it did do more yet it would overthrow all certainty of our faith Because if God can efficiently cause and that as the total principal cause by predetermination all the lies that ever were told in the world we can never be sure that the other mode of his operation so far differeth from this as that he cannot be the chief cause of a lie in this way as well as of all lies by predetermination I have driven many to say their utmost and could never yet hear any such difference assigned as could prove any Inspiration whatsoever to have more of Divine Causality in it than physical predetermination doth signifie and import nor how this principle leaveth us any certainty that the tongues of all the Prophets and Apostles were not predetermined to speak falsly ab antecedente and so their pens XLVIII To say that God is not able to make a Creature with power to determine any one Volition of its own even as modified comparate or circumstantiate without his efficient physical predetermination aforesaid sayeth more against Gods Omnipotency though on pretence of a contradiction than I dare say or think XLIX Yet after all this I grant that if all proper free will and contingency be denyed and every act in the world as comparate and circumstantiate made
And who it is that erreth indeed the Light must discover and the studious impartial prepared Children of the Light must discern and the Father of Lights must finally judge Note that in the first part I speak as in the name of the Predeterminants till I come to the Questions and thence-forward I speak as in my own name which the Reader may easily perceive §. VII Of Jansenius his way of reconciling Grace and Free-will § 1. BUt after all these cometh Jansenius and justly blaming Philosophy as the great occasion of our heresies and errours which misled the Schoolmen Jesuites and others he goeth to Augustine alone as Lombard thought he had well done before him and disgraceth his cause by saying that Augustine first taught it to the Church as if Grace had been unknown by the former ages And because many will not be at the labour to know his mind by reading so big a volume I shall briefly select what concerneth the matter in hand and animadvert upon it 1. His first Tome describeth the Heresie of Pelagius wherein he proveth that Pelagius held all this that followeth concerning grace 1. The Remission of sins containing 1. Conversion to God 2. The abstersion of the blot and filth 3. Reconciliation or remission of Gods offence 4. And of the eternal punishment Jansenius Aug. To. 1. l. 5. c. 22. p. 126 127. 2. That Pelagius owned the Infusion of habitual grace And that God in Baptism did blot out all sins purge cleanse and expiate them save and renew the soul restore nature deliver from the body of this death and from the contracted custome of sinning He held that Grace doth Regenerate Illuminate cause Faith Justifie even Infants Sanctifie make us new Creatures incorporate us into Christ as his members give us the anointing of the Holy Ghost not only restoring us to the state that we were in in Adam but to a better and to be adopted sons of God and saved cap. 24. And 25. as to the Relative effects that Grace Reconcileth man to God maketh him an adopted Son of God and the Temple of the Holy Ghost an Heir of God and co-heir with Christ So that they acknowledge not only Habitual Infused Grace but more even in Baptism As also the Assisting motions of the spirit to good acts making them possible Also that after Pope Zozymus had condemned the Pelagians they went further and that their design was but to lay mens salvation or damnation on free-will lib. 6. c. 7. c. And when he cometh to characterize Pelagius he doth it as he doth elsewhere the Protestants and as Malignants do Religious persons by presumptions viz. that he was indeed as Augustine saith Temperate and of a good life but singular and very proud which he proveth by his opinion and because he was against Swearing and said that Gods servants mouths should vent no bitter thing but only that which is sweet and that Christians must be so patient as readily to let go what is taken from them and that gallantry and gay cloathing is contrary to God and that enemies must be loved as friends and yet not believed and that Riches must be forsaken c. as holding nothing mean and moderate that he affected novelty and yet his â—rrours were old coming from Origen â—uffinus Palladius Evagrius Jovinâ—an and the Philosophers that he affected fame admiration hypocrisie pretending to more holiness than others under the garb of poverty c. over-â—alued Reason Logick Syllogismes Philosophers c. All which I mention not to abate any mans dislike of any one errour of Pelagius but to shew that it is so usual for dissenters to make one another seem odious and to feign or aggravate faults and to vilifie or deny Gods grace in others that he that would not be tempted into malice uncharitableness and slander must take heed what he believeth even of men accounted most abominable hereticks Doubtless Pelagius his denying original sin and his laying too much on mans will and too little on grace are things to be detested II. Jansenius asserteth that the Angels and Adam had such Free-will as could obey or disobey and so could determine it self to good and persevere therein without any more grace than they had when they did it not And that by this Free-will some Angels stood and some fell and Adam fell when he might by it have stood and thereby fell from a nobler sort of Free-will which consisteth in a due subservience to God and fell to the Love of Himself not primarily of external things instead of God and to selfdependency and dominion De Grat. primi hom c. 6. p. 40 41 42. c. 7. Nos hic asserimus tanquam sine dubitatione verissimum juxta doctrinam sancti Augustini ecclesiae omnia hujusmodi opera adeoque ipsam fidem dilectionem Dei ab eo potuisse per arbitrii libertatem fieri sic ut ea non donaret ei gratia Dei vid. c. 7 8 c. The reason of this was sanitas Voluntatis Adami c. 9. III. Yet Grace was necessary to man and Angels both to perseverance and to every good act c. 10 11. And c. 12 13 c. this Grace necessary to all was not Habitual Grace for that they had nor general concurse which none denyed but it was Actual Adjuvant Roborating help But the Grace given to Angels and Adam was Adjutorium sine quo non giving the will power to determine it self but not Adjutorium quo which ever determineth it One giveth the Power and the other the Act. The same that is meant by the common distinction of Grace sufficient and effectual by the Dominicans Yet this Adjutorium sine quo non did with free will procure the Act in the standing Angels and Adam while he stood But that made it not Adjutorium quo because it is not so called efficax only ab eventu but because it so helpeth that illo praesente continuo fiat id propter quod datur illo absente nunquam fiat p. 63. c. 14 15. One is like Light and the visive faculty ad videndum the other ut ipsa visio such as all formal causes are and Gods simultaneous efficiency The difference is c. 15. that Adjutorium sine quo non doth but perfect the power and the chief honour belongeth to the will that useth it and could choose But contrarily the adjutorium quo is the principal cause of the Act and leaveth not the event to the will but useth it effectually to the act intended Therefore merit and perseverance in Innocency were no special gifts of God IV. That without or before faith no good work is done but lies and sins l. 3 4. c. 1. p. 223. no nor without true Godliness p. 261. passim To think that Infidels and ungodly have any true virtue is dotage c. 17. V. The first sin had no necessity being meer sin and no punishment and so easily avoidable and wholly voluntary Other sins
work but a grace of some other Providence 4. Consequently that there are men yea most who are no subjects of Christ nor under any Law of grace by Christ and yet not under the meer Law of Innocency and therefore are under some other Law who knows what or lawless 5. His damning all that perish meerly for Original Sin and its necessitated consequents which no man had ever the least power to avoid 6. His asserting that Angels and Adam had sufficient Grace and Free-will by which the Angels did and Adam could have persevered in Innocency and never sinned And yet that since the fall no ungodly man hath such help and free-will to any one better act than he doth nor the holiest person to any better than he doth but the best Saint is less able to do one better act than Adam was to keep all the Law 7. And so his consequent that it is properly impossible for any man in the World good or bad to do any better than he doth 8. That all they love God sincerely amore amicitia who love God and Justice propter se as amiable in himself though they love their filthiest sins so much better and all their fleshly worldly interest as that they have but an uneffectual wish that they could leave them 9. That we must not say that Christ giveth men either a Power to do better than they do nor yet that Grace of Fear which they have as being below him And yet must say that he giveth multitudes this uneffectually sincere love which never saveth them 10. That a Habit of true faith may be many years in a man before i◠justifie him when as the word true must mean some other faith or else that same will never justifie him which did not justifie him so long 11. His Antinomian or Phanatick distinguishing Law and Grace as if Christ had no Precepts or Laws but Operations or else his Gospel and Covenant in signis were no part of his Grace 12. And thence his fiction that all that which is done by any Grace ad posse and in obedience to Christs written Law is a Legal Righteousness of our own and no part of Christs Righteousness These with what else I have before disclaimed I dislike in Jansenius his way And yet think that a man that can well distinguish words from things and will not be deceived by ambiguous terms may shew that even he and his adversaries are not so far disagreed as they seem E. g. Whether Christ dyed for all They are agreed that he dyed to procure for all so much Grace or Mercy as he giveth them and that among these a conditional Pardon and Gift of Christ and Life is one c. And they agree that he dyed not with any absolute intent of giving them any more than he doth give them What remaineth then but the Controversie de nomine Whether this much be fitly called his Dying for all which Scripture putteth out of doubt The like I might say of many of the rest of the differences §. VIII I Conclude with this summary determination of all these Controversies to satisfie sober minds 1. GOD our CREATOUR is the Causa prima the spring and Master and end of NATURE and accordingly having antecedently made the creature in such variety as pleased him 1. He Actively affordeth them all that general Influx by which the Being given them is supported and they are sufficiently furnished for their several motions operations or receptions 2. And his Infinite Goodness and blessed Will is their common End in which they are all finally terminated but variously thereby felicitated according to the variety of their capacities 3. And as the Governour of the Universe he sapientially ordereth all things and conducteth them from their Beginning to their End but variously as they are various II. So GOD our REDEEMER having in Christ made all necessary preparations and Redeemed mankind as to what belonged to a Saviour to do in Person upon earth and having antecedently made an Universal Law of Grace 1. Doth Reveal his Mercy to lost sinners commonly but in various degrees as he pleaseth And doth concurr with his Gospel by vouchsafing a Common Gracious Help which hath an aptitude and tendency to the recovery of lost sinners 2. And as the final Infinite Good he felicitateth all that are by Grace conducted to him as their end and on the rest will have his absolute will fulfilled and will not be frustrate of his End though sinners may be frustrate of theirs and be unhappy 3. And as Rector he sapientially conducteth man in the way to this felicitating End antecedently by the Gospel which is the same in it self to all that have it and consequently as Judge by his Rewards In which supposing his foresaid commoner preventing Grace he consequently giveth men such further degrees of co-operating grace or help and spiritual mercy as in the use of former grace they are fit to receive and justly and penally denyeth that to others which they have made themselves immediately unapt for or uncapable of in the way of this ordinary common operation But withall as a free Owner and Benefactor who may do with his own as he list as he diversifieth the works of Nature though Nature keep a constant course except in Miracles so he freely diversifieth the gifts of his Grace external and Internal though as Rector and the common Benefactor of lost sinners he alter not the terms and means of Grace which he at first determined of And the equality and constancy of his Rectoral and Judicial distributions is no way inconsistent with the diversity which as a free Owner and Benefactor he maketh either in his Decrees or Gifts So that he is the Cause of All Good though not every way equally to All to make All Good and happy And he hath made man capable of Improving his Gifts to return him his own with Usury which he will require But he is the Author of no evil of sin nor punisheth any but for sin and as a means to that Good which is better than the Impunity of the sinner But he ruleth and causeth the Effects of sin when he causeth not the sin it self The Order of his Productions may be much perceived by man and are fit for our observation Of his own Knowledge and Volitions of them we know no more but that It is not formally the same thing as Knowledge and Will in Man that It is most perfect and incomprehensible that It is his Essential Intellect and Will variously named as variously connoting the effects and objects that To dispute of any other internal order priority or posteriority in God's Knowledge or Will as if he had particular Thoughts Ideas and Volitions as man hath or any thing in Him were Caused by the object and to vex the Church with contentions hereabout is a presumptuous arrogance and prophaneness which God will punish and good and sober men should tremble at and hate and not
he will not cause cannot be And this is the beautiful variety and harmony in the Universe In God himself is nothing but perfection but the Greature being the shadowy Image of God defectibility and imperfection is essential to it so that he reduceth Morality to the frame and necessity of physical motion and maketh Moral Good and evil to be indeed as much natural good and evil and of the same kind except as in another subject as Summer and Winter heat and cold day and night health and sickness life and death animate and inanimate the unavoâ—dable diversifications of the will and work of God And that every permission of his will is accompanied with a positive volition of the thing permitted And yet that Will is not properly in God but so called after the manner of man That sin is considered as related to the Principle of action which is God and so it is good or as in the terminus Man and so it is horrid devilish odious evil as blindness death darkness caused all by Gods desertion or not operating otherwise than he doth § 7. To the quieting of the mind that cannot digest this but thinketh God is thus dishonoured being made more than Satan the cause of sin and misery for sin which the Scripture contradicteth and that man is excusable at the barr of Justice that could no more in innocency forbear to sin than to make a world To them that think it hard that no one in all the world could ever possibly do more or less Good or Evil than they do but that is all done by physical motion as in an Engine c. he hath a great deal to say and more than ever I elsewhere met with and with great modesty proposed § 8. As to the Law whose transgression is sin he supposeth that Whatsoever imposeth on us any thing to be done by us as an antecedent condition to any consequent good is the Law opposed to the Gospel Pag. 173. Yea that the proposal or pressing of any Truth or Goodness on us in a literal or moral way only or the word as written in Letters is the Law and the spirit operating the thing it self on the soul is the Gospel the first is the old Covenant and the second the New That the proper and next ends of the Law or letter are sin condemnation death and the Divine wrath To let in sin and heighten it that it might abound and to bring on us spiritual death These flow not from the Law of it self but by accident from the weakness of the flesh and creaâ—ure But both Law and sin are brought in ultimately for good viz. God having a design which he intended to enrich with the fullest the highest glories of his Godhead brings forth in the course of this design a dark scene of all evils sin death wrath The evil in this scene is carryed on to its utmost extent and height Thus the variety becomes more full in the whole design and the chief design is heightned in its greatest Glory God in his Infinite wisdom so bringeth in this scene of sin and evil that himself is perfectly pure and good in the contrivance and conduct of it He setteth up a Law good holy and spiritual but such that sin inevitably may take occasion from it through the frailty of the flesh and of the creature to spring up as an overflowing flood to display it self over all things in its fullest foulest birth This Law is to convince us of the frailty and mutability in mans primitive state c. viz. that he is a creature For Pag. 175 176. man is composed of the light of God and his own proper darkness These two the Schools call the Act and Potentiality the form and the matter being and not being which constitute every Creature The darkness or nothingness which is the Creatures own is the proper ground of sin The Law comes and distinguisheth the Light from the Darkness Pag. 177. so that to see sin is to see that we are Creatures God withholds his Pag. 178. Divine presence appearances and influences from man and so the darkness discovereth it self in man and predominateth and captivateth him entirely and becomes his choice and Lord. so that sin is but an Imperfect Creature and the Law to cause and shew it § 9. Pag. 113 114 c. He saith The Immediate cause of the first change made in the understanding at the fall was the Divine Glory withdrawing or withholding it self Darkness is the privation of Light Privations have no proper Causes but accidental only Thus the Divine Glory retiring from the understanding or ceasing to shine in it is by accident the cause of the darkness there as the Setting or departing of the Sun is the cause of Night which is not a blemish to the Sun but its glory that in its presence are all the beauties and joyes of light in its absence all the disagreeableness and melancholies of night and darkness Pag. 115. All evil is from the absence of God c. P. 117. The fault in man is the deficiency which ariseth from the defectibility or nothingness of the Creature in its shadowy state in the purity of its first Creation Pag. 122. The fall springs from the Harmony of the eternal design in the Divine mind being comprehended in it as a part of it § 10. And yet he makes man Guilty and unexcuseâ—ble and God just iâ— this because Guilt is but our being really bad And he that cannot deny himself to be bad is unexcuseable And the opening of this causeth shame And Justice is to Judge and use all creatures as they are § 11. To be short he maintaineth that man can have no freedom from necessitating predetermination If he should it would cross the nature of God of the creature of the soul and the unity and harmony of all things But that God causeth all sin negatively as necessarily as he causeth darkness or any natural privation But then he doth with a torrent of Rhetorick so Praise Gods design in it and the beauty and harmony of all things made up of good and evil unities varieties diversities and contrarieties and sheweth so largely the glory that cometh to God by sin and the good to the Universe and that it 's but our narrowness and weakness of sight that maketh us take it to be any other than a part of the glory of the universe though bad in and to the person that sinneth that I confess I never found my self more tempted to Love sin or to cease my hatred of it than by his florid Oratory § 12. And withall as he resolveth all the rest of Morality into Physical conceptions so he seemeth to judge suitably of Hell and of Redemption supposing that all this darkness that God brings on sinners is but to prepare for their resurrection to a life of unity and glory and that it shall go well with them in the end § 13. And as
first giveth all creatures what they have and next faileth them and leaveth them in darkness as the Sun setteth and then Rising again revolveth all things into his original pure spirituality like the revolution of day and night Summer and Winter it is sure another thing than the Scripture describeth it which maketh it a noble part of that Sapiential frame of Moral Government which some despise § 37. IX But let it be noted that we hold that as the Almighty Father is the glorious Creator Motor and Life of Nature and the Eternal Wisdom Word and Son the Glorious Ordinator Rector and Redeemer so the Eternal Love and the Holy Ghost is the final Perfecter of believers even of Gods Elect and that this Sanctification and proficiency is by more than Moral Sapiential Regiment even by the Real shedding abroad Gods Love upon the soul or by a Quickning Illuminating felicitating Communication of Divine Life and Light and Love which yet maketh not the Sapiential Regiment vain § 38. And as to Free-will I further say that we are far from holding that it is a state of man in which he is Above God or Independent and as a God to himself or that God is any way a defective or idle as they call it Spectator of mans sins or free acts But that this rank and state of free agents is Gods own wisely-chosen work in which he is delighted And that he doth truly attain his ends in all § 39. Therefore as Mr. Sterry magnifieth the harmony which aâ—â—seth from Moral Good and Evil as designed and necessitated by God so we first admire the harmony which ariseth from Natural and free agents and their works which must not be dishonoured and left out § 40. And more than so we doubt not but all Gods works are perfect it being their perfection to be suited to his own will And the difference between us and Mr. Sterry Dr. Twisse c. is not Whether God be Glorious in all his works or they be perfect For we say that though mans sin be found upon Gods works and that sin be none of his works nor any means properly so called of Pleasing or Glorifying him nor at all willed or caused by him but hated and punished yet he loseth none of his complacency or glory by it but notwithstanding its malignity shineth gloriously in the perfection of all his works § 41. Yea more we say that men sin under his Disposing power and that he will make use of their evil unto Good and sin shall become an occasion of that Glory to God as sickness to the Physicion of which it is no Cause or proper Means nor of it self condâ—ceth thereunto Yea and that no Act as an Act how sinful soever is done but by Gods causation as he is the fountain of nature and prime Motor Yea more that all the Effects and Consequents of sin that are not sin it self are under the Causal Government and disposal of God who will attain his Ends in all § 42. Therefore we differ but in this Whether God get not all that glory which Mr. St. floridly describeth notwithstanding sin or on supposition of it as barely permitted negatively but with a Decree or Volition of all the good consequents occasioned by it rather than by sin it self as a willed designed effect of his own necessitating Negations and in the positive part of the acts as circumstantiated of his determining premotion Whether mans permitted sin be any of Gods works And whether Gods glory be not rather non obstante peccato and also by occasion of it supposed to be mans work only and by all the good consequents caused by God than by the sin it self as a Means conducible or a Cause § 43. For we deny not that God could have prevented all sin if he had so resolved and yet we believe not that such a permission is equivalent to a necessitating Motion or Privation as Mr. Sterry would perswade us To make a creature no better than such as can do good if he will and can be willing with a decree to make many willing is much different from making the creature bad and then condemning him to Hell for being so as an act of Justice Yet we doubt not but the Divine Light will shortly give us all a fuller discovery of that which shall vindicate the Wisdom Goodness and Justice of God in his Government of man than yet the wisest mortals have § 44. Either you suppose that God doth all that he can do or not If yea then you suppose that he cannot nor ever could make any one Creature Worm or Grass more or less greater or smaller sooner or later or otherwise than he doth which few will believe It being not for want of Power but through perfection of Wisdom and freedom of Will that he doth no more But if God can make one creature more or one Motion more and yet doth not I ask Whether you dare call that non-agency by the name of Idleness or deficiency If not why should the Non-causation of sinful Volitions in specie morali or the leaving free-will to its own determination be so called Not to make more creatures or more physical motion or not to give more Grace and Glory is as much a non-agency as not to determine a sinning Will. § 45. As to all Mr. Sterry's Reasons against Free-will they are so Rhetorically rather than Logically delivered that I think it not meet to trouble the Reader with any further answer of them or to suppose them to have any more strength than those that other men plainlier have delivered § 46. I conclude with this repeated profession that I am fully satisfied that all the rest of the Controversies about Grace and Nature and Predestination and Redemption as they stand between the Synod of Dort and the Arminians are of no greater moment than I have oft expressed in this Book nor worthy any of that stir and contention which men that sufficiently difference not Words Methods and Matter have made to the mischievous injury of the Church And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties is in this controversie between the defenders of Necessary Predetermination and of Free-will that is not What free-will sinners have left but Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man there was such a thing as a will that can and ever did determine it self to a Volition or Nolition in specie morali without the predetermining efficient necessitating premotion of God as the first Cause or as Hobbes speaketh Whether ever a created will did act without a necessitating premotion And whether to will and to will freely be all one And whether the will except as to the kind of action be not as much necessitated to will or not will as my Pen to write or not write are we call not its acts Contingent or free either because they are what they are Volitions or though Ignorance because we see not the moving Causes § 47. And if
this hold for my part I must confess that I think the Religion which agreeth with it must neither be so good as Dr. Twisses Rutherfords Bradwardines or Alvarez's nor yet so bad as Hobbes's or Spinosa's but just such as Mr. Sterry's or the old Platonick or Stoick Philosophers I mean not such as Mr. Sterry's was for I hear he was an excellent person but such as his Book though obscurely intimateth And if any of that judgement have a better or worse it is not in consistency with his own principles FINIS Catholick Theology The Second BOOK The SYNODISTS and ARMINIANS CALVINISTS and LUTHERANS DOMINICANS and JESUITES Reconciled OR AN END OF THE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT GODS DECREES and GRACE and MANS FREE-WILL MERIT c. If men are willing A RETREAT TO THE MILITANT DIVINES WHO HAVE TOO LONG WARRED ABOUT WORDS and UNREVEALED THINGS and KEPT THE CHURCH OF GOD IN FLAMES and DRAWN CHRISTS MEMBERS TO HATE REPROACH and PERSECUTE EACH OTHER FOR THEY KNEW NOT WHAT In a Dialogue between C. a â—alvinist A. an Arminian and B. the Râ—concâ—ler and others By Richard Baxter Tim. 2. 14 15 16. Of these put them in remembrance charging them before the Lord that they strive not about words to no profit but to the subverting of the hearers Study to shew thy self approved unto God a Workman that needeth not to be ashamed rightly dividing the word of Truth But shun prophane and vain bablings for they will encrease unto more ungodliness and their word will eat as doth a Canker LONDON Printed for Nevil Simmons at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-Yard 1675. THE CONTENTS OF THE Second Book The first days Conference about Predestination THe need of conciliatory endeavours p. 1 2. What this undertaking is p. 3. Predetermination to Sin excluded the case briefly opened p. 4. The first Crimination by the Arminian Of eternal absolute Reprobation p. 6. Whether a thing not existent may be a Moral cause or God's Acts have Causes p. 7. How far Gods Decrees may be said to have extrinsick Causes p. 8. The second Crimination Of God's decreeing Sin either to predetermine it or the event or his permission p. 9. The third Crimination Necessitution of Sin by Negative decrees Negation of decrees opened p. 11. The fourth Crimination The pure Masse whether the object of Predestination p. 12. Decrees distinguished p. 13. The fifth Crimination Do the Decrees proceed according to the order of Intention or of Execution p. 14. The sixth Crimination Denying all Conditional Decrees p. 16. The seventh Crimination Of absolute Election p. 17. The eighth Crimination Leading men to presumption hereby p. 18. The ninth Crimination Setting necessity and fate p. 19. The tenth Crimination Making God a Respecter of persons by unequal Decrees p. 21. The eleventh Crimination Making God and Ministers Dissemblers p. 22. Crim. 12. Of a vain power given p. 23. The second days Conference The Criminations by the Calvinist What good this conciliatory attempt may do p. 24. The first Crimination Denying election uncomfortable The second Crim. An election of Things instead of Persons p. 26. The third Crim. Denying a decree of the first special Grave The fourth Crim. of Scientia Media p. 27. The fifth Crim. Denying Absolute Reprobation Reprobation opened p. 29 30. Whether God will Sin p. 30. or the Act p. 31. How far man can cause his act undetermined p. 32. Pretences for Gods causing Sin answered How God causeth the effect and not the Volition p. 85 c. What God doth about Sin p. 37. The sixth Crim. Of Conditional decrees p. 38. The seventh Crim. Of foreseen Merit p. 39. The eighth Crim. Of making many Elections p. 40. The ninth Crim. Ordering the Decrees according to Execution p. 41. How God doth Velle finem The Case opened p. 42. The tenth Crim. denying an eternal cause of futurition p. 45. Whether futurity be any thing and have any cause p. 48. The third days Conference Of Universal and Special Redemption The first Crim. Of the Armin. denying Christ's office to the world p. 50. Calvinists for universal Redemption what all agree in p. 54. * To which I here add the Church of England Homil. li. 2. p. 185. God so loved the world that he gave his only Son c. But to whom did he give him He gave him to the whole world that is to say to Adam and to all that should come after him O Lord what had Adam or any other man deserved at God's hands that he should give us his only Son We are all miserable Sinners damnable persons justly driven out of Paradise justly excluded from Heaven and justly condemned to Hell See a Learned Gentleman's Reasons for Univers Redemp yet living Mr. Polehill of Gods Decrees Did Christ die equally for all p. 55. The second Crim. Denying express Scripture p. 57. The Synod of Dort vindicated p. 59. The third Crim. They deny the Gospel Covenant it self p. 61. The fourth and fifth Crim. Making an impossibility or falshood the object of faith p. 62. The sixth seventh and eighth Crim. Disabling Ministers to Preach leaving most men remediless teaching Infidels impenitence p. 63. The ninth tenth eleventh and twelfth Crim. Exempting men from Hell torments justifying Ingratitude denying Christ's Kingdoms tempting men to Infidelity p. 64 65. The fourth days Conference The Calvinists first Crim. Making Christ dye in vain for them that he knew would perish p. 66. The second Crim. An imperfect Saviour p. 67. The third Crim. Dying for men in Hell p. 67. The fourth Crim. To die for those whom he would not pray for p. 68. The fifth Crim. Making Christ not to purchase faith p. 69. The sixth seventh eighth and ninth Crim. Uncertain conditional Redemption no more for the saved than the damned Christ's sheep to know him before he know them Pardoning Original Sin to all p. 70. Crim. 10. To die for the Seed of the Serpent p. 72. The fifth days Conference Of Man's Sinfulness and Impotency and of Free-will The Armin. Crim. 1st Denying all free-will they deny all Morality p. 73. What Liberty is here meant largely discussed to p. 79. What Liberty we hold p. 79. Doth Original Sin necessitate all evil p. 82. The second Crim. Denying Power to believe p. 85. What Power can and cannot mean p. 86. fullier opened p. 87 c. Questions hence answered p. 96 c. The advantage of some by denying Habits besides Power and Acts p. 99. Habits proved p. 100. Crim. 3. Making all men utterly and equally bad p. 101. Crim. 4. Infants Heathens and most men made and necessitated to sin and damnation p. 103. Of Infants remedy p. 104. Parents sin defileth them p. 105. Of Heathens Case p. 106. Crim. 5. That none can do more good or less evil than he doth p. 107. The sixth days Conference The Calvinists Crim. 1. Denying original sin p. 109. Original sin opened p. 111. Crim. 2. That men can use their Naturals to prepare for Grace p. 113.
the days of Arminius to this day especially between Prince Maurice and the States at the death of Barnevelt the imprisonment of Grotius c. The Synod at Dort and all the strife and discontent before and after it 3. Peruse but the Volumes written on one side by Suecâ—nus Arminius Grevinchovius Corvinus Tilenus Episcopius Curcellaeus Grotius c. with many Lutherans And on the other side by Gomarrus Lubbertus Macchovius c. Molinaeus Amesius Dr. Twisse Rutherford Spanhemius c. and think how sad such Combats are 4. Think what a lamentable distance to this day is kept up between the Lutherans and Calvinists in all Countries and much upon the account of these same Controversies And what bitter Books the Lutherans have written comparing the Calvinists to Papists Turks c. and how little Mr. Ducy by forty years Labour did to reconcile them and how small success all other Reconcilers have had though excellent learned judicious men such as Calixtus Johan Bergins Conrad Bergins Ludov. Crocius Mat. Martinius Isleburg Testaidus Amyraldus Placens Capellus Dallaeus Blondel Davenant Hall Carlton Abbot Morton Preston c. 5. Think of the great Conflicts in France and Flanders between the Jansenists and their Adversaries and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the Dominicans and the Jesuites And of how many Ages continuance those contests have been 6. Then rise up to the Time and Case of Faustus Rhegiensis Cassianus and the Massilienses and their Adversaries and the hard Characters left by those controversies on the names of worthy men 7. From thence ascend to Chrysostome and his Reproaches and Austin's Censures on the other side with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors Prosper and Fulgentius had with the Pelagians and Semipelagians of those times 8. And lastly read and pity almost all the Fathers especially of the Greek Church whose Names are now blotted with the censure of speaking too like our Arminians and Jesuites and after all this you will sure think this Contention was a very ill work if it be proved causless and you will think that it's time to end it if it be possible To which end an attempt is not discommendable if it should prove lost as to the greater part of men And some I doubt not God will bless it to at least to increase their love of peace A. I pray you tell me what is your Undertaking and in what measure it is that you think this Work may be accomplished B. My Undertaking is this To prove that in the points of Predestination and Redemption there is no difference between moderate men of each Party * Eadem enim difficultas fuit semper donationis in tempore praefinitionis aut praedestinationis in praescientia Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis prima gratia sine ulla causa ratione aut conditione sine qua non sic etiam praedestinatur Neque solum negari debet ratio cur unus praedestinetur alii verâ— non ut quidam dicebant sed etiam quare aliquis praedestinetur nulla facta comparatioâ—â— siquidem nulla ratio esse potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam nisi per modum sinis Vasquez in 1. Them Disp 91 c. 7. You see how much a Jesuite granteth but what is resolved into the points of Grace and Free-Will and in the points of Grace and Free-Will there is no real difference but what is resolved into the question of the degree of Gods co-operating influx compared with mans agency and with it self as on several Objects which will prove either no difference at all or else about a thing past mans Understanding And that only in the point of perseverance there is a real perceptible difference but such as is not worthy to be insisted on to the breach of Charity or the Churches peace but must consist with toleration and mutual love A. I know not whether this great Undertaking look more smilingly on the Times to come or frowningly on the Times past For if this be true what thoughts what names do we deserve for troubling the Christian World so perniciously and distractingly with a feigned difference But I pray you tell me in general how you will manifest all this B. 1. You must give me leave to tell you who they are that I undertake this Reconciliation of 2. And then how I shall perform it I. It is not every violent Contender that runneth into such palpable Errors as the common cause needeth not and will say any thing rather than agree that I am speaking of About these matters there are two Parties that stand on each extream who are not to be called Calvinists and Arminians but by other Names for their other Opinions These I intend to confute distinctly instead of reconciling them which iâ— impossible but by reforming them 1. On the one side I undertake not the Reconciliation of the Predeterminants who hold That Free-will is nothing but will a related to Reason Lubentia juxta rationem and that all its acts are as truly necessitated by the efficacions premotion of God as is the motion of a Clock or other Engine or of a Bruit though they will needs call them free because they are Volitions as if willing and free-willing were words of the same signification and that is deifying of mans Will or any Creature to say that it can move or determine it self to this Object rather than another without a Physical perdetermining efficient premotion by God at the first total Cause notwithstanding God should uphold its natural power and â—â— the cause of Nature afford his necessary universal Concourse and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act it to deifie it also They that think that God cannot make a Creature whose Will can determine it self without his predetermination to that act as circumstantiated though God uphold all its powers and all natural concurrentâ— else and that a self-determined not predetermined by premotion is a God or a Contradiction I am to confute and not to reconcile A. How will you confute them B. That is to be the work of a Disputation on that Point It shall now suffice to mind you that it seemeth to me very plainly to subvert Christianity if not all Religion For when Adam's sin and all the sin in the World of Men or Devils is resolved into the absolute unresistible Will and efficiency of God as the first total Cause and that it had been as impossible to have done otherwise as to be Gods or to Conquer God it 's easie to perceive whether God â—ate such sin and whether Christ died to signifie his hatred of it and whether he will damn men for not being Gods and whether he that is said unresistibly to predeterminâ— by immediate efficiency the thought will and tongue of every Lyar to every lye that ever was spoken can have any word delivered by man which we can be sure is true In a word if this
Opinion hold it will allow no other Religion in the World but this much To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil which God doth cause aâ— a free Benefactor differencing his Gifts in various proportions as he seeth meet as he differenceth Stars from Stones and Men from Dogs and equally causeth the wisdom of Man and the poyson of the Toad or Serpent and so will make such differences in this World and the next if there be any as pleaseth him as he doth here between one Horse that 's pampered and another that is tired out with labour Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way It hath pleased God by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills necessitation unto its proper practice thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Authors sake than we could have expected if none but such excellent persons as Alvarez * And more plainly yet Bradwardine who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell that God will have it so and none can resist him and his Brethren Dr. Twisse and Rutherford had maintained it But as Davenant well saith It is an Opinion of the Dominicans which Protestants have no mind to own And there are two sorts that thus subject the Will to absolute caused necessity 1. Those aforesaid the Dominicans who assist the predetermining premotion of God as necessary to every act natural and free 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural second Causes which is Hobbs his way and alas the way of great and excellent healing Câ—mero For they hold That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect and the Intellect by the Object â— and God made both Will and Intellect and Object and Law And so Camero hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of Adams sin into but the Devil But who necessitated the Devil to sin This will be all one when it is discussed And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible it will be impossible in the Angels for they are not Gods Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess that God made Man's Will at first with a natural self-determining power and freedoâ— suited to this earthly state of government and that Adam's Will by that same measure of Grace which he had could have forborn his sin at the instant when he sinned II. The other extream which I reconcile not but confute * Yet I am not â—â—â—tating the old way of anaâ—â—â—â—a thing all the hard sayings or opinions of others that being it that I write this against of which course the Epistles of Joan. Antioch 5. 6 c. and of cyril Aâ—ix to Proâ—â—â—s against his so using Theoaâ—â— Mops in Proâ—â—â—â—â—â—â— are worth the reaâ—â—ing besides the fore named T is the Pelagians who deny Original Sin and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier And how far this also subverteth Christianity you may perceive A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions as you may see in the Domâ—nâ—oans on one side and Hobbes against Braâ—hall and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor his Treâ—â— of Repentance on the other and therefore are not to be so slighted B. I do not slight them but confute them I confess that the cases are not without difficulty yea not a little But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced than they can be of the truth of their Opinions And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of â—â— liâ—n Porphyrie or Celsus against Christ that they would not have spoken as plausibly and made the case seem as difficult at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do A. Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned what they are B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me 1. To distinguish Names and Words from Things and * Vasâ—u in 1. Tho. q. 2â— a. 3. d. 4â— c. 1. Bona pars hujuâ— controversiâ— an reprobationis detur causa ex partâ— reprobi dâ— vâ—ce est nominal Controversies from real and to that end to open the aâ—biguity of words as I go along And to â—â—ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion or an enâ— rationâ—â— only that men contend about instead of a reality 2. I may be allowed when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one to distinguish them that each may have its proper answer 3. I may be allowed to â—ast by as unfit for contention all those unâ—evealed and unsearchable Points which none of the Contenders know at all nor ever will do in this World 4. And I will take leave to lay by the rash words of particular Writers as not to be imputed to any others nor to the main Cause or as that which I am not obliged to defend reconcile nor at all to meâ—dle with 5. And when all this is done you shall see what Aâ—toâ—â— the remaining differences will prove A. Begin then with the first Article of Prâ—dâ—stination B. Remember my â—ndertaking that it is not to justifie every â—â—â—â— words that hath written on the Point and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors But produce you all your Accâ—sations as against the Cause of the sober moderate Calâ—â—â—ists and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do The first Crimination A. 1. My first Charge is That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men without respect See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort where this very Charge is denied with detestation And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves Episcop Justit Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur Deum cos secundum â—perasua judicare â—b rebellionem contumaci-am corum dolere irasci c. damâ—are c. cum tamen non modo absolute eos perirâ— peccare voluerit sed originario tali labe infectos nasci fecâ—rit unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat Quod quid aliud esse potest quam histrionica quaedam scâ—nica actio to any fore-seen Sin or cause in them but meerly because â—â—â—â— pleaseth him to do it This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation B. That words may not deceive us let us in the beginning onâ—â— for all know what you mean by the word Decree A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will de eventâ— thaâ— this shall be B. And I suppose we are agreed 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity
the moderatest that he * Vid. Episcopii Resp ad qu. 64. qu. 33. pag. 32. â—bi dicit Deum decrevisse ut Judaei Christum e medio tolleren ex praescientia quod id liberâ— voluntate facturi essent atque inde praedictiones certas natas esse decreed the event that Sin should come to pass ipso permittente quamvis non efficiente or at least that he decreed his permission of it B. I. The first sort are those few whom I in the beginning renounced of whom the Dominicans and good Dr. Twisse and Rutherford his Follower de providentia are the chief I easily confess to you that God made the Law and God made man and God maketh the Objects and God causeth the Act as a natural Act in genere by a natural general concourse And if it could be also proved that God were the chief efficient Determiner of the Will and that by necessitation to this Act or Object comparatively rather than to that e. g. that David willed the Acts which were Murder and Adultery I could never deny that God is the chief Author of the Sin For the formal reason of Sin is Relative viz. Its disconformity to the Law of God And the Relation resulteth without any new Act or Agent Posito fundamento omni absoluto And neither God nor Man do or can do more to cause the Relation And Dr. Twisse and Rutherford so far saw this that the up-shot of all their Vindication is 1. That God causeth not sin as sin but as a means to his Glory 2. That God is under no Law as we are and therefore can be no Author of Sin But to the first I answer It 's one thing to will Sin as Sin and another thing to cause Sin as Sin We charge them not with inferring that God willeth Sin as Sin but Nullus est Catholicus qui ignoret peccatum non esse effectum praedestinationis etiam si praedestinatus occasionem ex eo saepius capiat suae salutis Nam cum Deus causa peccati esse nequeat efficitur ut Deus peccatum nulla ratione praedestinare possit Neque actus ipse peccati secundum esse naturale non est effectus praedestinationis quamvis sit hoc modo effectus divinae voluntatis Vasquez in Tho. 1. q. 23. cap. 2. disp 93. if he will it and cause it for another end he causeth the formal nature of Sin that we may not play with the ambiguity of Quatenus and that 's as much as man doth For Sinners do not all if any will sin as sin under this formal notion as it is a breach of the Law of God and displeaseth him but as it bringeth them some seeming good And by doing evil for that good they are Sinners To the second we do not charge the Dominicans with making God a Sinner But with making him the chief cause of the sin of man even in its form II. But this is nothing to the Calvinists in general Therefore I say that your selves hold the same that they do in this point Q. 1. Do not all the Jesuites and Arminius hold That God is the Decreer of what he is the Author of And that God is the Author of the Act as an Act natural in the general See but Rob. Baronius his Metaphysicks and Bellarmine whom he followeth A. That is nothing to the moral specification of the Act. B. And Dr. Twisse hath oft enough told you where Arminius saith That God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his Sin A. That is not that he willed the sin but that Ahab having made himself wicked God decreed not to stop him but let him go on B. Either you mean that the Object of Gods Decree was but his own permission as the Arminians use to say or else that it was the Sin it self matter and form permitted not because it is sin or evil for so man oft willeth it not at least but as an occasion of Gods Glory Arminius his words import the latter And then you go as high as Dr. Twisse or Rutherford But if you say that it was but a rash word of Arminius which you stand not to to make plain and short work with you I am so far from being liable to your charge that I charge you as presumptuous if not erroneous in saying that God decreeth or willeth to permit Sin And I assert 1. That God doth not Decree the form of Sin as Sin 2. Nor yet the event of that form for any good end For Ut peccatum eveniat is but peccatum futurum and what is it to decree Sin but to decree that it shall be Nor 3. Hath he decreed that this Act which is the Sin shall come to pass in its comparative circumstantiated state from whence it is that Sin in its form resulteth And so Augustines saying so much decantate by Dr. Twisse and others * As Bradwardine who also tells us That if God damn the Innocent his Will is the rule of justice and equity But I think they that so describe his Justice do rather think that none are damned than that the Innocent are or may be as an act of Justice whatever a meer Proprietor may do is not found that nothing cometh to pass but what God willeth either effecting it or permitting it It cometh to pass without Gods willing it or decreeing it so that he permitteth it but decreeth not that it shall come to pass Not that it is against his contrary absolute Decree but as Lombard from other places in Austin telleth you plainly God neither willeth that it shall be because it is sin nor properly and simply willeth that it shall not be for his Will is not overcome 4. Yea he cannot be proved to decree his own permission Because to permit is but not to hinder which is nothing but a negation And we have no ground to feign that God hath Volitions or Decrees of nothing or of negations So that I say that Sin cometh to pass without Gods Decree of the event or of his permission Though not without his Decree of the good which cometh by it of which more when I speak to the other extream And of this also more anon The third Crimination A. III. You make God necessitate mens sin and damnation by your negative decrees as well as others by their positive For you hold That no man can believe and repent but such as God decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to And no man can do any more good than God decreeth that he shall do And some say that God decreeth Not to give men any more Grace than he giveth them which is a Decree objectively negative de non dando And you and others say That he doth not Decree to give them more And so as a stone is not culpable for not flying no more are Sinners not elected for not believing and obeying God * Note what Vasquez granteth in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5.
us in all this * Vid. Episcop Instit Theo. li. 4. sect 5. cap. 7. pag 415. col 1. 4. But as to presumption hereupon I answer you 1. That there is no mercy which Satan will not tempt men to abuse even Christ and the hopes of Heaven it self 2. As long as wickedness is that evil which Election decreeth to deliver us from he that is wicked may be sure that he hath not the benefit nor mark of Election and cannot have the least assurance that he is elect 3. And while he that is truly godly knoweth that he is no further elected to Salvation than he is elected to persevere in godliness this is no rational inducement to him to forsake godliness any more than to renounce Heaven but rather to conclude I am decreed to persevere in holiness therefore I must so do 4. And to pass by the Controversie of perseverance till we come to it it is as all confess so few of the Elect that are certain of their own Election that this Objection can extend but to a few 5. Lastly None are certain of their Election but such as have strong clear active Grace and evidence that believe firmly and love God much and obey him carefully And such as these are fit to improve assurance and to live in the fruits of love and gratitude Did you ever know what love and thankfulness and delight in God and holiness are and yet can you think that they are the way to sin You know nothing in Religion if you know not that they are the life and soul of true Religion and the most powerful principles of Obedience and Perseverance Nor do you understand the Gospel-design if you know not that the greatest manifestation of the love of God is the greatest means of love and thankfulness and desire and delight in God and goodness unto man The ninth Crimination A. At least thus * Suetonius saith Tiberius was a neglecter of Religion because he thought that all things were ruled by fate Fate is set up in the World and all things are under necessity and unavoidable B. You had this Objection about necessity before and to the answer of it I refer you further 1. Immutable Election doth set up but a consolatory quietting certainty in the World without which mans mind must still be in troublesome unquiet if not tormenting terrours Is it a wrong to you if you can be sure to be saved Had you rather live and die under these apprehensions I know not whether I shall be in Heaven Kipping Philonatur l. 9. c. 11. p 431. voluntas ista absoluta hominem cum effectis suis ineluctabiliter necessitat hoc est ad unum oppositorum necessario constringit determinat omnia ejus acta eventa ut non aliter evenire queant quam eveniant where he confuteth Piscators Arguments for such necessitating Decrees p. 432 c. or Hell for ever If you have not certainty or a hope that is somewhat near it I think this conclusion if you be awake and in your wits must needs make your life a constant bondage and the fear of death your constant misery and must blast all the pleasures of your fulest Prosperity Thank God that his Foundation standeth sure and the Lord knoweth who are his and see that you keep his mark upon you professing Christ and departing from iniquity And do not cry out as if you were fatally carried to Heaven against your wills 2. As for the word Fate it is ambiguous Some by fate mean but the certainty that God's Predictions shall be fulfilled Quod fatur eveniet Some mean only the certain connexion of Causes and Effects under Gods sapiential Government of the World As Campanella maketh Necessity Fate and Harmony to be the result of Power Wisdom and Love but not accurately enough And some say but how truly I know not That the Stoicks took Fate for some primary necessitating Cause which did necessitate all Acts of the Gods and Men. It is a word that we have no need of they that will play them with it may 3. But as to Necessity again I say 1. Election maketh no mans sin or misery necessary nor tendeth to it 2. It maketh no mans Salvation Thus Fewrbornius in Fascicul Disser de termino vitae useth 17 Arguments contra sententiam Calvinianam de fatali simpliciter necessario termino vitae quasi Deus ex absoluto simplici decreto absque ullo ad causas secundas physicas voluntarias respectu câ—ique hominum genus horam mortis praesixerat And all upon the encouragement of some ill and unsound words of Piscator who is most extream in this whereas this is none of the Calvinists sense commonly who hold that sin is only fore-seen and not decreed but all true means are decreed with the end in one Decree therefore respected as decreed necessary against his will in sensu composito 3. The more it maketh our Salvation necessary that is certain and insuperable the greater is Gods mercy the greater our happiness and cause of gratitude and Joy The Saints in Heaven are not offended at the certainty of their persevering blessedness If you shall Object That it necessitateth the perishing of all others because none can be saved who are not Elect. Remember that this was your third Crimination and is answered before I say again 1. Necessity and Impossibility are either Logical in ordine probandi or Physical in ordine causandi The first sort followeth upon your own Doctrine He that God fore-knoweth shall sin and perish it necessarily followeth Necessitate consequentiae and it is impossible but it should follow that he will sin and perish but not by Gods fore-knowledge Causal necessitating either taketh away the true power of escaping or depriveth of such power by prevention But so doth not the Election or Decree of God 2. Though we hold such absolute Election as hath been opened to you and that God decreeth to cause men to believe before he fore-seeth that they will believe in order of Nature according to humane Conception yet we hold as you do that Reprobation doth not so proceed but that God decreeth men to Hell only on fore-sight of final wickedness which he never caused or willed And if in this we agree with you you must accuse your selves as much as us 3. God doth both Decree to give and actually give men power to do more than they do And his decreeing that another man shall well use that power which he hath doth sure take away no power from you 4. Yea Gods not decreeing to cause you to use your own power well doth take none of it from you But includeth that such power you have much less his Decree to do more for others 5. All the World acknowledgeth that a Benefactor as such is free to give his own benefits as he pleases unequally And giving more to one taketh nothing from another Suppose that
less a cause in man least of all in man when he is no man 5. The word Condition either respecteth 1. The thing or event willed 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with respect to that event 3. Or that Will radically consider'd in it self I opened this before but think of it again for the reason of the distinction is very plain And 1. God damneth no man but for sin nor privatively denieth any necessary Grace but for sin Therefore the event no doubt is before-hand conditional that is dependeth on a condition God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently and not else 2. The Act of Gods Will as denominated from the said Effect or Object particularly may be called A conditional Act or Will But if any think otherwise it is but de nomine 3. The radical essential Will or Act of God as in himself can have no cause or condition * Though sin be acknowledged to be the cause of the Will of God in Reprobation quoad res volitas that is in respect of the punishment willed thereby this hindreth not the absoluteness of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis And unless we understand the Fathers thus we must charge them with an Opinion which Aquinas is bold to profess that never any man was so mad as to affirm c. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 49. But 1. The actus reprobantis as really distinct from the effect is nothing but Gods Essence And who saith that sin causeth Gods Essence 2. And the effect of Reprobation as it is said to be a Decree not to give Faith or Grace is nothing and therefore that nothing cannot aptly so much as extrinsically denominate Gods Will or Essence as an Act. Is not here then a fair agreement Ruiz de praedef d. 9. p. 150. Quantum ad negationem electionis quantum ad permissionem peccati finalis praedâ—finitus suit reproborum numerus Dr. Twisse denieth none of this 6. That God willeth or decreeth not sin formally all the Christian world almost confess And what loveliness is there in that only odious thing that should tempt good people to father it on God or attribute the being of it to his Will or to be zealous Reproachers of those that say otherwise 7. And if God will and decree the Act not only as an Act in general but with all its modes and circumstances he undeniably willeth or decreeth the form of sin or the immediate necessary cause of it which in the case of efficiency will more evidently appear C. God willeth not the Form that is sin as sin and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumstances B. I have told you before that a wicked man may will sin in matter and form and yet not will it as sin To will it as sin is to take the form of sin as such to be good and so to be the ratio volendi which few if any Sinners ever do But to will both matter and form in one not as the formal reason of Volition but making total sin the matter chosen as a means to some other desired end this is possible for a very wicked man to do But I think the ordinary case of Sinners is not at all to will the form of sin but cast that by and to will the matter of it for the carnal pleasure or inferior good which it seemeth to tend to Now this excuseth not their will from wickedness that they will not malum sub ratione mali or sin because it is sin but for another end And shall we charge God of willing sin as the wicked do C. God willeth it to a good end and they to an evil end B. As evil must not be done that good may come by it so neither must it be willed to that end Man may need such a * Sure Arminius granteth enough and that which â—theâ—us and many School-men deny and for my parâ— I cannot grant when he saith At per accidens bonum est ut malum siat propter Det saptentiam bonitatem potentiam secundum quam Deus expeccato materiam gloriae suaeillustrandae sumit Est ergo peccatum isto respectâ— non medium per se illustrandae Gloriae Divinae sed occasio tantum non data in hunc finem neque natura sua ad illum accommodata sed a Deo arrepta horsum mira arte landabili abusu usurpata Armin. exam Perkins pag. 508. An occasion it is indeed but I will not grant that ex peccato God setcheth matter for his Glory nor that by accident it is good ut fiat Caeterum peccata etiam secundum rationem malitiae moralis objecta sunt seu materia circa quam divina praedestinatio versatur â—o modo quo versatur poenitentia Vasqu in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. dâ—sp 93. c. 2. means to his ends but so cannot God Yea men have oft good ends for evil Acts Many lye to glorifie God and sin for his Cause and Church and for their own and other mens Salvation Much of the Blood and Cruelties and Superstitions in the World have had good ends which yet excused not the things from sinfulness C. God is under no Law and therefore cannot sin But man is B. 1. That proveth God no Sinner but not that he causeth or willeth not the sin of man 2. Gods natural essential Perfection is his Law and more than a Law to him And from that Perfection all Laws in the world that are just and good have their Original that is Gods own Laws are the expressions of his holy perfect Will and Nature and Mans Laws are authorized by and subservient to and derived from the Laws of God in Nature and Scripture So that when the Apostle would describe a man best and likest unto God he saith That the Law is not made for the Righteous 3. If Gods Holiness and Wisdom make man a Law forbidding sin on pain of Hell the same Wisdom and Holiness with his Justice and Mercy will not will the sin so forbidden nor cause it nor consist with so doing C. It is not the form or essence of sins that God willeth but the existence and futurity or event not sin but that sin be B. I many a year studied thinking to prove that true But I doubt it is but a game at words and groundless distinguishing for a false conclusion For 1. Sin is a Relation formally even a disconformity of an Act or disposition and so of the person to Gods Law It can no otherwise be caused but by making the Law and causing the Act in the circumstances disconform God maketh the Law and God maketh man and his faculties and God causeth the Object and God permitteth the tempter If God also cause the Act in the prohibited circumstances he doth all that can be done in the causation of sin And so of his Volitions or Decrees As for the essence of sin in notion without the existence more
may be said that God indeed is some cause of that without culpability yea by his Holiness and Power For as the Relations of Curvitude and Dissimilitude result from the Relate's fundamentum as compared to the Correlate or terminus so he that causeth any of them hath some hand in causing the Relation as a Relation And so God by forbidding Adultery Lying c. by his Law doth by Institution make those acts to be sin that is He layeth down the rule from which they are so denominated when committed That Adultery is committed is long of man that it is a sin when committed is long of God and man God by his Law and man by his Act. So that when you say God causeth not the essence but the existence or futurity you are so far out as that less of causality is to be ascribed to him as to the existence than the essence 2. But what is the existence but the essence existing or extra causas And what is it to cause sin but to cause it to exist And what is it to cause it to exist but to cause it or give it a being And what is it to will that sin shall exist but that the essence of it shall exist And what is it to will the event or futurity but to will that sin shall be And what more can man will or do about it to shew himself to be bad as Estius and others fully manifest C. I cannot but think that God may will that Act which is sin so he do not will it * Twiss Vind. li. 2. Digress 4. p. 201. Falsum est peccatum fieri ab hominâ— ut est peccatum Licet sit peccatum ut fit ab homine non tamen fit ab homine ut est peccatum hoc est sub ratione peccati Quanto minus in divinam voluntatem cadit cum hoc â—â— in humanam voluntatem competat as sin and so may cause it Quod peccatum but not Qua peccatum B. Here are three things before us 1. The common substratum or â—atter of the sin which is the Faculty and the Object and the Act only in genere act us or as not cloathed with the forbidden circumstances 2. The Act thus circumstantiated 3. The Relative form of sinfulness 1. No doubt but God doth cause all the first the Faculty Object and the Act as an Act e. g. In David's Adultery and Murder and Peter's denying Christ God gave them the Faculty by which they did it He â—pheld their natural power and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act But 2. The Act as thus circumstantiated he neither caused nor willed but permitted only that is that David should hic nunc lust after her that was another mans wife that he should vitiate her that he should choose out Uriah to the Sword that Peter should speak those particular words c. In the first sense God willeth the Act which is sin and the Faculty which is sinful but not in the second as sinfully circumstantiated And as for your Qua peccatum I tell you again few Sinners if any will it qua peccatum C. What say you to this undeniable Argument If God will not that Act which is sin he willeth almost nothing that men do For we sin in all someway or other And so God hath little to do in the world B. The last answer fully serveth to this If we sin in every Act yet all that is in every Act is not sin or prohibited All that is good in the Act is of God and willed by him But it is the prohibited circumstances of the Act which God doth not cause or Will which morally specifie it as sin As when I pray I sin in praying coldly unbelievingly with wandring thoughts God causeth not these though he cause the Prayer Or to come from compound Acts to simple Those wandring thoughts are not my sin as they are thoughts but as they are upon an undue Object A lye is not a sin as it is a word but as this word which is false And so in all others C. But some Acts are simply forbidden in themselves and not only in their circumstances Therefore if God there cause the Act he causeth the Sin B. No Act as an Act is forbidden but as circumstantiated by Object Time Mode Place c. Mr. Capell * Lib. of Tempt chooseth lying only as an instance of prohibitum per se But I answered before that all the Act in lying is Volition Intellection and Speech And these as such are not forbidden But only these particular words which are false The common instance is Odisse Deum But here hatred in it self is not the sin but â—s unduly terminated on God as the Object And this God willeth not C. By this you deifie man For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of And so man is made a first cause that is a God For the particularizing of the Object and the circumstantiating of the Act is aliquid something and must have some first cause B. The truth is this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants Which I have answered in due place and here briefly tell you 1. That when two Objects are before me a commanded and a forbidden one there is * I have noted after that Dr. Twisse saith Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile neque necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati And these have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale Armi. dic Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile jucundum in many instances And God maketh the Object e. g. Honey or Eves fruit and God maketh the Appetite so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity that is that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee But whether thou wilt eat it he hath left free so that if God also caused that determinate act he caused all And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law the Object and the man and thereby maketh that if thou wilt cause such an Act so disordered it shall be thy sin and misery so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin And they that ascribe the Act in suo modo to him ascribe all to him But as to Bonum utile he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile For it may be Conducibile ad malum interitum But it is not utile unless it be conducibile ad bonum yea ad finâ—m ultimum For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a mans ends or will And God is the Author
comparativa ita de adultis 4. Non solum comparative sed etiam absolute loquendo nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus Where note that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects viz. punishment For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God And all his stress is laid on this that the permission of the first sin is the first effect of Reprobation and this permission hath no cause in man Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cause in man But the truth is 1. A man may put such a sence on the word Reprobation as to include what he please But it 's usually taken for Gods Decree to damn men and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation and so is 1. A positive Act as a Volition 2. And privative objectively and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative 4. And some most ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus no Act that is to nothing And so a man that will play with words may say that 1. Gods non-agere nonâ—igere is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect which is nothing and therefore no effect And Alvarez utterly faileth iâ— this proof either that non-eligere is an Act or permittere vel non impedire an eâ—â—ect or that it is fitly called Reprobation which hath â—â— privation but a negation for its Object e. g. that Judas shall not be an Angel nor iâ—â—eccabilâ— but have natural free-will is no act of his Reprobation And so of the permission of the first sin Arminius himself exam Perâ—ins pag. 568. saith Voleâ—et Deus Israelem punire Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere Propria â—mmediata adâ—quata causa cur permiserit ut Achaâ— iâ—â—â— cadem perpetraret est illa quam dixi mensâ—ra sâ—elerum implenâ—â— erat â—â—â—â— Dâ—â—â—â—â—tra peccatum hominis per aliam â—â—em Nabothum ad se evocare Which Dr. Twisse useth through all his Writings against him ad hominem in stead of argument â—â—-thinks this concession should seem enough which is too much And I conjecture that Arminius wrote it by over-sight and woâ—ld have said that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth because he would â—â—â—â— him to â—â—â—â— up the measure of his sin making permission the res Voâ—â—ta But all theiâ— assigning Causes of Gods â—â—â—â— are â—â—â—â—â—â—ld God being above all causeâ— B. I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act clothed with all its circumstances That which God causeth he must needs will But when he saith Nostri Theologi affirmant he must mean but some few such as Maccovius Spanhemius Rutherford and perhaps Piscator or Beza of his own mind But the generality of Protestants either are against him or meddle not with it He that will read Davenant and such others shall find the difference I remember but few English Divines at all that own it besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse and to his and Alvarez and other mens Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion I may pretermit that here C. But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation but of Gods Works 2. Take heed of such unreverent words of God Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain Dare you reproach God as Idle if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him C. The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine and not mine that do but denominate their consequents B. Let us try that Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do that he made the World as soon as he was able and could have done it no sooner or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast or Plant or Atome more than he hath made nor to do any one action more than he doth C. No I hold no such thing For God is Omnipotent and Free B. I pray you then study it and tell me if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles why should you call him Idle if by the same Wisdom and Free-will he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent able by Gods common generical concurse as the cause of nature to determine or suspend his own Volitions without any predetermining efficiency of God If God will delight himself in making such a Creature will you dare to say that he is Idle because he moveth him not in another manner you will not so reproach a Watch-maker for not moving the Watch all day with his finger C. I confess I cannot answer that But how then is God the Governor of the World if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation B. The Work of a Governor as such is only 1. By Legislation to make the Subjects Duty 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the case of each Subject whether he do that Duty 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgment But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions C. It is so with man because he can do no more but not with God B. Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits by physical motion as Engins are moved as a Clock or Watch by natural necessitation And so he doth the meer naturals of man As his Concoction Pulse circulation of Blood generation in the Womb c. But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent ruleth him as such agreeably to his nature even by moral Agency by Laws and Judgment And this is that Regency of which we speak If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind or King of the World you deny him to be God and overthrow all Religion and Morality C. But what say you to all the Texts that tell us that God willed and caused that which wicked men did as in the case of Pharaoh Sihon Rehoboam Absolom the death of Christ and many others B. One of the greatest over-sights of them that thus Object is that they distinguish not between the sin and the effect of the sin or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him and the reception of this Act in passo in the recipient God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination Especially
is the greatest Lover of Sin in all the world judge by their confuted words in the former Book 1. They deny not nor can do that Love and Volitiâ—â— in God are all one Gods Love is not a Passion but his Will 2. They say that God willeth that sin exist 3. And that as summè unicè conducible to his Glory 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good 5. That God is pleased finally in what he willeth antecedently 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being so is he in the greatness and power and efficacy of his Volitions 7. And that man loveth not nor willeth not evil as evil or sin as sin but for inferior good infinitely below Gods Glory for which he willeth its existence And is not this to say that he is the greatest Lover of it that is C. Yet it sticks with me that God should be the Omnipotent Governor of the World and all Sin which is the common work of the World should be without or against his Will Providence is wronged by this B. You mistake the matter 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their Free-will under moral Government was not from impotency as if he could have made man no better or more necessary an Agent But of his Wisdom and Freedom by which he made the Bruits without Reason and Stones without Sense 2. All sin is done against the Law or commanding Will of God which determineth only of Duty and not directly of Event But it is not done against his absolute Will de eventu For God is not overcome nor frustrate of his Decrees 3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the first â—ook that Gods Providence doth about mans sin and then you will â—ot say that he is Idle or neglecteth his Government unless he cause Sin I. It is God that made man an Intellectual free Agent in his own Image and the Lord of his own Acts as a Creature morally governable by Laws And so all his free power is of God who still upholdeth it II. As God is the Fons Naturae he is the Principium motus and he concurreth as the first cause to all Action as Action in genere and so to all that hath a physical entity and reality in sin And I do not believe that Aureolâ—â— Duraâ—d or Lud. à Dola thought otherwise though they differ in expressing the mode of concurse III. God giveth men all the mercies which they turn to sin and is the cause of all those Objects which they inordinately love and abuse IV. God himself concurreth with Sinners in causing the same effects which they cause also by prohibited Volitions and Actions as in generation c. even when custom giveth one name to the sin and the effect And that by all the ways fore-named and many more V. God as the Worlds Governor and Benefactor maketh mens sins the occasions of much good and ordereth and over-ruleth all Wills and Events so as not to miss of any of his ends But will attain all his ends while the Sinner seeketh his own VI. All this that God doth he decreeth to do And all that Sinners do he fore-knew And neither his Wisdom Goodness or Power is ever over-come by sin or defective in any thing about it And is not all this enough for you but yet God must be the chief willer of sin C. I confess that God can govern the sinful World by this much B. Take in but one thought more which I afterward suggest Ockam laboriously endeavoureth to prove that the outward Act hath no peculiar sinfulness in it self distinct from that of the Will I have told you my Opinion of his tenet But this is granted him that no outward Act hath any sinfulness but secondary and participative as animated by the Will and that sin is primarily in the Will alone Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alledged by Dr. Twisse and Rutherford it is not the Will of the Sinner that God is made the Author of but seemingly of the Act indeed of the Effect Now God cannot be the cause of any mans sin unless he cause the sinful Volition But I have anticipated our Dispute of Providence in all this because it is here usually handled as the matter decreed And therefore when we come thither you must excuse me from repeating it or pardon what you put me to do The sixth Crimination C. My next offence against them is that they make Gods Will and Decrees conditional and so make God dependent upon man B. This is opened in the Second Book * Vasquez in 1. Tho. disp 91. c. 1. Cum quaeritur an divinae praedestinationis detur causa qu. non est de actu divinae voluntatis quatenus est ipsa essentia divina res increata sic notant scholastici omnes clarum enim est divinae praedestinationis hoc modo non esse causam sed est de effectibus Et perinde est quaerere causam praedestinationis ex parte nostra atque causam aliquam totiuâ— effectus praedestinationis in nobis quae effectibus illis non sit annumeranda Nam si quidpiam ponitur effectus praedestinationis nequit illud ulla ratione esse causa totius effectus In Deo 1. Ipsa essentia Dei 2. Respectus rationis ad res cognitas et volitas Hic nascitur ex objectis Ejus igitur possunt esse causae Indeed they differ not from the Synodists or Dr. Twisse himself I think in this That is 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations Promises and Threatnings in his Word 2. And that God may truly be said to Will and Decree his own Word and all that is in it with its conditional mode 3. And as Aquinas and Twisse and all say Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc sed non hoc vult esse propter hoc Gods Will doth not depend on the Condition but Gods Will is that the Effect or Event shall depend on the Condition When the Condition is performed it is not a medium of Gods Volition but of the Effect 4. But yet this all must confess that as to the bare extrinsick denomination from the Object as Gods Will is variously denominated from things past present and future so it may be from absolute and conditional Grants and Promises which you will not deny but God hath made 5. And in case of sin and damnation sin fore-seen is an objective condition disposition or qualification sine qua non of such as Gods velle damnare is immediately terminated on as they confess at the Synod at Dort and Molinaeus there openeth in his judgment at large C. But this decreeing upon fore-sight of somewhat in man maketh God to follow the Creature and depend upon it B. It maketh him no way dependant at all For the Creature neither causeth any Act of God nor hindreth him from any thing which he would do It is
Decree to predetermine the Agent For sin is so e. g. hating God blasphemy And that Dr. Twisse ill maketh Gods Decree the sole cause of futurity As to the presumptuous question how God knoweth future things besides that there is no time to measure Gods Acts by there need no other answer than that Gods infinite Understanding knoweth all that is intelligible But futures as such are intelligible Quid divinus intellectus infinitae â—â—â—tutis est quicquid intelligibile est necessarie debâ—t amplecti intelligere At futura contingentia intelligibilia sunt â—o quod sunt determinatae veritatis Vasq 1. Tho. q. 14. d. 65. cap. 4. But whereas he himself also defendeth that futures are known in decretis divinis he is forced to say that sin is known in Gods Decree of the materiale peccati where yet in his Doctrine of Simultaneous Concurse he maketh Gods concurse to be but part of the determining cause which would not without mans free co operation do it Therefore the Decree of a half causation is not enough to infer the effect futurition while they make sin that is eternally future yet not to be eternally willed or decreed by God to be future How can things pass without a cause enumero possibilium in numerum futurorum B. Alas what men and what Engines must the poor Church suffer and be tortured by sure Paul fore-saw these things when he feâ—red lest as the Serpent beguiled Eve with a promise of being as God in Knowledge so he should draw us from the simplicity that is in Christ. And when he warned us to beware lest any beguile us with vain Philosophy according to the rudiments of the world And when he telleth us of a Wisdom which is foolishness with God and of some who professing themselves wise became Fools Your Doctrine soundeth so unlike to Christ's and his Apostles that I must crave your Interpretation of it that we may understand before we wrangle I pray you what is it that you call Futurition C. The name tells you what it is You know what we mean by it B. I know that it is Grammatically a Noun Substantive but doth it signifie something or nothing C. It signifieth that something will be hereafter B. Now you turn it to a Verb But is futurity anything or nothing C. Suppose I say It is something B. If it was eternally something it is God For nothing else was eternal C. Suppose I say It is nothing B. If it be nothing it is no effect and therefore hath no cause and therefore no eternal cause C. Suppose I say that it is neither something nor nothing You know there are five sorts that Burgersdicius placeth between Res and Nihil and futurity may be one of them B. Five sorts of what You cannot tell If you take Ens or Res limitedly for less universal than Aliquid or a Species of it you may say that Datur medium inter Rem Nihil But sure esse and non esse are contradictories And taking Aliquid Ens or Res in the most universal notion it is a contradiction and a denial of the first principle of Knowledge to feign a medium Burgersdieius'es five Non-entia quae non sunt nihil are Privatio Denominatio externa ens Rationis Relatio modus entis And all this cometh from the pittiful narrowness of mans mind that can know nothing at all by one simple Conception but by parts And then it frameth several names according to all its inadequate Conceptions as if they all signified several somethings 1. Privatio is it self a compound notion including 1. The absence of the form 2. The debitum inesse 3. The matters capacity of it The first is Nothing the second is a Relation of which after the third is the nature or mode of the matter which is an inadequate Conception of Ens. 2. Denominatio externa signifieth 1. The Denominabilitas 2. Or the actual denomination The first is considerable 1. Qua talis 2. Or in causa velratione Denominability in se is nothing else but an inadequate Conception of ens rationis For I can call nothing by a Name But the Ratio denominandi may be something and as now intended is Relation 2. And the actual denomination is Res that is Verbum vel mentis veloris 3. Entia Rationis taken effectivè subjectivè are confessed to be real Entities but objectivè it is denied All Objects are so called 1. As aptitudinal 2. Or actually apprehended 1. As aptitudinal they are not entia rationis but something antecedent 2. As actual they are quid reale For they are conceptus humanus inadaequatè expressus sub ratione materiae A thought or conception is an Act which is quid reale And every Act consisteth of the modus agentis and the Object which as such is quasi materia and is essential to the Act so that even Genus and Species as in mans thoughts are quid reale And out of mans thoughts they are Relation or nothing 4. Relation is a something or nothing which keepeth an exceeding room in all our Sciences But when anatomized it is considerable 1. As in extrinsick Objects 2. As in the mind of man considering them 1. In the Object there is 1. Quid absolutum that is the subject the terminus the fundamentum cum ratione fundandi 2 The formal Relation The first is quid reale as is confessed The second is nothing besides the first It is nothing but rerum comparabilitas And that comparability is nothing besides the quid absolutum or thing it self When an Egg is new laid at the Antipodes an Egg here is newly related to it ut simile But nothing is added to this Egg But only now the mind of man can compare it with that at the Antipodes and consider that in quantity figure colour c. they are like which likeness as in ovo is nothing besides the same quantity figure colour c. themselves But by those Realities it is capable of being compared and the mind can raise an universal notion of both as compared 2. But this comparing Act of the Understanding is quid reale So that Ockam in his Quodlibets hath well proved in many questions that Relation is nothing besides the quid absolutum in re in mente humana And though his Gregor Armin. at large dispute that non-entia may be related yet it is on this supposition that non-entia may be imagined and be the matter of a thought or conceptus and as such they are entia rationis realia that is that conceptus is quid reale But besides that the Relatio non-entis is nothing but non-ens and a meer nihil Yet I confess that Rerum ordo is the sum of Relations and of morality and that this Ordo is existent whether we think of it or not But this Ordâ— is nothing distinct ab absolutis rebus ordinatis cum omnibus suis modis circumstantiis realibus Things are wonderfully diverse by
diversity of quantity quality distance c. But this diversity is nothing besides the said absolute quantity quality distance c. But I must not write a Logick for you I am by this much remembred that as David saith man walketh in a vain shew or Image when multitudes of nothings go for somethings and fill up so much of his thoughts and life and constitute so much of his Learning which he glorieth in C. But you have said nothing yet of the fifth which is Modus Entis And futurition may be reduced to that B. A true modus entis is quid absolutum reale and the same that we call an Accident And Gassendus chooseth to call Accidents Modes or Qualities And they are not really distinct from the ens cujus modi sunt if they be intrinsical Modes or Accidents as quantity quality action c. But they are small inadequate conceptions of the thing modified not conceptions of its constitutive chief denominating part but yet conceptions of quid entis so that an entire perfect conception of the thing would comprehend or include the conception of the Mode or Accident So that they that deride the name of Pars accidentalis as put for Accidens speak not always so good sense as they think they do But such Accidents or Modes as are extrinsical to the thing as Cloaths to the Body Servants Lands Riches Honours are not properly Modes and Accidents at all but Adjuncts C. Apply this to the point in question of Futurity B. If Futurity as is said be an eternal Being it is God If nothing it hath no cause If it be called Quid medium the very Quid is a contradiction to it To begin backward 1. If it be Modus Entis from eternity it must be Modus Dei For there was no ens ab aeterno but God If it be Modus Dei it is Dens For all in God is God 2. If it be Relatio it is absoluti alicujus relatio If so either of some real Being or of nothing If of a Being from eternity it must be a Relation of God to the thing future in that he either willed or fore-knew â— For nothing was eternal but God And if so that Relation of God to the thing future is something or nothing If something it is God himself and so hath no cause If nothing it is no effect and so hath no â—â—â—â— But if it be the Relation of nothing viz. of the thing future to an Intellect possible or real that could know it future than it is nothing it self For the Relation of nothing cannot be something a real accident without a real Subject 3. If futurity was from eternity ens Rationis it was Rationis Divinae for there was no created Reason ab aeterno And if so either Aptitudinal or Actual If Actual it was God For all his Idea's and entia rationis for I suppose you one of the bold men that affirm entia rationis to be in God must needs be God himself and so have no cause If Aptitudinal and not yet in mente divina but objecta possibilia either they were something or nothing If something then there was something eternal besides God which is not said by any of us If nothing to call them future signifieth no more but that Gods infinite knowledge extendeth to things that are not as if they were which is true But futurity it self being nothing hath no cause 4. If you say that they are extrinsical Denominations it is something or nothing that is denominated future I know you will say It 's nothing If so quatenus extrinsical to God it was from eternity nothing which you call a Denomination But if you mean the Act of God denominating it was quid reale that is God himself who hath no cause But yet this is the true foundation of the notion Because Gods Knowledge of all things and his Will of all good things extendeth to all intelligible and amiable Objects to all eternity therefore we first justly denominate God to be an Intellect that knoweth what will be and a Will which willeth all that he will do And thence we say that the thing was future from eternity And so from an extrinsick Denomination of Gods Mind and Will we run on to give names to numberless nothings and then talk and write and make Sciences and Disputes of them in our dreams as if they were somethings And this is the work of the fantastical World And then we confound poor Scholars with the names of Entia Intentionalia Species Entia rationis Universalia And with Aristotle Themistius c. say that the Intellect is all things that it knoweth c. O what work have vain notions and be-fooling Philosophy made not only in the World but in the Church and among those that call themselves Orthodox and cry up the sufficiency of the holy Scriptures The notion of Privations I need not here apply C. But things future are future whether any one think of them or not B. And some men will trouble and deceive themselves and others what-ever is said to them It is certain that possible and futurum are termini diminuentes negantes quoad existentiam That which only will be is not Therefore the name signifieth nothing but that the thing will be without any connotation of any cause of it but it implyeth that there is some fundamentum vel ratio which might warrant any perfect existent Intellect to say It will be And there needs no more to that but the eternal perfection of Gods own Intellect But I have said more of this lib. 1. and thefore here will add no more C. But how is it possible for God to fore-know that sin will be unless he first Will or Decree that it shall be by his permission B. I abhor the question and supposition That such worms as we who know not what Gods Intellect or Will is should presume to conclude that he cannot fore-know sin unless we can understand how he fore-knoweth it yea unless it be by a way that a man could fore-know it When it is a wiser way of arguing to say This is the way that man knoweth by and that man can comprehend Ergo it is not like to be the way of Gods fore-knowledge But remember one thing that here you plainly make God to will the form of Sin as well as the matter For is not the form future C. Yes B. And is not Gods Will his Love C. Yes B. And do you not make God then to love the very form of Sin which yet you say that no wicked man loveth C. No It is but the existence of the form that he willeth or loveth B. O excellent distinguishing He willeth not the form of Sin but only willeth that it be or exist The form is the Essence He willeth that the Essence exist but willeth not the Essence which is nothing but as existing But do wicked men will any more or so
much as that the form exist C. Dr. Twisse saith No. B. And if it were but the Act that existed doth not Gods Law make it sin by forbidding it and so cause the Essence C. Yes B. And if you say that God willeth the existence of the form of Sin why say you that he doth not cause it Is not his Will effective or is it any more contrary to his Holiness to cause it than to will or love it C. He causeth the existence but not the form or existence B. What jugling is this in such tremendous matters 1. What is it to cause the form but to cause that it exist To cause it to be is all the causing that it can have 2. And you confess that Gods Law by forbidding it maketh it sin in specie when it existeth Remember that you say that it is not only the matter but the form of sin which God willeth and causeth to exist And is it not a contradiction to call it evil and yet say that God willeth it when his Will is the Rule of Goodness C. It is not evil to God but to us B. So Dr. Twisse saith And to be evil to us even mans sin or damnaâ—â—â—n is not evil to God And so God is the great Lover of Sin and Damnation But why then is he said to hate it And is it not an Enemy to God and contrary to his Holiness Why did Christ die for that which God so loved C. Sin is nothing and therefore God causeth it not B. 1. Relations and Privations have their Causes and so hath Sin 2. Else man cannot be condemned for causing it The Synod of Dort and Reformed Churches teach no such Doctrine But it â—â— such as you that tempt the Arminians to revile them and say that you describe God in the shape of the Devil and much worse as loving and causing sin and misery more than he that so the love of God may be extinguished C. I think we must leave these Mysteries to God B. But good Brother though I have stopt your mouth and censures of your Brethren in this and such matters do you expect that every â—onest Christian must be able to discuss all your Logical Fallacies or else go with you for unsound and heterodox And have you dealt fairly by the Church of God to borrow from the School-men such snares for mens Consciences And must every man be perswaded that God is the greatest lover and willer from eternity of every wicked Act that is not able to answer your smoaky Sophisms about futurition and its eternal cause with such like I tell you the Serpent hath beguiled us as Eve and turned men from the simplicity that is in Christ C. I pray briefly give me the sum of what you drive at B. The sum is That though every Party and almost every person of each Party have odd notions of his own and peculiar weapons to wound his Brothers Reputation with and militate against Love and Concord and manifest the Pride of his self-conceited Understanding yet all sober Christians I think are agreed in all this Controversie of Gods Decrees in all that is truly necessary to our brotherly love and peace That is All grant that God decreed to do all that he doth and to give all the Grace and Mercy which at any time he giveth whether to all or some And that he absolutely and properly decreed no more But improperly he may be said to will an event in tantum when he willeth only to do so much or so much which naturally conduceth towards it though he know that it will never come to pass But what it is that God actually doth or giveth in time is all the controversie which is to be spoken of in the third Chapter And were it not for your tenaciousness of contentious notions I needed to have said no more than these few words here of Gods Decrees THE Third Days Conference With an ARMINIAN of Universal and Special REDEMPTION A. The second Article of our Difference is so fundamental and â—omen tous and our distance so great that I cannot believe that you can say any thing sufficient to reconcile us B. They that study Controversie as such are apt every where to finâ— matter of Quarrel and weapons of Contention but they that seeâ— peace do find out the terms and means of peace as sure and easie in them selves which Contenders cannot see Tell me in a word Are not all Parties agreed that Christ by his Merits and Sufferings procured for men all mercies which he giveth them â—â—â—â— and no more but as he may be said to procure them that which he offereth and bringeth to their choice which is properly to procâ—re them that offer or the benefit as offered A. Yes I think both sides will grant this that he purchased all that he giveth and absolutely or fully no more B. Why then all the Controversie is what he giveth men and that belongeth to the third and fourth Articles And so I might dismiss this at the beginning but for your expectations But what is it that maketh you think the difference so great The first Crimination A. 1. The Calvinists and Synodists deny Christ's very Office as he is the Saviour of the World and the second Adam the Redeemer of Mankind and the Mediator between God and Man And all this they confine to a small part of the World * Malderus in 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. d. 5. m. 1. p. 487. Non existimo opinionem illam Calvinisticam quae negat pro omnibus singulis Christâ—m mortuum esse tolerandam esse nec inter studiosos varitaris debere obtinere locum opinionem qui non perinde admittunt quod omnibus in Adamo lapsis iterum sit via salutis facta possibilis per Christum quod habeant per Christum in actu primo paratum vel in actu secundo datum sufficiens auxilium gratiae quo saltem media'e salvari possint c. B. Have you never read what Musculus hath written in Loc. Commun and Bullinger in his Decades for universal Redemption Have you not read the plain words of Calvin cited by Amyraldus in Defens Doct. Calvin though Petavius rail at him for it most furiously Have you not read the writings of Joh. Bergius Conrad Bergius Lud. Crocius Calixtus of Camero and his Followers at Saumers of Testardus Dallaeus Blondel's Preface c. for Universal Redemption Have you not read in the writings of Bishop Rob. Abbots Bishop Carelton Arch-bishop Usher Bishop Hall Dr. Sam. Ward c. their judgments for it Have you not read Bishop Davenant's excellent Dissertation for it de morte Christi Know you not that it was the judgment of Dr. Preston Mr. W. Whateley Mr. W. Fenner and many excellent Divines among us Know you not that Dr. Twisse himself I believe twenty if not forty times over in his Works saith That Christ so far died for all as to procure and give them
yet hereby confesseth that he willeth or decreeth that permission You say then that he decreeth to permit mens unbelief and this is all that the Synod saith of non-Election or leaving men out of the number of the Elect. 2. If you yourselves believe all this with what face can you oppose the same in others If you do not either you believe that none are Infidels and damned or you believe that God doth not permit it to be so but it is done by conquering his Omnipotency or else you know not what you believe choose which you will 3. Do you really differ as Episcopius pretendeth about the cause of Reprobation As to the cause of Damnation all are agreed that sin is the true meritorious cause The question is only of Gods Will or Decree of it And it is not of his sententia prolata or Decree pronounced by Christ in Judgment for of that also it is agreed that sin is the meritorious cause Your oft recurring to your Objections when they have been fully answered puts me on the rediousness of repeating the same Answers Gods * The cause of Gods Will in reprobating Will is considered either ex parte volentis essentially or as extrinsically denominated from the connotation of the Object In the first sense you have not yet declared your selves to deny the common Doctrine of the Christian World that Gods Will is his undivided most simple Essence and that God hath no cause and so his Will in it self hath no cause that in God there is nothing but God Dare you say that a Creature made God yea that so base a thing as Sin made him How then doth it cause his Will which is himself Is Gods Will such a mutuable thing as mans And is it not the first cause of all things And shall men pretending to Learning reproach others for not assigning a cause of the first cause and that Sin which is baser than a Creature causeth the Creator But if you speak of Gods Will as denominated by connotation of the Object mark what we grant you viz. that as thus only Gods Will or Volitions are denominated diverse so are they denominated to be of this or that sort and numerically also distinguished And so they may be said to have a cause but not an efficient cause but only an * Arminius and Arnoldus Corvinus frequently affirm that Faith is not the cause of Gods Election to Glory but only a condition in the object objective cause And what Cause is an Object To let pass the Error of many Logicians it is only as an Object a material constitutive cause at least here And so sin is the objective material cause of that extrinsical denomination and relation of Gods Will called Reprobation to damnation It is that dispositio objecti which is essential to the Object And so as Gods Will may any way be said to have a cause we will say freely after the manner of men that sin is the objective cause of the Decree of damnation And speak now with shame can you say more or less Do you or any of us that are sober and understand our selves differ at all in this 4. And you cheat your selves and others more in saying Not from any ill desert of theirs more than others When if you would speak congruously you should only say that when all deserved to be utterly forsaken God effectually prevaileth with the Wills of his Elect not for any good desert of theirs above others You would infinuate that God must punish no man unless he deserve worse than every man whom he forgiveth which is false Do you not your selves believe that all have sinned and come short of the Glory of God and that God might justly have let them perish Do you not hold your selves that all men are guilty of resisting or sinning against Grace it self as well as against Nature and that God may justly with-hold his Grace from the Rejecters of it and if he did so by all he did not wrong them If God then leave not all as he might do but resolve to prevail with some infallibly do you represent this mercy as if it were cruelty to others What if it be apparent that you your selves charge God with as much of that which you call cruelty to all the World as the Synod doth to the Reprobate alone or as many of us do For they do but say that God leaveth the Reprobate to their own free Wills And you say that he doth so by all the World You say that God giveth all men that hear the Gospel so much Grace as that they may have Christ and Salvation if they will And they say so too as confidently as you do Tell me if you can then what Mercy or Grace you plead for as common more than they you cannot tell me And will you wrangle as if you differed when you do not Only they say and think that they give more to Gods Grace as to the Elect than you do which is to be examined anon And then you will quarrel about the Cause of the first Cause the Will of God and dream of it as if it were like the Will of Man which is an effect and that of many Causes Is it not enough for you that sin is the cause of all punishment but it must also be the efficient cause of Gods Will which is God Yet again I tell you that all sobeâ— men will agree with you that Gods Volitions of extrinfick Objects viz. Reprobations denominate not Gods Essence as such for we use not to say God is Reprobation or Election but only his Essence as terminated ad extra And to gratifie you to the utmost we distinguish an operating efficient Cause from a recipient Cause And we maintain that a Sinner is the recipient Cause of Gods damning Volition or Reprobation As shutting the Windows is the cause that my Room is dark and opening them is the cause that they are light not by causing the Sun to shine but by receiving or not receiving it so man is a receiving Cause of the Effects of Gods Will and Operation and of the Will and Operation it self as extrinsically denominated and diversified by the Effects But this recipient Cause is nothing but cause materialis objectiva which hath two parts the ipsa materia and the materiae dispositio Take not on you still to differ where you do not The third Crimination A. * Of that Deus vult omnes salves fieri saith Alliaco 1. q. 14. F. 1. Potest exponi de voluntate signi vult id est praecipit vel obligat c. 2. Si exponitur de voluntate beneplaciti potest intelligi de Vol. antecedente 3. Si de Vol. beneplaciti proprie dicta debet intelligi ut dicit Magister i. e. nulli salvantur nisi quos Deus vult salvari 4. Vel de generibus singulorum sed at singulis generum By denying Universal Redemption they deny that
doth not only give all men leave and liberty to be holy but offereth them Life and giveth every man his choice whether he will repent and live or refuse Grace and perish And much more then Liberty he giveth them by Commands Threatnings Promises Mercies Means Helps Intreaties Afflictions c. urging them to repent and live XVII And this political Liberty containeth a freedom from all punishment from God to those that cause it not by wilful sin And more than so a certainty of the Reward of Glory XVIII Besides these fore-mentioned Liberties natural and political there is also an ethical or moral Liberty from sinful Habits and Acts And of that we hold that every man is delivered from these sinful Habits and Acts so far as he hath and useth Gods Grace And so that the sanctified are delivered from the reign or servitude of sin XIX And we hold that yet the habits of Grace do not necessitate this or that particular act of Obedience or Love but it is too possible to sin by Omission or Commission notwithstanding these habits XX. And we hold that the ordinary habits of Vice in the wicked do not absolutely necessitate them to this or that sinful Commission in particular at least not to very many sins but that it is possible for them to do some Duties and forbear many sins notwithstanding Original and superadded pravity XXI I add to the XI Sect. before as an instance that mans Will is not by any natural necessity determined to will it s own felicity by the comparate electing Act of the Will but hath Power and Liberty to refuse or nill it This many will think strange but I am sure that it is true For man was made and redeemed and is sanctified for a higher End than his own felicity yea more than one even the Glory and Pleasing of God and the common Good And reason telleth me undoubtedly that I ought to love that best which is best in it self and that if my annihilation would conduce to the saving or happiness of the World or of one Kingdom or of thousands of Persons I ought to consent to it for such ends yea were it but to keep the Earth from perishing and the Sun from being useless to this World And though God in mercy hath so united my felicity with his Glory and the common Good that there never will be use for such an option or choice yet it followeth not thence that I may not say that hypothetically if I were put to it such a thing is possible and would be due And as Paul said I could wish my self accurst from Christ for my Brethrens sake the Jews not I do wish it but would this save them I could wish it because the salvation of thousands and their Service to God is better than Ours even so may we Annihilation is inconsistent with Felicity But Annihilation might and should be chosen before the Annihilation of the World or the perdition of millions if God had called us to it Yea Christ that saith It were good for that man that he had never been born implyeth that a damned man would choose it as a minus malum yea many a one that I have known my self desired it Therefore it is a thing that the Will may do XXII And as another Instance I need not prove that the bonum sensibile which is necessarily loved or willed by some complacency or simple Volition is not necessarily chosen but may freely be rejected Otherwise no sin scarce could be avoided All these sorts or Acts of Free-will we hold and are agreed on And are we yet unfit for concord and coalition for want of acknowledging the freedom of the Will A. I must confess that you have acknowledged much B. And I confess that so have you on the other side I pray you now tell me where lieth our disagreement A. You overwhelm me with Distinctions and numerous particulars so that I suspect you do but by this dust intend to blind our eyes A man may make any thing good by such minute distinguishing and atomizing matters to make them imperceptible Did you deal plainly I could answer you B. Is this an answer fit for a learned or ingenuous man Is confusion plainness with you such plainness too many plani have deceived the Church with and set well-meaning Christians together by the ears so that the Christian World hath long pleased the Devil and found him sport as fighting-Dogs and Cocks do to men and all by the cheats of ignorant confusion Kingdoms and Factions fight about words which they never understood Like the consulting Physicians who could not agree whether their Patieâ—ts Ischury should be cured by Succinum or by Electrum or by Carabe or by Ambarum and the poor man died because they could not consent If I distinguish vainly or falsly sine differentia cannot you shew where the vanity or falshood is How can you tell it is false or vain if you know not where the falshood or vanity is Will you say It is somewhere but I know not where Let that answer from others then to all your reasonings seem sufficient Your reason is false and your argument naught but we know not were the falshood lyeth A ready confutation fit for our Church-troublers I have purposely in the First Book given you all the distinctions about Liberty which I use in an orderly Table that you may easily understand them by seeing them together so that if there be falshood or vanity in them they are open to your easie search and view Tell me what freedom is denied you or else for shame contend no more A. They hold that Original Sin doth necessitate all the unregenerate to do evil and to forbear good so that they cannot possibly forbear Sins of Commission or Omission II. They hold that Grace doth irresistibly neâ—â—ssitate the Elect to believe and love God and forbear Sin so that they cannot do otherwise B. I. Stay a little 1. You must distinguish of several sorts of Good and Evil 2. And of several sorts of Necessity 1. I hope you will not think it false vain or curious to distinguish between 1. An ungodly course of Life and some one particular act of Sin 2. The omission of the predominant Love of God and a course of holy living and special saving acts and the omission of this or that commanded act 2. And I hope I may advise you to distinguish between 1. A constrained Necessity against our Will and a voluntary Necessity of diseased vicious inclination 2. And between a necessity in sensu composito and in sensu diviso 3. And between an uncurable and a curable necessity And then I answer I. We hold that an ungodly man by his Original and superadded pravity is so strongly and fixedly inclined to a sensual ungodly life that in sensu composito while he is such he will certainly live such a life in the main course of it And do not you think so too
I pray you tell me A. It is an idle question For that is but necessitas existentiae He that is ungodly is necessarily ungodly while he is so B. II. VVe hold moreover that the same man will certainly all that time omit the prevalent love of God and all acts proper to the godly A. That 's but the same else he were a godly man B. III. VVe hold also that yet this man may forbear many acts of sin and do many things commanded and so is not under a vicious necessity of committing all Sin or omitting all Duty IV. VVe hold also that his vicious necessity of disposition is curable and not remediless and desperate V. VVe hold also that it is not curable without Gods saving sanctifying Grace proportioned to his disease or pravity VI. VVe hold also that God hath appointed every man certain Duties and Means to be used in order to his cure VII VVe hold that he giveth much outward help and some inward commoner Grace antecedent usually to sanctifying Grace by which much of these Duties and Means may be used VIII And we hold that God appointeth no means in vain nor commandeth any unprofitable Duty or which man hath not sufficient encouragement to use with hope of success and is not unexcuseable if he neglect Do you differ from us in any of this Or is there any thing more that we must have to be capable of your love and concord A. Though I granted you a necessitas existentiae that a wicked mans life while such be wicked in the main for that is but to say that a wicked man is a wicked man yet I grant you not a necessitas effecti as if his pravity made his wicked life unavoidable or necessary as a necessitating cause B. His wicked life is considerable 1. As to his inward actings or to his outward 2. As to the immediate or next Acts and as to the remote 3. And the necessity is voluntary or involuntary And so I say 1. He is under no natural or involuntary necessity but under a * Etsi Amor ille non excedat vires physicaâ— voluntatis humanae per se spectatae eas tamen superat si spectentur difficultates quae occurant Unde fit ut sine speciali auxilio non possit ad actum reduci naturalis inclinatio Dâ—um super omnia diligendi Non potest homo credere mysteria â—fidei â—t oportet ad salutem sine gratiae auxilio etiam quum sufficienter sunt proposita probatum a Deo esse revelatum Non potest homo servare quoad substantiam ullum praeceptum affirmativum supernaturale de interno actu sine auxilio gratiae etiam de singulis Pet. a S. Joseph Thes general de aux p. 81. 82 83. vicious inclination or habit which will produce some effects certainly and others uncertainly 2. The certain effects of the habitual privation of the love of God and enmity to him and to holiness is that his Soul will not in statu praesenti immediately nor till it be cured or over-swayed by a superior cause â— love God above all nor love holiness nor live a holy life Because the Soul will not go contrary to its habitual inclination without somewhat to over-power that habit An effect will not be contrary to the fixed inclination of its cause 3. And another certain effect of a Soul predominantly habituated to sensâ—ality is that it will live a sensual life constantly as to the bent of inward Volitions and ordinarily as occasion serveth in outward actions 4. But being not so necessitated to every Sin nor against every Duty and means of Cure this Soul is not under a necessity of so continuing uncured Now if it be the present voluntary ascertaining Disposition which you deny then 1. You must hold that an Enemy of God can immediately love him above all and live a holy life 2. And that there is some cause in a man most habitually sensual by which he can forbear both the inward desires and outward acts of sensuality which are contradictions to him that knoweth what a prevalent fixed habit is 3. And that all wicked Enemies of God have in them a cause that can immediately cure all their own enmity and pravity without Gods Spirit of Grace or else have his Spirit and Grace immediately at an instant at command And if all a mans Original Sin and contracted habits be so easily laid by at any minute the cure seemeth much easier than the depravation which perhaps hath been a long time growing to that strength which is contrary to all the Worlds experience As it is easier to kindle a fire in the City than to quench it and to catch the Plague or any Disease than to cure it or to wound the Body than to heal it or to pull down a House than to build it to drown a Ship than to make it c. So all Ministers Tutors Parents Christians yea persons find how wofully hard it proveth to cure one Sin To cure the Ignorant the Unbelieving the Hard-hearted the Proud the Lustful the Covetous the Passionate much more the malignant Enemies of God and holiness What need of the sanctification of the Holy Ghost or the medicinal Grace of Christ if the very depraved Will can do all in a moment of it self and depose its enmity A. You speak to me as if I were a Pelagian I am not for any of this But will rather yield to what you say B. II. And as for your second Charge * Vid. quae haâ—â—t Ruiz de praedefin tr 2. d. 8. per tot de necessitate vaga consistentâ— cum libertate secundum quid Et a. 9. p. 137. That all good actions are fore decreed of God proved and multitudes cited that defend it that they assert unresistible necessitating Grace I pray you leave it to the Fourth Article which is its proper place to avoid repetition But here let me remember you by the way 1. That not to love God not to believe not to repent not to live holily are no Acts and therefore no Effects of power but a privation 2. That therefore Gods causing a man to love him to Believe to Repent to be Holy is not to deprive him of any power but to give him act and power 3. Therefore it is not a depriving him of any true Liberty For true Liberty is the Liberty of some faculty or power 4. But if you will call a voluntary Impotency and Viciousness by the name of a free-power then God taketh away such Power by giving us Power and such Liberty by making us free But proceed to the next Crimination The second Crimination A. * The Arminians say that God giveth a supernatural power even to the Will it self and that by immediate operation Synod art 3. 4. p. 15 c. And they add Mente illuminata voluntati concessa supernaturali potentia partim per illuminationem partim per virium immediatam insusionem
usu ut in auditâ— verbi cum attentione meditatione virâ—ute sua efficaci singulis excitis liberrime sine coactionis impulsu raptâ— nova luce accensa in mente nova vero virtute voluntati communicata c. Qui assentiuntur obsequâ—ntur spiritui sancto virtute ejusdem id faciunt non tamen sine actione motu annixu Id. p. 722. Still note that the Grace called sufficient is that which giveth the Power without the Act Therefore as many things concur to denominate us able so do they to sufficiency of Grace Malderus in 12. qu. 111. â— 3. d. 3. saith Recte quidam eruditus annotavit neque praedicationem aut excitationem externam neque internam illuminationem intellectus simpliciter esse gratiam sufficientem quamvis in sâ—o genere quaeque sufficiens dici potest c. sed voluntas per boni affectus aspirationem supernaturali motione excitanda est Our Bradward shortneth all the Controversie li. 13. cor p. 208 109. telling us that Gods Will is the cause of every future and so of the future form of sin and that if there were no God there would be no Impossibile Whereas I think there would be nothing but impossibles For it would be impossible that any thing should ever be But there would be no propositions de impossibili Nay he talks of a non-posse esse impossibile and calls this mirum corrollarium Adrian Quodl 3. fol. 16. Quis duplicitur potest crederese a peccatis abstinere non posse 1. Quod non posset sine speciali Dei gratia adjutorio sic non errat 2. Absolute credendo se non abstinere posse a peccata aut non posse ad vitandum peccata a Deo sufficiens auxilium impetraâ—â— etiamsi fecerit quod in se est Et hic error est species infidelitatis opposita fidei ad quam obligatur credendo Deum juste pie miscricorditer mundum gubernare Illi-enim manifestissime repugnat apud nunquemque sanae mentis Deum homini imputare ad culpam ad quod vitandum nec dedit nec dare paratus est sufficientem facultatem homini inquam facienti totum quod in se est medium helps concauses c. B. You say true But remember still that this is from no change in the natural faculty as you confess For it was never in any man a power e. g. to act without dependance on God nor to act without an Object in Specie nor to act on an incongruous uncapable Object nor without a due medium and necessary concauses Now if you mean that the change is not on mans faculties but on the Objects Medium Causes c. that men do not love God while unholy you are notoriously mistaken For it is Sin that hindereth And God is the same God and Christ the same Christ and the Word the same and oft the preaching the same to a Believer and an Unbeliever So that though outward helps and hinderances do much the inward cause is most considerable And if all were right within it were no sin in us to be disabled by outward changes It is no sin not to hear without a Preacher or not to see that which is invisible or not to understand that which is not Intelligible or not to love that which is not Amiable or that which is by distance or unfit mediums made no Object of our Acts no more than not to touch the Moon or not to see into the bowels of the Earth Therefore though it 's true that the Will is related as a power to capable Objects and not as a power to things that by incapacity are no Objects yet the change that is made on it self by Sin and Grace doth not make it no power and a power in this natural essential sense It is one thing that is called natural power or faculty and another thing that is called Aright disposition or habit Therefore as to the first the Soul of every man hath a true natural power to repent believe and love God and they omit it not for want of natural power but of something else A. Call it then a moral power if you will B. We must so call it But you must know what that is It is not a power of the same sort with the natural power The very word Power is equivocal or analogous to them Else Grace should increase the Essence of the Soul or make a man to be more a man than he was before And Dr. Twisse derideth the Arminians for saying that potentia fundatur in potentia viz. Moralis in naturali which were very just if it were powers of the same kind that were spoken of but now being otherwise it is unjust for no doubt but potentia moralis is in potentia naturali as health is in the Body Quest 4. But I further ask you Do you think that any men do now in an unregenerate state love God above all and live a holy heavenly life yea or effectually and savingly believe by the meer power of their natural faculties till they are changed A. No that 's a contradiction to be unholy and holy I am none of those Pelagians that make Grace unnecessary to mans cure B. Are you not convinced then that where the natural power is existent something is wanting without which the acts of Holiness will not be performed Tell me then what that is A. That which is wanting to a man that hath sufficient Grace is nothing but his own Concurrence or Will For without any special Grace differing from sufficient he can believe But that which is wanting to them that have it not is sufficient Grace it self for believing which they want for abusing the antecedent Grace sufficient for preparation B. We speak not now of Grace as efficient ex parte Dei agentis But of Grace as it is in us or an effect of the former what is it in man that is wanting to believing Is it a natural Power or a right Disposition or what A. Till a man have sufficient Grace to believe it is proper strength or power it self that he wanteth and sufficient Grace is such a power But when he hath it he wanteth nothing but the Act which he can excite and doth not B. I confess I find Arminius Arnoldus Corvinus and others granting that all men are unable to believe till Grace enable them and more than so saith Arnoldus There is more strength or power necessary now to believe in Christ than was necessary to Adam to keep all the Law partly because of the mysteriousness of Faith and partly because we must first be restored to a new ability which requireth more power than to keep what we had A sly equivocation turning the question from the potentia operata to the potentia operans If it did require more power in the efficient so to renew us it followeth not that he thereby putteth more power into us than Adam had But Gods Power hath no degrees
arbore scientiae boni mali transgressus est propter quod nos omnes peccatores constituti sumus rei facti condemnationis mortis B. 1. Mark that he expresly maketh us by Adam's sin to be Peccatores rei constituti 2. So in the next Thesis An peccatum Originis sit tantum carentia justitiae Originalis sanctimoniae primaevae cum inclinatione ad peccandum quae antea in homine fuit licet non ita vehemens aeque inordinata ut nunc est propter amissum favorem Dei maledictionem ejusdem amissionem ejus boni quo in ordinem redigebatur An vero contrarius quidam habitus justitiae sanctimoniae infusus vel ingressus acquisitus post peccatum perpetratum Dub. Here he confesseth also a positive Original Sin in the inordinateness of the sensual inclination 3. When he denieth Adam's Act to be our Original 1. He denieth not for no Christian denieth it to be the Original Sin that is the first sin and the cause of ours 2. And he seemeth but to mean that Adam's Sin individually was not ours which is most certain For the same Accident cannot be in two distinct Subjects If our persons be not every one Adam's person it is impossible that the same individual sin or guilt should be his and ours any more than the same individual Soul If God did arbitrarily meerly because he would do it impute Adam's fact to all Mankind and to every one personally this would make it as many sins as there be persons One mans Original Sin would not be anothers and none of theirs the same quoad formam numericam with Adam's Adams is Adams and yours is yours and mine is mine We cannot therefore be heretick men for such doubtful forms of speech in which we differ among our selves The plain truth is the matter is not so well opened commonly among us as to allow us to condemn others till we have better done our own parts My thoughts are these 1. That we were seminally and virtually really in Adam having the very essence of our Souls derived from him not being in him only as the House is in the head of the Architect but as an essential form is in the generater though we call both esse in causa 2. That we were not personally in Adam though seminally that is we were not natural persons in him when he sinned 3. God supposeth no man to have been what he was not or done what he did not For he erreth not 4. God is not the Author of Sin Therefore he doth not by arbitrary imputing of Adam's act and reputing us to have done what we did not make all men Sinners which Adam could not do 5. But God doth truly repute us to have been seminally in Adam and to have no Essence but what is really derived from his Essence And as when a man is guilty no part of him is innocent neque semen neque sanguis though they have not a distinct guilt but participative qua partes rei so we were Sinners in that act and guilty of that act so far as we were partes Adami and in him 6. This was not to be at that time guilty as distinct persons for we were not such 7. But we that were then only seminally inexistent after became real distinct persons and then that guilt even of Adam's fact adhering still to us became reatus personae because the Subjects of it are personae Even as if Eve had been made after the Fall of Adam's Rib that Rib at first was guilty not by another but the same numerical guilt that Adam was as part of a Sinner For it was a capable Subject of no more But when that same Rib was made a person it would be a guilty person For it lost not the guilt by that change But then it is not only or chiefly our Bodies which are from Adam which are from the elements in our daily food but our Souls And therefore the adherence of the guilt to a rational spirit essentially flowing from anothers essence is more easily understood and defended than that of the corporal Rib could be 8. I do contrary to excellent Jos Placeus suppose that in primo instanti this our participation in Adam's guilt is in order before our qualitative pravity And that God doth therefore deny us his Spirit first to make us originally holy not only because Adam but because we in Adam as aforesaid did forfeit and expel it 9. I think that mens assertion of a Decree or Covenant of God that if Adam fell any more should be imputed to his Off-spring than they were thus really guilty of themselves is the bold addition of mens invention of greater audacity than the addition of Ceremonies to the Worship of God which yet some are more sensible of 10. I think that if Adam had not sinned that same first sin but had sinned another sin the next hour or day or moneth or year or any time before Generation it would have been equally ours as this first was because we were equally in him and no Scripture-Covenant makes a difference 11. I think that whereas Adam's sin had twenty particular sins as parts of the whole we were guilty of all as well as of the first act or part else we should not be guilty of his eating the forbidden â—ruit for doubtless that was not the first His incogitancy and non-Nolition and sinful Volitions were before it Yea I doubt not but we are guilty of all the sin that Adam committed from his first sin till the making of the New-Covenant at least 12. I doubt not but if Adam had never sinned yet supposing the same Covenant to stand if his Sons after him had sinned we should have been guilty of it as we are of his sin yea had it been but our nearest Parents 13. I doubt not but that we are still so guilty of our nearer Parents Sins further than as the introduction of the new pardoning Covenant and the oft pardons by it and the incapacity of nature to bear any more punishment may make a difference This is not a place voluminously to prove all this But if any Arminians be tempted to speak doubtingly of this Original Guilt while they confess Original sinful pravity 1. Blame your own additions to Gods Covenant and your obscure writings of the thing 2. And say not that they deny Original Sin but express the matter as it is It seemeth that Arminius by Peccatores rei constituti sumus meaneth as we do C. I must confess your explication is rational and concilatory But how can you excuse Corvinus B. See but how he defendeth Arminius against Tilenus as holding our Original Sin to be truly Sin and a punishment for Sin and you will think that he denieth it not himself See also what Twisse supposeth him to grant Cont. Corvin p. 253 254. Indeed he doth two much obscure and extenuate the formalem rationem peccati in
comparison of the ratio poenae in it But I much suspect that there is much Logomachie in the controversie and that it is mostly de nomine peccati non de re For I perceive some of them conceive of peccatum as a word that hath only an active signification from peccare And because an Infant doth not peccare actualiter therefore they say that Original Sin is not strictly called Peccatum meaning that the Name properly agreeth only to an evil Act. And can a Controversie de nomine make a heresie Ask them these Questions 1. Whether an Infant be not animal rationale liberum as having the same natural faculties with the Adult 2. Whether he be not then capable of virtuous and vicious Dispositions 3. And whether these are not bonum malum morale If he be not capable of malum morale than neither of bonum morale And if so then not of Holiness nor any moral aptitude for Heaven any more than a Beast This they all deny and therefore must needs say that their vicious inclinations are malum morale adapting them not only physically for physical evil but morally for punishment And truly if they will call Sin such a moral evil I will not break communion with them about the sense of Peccare C. But Amesius tells Grevinchovius that it may be proved by good witnesses that he denied Original Sin which Dr. Twisse many times over and over reciteth contra Corvinum B. As the instance of three or four single persons is nothing to my business so I am no judge of any such Reports unless I had heard the witnesses my self I have had so many notorious lyes confidently reported of me by men not contemptible that it hath taught me to be backward in receiving any Accusations and judging before I hear the accused Especially a man that writeth much is more to be judged of by his Writings than by Back-biters Reports C. But Episcopius is no way to be excused Nor Bishop Jer. Taylor who copiously plead against Original Sin B. Therefore they are not the persons that I have now to do with but have else-where as copiously proved Original Sin and confuted such Arguments as they use But the chief of my Arguments they touch not The second Crimination C. They say that man before regeneration can do that which is spiritually good and hath power to use his naturals well so that by degrees he may thereby come up to a state of saving Grace or be fitted to be a Believer And that some can believe and repent that do not Whereas the Scripture maketh men dead in sin and out of Christ we can do nothing B. This unhappy CAN I tell you is our Cannon that battereth our Peace and Love and pardon me if I tell you as I did them that I doubt whether you understand well what it signifieth Tell me Quest. 1. Have not wicked men natural life Or are they dead C. No man doubteth of that B. Quest 2. Have they not natural powers or faculties for natural Acts C. Nor is that denied by any man B. Quest. 3. Is it not the same natural faculty of Intellection by which we understand and believe things common and spiritual And the same natural faculty of willing by which we love or will them both C. Nor is that questioned by any B. Quest 4. Is there not such a thing as common Grace distinct from and short of true Regeneration or Sanctification C. Yes we are all agreed of that B. Quest. 5. Is there any Nation or People in the World that are not obliged by God to use some means towards their own Conversion and to forbear their Sin C. No doubt of it but they are obliged to perfect Obedience and they are specially obliged to repent and use some means thereto B. Quest 6. Is there not such a thing in the World as a true power to do something that never is done and forbear what is not forborn C. I know not what to say to that An hypothetical power and secundum quid so called there is But of proper power I doubt Dr. Twisse against Hord li. 1. p. 71. saith Suppose all men had power to do any good If God will not give them velle quod possunt is it possible that they should velle bonum if God will not work it in them B. It is a logical impossibility of consequence nothing to the purpose which also fore-knowledge would infer But as to real power denominating the Object possible it is a palpable contradiction to say I have true power to do an impossible thing when to say I have power to do it and to say it is possible to me are all one Else-where Dr. Twisse can say that Gods velle eventum is not necessary ad possibilitatem sed ad eventum Do you doubt whether Adam was able to have forborn the sin and so sinned for want of power to do otherwise C. An obediential and passive power he had and faculties that were able hypothetically if God had predetermined them by premotion and effectual Grace But of the rest I doubt B. We will not be diverted with empty words A dead man hath an obediential passive power as the School mean it An hypothetical or conditional power is no power when the condition is not existent If you say Adam could not but sin you make his standing a natural impossibility and God the cause of all his sin whom he could no more overcome therein than make a World And will men then believe that God hateth that sin which he unresistibly causeth and sent Christ to die for it and will damn men for not doing natural impossibilities C. Well! suppose as commonly we do that Adam was able to have stood and consequently that there is a true power in the World that 's never acted B. Quest. 7. Is no man by Nature with common helps and Grace able to do more good than he doth and forbear more sin C. No doubt he can if he will But the doubt is of his Will B. Quest. 8. Is no man by Nature and common Grace able to will the doing of more good and forbearing more evil than he so willeth C. His Will hath natural power but it is contrarily disposed B. Quest 9. Can no man by Nature and common Grace notwithstanding the undisposedness of his Will yet so far restrain or prevail against his undisposedness as actually to will and do more good and less evil than he willeth and doth C. If Adam could have forborn all sin I must think common Grace Pâ—aecipitur nobis bene agere non quod possimus ex nobis illud facere sed quia si faciamus totum quod in nobis est semper Deus paratus sit facere quod in se est Aegid Colum. Quodl 2. qu. 30. p. 121 122. Nostrum est enim secundum Damascenum sequi Deum vocantem ad virtutem vel diabolum vocantem ad malitiam unde Damas l. 2.
Jesuites hold that Infants that have no remedy are excluded from Glory only for Original Sin B. And I think so do all Christians or should do 1. Of all the Adult there is no question Is there any that hath no sin of his own Or doth God forgive all their own sin to the damned And as to Infants 1. Wise men should not vex Gods Church with matters no more revealed 2. All the Scripture maketh them members as it were of their nearer Parents as well as of Adam and as I have proved to you threatneth them for nearer Parents sins even in the Second Commandment and Exod. 34. as well as for Adam's And all the world being Gen. 3. 15. brought under a Covenant or Law of Grace which conditionally pardoneth all sin the not-believing of the Parent is the cause of the non-liberation or not-pardoning of himself and his Infant How can you say then that they suffer only for Adam's sin 3. And sure their natural pollution is their own sin And the Church of England Art 9. thus describeth Original Sin Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam as the Pelagians do vainly talk but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is ingendred of the Off-spring of Adam whereby man is very far gone from Original Righteousness and is of his own nature inclined to evil So that the Flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit and therefore in every person born into this world it deserveth Gods Wrath and Damnation And this infection of Nature doth remain yea in them that are regenerated whereby the lust of the Flesh called in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which some do expound the Wisdom some Sensuality some the Affection some the Desire of the Flesh is not subject to the Law of God Though I think that Text Rom. 8. speak not of the Regenerate C. I include this Corruption when I speak of Adam's sin imputed And though the Article mention not this Imputation I suppose it was but through forgetfulness and not that they denied it as no part of Original Sin B. * Vid. Chamier Paustr at To. 3. l. 1. c. 2. 7 8. Contr Pigh Salmeron Pet. Mart. in Rom. 5. Placaeum in Thes Salmuriens Vol. 1. in Tractat. pecub defens de Imputatpeccati Adae who are less for the imput of Adam's sin than others e contra vid. And Rivet's enumeration of Writers for that imputation Defens Concil c. I have nothing to do with that and am no judge of other mens thoughts that are dead All that I desire you to observe is that all understanding Protestants agree that the sole Law of Innocency Obey perfectly and live is not the Law that God governeth the World or any in it by since the Covenant of Grace was made but all are under a Law of Mercy And therefore Parents and Children in and out of the Church are judged by that Law which they were under and not by the Law of Innocency alone without any remedying Law of Mercy THE Seventh Days Conference Between A. and B. Of SUFFICIENT and EFFECTUAL GRACE A. You have made us hitherto believe that the Controversies about Predestination and Redemption are all resolved into those of Free-will and Grace and if there be no difference here there can be none there Let us now then come to the core of the Controversie which is all The first Crimination 1. The Calvinists deny sufficient Grace * By sufficient Grace is meant that by which a man may be saved and without which he cannot in q. Vasqu in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp 97. c. 1. 1. Some say that to some men for former sin God penally denieth Grace sufficient for Faith and Repentance So Tostat in Mal. 4. q. 12. Greg. Armin. 1. d. 46. qu. unica Cajet in Joh. c. 19. Roffens Contr. Luther ar 26. Tapper in art 7. pag. 254. Henric. quodl 8. q. 5. 2. Others say that auxilium sufficiens is offered to all and denied to no man in this life how obdurate hower which Vasq in 1. Tho. q. 23. d. 98. c. 3. saith is the commoner Opinion of the Schools Ita Adrian in 4. q. 1. de poenit Sotus de nat gra c. 18. Driedo de Red. c. 3. 5. Vega in Conc. Trid. l. 13. c. 13 c. But Vasquez saith cap. 5. That ad poenitentiam ad fidem it is non omnibus momentis sed certis temporibus datum They commonly agree to Augustines words though none know just how God changeth Wills Certum est nos velle cum volumus sed ille facit ut velimus bonum Et certum est nos facere cum facimus sed ille facit ut faciamus praebendo vires efficacissimas De Grat. lib. arb l. c. 16. c. 17. Ut vâ—limus sine nobis operatur These words put his Expositors hard to it And Vasquez saith That ut is here put finally and the meaning is that to make us willing he giveth us without us his preventing or operating Grace or as Greg. his impulse And if it mean any more it cannot be true For doubtless man is the Agent or Willer when he willeth So li. 1. ad Simplician q. 2. Aliter Dâ—us praestat ut velimus aliter praestat quod voluerimus Ut velimus enim suum esse vâ—luit nostrum Suum vocando nostrum sequendo quod autem voluerimus solus praestat id est posse bene agere semper beate videre where the words also are obscure but Vasquez noteth that here the ut is not final as before and that Voluerimus is not preterpefect tense but the future tense as the following words explain it else he should contradict himself Et de Eccles dogm c. 21. Manet ad quâ—râ—ndam salutem â—rbitrii libertas sed admonentâ— prius Deo invitante ad salutem ut vel eligat vel sequatur Et initium salutis nostra Deo miserante habemus ut acquiescamus saluti-â—erae inspirationi nostra potestatis est and so make all men that are damned to suffer for meer Impossibilities having no Grace to enable them to escape Sin or Misery And consequently that Adam's sin only was avoidable for which all the World is cast into a necessity of sinning and none but a few elect ones have ever had so much as the possibility of any true remedy Yea many of them deny that Adam himself had sufficient Grace B. 1. The word Sufficient is sometimes taken for all that is any way needful and so it is that they commonly deny sufficiency of uneffectual Grace More Grace might have certainly produced the Effect A man is commonly said to have enough who needeth no more Now more is here useful needful desirable to the facilitating and ascertaining the event If you are not agreed with them in this why do you pray for more Grace and labour for more and take it to be a sign of
pâ—â—supponit opus miserecordiâ— in ea â—undatur tanquam iâ— prima radice quia ne procedatur in infinitum deveniendum est ad aliquid quod ex sola bonitate divinae voluntatis dâ—pendeat B. I hope you have no malignant desire to extenuate Gods Grace but are willing to acknowledge it to be as great and large as indeed it is if you can discern the proof C. God best knoweth how to honour himself B. Quest. 1. Do you think that all the World or all that shall perish yea or any part of the World is under the meer Curse of the Law of Innocency as violated by Adam without any remedy or mercy C. I think they are without real Remedy though not without all Mercy for a delay of punishment is mercy B. Quest 2. Do you think that they are only under the Curse of that Law as the Devils are without any possibility or offers of a remedy or that they are also still under the Covenant-Offers of Life upon condition of Innocency C. I cannot suppose God now to offer a man Life on condition he be no Sinner whom he knoweth to be a Sinner For such an Offer is equivalent to a sentence of Death or denial of Life Nor can I say that they are as desperate as the Devils because they know not the desperateness of their case B. Quest. 3. Do you think all the difference between them and Devils lieth in delay and ignorance of their misery Then the most ignorant and presumptuous of them is the least miserable though the most sinful which cannot be Quest 4. But do you think that no Meâ—cy is to be offered â—o such C. Yes because we know not who are Elect and who not B. Quest. 5. Are we to offer men mercy only as Elect or rather as Sinners and miserable under a Law of Grace and as Subjects of God obliged by that Law to accept it C. We offer it to all Sinners that the Elect may receive it B. Quest. 6. Are none but the Elect under a Law of Grace as the rule of their Duty their expectation and of Judgment C. Others may be under the Obligations of it but not under the Gâ—aâ—e of it B. Remember then 1. That they are not lawless 2. That they are not under that meer violated Law of Innocency Be innocent and live 3. That they are under the Obligations of the Law of Grace Quest 7. Is there any of them that are not bound to use certain means appointed of God in order towards their own Salvation C. They are bound to intend their own Salvation and with that intention to use some means But God intends it not B. Quest. 8. Doth God command men on pain of damnation to any vain endeavours or use of means C. He commandeth it not in vain for it shall make them unexcuseable 2. They are not to judge their endeavours vain because they know it not 3. But in the issue all will be in vain to them B. Quest 9. Would it be in vain to them if they really did the utmost that common Grace enableth any men to do C. It is not properly Grace to them and so not common 2. It would be in vain to them B. Quest 10. Is that vain which bringeth a man into the nearest preparation for special Grace and nearest to the Kingdom of God C. To the Elect it is not vain Nor to others for their sakes Nor to others as to the lessening of their pains in Hell But as to their Salvation it is B. Quest 11. Who would it be long of or be reputed the Cause if it be in vain C. Of themselves who are born in sin from Adam and are Unbelievers B. You suppose it impossible for them to believe and impossible for them not to be the Children of Adam They made not themselves and you suppose that for want of Grace they cannot believe Quest 12. When Death shall acquaint them with the impossibility that they were under do you think 1. That it will be the way of glorifying the Justice of God in Judgment to have the World know that he condemneth Sinners meerly because he will condemn them for that which they never had any more true power to avoid than to make a World 2. Or will their Consciences in Hell accuse them or torment them for that which they then know was naturally impossible and caused by God C. We know not how God will glorifie his Justice or how their Consciences will torment them It may be they shall then be as ignorant of the necessitating cause as now B. 1. Do you know it now and shall not they know it then 2. God telleth us the contrary That all hidden things shall be brought to light and that God will justifie his own proceedings by proving that mens destruction is of themselves that every mouth may be stopped and all the World be guilty before God And he calleth it his Righteousness in judging to give to every man according to his Works and that mens Consciences shall then excuse them or accuse them when God shall judge the secrets of their hearâ—s and not when he shall torment them by deceiving them Rom. 2. 2 Thess 1. 6 7 8 9 10. Matth 25. 7. 23 24. 2 Tim. 4. 8 9. Rom. 14. 10. Gen. 18. 24 25. Quest 13. Do you believe that none but the Elect have now any real mercy besides a delay of their future misery and hopes of its abatement C. I do For all things are to be judged of by the end And that is really no mercy which is not intended to a mans happiness but his misery As Afflictions are no evils to the Elect because they are intended and work together for their good B. Is the offer of Christ and Life no mercy Is all Gods patience and forbearance as a means to lead them to repentance no mercy Is all the teaching perswading intreating condescension of Christ no mercy See what error here you run into and how contrary to Scripture and to nature it self 1. You contradict Gods Word which frequently calleth them mercies Psal 145. 9. 106. 7. 45. Neh. 9. 19 27 28 31. Jon. 4. 2. Rom. 2. 4. Matth. 18. 33. Isa 63. 9. Ezek. 16. 2. You deny the chiefest part of mens duty even to accept of mercy to improve mercy to be thankful for mercy to be led by Gods good-ness to Repentance to use mercies as Gods Talents to his Glory c. If you say They know not but they are mercies you feign God to bind men to duty but by deceit It is as mercies and not as that which for ought they know may be mercies that they are to be valued used c. 3. You excuse men from the greatest aggravation of their sin even sinning against Mercies How can they sin against them that have none 4. You feign Gods Justice to be stragely glorified by damning men in Hell for ever for sinning against mercy who never had any
thank himself too for all the good he does that Being as much of him as the other c. Answ It follows not For 1. Of all the good that man doth God is still the moral Cause egging on to it by all c. 2. And the same Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightning the Mind renewing the Will healing the spring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it and in a word making it every way more it self God must be more an Owner than man And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will because it flowed from Divine Goodness That which is good in man by way of Off-spring being so in God by way of Well-spring Ibid. p. 10. the same degree of impress or influx or force which causeth one man to believe or act is not sufficient to cause any other worse disposed man to believe or act nor the same man when he is more ill disposed and hindered 4. If we put the case of men equally disposed it is impossibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally disposed Nay it is most probable that they are not Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cause a difference than their countenances have of particles making the wonderful diversity which we see Nor is the same man long equally disposed 5. Men equally disposed if such there were may have unequal impediments without and in their bodies and temptations which may cause them to need unequal help of Grace 6. The same individual Impress which causeth no more than a Power causeth not the Act also For that is a contradiction to cause the Act and not to cause it 7. But a less degree of impulse or help may cause the act in one when a greater degree causeth it not in another 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in â—ll other diversities in the World by the diverse receptive dispositions of the Patient Which made Johan Sarisberiensis in Nugis Curial and many School-men to liken God with some acknowledged difference in his Operations to the Sun which by one invaried efflux of motive illuminative and calefactive power causeth innumerable varieties of effects as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Dispositions 9. But all good disposition or preparation is of God But by such ways of operation as we are searching after But all ill disposition is from our selves 10. To conclude God giveth men sometimes as much power to Will or Act when they do not as they have when they do But usually not an equal predisposition some having more indisposed themselves which is to be changed by contrary acts But whether de facto men equally enabled predisposed helped and hindered do yet without any cause but their own free-will it self act or will variously is a question that these Controversies need not come to That such were there such in the World could do it I take for granted what-ever they do The Controversie is well known which Hobbes hath raised in the World who saith That to be free and to be willing is all one and that every act of the Will is as truly necessitated by physical premotion as the motions of any Engine are And that we talk of liberty and contingency in the dark not that there is any such thing indeed but when we know not the train of Causes we use those names which signifie but our ignorance And that the first Cause and other superior Causes do by premotion as much necessitate each Volition as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow And the Dominicans predetermination and Camero's necessitation by a train of second Causes is the same I think But I think God hath made a very good use by his over-ruling ordination of the Doctrine of Hobbes learnedly and timerously or cautelously seconded by Gassendus and improved by Benedictus Spinosa an Apostate Jew in his Tractatus Politico-theologicus For the goodness and learning of such worthy men as were Alvarez Twisse Camero in all other points moderate and admirably judicious hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine which Hobbes and Spinosa having plainly and nakedly propounded is now detested by almost all good men For from thence they have plainly inferred the subversion of all morality as distinct from physical motion and consequently of all true Religion I deny not that I find my self the Controversie in it self exceeding difficult and that I have not been without temptations to their Opinion nor yet am And that indeed all pretended middle ways between Hobbes his Necessitation Physical and true Free-will are but fancies as far as I can perceive And if I leave true Free-will I must turn to their necessitation I confess their arguing is very plausible that there is no Effect without a Cause and that when ever the Will chooseth one thing and refuseth another there is some antecedent Cause in the power disposition or external things and that the same Cause in the same state and mode having no difference in it self doth always produce the same effect Otherwise the diversity should have no cause And that the Will being in the same disposition and having all the same objects helps impediments and other circumstances will have the same acts All this is plausible But 1. If I receive it I must let go almost all Religion as well as Christianity of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion And we must not reduce certainties to the obscurest unsearchable uncertainties 2. And in God himself their foundation is confuted For he that is the first Cause eodem modo se habens sine ulla diversitate unicus plurima immo omnia causat Therefore their Principle is false 3. And finding man made after the Image of God not only as holy but as man Gen. 6. I have great reason to think that Free-will is part of his natural Image and that as God is a causa unica plurimorum so may Free-will be And that as a God is causa prima entium so Free-will may be a kind of causa prima not actionis qua talis but of the comparative moral species of its own acts as choosing this thing rather than that which is no addition to real entity but a wonderful mode of it which man cannot tell whether he should call something or nothing 4. I say therefore that here is no Effect without a Cause Free-will may be the cause of various Effects without a various predisposition C. Doth not the Will act as it is disposed to act B. That it acteth not always according to Habits which are more than dispositions is certain by experience For objects oft prevail against habits and habits do not necessitate C. That is because the Will is otherwise disposed by some contrary stronger habits As either
so doing it was not a Will but bruitish Appetite B. The Understanding said truly It is pleasant and Appetible and so the Will in its initial desire sinned not But that it looked no further and excited not the Intellect to remember and it self to desire more to please God was by an abuse of its power and liberty of self-determining and so the sensible good prevailed because the superior good was forgotten and neglected And the Will may thus suspend its act after an intellectual perception without being bruitish though it so â—ar disobey Reason its guide C. These things are exceeding intricate and difficult for all that you say B. They are so * The same I say of objective and intellectual necessitation of the Will saith H. Kipping truly Inst Philos Nat. li. 9. c. 10. pag. 416. Errant Scholae reformatâ— doctores qui asserunt voluntatem ad actum suum determinari a judicio intellectus ita ut voluntatic libertas nulla sit constricta vero sit ad intellectus ductum a quo semper determinatur Joh. Camero Mart. Schogkius Hornbeck Maccovius Heerbord Hos prolixe bene refellit Episcopius But forget not that the great difficulty is between us and the Hobbists or Infidels and Fatists and not between the true Christians among themselves as to our present Controversies I confess that the confuting of their Opinion that all Volitions are necessitated unavoidably by Gods Operation is a far harder work than the reconciling of the Lutherans and Calvinists who go upon no such Principles Tell me Is this it that you would come to or not If you once perswade me that God causeth all sinful Volitions as necessarily as he causeth a Tree to grow and that man can no more avoid them and that liberty of Will signifieth no more than velle or not nolens velle and so that God is the prime irresistible cause of all Sin as much as of all Good so far as it is capable of a Cause I must needs next believe 1. That God hateth not his own Work yea that he loveth it 2. That he hateth no man for it 3. That moral Good and Evil is nothing in man but such as obeying or disobeying proportionably in a Horse or Dog 4. Yea far less because man doth â—ut as my pen which writeth as I move it in respect to God But so is not my Horse or Dog to me 5. And how then to judge of all the Scripture the Ministry of the Incarnation and Death of Christ of the Duties of a Christian life of Hell c. it 's easie to perceive viz. That as God differenceth Men and Toads meerly because he will do so even so doth he the good and the bad in the World and that Sin is no evil any way but to our selves and that God is as much the cause of it as of Sickness and is as well pleased with the Worlds Infidelity and Impiety as with the Churches Sanctity And that he will no otherwise damn men for Sin than erbitarily to make such baser than others as Dogs are than men Benedictus Spinosa hath given you the Consectaries more at large O how heartlesly should I preach and pray how carelesly should I live if once you brought me to this Opinion that all sin is the unresistible Work of God so far as it is a work as much as holiness is C. If there be no middle between Free-will and this Impiety as I confess I cannot disprove your Consectaries it's time for us to turn our studies against the common Enemies of all Religion and Morality instead of contending with one another specially when they have so much to say B. And do you think they do well and friendly by the Church who take these mens part and own their Cause in the foundation and entangle poor Souls in such intricate difficulties when we that know not the least of Gods Creatures or the mysteries of any of his Works do little know all the quick and intricate actions of our own Souls In a word man hath more power to good than he useth and that power is called sufficient or necessary Grace to the act though there be many difficulties which no one of either side can resolve The second Crimination C. But I fear many of them with Pelagius by GRACE do mean nothing So Dr. Twisse frequently repeateth that meeâ— posse credere is but Nature and not Grace because it is equally a posse non credere But 1. A natural power reprieved by Grace and preserved and given for gracious ends 2. And many and great helps of Grace to excite and rectifie it may be called an effect of Grace but Nature it self at least when they speak of the Heathens who they say have some kind of Grace B. Turn your eyes a little from the name of Pelagius and every thing else that useth to blind Disputers with prejudice and partiality and then answer me these following questions Quest. 1. Do you think that Mercy contrary to sinful Commerit is not properly Grace C. I confess it is B. Quest. 2. Is not the whole frame of Humane Nature and our Utensils put into the hand and power of Christ the Redeemer to be managed by him to his Mediatory ends Joh. 17. 2. Math. 28. 19 20. Joh. 13. 3. Ephes 1. 22 23. Phil. 2. 7 8 9 10 11 12. For this end he died rose and revived that he might be Lord both of the Dead and Living Rom. 14. 9. Joh. 5. 22 23 24. The Father judgeth no man but hath committed all Judgment to the Son c. And is not the very reprieval of the World from deserved ruine and misery so many thousand years an Act of Grace and Nature now continued used and improved by Grace and so far may be said to be of Grace C. This is plain truth and must not be denied B. Quest 3. Is it not undeserved Mercy to all Mankind that ever since Adam's Sentence Gen. 3. 15. they are all ruled by a Law of Grace and not the Law of Innocency alone and by that Law of Grace must all be judged C. If you before evinced that any thing is truly mercy to the Reprobate I must confess it But I have not before so much thought of this what Law the World is under as the case deserveth But I remember Camero in the fragments of his dispute with Courcellaeus taken by Testardus though he deny not that the Covenant of Grace was made with all mankind in Adam and Noah yet saith That by or for their nearer Parents sins the Infants of Infidels are out of that Covenant B. 1. It 's well you note that it is not only Augustine Enchir. ad Laâ—rent and I that are for the Imputation of nearer Parents sin in some Vid. Pet. Martyr in Rom. 5. confessing Augustine's judgment sort as well as Adam's 2. He speaketh there of the Covenant as mutual and not as a Law or an offered Covenant or Divine
And the sum of his opinion about the nature and cause of our holy actions is 1. That Gods universal influx or causation is necessary on our will to make them acts 2. That Free-Will is the cause that they are these particular acts about this object rather than another 3. That Gods particular or special influx of Grace is the cause that they are supernatural acts And that preventing Grace doth give men good thoughts and the first motion of the affections before deliberation and choice or liberty as Vasquez also saith which seemeth the same with the Doctrine of Ockam Buridane and the rest of the Nominals who call it Complacency as antecedent to Election yea and Intention To be pleased with the thing simply on the first apprehension they call a necessary natural act Though the Scotists say that quoad exercitium actus vel libertatem contradictionis even that is free And it seems the same which Augustine and Jansenius call primam aelectationem But converting Grace it self Molina takes to be a habit wrought by Gods special help in and with the word or means His words are of men that are hearing Gods Word or thinking on it Influit Deuâ— in â—easdem notitias inâ—luxâ— quodam particulari ac supernaturali quo cognitionem illam adjuvat tum ut res melius dilucidius expendatur peâ—etret â—umâ—etiam ut notitia illa jam limites notitia supernaturalis ad finem supernaturalom in suo ordine attingat Inde oritur in voluntate motus affectionis c. Yet no Jesuite is supposed to go further from the Calvinists than this man In truth I cannot perceive but that Jesuites Arminians Lutherans and all such are willing to ascribe as much to Gods Grace as they think consistent with mans Free-will and Gods not being the cause of sin which is the same thing that the Calvinists also endeavour thoughâ—hey seem not to hit on the same names and notions to do the thing desired save themselves and those that hear them 1. Tim. 4. 16. And that he that converts a sinner doth save a soul from death James 6. ult And that the word is the immortal incorruptible seed by which we are begotten again and which remaineth in us Are you now in doubt of this C. It is one thing for God to work with the Word and another thing to work by the Word The first we confess But if God work by the Word then he must operate first on the Word which is the Preachers act and so by that Word on the soul and not immediately Therefore I rather think that the word is a concomitant than an instrumental cause B. 1. You wrong your self and Christ in that you will not believe him John 3. that we mortals know not the way and manner of the Spirits accesses and operations on the soul any more than the cause of the wind whose sound we hear Do you not know that you do not know how Gods Spirit moveth our intellect and wills and how he maketh use of instruments except secundum quid in some particles revealed 2. An hundred Texts of Scripture which I omit lest I be tedious tell us that the Word is a means or subordinate cause to God of his informing and reforming operations on mens souls And it 's dangerous to dream of any second cause that is so concomitant as to be but co-ordinate with the first cause and not subordinate to it And the word is not only subordinate to God as Instituter by Legislation and Declaration but also to God as efficient operator 3. God can work two ways by the Word which are within our reach besides others 1. As it is the act of the speaker by exciting and illuminating him 2. As it is the species as they call it received by the senses and imagination which God can by his power set home to the attainment of the due effect 4. And yet I know not any or many of your Adversaries that deny that besides this Divine operation by the VVord God hath another immediately on the soul exciting it to operate upon the VVord as the vis plastica vitalis materna operatur in semen jam receptum But I will here forbear to trouble you with the physical difficulties whether the VVord heard be only objectum intellectus or also causa efficiens as light is both to the eye And whether it be operative on the intellect or only terminative with other such like C. Well I must grant you that all Infused Faith as to the act is Acquired But all Acquired Faith not Infused but infusion is added to our own endeavours like the creation of the humane soul B. I am glad that we are got so far on towards peace But Quest. 4. What mean you by Infusion Is it not a Metaphor C. Yes and we mean that immediate perswasion of God which you even confess to be besides his operation by the Word and by our Cogitations Even a Creation of an act or habit B. Quest. 5. Is it the name Infusion or the thing that you plead for C. The name though I confess Metaphors must not be used unnecessarily in Disputes is yet convenient but that I leave indifferent B. Quest 6. Do you not think that the act of Faith is the act of mans own Intellect and Will or Soul and that immediately C. Yes that cannot be denied B. If so then when you say that our act is Infused I hope you will confess the term to be none of the plainest and you only mean that Gods Grace doth so operate on the faculty as to excite it so to act and consequently that the thing first and properly infused is not the act of Faith it self but the vis impressa facultatem before described by which the act is caused And so in a secondary sense the act may be called Infused but not most immediately C. I confess it is the habit which we commonly take to be Infused and therefore we use to distinguish habitus infusos ab habitibus acquisitis rather than actus infusos ab actibus acquisitis B. Is that Habit before the Act or after it C. You know that it is a Controversie among our selves Mr. Pemble saith it is before and the common opinion is that it is after the first special Act. B. 1. I once received that from Mr. Pemble ignorantly But that cometh to us by not distinguishing the vis impressa or first received influx of the spirit from a Habit when as Amesius well saith it is fitter called semen fidei vel dispositio quaedam than a Habit of Faith For 1. no man can prove such an antecedent habit and therefore none should assert it 2. The true nature of a Habit consisteth in a promptitude to perform that special act with facility But that we should have such a promptitude and facility not only while we are Infant Christians but no Christians as having not yet believed in Christ is not probable according to our
never read that any mans damnation was any whit the more increased for not performing these acts And again page 170. It is true there is a Faith infused by the Spirit of God in regeneration But who ever said that any man was damned because he doth not believe with such a Faith As much as to say that non-regeneration is the meritorious cause of damnation C. I am amazed at this especially his supposing that no man ever said that which I thought no man of us had denied B. I would think that his meaning is that men are not condemned for want of Gods infusing act but their own believing act or for the privation of Infusion but for the privation of Faith or of Faith not quatenus infused but as they ought to have believed without infusion But he was not so wanting in accurateness but that he knew how to have exprest himself had that been his meaning And then I know not how his words will consist with this sense I never read that any mans damnation was the more increased for not performing these acts where changing their own hearts is one And whoever said that any man was damned because he did not believe with such a Faith Here it is the Faith as such which is supposed spoken of the privation whereof is not the meritorious cause of damnation And indeed though the power of this Faith would have been in us had there been no Sin or Saviour yet there would have been no obligation to believe in Christ as Mediator And therefore if the Law of Innocency had stood alone even the want of an acquired Faith in Christ would have been no sin But this is the unhappiness of such as must read Controversial Writings There is no end of searching after the Writers meaning But the thing it self I think is plain c. that only an effectual special Faith will save us and it is such a Faith of which Christ speaketh Mat. 16. 16. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved and he that believeth not shall be damned though he believe with any other Faith whatsoever which he calleth acquired Perhaps this his opinion hath some dependance on what he saith before ibid. He punisheth the disobedient with eternal death True but according to what Covenant Not according to the Covenant of Grace that is only a Covenant for Salvation but according to the Covenant of the Law the Covenant of Works Woful error and confusion The Covenant of the Law is almost as bad a phrase as the Covenant of the Covenant 1. Gods Law of Innocency was a Law and Covenant in several respects 2. So was the Jewish Law which Paul meaneth by the Law of Works 3. So is the Christian Law of Christ and of Grace No man is now condemned by the Jewish Law of Works as such it being ceased and never did it bind the Gentile world The Law of Nature and of Innocency indeed condemneth the disobedient but the Law or Covenant of Christ or of Grace doth condemn them to much sorer punishment Luke 19. 27. Those mine enemies that would not I should reign c. Mark 16. 16. He that believeth not shall be damned Heb. 10. 29. Mat. 25. throughout But this confounding of the Covenants I must not here rectifie But yet I hope he meant only that men suffer not for want of Gods Regenerating Infusing Act but for want of their own act of Faith The fifth Crimination C. I find Dr. Twisse ibid. alibi saepe charging it on them as holding that Grace is given according to Works which is Pelagianism For they think that God looketh at some preparation in the Receiver and giveth it to some because they are prepared for it and denieth it to others because they are unprepared whereas it is not in him that willeth nor in him that runneth but in him that of his meer good pleasure sheweth mercy B. There is enough said of this after about differencing and effectual Grace But if we must say more I ask you Quest. 1. Do you by this phrase according to Works mean to urge the Scripture that speaketh in that phrase in its proper sense or do you Vulgatum illud facientâ— quod in se est Deus non denegat Gratiam intelligitur de faciente â—â— gratia auxilie Pet. â— S. Joseph Thes Univers de auxil pag. 83. Idem pag. 90. Nequidem ipsius Christi opera fuerunt actu meretoria citra promissiâ—nem Dei usi ex se essent valoris inâ—â—â—iti which needeth explication only use the phrase in some other sense of your own C. I use Scripture phrase in Scripture sense because I rest on its Authority B. Quest 2. Are we not also saved without Works in Scripture sense And would it be contrary to Paul to say we that we are saved by Works yea or according to them in that sense that he speaketh of them See James 2. 14 c. Tit. 3. 5. Ephes 2. 5 8 9. Gal. 3. 2. 5. 10. Acts 15. 11. c. and 16. 31. Rom. 5. 10 And yet saved according to Works in another sense James 2. 14 c. Phil. 2. 12. Gal. 6. 4. Rom. 20. 12 13. 2 Cor. 5. 10. C. In several senses of Works we deny it not B. Quest 3. At least you will grant that we are not justified by Works and yet that we are justified by Faith yea in another sense by Works Quest 4. Is not believing and repenting in order to Justification and all holy obedience in order to Salvation as truly opâ—â— a work and in a far nobler sense than preparation for Faith is C. That cannot be denied B. Then you cannot affirm that the phrase not according to Workâ— which excludeth not Faith Repentance holy Obedience to justification and salvation doth intend the exclusion of all preparation in order to Conversion or Faith in Christ when by Works excluded it meaneth the same thing or sort in all C. But saith Dr. Twisse ibid. page 154. Pardon and Salvation God doth confirm only on condition of Faith and Repentance But â—â— for Faith and Repentance doth God confer them conditionally also If so whatsoever be the condition let them look to it how they can avoid the making of Grace to wit the Grace of Faith and Repentance to be given according to Works B. I know he frequently saith the same But 1. I speak now only of the sense of that Scripture and say that this goeth upon a most false and dangerous supposition that Justification and Salvation are given according to Works though Faith and Repentance be not whereas in the sense of Works there meant by Paul no man can be justified by Works And though Christ saith This is the work of God that ye believe in him whom the Father hath sent yet it is not that which Paul meaneth Let not therefore Scripture words be abused to mislead mens understandings 2. But as to the matter of the Controversie I spoke to it enough
before No man can deny but that God usually prepareth the Soul fer Conversion by a common sort of Grace And though he may do what he list with his own and extraordinarily may in an instant convert the most unprepared malignant obdurate person yet that is not his usual way And some that think otherwise are led into the mistake by thinking that a man is converted when he hath suddenly some terrifying humbling preparation which endeth in conversion Whether he convert all that are brought to the very highest and nearest degree of preparation I know not nor perhaps you neither But that usually he converteth all such we have very great reason to think probable And that he hath not commanded men to seek his special Grace in vain So that whether it be a proper promise on Gods part or only an encouragement short of proper promise I told you before is a hard question But we maintain that it is not that proper mutual Covenant which maketh a Christian and is celebrated in Baptism and giveth Salvation If one of old John Rogers's Thomas Hooker's or Robert Bolton's hearers when they were vehemently urging preparatory humiliation desire endeavour c. should have said to them Sir you play the Arminian and contradict St. Paul who saith that Grace is not given according to Ista â—â—â—dia nemini Deus destâ—â—â—â— propter vel secundum morita ipsius sed ex pura puta Gratia Nemini etiam denegat nisi juste propter gracedentia peecata Armin. Disp Privat Thes 41. Sect. 10. Adrian VI. Quodl 3. q. 1. fol. 21. expoundeth Habenti dabitur thus Qui habet verbi Dei amorem ut illuc mentis intuitum dirigat dabitur ei sensus intelligendi qui non habet verbi Dei amorem auferetur ab eo naturalis capacitas intelligend c Works Therefore God will give it me never the more for such preparations what would you have said to him The truth is practical Preachers in these practical cases are carried with full sail into that truth which Disputers would wrangle out of Doors But as for any workâ— meritorious in point of commutative Justice yâ—a or of any full and proper Covenant of God giving a proper Right to the Sinner upon which he may claim special Grace as his due I know of none such before true Conversion though Gods commands and general promises give men sufficient encouragement C. But what say you to Rom. 9. It is not in him that willeth or runneth c. B. I do not love to expound hard Texts unsatisfactorily by scraps I will give you God willing a Paraphrase of the Chapter together by it self I suppose you have read John Goodwin's and Dr. Hammonds Paraphrase At present it may suffice to say 1. That the meaning is not that he that would have Christ and Grace and Holiness is no fitter for it than he that would not have them nor that he that seeketh them is no fitter for them than he that rejecteth themâ—nor that he that believeth is no fitter for Justification than â—n Iâ—fidel nor he that is holy any fitter for Heaven than the unholy nor yet that he that heareth meditateth prayeth aâ— he can and attaineth the highest degree of common Grace is no fitter or likelier for Faith or special Grace than he that despiseth it and the means of it 2. But the meaning is that God of his free mercy câ—lled the Gentiles that were further from him than the Jews and may give both the Gospel and the Grace of the Gospel to one and take it from or not give it to another when both of them are equally unworthy of it by their sin So that the first and principal cause that differenceâ—ha Jacob from an Esau is not that Jacob before Gods Grace did will and râ—n deâ—ire and seek Grace but that Mercy begun with him and gave him though as unworthy as Esau both commonner and special Grace which caused him to will and run And yet for all that both are supposed to have forfeited mercy by sinning against it and it is in him that willeth not and runneth not that the cause of his misery and privation of mercy is to be found Yea in many an instance where mercy and helps are given by an equality a wicked man may make himself to differ by his sin and wilfully become worse than others C. At least you must here confess that de facto we do really differ from each other in this point B. All they that hold all that Doctrine of Preparation for Conversion which you find in the suffrages of the British Divines in the Synod of Dort do not that I know of differ from many of the Lutherans and Jesuites nor from many of the Arminians herein while by the name of merit of Congruity used by some and Preparation by the other no more is meant than they there assert And as to the question of a promise or no promise I shew'd you before how small the difference is yea with some it is but de nomine while one calleth that a Promise which another calleth but a half promise with Mr. Cotton or a precept to use means with sufficient encouragement when perhaps in the description of the thing they agree So that among the most and sober practical Preachers I yet see no real difference in sense at all about the necessity of preparatory Grace The sixth Crimination C. For ought I can understand some of them acknowledge no Corruption nor Grace in the Will as having no Habits but meer Indifferency or Liberty but think that the illuminating of the understanding is enough to change the will * The Remonstrants say Synod circ art 3. 4 p. 15. Voluntatem iâ—super Deus in obsequium suum fle ctit ad actuâ— fidei obedientiâ— ita inclinat per spiritum suum sanctum verbo utentem ut voluntas per illam operationem non solum possit obedire â—ed obediat quoties obedit non ex se anâ— per se aut a se B. 1. These are a few odd persons that differ from the generality of your Adversaries and I am not to justifie all that every man writeth 2. But even of these I suppose the meaning of the most is but this that sin began inthe Intellect and there Grace must begin and that God worketh on the will but mediante Intellectu And these Camero held as well as they and so do many more And these seem to differ not about the necessity of Grace but the manner of its conveyance to the will whether it be only by the intellect 3. And as the wind bloweth where it listeth and we hear its sound but know not whence it cometh or whither it goeth so is every one that is born of the Spirit We know that the will is vitiated as ill as the understanding and needeth Grace as much as it and that God is as near to the one in his operations as to the
a long answer B. Not as Paul meant it but as our troublesome Contenders use it in Even those that found the infallibility on scientia media make congrous Grace ex proposito convertendi to be the cause of the difference So Malderus 1 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 517. Quod hic credat prae alio indubie venit de misericordia Dei ipsum siâ— vocantis ut accomodet assensum misericordia inquam qua nos in Câ—risto elegit Totum est miserentis Dei ipse vocat ipse facit â—t vocatus veniat ipse â—t currat ipse nolentem praevenit ut velit volentem subsequitur nâ— frâ—fira velit vi sua Gratia it a sibi aptat liberum arbitrium ut a nâ—llo dâ—ro corde respâ—â—tâ—r quod diciâ—â—s provenire ex â—o quod meris inâ—â—â—abilibus occultis modis noverit Deus ita hominis â—over sensum ut accomodet assensum Fatemur Dei omnipotentiam Dominium quod habet in voluntates hominum manifestari in gratiae effâ—catia Et consensus homiâ—is est donâ—m Dei descendens a Patre luminum â—llumque consensum Deâ—â— vult â—acit quia facit â—ominem viribâ—â— gratiâ—â—acerâ— Yeâ— he yieldeth to â—radwardines Doctrine supposing him only to intend necessitatem quandam consequentiae necessarium esse hominem libere velle illâ—d ipsum quod Deuâ— cujuâ— omnipotentia quaecunque voluit facit praevoluit ipsum ville libere Item gratiam efficacem derâ— intuitâ— meritorum Christi non tantum quatenuâ— est sufficiensâ—sed etiam quatenus est eâ—â—iâ—ax dum seeundum propositum â—â—â—â— â—â—â—m cura Dâ—â— non est aqualis do omnibus another sense the answer must be suited to the question And here note that really it is the state of both parties compared and not of one of them that constituteth the dissimilitude as is said And the efficient causes of both states are the causes of the difference And so truly the cause of Nero's unbelief and the causes of Paul's Faith which are many as aforesaid all set together are the causes of the differences or rather all make up one cause of it This no Logician can deny But yet in vulgar speech we use to say that that person or thing is the cause of the difference 1. Which is the cause of the singularity 2. Or which causeth the state of the second person compared supposing the state of the first person to be already existent And so you will find yet several senses of the question C. Explain it by some instances B. 1. As to the cause of singularity If one man be born an Ideot or a Monster when we ask what made him differ from other men though really the causes of the dissimilitude be to be assigned on both parts yet we mean only on his part why is he not like others So if one Child be unlike to all his brethren or one Scholar in the School be much better or much worse than all the rest or if one in a Family be sick he that asketh what maketh him differ doth mean what made him sick c. 2. And so as to Posteriority of State if you suppose one of the dissimiliar parts pre-existent and ask what maketh the other to differ from it as if you ask why the Scholar writeth not like his Copy why the Son is so unlike to the Father why this age is so unlike the last c. We mean only what causeth the difference ex parte subsequente C. Apply it to the case in hand B. If you ask what made the difference between the Devils and the persevering Angels In the full and proper answer you must assign the reason on both parts But according to the usual sense of the question you must say The wilful sin of the Devils made the difference For the equal state of uprightness went before the difference So if you ask what made the difference between the world after the fall and before it vulgarly we must say sin because that came last So if you ask what made the difference between Noah and the world between Lot and Sodom Ans Indeed that which made one part sinful and the other righteous But according to the vulgar sense of the question it was the Righteousness of Noah and Lot and the causes of that righteousness So what made the difference between Judas and the eleven Apostles Ans Judas his wilful sin and Wickedness though indeed the cause is on both sides So what maketh the difference between Believers and the Unbelieving world Really the unbelief of the world and the Faith of Christians with their causes But it 's like the speaker meaneth only ex parte credentium And then the cause of their Believing is the cause of their differing But now if it hold true that God giveth a sufficiency of Grace ut causa universalis ex parte donantis antecedently to mens accepting or rejecting equally then if one ask what maketh the difference you would understand him why have not unbelievers Faith as well as others And then the answer would be wilful resisting or refusing Grace or the moral special indisposition of the Recipients makes the difference or else all would be alike believers But note that we ask not What maketh the difference between Believers and unbelievers but do particularize the subject and ask what maketh the Believer differ from the Unbeliever or what maketh the unbeliever differ from the believer It is then supposed that we mean only ex parte nominata And thus in the vulgar sense the questions what maketh the believer differ from the Infidel and what maketh the Infidel differ from the believer must have various answers C. I understand you thus in brief 1. You say that constitutively it is Faith that is the difference on Paul 's part and unbelief on Nero ' s. 2. The causes of the said Faith and unbelief are the causes of the difference As the causes of the whiteness of one wall and of the blackness of the other cause their difference 3. That to ask why the Believer differeth from the Unbeliever is but to ask why he is a Believer when the other is not 4. Here you say the two Relations of dissimilitude in two ubbjects make the questions two in one viz. 1. Why or whence is Paul a Believer 2. Whence is it that Nero is an Unbeliever 5. You say that Nero is an Unbeliever through his own wilfulness and illdisposition resisting Grace Satans temptations concurring And that Paul is a Believer from many conjunct causes 1. Gods Grace by his Spirit 2. Christs Merits 3. Christs donation of that Spirit 4. The means by which he worketh 5. The concurse of Pauls will To which efficients you add in most a competent Receptive disposition in genere causâ— materialis both passive and active 6. You say that in all this Gods Grace is incomparably the greater cause than man's will 7. But yet not the sole cause and that some free-not-necessitated concurse of mans
received But they lay the certainty of our perseverance on Gods Decree and Promise Now say they God did not decree that it should be non-possibile but only that it should be non-futurum And so that he hath promised the non-futurity but not an impossibility of falling away 3. And yet they sometimes use the term impossible here But how 1. Say they There is a logical impossibilitas consequentiae And so there is on supposition of meer prescience and prediction For do but make this one of the premises God fore-knoweth that Paul will persevere and it is impossible this conclusion should be true Paul will not persevere But yet this may be nevertheless true It is possible for Paul to fall away But this impossibility of consequence in order of arguing is nothing to the impossibilitas rei in respect to the Causes 2. And also they say that there is impossibilitas hypothetica supposing that man willfully reject not Grace Gods Power it self is so engaged to defend him against Satan and all Enemies that it is impossible for them to overcome God and destroy him But here impossible is related to the power of Enemies only It is a thing that Satan hath not Power to do to conquer Grace 3. But when the question is of the Power of the Person himself they say It is unfit to say that he is unable to fall away or that it is impossible in respect to his own Power 1. Because that to fall away is an effect of Impotency and not of Power 2. Because God will not so operate by his Grace as to make a man unable to sin but unwilling and actually to keep him from it So that Grace doth not make us impotent to resist it and make it really impossible to us to fall away but maketh us able and willing to stand and causeth us freely de facto to persevere 3. And I must tell you that your Crimination is grounded on a lame and faulty recitation of their Opinion you name but half of it instead of the whole which is That the sanctified never fall away from the due fear and care and endeavour of persevering and consequently not from Sanctification or Justification And will you infer that a man needeth not fear care or live holily if certainly he shall do so A. Yes what need I take care of that which I shall certainly do B. That is what need you take care if you certainly shall take care A. What need I trouble my own head about that which God will do what-ever I do If he undertake to ascertain it I may leave it to him B. You talk contradictions God doth not undertake to secure your Salvation whether you will or not or care or not or labour or not But to cause you to will to care and labour And you say If God will make me willing I need not be willing If God will make me think of it and care and labour for it I need not think of it or care or labour for it The Sun need not shine if God will make it shine You need not eat if God decree that you shall eat Are not these weak Contradictions A. But as weak as you make it the Contradiction is their own For they first make God to make their falling away to be impossible or certainly non-futurum and yet say that he will make them fear it that is to perform an Act without the proper Object As if God decreed that they should fear Good as Good or love Evil as Evil No man can fear that which neither is nor is taken to be fearful An impossible or certainty non-future hurt is not fearful or an Object of fear unless to a mad man B. There were much weight in what you say but for that which you leave out 1. That objective certainty may be separated from subjective certainty that is men may be uncertain of that which is certain in it self 2. Yea few of the Godly have a strong assurance of their sincerity and Justification 3. And no man in this life hath a perfect assurance no more than other perfect Graces 4. And every mans faith it self in Gods Promises and fidelity is imperfect Therefore while all these are imperfect and not only so but liable to sad assaults and interruptions and decays 5. Yea and the person liable to such hainous sins as look terribly towards Apostacy you cannot say that fear is needless For though God decree the certainty of their perseverance that proveth not that they are perfectly certain of it A. But God will not found our Duty on our Sin nor command men to fear because through sinful weakness they do fear B. God will not make our Sin to be our Duty in sensu conjuncto 1. But God will make Duty on supposition that Sin maketh it necessary If you sin God will make sorrow and confession your Duty which would else be none 2. Yea more the same Act may be a Duty and a Sin in several respects And so may fear of Hell be A. Stay there Do you not then make God the Author of Sin For if he cause the Act as a Duty when it is caused it will prove a Sin too B. You mistake Two Causes may cause two Modes and Relations of the same Act and one not at all cause that which the other causeth God causeth every Act in genere act us which is sinful and yet causeth not the deficiency or exorbitancy of it As the Rider maketh the Horse go but not to go lamely God knowing our uncertainty of our own Election and Sincerity may make it our Duty by a wise and careful fear to avoid our own danger And yet that fear may not only come also from some ignorance and unbelief in our selves but have sinful degrees and so have that in it which God is not the cause of The second Crimination A. Their Doctrine tendeth to the indulgence of all sin * One would think that the Doctrine asserting the loss of Justification by mortal sin were stricter than the Calvinists But judge by the Jesuites Doctrine who teach that a man in mortal sin or unconverted may de congrâ—o merit Justification Ruiz de praedest exad d. 19. â—ect 4. p. 242. Ad meritum congrui non requiritur personam esse simpliciter Deo gratam quin potiâ—s propter peccatum mortale fit inimica Dei nihilâ—minus actus fidei alii qui ex side procedunt secundum se grati sunt quantum sufficit ut justificationem de congruo mereantur opera namque fraternae charitatis Heb. 13. miserccordiae sunt ut sacrificia quibus Deum per mortale peccatum amissum promeremur reconciliatum accipere 1 Joh. 1. si confiteamur c. So that Gods Justice is bound to be reconciled to and Justifie a wicked enemy for an Alms or for Confession Is not this an easie cure of enmity But the promise is made only câ—teris patibus to true Believers already
equality with the wise Do we not see that as man is so is his strength and work operari sequitur esse The strong do as the strong and the weak judge and do as the weak Why else doth God give men strength of Grace sure they that think the habit of Grace must needs be before any act will not hold that all our lives after the Acts from immediate divine production go beyond the degree of the habits We know that God is the chief cause of our perseverance and all our works that are good But he causeth them by disposing and quickening strengthening illuminating and sanctifying our faculties to do them which is habitual Grace B. What is your own judgment in this point A. Our judgment is 1. That he that truly at the present preferreth the pleasing of God and his Salvation before all this World is sincere and justified 2. That of these some have well setled apprehensions and resolutions but others have such shallow Conceptions and weak Resolutions as that a very strong Temptation would change their minds and overcome them 3. But if they escape such Temptation and be not overcome they shall be saved For God will not damn men for possible Sin and Apostacy which they were never guilty of but only for that which they did commit 4. And that it is no certain sign of hypocrisie that they would have fallen away had their Temptations been great but only a proof that they were weak 5. Else to pray Lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil should be rather discover not our sincerity or hypocrisie by temptation 6. Therefore God useth to proportion mens trials to their strength And that young and weak Believers may persevere he exposeth them not antecedently to their provocation to great Temptations as he doth the strong Even as while a young Tree hath little rooting it hath also but a little top else had it the top of a great Tree and but the roots of a Plant the first great Wind would overturn it 7. Even strong Christians might possibly have some Temptations which would over-match their strength and turn them from Christ if God should not keep them from such Temptations 8. Therefore there are some Temptations so far above the very nature of man by such Grace as is not a meer Miracle to be overcome as that God doth not suffer Mankind to be tried with them As to be most exquisitely tormented many moneths or a longer time And in that unusual trial of the poor Christians in Japon though many endured those torments many weeks yet nature could not sustain them to the last but when they had suffered as much as many Smithfield burnings to death at last almost all denied Christ so that Christianity is now there extirpated Now if Rogers Bradford Hooper shewed sincerity by suffering death why should we not think that these did so that suffered far more than they though afterward the degree was greater than their strength 9. We hold that Gods Punishments and Mercies to men in this World are very much exercised in either permitting or not permitting great Temptations * The same Bradwardine l. 2. c. 16. holdeth that the cause of the damneds obstinacy in sin is not only themselves and Gods not-willing to cure and save them but also Gods positive Will by which their obstinate wills are for ever continued in the act But I see not why we should assert Gods positive Will of Sin in Hell or Earth when his not-effectual willing to cure it is enough And that for great sin he oft delivereth men up to Satan and giveth him the greater power over them Yea that the nature of sin it self is such as giveth greater advantage to the Tempter As he that will with Achan look on the wedge of Gold or that will please his tast with delicious Drinks and Meats or that will permit his eyes immodest Spectacles hath thereby let in the Devil into his Imagination and will not easily thence cast him out And on the other side he that pleaseth God and conquereth one Temptation obtaineth that Grace by which he is much saved from the next and the Tempter is the more disadvantaged and restrained 10. Lastly We therefore hold That seeing Temptations do not only try our sincerity or hypocrisie else we should desire them for self-examination but also tend to change mens minds and make them worse the way to persevere is to pray against and avoid Temptations and resist those that cannot be avoided This is our judgment In which you see that we hold that all weak Christians that are sincere may have assurance of their present Justification though they are not strong enough to stand the greatest trials And that they may well hope that God will save them from over strong Temptations while they sincerely do his Will B. But Christ saith That he that forsaketh not all that he hath and hateth not his own life cannot be his Disciple And what greater trial can there be than the loss of life it self A. Though some taking it to be hard that none are true Christians that would not be Martyrs were they tried have said that this Text speaketh de necessitate praecepti non medii You must grow up to this at last if you will be my Disciples yet I will not so force the Text but say as you do But 1. There are far stronger Temptations than the love of Life Though not from Interest yet from false reasonings which may deceive the judgment And one that would die for Christ while he believeth in him may possibly have so strong Temptations to unbelief as shall exceed in danger his fear of death 2. And all men that at the present would forsake Life and all for Christ yet have not the same fixedness of Resolution nor the same degree of Faith and Love No doubt but the Martyrs in the same flames had various degrees of Grace Now a less firm and fixed measure may be loosened by degrees or shaken by Seducers and mutable man may after be overcome by that same Temptation which once he could have overcome So that I accuse their Doctrine as utterly inconsistent with true Christian Comfort on both these account And such is the success of those men that will overdo and devise means of their own for extraordinary comforts which God never gave them B. The comfort of poor Christians it seems standeth but on slippery terms in the Opinion of both sides while each Party thinks that there is no true comfort in the others way * Whether we may be morally sure of our present Justification the Papists Doctors agree not among themselves Bellarmine and many others affirm it and others deny it as Aureolus cited by Brianson in 4. q. 4. fol. 36. and others that say no man can know whether his Habits are infused But doth not experience confute you Do you not see that many have true Christian comfort that are not of
Righteousness is it but Christs that is said to be imputed to us P. It is none but what we have from Christ But the phrase of Imputing supposeth it ours And the meaning is no more but that we are reputed Righteous And the causes are not included in the phrase of Imputing righteousness to us but in the words before and after As Imputing sin to us and not Imputing it is but to Repute reckon or judge us sinners or by sin guilty of punishment or not guilty so is it here So that it is supposed 1. That Righteousness that is This Relation of being Righteous is the thing imputed 2. Christs Righteousness is the meritorious cause 3. The Gospel Donation is the instrumental Cause 4. Our Faith in Christ is the condition and as such the subordinate matter necessary on our parts And that faith is imputed for Righteousness plainly meaneth but this that Christ having merited and satisfied for us all that is now required on our part to denominate or primarily constitute us Righteous is to be true Believers in him or true Christians And I further ask you Do you thus paraphrase the words Faith that is Christs Righteousness is imputed to us for righteousness Lib. Yes I do so because the act is put for the object P. Were it so said but once and otherwise oft you had some colour for this But when it is never said Christs Righteousness is imputed to us and so oft said Faith is imputed for righteousness how shall ever the Scripture be understood at this rate if still by faith it mean not faith at all but Christs righteousness And why must not all other places that mention faith be so understood also But read the Texts and set all together and see what sense thus will be made of it Rom. 4. 3. What saith the Scripture Abraham believed God and it that is not his believing but Christs Righteousness was Imputed to him for righteousness Is this a sober and modest paraphrase or a shameless violence Doth not it refer to believing God before mentioned Vers 4 5. To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned or imputed of Grace but of debt But to him that worketh not but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly his faith that is not his faith but Christs righteousness is counted for righteousness Is this a modest Exposition Vers 10 11. We say that Faith that is not faith but Christs righteousness was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness How then was it that is not his faith but Christs righteousness reckoned In uncircumcision And he received the sign of circumcision a seal of the righteousness of the fiath that is not of the faith but of the righteousness of Christs righteousness which he had being uncircumcised that he might be the Father of them that believe that righteousness that is Christs might be imputed to them also who walk in the steps of that faith which Abraham had c. doth faith here also signifie no faith Vers 13. When the promise is said to be through the righteousness of faith and Vers 14. faith made void is it no faith that is here also meant by faith And Vers 16. It is of faith to that seed which is of the faith of Abraham is not faith indeed here meant by the word faith So Vers 18 19 20 21. Who against hope believed And being not weak in faith he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief but was strong in faith And being fully perswaded that what he had promised he was able to perform is it no faith that is meant in all these words yea or no act of faith but accepting the righteousness of Christ So next Vers 22. And therefore it was imputed to him for Righteousness that is Not his faith but by It is meant only Christs Righteousness though it was faith that was over and over mentioned as the antecedent So Vers 23 24. It was not written for his sake only that it that is not faith but Christs righteousness was imputed to him But for us also to whom it that is not faith shall be imputed if we believe is not that faith neither on him that is God the Father that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead which is a distinct act from Consenting to have his righteousness who was delivered to death for our offences and was raised again for our Justification Is the meaning that we are justified by the Imputation of Christs Resurrection so to us as that in Law sense we rose again in him and by Rising fulfilled the Law of Innocency I will not for shame and weariness thus go over other such Texts but I must be so faithful as to say that if good men and wise men and men that cry down the Papists and others for adding to Gods Word and corrupting it and calling it a Nose of Wax and introducing new Articles of faith will yet own such Expositions as these and accuse those that own them not they are as great Instances as most I remember except the defenders of Transubstantiation how far education or custom or humane dependance or faction and partiality and prejudice may blind the reason of professed Christians and godly men And that man that dare lay his comforts and hopes of justification and life upon such expositions of Gods Word should be modest in crying down the false hopes of others and reproving them that build upon the sand Lib. You have made a long discourse to make us odious upon a false supposition We do not say that in all or any of those Texts by faith is not meant faith but only that it is not faith as faith or as an act of ours but as connoting its object the Righteousness of Christ P. 1. Alas a great number of better men than you have too oft and plainly said without distinction that Faith is not imputed to us for righteousness I hope they meant better than they spake but I would it could be hid from the world that these words are not only in the Independents Savoy Confession but even in the Confession of the Westminster Assembly cap. 11. Not by imputing faith it self the act of believing or any other Evangelical obedience to them as their Righteousness but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ to them So also in the larger Catechism Not as if the Grace of faith or any act thereof were imputed to him for his Justification How well soever they may mean Gods oft repeated Word should rather have been expounded than denyed 2. But what mean your cloudy words It is not faith as faith but as connoting the object They that cannot speak clearly seldom clearly understand what to speak The Question is Whether it be really and properly Faith that is meant in all these Texts or whether it be only Christs righteousness If you say that It is both in several respects you grant then that it is saith it self in one respect that is
as those as that Accusations against adversaries are to be believed without proof on one side and not on the other Gods Rule against receiving evil reports will be cast out and Charity and Justice will be cast away and meer siding and saction will possess the place And then all the question will be Who are those Accusers that are to be believed And if you think that it is your Teachers the Papists that have many more will think that they have more reason to believe them And â—â— the Anabaptists will believe theirs and the Separatists theirs and the Quakers theirs and what falshood and evil will not then be believed against all parties and how odious will they appear to one another and consequently all Christians to Infidels and Heathens L. A man that is set upon a sodering design may palliate any Heresie in the world and put a fair sense on the foulest words but God hateth such cloaking of sin and complyance with it R. May not Papists Familists Seekers Quakers and all Sects say the same against Concord and Complyance with you I pray you tell me what you think of these following words before you know who wrote them and take heed what you say of them lest you strike you know not whom Quest How is Justification free seeing faith and repentance are required to it Answ There are two answers given One is from Augustines doctrine Epist 105. the summ is As Justification is taken inclusively taking in Faith and Repentance as its beginning it is free because faith is free But as it is taken narrowly for Justification following faith that is for Remission of sin and Reconciliation with God it is merited by faith But the other solution I more approve and it seemeth more agreeable to Scripture to wit that even Remission of sin it self and Reconciliation with God are given freely no Merit of ours going before and that neither by faith nor repentance we do merit the gift of this grace For understanding of which Note that Faith hath not of it self any efficacy as it is our act to Remit or Reconcile but all the Vertue proceedeth from the object it self that is Christ whoâ—e Vertue and Merit God hath determined to apply to a sinner for his justification by faith in him And what I say of Faith I say of Repentance and other dispositions as in the example of them that looked to the Brazen Serpent who were healed by looking not that looking as it was an act of the eye had such a healing force but the efficaâ—y was from the Serpent which God had appointed for the Ioure So we say of Faith which hath not in its nature and from its entity any power to Remit and Reconcile but as the Vertue of Christ doth this in believers And so I answer that If Faith justified as an act and of it self Justification were not free But so it doth not but is a Mediâ—m by Gods good pleasure by which the Vertue of Christ Justifieth believers therefore faith or repentance make it not lâ—ss free â— g. I give a Beggar a gift He puts forth his hand and taketh it If one tell me Thou gavest it not freely because he took it or else had not had it it were a ridiculous objection For putting forth the hand doth not of it self bring him a gift else every time that he puts forth his hand it would bring in a gift But it is from the vertue and bounty of the giver So is it as to faith and the dispositions by which the vertue of Christ and the free mercy of God do give Remission and Reconciliation to believers and disposed persons so that it taketh not away Christs Merit nor maketh Grace less free that faith or these dispositions are asserted L. I know not how much men may mean worse than they speak but these words are such as the best Protestants use R. They are the words translated of the aforesaid Fr. Tolet a Jesuit and Cardinal on Rom. 3. pag. 157 158 159. But still remember that by Justification they mean the holy effect of the Spirit on the soul and indeed by Remission of sin they most commonly mean the destroying or mortifying sin within us and ceasing to commit the act And they are dark and confused in these matters L. But do not Papists hold forgiveness of deserved punishment R. Yes but they bring it in disorderly and on other occasions But if they did not how could they hold that any sin past from our childhood till Conversion is Remitted or pardoned For the Act is past as soon as done factum infectum fieri non potest and so such past sins can have no remission but forgiving the penalty and healing the effects And wrangling Papists consider not that this is the Remission that Protestants mean who call their kind of Remission by the name of mortification And so we endlesly quarrel about words through our unhappy imperfection in the art of speaking and words being arbitrary signs the world is come to no agreement of their sense L. You confess then their confused Doctrine and you cannot excuse many of their Doctors from gross error herein R. No nor many honest pious persons that go for Protestants What Papists have more plainly subverted the Gospel by their Doctrine on these subjects than many of those called Antinomians have done by the contrary extream And who can justifie all the sentences and phrases of many eminent Divines among us yea or of many of the most wise and accurate For when all are much ignorant who can say I do not err L. But undoubtedly you will be as bitterly censured for these your favourable interpretations of the Papists in the point of Merit as if you were half a Papist your self and were but such a Mongrel as Erasmus Wicelius Cassander or Grotius or as if your Conciliatory designs would carry you as far at last as Grotius Mileterius Baldwin or at least as Mountague Guil. Forbes and such others went And others will then say that you are justly served for writing so much against Grotius and his followers on this account as you have done of which Bishop Bramhall and his Epistoler have already told you R. Truth honesty and Gods approbation change not as mens interests minds or tongues do Time will come that Truth will be more regarded when Love and Peace are to be revived unless God will forsake this contentious and unrighteous World And I am so near so very near that World where there is nothing but Truth Love and Righteousness and where God is All and the Fulness and felicitating object of holy souls and where the censures of men are of no signification that I am utterly unexcusable if I should betray the Cause of Truth Love and Concord to avoid the obloquy of men who speak evil of the things which they never understood The Thirteenth Dayes CONFERENCE Of the great errours sin and danger which many Ignorant Professours fall
into on the pretence of avoiding and abhorring Popery Between S. A Sectary and P. A Peacemaker P. NEighbour I understand that you are one of those that divulge your desamatory Lamentations of me as inclining to Popery for some passages which I lately Preached in the City I pray you speak that to my face which you so freely speak behind my back S. Sir the City ringeth of you as one that greatly wrongeth the cause of God And my own ears heard you say that the difference between us and the Papists is little more than in ambiguous words and points unsearchable P. And this I hear you are one that have divulged and so it is by such as you that the City is made to ring of it But if this be an untruth of great aggravation do you then deserve the title you assume or are you a fit defender of the truth or can your Conscience tolerate you herein That which I said was this I distinguished the Controversies between us and the Papists into such as depend on a Carnal Interest and Mind and such as do not but arise from the meer difficulty of the subject In the former sort I said our difference is very great and like to be so and such are the differences about their Papal power and Church state their Government and worship as fitted hereunto and many doctrines as that of Purgatory Indulgences Auricular Confession abused by them Transubstantiation c. But the other sort of doctrinals are made by many the matter of greater difference than there is cause such as I named Predestination Providence the cause of sin mans power and fre-will Grace certainty of salvation and I might have added Justification and Merit as held by their Church and most of the Schoolmen not that here is no difference indeed but that long study hath made me certain that it is more in words than is commonly conceived And this Truth is fit to be spoken though the mistaken be offended by it Yea in these matters the Papists differ among themselves as much as with us Dare you deny that these were my words If you do you are a falsifier S. When you speak so clowdily who can remember every word you say P. Is not this plain English Peruse it and consider And dare you carry false reports abroad on pretence of pious zeal and then say You cannot remember Why would you report that which you cannot remember Why would you not stay till you had helpt your memory by speaking with me or some one that could have informed you But are not we in a hard case with such hearers as you when we must look to be as oft belyed as your understanding or your memory faileth because your loose Conscience faileth with them which is very oft S. I am not alone in judging thus of you City and Countrey ring of it what company can one come into where you are not talkt of I daily hear good people lament you and the best they say is that God useth to let those men fall fouly in some things who have been extraordinarily serviceable that men may not idolize them P. They that know me but half as well as I know my self will know that I have enough to abase me before God and man But will that warrant a course of lying and backbiting in others Do you partly receive and partly make and propagate false reports and then plead the Commonness for your excuse He that set London on fire might so have excused himself because the flame was common when he had caused it The effect and prospering of your sin should humble you and not seem to justifie you But yet I must tell you that Backbiting Sectaries are not the greater part of London There are many sober people that are ashamed of your sin and folly I will make this friendly motion to you Instead of backbiting Let us here to one anothers faces so friendly admonish each other of that which we take to be sin as may help to bring each other to repentance And do you begin Tell me of all the evil that you know by me S. I have nothing to accuse you of but that your Principles are too large and you vent them too freely and thereby you harden Papists and dishonour the Protestant cause and wrong free grace and the Righteousness of Christ by your doctrine of Justification and mans Righteousness And by coming so near Conformity you grieve the hearts of good people and may bring persecution on those that cannot do as you can P. 1. About Conformity forbear me here for I must deal with you of that by it self elsewhere 2. As to my doctrine of Justification if I have not fully justified it elsewhere I shall not now on this occasion 3. But whether you or I be righter about Popery let us now debate Have you read my Safe Relig. and my Key for Catholicks and my Treatise of the Certainty of Christianity without Popery and my late Dialogue and my Treat against Johnson of the Visibility of the Church and others against Popery S. I have somewhat else to do than read all your Writings P. Why have you not then somewhat else to do than hear me and backbite me and judge of things which you have not leisure to understand Do we not still deal on hard terms with such men as you that neither speaking nor writing can make them know our minds Have all your party that revile me done more each one against Popery than I have done But if this be all that you have to call me to repentance for I have a great deal more to say against my self And now I will deal faithfully with you I beseech you try whether it be not necessary that you speedily repent of all these following sins 1. What a shame is it for one that would be taken for a Religious man to be so Ignorant as you are and no better know the truth of Christ from the errors of Popery than it appeareth you do 2. What a sin for one so Ignorant to be so rash and bold in venturing to judge of that which he understandeth not 3. What a sin is it for one so Ignorant to be so proud of his pretended knowledge as to venture to defame his Teachers for contradicting him in his erâ—oneous conceits Have you studied these things as long and hard as I have done or are you sure that you have done it more in partially and that God hath illuminated you so much more as your confidence would import 4. What an unchristian crime is it to make lyes and carry them abroad of your Teachers and then be forced to confess that it was the failing of your memory as to what you heard 5. What a sin is it to be a backbiter Neither you nor any one of your quality did ever come to my face either to know my meaning or to hear what I had to say nor to reprove my sin or convince
me of my error 6. Is not unrighteousness a sin in your judging and reports as it is in publick Judgements Should not a man be heard before he be condemned especially a Minister of Christ 7. What a sin is it to receive false reports from others and encourage backbites whom you should rebuke and frown away 8. What a heinous sin is it thus to destroy the Hearers souls and as those that have the Plague to carry your infection from house to house and kill mens Love and breed in them false conceits and bitter injurious thoughts of others 9. What a sin is it with such unthankfulness to requite Christs servants that spend their dayes and strength and estates in labouring for mens good When I take none of your money when I have these twelve years preached as I had liberty freely without hire when I had been put on to plead the Non-conformists Cause in the costliesâ— circumstances and to bear the greatest odium for it when I was I think the first that was silenced on such accounts when I have been twelve or fourteen years deprived of all Ecclesiastical maintenance when I refused a Bishoprick when I have laboured in Writings and other duties to the consuming of my flesh in daily and hourly pain and weakness and now look every Sermon for my last and am ready to appear before my Judge to be to the very last thus calumniated and reviled by pievish Sectaries would be a sad reward were your favour my reward But is this just or grateful or shall the unrighteous and unthankful be accounted the best men I know I could have been one of the highest in your favour and applause if I would have humoured and followed you But I had rather that God should keep me from your honour than buy it at so dear a rate 10. And is it no sin thus to hinder the success of our labours by making us odious or suspected by them that should profit by us 11. Is it not hypocrisie to cry out of the Bishops for silencing us when you shew that you would fain do it your selves Would not you silence me now if it were in your power Yea I doubt not but when I die some of you will rejoyce and say that God did it in judgement on me 12. And thus to make divisions among Christians that should hold the Unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace will one day be known to be a sin 13. And so it is hereby to harden the enemies of Religion by your clamours and the divisions which you cause and tempt them to hate both you and us 14. And it is worst of all to father all this on God and Truth and Godliness and use such holy Names for so bad a Cause 15. And it aggravateth your sin that you take no more notice of all those plain and terrible Scriptures which as openly condemn your sin as the sin of Drunkards or Swearers is condemned were it but James 3. it would leave you utterly without excuse 16. Yea and that you can see the sins of such Drunkards and Swearers yea and see the Mote in the eyes of one that doth but use a Form or Ceremony which you dislike and cannot see these Beams in your own For all these sins I admonish you presently to repent S. Who is it that is censorious you or I It is sin with you to open your sin P. I desired you to open it But see now how hard a work Repentance is when in a Professor such sins as these will not be confessed S. Well come to the cause it self Is it I or you that comply with Papists P. I make that the business of this Conference with you It is not you only but some wiser men than you that look so much at the evil of Popery that they forget the evil of an unrighteous opposition and of the other extream And they do as one that by labouring to cure another of a Dead Palsie casteth himself into a Phrensie or a Feaver or like one that to avoid a Carrion that stinketh in the Ditch doth run himself into the Ditch on the other side the way Gods Truth must be vindicated only by Truth and Wisdom is best justified of her own children by Wisdom God hath no pleasure in fools noâ— doth his Glory need our lye There is a time when the Devil will seem to be against error and sin and so against Popery but it is in a way which shall promote it which commonly is by ill-doing and over-doing I tell you plainly the Cause of Truth and Reformation gets nothing by some men that seâ—m most zealous for it For an unstudied half-wise honest Minister or private man to believe false reports of the Papists and to mis-state Controversies and to rail on them on such suppositions and to mix many errors of his own in his opposition and to backbite those that know more of the matter as symbolizing with the Papists this is certainly serving the Devil how honest soever the instruments in the main may be S. I perceive that you have an aking tooth at the Protestant Divines as well as at me Are you wiser than all they or are you not warping to Grotianism which you have written against P. Among the Protestant Divines there are well studied knowing solid men that understand what they say such as Bishop Usher Dr. Chaloner Dr. Field Dr. White Chillingworth Morton Davenant Andrews and many such and abroad Camero Dallaus Blondell Drelincourt Amyraâ—dus Placaeus Vâ—ssius Junius Martinius Crocius Bergius Bucer Musculus Melanchthon and many others and there are ignorant hot-headed self-conceited men that rave in extreams as Gallus Ambsdorsius and their companions did against Georg. Major for saying Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem And it is no wonder that the best Churches have many such and if such are the forwardest to judge and cry down all that are not as ignorant as they And in our times the World is more beholden to the fewness of buyers and the wit of Booksellers refusing to Print them than to the humility or modesty of such men that the Shops do not abound with such furious Writings â—s Mr. Brownes Antichristomachus Mr. Danvers Mr. Bagshaw c. and that Antichrist Antichrist is not made in Print the Universal Consutation of sober truth as commonly as it is bawled out in words S. Is it not safest to get far enough from Antichrist and Popery Your study is to teach men how near they may come to sin without sin and how to dance about the brink of Hell For my part I will be one of them that shall come out of Babylon and partake not of her sins nor touch the unclean thing and that keep their garments undefiled and not one that like you is grown Lukewarm by being over-fond of Unity and Peace You will follow Grotius it's doubt at last P. Uncleanness must not be touched nor sin partaked of nor lukewarm indifferency
being superstitious by a great deal of self-made Duty and Sin only theirs and yours are not in the same things They say Touch not taste not handle not some things and you other things while you say that God hath forbidden forms of prayer and many lawful circumstances of Worship and other such like And I now intreat you and all the servants of Christ soberly to consider whether a wild injudicious calling sound Doctrine and Practices Antichristian and using that name as a bugbear for want of solid argument and an injudicious running from Papists into the contrary errors and extreams hath not brought on many the guilt and misery which in all the following particulars I shall open to you 1. Such men have corrupted the Gospel of Christ by bringing in many doctrinal errors and opening a door to the heretical to bring in more Almost all the Libertine Antinomian errors have come in by an injudicious opposition to Popery as if they were the Vindication of Election Free Grace Christs Righteousness Justification by faith Perseverance against mans Works and Merits And it is not to be denyed that the said Libertine Doctrines do more contradict the Doctrine of the Gospel even Christianity it self than the Doctrine of the Papists about the same subjects do I know this to be true who ever is offended at it Aquinas Scotus Gabriel Bellarmine Pererids Tolet yea Vasquez Suarez and Molina are not near so erroneous about Justification Grace Faith and good works as Richardson Randal Sympson Towne Crispe Saltmarsh and many such others are Yet how many Religious people have I known that have gloried in these errors as the sweet discoveries of free grace 2. Such erroneous extreams in opposition to Popery have greatly dishonoured the Reformers and Reformation When it cannot be denyed but such and such errors are found among them it maketh all the Reformation suspected as Illyricus his Doctrine of the substantiality of sin and the non-necessity of Good works to salvation and as Andr. Osianders Doctrine of Justification by Gods essential righteousness did and as many harsh passages in Piscator and Maccovins do to name no more besides those before named What a stir have our later Divines still with the Papists in defending some few harsh sayings of Luther Calvin and Beza about the Cause of sin and some such subjects But downright errors cannot be defended 3. Your injudicious opposition greatly hardneth the Papists and hindereth their conviction When they find some errours in your writings as that all are bound to believe that they are elected and Justified that this is the sense of the Article I believe the forgiveness of sin that this is sides divina that we are Reputed of God to have fulfilled all the Law of Innocency habitually and actually in and by Christ c. and then when they read that such men lay the great stress of the Reformation upon these as the very cause of our rejecting Rome and the artiouli stantisaut cadentis Ecclesiae what can more harden them to a confidence that we are hereticks and that they are in the right As I have known the persons that had been in danger of turning Papists if the errour of Transubstantiation and some few more had not been so palpable as to resolve them These men cannot be in the right even so many Papists were like to have turned Protestants had they not met with some notorious errours in such injudicious adversaries 4. Yea we too very well know that your extremities have occasioned divers Protestants to turn Papists Yea some Learned men and such as have zealously run through many Sects in opposition to Popery themselves And some of my acquaintance that went as far in the profession of Godliness as most that I have known They have been so confounded to find partly palpable errours taken for sound doctrine and sound doctrine railed at as Popery and partly to see the shameful diversity and contentions of all the Sects among themselves that it hath drawn them to think that there is no prosperity of the Church and Godliness to be expected but where there is unity and Concord and no Unity and Concord to be hoped for among Protestants And therefore they must return for it to Rome And Grotius professeth that it was this that moved him to go so far towards them as he did And I must needs say that I believe from my very heart that the shameful divisions contentions backbitings revilings censurings persecutions errours and scandals of Protestants among themselves is a far stronger temptation to turn men to Popery than any thing that is to be found among the Papists to turn men to it and that many are thus driven to it that would not have been drawn 5. And by calling good and lawful if not necessary things Antichristian and Popish you have made Religious people ridiculous and a scorn to many that have more wit than Conscience as if we were all such humorous Novices as would run mad by being frightned with the name of Antichrist And as they deride you for it as Fanatical so they the less fear Popery it self 6. And by these extremities you corrupt the peoples minds with a wrathful and contentious kind of Religion which â—s easily taken up in comparison of a holy and heavenly mind When you should kindle in them a zeal for Love and Good Works the mark of Gods peculiar people you are killing Love and kindling wrath Gunpowder may be set on fire without so much blowing of the coal Long experience assureth us that a siding angry contentious zeal is easily kindled but a lively faith a confirmed hope of Glory a Love to God and man needs more ado S. Stay a little in the midst of your reproofs Would you perswade us to a Union with Antichrist and to live in Love and Concord with the members of the Devil Are not the Papists such Have you no way to reconcile us to Rome but by pleading for Love and peace Must we not contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the Saints and not be Lukewarm to the doctrines of Jezabel that seduceth the people of God to Idolatry P. 1. Were you perswadable I would perswade you not ignorantly to contradict the truth of God and call it Popery nor to set up certain false or incongruous notions and pretend them great and necessary verities nor to make a stir for some odd unsound opinions received upon trust from those that you thought best of and to buzz abroad suspicious of Popery against those that have more understanding and conscience than to imitate you nor to fly in the faces of Gods faithfullest servants much less to use your tongues to backbite them as if they were Antichristian because they are not as shamefully ignorant and deceived as you are And I would perswade you to study and digest well what you take the boldness to speak against and not to talk confidently and furiously against that which you never