the new Testament and therefore could not be done by Christ himselfe much lesse by his Pastors and to remit the impenitent seems to be against the will of God the Father from whom Christ was sent to convert the world and to reduce men unto obedience Furthermore if each Pastor had an authority granted him to remit and retain sinnes in this manner all awe of Princes and civill Magistrates together with all kind of civill Government would be utterly destroyed For Christ hath said it nay even nature it â—elfe dictates that we should not feare them who slay the body but cannot kill the soule but rather feare him who can caâ—t both soule and body into hell Mat. 10. vers 28. Neither is any man so mad as not to choose to yeeld obedience rather to them who can remit and retain their sinnes then to the powerfullest Kings Nor yet on the other side it is to be imagined that remission of sinnes is nothing else but an exemption from Ecclesiasticall punishments for what evill hath excommunication in it beside the eternall pains which are consequent to it or what benefit is it to be received into the Church if there were salvation out of it We must therefore hold That Pastors have power truly and absolutely to forgive sinnes but to the penitent and to retain them but of the impenitent But while men think that to Repent is nothing else but that every one condemn his Actions and change those Counsels which to himselfe seem sinfull and blameable there is an opinion risen that there may be repentance before any Confession of sinnes to men and that repentance is not an effect but a cause of Confession and thence the difficulty of those who say that the sins of the penitent are already forgiven in Baptisme and theirs who repent not cannot be forgiven at al is against Scripture and contrary to the words of Christ Whose soever sins ye remit c. We must therefore â—o resolve this difficulty know in the first place that a true acknowledgement of sin is Repentance for he that knows he hath sinned knows he hath erred but to will an errour is impossible therefore he that knowes he hath sinned wishes he had not done it which is to repent Farther where it may be doubtfull whether that which is done be a sin or not we must consider that repentance doth not precede confession of sins but is subsequent to it for there is no repentance but of sinnes acknowledged The penitent therefore must both acknowledge the fact and know it to be a sinne that is to say against the Law If a man therefore think that what he hath done is not against the Law its impossible he should repent of it Before repentance therefore its necessary there be an applicacation of the facts unto the Law but it s in vain to apply the facts unto the Law without an Interpreter for not the words of the Law but the sentence of the Law-giver is the rule of mens actions but surely either one man or some men are the Interpreters of the Law for every man is not judge of his own fact whether it be a sin or not wherefore the fact of which we doubt whether it be a sinne or not must be unfolded before some man or men and the doing of this is confession Now when the Interpreter of the Law hath judged the fact to bee a sinne if the sinner submit to his judgement and resolve with himselfe not to do so any more t is repentance and thus either it is not true repentance or else it is not antecedent but subsequent to confession These things being thus explained it is not hard to understand what kinde of power that of binding and loosing is for seeing in remission of sinnes there are two things considerable one the Judgement or Condemnation whereby the fact is judged to be a sinne the other when the Party condemned does acquiesce and obey the sentence that is to say Repents the remission of the sinne or if he repent not the Retention The first of these that is to say the Judging whether it be a sinne or not belongs to the Interpreter of the Law that is the Soveraign Judge the second namely Remission or retention of the sinne to the Pastor and it is that concerning which the power of binding and loosing is conversant And that this was the true meaning of our Saviour Christ in the institution of the same power is apparent in the 18. of Mat. vers 15 16 17 18. thus He there speaking to his Disciples sayes If thy Brother sinne against thee goe and tell him his fault betweene thee and him alone where we must observe by the way that if thy Brother sinne against thee is the same with if he doe thee injury and therefore Christ spake of those matters which belonged to the civill Tribunall he addes if he heare thee not that is to say if he deny that he hath done it or if having confest the fact he denies it to be unjustly done take with with thee yet one or two and if he refuse to heare them tell it the Church But why to the Church except that she might judge whether it were a sinne or not But if he refuse to hear the Church that is if he doe not submit to the Churches sentence but shall maintain that to be no sin which She Judges to be a sinne that is to say if he repent not for certain it is that no man repents himselfe of that action which She conceives not to be a sinne he saith not Tell it to the Apostles that we might know that the definitive sentence in the question whether it were a sin or not was not left unto them but to the Church but let him be unto thee sayes he as an Heathen or Publican that is as one out of the Church as one that is not baptized that is to say as one whose sinnes are retained For all Christians were baptized into remission of sinnes But because it might have been demanded who it was that had so great a power as that of withholding the benefit of Baptisme from the impenitent Christ shewes that the same Persons to whom he had given authority to baptize the penitent into the remission of sinns and to make them of heathen men Christians had also authority to retain their sins who by the Church should be adjudged to be impenitent and to make them of Christian men Heathens and therefore presently subjoynes Verily I say unto you Whose soever sinnes yee shall binde upon Earth they shall â—ee bound also in Heaven and whose soever sins yee shall loose upon Earth they shall be â—oosed also in Heaven Whence we may understand that the power of binding and loosing or of remitting and retaining of sinnes which is called in another place the power of the keyes is not different from the power given in another place in these words Goe and teach all Nations Baptizing them
precellence neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in my selfe for every man must account himself such as he can make himselfe without the help of others But though the benefits of this life may be much farthered by mutuall help since yet those may be better attain'd to by Dominion then by the society of others I hope no body will doubt but that men would much more greedily be carryed by Nature if all fear were removed to obtain Dominion then to gaine Society We must therefore resolve that the Originall of all great and lasting Societies consisted not in the mutuall good will men had towards each other but in the * mutuall fear they had of each other Born sit Since we now see actually a constituted Society among men and none living out of it since we discern all desirous of congresse and mutuall correspondence it may seeme a wonderfull kind of stupidity to lay in the very threshold of this Doctrine such a stumbling block before the Readers as to deny Man to be born sit for Society Therefore I must more plainly say That it is true indeed that to Man by nature or as Man that is as soone as he is born Solitude is an enemy for Infants have need of others to help them to live and those of riper years to help them to live well wherefore I deny not that men even nature compelling desire to come together But civill Societies are not meer Meetings but Bonds to the making whereof Faith and Compacts are necessary the Vertue whereof to Children and Fooles and the Profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects is altogether unknown whence it happens that those because they know not what Society is cannot enter into it these because ignorant of the benefit it brings care not for it Manifest therefore it is that all men because they are born in Infancy are born unapt for Society Many also perhaps most men either through defect of minde or want of education remain unfit during the whole course of their lives yet have they Infants as well as those of riper years an humane nature wherefore Man is made sit for Society not by Nature but by Education furthermore although Man were born in such a condition as to desire it it followes not that he therefore were Born sit to enter into it for it is one thing to desire another to be in capacity â—it for what we desire for even they who through their pride will not stoop to equall conditions without which there can be no Society do yet desire it The mutuall fear It is objected It is so improbable that men should grow into civill Societies out of fear that if they had been afraid they would not have endur'd each others looks They presume I believe that to fear is nothing else then to be affrighted I comprehend in this word Fear a certain foresight of future evill neither doe I conceive flight the sole property of fear but to distrust suspect take heed provide so that they may not fear is also incident to the fearfull They who go to Sleep shut their Dores they who Travell carry their Swords with them because they fear Theives Kingdomes guard their Coasts and Frontiers with Forts and Castles Cities are compast with Walls and all for fear of neighbouring Kingdomes and Townes even the strongest Armies and most accomplishâ—â— for Fight yet sometimes Parly for peace as fearing each others power and lest they might be overcome It is through fear that men secure themselves by flight indeed and in corners if they think they cannot escape otherwise but for the most part by Armes and Defensive Weapons whence it happens that daring to come forth they know each others Spirits but then if they fight Civill Society ariseth from the Victory if they agree from their Agreement III. The cause of mutuall fear consists partly in the naturall equality of men partly in their mutuall will of hurting whence it comes to passe that we can neither expect from others nor promise to our selves the least security For if we look on men full-grown and consider how brittle the frame of our humane body is which perishing all its strength vigour and wisdome it selfe perisheth with it and how easie a matter it is even for the weakest man to kill the strongest there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others they are equalls who can doe equall things one against the other but they who can do the greatest things namely kill can doe equall things All men therefore among themselves are by nature equall the inequality we now discern hath its spring from the Civill Law IV. All men in the State of nature have a desire and will to hurt but not proceeding from the same cause neither equally to be condemn'd for one man according to that naturall equality which is among us permits as much to others as he assumes to himself which is an argument of a temperate man and one that rightly values his power another supposing himselfe above others will have a License to doe what he lists and challenges Respect and Honour as due to him before others which is an Argument of a fiery spirit This mans will to hurt ariseth from Vain glory and the false esteeme he hath of his owne strength the others from the necessity of defending himselfe his liberty and his goods against this mans violence V. Furthermore since the combate of Wits is the fiercest the greatest discords which are must necessarily arise from this Contention for in this case it is not only odious to contend against but also not to consent for not to approve of what a man saiâ—h is no lesse then tacitely to accuse him of an Errour in that thing which he speaketh as in very many things to dissent is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from which may appear hence that there are no Warres so sharply wag'd as between Sects of the same Religion and Factions of the same Common-weale where the Contestation is Either concerning Doctrines or Politique Prudence And since all the pleasure and jollity of the mind consists in this even to get some with whom comparing it may find somewhat wherein to Tryumph and Vaunt it self its impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutuall scorn and contempt either by Laughter or by Words or by Gesture or some signe or other then which there is no greater vexation of mind and then from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to doe hurt VI. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other ariseth hence that many men at the same time have an Appetite to the same thing which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common nor yet divide it whence it followes that the strongest must have
other faculty or affection of the mind is also termed naturall Therefore the Law of Nature that I may define it is the Dictate of right * Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of Life and Members as much as in us lyes Right Reason By Right Reason in the naturall state of men I understand not as many doe an infallible faculty but the act of reasoning that is the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may â—…r redound to the dammage or benefit of his neighbours I call it Peculiar because although in a Civill Government the reason of the Supreme i. e. the Civill Law is to be received by each single subject for the right yet being without this Civill Government in which state no man can know right reason from false but by comparing it with his owne every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of his owne actions which are done at his owne perill but also for the measure of another mans reason in such things as doe concerne him I call it True that is concluding from true principles rightly fram'd because that the whole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning or rather folly of those men who see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation but the Principles of Right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the 2 3 4 5 6 and 7. Articles of the first Chapter II. But the first and fundamentall Law of Nature is That Peace is to be sought after where it may be found and where not there to provide our selves for helps of War For we shewed in the last Article of the foregoing Chapter that this precept is the dictate of right reason but that the Dictates of right reason are naturall Lawes that hath been newly prov'd above But this is the first because the rest are deriv'd from this and they direct the wayes either to Peace or self-defence III. But one of the Naturall Lawes deriv'd from this fundamentall one is this That the right of all men to all things ought not to be retain'd but that some certain rights ought to be transferr'd or relinquisht for if every one should retain his right to all things it must necessarily follow that some by right might invade and others by the same right might defend themselves against them for every man by naturall necessity endeavours to defend his Body and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his Body therefore War would follow He therefore acts against the reason of Peace i. e. against the Law of Nature whosoever he be that doth not part with his Right to all things IV. But he is said to part with his right who either absolutely renounceth it or conveys it to another He absolutely renounceth it who by some sufficient Signe or meet Tokens declares that he is willing that it shall never be lawfull for him to doe that again which before by Right he might have done but he conveys it to another who by some sufficient Signe or meet Tokens declares to that other that he is willing it should be unlawfull for him to resist him in going about to do somewhat in the performance where he might before with Right have resisted him but that the conveyance of Right consists meerly in not resisting is understood by this that before it was convey'd he to whom he convey'd it had even then also a right to all whence he could not give any new Right But the resisting Right he had before he gave it by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his Rights is utterly abolisht Whosoever therefore acquires some Right in the naturall state of men he onely procures himself security and freedome from just molestation in the enjoyment of his Primitive Right As for example if any man shall sell or give away a Farme he utterly deprives himself only from all Right to this Farme but he does not so from others also V. But in the conveyance of Right the will is requisite not onely of him that conveys but of him also that accepts it If either be wanting the Right remaines for if I would have given what was mine to one who refus'd to accept of it I have not therefore either simply renounc'd my Right or convey'd it to any man for the cause which mov'd me to part with it to this Man was in him onely not in others too VI. But if there be no other Token extant of our will either to quit or convey our Right but onely Words those words must either relate to the present or time past for if they be of the future onely they convey nothing for example he that speaks thus of the time to come I will give to morrow declares openly that yâ—t he hath not given it so that all this day his right remains and abides to morrow too unlesse in the interim he actually bestowes it for what is mine remains mine till I have parted with it But if I shall speak of the time present suppose thus I doe give or have given you this to be received to morrow by these words is signified that I have already given it and that his Right to receive it to morrow is conveyed to him by me to day VII Neverthelesse although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the Will if yet to words relating to the future there shall some other signes be added they may become as valid as if they had been spoken of the present If therefore as by reason of those other signes it appear that he that speaks of the future intends those words should be effectuall toward the perfect transferring of his Right they ought to be valid for the conveyance of right depends not on words but as hath been instanc'd in the 4. Article on the declaration of the Will VIII If any man conveigh some part of his right to another and doth not this for some certain benefit received or for some compact a conveighance in this kind is called a Gift or free Donation Bâ—t in free donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the pâ—esent or the time past for if they respect the future they oblige not as words for the reason given in the fore-going Article It must needs therefore be that the Obligation arise from some other tokens of the Will But because whatsover is voluntarily done is done for some good to him that wils it there can no other token be assigned of the Will to give it except some benefit either already receiv'd or to be acquir'd but is suppos'd that no such benefit is acquired nor any compact in being for if so it would cease to be a free gift It remains therefore that a mutuall good turne without agreement be
Right claime as his own for where all things are common there can be nothing proper to any man it followes that * propriety receiv'd its beginning when Cities receiv'd theirs and that that onely is proper to each man which he can keep by the Lawes and the power of the whole City that is of him on whom its chief command is conferr'd Whence we understand that each particular Citizen hath a propriety to which none of his fellow-Citizens hath Right because they are tyed to the same Lawes but he hath no propriety in which the Chief Ruler whose CoÌ„mands are the Lawes whose wiâ—l contains the will of each man and who by every single person is constituted the Supreme Judge hath not a Right But although there be many things which the City permits to its Citizens and therefore they may sometimes goe to Law against their Chief yet is not that action belonging to Civill Right but to Naturall Equity neither is it concerning what * by Right he may doâ— who hath the Supreme Power but what he hath been willing should be done and therefore he shall be judge himself as though the equity of the cause being well understood he could not give wrong judgment Propriety receiv'd its beginning c. What 's objected by some That the propriety of goods even before the constitution of Cities was found in Fathers of Families that objection is vaine because I have already declar'd That a Family is a little City For the Sonnes of a Family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their Father distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family but not from the propriety of the Father himself but the Fathers of diverse Families who are subject neither to any common Father nor Lord have a common Right in all things What by Right he may doe c. As often as a Citizen is granted to have an action of Law against the Supreme i. e. against the City the question is not in that action whether the City may by Right keep possession of the thing in controversie but whether by the Lawes formerly made she would keep it for the Law is the declared will of the Supreme since then the City may raise money from the Citizens under tow Titles either as Tribute or as Debt in the former case there is no action of Law allowed for there can be no question whether the City have Right to require Tribute in the latter it is allowed because the City will take nothing from its Citizens by fraud or cunning and yet if need require all they have openly and therefore he that condemnes this place saying That by this doctrine it is casie for Princes to free themselves from their Debts he does it impertinently XVI Theft Murther Adultery and all injuries are forbid by the Lawes of nature but what is to be called Theft what Murther what Adultery what injury in a Citizen this is not to be determined by the naturall but by the civill Law for not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth but onely another mans goods is theâ—… but what is ours and what anothers is a question belonging to the civill Law In like manner not every killing of a man is Murther but onely that which the civill Law forbids neither is all encounter with women Adultery but onely that which the civill Law prohibits Lastly all breach of promise is an injury where the promise it selfe is lawfull but where there is no Right to make any compact there can be no conveighance of it and therefore there can no injury follow as hath been said in the second Chapter Artic. 17. Now what we may contract for and what not depends wholly upon the civill Lawes The City of Lacedâ—mon therefore rightly ordered that those young men who could so take away certain goods from others as not to be caught should â—oe unpunisht for it was nothing else but to make a Law that what was so acquired should be their own and not another Rightly also is that man every where sâ—ain whom we kill in warre or by the necessity of selfe-defence So also that copulation which in one City is Matrimony in another will be judged Adultery Also those contracts which make up Marriage in one Citizen doe not so in another although of the same City because that he who is forbidden by the City that is by that one man or Councell whose the supreme power is to contract ought hath no Right to make any contract and therefore having made any it is not valid and by consequence no Marriage But his contract which received no prohibition was therefore of force and so was Matrimony neither addes it any force to any unlawfull contracts that they were made by an Oath * or Sacrament for those adde nothing to the strenghning of the contract as hath been said above Chap. 2. Artic. 22. What therefore Theft what Murther what Adultery and in generall what injury is must be known by the civill Lawes that is the commands of him who hath the supreme authority That they were made by an Oath or Sacrament c. Whether Matrimony bee a Sacrament in which sense that word is used by some Divines or not it is not my puâ—…pose to dispute Onely I say that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live together i. e. granted by the civill Law whether it be a Sacrament or not is surely a legitimate Marriage but that copulation which the City hath prohibited is no marriage since it is of the essence of Marriage to be a legitimate contract There were legitimate marriages in many places aâ— among the Jewes the Grecians the Romans which yet might be dissolved but with those who permit no such contracts but by a Law that they shall never be broke Wedlock cannot be dissolved and the reason is because the City hath commanded it to be indissoluble not because Matrimony is a Sacrament Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the Temple to blesse or if I may say so to consecrate the husband and wife will peâ—haps belong only to the office of Clergy-men all the rest namely who when and by what contracts Marriages may be made pertains to the Lawes of the City XVII This same supreme command and absolute power seems so harsh to the greatest part of men as they hate the very naming of them which happens chiefly through want of knowledge what humane nature and the civill Lawes are and partly also through their default who when they are invested with so great authority abuse their power to their own lust That they may therefore avoyd this kind of supreme authority some of them will have a City well enough constituted if they who shall be the Citizens convening doe agree concerning certaine Articles propounded and in that convent agitated and approved and doe command them to be observed and punishments prescribed to be
distinction between Counsel and Law from the difference between Counsell and Command Now COUNSELL is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from the thing it self which is advised but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the Commander For it is not properly said Thus I will and thus I Command except the will stand for a Reason Now when obedience is yielded to the Lawes not for the thing it self but by reason of the advisers will the Law is not a Counsell but a Command and is defined thus LAW is the command of that Person whether Man or Court whose precept containes in it the reason of obedience as the Precepts of God in regard of Men of Magistrates in respect of their Subjects and universally of all the powerfull in respect of them who cannot resist may be termed their Lawes Law and Counsell therefore differ many ways Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth Counsell to them who have no power To follow what is prescribed by Law is duty what by Counsell is free-will Counsell is directed to his end that receives it Law to his that gives it Counsell is given to none but the willing Law even to the unwilling To conclude the right of the Counsellour is made void by the will of him to whom he gives Counsell the right of the Law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a Law imposed II. They confound Law and Covenant who conceive the Lawes to be nothing else but certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or forms of living determined by the common consent of men Amongst whom is Aristotle who defines Law on this manner 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say Law is a speech limited according to the common consent of the City declaring every thing that we ought to doe which definition is not simply of Law but of the Civill Law for it is manifest that the Divine Lawes sprang not from the consent of men nor yet the Lawes of Nature for if they had their originall from the consent of men they might also by the same consent be abrogated but they are unchangeable But indeed that 's no right definition of a Civill Law for in that place a City is taken either for one civill person one will or for a multitude of men who have each of them the liberty of their private wills if for one person those words common consent are ill placed here for one person hath no common consent neither ought he to have said declaring what was needfull to be done but commanding for what the City deolares it commands its Subjects He therefore by a City understood a multitude of men declaring by common consent imagine it a writing confirm'd by Votes some certain formes of living but these are nothing else but some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man and therefore are no Lawes before that a Supreme Power being constituted which can compell have sufficient remedy against the rest who otherwise are not likely to keep them Lawes therefore according to this definition of Aristotle are nothing else but naked and weak contracts which then at length when there is one who by right doth exercise the Supreme Power shall either become Lawes or no Lawes at his will and pleasure Wherefore he confounds Contracts with Lawes which he ought not to have done for Contract is a promise Law a command In Contracts we say I will do this In Lawes Doe this * Contracts oblige us Lawes vie us fast being obliged A Contract obligeth of it self The Law holds the party obliged by vertue of the universall Contract of yeelding obedience Therefore in Contract its first determined what is to be done before we are obliged to doe it But in Law we are first obliged to performe and what is to be done is determined afterwards Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civill law thus A civill law is a speech limited by the will of the City commanding every thing behoofefull to be done which is the same with that we have given above in the 6. Chap. art 9. to wit that the civill lawes are the command of him whether man or Court of men who is endued with supreme power in the city concerning the future actions of his Subjects Contracts oblige us To be obliged and to be tyed being obliged seems to some men to be one and the same thing and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words but none indeed More cleerly therefore I say thâ—… That a man is obliged â—y his contracts that is that he ought to performe for his promise sake but that the Law tyes him being obliged that is to say it compells him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the Law III. They confound Lawes with Right who continue still to doe what is permitted by divine Right notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civill Law That which is prohibited by the divine Law cannot bee permitted by the civill neither can that which is commanded by the divine Law be prohibited by the civill notwithstanding that which is permitted by the divine Right that is to say that which may be done by divine Right doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civill Lawes for inferiour Lawes may restrain the liberty allowed by the superiour although they cannot enlarge them now naturall liberty is a Right not constituted but allowed by the Lawes For the Lawes being removed our liberty is absolute This is first restrained by the naturall and divine Lawes the residue is bounded by the civill Law and what remains may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular Towns and Societies There is great difference therefore between Law and Right For Law is a setter Right is freedome and they differ like contraries IV. All Law may be divided first according to the diversity of its Authors into Divine and humane the Divine according to the two wayes whereby God hath made known his will unto men is twofold naturall or morall and positive naturall is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternall word borne with them to wit their naturall Reason and this is that Law which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold Positive is that which God hath revealed to us by the word of Prophesie wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man Such are the Lawes which he gave to the Jewes concerning their government and divine worship and they may be termed the Divine civill Lawes because they were peculiar to the civill government of the Jewes his peculiar people Again the naturall Law may be divided into that of Men which alone hath obtained the title of the I aw of nature and that of Cities which may be called that of Nations but vulgarly it is termed the Right of Nations The precepts
Law to take away other mens goods they commanded that these goods should not bee accounted other mens but their own who took them and therefore such surreptions were no thefts In like manner copulations of heathen Sexes according to their Lawes were lawfull marriages XI It s necessary to the essence of a Law that the Subjects be acquainted with two things First what man or Court hath the supreme power that is to say the Right of making Lawes Secondly what the Law it self sayes for he that neither knew either to whom or what he is tyed to cannot obey and by consequence is in such a condition as if he were not tyed at all I say not that it is necessary to the essence of a Law that either one or the other be perpetually known but onely that it be once knowne and if the Subject afterward forget either the Right he hath who made the Law or the Law it self that makes him no lessâ— tyed to ohey since he might have remembred it had he had a will to obey XII The knowledge of the Legislator depends on the Subject himselfe for the right of making Lawes could not be conferr'd on any man without his owne consent and covenant either exprest or suppos'd exprest when from the beginning the Citizens doe themselves constitute a forme of governing the City or when by promise they submit themselves to the Dominion of any one or suppos'd at least as when they make use of the benefit of the Realme and Lawes for their protection and conservation against others for to whose Dominion we require our fellow Subjects to yeeld obedience for our good his Dominion we acknowledge to be legitimate by that very request and therefore ignorance of the power of making Lawes can never be a sufficient excuse for every man knowes what he hath done himselfe The knowledge of the lawes depends on the Legislator who must publish them for otherwise they are not Lawes for Law is the command of the Law-maker and his command is the Declaration of his Will it is not therefore a Law except the will of the Law-maker be declar'd which is done by promulgation Now in promulgation two things must be manifest whereof one is that he or they who publish a Law either have a right themselves to make Lawes or that they doe it by authority deriv'd from him or â—hem who have it the other is the sense of the Law it selfe Now that the first namely publisht Lawes proceed from him who hath the supreme command cannot be manifest speaking exactly and philosophically to any but them who have received them from the mouth of the Commander the rest beleeve but the reasons of their beliefe are so many that it is scarce possible they should not believe And truly in a Democratical City where every one may be present at the making of Laws if he will he that shall be absent must beleeve those that were present but in Monarchies and Aristocraties because it s granted but to few to be present and openly to heare the commands of the Monarch or the Nobles it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them to the rest And thus we beleeve those to be the Edicts and Decrees of Princes which are propouÌ„ded to us for such either by the writings or voices of them whose office it is to publish them But yet when we have these causes of beliefe that we have seen the Prince or supreme Councell constantly use such Counsellors Secretaries publishers and scales and the like arguments for the declaring of his will that he never took any authority from them that they have bin punisht who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgrest the Law not onely he who thus believing shall not obey the Edicts and Decrees set forth by them is every where accus'd but he that not believing shall not yield obedience is punisht for the constant permission of these things is a manifest signe enough and evident declaration of the Commanders will provided there be nothing contain'd in the Law Edict or Decree derogatory from his supreme power For it is not to be imagin'd that he would have ought taken from his power by any of his Officers as long as he retaines a will to governe Now the sense of the law when there is any doubt made of it is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath committed the knowledge of causes or Judgements for to judge is nothing else then by interpretation to apply the lawes to particular cases now we may know who they are that have this Office granted them in the same manner as we know who they be that have authority given them to publish Laws XIV Againe the civill law according to its two fold manner of publishing is of two sorts written unwritten By written I understand that which wants a voice or some other signe of the will of the â—egislator that it may become a Law For all kind of Laws are of the same age with mankinde both in nature and time and therefore of more antiquity then the invention of letters and the Art of writing wherefore not a writing but a voice is necessary for a written law this alone is requisite to the being that to the Remembrance of a Law for we reade that before letters were found out for the help of memory that Lawes contracted into Meetre were wont to be sung The unwritten is that which wants no other publishing then the voice of nature or naturall reason such are the lawes of nature For the naturall Law although it be distinguisht from the civill for as much as it commands the Will yet so farre forth as it relates to our actions it is civill for example this same Thou shalt not covet which onely appertaines to the minde is a naturall Law onely but this Thou shalt not invade is both naturall and civill for seeing it is impossible to prescribe such universall Rules whereby all future contentions which perhaps are infinite may be determined it s to be understood that in all cases not mentioned by the written lawes the law of â—aturall equity is to be followed which commands us to distribute equally to equals and this by the vertue of the civill law which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly doe actually transgresse the lawes of nature XV. These things being understood it appeares first That the Lawes of Nature although they were describ'd in the Books of some Philosophers are not for that reason to be termed Written lawes and that the Writings of the Interpreters of the Lawes were no Lawes for want of the Supreme Authority nor yet those orations of the Wise that is to say Judges but so farre forth as by the consent of the Supreme power they part into custome and that then they are to be received among the Written lawes not for the Customes sake which by its own force doth not
to those outward effects of honour in which sense we are said to honour him of whose power we testifie our selves either in word or deed to have a very great respect insomuch as honour is the same with worship Now WORSHIP is an outward act the sign of inward honour and whom we endeavour by our homage to appease if they be angry or howsoever to make them favourable to us we are said to worship X. Aâ—l signes of the mind are either words or deeds and therefore all worship consists either in words or deeds now both the one and the other are referred to three kindes whereof the first is Praise or publique declaration of goodnesse The second a publique declaration of present power which is to magnify 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The third is a publique declaration of happinesse or of power secure also for the future which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I say that all kindes of honour may be discerned not in words only but in deeds too but we then praise and celebrate in words when we doe it by way of Proposition or Dogmatically that is to say by Attributes or Titles which may be termed praysing and celebrating categorically and plainly as when we declare him whom we honour to be liberall strong wise And then in deeds when it is done by consequence or by hypothesis or supposition as by Thanksgiving which supposeth goodnesse or by Obedience which supposeth power or by Congratulation which supposeth happinesse XI Now whether we desire to praise a man in words or deeds we shall find some things which signify honour with all men such as among attributes are the generall words of vertues and powers which cannot be taken in ill sense As Good Faire Strong Just and the like and among actions Obedience Thanksgiving Prayers and others of that kinde by which an acknowledgement of vertue and power is ever understood Others which signify honour but with some and scorne with others or else neither such as in Attributes are those words which according to the diversity of opinions are diversly referred to vertues or vices to honest or dishonest things As that a man slew his enemy that he fled that he is a Philosopher or an Orator and the like which with some are had in honour with others in contempt In deeds such as depend on the custome of the place or prescriptions of civill Lawes as in saluting to be bare-headed to put off the shoes to bend the body to petition for any thing standing prostrate kneeling forms of ceremony and the like Now that worship which is alwayes and by all men accounted honourable may be called Naturall the other which followes places and customes Arbitrary XII Furthermore worship may be enjoyned to wit by the command of him that is worshiped and it may bee voluntary namely such as seems good to the worshipper If it be enjoyned the actions expressing it do not signify honour as they signify actions but as they are enjoyned for they signify obedience immediately obedience power insomuch as worship enjoyned consists in obedience voluntary is honourable onely in the nature of the actions which if they doe signify honour to the bebolders it is worship if not it is Reproach Again worship may be either publique or private but publique respecting each single worshipper may not be voluntary respecting the City it may for seeing that which is done voluntarily depends on the will of the Doer there would not one worship be given but as many worships as worshippers except the will-of all men were united by the command of one but Private worship may be voluntary if it be done secretly for what is done openly is restrained either by Lawes or through modesty which is contrary to the nature of a voluntary action XIII Now that we may know what the scope and end of wopshipping others is we must consider the cause why men delight in worship And we must grant what we have shewed elsewhere that Joy consists in this that a man contemplate vertue strength science beauty friends or any power whatsoever as being or as though it were his own and it is nothing else but a Glory or Triumph of the mind conceiving it selfe honoured that is to say lov'd and fear'd that is to say having the services and assistances of men in readinesse Now because men beleeve him to be powerfull whom they see honoured that is to say esteemed powerfull by others it falls out that honour is increased by worship and by the opinion of power true power is acquired His end therefore who either commands or suffers himself to be worshipt is that by this meaus he may acquire as many as he can either through love or fear to be obedient unto him XIV But that we may understand what manner of Worship of God naturall reason doth assigne us let us begin from his Attributes where first it is manifest that existence is to allowed him for there can be no will to honour him who we think hath no being Next those Philosophers who said that God was the World or the worlds Soul that is to say a part of it spake unworthily of God for they attribute nothing to him but wholly deny his being For by the word God we understand the Worlds cause but in saying that the World is God they say that it hath no cause that is as much as there is no God In like manner they who maintain the world not to be created but eternall because there can be no cause of an eternall thing In denying the world to have a Cause they deny also that there is a God They also have a wretched apprehension of God who imputing idlenesse to him doe take from him the Government of the world and of mankind for say they should acknowledge him omnipotent yet if he minde not these inferiour things that same thred bare Sentence will take place with them Quod supra nos nihil ad nos What is above us doth not concern us and seeing there is nothing for which they should either love or fear him truly he will be to them as though he were not at all Moreover in Attributes which signifie Greatnesse or Power those which signifie some finite or limited thing are not signes at all of an honouring mind for we honour not God worrhily if we ascribe lesse power or greatnesse to him then possible we can but every finite thing is lesse then we can for most easily we may alwayes assigne and attribute more to a finite thing No shape therefore must be assigned to God for all shape is finite nor must he be said to be conceived or comprehended by imagination or any other faculty of our soul for whatsoever we conceive is finite And although this word Infinite signifie a conception of the mind yet it followes not that we have any conception of an infinite thing For when we say that a thing is infinite we signifie
therefore not the Cities worship but what is done by the City is understood to be done by the command of of him or them who have the Soveraignty wherefore also together with the consent of all the subjects that is to say Uniformly XVI The naturall Lawes set down in the foregoing Article concerning the divine worship only command the giving of naturall signes of honour but we must consider that there are two kindes of signes the one naturall the other done upon agreement oâ— by expresse or tacite composition Now because in every language the use of words and names come by appointment it may also by appointment be altered for that which depends on and derives its force from the will of men can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed again or abolisht Such names therefore as are attributed to God by the appointment of men can by the same appointment be taken away now what can be done by the appointment of men that the City may doe The City therefore by Right that is to say they who have the power of the whole City shall judge what names or appellations are more what lesse honourable for God that is say what doctrines are to be held and profest concerning the nature of God and his operations Now actions doe signify not by mens appointment but naturally even as the effects are signes of their causes whereof some are alwayes signes of scorn to them before whom they are committed as those whereby the bodies uncleannesse is discovered and whatsoever men are ashamed to doe before those whom they respect Others are alwayes signes of honour as â—o draw near and discourse decently and humbly to give way or to yeeld in any matter of private benefit In these actions the City can after nothing but there are infinite others which as much as belongs to honour or reproach are indifferent now these by the institution of the City may both be made signes of honour and being made so doe in very deed become so From whence we may understand that we must obey the City in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign of honouring God that is to say for Worship provided it can be instituted for a sign of honour because that is a sign of honour which by the Cities command is us'd for such XVII We have already declared which were the Laws of God as wel sacred as secular in his government by the way of Nature onely Now because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning and that it so falls out that men are of different opinions concerning the most actions it may be demanded farther whom God would have to be the Interpreter of right Reason that is to say of his Lawes And as for the Secular Lawes I mean those which concern justice and the carriage of men towards men by what hath been said before of the constitution of a City we have demonstratively shewed it agreeable to reason that all Judicature belongs to the City and that Judicacature is nothing else but an Interpretation of the Laws and by consequence that every-where Cities that is to say those who have the Soveraign power are the Interpreters of the Lawes As for the Sacred Lawes we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in the fifth Chap. the 13. art that every Subject hath transferr'd as much right as he could on him or them who had the supreme authority but he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how God is to be honoured and therefore also he hath done it That he could it appeares hence that the manner of honouring God before the constitution of a City was to be fetcht from every mans private Reason but every man can subject his private Reason to the Reason of the whole City Moreover if each Man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of God in so great a diversity of worshippers one would be apt to judge anothers worship uncomely or impious neither would the one seem to the other to honour God Even that therefore which were most consonant to reason would not be a worship because that the nature of worship consists in this that it be the sign of inward honour but there is no sign but whereby somewhat becomes known to others and therefore is there no sign of honour but what seems so to others Again that 's a true sign which by the consent of men becomes a sign therefore also that is honourable which by the consent of men that is to say by the command of the City becomes a sign of honour It is not therefore against the will of God declared by the way of reason onely to give him such signs of honour as the City shall command wherefore Subjects can transferre their Right of judging the manner of Gods worship on him or them who have the Soveraign power nay they must doe it for else all manner of absurd opinions concerning the nature of God and all ridiculous ceremonies which have been used by any Nations will bee seen at once in the same City whence it will fall out that every man will beleeve that all the rest doe offer God an affront so that it cannot be truly said of any that he worships God for no man worships God that is to say honours him outwardly but he who doth those things whereby hee appeares to others for to honour him It may therefore bee concluded that the Interpretation of all Lawes as well Sacred as Secular God ruling by the way of nature only depends on the authority of the City that is to say that man or councell to whom the Soveraign power is committed and that whatsoever God commands he commands by his voyce And on the other side that whatsoever is commanded by them both concerning the manner of honouring God and concerning secular assaires is commanded by God himselfe XVIII Against this some Man may demand first Whether it doth not follow that the City must be obeyed if it command us directly to affront God or forbid us to worship him I say it does not follow neither must we obey for to affront or not to worship at all cannot by any Man be understood for a manner of worshipping neither also had any one before the constitution of a City of those who acknowledge God to rule a Right to deny him the honour which was then due unto him nor could he therefore rransfer a Right on the City of commanding any such things Next if it be demanded whether the City must be obeyed if it command somewhat to be said or done which is not a disgrace to God directly but from whence by reasoning disgracefull consequences may be derived as for example if it were commanded to worship God in an image before those who account that honourable Truly it is to be * done For Worship is instituted in signe of Honour but to Worship him thus is a signe of honour and
he shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God even the Father when he shall have put downe all rule and all authority and power 1 Cor. 15. ver 24. Secondly the words of our Sauiour reproving Jamos and Iohn when they had said VVilt thou that we call for Fyer from Heaven that it may consume them namely the Samaritans who had denyed to receive him going up to Jerusalem and replying The Son of Man is not come to destroy soules but to save them And those words Behold I send you as Sheep among VVolves Shake off the dust of your Feet and the like And those words God seut not his Son into the world to judge the world but that the world through him might be sav'd and those If any man heare my words and keep them not I judge him not for I caâ—e not to judge the world c. doe all shew that he had no power given him to condemne or punish any man We reade indeed that the Father judgeth no Man but hath committed all judgement to the Son but since that both may and must be understood of the day of future judgement it doth not at all repugne what hath beene sayed before Lastly that he was not sent to make new Lawes and that therefore by his Office and mission he was no Legislatour properly so called nor Moyses neither but a bringer and Publisher of his Fathers Lawes for God only and neither Moyses nor CHRIST was a King by Covenant is collected hence that he sayed I came not to destroy to wit the Lawes before given from God by Moyses which he presently interprets but to fulfill And He that shall break one of the least of these Commandements and shall teach men so he shall be called least in the Kingdome of Heaven CHRIST therefore had not a Royall or Soveraigne power committed to him from his Father in this world but consiliary and doctrinalâ— onely which himselfe signifies as well then when he calls his Apostles not Hunters but Fishers of men as when he compares the Kingdome of God to a graine of mustard seed and to a little Leaven hid in meale VII God promis'd unto Abraham first a numerous seed the possession of the Land of Canaan and a blessing upon all Nations in his seed on this Condition that he and his seed should serve him next unto the seed of Abraham according to the flesh a Priestly Kingdome a Government most free in which they were to â—e Subject to no humane power on this Condition that they should serve the God of Abraham on that fashion which Moyses should teach Lastly both to them and to all Nations a heavenly and eternall Kingdome on Condition that they should serve the God of Abraham on that manner which Christ should teach For by the new that is to say the Christian Covenant it 's covenanted on mens part to serve the God of Abraham on that manner which JESUS should teach On Gods part to pardon their 〈◊〉 and bring them into his â—…stiall Kingdome We have already spoken of the quality of the heavenly Kingdome above in the 5. Article but it is usually call'd sometimes the Kingdome of Heaven sometimes the Kingdome of Glory sometimes the life Eternall What 's required on mens part namely to serve God as CHRIST should teach containâ—s two things Obedience to be performed to God for this is to serve God and Faith in JESUS to wit That we beleeve JESUS TO BE THAT CHRIST who was promis'd by God for that only is the cause why his Doctrine is to be followed rather then any others Now in holy Scriptures Repâ—ntance is often put in stead of Obedience because Christ teacheth every where that with God the Will is taken for the deâ—d but Repentance is an infallible sign of an obedient mind These things being understood it will most evidently appear out of many places of sacred Scripture that those are the Conditions of the Christian Covenant which we have nam'd to wit giving remission of sins and eternall life on Gods part and Repenting and Beleeving in JESUS CHRIST on Mens part First the words The Kingdom of God is at hand Repent yee and beleeve the Gospell Mark 1. 15. contain the whole Covenant In like manner those Thuâ— it is written and thus i◠〈◊〉 Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead the third day and that repentance and râ—mission of sâ—nneâ— should be preached in his Name among all Nations begining aâ— Jerusalem Luke 24. vers 46 47. And those Repent and be converted that your sinâ— may be blâ—tted ouâ— when the timos of refreshing shall come c. Acts 3. vers 19. And sometimes one part is expresly propounded and the other understood as here He that beleeveth in the Sonne hath everlasting life He that beleeveth not the Sonne shall not see life but the wrath of God abideth on him Iohn 3. vers 36. Where Faith is exprest Repentance not mentioned and in CHRISTS preaching Repent for the Kingdome of heaven is at hand Mat. 4. 17. Where Repentance is exprest Faith is understood But the parts of this new Contract aâ—… most manifestly and formally set down there where a certain Ruler bargaining as it were for the Kingdom of God asketh our Saviour Good Master what shall I doâ— to inher it eternall life Luke 18. v. 18. But CHRIST first propounds one one part of the price namely observation of the Commandements or obedience which when he answered that he had kept he adjoynes the other saying Yet lackest thou one thing Sell all that thou last and distribute to the poor and thou shalt have Treasune in Heaven and come follow me v. 22. This was matter of Faith He therefore not giving sufficient credit to CHRIST and his heavenly Treasures went away sorrowfull The same Covenant is contained in these words Hee that beleeveth and is baptized shall be saved he that beleeveth not shall be damned Mark 16. vers 15 16. Where Faith is exprest Repentance is supposed in those that are baptized and in these words Except a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the Kingdome of Heaven Iohn 3. vers 5. Where to be born of water is the same with regeneration that is to say Conversion to CHRIST Now that Baptisme is required in the two places cited just before and in divers others we must understand that what Circumcision was to the old Covenant that Baptisme is to the new Seeing therefore that was not of the Essence but served for a memoriall of the old Covenant as a Ceremony or signe and was omitted in the wildernesse in like manner this also is used not as pertaining to the Essence but in memory and for a signe of the New Covenant which wee make with God and provided the will be not wanting the Act through necessity may be omitted but Repentance and Faith which are of the Essence of the Covenant are alwayes required VIII In the Kingdome
lawes and punishments appointed for offendors yet particular men travell not without their Sword by their sides for their defences neither sleep they without shutting not only their doores against their fellow Sebjects but also their Trunks and Coffers for feare of domestiques Can men give a clearer testimony of the distrnst they have each of other and all of all How since they doe thus and even Countreyes as well as men they publiquely professe their mutuall feare and diffidence But in disputing they deny it that 's as much as to say that out of a desire they have to contradict others they gainsay themselves Some object that this principle being admitted it would needs follow not onely that all men were wicked which perhaps though it seeme hard yet we must yeeld to since it is so clearly declar'd by holy writ but also wicked by nature which cannot be granted without impiety But this that men are evill by nature followes not from this principle for though the wicked were fewer then the righteous yet because we cannot distinguish them there is a necessity of suspecting heeding anticipating subjugating selfe-defending ever incident to the most honest and fairest condition'd much lesse do's it follow that those who are wicked are so by nature for though from nature that is from their first birth as they are meerly sensible Creatures they have this disposition that immediately as much as in them lies they desire and doe whatsoever is best pleasing to them that either through feare they fly from or through hardnesse repell those dangers which approach them yet are they not for this reason to be accounted wicked for the affections of the minde which arise onely from the lower parts of the soule are not wicked themselves but the actions thence proceeding may be so sometimes as when they are either offensive or against duty Vnlesse you give Children all they aske for they are peevish and cry I and strike their Patents sometimes and all this they have from nature yet are they free from guilt neither may we properly call them wicked first because they cannot hurt next because wanting the free use of reason they are exempted from all duty these when they come to riper yeares having acquired power whereby they may doe hurt if they shall continue to doe the same things then truly they both begin to be and are properly accounted wicked In so much as a wicked man is almost the same thing with a childe growne strong and sturdy or a man of a childish disposition and malice the same with a defect of reason in that age when nature ought to be better governed through good education and experience Vnlesse therefore we will say that men are naturally evill because they receive not their education and use of reason from nature we must needs acknowledge that men may derive desire feare anger and other passions from nature and yet not impute the evill effects of those unto nature The fonndation therefore which I have laid standing firme I demonstrate in the first place that the state of men without civill society which state we may properly call the state of nature is nothing else but a meere warre of all against all and in that warre all men have equall right unto all things Next that all men as soonâ— as they arrive to understanding of this hatefull condition doe deâ—ire even nature it selfe compelling them to be freed from this misery But that this cannot be done except by compact they all quitt that right which they have unto all things Furthermore I declare and confirme what the nature of compacts is how and by what meanes the right of one might be transfer'd unto another to make their compacts valid also what rights and to whom they must necessarily be granted for the estabishling of Peace I meane what those dictates of reason are which may properly be term'd the Lawes of nature and all these are contain'd in that part of this booke which I entitle Liberty These grounds thus layd I shew farther what civill government and the supreme power in it and the divers kinds of it are by what meanes it becomes so what rights particular men who intend to constitune this civill government must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the supreme power whether it be one man or an assembly of men that except they doe so it will evidently appeare to â—e no civill government but the rights which all men have to all things that is the rights of Warre will still remaine Next I distinguish the divers kindes of it to wit Monarchie Aristocratie Democratie and paternall Dominion and that of Masters over their Servants I declare how they are constituted and I compare their severall conveniences and inconveniences each with other furthermore I unfold what those things are which destroy it and what his or their duty is who rule in chiefe Last of all I explicate the natures of the Law and of sinne and I diginguish Law from Counsell from compact ' from that which I call Right all which I comprehend under the title of Dominion In the last part of it which is entituled Religion lest that right which by strong reason I had confirm'd the Soveraigne powers in the preceding discourse have over their Subjects might seem to be repugnant to the sacred Scriptures I shew in the first place how it repugns not the Divine right for as much as God overrules all rulers by nature i. e. by the Dictates of naturall reason In the second for as much as God himselfe had a peculiar dominion over the Jewes by vertue of that antient Covenant of Circumcision In the third because God doth now rule over us Christians by vertue of our Covenant of Baptisme and therefore the authority of Rulers in chiefe or of civill government is not at all we see contrary to Religion In the last place I declare what duties are necessarily requir'd srom us to enter into the Kingdome of Heaven and of those I plainly demonstrate and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy writ according to the interpretation made by all that the obedience which I have affirm'd to be due from particular Christian Subjects unto their Christian Princes cannot possibly in the least sort be repugnant unto Christian Religion You have seene my Method receive now the reason which mov'd me to write this I was studying Philosphie for my minde sake and I had gathered together its first Elements in all kinds and having digested them into three Sections by degrees I thought to have written them so as in the first I would have treated os a body and its generall properties in the second of man and his speciall faculties and affections in the third of civill government and the duties of Subjects Wherefore the first Section would have contained the â—irst Philosophie and certaine elements os Physick in it we would have considered the reasons os Time Place Cause Power Relation Proportion Quantity Figure
and motion In the second we would have beene conversant about imagination Memory intellect ratioâ—ination appetite Will good and Evill honest and dishonest and the like what this last Section handles I have now already shewed you Whilest I contrive order pensively and slowly compose these matters for I onely doe reason I dispute not It so happen'd in the interim that my Country some few yeares before the civill Warres did rage was boyling â—ot with questions concerning the rights of Dominion and the obedience due from Subjects the true forerunners of an approaching War And was the cause which all those other matters deferr'd ripen'd and pluckt from me this third part Therefore it happens that what was last in order is yet come forth first in time and the rather because I saw that grounded on its owne principles sufficiently knowne by experience it would not stand in need of the former Sections I have not yet made it out of a desire of praise although if I had I might have defended my selse with this faire excuse that very few doe things laudably who are not affected with commendation but for your sakes Readers who I perswaded my selse when you should rightly apprehend and throughly understand this Doctrine I here present you with would rather chuse to brooke with patience some inconveniences under government because humane affairs cannot possibly be without some then selfe opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the publique That weighing the justice of those things you are about not by the perswaâ—ion and advise of private men but by the Lawes of the Realme you will no longer suffer ambitious men through the streames of your blood to wade to their owne power That you will esteeme it better to enjoy your selves in the present state though perhaps not the best then by waging Warre indeavour to procure a reformation for other men in another age your selves in the meane while either kill'd or consumed with age Farthermore for those who will not acknowledge themselves subject to the civill Magistrate and will be exempt from all publique burthens and yet will live under his Jurisdiction and looks for protection from the violence and injuries of others that you would not looke on them as fellow Subjects but esteeme them for enemies and spies and that yee rashly admit not for Gods Word all which either openly or privately they shall pretend to bee so I say more plainly if any Preacher Confessor or Casuist shal but say that this doctrin is agreeable with Gods word namely That the chief ruler nay any private man may lawfully be put to death without the chiefes command or that Subjects may resist conspire or covenant against the supreme power that ye by no means beleeve them but instantly declare their names He who approves of these reasons will also like my intention in writing this book Last of al I have propounded to my self this rule through this whole discourse First not to define ought which concerns the justice of single actions but leave theÌ„ to be determined by the laws Next not to dispute the laws of any government in special that is not to point which are the laws of any country but to declare what the laws of all countries are Thirdly not to seem of opinion that there is a lesse proportion of obedience due to an Aristocraty or Dâ—mocraty then a Monarchy for though I have endeavoured by arguments in my tenth Chapter to gain a belief in men that Monarchy is the most commodious government which one thing alone I confesse in this whole book not to be demonstrated but only probably stated yet every where I expresly say that in all kind of Government whatsoever there ought to be a supreme and equall power Fourthly not in any wise to dispute the positions of Divines except thâ—se which strip Subjects of their obedience and shake the foundations of civill government Lastly lest I might imprudently set forth somewhat of which there would be no need what I had thus written I would not presently expose to publique interest wherefore I got some few copies privately disperst among some of my friends that discrying the opinions of others if any things appeared erroneous hard or obscure I might correct soften and explain them These things I found most bitterly excepted against that I had made the civill powers too large but this by Ecclesiasticall Persons that I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience but this by Sectaries that I had set Princes above the civil Laws but this by Lawyers wherefore I was not much moved by these mens reprehensions as who in doing this did but do their own business except it were tye those knots somewhat faster But for their sakes who have a litle been staggered at the Principles themselves to wit the nature of men the authority or right of nature the nature of compacts and contracts and the originall of civill government because in finding fault they have not so much followed their Passions as their common sense I have therefore in some places added some annotations whereby I presumed I might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts Lastly I have endevoured to offend none beside those whose Principles these contradict and whose tender mindes are lightly offended by every difference of opinions Wherefore if ye shall meet with some things which have more of sharpnesse and lesse of certainty then they ought to have since they are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties as the establishment of peace and by one whose just grief for the present calamities of his country may very charitably be allowed some liberty it is his only request to ye Readers ye will deign to receive them with an equall mind The Index of the Chapters under the titles of LIBERTY CHAP. I. OF the State of men without civill society 1 CHAP. II. Of the Law of nature concerning contracts 16 CHAP. III. Of the other Lawes of nature 34 CHAP. IV. That the Law of nature is a divine Law 58 EMPIRE CHAP. V. OF the causes and first Originall of civill government 73 CHAP. VI. Of the right whether we consider it in an Assembly or in one Person 〈◊〉 which he hath who is endued with supreme authority 82 CHAP. VII Of the three kindes of government Democraty Aristocraty and Monarchy 100 CHAP. VIII Of the right which Lords and Masters have over their Servants 126 CHAP. IX Of the rights which Parents have over their children and of a Kingdome Paternall 173 CHAP. X. A comparison of the three kinds of government each with other according to the inconveniences of each one 146 CHAP. XI The places and examples of Scripture concerning the right of government which make for proof of the foresaid Doctrines 165 CHAP. XII Of the inward causes which dissolve all civill government 172 CHAP. XIII Of the duties of those men who sit at the Helm of State 189 CHAP. XIV Of Lawes and Sinnes 208 RELIGION CHAP. XV. OF Gods government by