are And if it were fit for such poor finite Creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do I think we might say That God himself cannot choose what is not good the Fredom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best § 32. But to consider this mistaken part of Liberty right Would any one be a Changeling because he is less determined by wise Considerations than a wise Man Is it worth the Name of Freedom to be at liberty to play the Fool and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self If want of restraint to chuse or to do the worse be Liberty true Liberty mad Men and Fools are the only Free-men but yet I think no Body would chuse to be mad for the sake of such Liberty but he that is mad already § 33. But though the preference of the Mind be always determined by the appearance of Good greater Good yet the Person who has the Power in which alone consists liberty to act or not to act according to such preference is nevertheless free such determination abridges not that Power He that has his Chains knocked off and the Prison-doors set open to him is perfectly at liberty because he may either go or stay as he best likes though his preference be determined to stay by the darkness of the Night or illness of the Weather or want of other Lodging He ceases not to be free though that which at that time appears to him the greater Good absolutely determines his preference and makes him stay in his Prison I have rather made use of the Word Preference than Choice to express the act of Volition because choice is of a more doubtful signification and bordering more upon Desire and so is referred to things remote whereas Volition or the Act of Willing signifies nothing properly but the actual producing of something that is voluntary § 34. The next thing to be considered is If our Wills be determined by Good How it comes to pass that Men's Wills carry them so contrarily and consequently some of them to what is Evil And to this I say that the various and contrary choices that Men make in the World doe not argue that they do not all chuse Good but that the same thing is not good to every Man Were all the Concerns of Man terminated in this Life why one pursued Study and Knowledge and another Hawking and Hunting why one chose Luxury and Debauchery and another Sobriety and Riches would not be because every one of these did not pursue his own Happiness but because their Happiness lay in different things And therefore 't was a right Answer of the Physician to his Patient that had sore Eyes If you have more Pleasure in the Taste of Wine than in the use of your Sight Wine is good for you but if the Pleasure of Seeing be greater to you than that of Drinking Wine is naught § 35. The Mind has a different relish as well as the Palate and you will as fruitlesly endeavour to delight all Men with Riches or Glory which yet some Men place their Happiness in as you would to satisfie all Men's Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters which though very agreeable and delicious fare to some are to others extremely nauseous and offensive And many People would with Reason prefer the griping of an hungry Belly to those Dishes which are a Feast to others Hence it was I think that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire whether Summum bonum consisted in Riches or bodily Delights or Virtue or Contemplation And they might have as reasonably disputed whether the best Relish were to be found in Apples Plumbs or Nuts and have divided themselves into Sects upon it For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves but their agreeableness to this or that particular Palate wherein there is great variety So the greatest Happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest Pleasure and the absence of those which cause any disturbance any pain which to different Men are very different things If therefore Men in this Life only have hope if in this Life they can only enjoy 't is not strange nor unreasonable they should seek their Happiness by avoiding all things that disease them here and by preferring all that delight them wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference For if there be no Prospect beyond the Grave the inference is certainly right Let us eat and drink let us enjoy what we delight in for to morrow we shall die This I think may serve to shew us the Reason why though all Men's Wills are determined by Good yet they are not determined by the same Object Men may chuse different things and yet all chuse right supposing them only like a Company of poor Insects whereof some are Bees delighted with Flowers and their sweetness others Scarabes delighted with other kind of Viands which having enjoyed for a Season they should cease to be and exist no more for ever § 36. This sufficiently discovers to us why Men in this World prefer different things and pursue Happiness by contrary Courses But yet since Men are always determined by Good the greater Good and are constant and in earnest in matter of Happiness and Misery the Question still remains How Men come often to prefer the worse to the better and to chuse that which by their own Confession has made them miserable § 37. To this I answer That as to present Happiness or Misery present Pleasure or Pain when that alone comes in Consideration a Man never chuses amiss he knows what best pleases him and that he actually prefers Things in their present enjoyment are what they seem the apparent and real good are in this case always the same For the Pain or Pleasure being just so great and no greater than it is felt the present Good or Evil is really so much as it appears And therefore were every Action of ours concluded within it self and drew no Consequences after it we should undoubtedly always will nothing but Good always infallibly prefer the best Were the pains of honest Industry and of starving with Hunger and Cold set together before us no Body would be in doubt which to chuse were the satisfaction of a Lust and the Joys of Heaven offered at once to any one 's present Possession he would not balance or err in the choice and determination of his Will But since our voluntary Actions carry not all the Happiness and Misery that depend on them along with them in their present performance but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil which they draw after them and bring upon us when they themselves are passed and cease to be that which has the Preference and makes us will the doing or omitting any Action in our Power is the greater Good appearing to result from that choice in all its Consequences as far as at present they are represented to our view § 38. So that that which determines the choice of the Will and
compounded and decompounded may at last be resolved into simple Ideas which are all the Materials of Knowledge or Thought we have or can have Nor shall we have reason to fear that the Mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of Ideas if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple Modes Number and Figure alone affords us How far then mixed Modes which admit of the various Combinations of different simple Ideas and their infinite Modes are from being few and scanty we may easily imagine So that before we have done we shall see that no Body need be afraid he shall have scope and compass enough for his Thoughs to range in though they be as I pretend confined only to simple Ideas received from Sensation or Reflection and their several combinations § 10. It is worth our observing which of all our simple Ideas have been most modified and had most mixed Modes made out of them with names given to them And those have been these three Thinking and Motion which are the two Ideas which comprehend in them all Action and Power from whence these Actions are conceived to flow These simple Ideas I say of Thinking Motion and Power have been those which have been most modified and out of whose Modifications have been made most complex Modes with names to them For Action being the great business of Mankind and the whole matter about which all Laws are conversant it is no wonder that the several Modes of Thinking and Motion should be taken notice of the Ideas of them observed and laid up in the Memory and have Names assigned to them without which Laws could be but ill made or Vice and Disorders repressed Nor could any Communication be well had amongst Men without such complex Ideas with Names to them and therefore Men have setled Names and supposed setled Ideas in their Minds of modes of Actions distinguished by their Causes Means Objects Ends Instruments Time Place and other circumstances and also of their Powers fitted for those Actions v. g. Boldness is the Power to speak or do before others without fear or disorder and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which power or ability in Man of doing any thing when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing is that the Idea we name Habit when it is forward and ready upon every occasion to break into Action we call it Disposition Thus Testiness is a disposition or aptness to be angry To conclude Let us examine any Modes of Action v. g. Consideration and Assent which are Actions of the Mind Running and Speaking which are Actions of the Body Revenge and Murther which are Actions of both together and we shall find them but so many Collections of simple Ideas which together make up the complex ones signified by those Names § 11. Power being the Source from whence all Action proceeds The Substances wherein these Powers are when they exert this Power into Act are called Causes and the Substances which thereupon are produced or the simple Ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that Power are called Effects The efficacy whereby the new Substance or Idea is produced is called in the subject exerting that Power Action but in the subject wherein any simple Idea is changed on produced it is called Passion which efficacy however various and the effects almost infinite yet we can I think conceive it in intellectual Agents to be nothing else but Modes of Thinking and Willing in corporeal Agents nothing else but Modifications of Motion I say I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two For whatever sort of Action besides these produces any effects I confess my self to have no Notion nor Idea of and so they are quite remote from my Thoughts Apprehensions and Knowledge and are as much in the dark to me as five other Senses or the Ideas of Colours to a blind Man And therefore many words which seem to express some Action signifie nothing of the Action or Modus Operandi at all but barely the effect with some circumstances of the Subject wrought on or Cause operating v. g. Creation Annihilation contain in them no Idea of the Action or Manner whereby they are produced but barely of the Cause and the thing done And when a Country man says the Cold freezes Water though the word Freezing seem to import some Action yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect viz. that Water that was before fluid is become hard and consistent without containing any Idea of the Action whereby it is done § 12. I think I shall not need to remark here that though Power and Action make the greatest part of mixed Modes marked by Names and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men yet other simple Ideas and their several Combinations are not excluded much less I think will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed Modes which have been setled with Names to them that would be to make a Dictionary of the greatest part of the Words made use of in Divinity Ethicks Law and Politicks and several other Sciences All that is requisite to my present design is to shew what sort of Ideas those are I call Mixed Modes how the Mind comes by them and that they are Compositions made up of simple Ideas got from Sensation and Reflection which I suppose I have done CHAP. XXIII Of our Complex Ideas of Substances § 1. THe Mind being as I have declared furnished with a great number of the simple Ideas conveyed in by the Senses as they are found in exterior things or by Reflection on its own Operations takes notice also that a certain number of these simple Ideas go constantly together which being presumed to belong to one thing and Words being suited to common apprehensions and made use of for quick dispatch are called so united in one subject by one name which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one single Idea which indeed is a complication of many Ideas together Because as I have said not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves we accustom our selves to suppose some Substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result which therefore we call Substance § 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion of pure Substance in general he will find he has no other Idea of it at all but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities which are capable of producing simple Ideas in us which Qualities are commonly called Accidents And if any one should be asked what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres he would have nothing to say but the solid extended parts And if he were demanded what is it that that Solidity and Extension inhere in he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned who
same Figures and Motions of any other and I challenge any one in his Thoughts to add any Thing else to one above another § 16. Thirdly If then neither one peculiar Atom alone can be this eternal thinking Being nor all Matter as Matter i. e. every particle of Matter can be it it only remains that it is some certain System of Matter duly put together that is this thinking eternal Being This is that which I imagine is that Notion which Men are aptest to have of GOD who would have him a material Being as most readily suggested to them by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other Men which they take to be material thinking Beings But this Imagination however more natural is no less absurd than the other For to suppose the eternal thinking Being to be nothing else but a composition of Particles of Matter each whereof is incogitative is to ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of that eternal Being only to the juxta-position of parts than which nothing can be more absurd For unthinking Particles of Matter however put together can have nothing thereby added to them but a new relation of Position which 't is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them § 17. But farther this corporeal System either has all its parts at rest or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its Thinking consists If it be perfectly at rest it is but one lump and so can have no privileges above one Atom If it be the motion of its parts on which its Thinking depends all the Thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limitted since all the Particles that by Motion cause Thought being each of them in it self without any Thought cannot regulate its own Motions much less be regulated by the Thought of the whole since that Thought is not the cause of Motion for then it must be antecedent to it and so without it but the consequence of it whereby Freedom Power Choice and all rational and wise thinking or acting will be quite taken away So that such a thinking Being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind Matter since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind Matter or into Thought depending on unguided motions of blind Matter is the same thing not to mention the narrowness of such Thoughts and Knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts But there needs no enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibilities in this Hypothesis however full of them it be than that before-mentioned since let this thinking System be all or a part of the Matter of the Universe it is impossible that any one Particle should either know its own or the motion of any other Particle or the Whole know the motion of every Particular and so regulate its own Thoughts or Motions or indeed have any Thought resulting from such Motion § 18. Others would have Matter to be eternal notwithstanding that they allow an eternal cogitative immaterial Being This tho' it take not away the Being of a God yet since it denies one and the first great piece of his Workmanship the Creation let us consider it a little Matter must be allow'd eternal Why Because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing why do you not also think your self eternal You will answer perhaps Because about twenty or forty years since you began to be But if I ask you what that You is which began to be you can scarce tell me The Matter whereof you are made began not then to be for if it did then it is not eternal But it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your Body but yet that frame of Particles is not You it makes not that thinking Thing You are for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal immaterial thinking Being but would have unthinking Matter eternal too therefore when did that thinking Thing begin to be If it did never begin to be then have you always been a thinking Thing from Eternity the absurdity whereof I need not confute till I meet with one who is so void of Understanding as to own it If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing to be made out of nothing as all Things that are not eternal must be why also can you not allow it possible for a material Being to be made out of nothing by an equal Power but that you have the experience of the one in view and not of the other Though when well considered Creation of one as well as t'other requires an equal Power And we have no more reason to boggle at the effect of that Power in one than in the other because the manner of it in both is equally beyond our comprehension For the Creation or beginning of any one thing out of nothing being once admitted the Creation of every thing else but the CREATOR Himself may with the same ease be supposed § 19. But you will say Is it not impossible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing since we cannot possibly conceive it I answer No 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite Being because we cannot comprehend its Operations We do not deny other effects upon this ground because we cannot possibly conceive their Production we cannot conceive how Thought or any thing but motion in Body can move Body and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us deny it possible against the constant Experience we have of it in our selves in all our voluntary Motions which are produced in us only by the free Thoughts of our own Minds and are not nor cannot be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind Matter in or upon our Bodies for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it For example My right Hand writes whilst my left Hand is still What causes rest in one and motion in the other Nothing but my Will a Thought of my Mind my Thought only changing the right Hand rests and the left Hand moves This is matter of fact which cannot be denied Explain this and make it intelligible and then the next step will be to understand Creation In the mean time 't is an overvaluing our selves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our Capacities and to conclude all things impossible to be done whose manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension This is to make our Comprehension infinite or GOD finite when what he can do is limitted to what we can conceive of it If you do not understand the Operations of your own finite Mind that thinking Thing within you do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal infinite Mind who made and governs all Things and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain CHAP. XI Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things § 1. THe Knowledge of our own Being
we have by intuition The Existence of a GOD Reason clearly makes known to us as has been shewn The Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing we can have only by Sensation For there being no necessary connexion of real Existence with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory nor of any other Existence but that of GOD with the Existence of any particular Man no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being but only when by actual operating upon him it makes it self perceived by him For the having the Idea of any thing in our Mind no more proves the Existence of that Thing than the picture of a Man evidences his being in the World or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History § 2. 'T is therefore the actual receiving of Ideas from without that gives us notice of the Existence of other Things and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us which causes that Idea in us though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it For it takes not from the certainty of our Senses and the Ideas we receive by them that we know not the manner wherein they are produced v. g. whilst I write this I have by the Paper affecting my Eyes that Idea produced in my Mind which whatever Object causes I call White by which I know that that Quality or Accident i. e. whose appearance before my Eyes always causes that Idea doth really exist and hath a Being without me And of this the greatest assurance I can possibly have and to which my Faculties can attain is the Testimony of my Eyes which are the proper and sole Judges of this thing and whose Testimony I have reason to rely on as so certain that I can no more doubt whilst I write this that I see White and Black and that something really exists that causes that Sensation in me than that I write or move my Hand which is a Certainty as great as humane Nature is capable of concerning the Existence of any Thing but a Man's self alone and of GOD. § 3. The notice we have by our Senses of the existing of Things without us though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive Knowledge or the Deductions of our Reason employ'd about the clear abstract Ideas of our own Minds yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of Knowledge if we persuade our selves that our Faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those Objests that affect them it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence For I think no body can in earnest be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the Existence of those Things he sees and feels At least he that can doubt so far whatever he may have with his own Thoughts will never have any Controversies with me since he can never be sure I say any thing contrary to his Opinion As to my self I think GOD has given me assurance enough of thâ—â—â—istence of Things without me since by their different application I â—an produce in my self both Pleasure and Pain which is one great Concernment of my present state This is certain the confidence that our Faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the Existence of material Beings For we cannot act any thing but by our Faculties nor talk of Knowledge it self but by the help of those Faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what Knowledge is But besides the assurance our Senses themselves give us that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Existence of Things without us when they are affected by them we are farther confirmed in this assurance by other concurrent Reasons § 4. First 'T is plain those Perceptions are produced in us by exteriour Causes affecting our Senses Because those that want the Organs of any Sense never can have the Ideas belonging to that Sense produced in their Minds This is too evident to be doubted and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the Organs of that Sense and no other way The Organs themselves 't is plain do not produce them for then the Eyes of a Man in the dark would produce Colours and his Nose smell Roses in the Winter but we see no body gets the relish of a Pine-apple till he goes to the Indies where it is and tastes it § 5. Secondly Because sometimes I find that I cannot avoid the having those Ideas produced in my Mind For though when my Eyes are shut or Windows fast I can at Pleasure re-call to my Mind the Ideas of Light or the Sun which former Experience had lodg'd in my Memory so I can at pleasure lay by that Idea and take into my view that of the smell of a Rose or taste of Sugar But if I turn my Eyes at noon towards the Sun I cannot avoid the Ideas which the Light or Sun then produces in me So that there is a manifest difference between the Ideas laid up in my Memory over which if they were there only I should have constantly the same power to dispose of them and lay them by at pleasure and those which force themselves upon me and I cannot avoid having And therefore it must needs be some exteriour cause and the brisk acting of some Objects without me whose efficacy I cannot resist that produces those Ideas in my Mind whether I will or no. Besides there is no body who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the Sun as he hath the Idea of it in his Memory And actually looking upon it Of which two his perception is so distinct that sew of his Ideas are more distinguishable one from another And therefore he hath certain knowledge that they are not both Memory or the Actions of his Mind and Fancies only within him but that actual seeing hath a Cause without § 6. Thirdly Add to this that many of those Ideas are produced in us with pain which afterwards we remember without the least offence Thus the pain of Heat or Cold when the Idea of it is revived in our Minds gives us no disturbance which when felt was very troublesome and is again when actually repeatedâ— which is occasioned by the disorder the external Object causes in our Bodies when applied to it And we remember the pain of Hunger Thirst or the Head-ach without any pain at all which would either never disturb us or else constantly do it as often as we thought of it were there nothing more but Ideas floating in our Minds and Appearances entertaining our Fancies without the real Existence of Things affecting us from abroad And though mathematical demonstrations depend not upon sense yet the examining them by Diagrams gives great credit to the Evidence of our Sight and seems to give it a Certainty approaching to that to the Demonstration it self For it would be very strange that a Man should allow it for an
taken from the bulk or motion of Bodies 8. They belong to all Beingsâ— 9. All the parts of Extension are Extension and all the parts of Duration are Duration 10. Their parts inseparable 11. Duration is as a Line Expansion as a Solid 12. Duration has never two parts together Expansion altogether CHAP. XVI Of Number SECT 1. Number the simplest and most universal Idea 2. It s Modes made by Addition 3. Each Mode distinct 4. Therefore Demonstrations in Numbers the most precise 5 6. Names necessary to Numbers 7. Why Children number not earlier 8. Number measures all Measurables CHAP. XVII Of Infinity SECT 1. Infinity in its original intention attributed to Space Duration and Number 2 3. How we come by the Idea of Infinity 4. Our Idea of Space boundless 5. And so of Duration 6. Why other Ideas are not capable of Infinity 7. Difference between infinity of Space and Space infinite 8. We have no Idea of infinite Space 9. Number affords us the clearest Idea of Infinity 10 11. Our different conception of the Infinity of Number Duration and Expansion 12. Infinite Divisibility 13 14 17 18. No positive Idea of Infinite 15 16 19. What is positive what negative in our Idea of Infinite 20. Some think they have a positive Idea of Eternity and not Space 21. Supposed positive Ideas of Infinity cause of Mistakes 22. All these Ideas from Sensation and Reflexion CHAP. XVIII Of other simple Modes SECT 1 2. Modes of Motion 3. Modes of Sounds 5. Modes of Tastes 7. Modes of Colours 8. Why some Modes have and others have not Names CHAP. XIX Of the Modes of Thinking SECT 1 2. Sensation Remembrance Contemplation c. 3. The various attention of the Mind in Thinking 4. Hence probable that Thinking is the Action not Essence of the Soul CHAP. XX. Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain SECT 1. Pleasure and Pain simple Ideas 2. Good and Evil what 3. Our Passions moved by Good and Evil. 4. Love 5. Hatred 6. Desire 7. Ioy. 8. Sorrow 9. Hope 10. Fear 11. Despair 12. Anger 13. Envy 14. What Passions all Men have 15 16. Pleasure and Pain what 17. Shame 18. These instances to shew how our Ideas of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflexion CHâ—P XXI Of Power SECT 1. This Idea how got 2. Power active and passive 3. Power includes Relation 4. The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit 5. Will and Vnderstanding two Powers 6. Faculties 7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity 8 12. Liberty what 9. Supposes the Vnderstanding and Will 10. Belongs not to Volition 11. Voluntary opposed to involuntary not to Necessary 13. Necessity what 14 20. Liberty belong not to the Will 21. But to the Agent or Man 22 24. In respect of willing a Man is not free 25 28. The Will determined by something without it 29. The greater apparent Good determines the Will 30 32. This is a Perfection of humane Nature 33. And takes not away Liberty 34 35. Why Men chuse differently 36. Why they chuse amiss 38. From the different appearance of Good 39. And judging amiss on these Appearances 40 42. First in comparing present and future 43. Secondly In thinking wrong of the greatness or certainty of the Consequence of any Action 44. Causes of wrong Iudgment Ignorance Inadvertency Sloth Passion Fashion c. 45. Preference of Vice to Vertue a manifest wrong Iudgment 47. Recapitulation CHAP. XXII Of Mixed Modes SECT 1. Mixed Modes what 2. Made by the Mind 3. Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names 4. The Name ties the Parts of the mixed Modes into one Idea 5. The Cause of making mixed Modes 6. Why Words in one Language have none answering in another 7. And Languages change 8. Mixed Modes where they exist 9. How we get the Ideas of mixed Modes 10. Motion Thinking and Power have been most modified 11. Several Words seeming to signifie Action signifie but the Effect 12. Mixed Modes made also of other Ideas CHAP. XXIII Of the Complex Ideas of Substances SECT 1. Ideas of Substances how made 2. Our Idea of Substance in general 3 6. Of the sorts of Substances 4. No clear Idea of Substance in general 5. As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body 7. Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances 8. And why 9. Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Sustances 10 11. The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts 12. Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State 13. Conjecture about Spirits 14. Complex Ideas of Substances 15. Idea of spiritual Substances as clear as of bodily Substances 16. No Idea of abstract Substance 17. The Cohesion of solid Parts and impulse the primary Ideas of Body 18. Thinking and Motivity the primary Ideas of Spirit 19 21. Spirits capable of Motion 22. Idea of Soul and Body compared 23 27. Cohesion of solid Parts in Body as hard to be conceived as Thinking in a Soul 28 29. Commâ—nication of Motion by Impulse or by Thought equally intelligible 30. Ideas of Body and Spirit compared 31. The Notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of Body 32. We know nothing beyond our simple Ideas 33 35. Idea of God 36. No Ideas in our Complex one of Spirits but those got from Sensation or Reflexion 37. Recapitulation CHAP. XXIV Of Collective Ideas of Substances SECT 1. One Idea 2. Made by the Power of composing in the Mind 3. All artificial Things are collective Ideas CHAP. XXV Of Relation SECT 1. Relation what 2. Relations without correlative Terms not easily perceived 3. Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations 4. Relation different from the Things related 5. Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject 6. Relation only betwixt two Things 7. All Things capable of Relation 8. The Ideas of Relations clearer often than of the Subjects related 9. Relations all terminate in simple Ideas 10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated are Relative 11. Conclusion CHAP. XXVI Of Cause of Effect and other Relations SECT 1. Whence their Ideas got 2. Creation Generation making Alteration 3 4. Relations of Time 5. Relations of Place and Extension 6. Absolute Terms often stand for Relations CHAP. XXVII Of other Relations SECT 1. Proportional 2. Natural 3. Instituted 4. Moral 5. Moral Good and Evil. 6. Moral Rules 7. Laws 8. Divine Law the measure of Sin and Duty 9. Civil Law the measure of Crimes and Innocence 10 11. Philosophical Law the measure of Vertue and Vice 12. Its Inforcements Commendation and Discredit 13. These three Laws the Rules of moral Good and Evil. 14 15. Morality is the Relation of Actions to these Rules 16. The denominations of Actions often mislead us 17. Relations innumerable 18. All Relations terminate in simple Ideas 19. We have ordinary as clear or clearer Notion of the Relation as of its Foundation 20. The Notion of
the Relation is the same whether the Rule any Action is compared to be true or false CHAP. XXVIII Of Clear and Distinct Obscure and Confused Ideas SECT 1. Ideas some clear and distinct others obscure and confused 2. Clear and Obscure explained by Sight 3. Causes of Obscurity 4. Distinct and confused what 5. Objection 6. Confusion of Ideas is in reference to their Names 7. Defaults which make Confusion First complex Ideas made up of too few simple ones 8. Secondly Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together 9. Thirdly Or are mutable and undetermined 10. Confusion without reference to Names hardly conceivable 11. Confusion concerns always two Ideas 12. Causes of Confusion 13. Complex Ideas may be distinct in one part and confused in another 14. This if not heeded causes Confusion in our Arguings 15. Instance in Eternity 16 17. Divisibility of Matter CHAP. XXIX Of Real and Fantastical Ideas SECT 1. Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes 2. Simple Ideas all real 3. Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations 4. Mixed Modes made of consistent Ideas are real 5. Ideas of Substances are real when they agree with the Existence of Things CHAP. XXX Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas SECT 1. Adequate Ideas are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes 2. Simple Ideas all adequate 3. Modes are all adequate 4 5. Modes in reference to settled Names may be inadequate 6 7. Ideas of Substances as referr'd to real Essences not adequate 8 11. Ideas of Substances as Collections of their Qualities are all inadequate 12. Simple Ideas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and adequate 13. Ideas of Substances are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inadequate 14. Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes and cannot but be adequate CHAP. XXI Of true and false Ideas SECT 1. Truth and Falshood properly belongs to Propositions 2. Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition 3. No Idea as an appearance in the Mind true or false 4. Ideas referred to any thing may be true or false 5. Other Men's Ideas real Existence and supposed real Essences are what Men usually refer their Ideas to 6 8. The cause of such references 9. Simple Ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name but are least liable to be so 10. Ideas of mixed Modes most liable to be false in this sense 11. Or at least to be thought false 12. And why 13. As referred to real Existences none of our Ideas can be false but those of Substances 14 16. First Simple Ideas in this sense not false and why 15. Though one Man's Idea of Blue should be different from another's 17. Secondly Modes not false 18. Thirdly Ideas of Substances are false when the Combination is made of simple Ideas that do never co-exist or has in it the negation of any one that does constantly coexist 19. Truth or Falshood always supposes affirmation or negation 20. Ideas in themselves neither true nor false 21. But are false First when judged agreeable to another Man's Idea without being so 22. Secondly When judged to agree to real Existence when they do not 23. Thirdly When judged adequate without being so 24. Fourthly When judged to represent the real Essence 25. Ideas when false 26. More properly to be called Right or Wrong 27. Conclusion BOOK III. CHAP. I. Of Words or Language in general SECT 1. Man fitted to form articulate Sounds 2. To make them signs of Ideas 3 4. To make general Signs 5. Words ultimately derived from such as signifie sensible Ideas 6. Distribution CHAP. II. Of the Signification of Words LECT 1. Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication 2 3. Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them 4. Words often secretly referred First to the Ideas in other Men's Minds 5. Secondly To the reality of Things 6. Words by use readily excite Ideas 7. Words often used without signification 8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary CHAP. III. Of general Terms SECT 1. The greatest part of Words general 2. For every particular thing to have a name is impossible 3 4. And useless 5. What things have proper names 6 8. How general Words are made 9. General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas 10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Definitions 11. General and universal are Creatures of the Vnderstanding 12. Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species 13. They are the Workmanship of the Vnderstanding but have their foundation in the similitude of things 14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence 15. Real and nominal Essence 16. Constant connexion between the Name and nominal Essence 17. Supposition that Species are distinguished by their real Essences useless 18. Real and nominal Essence the same in simple Ideas and Modes different in Substances 19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible 20. Recapitulation CHAP. IV. Of the Names of simple Ideas SECT 1. Names of simple Ideas Modes and Substances have each something peculiar 2. First Names of simple Ideas and Substances intimate real Existence 3. Secondly Names of simple Ideas and Modes signifie always both real and nominal Essence 4. Thirdly Names of simple Ideas undefinable 5. If all were definable 't would be a process in infinitum 6. What a Definition is 7. Simple Ideas why undefinable 8 9. Instances Motion 10. Light 11. Simple Ideas why undefinable farther explained 12 13. The contrary shewed in complex Ideas by instances of a Statue and Rainbow 14. The Names of complex Ideas when to be made intelligible by Words 15. Fourthly Names of simple Ideas least doubtful 16. Fifthly Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali 17. Sixthly Names of simple Ideas stand for Ideas not at all arbitrary CHAP. V. Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations SECT 1. They stand for abstract Ideas as other general Names 2. First The Ideas they stand for are made by the Vnderstanding 3. Secondly Made arbitrarily and without Patterns 4. How this is done 5. Evidently arbitrary in that the Idea is often before the Existence 6. Instances Murther Incest Stabbing 7. But still subservient to the end of Language 8. Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a proof 9. This shews Species to be made for Communication 10 11. In mixed Modes 't is the Name that ties the Combination together and make it a Species 12. For the Originals of mixed Modes we look no farther than the Mind which also shews them to be the Workmanship of the Vnderstanding 13. Their being made by the Vnderstanding without Patterns shews the reason why they are so compounded 14. Names of mixed Modes stand always for their real Essences 15. Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas 16. Reason of my being so large on this Subject CHAP. VI. Of the Names of Substances SECT 1. The common Names of Substances stand for sorts 2. The Essence of each sort is the abstract Idea 3. The nominal and real Essence different 4 6. Nothing essential to Individuals 7 8. The
the Senses 5. Because an Idea from actual Sensation and another from Memory are very distinct Perceptions 6. Thirdly Pleasure or Pain which accompanies actual Sensation accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects 7. Fourthly Our Senses assist one another's Testimony of the Existence of outward Things 8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs 9. But reaches no farther than actual Sensation 10. Folly to expect demonstration in every thing 11. Past Existence is known by Memory 12. The Existence of Spirits not knowable 13. Particular Propositions concerning Existence are knowable 14. And general Propositions concerning abstract Ideas CHAP. XII Of the improvement of our Knowledge SECT 1. Knowledge is not from Maxims 2. The occasion of that Opinion 3. But from the comparing clear and distinct Ideas 4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles 5. This no certain way to Truth 6. But to compare clear compleat Ideas under steddy Names 7. The true method of advancing Knowledge is by considering our abstract Ideas 8. By which Morality also may be made clearer 9. But Knowledge of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience 10. This may procure us convenience not Science 11. We are fitted for moral Knowledge and natural Improvements 12. But must beware of Hypotheses and wrong Principles 13. The true use of Hypotheses 14. Clear and distinct Ideas with setled Names and the finding of those which shew their agreement or disagreement are the ways to enlarge our Knowledge 15. Mathematicks an instance of it CHAP. XIII Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledge SECT 1. Our Knowledge partly necessary partly voluntary 2. The application voluntary but we know as things are not as we please 3. Instances in Numbers CHAP. XIV Of Iudgment SECT 1. Our Knowledge being short we want something else 2. What use to be made of this twilight Estate 3. Iudgment supplies the want of Knowledge 4. Iudgment is the presuming things to be so without perceiving it CHAP. XV. Of Probability SECT 1. Probability is the appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs 2. It is to supply the want of Knowledge 3. Being that which makes us presume things to be true before we know them to be so 4. The grounds of Probability are two conformity with our own Experience or the Testimony of others Experience 5. In this all the agreements pro and con ought to be examined before we come to a Iudgment 6. They being capable of great variey CHAP. XVI Of the Degrees of Assent SECT 1. Our Assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of Probability 2. These cannot always be all actually in view and then we must content our selves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a degree of Assent 3. The ill consequence of this if our former Iudgment were not rightly made 4. The right use of it is mutual Charity and forbearance 5. Probability is either of matter of fact or speculation 6. The concurrent experience of all other Men with ours produces assurance approaching to Knowledge 7. Vnquestionable Testimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence 8. Fair Testimony and the nature of the Thing indifferent produces also confident belief 9. Experiences and Testimonies clashing infinitely vary the degrees of Probability 10. Traditional Testimonies the more more their removed the less their Proof 11. Yet History is of great use 12. In things which Sense cannot discover Analogy is the great Rule of Probability 13. One case where contrary Experience lessens not the Testimony 14. The bare Testimony of Revelation is the highest certainty CHAP. XVII Of Reason SECT 1. Various significations of the word Reason 2. Wherein Reasoning consists 3. It s four parts 4. Syllogism not the great Instrument of Reason 5. Helps little in Demonstration less in Probability 6. Serves not to increase our Knowledge but fence with it 7. Other helps should be sought 8. We Reason about Particulars 9. First Reason fails us for want of Ideas 10. Secondly Because of obscure and imperfect Ideas 11. Thirdly For want of intermediate Ideas 12. Fourthly Because of wrong Principles 13. Fifthly Because of doubtful terms 14. Our highest degree of Knowledge is intuitive without reasoning 15. The next is Demonstration by reasoning 16. To supply the narrowness of this we have nothing but Iudgment upon probable reasoning 17. Intuition Demonstration Iudgment 18. Consequences of Words and Consequences of Ideas 19. Four sorts of Arguments First Ad Verecundiam 20. Secondly Ad Ignorantiam 21. Thirdly Ad Hominem 22. Fourthly Ad Judicium 23. Above contrary and according to Reason 24. Reason and Faith not opposite CHAP. XVIII Of Faith and Reason and their distinct Provinces SECT 1. Necessary to know their Boundaries 2. Faith and Reason what as contradistinguished 3. No new simple Idea can be conveyed by traditional Revelation 4. Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable also by Reason but not with the same certainty that Reason doth 5. Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason 6. Traditional Revelation much less 7. Things above Reason 8. Or not contrary to Reason if revealed are matter of Faith 9. Revelation in matters where Reason cannot judge or but probably ought to be hearkened to 10. In matters where Reason can afford certain knowledge that is to be hearkened to 11. If the boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason no Enthusiasm or extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted CHAP. XIX Of Wrong Assent or Errour SECT 1. Causes of Errour 2. First Want of Proofs 3. Obj. What shall become of those who want them answered 4. People hindred from Enquiry 5. Secondly Want of skill to use them 6. Thirdly Want of Will to use them 7. Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability whereof 8 10. First Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles 11. Secondly Received Hypothesis 12. Thirdly predominant Passions 13. The means of evading Probabilities 1st Supposed fallacy 14. 2dly Supposed Arguments for the contrary 15. What Probabilities determine the Assent 16. Where it is in our power to suspend it 17. Fourthly Authority 18. Men not in so many Errours as is imagined CHAP. XX. Division of the Sciences SECT 1. Three sorts 2. First Physica 3. Secondly Practica 4. Thirdly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5. This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledge FINIS (α) Gruber apud Thevenot part 4. p. 23. (β) Lambert apud There-not p. 38. (γ) Vossius de Nili Origine c. 18.19 (δ) P. Mart. Dec. 1. Hes des Incas l. 1. c. 12. (ζ) Lery c. 16. (α) Rhoe apud Thevenot p 2. (β) Jo. de Lery c. 16. (α) A Gry is 1 â—â— of a line a line 1 10 of an inch an inch 1 1â— of a philosophical foot a philosophical foot 1 â— of a pendulum whose Diadromsâ— in the latitude of 45 degrees are each equal to one Second of time or 1 6â— of a minute I have affectedly made use of this measure here and the parts of it under a decimal division with names to theâ—â— because I think it would be of general convenience that this should be the common measure in the Commonwealth of Letters