and the Angels differ ibid. the soule hath a diverse operation in the body ibid. three things proper to the soule 139. Spirits that there are intellectuall spirits 51. T Theologie differeth from other sciences 10 Tongue the properties therof 19. Truth three things concurre that a man may speake a truth 24 V Vertues morrall and theologicall differ 154. Vertue twofold 283. Virginitie is not a vertue 282. The Papists make 3 crownes for Virgins Martyrs and Doctors of the people 285. Visage the bewrayer of the minde 27. Vnderstanding twofold 67. 197. twofold act of the understanding 99. sinne how in the understanding 101 Vniversall twofold 70. Vse of the creatures twofold 239. 240. to give to use and in use differ ibid the use of a thing manifold ibid. W Will three properties thereof 97. it followeth the last determination of reason ibi why sometimes it doth not follow the understanding 98. the will and understanding are reciprocant in action ibid. whether we will a thing or understand it first 1â—0 how the will followeth the last determination of reason 103. the understanding is not the cause of the wils liberty 105. it hath a twofold liberty 108. the essentiall property of the will 113. what determinates the will 112. two things considered in the will 113 114. it is not the cause of our predestination 122. a mans wils a thing two waies 131 the will hath a threefold motion ib. it is considered three waies 133. it hath neede of two things 191. Woman made out of the man 264. why made of the rib 266 Woman helpes her husband in three things 278 World considered two wayes 7. there should not be too great inequalitie between man and wife in marriage 279. 1. Cor. 15.49 As we have borne the image of the earthly Adam so shall wee beare the image of the heavenly Adam A Table of the places of Scripture cleared in this Booke Cap. Ver. pa. Genesis 1 2 164 16 11 237 26 6 120 25 10 49 30 37 3 39 9 163 50 19 225 Exodus 5 2 185 13 17 120 16 19 154 21 22 52 3â— 32 180 34 1 95 Levit. 17 11 44 18 18 67 19 2 7 Â 18 151 Numb 10 33 73 23 14 119 Â 21 215 Deut. 11 12 135 23 24 241 25 4 114 Â 25 272 28 26 14 29 5 35 Iosh 2 1 274 Iudg. 13 22 89 14 15 77 1 Sam. 6 14 184 23 11 121 25 21 197 2 Sam. 2 10 186 12 8 273 19 22 ibid. 23 20 73 1 King 13 5 115 18 27 153 22 28 122 2 King 2 24 153 3 14 47 1 Chron. 12 33 168 Iob. 4 18 107 21 27 20 Psal 19 9 18 17 8 16 31 9 43 45 1 19 49 3 83 Â 12 46 80 11 40 81 14 133 104 29 7 121 4 70 137 16 6 Prov. 3 3 22 Â 16 20 Â 27 141 6 8 162 8 13 19 1 22 26 17 15 155 21 1 111 Eccles 6 7 18 Â 8 223 7 9 230 10 2 22 Cant. 1 4 165 Esay 11 5 159 28 21 215 Â 26 95 Iere. 7 13 132 10 11 4 12 2 26 50 20 215 Dan. 8 23 27 Hosea 2 21 75 7 3 153 9 16 274 10 11 114 Ionas 3 3 73 Â 5 123 Matt. 5 28 140 6 23 29 8 24 68 12 4 13 Â 8 240 19 33 10 22 30 34 Â 31 167 26 23 48 Â 38 206 Â 39 190 Marke 2 27 240 4 26 135 6 34 25 10 21 243 Â 24 ibid. 11 13 4 12 31 168 Luke 3 11 166 10 42 58 Â 22 196 12 47 140 33 34 16 Iohn 1 9 69 4 36 40 1 33 145 12 39 113 Â 1 9 14 9 89 15 15 125 19 34 25 Actes 3 48 125 7 24 160 12 23 12 26 24 44 Rom. 2 29 18 6 18 108 9 3 180 10 17 17 1. Cor. 6 16 169 8 4 4 12 15 14 15 35 2 Â 42 37 13 10 76 2. Cor. 4 4 61 Â 6 4 11 8 242 12 14 177 Galat. 2 9 120 Â 26 170 4 6 148 Â 24 219 Ephes 1 3 138 3 10 148 Â 18 216 4 25 147 5 23 15 Philip. 1 23 179 2 21 176 3 12 89 Â 17 129 Collos 3 5 173 Â 10 61 1 Thes 4 17 115 5 23 52 1. Tim. 3 1 153 5 4 17 Â 33 173 2. Tim. 1 12 136 2 13 72 Heb. 1 15 15 11 12 13 Iam. 2 25 274 2. Pet. 1 9 75 2 14 16 4 4 75 1 Ioh. 2 4 24 3 2 38 4 20 166 Iude. Â 3 188 Rev. 6 10 54 9 22 255 A Delineation of this whole Booke IT is a Position in the Metaphysickes that Omne bonum est sui communicativum Goodnesse cannot be contained within it selfe but it manifests it selfe to others So the Moralists say Amor uon est unius Love must alwayes be betwixt tvvo or moe So the love and goodnesse of Gods are manifested to the world divers wayes but the first sight that we get in them is in Creation whereby God gave all things through them a being and substance which no creature on earth can understand except man because he beareth the Image of God or at least some sparkles thereof ingrafted in his heart That we may conceive what this Image is we must branch it out according as it hath the situation in the soule and body of man These are lively described to us in this booke which is divided into two parts In the first is contained The Creation in generall of all creatures cha 1 particular of man ch 2. where is considered the Creation of man 1 in generall in body wherin is considered of the members which are either externall as the Head Chap. 3. Eyes Chap. 3. Eares Chap. 3. Mouth Chap. 3. Tongue Chap. 3. Womans dugge Chap. 3. Hands Chap. 3. internall as the Heart Chap. 3. Liver Chap. 3. Lungs Chap. 3. Ribbes Chap. 3. Intrales Chap. 3. Iejunum intestinum Chap. 3. Kidneyes Chap. 3. Five senses Chap. 3. Immortalitie chap. 4 Perfection chap. 5 Soule ch 6. wherein is considered of the Immortalitie chap. 7. Conjunction of soule and body chap. 8. 2. end wherefore he was created 9. 3. image of God â— 10 which was either inward in his Vnderstanding where is described Adams knowledge chap. 11. which was either inbred and that naturall 12. acquired 13 reveiled and that Of God 14. Of his creatures 15. Will wherein we must consider Conformity Chap. 16. Lâ—berty Chap. 16. Power Chap. 16. Affections see the second part Chap. 1. outward see the second part 4. two adjuncts of this Image The second part containes The affections or passions are considered either in generall Chap. 1. Wherein is considered their division which is in the part of the soule either concupiscible which containes love under which two all the passions may be reduced chap 2. irascible which containes desire under which two all the passions may be reduced chap 2. remedies either by remedies
necessitie Triplex necessitas ab intrinseco ab extrinseco ratione finis First when the necessitie ariseth from within this is called necessitas ab intrinseco as the blessed in heaven are mooved by the proper inclination of their will to love God necessarily Secondly when the necessity ariseth from without as when the will is indifferent in it selfe to doe or not to doe to goe this way or that way When Nebuchadnezzar stood in the parting of two wayes Ezech. 21. doubtfull whither to goe towards Ierusalem or Rabbath the Lord determinates his will to goe towards Ierusalem Thirdly in respect of the end as a man is to passe over a water but he cannot goe to the other side without a boate These three sorts of necessities take not away the liberty of the will although they necessitate it the first sort of necessity takes not away the liberty of the will although it necessitate it for this will is internum principium sui motus and this libertie cannot be taken from it unlesse it be destrayed the second sort of necessity takes not away the freedome from it for the will cannot be both inforced and yet free as heate cannot be made cold but yet the will may be necessitate for as the water which is cold may be made hoate so the will which is free may be necessitate and the third sort of necessitie establisheth the freedome of the will Man in his first estate had free choyce of good or evill The first collation betwixt the innocent renewed old and glorified Adam but was necessitate to neither of them in his second estate he is a servant to sinne and necessitate to it in his third estate hee is free from the servitude of sinne but not from the necessitie of it in his fourth estate hee is voluntarily good and necessarily good but hee is not free libertate indifferentiae as man was before the fall for that includes a weakenesse in it In Adam's first estate his will was free from sinne Coll. 1 and necessity of sinne because he had neither internum nor externum principium to move him to sinne so he was free from misery but not from mutability In his second estate he is subject to the necessity of sinning to misery and to the servitude of sinne but free from coaction In his third estate hee is free from the dominion of sinne from the servitude of sinne and from compulsion but not from the necessitie of sinning In his fourth he shall be free from misery servitude mutability and necessity of sinning but not from necessity and willingnesse to love God In his first estate he was liber free in his second estate he was servus a servant to sinne In his third estate hee is liberatus free from sinne but in his fourth estate hee shall be liberrimus most freed from finne The will working freely Prop. hath power to determinate it selfe as it is directed by the understanding in civill and morall actions and in indifferent things but in actions spirituall it is onely determinate by God The will hath power by the light of the understanding to determinate it selfe in civill and morall actions Illust and God in these likewise doth determinate the will Prov. 21.1 The Kings heart is in the hands of the Lord and hee turnes it as the rivers of water when the King determinates his owne heart the Lord also determinates it for every particular agent determinates his owne instrument to his worke Sola increata voluntas est independens but the will is the instrument of God for onely the uncreated will hath an independant power therefore the will being but a second cause is determinate by God When God determinates the will in civill things he doth it by changing restraining or over-ruling it but when he determinates the will which cannot determinate it selfe in spirituall things then he converts the will and inclines it and here he is the sole and onely cause Object That which is moved from a cause without it selfe is said to be compelled but the will cannot be compelled therefore it may seeme that it cannot be determinate by God Answ That which is moved by an externall cause is said to be compelled if the externall cause take away the proper inclination of the second cause but if it leave the second cause to the owne proper inclination then it is not said to be compelled but to worke freely Object But the motion is rather ascribed to him who mooves than to that which is mooved as wee say not that the stone killed the man but the man who threw the stone if God then moove the will it might seeme that the will were free and not to be blamed in the action Answ If the will were so mooved by God that it mooved not it selfe then the will were neither to be praised nor to be blamed but seeing it is both mooved and moves it selfe and is not like a stone in a mans hand which is moved and moves not it selfe therefore it is to be blamed in the sinfull action The Will in morall and civill actions is not determinate in the meanes which leade to the end for that the understanding doth onely but respecting the end it both determinates it selfe naturally and is determinate by God but in spirituall things it is onely determinate by God both in the means and in the end Philip. 2.13 It is God who worketh both the will and the deed in us The grace of God determinates the will onely to good Consequence therefore these extenuate mightily the grace of God who grant that God in the conversion of Man doth powre in a supernaturall grace in his heart but yet this grace doth not determinate the heart of man Corvinus c. 43. pag. 642. so Fonseca for that the will doth naturally and freely and to draw out the act of Faith say they there needs no concurrance of the grace of God but only moral perswasions So Fonseca who holds that God onely sets the will on worke but leaves the will to worke by it selfe he determinates saith he onely in specificatione but not in exercitio in inclining the will to embrace such an object but the operation about that object is left free unto the will it selfe this it may performe freely without Gods grace Object But it may seeme that God determinates the sinfull actions of men as well as their morall both in the meanes and in the end and is the cause of the one as well as of the other as God knoweth certainely that the Antichrist will sinne therefore the will of the Antichrist is determinate to sinne by the decree of God Answ Eternum decretumâ— Dei ponit infallibilitatem consequentis sed non consequentiae This followeth not because putting the decree of God the Antichrist will sinne these two go not together as the cause and the effect for Gods decree is not the cause why the Antichrist sinnes but it
although it be long ere it burne Thirdly there is in a patient a passive or obedientiall power or that which they cal potentia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or susceptiva as when the potter makes a vessell of clay Fourthly there is a meere passive power as a stone hath no aptnes to bee made a living creature Man before his conversion is not like powder which had a neere power to take fire he is not like greene wood which hath a remote power to take fire he is not like the stone that is meere passive but he is like the clay in the potters hand that is passive and capable to bee formed according to the will of the potter and in this fense is that of Augustine to be understood Velle credere est gratiae sed posse credere est naturae to be willing to beleeve is of grace but to be able to beleeve is of nature which Cajetan expounds wel posse credere is meant of the potential or obediential power God hath three sorts of workes which hee workes in our justification First Jllust 2 Tria genera operam Deus operatur in nostra justificatione such workes as are onely proper to God as to stand at the doore and knocke Revel 3. â—0 to open the heart and to inspire c. In which our will giveth neither concourse nor co-operation therefore in these we are onely passive and the will is actived not being as yet active it selfe Non habet activum concur sum hic sed solum modo recipit the will hath no active concourse unto grace here it hath onely an aptnesse to receive faith being wrought in it Secondly the begetting of new qualities in the habite as Faith Hope and Charity for to the bringing forth of such excellent qualities nature can doe nothing Man here also is passive as the ayre when it is illuminate by the light Thirdly such workes in the act as to beleeve repent c. which God workes not in us without us unto which purpose is applied that of Paul 1 Cor. 15. The grace of God with me and that of Augustine cooperando perficit quod operando incepit so the will of man by this concurring grace is made pedissequa and a subordinate agent unto grace grace being comes and dux August Epist 406. and the will being pedissequa sed non praevia attending grace but no wayes going before Prop. In the point of Mans conversion the will being moved afterwards moves it selfe Illust This action of the will is first from grace and secondly from the will it selfe in both these acts God concurres as the first agent and the will as the secondary In the state of corruption the Will is the true efficient cause of sinne in the estate of justification the will is truely indued with grace but in both these estates the Will is a true efficient but differently for in the sinfull estate the will is the principall efficient but in the estate of grace it is subordinate to the grace of God and not collaterall the holy Ghost quickning it and reviving it to worke and so by the grace of God wee are that we are 1 Cor. 15.10 Quest Whether is the conversion of man with his Will or against his Will Answ Voluntas confideratur ut est natura quaedam ut est principium suarum actionum The Will is considered two wayes First Vt est natura quaedam as it is a creature ready to obey God who rules the universe Secondly Vtest principium suarum actionum whereby it freely wills or nils in the first sence it is not against the will that it is converted in the second sence as it is corrupted willing sinne freely before sinne be expelled it is against the Will The water hath the proper inclination to goe downeward to the center yet when it ascends upward and keepes another course ne detur vacuum lest there should be any emptinesse in nature it runnes a course contrary to the own proper inclination so when the will obeyeth God in the first act of mans conversion it is not against the Will if ye respect the will as it followeth the direction of God but if yee respect the will as it is corrupt and sinfull it is against the will to obey God Quest Thom. cont gentil de miraculis Whether is the conversion of man a miracle or not Answ Dua conditiones requiruntur ut aliquid fit miraculum 1 â—e causa fit occulta 2. ut sit in re unde aliter videatur debere evenire We cannot call it a miracle for there are two conditions required in a miracle First that the cause which produceth the effect be altogether unknowne to any creature for if it be knowne to some and not to others it is not a miracle the eclipse of the Sunne seemes to the country man a miracle yet a Mathematician knoweth the reason of it therefore it is not a miracle The second condition required in a maracle is that it be wrought in a thing which had an inclination to the contrary effect as when God raiseth the dead by his power this is a miracle because it is not according to the nature of the dead that ever they should rise againe So when Christ cured the blind this was a miracle for nature would never make a blinde man to see so when Christ cured Peters mother in law of a feaver on a sudden this was a miracle for nature could not doe this in an instant If any of these two former conditions be lackeing it is not a Miracle Therefore in the defect of the second condition the creation of the world is not a miracle because such a great effect is proper to the nature of so glorious a cause but if Man or Angel could create it were a miracle for it is contrary to their finite nature to produce such an infinite effect So the creation of the Soule is not a miracle because God worketh ordinarily here nature preparing the body then God infuseth the Soule But if God should create a Soule without this preparation of nature this should bee a miracle in respect of the second condition as when he created Eve without the helpe of Adam and Christs manhood in the wombe of the Virgin Creatio est opus magnum sed non miraculum without the Virgine So the conversion of Man is not a miracle because the reasonable Soule was once created to the Image of God and is againe capable of the grace of God When wee heate cold water by fire although it be contrary to the inclination of the forme of the water to bee hote yet it may receive heate and when it receives heate it is not a miracle But improperly the conversion of Man may be said to bee a miracle in respect of the first condition required in a miracle because it is done by God who is an unknowne cause to us and although it bee not
exercitij Voluntas sequitur intellectum quoad specificationem exercitium actus intellectus sequitur voluntatem quoad exercitium actus tantum but the mind dependeth upon the will quoad exercitium but not quoad specificationem for when the minde hath given out her last determination concerning any particular object the will must chuse that particular and not another and neither refuse it nor suspend it and it must chuse it in that measure of earnestnesse as it is knowne to be good tantum quisque vult quantum intelligit se velle debere every man desireth so much as he understands But upon the other side the will sets onely the minde on worke and conveneth the councell to deliberate but telleth them not what to conclude and attendeth their deliberation and promiseth to follow their conclusion Example when a controversie ariseth in the Church the supreame magistrate conveneth a Synode and commandeth them to give out their determination and Canon but commandeth them not to encline more to one side than to the other here he commands exercitium and leaves specificationem free but when hee hath heard their determination according the Word of God hee taketh him to that side which they conclude to be best without either suspending or refusing and so followeth them both quoad exercitium specificationem Yet in this similitude there is some dissimilitude for the magistrate yea every private man hath judicium discretionis but the will hath no judgement in it selfe for it meerely depends upon the judgement of the minde which maketh the necessitie of the dependance of the will upon the minde to be greater than the dependance of the King upon his Councell or of any private man upon a Synods determination This naturall reciprocation of the minde and the Will is sensibly perceived by the instruments of the understanding and the will in the body whereby they exercise their functions to wit the heart and the braine the spirits are carried from the heart to the braine and when the heart waxeth hoate with an earnest desire of the will then the braine is more busied and intended to finde out the way how the heart may be satisfied and againe when there is a cleare and a full knowledge in the braine then the spirits runne from the braine to the heart and stirre up the heart to pursue for the obtaining of the knowen good which reciprocation bringeth foorth a happy worke when the unruly affections and sinful appetites mixe not themselves with the businesse to marre all Quest Whether will we a thing first or understand we it first and then will it Answ We will a thing before wee understand it by an inbred desire and blinde appetite but we cannot will a thing in respect of the meanes untill the understanding give light first Quatuor sunt activa principia res apprehense apprehensiva vis voluntas vis executiva In all our actions there concurre foure things First the Object which is the thing we apprehend Secondly the apprehending power or the understanding judging this to be good or evill Thirdly the will which is mooved by the understanding Fourthly the members mooved by the will here the understanding considering the object giveth light to the will Quest Where begins sinne first whether in the will or in the understanding Answ The habite of sinne is first in the understanding because all sinne comes from error which is in the understanding Againe when the understanding is considered by it selfe without any operation In actu absoluto pectatune est prius in intellectu in actu compesito prius in voluntate then sinne is first in it but when the understanding and the will worke together then sinne is first in the will Here wee may gather that the sinne in the will is greater than the sinne in the understanding Pec catum est in obiecto occa sionaliter in intellectu er iginaliter in voluntate formaliter in membris qua odusum because in the understanding there is onely a habite of sinne but in the will there is both the habite and the Act of sinne and therfore we see that the Will is punished with greater rebellion than the understanding is with darkenesse Pharaohs heart was hardned he knew the judgements of God but yet his Will continually rebelled Quest Whether is there a sinne in the will without errour in the understanding or no Answ Sinne is in the understanding two wayes First Duplex ignor antia originalis interpretativa originally when the understanding is so blinded that it can give no direction to the Will Secondly interpretatively when the understanding hath shewen the truth to the will and the sinne is committed first by the Will yet for lacke of consideration the understanding approveth the act of the Will and so followeth it in the same sinne which is by reason of the dependance of the understanding from the will as a man going to murther the Will sets downe the wicked end that the understanding may devise the cruell meanes yet the understanding had showen the truth to the will before that it was good not to murther Quest. Whether doth ignorance in the understanding make the will willing or not willing in the actions Answ There is a threefold ignorance Triplex ignorantia antecedens cancomitant consequens The first is called ignorantia antecedens when a man is ignorant of that which hee is not bound to know nor could not know which if he had knowne he would not have done it here ignorance is the cause of the fact as a man cutting wood his axe head flees off and killes a man ignorantly he doth the thing ignorantly which if hee had knowne he would not have done here the ignorance in the understanding makes not the will willing because he sinnes ex ignorantia The second is called ignorantia concomitans when a man doth that thing ignorantly which if hee had knowen hee would not have done but would have done another thing as bad and is sorry that hee hath not done it A man conceives a hatred against such a man he mistaking the man kil les another in place of him ignorantly when this is told him hee is sorry that he hath not killed his enemy when hee killes the other man his ignorance is not willing ignorance neither is it unwilling ignorance Triplex ignorantia volens nolens non volens It is not willing ignorance because he would not have killed the man whom he killed it is not unwilling ignorance because hee would have killed his enemy and was sorry that he killed him not so that his ignorance was partly willing and partly not willing Al quis pecoat dupliciter ex ignorantia ignorater here he sinnes ignoranter but not ex ignorantia Ignorantly he killed the man although ignorance was not the cause for hee did it of set purpose The third is called ignorantia consequens
when a man is wilfully ignorant and drawes on the ignorance upon himselfe and then excuseth his sinne a man in his drunkennesse killes a child ignorantly this ignorance is a willing ignorance because the man willingly was drunk and contracted this ignorance and therefore he should be punished both for his drunkennesse and for his murther this is called an affectate ignorance and willing The second propertie of the will Prop. is the liberty of the will whereby it chuseth freely Some of the Schoolemen hold that freedome is originally in the understanding The second propertie of the will and formally in the will as Aquinas others hold that this freedome is formally both in the understanding Duplex libertas originalis formalis and the will but first in the understanding and then in the will as Durandus but we hold that freedome is onely in the will That freedome is not originally in the understanding Wee will show that this freedome cannot be originally in the understanding by these two reasons First the understanding is neither free from coaction Reason 1 nor naturall necessitie it is not free from coaction for the understanding is forced to know a thing which it would not know contra inclinationem totius suppositi contrary to the inclination of the whole person Voluntas sequitur rationem ut indicativum non ut impulfivum as the Devils are forced to beleeve that there is a God so a man that is sicke unto death is forced to beleeve that he shall die contrary to the inclination of the whole man who would live but the will can no wayes be thus inforced to will Againe the understanding is not free from naturall necessitie for if arguments which necessarily conclude be proposed to it it cannot chuse but beleeve them if probable arguments be proposed to it then it hath but a conceipt or opinion with a feare to the contrary but if arguments of like probabilitie on both sides be proposed to it here it is necessitate to doubt unlesse the inclination of the will come in to incline it rather the one way than the other we may imagine any thing that we please but we cannot give our lightest assent unto a thing unlesse there be some colour of reason at least to induce All the powers of the Soule Reason 2 are determinate by the will in their actions and that necessarily without any freedome in them as the seeing eye cannot but necessarily see colours if they be laid before it so the understanding is forced to understand when truth is laid before it but the will although it be determinate by the understanding yet this determination takes not away the liberty of the will and places it in the understanding originally againe the dnderstanding is determiate by the object necessarily and naturally but the will is determinate by the understanding necessarily yet freely Freedome is radically and originally in the will Conseq therefore Bellarmine halts here both contrary to himselfe and to others of his owne coate he is plainely contrary to himselfe as Benius the Iesuite markes well for first saith Benius he placeth libertie radically in the understanding whereby the will is determinate by the last judgement of reason and yet in the third Booke and eight Chapter of freewill and grace Bellarmine saith Volunt as in eligendo libera est non quod non determinetur necessariò a judicio ultimo practico rationis sed quod istud ipsum ultimum practicum judicium rationis in potestate voluntatis est that is The will is free in chusing not that it is determinate necessarily by the last judgement of reason but because this same last judgement of reason is in the power of the will Benius saith that he cannot see how these two can stand together that the understanding in the last Iudgement should determinate the will and that the same last Iudgement of reason shoud be in the power of the will so that the patrons of free will in Man doe not agree among themselves concerning the originall of freedome sometimes placing it in the understanding and sometimes in the will Here we conclude that freedome is originally in the will for when the understanding hath demonstrate the truth unto the will although the understanding necessitate the wil to chuse yet it doth not inforce it but it chuseth that which it chuseth freely Secondly That free dome is not formally both in the understanding and the will we will shew that this libertie is not both in the understanding and the will formally for if it were formally in both then it should follow that there were two free wills in man one in the understanding and another in the will and consequently a double election and a double cause of sinne but the formall cause of sinne is in the will therefore Bernard saith Cesset voluntas propria infernus non crit that is Let the will cease from sinning and there shall not be a hell therefore there cannot be a formall cause of freedome in the understanding It rests then that freedome is both originally and formally in the will Wee must not thinke this an idle schoole distinction and so let it passe for covertly under this that they make the understanding to be radically and originally free they cover their poyson of free-will and so vent it to the world for freedome being originally in the understanding since the fall unto good it directs the will in every action and the will being determinate by the understanding then there must be yet free-will in Man since the fall naturally to embrace good as well as evill Quest What is the understanding to the will then when the will chuseth seeing it is not the originall of the liberty thereof Intellectus est causa determination is non libertatis Answ It is the cause of the determination of the will but not of the liberty thereof It cannot be the efficient cause of the liberty of the will although it might seeme so to be as for example remission of sinnes is promised and given if we forgive men their trespasses yet our forgiving of men their trespasses is not the cause why God remits our sinnes but a condition so the fire heateth not unlesse there be a mutuall touch betwixt the agent and the patient but yet this mutuall touch of the agent and the patient is not the cause why the fire burneth but a condition So although the will chuse not without the light of the understanding yet the understanding is not the cause why the will chuseth freely Aliud est conditio aliud causa but a condition without which it could not chuse the cause is one thing but the condition is another Object A condition never precedeth an effect Bellarm. de grat lib. arbit as ye cannot see unlesse the window be opened and yet it will not follow that if the window be opened which is the
when one actually receiveth the grace offered and applyeth it to himselfe But this distinction of grace cannot hold for how can that be sufficient grace which never taketh effect seeing none was ever saved or ever shall be saved by this sufficient grace which is not effectuall sufficient grace hath ever the owne effect for whom God will have converted they cannot but be converted Rom. 9.19 VVho can resist the will of God Againe those that are not converted they of themselves cannot be converted God gives them neither willingnesse nor sufficient grace to whom is he debter for if God gave them this willingnesse then it should be both sufficient and effectuall grace to them But we hold that both sufficient and effectuall grace are the free gifts of God because without me saith Christ ye can do nothing Ioh. 15.5 Neither in sufficient nor in effectuall grace Againe we hold that abundant and effectuall grace are onely offered to the Elect and that which was offered to Cherazin and Bethsaida was onely sufficient to leave them inexcusable and not to convert them Thirdly the Iesuites plead for nature holding that God concurres generally onely with the second causes in giving them a naturall power to worke but not by mooving and applying them to their operations as the Carpenter applyeth his axe to cut Neither say they hath hee any influence in the action it selfe ascribing nothing to God but the conservation of the second causes and if hee worke with the second causes Becan tract de deo they make not man subordinate to God but as two causes working together as a weake and a strong man carrying a loade But we hold that God not onely concurres generally with the second causes but applyes and mooves the second cause to worke not as the second causes are co-ordinate with God but as subordinate so that when God works upon his Will he giveth not only a generall influence whereby he sustaines the Will but also he hath a particular influence into it neither is the will his fellow helper in the action but subordinate to him for in producing of the effect God likewise concurs particularly To conclude this point that the will of man separates not it selfe 1 Cor. 4.7 it is manifest thus if equall grace he offered to two and an inequall effect follow the one of them embracing grace and the other of them refusing one of these two absurdities must necessarily follow either that the grace of God was not an equall remedy for both because it cured them not both which is blasphemy or else that there was not a like corruption in both which is flat Pelagianisme If mans will make the separation then the Apostles question 1. Cor. 4.7 who hath separated thee is easily answered and man then should have wherein to boast Rom. 11.18 God is onely the effectuall cause of mans conversion Prop. There are three sorts of causes Illust First a Physicall cause Secondly Triplex causa Physica moralis miraculosa a morall cause Thirdly a miraculous cause A Physicall cause is that which really and truly produceth the effect and is called an effectuall cause in the Schooles A morall cause is improperly and metaphorically a cause because it produceth not properly an effect onely it proposeth arguments to induce or to perswade A miraculous cause is that which worketh above the course of nature God in mans conversion is not only the morall cause because morall perswasions suffice not to produce a supernaturall effect it onely proposeth arguments counsels and commands but cannot incline the heart directly When a Father holds up an apple to his child or when the master of the game sets up 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a reward to the runners hee doth nothing but allure or perswade them he makes them not able to runne Secondly God is not onely the morall cause of mans conversion for then hee should have no greater stroke in mans conversion than the Divell hath in perverting the children of disobedience to their destruction for the Devill in mans destruction onely inticeth allureth and seduceth but hee changeth not his Will and worketh onely per illicium inticing him onely to sinne but the man himselfe changeth not his will God doth not onely worke upon our wills by morall perswasions proposing rewards to us exhorting and commanding us but changeth and directly workes upon the will therefore the Apostle saith Philip. 2.13 Both the will and the deed are from him God is the Physicall cause of mans conversion Deus non tantum est causa moralis aut miraculosa conversionis humanae physica aut quasi physica or rather like a Physicall cause by drawing inclining and mooving the heart A man is put in the fetters one gets him out of the fetters by one of two meanes First he useth morall perswasions to him to come foorth then hee comes as a Physicall cause by breaking his bolts and taking him foorth if God did nothing in mans conversion but by morall perswasions then hee should never come out of the fetters for by nature he is like the deafe Adder that stoppeth his eare at the voyce of the enchanter Psa 58. God is not the miraculous cause of mans conversion because the conversion of man is not a miracle as we have showen before When God converts a man to grace first Prop. he opens the heart and then he enters the heart all this time being dead untill God awake it In order of causes God first he opens the heart Illust and then he enters but in order of time when he opens he enters The Iesuites make God when he enters the efficient cause of mans conversion Greg. de Valen. dis 8. g. 3. p. 4. and they make the heart when it opens the materiall or dispositive cause of mans conversion and one of them goeth about to cleare the matter by this comparison out of Dominicus a Soto thus Duplex causa efficicus dispositiva When the winde beates upon a window by entring in it opens the window and by opening the window it enters in in respect of the efficient cause it enters in by motion but in respect of the dispositive cause it first opens and then enters But his comparison is false for God must first open the heart and enter before ever the heart open and we receive grace so that the second act of God and our opening are simul tempore for when we receive he opens and when hee hath entred and opened wee receive although Gods opening goe before in order of causes yet in time it goeth with our receiving as the fish takes the hooke and the hooke the fish at the same time but in order of causes the hooke is presented first to the fish Bellarmine in his sixt Book of Free-will and Grace Chap. 15. summes up the co-working of the Grace of God with Free-will in man in these conclusions following Man hath a remote power before hee get grace
condition that yee will streight see unlesse the light come in which is the cause why wee see but when the understanding showeth the light to the will it is not as condition but a cause why the will chuseth this thing and not that as the light makes the coloures actually visible which were but potentially visible before the light did shine Answ Conditio duplex causalis conditionalis There is a twofold condition First when the condition includes a cause as if a man breath hee hath lungs here the condition of breathing is his lungs which is also the cause of his breathing Secondly there is condition which is onely a condition and includeth no cause in it as the opening of the window is the condition without which we cannot see if the window be not opened the light cannot come in and yet the opening of the window is not the cause of the light for the cause is in the light it seife why the object is visible Againe the light shining upon the object is not the cause of our seeing the object for the cause is the eye and the light is the condition without which we cannot see the object So the understanding is onely but a condition to the will and not a cause why it chuseth freely because the freedome of the will is onely in it selfe embracing the object freely without any externall cause mooving it The will of God neither turnes nor returnes A collation betweene the will of the Angels God and man it is like the pole which stands immoveably in the firmament the will of the Angell turnes but returnes not it is like the winde which being setled in one ayrth stands still there but the will of man both turnes and returnes Coll. 2 it is like the winde sometimes in this ayrth and sometimes in that In the Angels there was primum instans Betwixt the will of the Angels in nocent second old and renewed Adam secundum instans the Angels in primo instanti were incompletè liberi they were then but viatores for although they did at the first onely actually chuse good in the first moment of their creation yet they were not confirmed in good Iob 4.18 Duplex instans angelorum primus secundus he found not constancy in his Angels but in the second instant the good Angels were completè liberi and confirmed in good as the bad Angels were setled in evill the good Angels confirmed in good were comprehensores but not viatores and the bad were confirmed onely in evill and are continually viatores So the first Adam was incompletè liber and viator and therefore might chuse either good or evill so the renewed Adam is incompletè liber viator because naturally he chuseth evill and by grace he may chuse good but the second Adam Iesus Christ being both comprehensor and viator is completè liber and cannot chuse evill the old Adam is viator onely and chuseth onely evill When the Divels and wicked men are said to be determinate to evill it is not so to be understood that they are determinate to one sort of evill onely for they may goe from one sort of evill to another as the Divell inticed the Iewes to kill Christ and yet he inticed Peter to disswade Christ from going to Ierusalem that he might be saved and yet they are stil determinate to evil An Angell differeth from the Soule of Man foure wayes First naturally Coll. 3 Betwixt the Angels and Man Quatuor modis differt angelus ab homine 1. naturaliter 2. logice 3. metaphysice 4. theologice for the Soule doth animate the Body but an Angell animates not a Body Secondly they differ in their definition for the Soule is a reasonable creature but an Angell is an intellectuall creature Thirdly the Soule may be moved by the inferior faculties but the Angell is onely mooved by God Fourthly the Soule makes choice either of good or evill but an Angell of good onely or of evill onely Willingnesse is the most absolute perfection of the will and therefore when the Saints ayme at this Conseq it is noted as one of the highest degrees of perfection in this life to be willing to doe good Psal 110. My people are a willing people The liberty of the will is twofold Duplex libertas volunta â—is contrarietatis contradictionis the liberty of contrariety and the liberty of contradiction Man had liberty of contrariety before his fall to chuse good or evill and liberty of contradiction to doe or not to doe these two sorts of liberties are not the perfectest estate of the will for when it hath power to chuse or not to chuse it imports a weakenesse in it but when it is determinate to the good then it is fully satisfied this is reserved for Man in glory The Apostle Rom. 6.18 used this word liberty more improperly when hee saith free from Iustice and servant to sinne when hee calleth this freedome it is most improperly freedome for if the Sonne make us free then wee are free Ioh. 8.36 so wee say to serve God this service is not properly service but freedome The essentiall property of the will The second property of the will is freedome that it cannot be compelled by no externall agent in the free chusing although in the externall action thereof it may be forced God worketh diversly upon the will sometimes hee changeth the will and converts it as when hee changed and converted the will of Saul and made him an Apostle Secondly sometimes he changeth the will but converts it not as when Esau came against his brother Iacob hee changed his will and made him fall upon his necke and weepe Gen. 33.4 But yet converted him not so when Alexander the great came against Ierusalem minding to destroy it the Lord changed his minde and made him courteous to the Iewes by granting them sundry priviledges and bestowing gifts upon them here his minde was changed but not converted Thirdly sometimes God neither changeth nor converts the will but restraineth it as the will of Laban when hee came against Iacob Gen. 31.24 and Attila when he came against Rome Fourthly sometimes God neither changeth nor converteth nor restraines the will but he over-rules it as he did the will of the Iewes who crucified Christ all these wayes God workes upon the will but he never compels it Although the will cannot be compelled in actu elicito in the owne free choyce yet in actu imperato Duplex actus e icitus imperatus in the commanding act it may be compelled as when they drew the Martyrs against their will before their idols putting frankincence in their hands to burne it before them So Ioh. 21. Christ saith to Peter they shall draw thee whether thou would'st not As the will in the commanding act may be compelled Prop. so the will in the free chusing act may be necessitate Illust There is a threefold
not to have willed it for as Thomas in his Booke contra gentiles saith Quaedam eveniunt ex necessitate suppositionis immutabilitatis eo modo quo provisa sunt sciz contingenter liberè ea quae Deus determinavit liberè contingenter eventura ea contingenter evenient necessariò quae determinavit necessanò That is some things fall out by necessitie of supposition and immutabilitie that same way whereby they are foreseene to wit contingently and freely but those things which God hath determinated to fall out contingently and freely they shall fall out contingently and those things that he hath determinate necessarily to come to passe shall of necessetie be Quest Seeing the purposes of God are but absolute why are his promises and threatnings set downe conditionally Answ He sets them downe conditionally to move sinners more earnestly to repent Ion. 3.5 Yet fortie dayes and Ninive shall be destroyed But hee keepes up the condition here to move the Ninivites the more earnestly to repentance and the event sheweth that this was Gods purpose not to destroy the Ninivites because they repented here by degrees he manifests his counsell unto them Example when a towne is beleaguered the Counsaile of warre ordaines that whosoever goes upon the walles shall die the death this is to terrifie souldiers that they goe not upon the wals the enemie make a sudden assault in the night a souldier runnes up upon the walles and repells the enemy whether shall this man die for it or not the Counsell of warre explaines themselves and that which they set out absolutely before they interpret it now this way our meaning was that no souldier should goe up upon the walles that hee might not give intelligence to the enemy but this souldier hath repelled the enemy therefore hee hath not violated our Law neither is he culpable of death See the example of Ionathan 1 Sam. 13. So when God saith fortie dayes and Ninive shall be destroyed keeping up the condition if they repented not when they repent he explaines his former sentence and shewes that it was not absolutely his meaning they should die but onely to terrifie them and to moove them to repentance The Iesuites when they subordinate the Will of man to the conditionall knowledge of God they leave mans will indifferent here to chuse or not to chuse and upon this freedome of mans will they ground the decree of God to predestinate this man and to reject that man But if this platforme hold then it will follow that when the will of this man imbraceth grace Voluntas neque est causa neque conditio predestinationis ut Iesuitae statuunt and the will of that refuseth it it must either be the cause of predestination or the condition but no Christian ever said that the will of man was the cause of predestination except the Pelagians and their followers if they make this act of the will the condition of mans election then they jumpe with the Arminians who measure the efficacie of grace from the event of the will which notwithstanding some of the Iesuits strongly denie Quest If the will be neither the cause nor condition of our predestination which is it then Ans It is but a meane for the fulfilling of mans predestination for a mans name is not written in the Booke of life because hee assents willingly to the promises of the Gospel and beleeves them but because his name is written in the booke of life therefore hee beleeves Act. 13.48 As many as were ordained unto eternall life beleeved If a King should discerne that none should be courtiers with him unlesse they were trained first up in the warres this trianing up in the warres is neither the cause not yet the condition which mooves the King to make choise of them it is a meane whereby they are received into the Court but no motive which mooved the King So Faith whereby a man is adopted to be the Sonne of God is neither the cause nor yet the condition which mooves God to elect Man but whom he electeth freely them he gives to beleeve If it be asked of Bellermine wherfore this man is saved and not that man hee will answere that there is no other cause but the good pleasure and will of God Secondly if it bee asked of him why he gives this man gratiam congruam or fitting grace and not that man hee will answer because his will is to save this man and not that man Thirdly if it be asked of him wherefore this man receives grace and not that man he will answere because grace is fitting for this man and not for that man hee calles this fitting grace not when the will is determinate by grace as wee hold Physica determinatione Triplex determinatio physica eventu moralis or Hyperphysica rather neither will he make it to depend ab eventu as the Arminians doe from the Will of man but hee findes out a middle betwixt these two placing it onely in morall perswasions and the efficacy of the willes determination to depend upon Gods grace for God saith hee foreseeth Duplex sensus divisus compositus that the will cannot refuse because hee hath fitted it so to the will at this time and in this place so that he cannot now absolutely reject the grace of God but conditionally and he saith in sensu diviso hee may reject the grace of God but not in sensu composito Example when I see a man writing he cannot but write and yet considering this act of writing by it selfe he writes freely so joyning Mans Will with Gods Decree a man cannot but Will and yet respecting the Will in it selfe he may Will grace or not Will it when it is offered to him because grace doth determinate his Will saith he here he wills infallibiliter sed non necessariò Dupliciter aliquis vult infallibiliter necessario But the Arminians hold that the conversion of man altogether depends from his Will and that there is no other cause why this man chuseth and that man refuseth grace but onely the will Fourthly if it be asked whether or no this man may resist the grace of God or not he will answer by the absolute freedome of his will hee may resist it by this it followeth that they will establish a reall act in the will which is neither subject to Gods providence nor predestination but if they acknowledged the consent of the will to be a meane for the fulfilling of predestination in this we would agree with them Secondly Triplex gratia sufficiens abundans efficax the Iesuites that they may pleade for free will make three sorts of grace sufficient abundant and effectuall grace and they make abundant grace a higher degree than sufficient grace as that grace which was offered to Corazin and Bethsaida Matth. 11. because they had a more effectuall calling than Tyre and Sidon they make that effectuall grace
Conclus 1 to the workes of holinesse Man hath not a remote power to do good as the greene wood hath a remote power to take fire Our diss but only a passive or obedientiall power whereby grace makes him able to the workes of holinesse Man before his conversion Conclus 2 hath not a neere and a perfect power before grace be offered to the workes of holinesse and therefore in the workes of pietie he can doe nothing of himselfe This proposition we willingly grant for mans will is not like powder ready presently to take fire Our cons Stirring up grace Conclus 3 must necessarily goe before mans conversion whether it be from infidelity to faith or from sinne to righteousnesse neither is helping grace sufficient to mans conversion This proposition might be granted Our cons first against the Pelagians who denied all grace and against the sem-Pelagians who acknowledged preventing grace but not stirring up grace and we would grant to it if by stirring up grace he meant infused grace which after that it is infused into the heart of man it stirs him up to do good This stirring up grace Conclus 4 is given to man without any preparation to grace Wee agree to this proposition if by stirring up grace Our cons he meant infused grace Stirring up grace is not granted to man without his working although it be given to him without the co-operation of free-will this proposition he goeth about to cleare thus Conclus 5 stirring up grace saith he comprehends two things in it First initium bonae cogitationis Secondly initium boni desiderij but to thinke and desire are the actions of the mind and will wherefore a man cannot desire and thinke any thing without his owne action Yet because there are some sudden motions which antevert all deliberation of reason therefore they cannot be the acts of free-will such are these impure thoughts that are cast into the heart by the Divell against our wil these are the free motions of the will therefore the Apostle Rom. 7. saith I doe not these things but sinne that dwels in me so it may be said of these first good thoughts because they proceed not from the will I doe not these Our diss but the grace of God which prevents me These primoprimi motus which antevert the use of reason are partly with the will and partly against the will they are not with the wil because they arise before the consent of the will neither are they against the will for then the heart should not delight it selfe in them when then arise So the first motions of the spirit in the heart are not altogether with the will because it is sinfull neither altogether against the will because the will is subordinate to God and begins to take some delight in them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wee must distinguish these three motions of the will involuntarium voluntarium non voluntarium involuntarium when the will no wayes wils a thing voluntarium when the will wils it altogether non voluntarium when it partly wils it and partly wils it not in this last sense it is that our will consents to the working of Gods Spirit in our conversion That we may assent to stirring up grace Conclus 6 or to Gods internall calling helping grace is necessary Wee agree to this proposition Our cons if this grace be taken for infused grace Neither stirring up grace Conclus 7 nor helping grace impose any necessity to man but that he may either chuse or refuse Gods calling Wee hold that after grace is infused in the heart Our diss although it compell not the will to doe good yet it necessitates it It may be that two having the same internall motion Conclus 8 the one may be called and not the other Wee hold Our diss that the will of the man called inwardly is so determinate by grace that he cannot but chuse his conversion but the will of the other not being determinate by grace cannot chuse it The conversion of man to God Conclus 9 as it is a worke it proceeds from free will onely and Gods generall helpe assisting as it is good it is onely from grace as it is a good worke it is partly from the will and partly from grace and hee goeth about to proove this because saith he the efficient cause of humane actions as they are actions is the will of man and as they are free-actions they proceed from the freedome of the will and as they are godly actions they proceed of grace therefore grace makes the action good and supernaturall Wee hold that the action Our diss not onely considering it as it is good but considering it as it is an action proceeding from the will is necessitate by God These actions which a man doth after his conversion Conclus 10 he needes not to these actions a new grace but onely a continuall direction protecting and keeping the seed already sowen in the heart Man after his conversion hath neede of a continuall influence of grace Our diss as the Organs have neede continurally of one to blow them otherwise they will make no sound they would make the grace of God in man being once infused to be like a clocke if the peses be drawne up in the morning it will goe right all the day The habite of grace is infused into the heart Concl. 11 but not without the preparation of mans owne will Our diss Wee hold that before grace be infused in the heart there is no preparation in man And thus farre Bellarmine goeth about to prove that there is free-will in man naturally yet unto good and would extenuate the grace of God The efficatious grace of God being offered to man Prop. he cannot resist it We are to marke Illust. what the will of man can doe before his conversion to God secondly Triplex consideratio voluntatis ante conversionem in primo puncto conversionis post conversionem what it can doe in the first point of his conversion thirdly what hee doth after his conversion And there is a threefold grace answerable to these three estates first there is vocans an externall calling secondly Triplex consideratio gratiae in vocaendo in operando in co-operando working grace internally answering to the third estate The first grace is oftentimes resisted Ier. 7.13 When J call upon you early in the morning yee answer mee not Psal 81.14 Oh that my people had hearkned unto me So Matth. 23.37 How often would I have gathered thee under my wings but thou would'st not The working grace answering to our third estate may be said to be resisted not simply Duplex resistentia simplex secundum quid but secundum quid for this resistance is not betwixt the will and the grace of God but betwixt the flesh and the spirit Rom. 7. The working grace answering to our second estate cannot be resisted in the first point of mans
particular fact hee gets not a new right to his first justification but is restored againe to the use of it When Nebuchadnezzar became madde hee was cast out of his Kingdome and lived amongst the beasts when he became sober againe and understanding hee got not a new right againe to his Kingdome but onely was restord to his possession so when a man fals by sinne from God when he repents hee gets not a new right to his justification but onely he gets the right use of his former justification Quest Whether is the child of God quite cut off from Christ when he commits any great sinne Answ If we respect Gods part hee is not cut off for justification upon Gods part implieth not any qualitie in man but his free favour in pardoning so that the question is not what man deserved but what God doth injustifying man It is he who justifieth the ungodly Rom. 4.5 But if we respect mans part in sinning and according to his feeling before he repent hee is cut off but not respecting Gods first justification A woman commits adultery shee deserves to be repudiate from her husband yet the marriage is never dissolved upon her husbands part untill he give her the bill of divorce So the sinner when he falls into any great sinne upon his part he deserves fully to be cast off and yet hee is not cast off by God because he hath not given him the bill of divorce demeritoriè incurrit iram Dei licet non effectivè he deserves the wrath of God although the Lord powre not out his wrath upon him Quest What loseth he then by his fall Be ccatorneque amittit habitu mâ—neque actum fidei sed act us pro tom poâ—re suspenditur Answ Hee loseth not the habite of his faith neither the act of his faith but onely this act of his faith is suspended for the time Act. 20.9 When Eutyches fell downe out of an upper loft all that beheld him thought he had beene dead yet when Paul embraced him in his armes he said he is not dead the act of life was not extinguished here but suspended So when the child of God falleth into any notorious sinne grace is not quite gone out of him The incestuous Corinthian who had laine with his fathers wife 1 Cor. 5.1 was to be excommunicated and cut off from the Church That his spirit might be saved and the flesh destroyed he had the spirit all this time in him when he had fallen into this great sinne and had not quite lost the grace of God so that the child of God seemeth to be cut off for the time and the holy spirit seemeth to be quenched in him yet grace commeth in and bloweth up the sparkles that were lurking all this time under the ashes of sinne example of this we may see in David lying so long both in murther and adultery Therefore these who hold that a man may lose his justifying faith Consequence either altogether or for a time and then by the grace of God working repentance in the heart of man if may be restored to him againe they mistake the nature of true faith for that which is justifying faith is a fountaine of living water springing up unto eternall life in man Ioh. 4. Neither can it be totally taken from a man and restored againe for Iude ver 3. saith that faith is but once given to the Saints Peter after his fall went out and wept bitterly Math. 26. Deus hic non infudit novum habitum sed suscitavit God infused not a new habite in Peter but wakened up the habite that was sleeping in him for his seede remained still in him 1 Ioh. 3. FINIS THE SECOND PART OF THE IMAGE of GOD in Man in his Creation Restauration and Glorification CHAP. I. Of the Passions of man in generall A Passion Prop. is a motion of the sensitive appetite stirred up by the apprehension either of good or evill in the imagination which worketh some outward change in the body They are called passions Illust to put a difference betwixt them and the faculties of the Soule Tria insunt animae potentia habitus passiones which are naturally inbred in it and betwixt the habits which are infused and acquired but the Passions although they be naturally inbred in the soule yet they must be stirred up by outward objects They are not like habits which are alwayes alike and permanent neither are they like bare imaginations and phantasies drawne from the objects and reserved in the memory but they arise from a knowne object laid up in the imagination appearing to us either pleasant or hurtfull They are wrought by an apprehension in the imagination because the imagination stirreth up immediatly the senses then the understanding faculty judgeth them to be true or false and the will considereth them as good or evill As the understanding judgeth them to be true or false it stirreth not up the appetite but as the will judgeth them to be good or evill yet not absolutely but as good or evill to us or ours and these faculties are rightly joyned together for the sensitive facultie of it selfe is blind neither could it follow or decline any thing unlesse the understanding faculty directed it so the understanding faculty were needelesse unlesse it had these passions joyned with it to prosecute the truth and to shun the falsehood Quest Whether are these passions placed in the sensitive part or in the reasonable Answ They are placed in the sensitive part and not in the reasonable because the reasonable doth not imploy any corporall organs in her actions for when wee reason there is no alteration in the body But the passions appeare in the blood by changing and altering of our countenance and they are a middle betwixt the body and the minde and have correspondency with both Hence it was that God commanded his people to abstaine from bloud Gen. 9.4 and that they should offer bloud in their sacrifices Heb. 9.22 that so the soule might answer for the soul which sinned Levit. 17.11.12 Although these passions be in the sensitive part as in the subject yet the understanding is the principall cause which moveth them If there were a commotion amongst the common people moved by some crafty Achitophel the commotion is properly in the people as in the subject but it is in the craftie Achitophels head as in the cause who moveth the sedition So these passions are in the will and understanding as commanding and ruling them but in the sensitive part as in the proper subject In beasts the phantasie sets the sensitive appetite on worke but in man the phantasie apprehending the object presents it to the understanding which considers it either as true or false and the understanding presents it to the will and thence ariseth the prosecution of the good or shunning of the evill in the sensitive appetite with an alteration of the spirits in the body The passions of man
to signifie that Iesus Christ subdued not onely his sensitive faculties but also the intellectuall in his will and understanding and it was for this that the High Priest under the law was forbidden to we are his girdle about his sweating places Ezek. 44.18 that is about his middle as the Chal. de Paraphrase interpreteth it not beneath but about his pappes to signifie the moderation of all his passions It is a true axiome quod operatur Christus pro nobis oper atur in nobis that which Christ doth for us he doth in us He subdueth his owne passions Reconciliando that He may subdue our passions Secondly Christ reconciles the passions which strive so one against another Iudg. 17.6 when there was no King in Israel every man might doe what hee pleased so these passions doe what they please contradicting one another till Christ come in to reconcile them Moses when he saw two Hebrewes striving together he sayd ye are brethren why doe ye strive Exod. 2.13 So when Christ seeth the passions striving one with another Hee saith Yee are brethren why doe yee strive Acts 7.24 Thirdly Rectificando Christ sets the passions upon their right objects whereas before they were set upon the wrong objects and he turnes these inordinate desires the right way A man takes a bleeding at the nose the way to stay the bloud is to divert the course of it and open a veine in the arme So the Lord draweth the passions from their wrong objects and turnes them to another Mary Magdalen was given to uncleane lust the Lord diverted this sinfull passion and she became penitent and thirsted after grace Luk. 8.2 So hee turned the passions of Saul when he was a bloudy murtherer to thirst for grace Act. 9. We know a womans appetite to be a false appetite when shee desireth to eate raw flesh or coales or such trash and that shee is mending againe when her appetite is set upon wholsome meates So when the passions are set upon wrong objects then a man is in the estate of sinne but when the passions are turned to the right objects then a man becomes the child of God Fourthly when Christ hath sent these passions upon the right object Immobiliter permanendo hee settles them that they cannot bee mooved for as the needle in the compasse trembleth still till it bee directly setled towards the North pole then it stands So the affections are never setled till they bee set upon the right object and there he tyes them that they start not away againe Psalme 86.9 David prayeth knit my heart to thee O Lord. The beasts when they were brought to be made a sacrifice were tyed with cords to the hornes of the Altar Psalm 118.27 that they might not start away againe So the Lord must tye the affections to the right objects that they start not away againe The passions are either in the concupiscible or irascible part of the Soule There be six passions in the concupiscible appetite Love hatred desire abomination pleasure sadnesse CHAP. VI. Of the Passions in particular in the concupiscible appetite Of Love LOve Amor est voluntarius quidam affectus quám coniunctissimè re quae bona judicatur fruendi is a passion or affection in the concupiscible appetite that it may enjoy the thing which is esteemed to be good as neere as it can Man before the fall Prop. loved God aboue all things and his neighbour as himselfe God is the first good cause and the last good end Illust he is the first true cause by giving knowledge to the understanding he is the last good end by rectifing the will therefore the understanding never contents it selfe untill it know God and the will never rests til it come to the last good end God is A to the understanding and Ω to the will He is mans chiefe good therefore he is to be preferred to all things both to our owneselves and to those things we count most of beside our selves wherefore Luk. 14. he faith He that loveth his life better than me is not worthy of me So Math. 10. He that loveth his father or mother better than me is not worthy of me so hee that preferres his owne love before God is not worthy of the love of God There are three sorts of love Illust 2 emanans or natural love imperatus or commanded love elicitus or love freely proceeding Triplex amor emanans imperdius elicitus Naturall love is that love whereby every thing hath an inclination naturally to the like as heavie things naturally goe downe to the center of the earth beasts are carried by sense and instinct to their objects the Pismire in Summer layeth up provision against the Winter Prov. 6.8 This naturall instinct the Greekes call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So man is carried to his object by love because he must love something what better object could hee chuse to love than God Commanded love is that whereby reason sheweth us some good thing to be loved and then our will commandeth us to love the same If wee had no more but reason to shew it to us and the will to command us these wee enough to moove the affections to love God Love proceeding freely is that when the affections make choyce of God freely when as they consider his goodnesse that breeds admiration in them when they doe consider his beauty that breeds love in them and his sweetnesse doth satisfie their whole desires so that nothing is so worthy an obiect to bee beloved as God who hath all these properties in him God loved us first Ioh. 3.16 therefore we are bound to love him againe There are three sorts of love First Triplex 〈◊〉 quaerens vtile lascivus purâ—â— the love that seekes his owne profite onely as when a subject loves his Prince onely for his goods such was the love of Laban to Iacob here the Prince is not bound to love his subject againe neither was Iacob bound to love Laban for this sort of love Secondly the love that lookes to filthinesse and dishonestie such was the love which Putiphars wife carried to Ioseph Gen. 39.9 Ioseph was not bound to love Putiphars wife againe in this sort of love The third sort of love is most pure and holy love and in this love wee are bound to love backe againe God loved us before wee loved him hee loved us freely and for no by-respect therefore wee are bound to love him first and aboue all things The Part loves the being of the whole Illust 3 better than it selfe this is seene in the world the great man and in man the little world for the water in the great world ascends that there should not bee vacuum or a vastnesse in the universe for the elements touch one another as wee see when we poure water out of a narrow mouthed glasse the water contrary to the nature of it runneth up to the ayre that