Agents by whom they are acted to doe otherwise Yet there is another difference according to the morall condition of these actions For if they are good and so farre as they are goood they come to passe by Gods working of them but if they are evill and so farre as they are evill they come to passe onely by Gods permitting according to that of Austin Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotēs fieri velit vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo Not any thing comes to passe but God willing it either by suffering it to wit in case it be evill or himselfe working it to wit in case it be good And according to that eleventh Article of Religion agreed upon by the Arch-Bishop and Bishops and the rest of the Clergy in Ireland which is this God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever should come to passe in time yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather Farther consider it is confessed by all that God concurres in producing the act of sinne as an efficient cause thereof not morall but naturall And Aquinas himselfe though he denyes that Voluntas Dei est malorum Because indeed as Hugo de Sancto Victore observes by the will of God is commonly understood in this case Voluntas approbans his will approving it and loving it And so it is justly denyed that God doth will evill things speaking of the evill of sinne Yet Aquinas professeth and disputes and proves that Actus peccati est a Deo the Act of sinne is from God Like as the Act of walking is from the soule though the lamenes in walking ariseth from some disease in the legge Now the Devill concurres not in this manner to any act of sin neither is the efficient cause thereof in the Kinde of a Naturall efficient but onely Morall by tempting and perswading What therefore shall we conclude as this Authour doth without feare or witt or honesty that by the confession of all men God is hereby made worse then the Devill To what abominable courses do the wilde witts and profane hearts of these men expose them The greatest works of Satan in moving men to sin are comprehended under blinding and hardening of them Now these operations are also attributed to God And like enough he doth usually performe them not by the ministry of his holy Angells but by the Ministry of Satan and his Angells of Darkenesse as we read 1. Kings 22. v. 21. 22. 23. Ioh 13. 27. Acts 5. 3. What then shall the Devill so farre possesse our hearts as to break forth into such intolerable blasphemyes as to conclude hereupon that God is bad or worse then the Devill The providence of God I willingly confesse is wonderfull and mysterious in this like unto the Nature of God to be adored rather then pryed into So this providence to be dreaded rather then for satisfaction to every wanton and wild witt to be searched into Yet all confesse that the Lord could hinder all this if it pleased him and rebuke Satan and restraine the power and stop the course of sin and prevent occasions leading thereunto but he will not and why But because he knowes it becomes his allmighty power and wisdome infinite rather exmalis bene facere quà m malum esse non sinere To worke good out of evill then not at all to suffer evill Lastly what meanes this Authour to carry himselfe so as to betray so strange ignorance in mitigating Satans operation in tempting unto sin as if this were not sufficient to make him the Authour of sin Especially considering the reason that moves him hereunto which is meerely the delight that he takes in dishonouring God and being a desperate spirit himselfe to make as many as he can partakers of the same desperate condition For cupiunt perditi perdere sayth Cyprian cum sint ipsi paenales quaerunt sibi ad poenam comites being damned themselves they desire to damne as many as they can And being bound in chaines and kept to the judgement of the great day they desire to have as many companions as they can in drinking of that cup of trembling and sucking the very dreggs of that cup of trembling and wringing them out For as the Historian observes Maligna est calamitas cum suo supplicio crucietur acquiescit alieno Calamity makes a man of a spightfull nature and when himselfe is tormented he takes content in this that others suffer with him And as the Oratour observes Nullum adversarium magis metuas quà m qui non potest vivere potest occidere No adversary more to be feared then he who cannot live himselfe yet can kill another This makes a coward resolute when he must needs dye he will fight like a mad man and kill all he can I say what meanes this Authour to carry the matter hand over head as if it were without question That he is not the Authour of sinne who onely is a Morall cause thereof but rather he that is the naturall efficient whereas great Divines carry it to the contrary As namely Dominicus Soto in his first booke of nature and grace chap 18. Although sayth he there are many that thinke it hard to explicate how in the hatred of God which hath an inward and indivisible malignity God can be the cause of the entity but not of the fault Yet this is not so hard to be understood Then he proceeds to shew how this may be First laying for his ground what it is to be the cause of sinne thus In morall actions he is altogether and is judged to be the cause who by a law or help or counsell or favour or perswasion moves any one either to good or evill Observe I pray the doctrine of this School-Divine directly contrary to that which this Authour supposeth without all proofe For in the judgement of Dominicus Soto he onely is to be accounted the cause of another mans sinne who is the morall cause thereof as by tempting counselling perswading thereunto And upon this ground he proceeds to free God from being the Authour of it after this manner But as for God he by all these wayes moves his creatures to that which is good and honest and none at all to evill Neither is the doctrine of Dominicus Soto alone but the common doctrine of the Divines of Salamancha as Molina confesseth in his disputation 23. And albeit Molina the Jesuite were of another opinion Yet Vasquius the Jesuite professeth that he was ever of the same minde with Dominicus Soto and the Divines of Salamancha in this In his 129 disputation upon the first part of his Summes As for Prosper he hath no such argument But first observe the Objection whereunto he answereth was made against the Doctrine of Austin as the Authour acknowledgeth Whence it followeth that looke
his own hand still and hereby occasions and opportunities are offered from time to time for a man to advantage himselfe in sinfull courses either in the way of profit or satisfying his unclean lusts And Arminius confesseth that the administration of Arguments and occasions which provoke to such an act as cannot be committed by the creature without sinne if not by Gods intention yet at least according to the creatures affection and often according to the events that arise therehence This administration I say Arminius confesseth doth belong to the Divine providence And these arguments he saith are objected ther to the mind of man or to his senses outward or inward and that either by the mediate worke of the creatures comming between or by God's immediate action And that the end of this Divine administration is to make tryall whether the creature will abstaine from sinne even then when it is provoked thereunto As for the triall of David was Bathsheba going â—oâ—th to wash her selfe objected to David whereupon he was inflamed with lusts Ioseph was not though farre more strongly sollicited by the temptations of his wanton Mistris Secondly to necessitate the will or determine the will are noe phrases of our Divines The first is used only by Bradwardine as at present I remember sometimes Arch-Bishop elect of Canterbury The other is that phrase of the Dominicans Now they are of age and able to answer for themselves Why doth not this Authour answer a chapter or two in Bradwardine a chapter or two in Alvarez where they dispute this and resolve the question affirmatively Surely hereby he should performe a worke more worthy of a Scholasticall Divine then by so hungry a discourse as this Secondly consider neither Bradwardine maintaines that God necessitates nor Alvarez that God determines the will to sinne but to every naturall act in which kind of acts sinne is to be found Why then should this Auhour carry himselfe thus in his crimination We know sin is meerly privative in the formall notion thereof an obliquitie such as concerning which Austine hath long agoe deliverd that it hath noe efficient cause but deficient only And divers waies Divines have shewed how God may be the authour of the act yet not the Authour oâ— the sin and illustrated it by various similitudes As of a man riding upon a lame horse he makes him goe but doth not make him halt The sun shining upon a dung-mixton makes it evaporate but doth not make it stinke The sun makes flowers to evaporate and send forth their favours as well as a dung-mixton but that the one evaporates a sweet odour the other an unsavory is froÌ„ the nature of things themselves on which the sun beates In like sort the Sun by the heat thereof provokes all things to engender according to their kinds even frogs and toades snakes as well as other creatures profitable for the use of man in the way of food yea of vipers flesh good use is made in the way of physicke And God knowes how to make good use even of the sinnes of men and of the rage and malice of Satan If an underw-heele being out of his place the upper wheele in a jacke or clocke will set him going in a wrong way as well as all the rest in a right way his motion is from the upper whele his irregular motion from himselfe A good Scribe meeting with moist paper will make but sorry worke The writing is from himselfe the blurring from the moistnesse of the paper on this very question whether the act of sinne be from God Aquinas maintaining the affirmative illustrates it by a distinction of the halting motion of a lame legge the motion saith he is from the soule the 〈◊〉 is froÌ„ the imperfection of the Organ the infirmitie of the legge Yet this Authour carrieth it hand over head as if to be the Authour of the action were to be the sinne not considering that himselfe maintaines that God is the Authour of the action and that in the kind of a cause efficient naturall Thirdly when Bradwardine maintaines that God necessitates the will to every good act thereof he withall professeth that he necessitates it ad liberum actum suum that is to worke every act thereof freely Soe when Alvarerz maintaines that God determinates the will to every act thereof he withall maintaines that God determines the will to worke free ye and so Aquinas For when he workes upon contingent causes he moves theÌ„ to bring forth their effects contingently like as when he workes upon necessary causes he moves them to produce their effects necessarily And like as to move contingent causes to produce their effects contingently is to move them to produce their effects with a possibility to the contrary Soe to move free causes to produce their effects freely is to move them to produce their effects with an active power to the contrary But to proceed whereas he saith that sinne must needs follow the determination it is as true 1. In this Authour's judgment that it must needs follow upon God's coÌ„currence to this act If he say that this concurreÌ„ce is necessary to every act I answer it is necessary to the substance of every act but not at all required to the sinne though this Authour carieth it blindfold after this manner Secondly so say we is determination required to the substance of every act And Gods concourse with the creature is not coordinate like as one man concurres with another in moving a timber logge which is the expression of the Jesuites thereby manifesting the vilenesse of their opinion as we can demonstrate and that more waies then one by evident demonstration as I have allready shewed in my Vindiciae Let this Authour answer those digressions if he can I am confident he will never answer them while his head is hot nor all the Rabble of the Arminians We know God is the first cause and all other are but second causes in comparison to him Yet we willingly confesse that the providence of God is wonderfull and of a mysterious nature in this but such as whereunto the Scripture gives pregnant testimonie as scarce to any thing more So jealous he is least his providence should be denied in evill wherein indeed it is most wonderfull and he takes unto himselfe the hardning of men's hearts and blinding of their mindes and prostituting them to abominable courses even to vile affections and thereby to punish sinne with sin as Rom 1. Therein saith the Apostle they received the recompence of their errour This hath Austine also by Scripture suggestion testified at large in his book De gratiâ Libero arbitrio in two large chap likewise in his fifth book against Iulian the Pelagian third chap this also the Adversaries have been driven to confesse in a strange manner as to give instance first in Bellarmine whose words are these God saith he praesidet ipsis voluntatibus easque regit
is in his power or when he hath authority to forbid 't is as if he should command the committing of that sin Now this is only in such a case where the necessitie respects the person who is the deficient cause as namely in case he be bound in duty to afford help and succour to him that cannot keepe himselfe from sinning without the succour of an other not otherwise And therefore it reacheth not to God who is not bound to preserve any man or creature from sinning Least of all is he bound to regenerate a man that is borne in sinne Adam was created in all sufficiency that the reasonable creature was capable of without any pronenes unto evill but rather in a morall propension to that which was good And his fall hath brought this corruption upon all mankind even a necessitie of sinning as Arminius and Corvinus confesse He wanted no power to doe that which was good or to abstaine from sin but ever since his fall impotency to that which is good pronenesse unto that which is evill hath been the naturall inheritance of all mankind And as for the permission of Adam's fall his sin was in a thing naturally indifferent the holines of his nature not inclining him more to abstain from that fruit any more then to partake of it Neither doe we say that God did withhold from Adam any grace that these our adversaries maintaine to be necessary for the avoiding of that sinne which was committed by him How Adam himselfe was brought by Eve to eate of that fruit is not expressed As for Eve the temptation which Satan used with her which did prevaile is expressed He allured her with the representation of the powerfull nature of that to make them as Gods knowing good and evill he made this seem credible by the very denomination which God gave unto the Tree the Tree of knowledge of good and evill It seemes not likely that she knew who it was that spake unto her in the Serpent nor that she was acquainted with the fall of Angells Then againe the desire of knowledge is no evill thing it selfe or stands in any contradiction to the integrity of a reasonable creature Nay nothing more agreeable to the nature of the best it brings such a perfection with it Only the errour was in affecting it this way God did not keep the Devill off nor reveale unto her who it was that spake unto her much lesse his apostaticall condition least of all his project to supplant them Neither did he quicken that holy feare which he had inspired into her to resist it at the first to goe to her husband to acquaint him with it She might thinke that the knowledge of good and evill might make her more fit for the service of God then unfit All which considered her will being moved to seek this perfection by tasting of such a fruit there was no cause or reason to hinder her from tasting it save only the consideration of God's prohibition For the will of every reasonable creature is naturally apt to affect that which is good and though that good may prove evill in some circumstance yet if that circumstance be not considered the will proceeds to affect it How long the Devill was exercised in this temptation we know not Inconsideration is conceived by Durandus to be the originall of that sinne of theirs and God was not bound to maintaine this consideration quick in her and of the danger of such a transgression In fine she came to a will resolution to tast of it to the producing of this act as a naturall thing the Lord concurred as all confesse namely to the substance of the act The question is whether he concurred to the effecting of it absolutely or conditionally It was as true of Adam and Eve that in him they lived and moved and had their being as it is of us We say God as a first cause moves every second cause but agreeably to their natures Necessary agents to worke every thing they worke necessarily Free agents to doe every thing they doe freely But to say that God made them velle modo vellent to will in case they would will is so absurd as nothing more The act of willing being hereby made the condition of it selfe and consequently both before and after it selfe See what I have delivered concerning this in my Vindiciae lib. 2. Digr 3. and Digr 6. of the nature of permission more at large where unto this Authour is content to answer just nothing Sect 7. There are two things say they in every ill act First the materiall part which is the substance of the action Secondly the formall part which is the evill or obliquitie of it God is the Authour of the action it selfe but not of the obliquitie and evill that cleaveth to it as he that causeth a lame horse to goe is the cause of his going but not of his lame going And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Authour of sinne First all sinnes receive not this distinction because of many sins the acts themselves are sinfull as of the eating of the forbidden fruit and Saul's sparing of Agag and the fat beasts of the Amalekites Secondly It is not true that they make the decree of God only of actions not of their aberrations For they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull and not as bare actions For actions deserve damnation not as actions but as trangressions of Gods law 3. To this simile I say that the Rider or Master that shall resolve first to flea his horse or knock him on the head and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him is undoubtedly the cause of his halting And so God if he determine to cast men into hell and then to bring them into a state of sinne that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the Authour as well of their sins as of those actions to which they doe inseperably adhere and that out of Gods intention to destroy them This distinction of that which is materiall and that which is formall in sinne is commonly used by Aquinas 1. secun q 71. art 6 in corp Augustinus in definitione peccati posuit duo Unum quod pertinet ad substantiam actûs humani quod est quasi materiale in peccato cum dicit dictum vel factum vel concupitum Aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali quod est quasi formale in peccato cum dixit contra legem aeternam So then the substance of the act is the materiall part in sinne And the opposition of this act to the law of God is the formall part of it both according to Aquinas and according to Austin also And q 75. art 1. corp He defineth sinne to be Actus inordinatus
on the part of Reprobates is not the damnation of them but the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice which in Scripture phrase is called the Declaration of his wrath For God made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill And to this end he doth not only permit them both to sinne and to persevere therein without repentance but also to damne them for their sinne And this worke of God namely the permission of sinne is as requisite for the manifestation of his mercy on the part of his Elect as for the Declaration of his wrath on the part of reprobates Yet who was ever found so absurd as to say that we make the sinfull actions of men to be the meanes which God useth to bring about the salvation of his Elect. So little cause have we to make use of this distinction as the action it selfe and the sinfullnesse thereof to shew in what sense it is a meanes which God useth whereby to bring about the damnation of man For we utterly deny sinne to be any such meanes of God but the permission thereof only is the meanes whereby to bring about not their damnation as this Authour suggesteth but the meanes together with the damnation for sinne whereby he bringeth to passe the declaration of his just wrath But men of this Authours spirit unlesse they be suffered to calumniate at pleasure and corrupt their opposites Tenet at pleasure they can say just nothing It is true actions deserve damnation only as they are transgressions of God's law but we deny that these transgressions are God's meanes but only the permission of them is his meanes and by permitting these transgressions as also by damning for them he brings to passe his glorious end to wit the declaration of his just wrath 3ly It is most untrue that God brings any man into a state of sinne He brings himselfe into it most freely God having no other hand in the sinne but as permitting it that is as not preserving from it Indeed if he did bring men into sinne and they not rather bring themselves thereinto he were the Authour of it But it is well knowne that sinne cannot transcend the region of acts naturall All acts supernaturall must needs be the worke of grace and truly good But every sinfull act is merely naturall never supernaturall Now never any of our Divines denyed a man liberty in his greatest corruption unto acts naturall the Devill himselfe hath liberty thus farre It is true originall sinne is brought upon all by the sinne of Adam For hereby the fountaine of humane nature became corrupted but in this very sin of Adam we had an hand if there be any truth in Scripture which testifies that In Adā we all have sinned This is the doctrin which the Author spights though he be more wise then to publish to the world his spleen against it And I have seen under his hand where he denies originall sinne to be veri nominis pecatum sinne truly so called And albeit M. Hoord makes a flourish in saying that God might justly damne all man-kind for the sinne of Adam and that also was this Authour's doctrine in the lectures which he read at Magdalen Hall yet I have good cause to doubt whether this be his opinion now and not rather the same with Pelagius his opinion saving the difference which Pelagius did put between not entering into the Kingdome of heaven and damnation As for all other sins which we call actuall they are as I said naturall only and not supernaturall and therefore no man wants liberty as to doe them so to abstaine from them Only he wants a morall and Spirituall liberty to abstaine from them in a gracious manner according to that of Aquinas Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur à Deo tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit Though a man who is reprobated of God cannot obtaine grace yet that he falleth into this or that sinne it comes to passe of his own free will It is true also even in God's providence concerning acts naturall there is a great mystery For as God foretold David that his neighbour should lye with his wives and though he sinned secretly yet the Lord would doe this openly So he foretold that upon that Altar which Ieroboam erected a child that should be borne of the house of David Iosiah by name should burne the Prophets bones And that Cyrus also should build him a Citty and let goe his captives Yet who doubts but that Cyrus did freely deliver the Jewes out of Babylon and Iosiah did as freely burne the Prophets bones upon the alter in Bethel as ever they did action in their lives So Absalom did as freely defile his Fathers Concubines Then againe we deny that the damnation of any man is the end that God intends but the manifestation of his own glory And therfore though he hath made the wicked against the day of evill yet both that and all things he hath made for himselfe And to this tends both the permission of sinne and the damnation of Reprobates for their sin And in no moment of nature are either of these intended before the other both being joyntly meanes for the procuring of another end And if permission of sinne were first in intention with God and then damnation as these men would have it it followeth evidently by the most generally received rules of Schooles that permission of sinne should be last in execution that is men should first be damned and afterwards permitted to fall into sinne This is the issue of these men's Orthodoxy and accurate Divinity Section 8. The will is determined to an Object two waies 1. By compulsion against the bent and inclination of it 2. By necessity according to the naturall desire and liking of it God's predestination say they de termineth the will to sinne this last way but not the first It forceth no man to doe that which he would not but carrieth him towards that which he would When men sin t is true they cannot choose And it is as true they will not choose It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that God's decree is the cause of men's sins but their own wicked wills 1. The Ancients made no distinction between these two words Necessity and Compulsion but used them in this argument promiscuously and did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne least they should grant him hereby to be the Authour of sin as I have touched before and shall intimate againe afterward Nor did the School men put any difference between them as may appeare by the testimony of M. Calvin who speaking of the School-distinction of the will 's threefold liberty from necessity from sin from Misery saith This distinction I could willingly receive but that it confoundeth necessitie with coaction 2.
That which necessitateth the will to sinne is as truly the cause of sinne as that which forceth it because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed which otherwise might be avoided and therefore if the Divine decree necessitate man's will to sinne it is as truly the cause of sinne as if it did inforce it 3. That which necessitates the will to sinne is more truly the cause of the sinne then the will is because it overruleth the will and beareth all the stroke taketh from it ' its true liberty by which it should be Lord of it selfe and disporser of ' its own acts and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power which is under the insuperable check and controule of no Lord but it selfe It overruleth I say maketh it become but a servile instrument irresistably subject to superiour command and determination And therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sins as proceed from the will so determined then the will is For when two Causes concurre to the producing of an effect the one a principle overruling cause the other but instrumentall and wholly at the Devotion of the principall then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall which by the force of ' its influxe and impression produceth it rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a mere servant in the production of it We shall find it ordinary in Scripture to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent It is not ye that speak saith Christ but the Spirit of my Father that speaketh in you I laboured more abundantly then they all yet not I but the grace of God which was in me And I live yet not I but Christ liveth in me saith St. Paul Gal 2. 20. In these and many other places the effect or work spoken of is taken from the instrument and given to the principall agent Which being so though man's will worke with God's decree in the commission of sinne and willeth the sin which it doth yet seing what the will doth it doth by the commanding power of God's Allmighty decree and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe the sin committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to man's will the inferiour as to God's necessitating decree the superiour cause 4. That which makes a man sinne by way of necessitie that is with and not against his will is the cause of sin in a worse manner then that which constraineth him to sinne against his will As he which by powerfull perswasions drawes a man to stab to hang to poison himselfe is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill and unnaturall action then he that by force compells him because he maketh him to consent to his own death And so if Gods decree doe not only make men sin but sin willingly too not only cause that they shall malè agere doe evill but malè velle will evill it hath the deeper hand in the sinne God determines the will to sinne by necessitie though not by compulsion this he obtrudes upon our Devines as their opinion but quotes none is it likely that he who quotes Beza to shew that in his opinion God doth not only permit sinne but will sinne And Calvin to shew that a man's mind is blinded volente jubente Deo would not quote some or other of our Divines to prove that which he obtrudes upon them If his common place booke could afford him any such quotation out of any one of them to shew who they be and where they say that God determines the will to sinne by necessity though not by compulsion Was there ever the like crimination made against any without naming them that say so and the place where and their own words Or hath this man or any of his spirit deserved any credit to be trusted this way The very phrase of determining in Latine is no word of course with our Divines in this argument It is the phrase of the Dominicans But doe they say that God determines the will to sinne I doe not thinke he can produce one of them that expresseth himselfe so unscholastically so absurdly Alvarez saith that God by his effectuall decree predetermineth second causes to worke He saith that God doth predetermine the will to the act of sinne as it is an act That the first root of contingency is the will of God Then to what doth God determine the will in their opinion Is it to the act only and not to the manner of its production Namely to produce it voluntarily and freely Nothing lesse though this Authour counts it his wisdome to conceale this God by his omnipotency doth cause that man whose heart he moves to will and will freely Againe God's generall concourse is a divine immediate influence into second causes whereby they are foremoved applyed and determined to worke every one according to the condition of its nature The naturall cause naturally the free cause freely as I have professedly delivered Disput 18. 23. And that in such sort freely as they can choose to doe otherwise if they will and that in the very instant wherin they doe what they doe But come we to consider his answer 1. Touching that which he saith of the Ancients he gives us his bare word for it as touching the confounding of necessitie and compulsion yet Bernard I confesse willingly in talking of liberty from necessity understands by necessity coaction He saith farther that those Ancients did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne least they should grant thereby that God is the Authour of sinne But I doe not thinke he can shew this phrase of necessitating the will any way to be found among the Ancients what he hath touched before I have considered what he shall intimate hereafter I hope I shall not let it passe unsaluted And the truth is to necessitate hath such an Emphasis with it as to perswade that whatsoever a man is necessitated to do that he doth by constraint against his will And it is a rule commonly received that Voluntas non potest cogi The will cannot be forced which is most true as touching Actus eliciti the acts of the will inward and immediate and not so of actus imperati acts outward and commanded But Bradwardine who alone useth this phrase among'st School-Divines takes it in no such sense but only for an effectuall operation of God upon the will moving it to worke this or that not necessarily but freely which this Authour most judiciously dissembleth all along for desparing to prevaile by true and substantiall information of the understanding perturbundis affectibus suffuratur by a corrupt proposition of his Adversaries tenet hopes to worke distast upon the Readers affections Bradwardines position is this God can after a sort necessitate every created will to ' its free act and to a free cessation vacation from act and
Behold Reader the issue of this man's Divinity and whether he be not leading thee into the very chambers of death by working thee with him to oppose the free grace of God both in predestination and in regeneration and the power and efficacy therereof in working thee to faith to repentance and to every thing that is pleasing and acceptable unto him that through Jesus Christ Yet we have shewed a manifest difference between God's moving the creature unto that which is good and moving the creature unto such acts as are evill For in evill be moves only to the substance of the act whereof our Adversaries themselves acknowledge God to be the Authour that is the efficient cause and this he performes by influence generall But as touching every good act the Lord moveth not only to the substance of the act by influence generall but also to the goodnes thereof by influence speciall He proceeds to tell us what Philosophers teach concerning the condition of the will And because it is very absurd for a Christian to goe to schoole to Philosophers to learne the condition of Divine providence he tels us of Fathers too that maintaine the same as he saith but he quotes neither the one nor the other Now I would gladly know what Father hath ever taught that God hath no power over the will of man to convert it and ex nolentibus volentes facere of unwilling to make men willing to worke men to faith to repentance to all kind of pious obedience And as for God's secret providence in evill how plentifull is the Scripture concerning this God is said to have sent Ioseph into Egypt though this was brought to passe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren To tell David that the sword should not depart from his house though this could not be taken up or used but by the free will of men To send Senacherib against a dissembling nation and to professe that this proud King in all his bloudy executions upon the people of God was but as the axe or the sawe in the hand of God The like is testified concerning Nabuchodonosor after him Nay the Prophet demands Whether there be any evill in the Citty and the Lord hath not done it speaking of the evill of punishment though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men that the Lord caused the King of Assur to fall by the sword in his own land though this was done by the hands of his own children And as in violent courses so in impure courses the Scripture as plainly testifies the secret providence of God to have place therein And what doth Austin observe from the like places both in his fift book against Iulian the Pelag c 3 and in his book de gratia libero arbitrio professing occulto Dei judicio fieri perversitatem cordis that the perversity of the heart or will comes to passe by the secret judgment of God And the power that God hath over the wills of men to incline them even to evill that is his phrase as I have formerly shewed abundantly representing the places where he delivers this He proceeds not so much in Scholasticall discourse as in rhetoricall amplification more like a Shrew vexing him selfe and fretting that he cannot have his will then like a disputer That which necessitates the will makes it become but a servile instrument irresistably subject to superiour command and determination this action of command comes in most unseasonably it denoting a morall action commanding not only things agreable but sometimes contrary to the will of the person commanded No such thing hath place in God's moving of the will of man did he move it unto sinne which yet is most false for he moves it only to the substance of the act But why should it seeme strange that the creature should be a Servant to the Creator and his instrument and a servile instrument Yet the notion of servility is very aliene from the matter in hand that having place only in proper speech as touching morall obedience that which we treat of is rather of motions naturall and of the subordination of the second cause to the first the second Agent to the first And was ever any sober man known to oppose this with such froth of words as this Authour doth Doth this Authour himselfe thinke it possible that the Creature can move it selfe or performe any operation without God's concourse I doe not think he doth Doe we not live in God have we not our being in God And what is this other then to say that our life and being depend on God in the kind of a cause efficient And doth not the same Apostle and in the same place testifie and that in the words of an heathen man to shew that all such did not so maintaine the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 condition of the will as to maintaine the exemption of it from influence Divine professe that in God we move also And the truth is all the question is about the manner of this concourse divine whereabouts this Authour spends not a word as if he kept his breath for some other purpose then to deale on that point which alone is controverted The irresistable subjection he speaks of is no more then the bereaving of the will of her liberty which is most untrue For proof whereof I appeale to every man that will but look upon Alvarez that maintaines this divine motion of will under the notion of determining And upon Bradwardine who alone that I know maintaines the same divine motion under the notion of necessitating Whereas he infers herehence that God is a truer cause of all such acts and sins that proceed from the will so determined then the will is Oftentimes he hath set before us such Coleworts but we have nothing but his bare word for it And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free Whereas both Bradwardin maintaines that God necessitates the creature to every free act of his And Alvarez that God determines the creature to worke freely Now is it a sober course hence to inferre that the act is not free As much as to say it cannot but be free therfore it is not free And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to sinne and in the best of God's children there is a principle that inclines to sinne God is confessed by our very opposites to be the true cause of the act yet not at all the cause of the sin by his concourse Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concourse We say God concurres to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only but the first Agent not a cause only but the first cause and man as a second Agent and second cause that moveth in God as the Apostle testifies like as he lives in God and hath his being in God But these
sober conscience that is able to judge indifferently between us in this But if to avoid this they deny that the concurrence is equall but that God's concurrence is conditionall to wit in case the creature will and so man is to be accounted the Authour of sinne and not God hence it followeth that seeing God's concurrence unto the act of faith and repentance is of the same nature in the opinion of these men God is not the Authour of faith and repentance any more then he is the Authour of sinne in the language of these disputers Or if they fly not to this as I have found this Authour as I guesse to deny God's concourse to stand in subordination to man's then my former argument is not avoided But a third reason ariseth herehence against his former discourse of God's concourse namely that if God and man doe equally concurre unto the act of sinne then as I have already shewed that they are equally guilty of sin So in the working of faith and repentance man is as forward as God and as much the Authour of his own fatih and repentance as God is in direct contradiction to the Apostle who saith that Faithis the guift of God not of our selves We willingly grant that God is the principall agent in producing every act whether it be naturall or supernaturall For in him we move as well as in him we live have our being But we deny sin as sin to be any act but a privation of obedience to the law of God as the Apostle defines it to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yet let us examine that which he delivers of the principall agent the texts produced by him that we may not be carried away as he is with a superficiary apprehension of things And first consider we might plead as well for such acts as this Authour calls sins as he doth for acts gracious by his superficiary discourse For doth not Ioseph comforting his brethren say unto them in like manner Now then you sent me not hither but God But consider farther in that passage alleadged by him out of Mat 10. 20. It is not ye that speak but the spirit of my Father which speaketh in you Was not this speech of the Apostles a free action The labour of Paul more abundantly then of all the rest of the Apostles was it not a free action in Paul â—f God determined theÌ„ unto these actions then freedome of will humane stands not in opposition to determination divine and consequently though the act be evill that is done by man yet may God determine the creature to the doing of that act without any impeachment of the creatures liberty If God did not determine the wills of his Servants but only afford a simultaneous concourse to their actions why is he called the cause principall since it is confessed God doth afford the like concourse to every sinfull act as touching the substance thereof Againe he repeates the same when in case of divine determination he saith the sinne cannot be so rightly ascribed to man's will the inferiour as to God's necessitating decree the superiour cause To which I answer againe being drawen thereunto by his Tautologies by the same reason it may be inferred that when the fire burnes any combustible thing the burning is rather to be ascribed to God the more principall cause then to the fire the lesse principall the first cause being more principall then the second and if it please God so to order it the fire shall not burne as it appeares in the three noble children cast into the furnace of Babylon when they came forth there was not so much as the smell of fire upon them Secondly I answer as before by the same reason when the concourse unto the sinfull act is equall on man's part on God's each shall equally be accounted the Authour of that sinne and not man more then God Now such a concourse is maintained by this Authour Thirdly in the working of faith and repentance since by these mens opinions God affords only his concourse he shall be no more the Authour of man's faith and repentance then man himselfe is Lastly be it granted that God is a more principall cause then maÌ„ in producing the act yet there is no colour of imputing unto God the causality of the sin who hath no Agency therein by doing what he ought not to doe or not in that manner he should doe this is found only in the creature who being a free Agent otherwise then as originall sinne hath impaired liberty which I hope this Authour will not deny is justly answerable for his own transgression As for example God determined that Cyrus should give the Jewes liberty to returne into their own land yet this action of Cyrus was as free an action as any that was performed by him throughout his life God determined that Josiah should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar at Bethel yet Iosiah did this as freely as ought else God determined that Christ's bones should not be broken yet the souldiours abstained from the breaking of his bones with as much liberty as they had used in case they had broken them This divine providence we willingly confesse is very mysterious and as Cajetan saith the distinctions used to accommodate it to our capacitie doe not quiet the understanding therefore he thought it his duty to captivate his into the obedience of faith And Alvarez in a solemne disputation proves that it is incomprehensible by the wit of man 4. His last is delivered most perplexedly I can make no sense of it as the words lie but I see his meaning He supposeth that God by our Tenet makes a man to sin willingly that he saith is worse then to constraine a man to sinne against his will Where observe how this man's spirit is intoxicated when he delivered this For first he calls that worse which is merely impossible and that by his own rules For he holds that sinne cannot be except it be voluntary speaking of sinne committed by any particular person Secondly he supposeth that by our opinion God makes a man to sinne which is most untrue For when he acknowledgeth that no sin can be committed by man without God's concourse will he say that God by his concourse helps a man to sinne He helps him to the producing of the act not to the committing of the sinne And indeed be the act never so vertuous if it proceed not out of the love and feare of God it is no better then such as the Heathens performed of which Austin hath professed that they were no better then splendida peccata glorious sins So that if God doth not give a man these graces of his holy Spirit in every act that is performed by him he shall sinne and not only in acts vitious and God is not bound to bestow these graces on any Section 9. Sinne may be considered as sinne or as a meanes of
at the first which proved afterwards to be a truth as appeares by the first chapter of Austin's booke de correptione gratiâ where Florus is justified and magnified by St. Austin and his criminators condemned And seing there were none such among the Monks of Adrumetum as the accusants pretended who so maintained grace as to deny free-will therefore that also must needs be false which followeth in this Authour when he saith that against them also St. Austin wrote his other booke De correptione gratiâ And the truth is the whole buisinesse was ended and the tumult appeased between those Adrumetine Monks before Florus came over as appeared by the relation made unto him by Florus concerning the amicable composition of all things there And Austin in this very passage which this Authour grates upon professeth that he writes not against them only he answereth such an objection For I conceive it to be no other more fully which was made by some of them formerly against Florus and the doctrine of Austin maintained by Florus The relation whereof was brought unto him by the same Florus as it seemes But of this more at large in my digression concerning the predestinarian heresy which I purpose to subjoine to this Austin saith indeed that Praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio gratia verò ipsa donatio Predestination is the preparation of grace Grace the gift it selfe which was prepared not the bestowing of it How can it be Can a gift temporall be the bestowing of a thing eternall What entertainment Zeno's servant found at his Masters hands which this Authour conceales I have often shewed who taught no such doctrine as destiny as to free a knave from stripes who as so great a Philosopher had a better judgment in the nature of fate then his servant and himselfe so well thought of by the whole State of Athenians Yet was not Zeno so well instructed in the mystery of Divine providence as we are by the word of God even from the selling of Ioseph all along to the crucifying of the Son of God from thence to the Kings giving up their Kingdomes to the Beast which should come to passe in the latter part of the last times of the world But let him make himselfe mery with Zeno's servant who taken in a theevish fact was content to helpe himselfe with any pretence but Zeno we know did not approve of his appology but prepared a Rod for the knaves back in despite of that And as for the Monks the relation that here he makes is merely a fiction of his own braine without all ground Thus his foundation being ruined no marvaile if the house he builds thereon must needs totter and fall on his ownpate Sect 3. 2. Nor if this be true can sin be punished eternally or that tribunall be just on which the sentence of eternall fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day To this I have the fathers bearing witnesse generally and plainly Tertullian hath there words The recompence of God and evill can with no justice be given to him who is good or evill not freely but of necessity Saint Hierome saith where necessity domineers there is no place for retribution Epiphanius saith the stars which impose upon men a necessity of sinning may be punished with better justice then the men themselves We place mens nativities under no fatall constellâ—tions saith Saint Austin that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill from all bands of necessity because of the righteous judgment of God Prosper speaking of the judgment of God by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works saith this judgment would never be if men did sinne by the will and determination of God Fulgentius also saith the same It is great injustice in God to punish him whom he doth not find but make an offender This was Saint Peruards opinion too it is only a will free from compulsion and necessity saith he which maketh a creature capable of reward punishment Out of these restimonies laid together may be collected three things 1. That the Ancients did use to call a necssity of humane actions good or bad by the name of destiny from what externall cause soever this necessity did arise 2. That they did use these two words Necessity and Compulsion promiscuously and therefore thought that necessity as well as compulsion did take away the wills liberty 3. Which is for our present purpose that they believed and contended that the judgments of God on sinners could not be just if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any absolute necessity under the power of their sins I will therefore conclude this Argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the errour of the Pharisâ—es who beleived the immortality of the soule and the resurrection of the dead yet held that all things come to passe by necessity It is saith he a point of extreame ignorance or madnesse rather for him that confesseth the resurection of the dead and the great day appointed for the revelation of God's righteous judgment to say that there is any destiny any necessity in mens actions For how can the righteous judgment of God and destiny comply and stand together And let me adde how can the beliefe of this and true piety stand together For where this perswasion that mens sins are necessary and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment is rooted in religion will quickly be rooted out 4. It tendes to religions overthrow because it makes the whole circle of man's life but a mere destiny By it all our doings are God's ordinances all our imaginations branches of his predestination and all events in Kingdomes and commonweales the necessary issues of the divine decree All things whatsoever though they seem to doe somewhat yet by this opinion they doe indeed just nothing the best lawes restrain not one offender the sweetest rewards promote not one vertue the powerfull'st Sermons convert not one sinner the humblest devotions divert not one calamity the strongest endeavours in things of any nature whatsoever effect no more then would be done without them but the necessitating overruling decree of God doth all And if lawes doe nothing wherefore are they made If rules of religion doe nothing why are they prescribed If the wills of men doe nothing why are men encouraged to one thing scared from another ther and if good endeavours and onsets doe nothing being excited continued limited controlled and every way governed by an active absolute and Almighty decree to what purpose are they used Who seeth not plainly whither these things tend To nothing more then to the subversion of piety and pollicy religion lawes society and government This did the Romans see full well and therefore they banished Mathematicos the teachers abetters of destiny out of Rome These and the like inconveniencies which come from the uppper way did worke
we acknowledge of predestination both in the way of a meritorious cause on Christs part and in the way of a disposing cause on our part For God we say hath predestinated to bestow upon us both grace and glory for Christs sake where Christ is made a meritorious cause of grace and glory but not of the act of predestination And farther we say that God hath predestinated to bestow glory upon us as a reward of grace as a reward of faith repentance and good workes and to this purpose it is said that God by his grace doth make us meet partakers of the inheritance of the Saints in light Coloss 1. 12. But as for the bestowing of grace on any we say there is no cause thereof on mans part For he hath mercy on whom he will Rom. 9. 18. and he hath called us with an holy calling not according to our workes but according to his own purpose and grace 2 Timoth. 1. 9. Now let us apply this to reprobation which is the will of God as well as predestination and if there can be no cause of predestination quoad actum Praedestinantis because there can be no cause of the will of God quoad actum volentis Who seeth not that by the same reason there can be no cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis And if it be a mad thing to maintain that merits are the cause of predestination quoad actum praedestinantis it must be as mad a thing to maintain that any merits of the creature can be the cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis And this doctrine Aquinas applies expresly to Reprobation it selfe upon the 9. Rom. Lect. 2 da at the end of these words Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis but how ex parte actus reprobantis nothing lesse but rather ex parte effectus and what effect not the denying of grace but only as touching the inflicting of punishment thus Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata quae à seipsis habent non à Deo And farther we prove this both by cleare evidence of Scripture and cleare evidence of reason and thirdly by as cleare a representation of their infatuation that oppose this doctrine and particularly of the Author of this discourse First by cleare evidence of Scripture Rom. 9. 11. Where the Apostle proves that Election stands not of good works by an argument drawn from the circumstance of the time when that Oracle The elder shall serve the younger was delivered together with the present condition of Jacob and Esau answerable to that time thus Before the children were borne or had done good or evill it was said to Rebecca The Elder shall serve the Younger Therefore the purpose of God according to Election stands not of good workes Now look by what strength of reason the Apostle concludes this of Election by the same strength of argumentation may I conclude of reprobation in proportion thus Before the Children were borne or had done Good or Evill it was said to Rebecca The Elder shall serve the Younger therefore the purpose of God according to reprobation stands not of evill workes that is like as good workes are not the cause of Election so evill workes are not the cause of Reprobation to wit quoad actum reprobantis as touching the very act and eternall decree of God it selfe Secondly observe I pray whether my reason be not as cleare If God upon the foresight of sin doth ordain a man unto damnation thus I am content to propose it in the most rigorous manner then this is done either by necessity of nature or by the constitution of God Not by necessity of nature as it is confessed and the cause is evident for undoubtedly he could annihilate them and so he can the holiest creature that lives as all sides confesse Therefore it must be by the constitution of God but neither can this hold For if so then God did constitute that is ordaine that upon the foresight of sin he would ordaine men unto damnation Where observe that the act of divine ordination is made the object of divine ordination as much as to say he did ordaine to ordaine or he did decree to decree Whereas the objects of Gods decrees are alwaies things temporall as for example We say well God did decree to create the world to make man out of the earth to send Christ into the World to preserve us to redeeme us sanctify us save us But Gods ordination or decree is an act eternall and cannot be the object of his decree or ordination I challenge all the Powers of darknes to answer this and to vindicate the Tenent which I impugne from that absurdity which I charge upon it if they can O but some will say it 's very harsh to say that God of his meer pleasure doth ordain men unto damnation I am content to doe my endeavour to remove this scandall out of the way of honest hearts yea and out of the way of others also First therefore consider is it fit to resist the evidence of divine truth because it is harsh to mens affections Secondly Wherein consists this harshnesse Is it in this that nothing is the cause of Gods decree and will nothing temper the harshnes of it unles a thing temporall as sinne be made the cause of Gods will which is eternall and even God himselfe But let us deale plainly and tell me in truth whether the harshnes doth not consist in this That the meer pleasure of Gods will seems to be made the cause not of Gods decree only but of damnation also as if God did damne men not for sin but of his meer pleasure And this I confesse is wondrous harsh and yet no more harsh then it is untrue though in this jugling world things are so carried by some who will both shuffle and cutt and deale themselves as if we made God of meer pleasure to damne men and not for sin which is a thing utterly impossible damnation being such a notion as hath essentiall reference unto sin But if God damne no man but for sinne and decreed to damne no man but for sinne what if the meer pleasure of God be the cause of this decree what harshnes I say is this As for example Zimri or Cosby perished in their incestuous act and gave up both lust and ghost together so going as it were quick to Hell never fearing the judgements of God untill they felt them If we say God decreed they should be cut off in this sin of theirs and be damned for it What hatshnes I pray in this though God made this decree of meer pleasure For is it not manifest he did For could he not if it had pleased him have caused them to outlive this sin of theirs and given them space for repentance and
naturall and carnall men and therein they doe abstaine from the committing of it freely And yet we say that even in abstaining from these acts they doe not abstaine from sinne for as much as they doe not abstaine from them in a gracious manner and all by reason of that originall corruption which remaines uncured in them untill such time as God who hath mercy on whom he will is pleased to cure it by the grace of regeneration 3. But because I imagine this Author le ts fly at randome and keeps not himselfe to the precise genius of the Tenent by him impugned but rather aimeth at our doctrine concerning providence divine and the decree of God according whereunto we willing professe with Austin that Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit Enchir. 95. Therefore I answere in the third Place That the necessity following upon this will of God is nothing prejudiciall to the liberty or contingency of second agents in their severall operations Although I am not ignorant that now a daies it is the common and glorious course of our Adversaries very confidently to presume and presuppose that upon the will of God passing upon the action of the creature there followeth a necessity standing in flat opposition to the liberty of rationall agents and no marvail for sic factitavit Hercules Arminius the great Champion of their cause his learning served him to doe so before them As if the contumelious usages of our Saviour by Herod and Pontius Pilate together with the Gentiles and people of Israel were not performed freely but by meer necessity opposite to liberty For it cannot be denied but that all these were gathered together against the holy sonne of God to doe what Gods hand and Gods counsel had predestinated to be done Acts 4. 28. And in like sort they that through disobedience stumbled at the word of God did not freely disobey the Word because Peter professeth of them in expresse termes that Hereunto they were ordained And after the same manner it is to be conceived of the Kings that gave their Kingdomes to the Beast namely that they did it not freely in as much as the Holy Ghost saith that God put into their hearts to fulfill his will and to consent and give their Kingdome to the Beast Yet the Church of Ireland in their Articles set forth by as good Authority as the Articles of the Church of England Art 11. having professed that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe to prevent such like objections as this Author fashioneth forthwith adde Yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the willes of reasonable creatures and neither the liberty nor the contingency of second causes is taken away but established rather And Austin in his Book De Grat. Liber Arbitr where he speaks as freely of Gods effectuall Providence working in evill as no where more in so much as our Adversaries take great exceptions against his speeches such as formerly delivered and that in expresse termes His main drift notwithstanding and scope in that Book is to prove that notwithstanding the divine operation in working the motion of the creature as he thinks good yet is the creature never a whit the lesse free in its own operation And indeed where grace is wanting there is too much will rather then too little unto that which is evill according to that he writes also elsewhere Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia And if Gods operation prejudiceth not the liberty of the creature much lesse the will of God For though not any thing comes to passe unlesse God willeth it whether it be good or evill yet with this difference as Austin in the same place professeth He will have that which is good come to passe by the effecting of it but evill only by his permitting of it Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo But though Austin and the Church of Ireland yea and the Word of God teacheth this yet the Tragaedian as this Author saith could see the contrary that is perceive the evidence of the contrary which none of these saw And is not this a pretty Comaedy that a Tragaedian and Zeno's servant must be brought in and that in a confidentiary supposition to out face not Divines only both antient and late but the very word of God For it is as clear forsooth that what comes to passe by the will of God and by the effectuall operation of God doth not come to passe freely and consequently that the doctrine which maintaines that evill comes to passe by the will of God as the crucifying of Christ by the predestination of God or by the operation of God as the Rent of the ten Tribes from the two and the hardning of Pharaoh's heart so as not to let Israel goe God professeth to be his work takes away all conscience of sinne All this I say is as cleare if we believe this Author as that Seneca's Tragaedies are the Oracles of God And I pray consider must it not take away as well all conscience of righteousnesse whether of faith or of repentance or of obedience unlesse we deny faith to be the gift of God repentance to be the gift of God unles we deny that God is he Who makes us perfect to every good work working in us that which is pleasing in his sight that God is he that putteth his own spirit in us and causeth us to walke in his statutes and to keep his judgements and doe them Yet what doth Seneca speak of the divine will or divine operation Did the Tragaedian under the terme of Fate denote the divine decree or the divine administration of things which is plentifully revealed to us in the word of God Austin I am sure thought otherwise in more places then one in Psalm 31. on these words Pronunciabo adversum me He blames those who when they are found in their sinnes say Fatum mihi fecit stellae meae fecêrunt But saith he Quid est fatum Quae sunt stellae certè istae quas in Coelo conspicimus Qui eas fecit Deus Quis eas ordinavit Deus ergo vides quod voluisti dicere Deus fecit ut peccarem Then he tells of others who said that Mars facit Homicidam Venus Adulterum So that Fatum with them were second causes which we all know in their operations doe both work by necessity of nature and have no power to maintain the free will of man and in Psalm 91. Quaeris ab illo quid sit Fatum dicit stellae malae Quaeris ab illo quis fecit stellas quis ordinavit stellas non habet quid tibi respondeat nisi Deus It 's true indeed the Pelagians did object the Stoicall Fate unto Austin as if his doctrine favoured of it and what doth he answer thereunto Nec
to stretch himselfe thereon and therefore he desires to change his lodging and to passe from the desert of good actions to the desert of evill actions which he formerly insisted upon and he tells a story of Zeno's servant most suitable to his Iambick taken out of Seneca though he quotes the place of neither Well Zeno's servant he saith when he was punished by his Master for a fault that he had done told his Master out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten because he was Fato coactus peccare and hereupon making his reckoning without his hoste concludes that Certainly if Malefactors could not chuse but play their rude prankes they could not be justly punished for them Wherein he tells us what the servant said but what the Master answered thereof he saith just nothing Nay doth he truly relate what the Servant said Nothing lesse but shapes it as he thinks good that making his own bed he may lye thereon more softly If we may believe Diogenes Laertius who reports the story the Servants answer was not Fato coactus sum peccare but Fatale mihi erat furari For he took his serâ—â—â—â— laying the theefe though the servant took advantage from his Masters doâ—â—â—â— of Fate to frame an Apology for himselfe yet would not Zeno permit him to 〈◊〉 thereby any priviledge from stripes For servum in furto deprehensum verberavit A manifest evidence that even in his opinion the destiny he maintained was no just excuse for sinne And to meet him in his own plea when he said Fatale mihi erat furari caedi inquit this was the answer he made to his servant which answer of his this Author either conceales or was not privy to his own ignorance And indeed Chrysippus the Stoick though an eager maintainer of Fate Stoicall yet denyed not the liberty of mens wills as appears in Cicero de Fato though in his opinion this doctrine of theirs did cohere And Plutarch likewise in his book De Fato professeth as much Fatum omnia continet sicut etiam videtur neque tamen proptereà omnia necessariò eveniunt sed unumquodque suo naturae modo Neither did Zeno conceive hereby all place to be taken away for perswasion as appears by his answer to Crates when he took him by the cloake to draw him away from Stilpo saying O Crates commodissimè auribus Philosophum teneas Cum igitur persuaseris tum illum trahe Nam si per vim egeris corpus quidem apud te sed animus apud Stilponem erit Neither were any Philosophers more studious of Morality then the Stoicks They wrote De Bonis Malis de Affectibus de Virtute de Fine deque primâ aestimatione de Actibus ac de Officiis de Adhortationibus dehortationibus as Diogenes writes in the life of Zeno. And Austin de Civit. Dei cap. 9. professeth of the Stoicks that though Omnia Fato fieri contenderent yet Non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent And more then this whereas the Stoicks were so jealous of maintaining the liberty of mens wills that they denyed them of all other things to be subject to necessity Austin professeth that their feare of subjecting the wills of men unto necessity in this respect was a causelesse feare Ibid. cap. 10. Unde nec illa necessitas formidanda est quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt causas rerum ita distinguere ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati quasdam subderent atque in his quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates ne videlicet non essent liberae si subderentur necessitati And then proceeds to shew that there is a certain necessity nothing prejudiciall to the will albeit the will be acknowledged in subjection thereunto And that necessity he describes to be this as when we say that Necesse est ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat his words are these Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas secundum quam dicimus necesse est ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat nescio cur eam timemus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis Herein Austin professeth to goe beyond the Stoicks in acknowledging a necessity whereunto the will of man is subject and that without detriment to the liberty thereof Yet in my judgement it would better become a Christian Divine to informe both himselfe and others out of the Word of God and rest thereon for the discovery of the nature of Providence and Predestination divine then to goe a forraging among Poets and Stoicks for the justification of his own in point of Christian faith and for the redargution of the way of his Opposites INTRODUCTION SECT IV. THese absurdities following too evidently from the upper Way Others of the same side wiling to decline them as rocks and precipices doe leave that Way and present man to God in his decree of reprobation lying in the fault and under the guilt of Originall sinne and say That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adams sinne did decree the greatest part of them to eternall torments in hell without remedy for the manifestation of his severe Justice But notwithstanding this difference among themselves they agree well enough together For this little jarre is not in their judgements enough to make a breach between them as we may see in the Conference at the Hague and in the Synod at Dort In the Conference at the Hague the Contra-Remonstrants have these words Quoad sententiarum diversitatem in hoc argumento quod Deus hominem respexit in hoc decreto nondum creätum vel creätum lapsum quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinae non pertinet libentèr alii alios aequitate Christiana toleramus After this in the Synod of Dort they permitted Gomarus to goe the Supralapsarian way and the Delegates of South Holland were very indifferent which way they took For these are their words An Deus in eligendo consideravit homines ut lapsos an etiam ut nondum lapsos existimant viz. the Delegates aforesaid non esse necessarium ut definiatur modo statuatur Deum in eligendo considerasse omnes homines in pari statu And to say the truth there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances seeing they agree in the substance For they both say 1. That the moving cause of reprobation is the alone will of God and not the sinne of man originall or actuall 2. That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates are necessary and unavoidable by Gods absolute decree These two things are the maxima gravamina that the other side stick at So that these two paths meet at last in the same way But because this last is chosen by the most and latest maintainers of the absolute decree as the more moderate of the two and the easyer to be defended I will set down the conclusion which I dislike in their way and words God hath absolutely purposed
of his Scene whereunto it is fit he should be serviceable And as for the two Articles here mentioned wherein they are said unanimously to agree and which he calls maxima gravamina It is true they doe agree herein but it may be in a farre other sense then he is willing should be taken notice of For as for the first 1. That the moving cause of reprobation is the alone will of God and not the sinne of man originall or actuall 1. This is true in proportion to election that like as no good work of man is the moving cause of election but only the will of God so no sinne or evill work of man is the cause of reprobation but only the will of God 1. That so it is of election the Apostle both 1. Saith Election is not of Workes but of him that calleth 2. And proveth thus Before Esau and Iacob were borne or had done good or evill it was said The Elder shall serve the Younger therefore Election is not of Workes that is of good workes but of him that calleth 2. That so it is of reprobation I prove by the same argument of the Apostle thus Before Esau and Iacob were borne or had done good or evill it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger therefore reprobation stands not of workes that is of evill workes but of the meer pleasure of God 1. And like as this is farther evident by Gods course of calling in the point of Election as the Apostle intimateth for as much as God calleth effectually whom he will in bestowing faith and repentance upon them For as the Apostle afterwards professeth He hath mercy on whom he will 2. So it is as evident in the point of reprobation in as much as God refuseth to call whom he will by denying faith and repentance unto them as afterwards the same Apostle professeth saying that God hardneth whom he will 2. And this doctrine we doe explicate by distinguishing that which our Adversaries desire to confound least their cheating carriage should be discovered as formerly I have shewed For Predestination and Reprobation may be considered either quoad Praedestinantis Reprobantis actum or quoad Praedestinationis Reprobationis terminum as much as to say quoad res praedestinatione reprobatione praeparatas that is either as touching the act of Predestination and Reprobation or as touching the things decreed by Predestination or Reprobation Now as touching the act of Predestination never any man saith Aquinas was so mad as to say that the merits of man are the cause of predestination And why so Because the act of predestination is the act of Gods will and formerly saith he I have shewed that there can be no cause of the will of God as touching the act of God willing but only as touching the things willed by God Now apply this to reprobation For is not reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating the very act also of Gods will This cannot be denied and herehence it followes that like as there can be no cause of Gods will as touching the act of God willing so there can be no cause of reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating And like as it was a mad thing in Aquinas his judgement to say that merits were the cause of predestination as touching the act of God predestinating so it is no lesse madnesse in his judgement to maintain that either sinne originall or actuall can be the meritorious cause of reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating And what are the reasons hereof in School-divinity Why surely these 1. Predestination and Reprobation are eternall but good workes and evill workes of the creature are temporall but impossible it is that a thing temporall can be the cause of that which is eternall 2. The act of Predestination and Reprobation is the act of Gods will and the act of Gods will like as the act of his knowledge is the very essence of God even God himselfe and therefore to introduce a cause of Gods will is to bring in a cause of God himselfe 3. If works or faith foreseen be any moving cause of Divine election then either they are so of their own nature or by the meer constitution of God Not of their own nature as it is apparent therefore by the constitution of God but this cannot stand neither For if by the constitution of God then it would follow that God did constitute that upon foresight of mans faith he would elect him that is ordaine him to salvation And what I pray is to constitute Is it any other then to ordaine And herehence it followeth God did ordaine that upon foresight of mans faith he would ordaine him unto salvation Whereby the eternall ordination of God is made the object of his eternall ordination whereas it is well known and generally received that nothing but that which is temporall can be the object of divine ordination which is eternall In like sort I dispute of reprobation if sinne be the cause thereof then either of its own nature it is the cause thereof or by the ordinance of God Not of its own nature as all are ready to confesse if you say by the ordinance of God then it follows God did ordaine that upon the foresight of mans sinne he would ordaine him unto damnation For reprobation is Gods ordaining a man unto damnation as touching one part of the things decreed thereby which we come to consider in the next place and that both in election and in reprobation having hitherto considered them as touching the act of God electing or reprobating and shewed that thus they can have no cause But as touching the things decreed thereby they may have a cause as Aquinas professeth and we professe with him As for example to begin with election The things decreed or destinated to a man in election are two Grace and Glory Now both these may have a cause For both Grace is the cause of glory and Christs merits are the cause both of grace and glory But let grace be rightly understood For in the confuse notion of grace many are apt to lurke thereby to shut their eyes against the evidence of truth For no marvail if men be in love with their own errours and in proportion to the love of errour such is their hatred of Divine truth opposite thereunto Now by grace we understand the grace of regeneration whereby that naturall corruption of mind and will commonly called blindnesse of mind and hardnesse of heart which we all bring into the world with us through originall sin is in part cured More distinctly we call this grace the grace of faith and repentance whereby our naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured Now this grace we say God bestowes on whom he will finding all equall in infidelity and impenitency For so the Apostle tells us that God hath mercy on whom he will And as God bestowes it on whom he will not finding any
cause in man any way moving him either in its own nature or by divine constitution moving him to bestow this grace on any So the Apostle 2 Timoth. 1. 9. God hath saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our workes but according to his own purpose and grace And indeed we being all found dead in sinne what could be found in one to move God to bestow the life of faith and repentance upon him more then upon another And if any such thing were found in man moving God hereunto then should grace be bestowed according unto works that is in the Fathers phraise as Bellarmine acknowledgeth according unto merits which was condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Palestine and Pelagius himselfe was driven to subscribe unto it otherwise they had condemned him also But as touching the conferring of glory God doth not bestow this on whom he will finding men equall without any moving cause thereunto even in man For though there be no moving cause hereunto in man of its own nature yet there is to be found a moving cause in man by constitution divine whereby God is as it were moved to bestow solvation on some and not on others For God hath made a gracious promise that whosoever beleeveth and repenteth and continueth in faith and repentance unto death shall be saved and whosoever beleeveth not and repenteth not shall be damned So then though men are equall in originall sinne and in naturall corruption and God bestowes faith and repentance on whom of them he will curing their corruption in whom he will yet when he comes to the conferring of glory men are not found equall in morall condition and accordingly God cannot be said on like manner to bestow glory solvation on whō he will For he hath tyed himselfe by his own constitution to bestow solvation on none but such as dye in thestate of grace Yet I confes some say that God bestows solvation on whom he will in as much as he is the author of their faith repentance bestows these graces on whō he will yet certainly there is a different manner in the use of this phraise of bestowing this or that on whom he will For when God bestowes faith and repentance he findes them on whom he will bestow it no better then others But when he comes to the bestowing of glory he findes them on whom he bestowes that farre better them others Now we come to the things decreed in reprobation and these are two 1. The denyall of the grace of regeneration that is of the grace of faith and repentance whereby mans naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured 2. The denyall of glory and the inflicting of damnation The first of these to wit the denyall of grace mentioned is made to whom he will And it must needs be so in ease God gives this grace to whom he will And the Apostle professeth that as God hath mercy on whom he will so he hardneth whom he will And as God denies this grace to whom he will so did he decree to deny it to whom he will Yet there is a difference considerable For albeit God hardneth whom he will by denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance yet notwithstanding like as it is just with God to inflict damnation upon them for that sinne whether originall or actuall wherein he findes them when the ministry of the word is afforded them so likewise it cannot be denied to be iust with God to leave their infidelity and impenitency wherein he finds them uncured But yet because God hath not made any such constitution namely that whosoever is found in infidelity and impenitency shall be so left and abandoned by him therefore he is properly said as to cure it in whom he will so to leave it uncured in whom he will finding them all equall in originall sinne and consequently lying equally in this their naturall infidelity and impenitencv So wee may iustly say there is no cause at all in man of this difference to wit why God cures infidelity impenitency in one and not in another but it is the meer pleasure of God that is the cause of this difference And if any list to contend hereabouts we shall be willing to entertaine him and conferre our strength of argumentation on this point 2. But as touching the denyall of glory and inflicting of damnation which is the second thing decreed in reprobation there is alwaies found a cause motive yea and meritorious hereof to wit both of the denyall of the one inflicting of the other And God doth not proceed herein according to the meer pleasure of his will that by reason of his own constitution having ordained that whosoever continueth finally in infidelity in profane courses and impenitency shall be damned And albeit on the other side it may be said in some sence as formerly I have shewed that God saves whom he will in as much as he is the author of faith which he bestowes on whom he will yet in no congruous sence can he be said to damne whom he will for as much as he is not the author of sinne as he is the author of faith For every good thing he workes but sinne and the evill thereof he only permits not causeth it And lastly as God doth not damne whom he will but those only whom he finds finally to have persevered in sinne without repentance so neither did he decree to damne or reprobate to damnation whom he will but only those who should be found finally to persevere in sinne without repentance Now let us apply this to the Article we have in hand which is this The moving cause of reprobation is the only will of God and not the sinne of man originall or actuall and for the explication hereof according to that which hath been formerly delivered We say that reprobation doth signify either a purpose of denying grace as above mentioned or a purpose of inflicting damnation And each may be considered either as touching the act of Gods decree or as touching the things decreed We shew how the Article holds or holds not being differently accommodated 1. As touching the things decreed 1. As touching the deniall of grace We say That God decreed of his meere good pleasure to deny unto some the grace of faith and repentance for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency which is found in all without any motive cause hereunto found in one more then in another 2. As touching the inflicting of Damnation We say That God decreed to inflict damnation on some not of his meer pleasure but meerly for their finall perseverance in sinne without repentance 2. As touching the very act of Gods decree We say Nothing in man could be the cause hereof but the meer pleasure of God as Aquinas professeth it a mad thing to devise in man a cause of divine predestination as touching the act of God predestinating as I have
rather a fiction of the remnants of the Pelagians wherewithall to reproach the doctrine of S. Austin in the poynt of Predestination Thus have I examined this Authors pretence of the Novelty of our Tenent I come to the consideration of that which followes DISCOURSE The Second Motive IT S unwillingnesse to abide the Tryall I find that the Authors and Abettors of it have been very backward to bring it to the Standard not only when they have been called upon by their Adversaries to have been weighed but also when they have been intreated thereto by their chief Magistrates who might have commanded them A shrewd argument mee thinks that it is too light In the Disputation at Mompelgard Anno 1586 held between Beza and Jacobus Andreas with some Seconds on both sides Beza and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the person of Christ the Lords Supper c. When they came to this Point did decline the sifting of it and gave this reason among others that it could not then possibly be disputed of sine gravi eorum offendiculo qui tanti mysterii capaces non sunt without the great scandall and hurt of the ignorant and unacquainted with these high mysteries The Contra-Remonstrants also in their Conference with their Adversaries at the Hague in the year 1611 could not be drawn to dispute with them about this point but delivered a Petition to the States of Holland and Westfrizland that they might not be urged to it resolving rather to break off the Conference then to meddle with it In the Synod likewise of Dort in the year 1618 and 1619. the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod ut de Electione potius quà m de odiosâ Reprobations materiâ agerent that they should rather dispute of the point of Election then the odious point of Reprobation Can this Doctrine be a truth and yet blush at the light which makes all thing manifest especially considering these things 1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of Practicall divinity by the ill or well stating of which the glory of God and good of Religion is much promoted or hindered 2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation both being parts of predestination that the one cannot well be handled without the other 3. That Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time 4. That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falshood and therefore bound in justice to purge it selfe of the crimination 5. That it may easily be defended if as some say it be such an apparent truth for Nihil est ad defendendum puritate tutius nihil ad dicendum veritate facilius saith S. Hierom. The striving to lye close and hide it selfe though perhaps it be not so infallible yet it is a very probable argument of a bad cause Truth covets no corners but is willing to abide the tryall whether in men or in doctrines David knowing his heart to be without guile offers himselfe ready to the Lords tryall Search me o God and know my heart try me and know my thoughts and see if there be any wicked way in me And our Saviour tells us that Every one that doth evill hates the light and comes not to the light least his deeds should be reproved but he that doth truth comes to the light that his deeds may be made manifest that they are wrought in God As S. Paul saith of an Heretick he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 selfe condemned and so may we say of Heresy and untruth it condemnes it selfe and by nothing more then by refusing the Touch-stone He is to be thought an empty Scholler who is loath to be opposed and his gold to be light and counterfeit that will not have it touched and weighed and these Opinions to be but errours which would so willingly walk in a mist and dwell in silence when it concernes the peace of the Church so much to have them examined TWISSE Consideration VVHo are these Authors of this Doctrine who here are said to have been backward to bring it to the standard Is Beza those Authors whereof was he the Author Was it the doctrine of predestination as proceeding of the meer pleasure of God and not upon foresight of mans faith and works Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Austin 1200 years agoe and that in opposition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians Or was it the doctrine of reprobation as not proceeding upon the foresight of sinne but of the meer pleasure of God Is this Author so ignorant as not to know what are the conclusions of Alvarez in the question Whether there be any cause of reprobation on mans part Lib. 10. de Auxil disc 110. pag. 866. 1. His first Conclusion is this Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto some everlasting life and to permit their sinne is not conditionate but absolute neither doth it presuppose in God foresight of the deserts of reprobates or of their perseverance in sinne unto the last period of their life 2. His next Conclusion is In the Angells that fell there is no cause of their reprobation on their part as touching the whole effect thereof but before any foresight of their future sinne God pro sua Voluntate of his meer will did reprobate some of them and suffered them to fall into sinne 3. The third Infants departing in Originall sinne alone there is no cause on their part of reprobation if they be considered in comparison with others which are not reprobated and the like is to be said proportionably of men of ripe years 4. The fourth Not only comparatively but absolutely there is no cause of reprobation Therefore neither sinne actuall nor originall nor both of them foreseen by God was indeed the meritorious and motive cause of the reprobation of any as touching all the effects thereof and the proofe hereof he prosecutes at large 5. Reprobation as touching the last effect thereof presupposeth in signo rationis the foresight of sinne originall or actuall for which a reprobate is damned Marke it well He does not say as the cause for which God decrees his damnation but as the cause for which a reprobate is damned And Aquinas whose followers the Dominicans are expresseth this doctrine in this manner and that more Scholastically and accurately then Alvarez Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata c. in Ad Rom. 9. Sect. 2. in fine that is Prescience of sinnes may be some reason of reprobation on the part of punishment to wit in as much as God purposeth to punish wicked men for their sinnes Where sinne is evidently made the cause of damnation and that by vertue of Gods purpose but by no means the cause of the
saith then for inflicting eternall death only on them that are guilty of it as we say But let we him finish the Declamation he hath begunne Is his mercy abundant doth it extend it selfe farther then justice when it is tackt up so short limited to a very few chosen ones when a hundred for one at least are unavoidably cast away out of his only will and pleasure As touching this I have already shewed how much he is out in his Algebra but let that passe unlesse this Divine take upon him to deliver truer Oracles then Saint Paul we are bound to believe that the elect only are vessells of mercy distinguished from reprobates as vessells of wrath Rom. 9. 22 23. and toward these alone it is that his mercy is abundant in the way of bestowing saving and spirituall graces It is untrue that he hath proved any such thing as he pretends namely that Gods mercy is extended to more persons then his justice And applied aright namely as touching mercy seen in pardoning sinnes in changing the heart and saving soules which are peculiar to Gods elect the most brazen faced opposite to Gods holy truth that liveth cannot deny but that they to whom these are granted are farre fewer then they to whom they are denied And if within the Church only for there only are found such as feare God his mercy extends to thousands of them that feare him when but to the third and fourth generation he punisheth the sinnes of the Father upon the Children which is all the proofe this Author brings to this purpose it followeth not herehence that his mercy extendeth any whit to more then doth his justice considering the small proportion of those within the Church and therein of them that feare him in comparison to those without the Church And like as visiting the sinne of Fathers which is commonly understood of temporall punishments so in proportion the mercy is to be understood of temporall mercy And we well know that it is nothing necessary that a man that fears God should have children And like as God doth not alwaies thus visit the sinnes of Fathers upon the Children in like sort it is not alwaies necessary that God should shew mercy to thousands of every one of them that feare him He dealt so with Abraham Isaack and Iacob they to whom the Law was delivered knew this full well then again must not they who look to have an interest in this gracious promise look unto it that they walk in the steps of their Forefathers that feared God By all which may appeare the superficiary nature of this Disputants argumentation even then when the zeale of his cause makes him as most confident so also most luxuriant Lastly doe we say that God damnes any man out of his only will and pleasure Doe we not professe that he damnes no man but for sinne And as he damnes no man but for sinne so likewise that he decreed to damne no man but for sinne though there could be no cause of this his decree but of his meere will and pleasure he made this decree namely to damne many thousands for their sinnes But let him come to an end of this his roaving discourse when he thinks good and not before Or doth his love passe knowledge when we see daily greater love then this in men and other creatures What Father or Mother would determine their children to certain death or to cruell torments worse then death for one only offence and that committed too not by them in their own persons but by some other and only imputed unto them How much lesse would they give themselves to beget Children and bring them forth that they might bring them to the rack fire gallowes and such like tortures and deaths What doe I heare Doth man or any creature shew more love to their Children then God doth towards his Elect Did they ever provide such a sacrifice to make satisfaction for their Childrens sinnes as God did provide for his Yea but reprobates also are Gods Children this must needs be his meaning though in plain termes he spared to expresse so much How unnaturall then was Christ who would not pray for the World if they were all his children And what meant he to professe that he sanctified himselfe only for them for whom he prayed Which sanctification of himselfe was in respect of the offering up of himselfe upon the crosse as Maldonate confesseth was the interpretation of all the Fathers whom he had read And in that prayer professeth of them saying they are thine and thou gavest them unto me as much as to say the World was not his And farther consider Is it safe to measure out Gods proceedings by the proceedings of men What Father or Mother would be content to execute a Child of theirs upon the Gallowes when by some capitall crime he hath deserved it How much lesse hold them upon the rack of continuall tortures what then must not God be allowed to inflict eternall death upon his creatures And what hath an earthly Father or Mother to doe either to determine or execute death on any This belongs to God not to man unlesse he make choyce of them as of his Ministers for the execution of vengeance But this Author is nothing yet awaked out of his dreames or his Arminian Lethargy Yet I hope he will grant that God did foresee all this even the sinnes of Judas in betraying and of the Jewes in crucifying the Sonne of God yet neverthelesse he was content to bring forth both him and them into the World Now what earthly Father and Mother would not make choyce rather to be Childlesse then to bring forth such children as should deale with them as Nero dealt with his Mother Proceed then and as from the affections of earthly Fathers and Mothers he disputes against the absolutenesse of Gods decrees so also in the next place let him conclude the like to the utter overthrowing of Gods foreknowledge Yet who of our Divine saith that God for one offence hath determined death and tortures to any reprobate of ripe years Doe they not all professe that as many as dye in actuall sinnes unrepented of God determined to damne them for those actuall sinnes unrepented of I doe not think he can alleadge any that denies this Againe what one of our Divines maintaines that Infants perishing in originall sinne are damned for that sinne which is made theirs only by imputation What a shamelesse habit hath he gotten to himselfe to deliver untruths yet will he not I warrant you be accounted a Pelagian neither will he plainly deny originall sinne as Grevincovius is said to have done and that testibus convinci potuit Their Tenets are nothing lesse shamefull then Pelagius his Tenets were only they have not that ingenuity which Pelagius had in professing plainly that there was no originall sinne conveyed unto us by propagation Now he comes more closely unto the matter yet but a little neither a
of them that are called but few are chosen Yet might that Synod well admonish Maccovius to take heed of such words as might give offence to tender yeares and be carefull to expresse the same truth in as inoffensive way as we can And accordingly having a digression in this very Argument in my Vindiciae Gratiae I proposed it in this manner Whether the holy one of Israell without any injurie to his Holy Majestie may be said to will sinne after a certaine manner and I maintaine the affirmative after this manner Deus vult ut peccatum fiat ipso permittente God will have sinne to come to passe by his permission and Bellarmine confesseth that Malum esse Deo permittente bonum est It is good that evill should be by God's permission which was also the saying of Austine long before And that non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo Not any thing comes to passe except God Omnipotent will have it come to passe either by suffering it or himselfe working it And the eleventh Article of the Church of Ireland framed in the dayes of King J'ames runnes thus God from all eternitie did by his unchangable Counsell ordaine what soever in time should come to passe yet so as there by no violence is offered to the to the wills of the reasonable Creatures and neither the libertie nor the contingency of second causes is taken away but established rather And Arminius himselfe professeth that Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerums uorum implere God would have Achab to fill up the measure of his sinnes and what is it to fill up the measure of his sinnes but to adde sinne unto sinne And this he delivereth without all qualification By these instances it appeareth That they of the first side can easily beare one with another in this difference And to say the truth there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances seeing they agree in the substance for which they both contend 1 That the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God and not the sinne of man originall or actuall 2. That the finall impenitencie and Damnation of Reprobates are necessary and unavoidable by God's absolute Decree The difference which this Authour takes into Consideration is about the object of Predestination and the difference in opinion thereabouts is usually to be observed threefold though this Authour is pleased to take notice of a secondfold difference for some conceive the object of Predestination to be man-kind as yet not created others conceive the object thereof to be man-kind created but not yet corrupted A third sort maintaine the object thereof to be man-kind both created and corrupted Now D. Iunius hath endeavoured to reconcile the three opinions making place for each consideration in the object of predestination And Piscator after him adventured on the like reconciliation and hath performed it with more perspicuitie and with better successe in my judgment then Iunius And that according to three different acts concurring unto Predestination The first is saith he God's purpose to create man-kind in Adam unto different ends now this Act doth clearely require the object thereof to be man-kind not yet Created The second Act he conceives to be God's Decree to permit all men to fall in Adam Now this Act he conceives as clearly to suppose the object thereof to be man-kind created but not corrupted The third last Act he conceives to be God's decree to choose some to shew compassion on them in raising them out of sinne by saith and repentance and of Reprobating others leaving them as be findes them and permitting them to finish their dayes in sinne to the end he might manifest the glorie of his grace in saving the one the glorie of his Justice in damning others Now this third Act he supposeth manifestly to require the object thereof to be man-kind both created and corrupted Now the Authours of these severall opinions have no reason to go together by the eares about these three opinions but with Brotherly love to entertaine one another First because the difference herein is not so much in Divinitie as in Logick and Philosophie difference in opinion about order in intentions being meerly Logicall and to be composed according to the right stating of the end intended and of the meanes conducing to the end it being generally confessed that the intention of the end is before the intention of meanes conducing thereunto And that look what is first in intention the same must be last in execution Secondly the Authours of these severall opinions about the object of Predestination doe all agree in two principall points 1. That all men before God's eternall predestination and reprobation are considered as equall in themselves whether as uncreated or as created but not corrupted or lastly whether created or corrupted 2 That God's grace only makes the difference choosing some to worke thē to faith repentance perseverance therein while he rejecteth others leaving thē as he findes them permitting them to finish their dayes in sinne whereby is upheld and maintained 1. First the prerogative of God's grace as only effectuall to the working of men unto that which is good 2. And secondly the prerogative of God's Soveraigntie in shewing mercy on whome he will to bring them to Faith and true repentance and hardning others that is not bestowing of grace and repentance upon them And seeing they all agree in these momentous points of Divinitie they have no cause to take it offensively at the hands of one another that they differ in a point of Logick Now I have adventured on this argument to find out to my selfe and give unto others some better satisfaction then formerly hath been exhibited and that by distinguishing Two decrees only on each part to witt the decree of the end and the decree of the meanes As for example 1. On the part of Predestination and Election I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glorious grace in the way of mercie mixt with Justice on a certaine number of men And the Decree of the meanes is to create them and permit them all to fall in Adam and to bring them forth into the world in their severall generations clothed with originall sinne and to send Christ into the world to dye for them and for Christ's sake first to bestow the grace of faith and repentance upon them and finally to save them 2. On the part of Reprobation I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glory in the way of Justice vindicative And the decree of meanes to be partly common and partly proper the common meanes are to create them and permit them all to fall in Adam and bring them forth into the world clothed with originall sin the speciall meanes are to leave them as he finds them and permit them to finish their daies in sinne and so not
shewing the like grace to them which he shewed to others 1. So that the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God and not the sinne of man originall and actuall like as on the other side the moving cause of election is only the will of God or not faith or any good workes whereupon this Authour is loath to manifest his opinion This doctrine is not only approved by Doctour Whitaker Doctour of the Chaire in the Universitie of Cambridge and that in his Cygnea Cantio a little before his death but justified and confirmed by varietie of Testimonies both of Schoolemen as Lumbard Aquinas Bannes Petrus de Alliaco Gregorius Arminensis of our owne Church and the Divines thereof as taught by Bucer at Cambridge by Peter Martyr at Oxon professed by the Bishops and others promoted by Queen Elizabeth and farther in the yeare of our Lord 1592 there was a famous recantation made in the Universitie of Cambridge by one Barret in the 37. of Elizabeth whereunto he was urged by the heads of houses of that Universitie The Recantation runnes thus Preaching in Latine not long since in the Universitie Church Right worshipfull many things slipt from me both falsly and rashsly spoken whereby I understand the mindes of many have been grieved to the end therefore I may satifie the Church the truth which I have publiquely hurt I doe make this publique confession both Repenting and Revoking my Errour First I said that no man in this transiâ—â—ie world is so strongly underpropt at least by the certainty of Faith that is unlesse as I afterwards expounded it by Revelation that he ought to be assured of his owne Salvation But now I protest before God and acknowledge in my conscience that they which are justified by faith have peace towards God that is have reconciliation with God and doe stand in that grace by faith therefore that they ought to be certaine and assured of their owne Salvation even by the certainty of Faith it selfe 2. Secondly I affirmed that the faith of Peter could not faile but that other mens faith may for as I then said Our Lord prayed not for the faith of every particular man but now being of a better and more sound Iudgment according to that which Christ teacheth in plaine words Ioh. 17. 20. I pray not for these alone that is the Apostles but for them also which shall believe in mee through their word I acknowledge that Christ prayed for the faith of every particular believer and that by the vertue of that prayer of Christ every true believer is so stayd up that his faith cannot faile 3. Thirdly touching perseverance to to the end I said that that certainty concerning the time to come is proud for as much as it is in his owne nature contingent of what kind the perseverance of every man is neither did I affirme it to be proud only but to be most wicked but now I freely protest that the true and justifiing faith whereby the faithfull are most neare united unto Christ is so firme as also for the time to come so certaine that it can never be rooted up out of the mindes of the faithfull by any temptation of the flesh the world or divell himselfe so that he that once hath this faith shall ever have it for by the benefit of that justifying faith Christ dwelleth in us and we in Christ therefore it cannot but be both increased Christ growing in us dayly as also persevere unto the end because God doth give constancy 4. Fourthly I affirmed that there was no distinction in faith but in the Persons believing in which I confesse I did erre Now I freely acknowledge the Temporarie faith which as Bernard witnesseth is therefore fained because it is temporary it is distinguished and differeth from the saving faith whereby sinners apprehending Christ are justified before God for ever not in measure and degrees but in the very thing it selfe Moreover I adde that Saint Iames doth make mention of a dead faith and Paul of a faith that worketh by love 5 Fifthly I added that forgivenesse of sinnes is an Article of faith but not particular neither belonging to this man or that man that is as I expounded it that no true faithfull man either can or ought certainely believe that his sinnes are forgiven But now I am of an other mind and doe freely confesse that every true faithfull man is bound by this Article of faith to believe the forgivenes of sinnes and certainely to believe that his owne particular sinnes are freely forgiven him neither doth it follow hereupon that that Petition of the Lord's prayer to wit forgive us our trespasses is needlesse for in that Petition we aske not only the gift but also the increase of Faith 6 Sixtly these words escaped me in my Sermon viz As for those that are not saved I doe most strongly believe and doe freely protest that I am so perswaded against Calvin Peter Martyr and the rest that sinne is the true and proper cause of Reprobation But now being better instructed I say that the Reprobation of the wicked is from everlasting and that saying of Saint Austine to Simplician to be mòst true viz If sinne were the cause of Reprobation then no man should be elected because God doth know all men to be defiled with it And that I may speak freely I am of the same mind and doe believe concerning the Doctrine of Election and Reprobation as the Church of England believeth and teacheth in the booke of the Articles of faith in the Article of Praedestination Last of all I uttered these words rashly against Calvin a man that hath very well deserved of the Church of God to wit that he durst presume to lift up himselfe above the high and Almighty God by which words I doe confesse that I have done great injurie to that most learned and right good man and I most humbly beseech you all to pardon this my rashnes as also in that I have uttered many bitter words against Peter Martyr Beza Zanchy Iunius and the rest of the same religion being the lights and ornaments of our Church calling them by the odious names of Calvinâ—sts and other slanderous termes branding them with a most grevious marke of reproach whom because our Church doth worthily reverence it was not meet that I should take away their good name from them Doctor Fulke in like manner maintaines that reprobation is not of workes but of God's free will Rom 9 Num 2. His words are these God's election Reprobation is most free of his owne will not upon the foresight of the merits of either of them for he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth vers 18. Yet here is to be distinguished for the explication of the truth That God's decree of Reprobation may be considered either as touching the Act of God reprobating and willing or as touching the things hereby willed or Decreed As
willed by him but only on some things Divina volunt as non omnibus sed quibusdam necessitatem imponit And in the body of that question thus he writes The distinction of things necessary and contingent proceeds from the distinction of God's will For when a cause is effectuall and powerfull to worke the effect followeth the cause not only so farre as to be brought to passe but also as touching the manner of its coming to passe Therefore seing the will of God is most effectuall it not only followeth that those things come to passe which God will have come to passe but that they come to passe after the same manner also after which he will have them come to passe Now God will have some things come to passe necessarily and some things contingently that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary which cannot faile by which effects are brought forth necessarily And for the producing of other effects he hath fitted causes contingent such as may faile in working from which effects are brought to passe contingently So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to passe but how Not allwaies necessarily or contingently And that certaine and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schooles but not necessity simply but only upon suspicion which may well consist with absolute contingency But to make the point yet more cleare Let us distinctly consider the things decreed For they that have an evill cause delight in confusion and feare nothing more then the light of distinction Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either deniall of Grace which is joyned with the permission of sinne Or damnation for sinne according to that on Aquinas Reprobation includes the will of permitting sinne inflicting damnation for sinne Now both the permission of sinne and damnation of God's part are his free acts and therefore come to passe freely But upon supposition that God will deny a man Grace it is impossible that such a man should have grace Secondly secluding grace there is noe actuall transgression for which a man is damned but may be avoided man having power for that naturally though naturally he have noe power to performe every good act The reason is because amongst good acts some are supernaturall as the acts of the three Theologicall vertues Faith Hope and Charity But noe sinfull act is supernaturall all such are naturall Now it is confest on all hands that notwithstanding man's corruption by reason of originall sinne yet he hath still power and free will to performe any naturall act and accordingly he hath free power to abstaine from it So that Iudas had free will to abstaine from betraying his Master After he had betrayed him he had free power to abstaine from destroying himselfe so that as these sinnes of his for which he was damned were avoidable by him in like manner his damnation for these sinnes was avoidable And allbeit God had determined that Iudas by Divine permission should betray his Master and destroy himselfe according to to that of Austin Iudas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini Iudas was ordained to betray his master And that of the Apostles jointly Of a truth against thy holy Son Iesus both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israell were gathered to doe what thy hand and thy counsell had before determined to be done Acts 4. 28. Yet herehence it followes only that it was necessary to wit upon this supposition namely of the Divine ordinance that these things should come to passe namely both Iudas his betraying of Christ and Herods mocking of him and Pilates condemning him and the peoples crying out away with him together with their preferring of Barrabas a murtherer before him and the Souldiers crucifying him But how came it to passe Not necessarily but contingently that is in this Authours phrase evitably and avoidably inas much as it was joyned with an absolute possibility to come to passe otherwise Nor with a possibility only but with a free power in the agents to have forborne all these contumelious carriages of theirs towards the son of God For both Iudas had free will to abstaine from betraying him and Herod with his Herodians could have abstained from their contumelious handling of him and Pilate from condemning him and the Preists and people from conspiring against him and the Souldiers from crucifying him only they had no power to abstaine from all or any of these vile actions in an holy manner as no man else hath power to abstaine from any evill in a gracious manner without grace Yea without the Grace of regeneration which alone plants in us both faith in God and a love of God to the very contempt of our selves and no performance of any good or abstinence from any evill is acceptable with God unto eternall life unlesse it proceed from this faith and this love That which is here produced out of Marlorate is a strange speech and such as I never read or heard from any before and such as whereof I can give no tolerable construction And is it fit that every extravagant passage that is found in any Writer of ours should be brought forth to charge our doctrine with It were a fitter speech for a Papist who maintaining the absolutenesse of Reprobation doth withall maintaine an apostacy from grace which we do not If Marlorate had any such opiniō he sings therein to himself to his own Muses What Divine of ours maintains that God hath decreed to damne any man otherwaies then by way of punishment for sin continued in unto death without repentance Had he spoken of Good works morall only it is true any hypocrite is capable of them and none taste deeper of Damnation then hypocrites But as for the worke of true faith true repentance it is the generall profession of our Divines that as faith and the spirit of repentance once given never faile so they shall infallibly bring a man unto everlasting life and free him from condemnation But any thing serves this Authors turn to vent his stomack And I am perswaded there is not one more of all our Divines that he can shew to concurre with Marlorat in this And if there were is it fit their improvident inconsiderate expressions should be cast in their teeth that avouch them not but rather conceive them to be void of all sobriety Brentius apud Marloratum in illud Ioh. 15. 2. Omnem palmitem in me non ferentem fructum tollet c. Caeterum haec sententia occurrit curiositati carnis quae solet argutè magis quà m reverenter de praedestinatione disserere pro suo ingenio colligere nullum à Domino ad vitam aeternam electum posse damnari etiamsi pessimè vivat Nullum item à Domino
in my writing So Beza in his questions and answers I say God hath ordained not judicio for judgment but judicio for just judgment that is to manifest his justice upon them Secondly we deny that God suffers them to persevere in their sinfull courses without giving them grace to repent to the end that he may damne them But with Alvarez every way standing as much for absolute Reprobation as Calvin that God suffers them to sin and to persevere therein and damnes them for their sin to this end namely for the manifestation of the glory of his justice And as for this Authour's opinion in premising the foresight of sin to the decree of damnation I have already represented the manifest absurdity thereof as namely in this that seing God cannot foresee sin unlesse he first decree to permit it it followes that by his opinion the decree to permit sin must preceed the decree of damnation that is sin is first in intention and then damnation Whence it followes that if sin be first in intention it must be last in execution and consequently men shall be first damned for their sin and after that suffered to commit sin this is the glorious issue of the premises of this Authour His third and last is that by our doctrine God for the effecting of all this powerfully doth so governe and work upon the wills of Reprobates that they have noe libertie or abilitie at all in the issue of avoiding their sinnes but must of necessitie commit them To this I answer that no other power is requisite for the effecting of all this then 1. To suffer all men to fall in Adam 2. To bring forth all men in originall sinne which alone deserves damnation as Mr. Hoord confesseth and as this Authour sometimes read in his Lectures at Magdelen Hall 3. Not to regenerate Reprobates but to suffer them finally to persevere in their ungodly courses without giving them grace to break off their sins by repentance 2. Yet we deny that all power and ability is taken from Reprobates to avoid actuall sinnes We grant willingly neither Elect nor Reprobate have any power to avoid sinne originall all of them being conceived and brought forth into the world in the corrupt masse But as for actuall sin not only regenerate have power to avoid that and that in a gracious manner but every Reprobate hath power to avoid that in a naturall manner My reason is because though a good worke may be an act supernaturall yet a sinfull work cannot be so but every actuall sin is an act naturall for the ground and substance of it But every naturall carnall man hath power freely either to doe any act naturall or to abstaine from doing it though when they abstaine from doing it as from committing murther adultery theft slaunder or the like they never abstaine from it in a gracious manner Like as any morall good worke they have libertie to doe but they cannot doe it in a gracious manner This proceeds meerly from the Spirit of regeneration which Spirit of regeneration the Lord never bestowes upon any Reprobate Sect 3. Thus they teach and therefore by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin as it will plainly appeare by these following considerations 1. It is ordinary to impute sin to those who have not so great an hand in the production of it as hath the Almighty by the grounds of this opinion For first the Devill is called the Father of lies and by the like reason of all other sinnes And therefore he that committeth sinne is said to be of the Devill and to be the child of the Devill And sin is called the the worke of the Devill which the Son of God appeared to loose And why is the Devill so called but because he doth egge and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sin This is all he doth or can doe But God doth much more if he necessitate and by his decree first and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men determine their wills irresistibly to sinen For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perswade for as much as sin must needs follow the determination but not the perswasion of the will God is therefore a truer cause of sin by this doctrine then the Devill 2. Wicked men are esteemed Authours of their own offences because they plot purpose choose commit them and are immediate Agents in the acting of them But God by this opinion doth more for he overruleth the projects purposes of wicked men and by an uncontroulable motion proceeding from an immutable decree carrieth all their deliberations resolutions choices and actions precisely that very way so as they cannot chose but doe as they doe whatsoever they may think to the contrary They have indeed potentiam in se liberam a power in it selfe free to chose what they refuse or to refuse what they chose to determine themselves this way or that way as liketh them best but they have not Liberum usum a free use of this their power God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe and maketh them doe those only actions which his omnipotent will hath determined and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions have prescribed More rightly therefore may God be called the Authour of those offences For deeds whether good or bad are owned more truly by him that overruleth them then by the servile instruments that only execute and doe them 3. Wicked counsellours and they who allure and advise men to sin are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sins to which they are the perswaders and have been punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed Jezabell Ahab's wife was reputed and punished as the murtherer of Naboth because she counselled and contrived the doing of it as we may see 1 Kings 21. 23. 25. But what is counselling to inforcing Evill counsells may be refused but an allmighty power cannot be resisted God therefore that useth this according to their doctrine in the production of sins is much more an Authour of them then he that only useth the other After two leaves spent first in the charge and secondly in proving that God is not the Authour of sin in a fumbling manner and thirdly in representing the doctrine of our Divines at pleasure now at length he comes to make it plainly appeare that by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin as he saith will plainly appeare by certaine considerations following which in few words come but to this in generall namely that God doth more then the Devill or wicked counsellours in alluring and advizing others to sin more then wicked persons in acting of their own sins But by this discourse of his he is as farre off as ever from proving that we make God the Authour of sin For consider
either by doing more he understands that God doth the same which the Devill wicked mē do more or though he does not the same yet he doth that which is more then that If his meaning be that God doth the same which the Devill wicked men doe this is notoriously untrue considering thē as tempters advizers and perswaders unto sin For God on the contrary forbids sin perswades to repentance to obedience both by his word and by his spirit and indeed the spirit workes not but by the word which is called the sword of the spirit All holines of life is comprised within the compasse of ten commandements these were given by the Lord frō mount Sinai pronounced by the sound of a trūpet to these the Lord calls his people saying stand in the waies and behold and aske for the old way which is the good way and walke therein ye shall find rest unto your soules For the transgression of these the Lord expostulates with thē Heare ô heavens and hearken ô earth I have nourished and brought up a people they have rebelled against me Whē they have gone astray he exhorts the and that most pathetically to returne by repentance by promise of salvation and threatning judgment if they doe not repent O Ierusalem wash thine heart from wickednes that thou maist be saved how long shall thy wicked thoughts remaine within thee I have seene thy adulteries and thy neighings the filthinesse of thy whoredome on the hills in the feilds and thine abominations Woe unto thee ô Ierusalem wilt thou not be made cleane When shall it once be And to provoak them the rather unto repentance he represents himselfe unto them as easy to be intreated as slow to wrath and one that by his patience and long suffering leades them to repentance And to this end he gives charge to his Ministers namely by representing the gracious nature of God to admonish them of their sinnes to call them to repentance to obedience And to this purpose to represent his promises which he hath annexed unto godlinesse both the promises of this life and the promises of a better life that is to come Yea and his threats also both of judgments in the world to come to the casting both of body and soule into hell fire and thereupon to exhort us to feare him above all others And judgments of this world as famine pestilence and the sword of the enemie To deliver them over into the hands of beastly people skilfull to destroy To send Serpents and Cockatrices among them that will not be charmed and that shall sting them and that without all mercy Surely these are not the courses of Satan or wicked counsellours Therefore they doe not as God doth neither doth God doe that which they doe and more also 2. If it be said that albeit the Lord doth not as the Devill doth and wicked men doe in perswading them to sinne yet he doth that which is more then this I answer that neverthelesse he cannot be accounted the Authour of sinne in case the doing of this alone doth constitute an Agent the Authour of sinne Now as formerly I have shewed this was the opinion of Dominicus Soto and of the Divines of Salamancha yea and Vasquez the Jesuite professeth that he was ever of that opinion Againe if to doe more then this be to become the Authour of sin both this Authour and all that are of his Spirit doe maintain as well we that God doth that which is farre more then this For I presume he will not deny but that God is he and he alone who doth support our natures in the committing of sin who maintaines our senses in their vigour and quicknesse without which we could take noe pleasure in sin and that concurres to every act of sin in the way of cause efficient not morally which alone makes one to become the Authour of sin by the judgment of Divines formerly mentioned but physically and naturally which no creature can doe namely become a naturall coefficient cause to the act of another man's will Nay which is most considerable I presume this Authour hath so much accuratenes in School-learning as not to deny that when the Devill tempts us or wicked counsellours doe tempt us to sin God concurres with them in this act and that in the kind of a cause efficient physicall For in him we live and move and have our being what is it to have our being from him but that he is the Authour of it in the kind of a cause efficient In the same sense doe we live in him and in the same sense doe we move in him It stands us upon as much to maintaine this as to maintaine that God is our Creatour For unlesse all things doe subsist in him neither were all things created by him Now this is a great deale more then to perswade For a weake man is able to perswade but noe creature is able to performe these parts which God doth in the act of every thing created by by him So that hereby the Reader may evidently perceive that the discourse is as farre off as ever from proving God by this Doctrine of ours to be the Authour of sin any more then he is constituted the Authour of sin by the doctrine of this Interpolator But I am content to examine the things he proposeth particularly and severely 1. The Devill saith he doth only allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sinne But God doth much more if he doe necessitate and by his decree first and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men determine their wills irresistibly to sinne For to determine is infinitely more then to perswade Now to this I have already answered by shewing 1. That albeit God doth more then this yet seeing he doth not this if the doing of this alone constitutes one the Authour of sin as many great Divines have concurrently maintained still God is free from being the Authour of sin This Authour barely supposing not once offering to prove the contrary 2. Himselfe confesseth that God concurres to the act of every sinne and that in the kind of a cause efficient naturall And I may be as bold as to say of this that it is infinitely more then to perswade like as he saith of God's determining the will and necessitating thereof Now I proceed to a more particular examination of his discourse And here first I wonder not a little at this Authour's distinction of the Devill 's inward suggestion from his outward temptations For I confesse freely I know noe outward temptation of Satan distinct from his inward suggestions Outward occasions and provocations to sinne I know none wrought by Satan any farther then as he in some cases is God's instrument as in afflicting Iob. For surely God hath not given over the world or any part thereof to the goverment of Satan this is in
pleasure proceeds in the denying of faith and repentance whereby alone sinne is cured and so of mere pleasure suffers some finally to persevere in sinne yet in inflicting damnation he doth not carry himselfe of mere pleasure without all respect to men's workes but herein he proceeds according to a law which is this whosoever believeth not and repenteth not shall be damned And like as God damnes noe man but for his finall perseverance in sinne So from everlasting he did decree to damne noe man but for his finall perseverance in sinne So that by vertue of the Divine decree of reprobation sinne and finall perseverance therein is constituted the cause of damnation but by noe meanes is it constituted the cause of the decree of reprobation neither doth the foresight of sinne precede it For first like as upon this doctrine that Grace is not given according unto workes the absolutenesse of predestination is grounded in the judgment of Austine as by necessary consequence issuing there from In like sort upon this that grace is not denied according unto men's workes as necessarily followeth the absolutenesse of Reprobation Secondly looke by what reason the Apostle proves that Election is not of good workes namely because before the children were borne or had done any good it was said the Elder shall serve the Yonger by the same reason it evidently followeth that reprobation is not of evill workes because before they were borne or had done good or evill it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger Esau's reprobation being as emphatically signified under his subjection to Iacob his younger as Iacob's election was designed by his dominion over Esau his Elder brother 3. If sinne be the cause of the decree of Reprobation then either of ' its own nature or by constitution divine Not by necessity of nature for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for sinne had it pleased him If by constitution Divine mark what absurdity followeth namely this that God did ordaine that upon foresight of sinne he would ordaine men unto damnation 4. If foresight of sinne precedes the decree of damning them for sin then the decree to permit sin much more precedes the decree to damne them for it as without which there can be noe foresight of sin and consequently permission of sin is first in intention and then damnation and therefore it should be last in execution that is men should first be damned and afterwards permitted to sin to wit in an other world 5. And lastly Reprobation is the will of God but there can be noe cause of God's will as Aquinas hath proved much lesse can a temporall thing be the cause of God's will which is eternall Upon this ground it is that Aquinas professeth Never any man was so mad as to say that any thing might be the cause of predestination as touching the act of God predestinating So may I say it were a mad thing to maintaine that any thing can be the cause of Reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating For the case is altogether alike the will of God being alike uncapable of a cause in both whereas this Authour saith that God by our opinion doth draw men on by his unconquerable power from sin to sin 't is mere bumbast All men being borne in sin must needs persevere in sin unlesse God gives grace to regenerate them For whether they doe that which is morally good they doe it not in a gracious manner or whether they abstaine from evill they doe it not in a gracious manner He that is of God heareth God's wordes ye therefore heare them not saith our Saviour because ye are not of God Arminius acknowledgeth and Corvinus after him that all men by reason of Adam's sin are cast upon a necessitie of sinning He askes what difference is there in the course which God taketh for the conversion of the Elect and obduration of Reprobates and I have already shewed a vast difference and here in breife I shew a difference He hath mercy on the one in the regenerating them curing the corruption he finds in them he shewes not the like grace to others but leaves them unto themselves as touching the evill acts committed by the one he concurreth as a cause efficient to the act which for the substance of it is naturally good For ens bonum convertuntur every thing that is an entity so farre is good but he hath no efficiency as touching the evill as which indeed can admit no efficiencie as Austin hath delivered of old Man himselfe is only a deficient cause of sin as sin and that in a culpable manner which kind of deficiency is not incident to God But to every good act he concurres two manner of waies that in the nature of a positive efficient cause in both namely to the substance of the act by influence generall and to the goodnesse of it by influence speciall and supernaturall It is true the Fathers made sin the object of prescience not of predestination the reason was because they took predestination to be only of such things which God did effect in time Now sin is none of those things that come to passe by God's effection but only by God's permission And that such was the notion of predestination with the Fathers I prove first out of Austin In sua quae falli mutarique non potest praescientiâ opera sua futura disponere illud omnino nec aliud quidquam est praedestinare In his foreknowledge which can neither be deceived nor changed to dispose his own workes that is to predestinate and nothing else And sin not being the worke of God no marvaile if it come not under predestination Secondly out of the Synod of Valens Praedestinatione autem Deum ea tantum statuisse dicimus quae ipse vel gratuita misericordiâ vel justo judicio facturus erat We say that God by predestination ordained only such things as himselfe would work either of his free mercy or in just judgment Againe it is as true that they made even sin it selfe the Object of God's will witnesse that of Austin Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo Not any thing comes to passe but God Allmighty willing it either by permitting it or working it So the eleaventh article of the Church of Ireland So Arminius Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum implere God would have Ahab to fulfill the measure of his sins So scripture often mentioned And Austin gives the reason of it malum fieri bonū est it is good that evill should be Bellarmine confesseth as much namely that Mala fieri Deo permittente bonum est It is good that evills should come to passe by God's permission And shall not God have liberty to will that which is good When he saith of the Ancients that They refuted this foule assertion of an absolute irresistable and necessitating decree
quippe servitus non institutio est Dei sed judicium This slavery of man to Satan is not God's institution but judgment that is God brought it upon him not of his mere pleasure but in the way of judgment Like as Austin in like manner acknowledgeth concupiscense to be not sinne only but the punishment of sinne also So Remigius and the Chuch of Lyons say that God imposed it not on Adam but man falling from God brought a necessitie of sinning upon him upon all his race God hereupon justly withdrawing his holy Spirit from him 2. Why he should alleadge the first passage under the name of the Church of Lyons I know not The reverend Bishop acknowledgeth Florus to be the Authour thereof a Deacon of Lyons pag. 126. Although the same Reverend Bishop acknowledgeth that other book also that goes under the name of the Church of Lyons now extant in the Bibliothecâ Sanctorum Patrum and wherehence Vossius communicateth unto us his excerpta was written by the same Florus pag. 115. He had more reason to father his next passage which he produceth out of Remigius upon the Church of Lyons For albeit Maldonat cites the booke intituled Liber de tribus Episcoporum epistolis whence this passage is taken under the name of Remigius yet he who set it forth ascribes it to the Church of Lyons and that by the direction of the Copy which was in the hands of Nicholas Faber as appeares Goteschalc hist 170. But none doe I find to ascribe this worke of Florus to the Church of Lyons though the Authour of another booke under that title the Bishop acknowledgeth to be Florus 3. Florus acknowledgeth that the very Saints of God are under a necessity of sin in a sort p. 149. In Sanctis licet sit liberum arbitrium jam Christi gratiâ liberatum atque Sanctum tamen tanta est illa sanitas ut quamdiu mortaliter vivunt sine peccato esse non possint cum velint atque desiderent non peccare non possūt tamen non peccare In the Saints of God though there be freedome of will as freed by the grace of Christ and made holy yet this health is such that as long as they carry this mortall body about thē they cannot be without sin and though they would and desire to be without sin yet they cannot be without sin This I conceive is spoken in respect of the flesh lusting against the Spirit of the law in our members rebelling against the law of our mind leading us captive to the law of sin How much more are the wicked in bondage to sinne and Satan as the same Florus sheweth pag. 142 For whereas Scotus taught that a man had not lost his liberty but only the power and vigour of his liberty Florus opposeth him thus Non rectè dicit quia nec sentit he saith not well because he thinks not well sed sicut vigorem potestatem libertatis ita ipsam perdidit libertatem ut jam ipse ad verum bonum unde cecidit liber esse non possit As he hath lost the vigour and power of his libertie so he hath lost libertie it selfe insomuch that unto true good from whence he is fallen he cannot be free to wit untill he be freed by the grace of Christ In like māner Remigius discourseth also grāting free will only to evill p. 36. In infidelibus id ipsum liberū arbitriū ita per Adam damnatum perditum in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest in vivis non potest In infidells free will it selfe so damned and lost in Adam may be free in dead workes cannot be free in living works that is is not free to produce works belonging to a spirituall life So that they unanimously confesse that in respect of originall sin there is a necessity of sinning but this is rightly to be understood namely thus that true good they cannot doe so that whatsoever they doe is evill only that it is free unto them to doe this or that evill which is most true Secondly thus farre they qualifie this necessitie of sinning that never any man is carried by the Divine providence so as to sinne whether they will or no. For albeit Rabanus charged them whom he opposed herewith pag. 53. Si enim secundum ipsos qui talia sentiunt Dei praedestinatio invitum hominem facit peccare quomodo Deus justo judicio damnat peccantem cum ille non voluntate sed necessitate peccaverit For if according to them who thinke such things God's predestination makes a man to sinne against his will how doth God in his just judgmēt damne him that sinneth when he sinned not voluntarily but necessarily Thus they criminated their adversaries but Remigius answers on their behalfe who were thus falsly accused Nemo ita sentit aut dicit quod Dei predestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare ut jam non propriae voluntatis perversitate sed divinae praedestinationis necessitate peccare videatur No man so thinks or speakes that God's predestination makes a man to sinne against his will so that a man should seeme to sinne not by the perversitie of his own will but by the necessitie of divine predestination But this is the worke of Divine predestination that he who sins willingly perseveres willingly in his sins shall against his will be punished And the truth is taking predestination as it signifies preparation of Grace or God's decree to conferre this rather God 's not predestinating a man or not giving grace and not making him to be of God is the cause why a man sinneth according to that of our Saviour He that is of God heareth God's words ye therefore heare them not because ye are not of God Yet this is rightly to be understood for God's not conferring regenerating grace is rather the cause why their naturall corruption is not cured thē that they goe on in their sinfull courses for naturally carnall men are prone enough to sin and in this course they necessarily continue untill God changeth their hearts necessarily I say but not against their wills For sinne is as a sweet morsell which they roule under their tongue This may suffice for answer unto these passages and withall to represent the vanitie of this Authour's discourse endeavouring to brand our doctrine with making God the Authour of sinne more of this hereafter For I am acquainted with that which he here conceales and with certaine adjuncts thereunto both touching the opinion of the Church of Lyons concerning falling from grace as also this Authours bold adventure in two particulars in justifying Vossius citing the cōfession of Pelagius as one of Austin's sermons as also defending him in the point of the predestinarian heresie which Doctor Usher maintaines to be a mere fiction of the Semipelagians to bring Austin's doctrin thereby into disgrace But Vossius conceives that there was indeed such an heresie and that the Monks
men devise God and man to move to the producing of the same act as two men in lifting a timber logge most indecently And to free this concurrence from chance they say sometimes that God workes this or that act in us modo velimus that is upon condition that we will But when they consider that God workes the act of willing as well as ought else are demanded to answer upon what condition he workes this what condition will they devise of this will he say modo velimus provided that we will As much as to say God will produce the act of willing provided that it be produced already by us Others say that God foreseeing that the will of man at such a time will produce such an act of willing in case God be pleased to concurre to the producing of it hereupon he resolves to concurre to the producing of it whereby the finall resolution is rather into the will of God then into the will of the creature I say the finall resolution of every sinfull act committed by the creature Secondly here is devised a thing future without all ground For whereas the act of willing as for example in Iudas the act of willing to betray his Master is it in ' its own nature merely possible not future how then did it passe into the condition of a thing future and that from everlasting For from everlasting God knew it as a thing future this could not be done without a cause And what cause could there be of an eternall effect but an eternall cause which is God alone And in God nothing can be devised to be the cause thereof but his will or decree Therefore to avoid this they must be driven to conclude that all future things became future by necessitie of nature if not of their own nature yet at least by the necessitie of God's nature he producing them all not freely but by necessitie of nature This is that Atheisticall necessitie whereupon our Adversaries are cast while they oppose such a necessitie as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to passe agreably to their natures necessary things necessarily contingent things contingently and accordingly ordaining necessary causes working necessarily for the producing of the one and contingent causes working contingently for the producing of the other as Aquinas discourseth 1. pag q. 19 in the Article whose title is this Utrum divina voluntas necessitatem rebus imponat whether the will of God imposeth a necessitie on things that come to passe in the world The reason this Authour brings is a mere Socysme saying the same over and over againe As when he saith For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect the one principall overruling cause the other but an instrumentall wholly at the devotion of the principall then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall which by the force of ' its influxe and impression produceth it rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a mere servant in the production of it To which I answer that which he calls overruling I have often shewed how absurdly it is imputed unto us For how can that be called overruling which workes not the will contrary to ' its nature but moves it only agreably to the nature thereof As for the cause principall what Scholar of any braines ever denyed God to be the cause principall in any action to the producing whereof he concurres For is he not the first cause and the first Agent Are not all other second causes and second Agents But this Authour hopes his Reader will understand this in reference only to the sinne not to the naturall act under it whereas God as touching the sinfullnesse of it is no Agent at all much lesse a prime Agent no cause at all much lesse a prime cause Then secondly let God never so effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connaturall thereunto yet if he works the creature therunto agreably to its nature that is if it be an necessary Agent moues it to worke necessarily if it be a contingent agent moves it to worke contingently if it be a free agent moves it to worke freely then by Arminius his confesion our cause is gained For God shall be found free from blame and the creature void of excuse Now this is clearly our doctrine and in effect the doctrine of all them who say that God determines the will as the Dominicans or that God necessitates the will as Bradwardine For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to worke freely in such sort that in the very act of working they might doe otherwise if they would They confesse this providence of God is a great mystery and not sufficiently comprehensible by humane reason Cajetan professeth thus much as before alleadged and Alvarez maintaines it in a set disputation And supposing God's concourse as necessarily required to every act of the creature they are able to prove by evident demonstration that no other concourse can be admitted then this whereby God moves every creature and that effectually to every act thereof but agreably to ' its nature and condition And this is farther demonstrated by God's fore knowledge of things future Another Arminian with whom I have had to deale in this argument being pressed with this reason drawen from God's foreknowledge and urged to shew how things possible became future that from everlasting for from everlasting they were known to God as future had no way to helpe selfe but by flying to the actuall existence of all things in eternity And I have good ground for strong presumption that this Authour with whom now I deale had his hand in that Pye which was above foure yeares agoe See the desperate issue of these mens discourses who are drawen to take hold of such a Tenet to helpe themselves withall which their best freinds the Jesuites the Authours of Scientia media doe utterly disclaime And on the other side the Dominicans who embrace the actuall existence of all things in eternity are utterly repugnant to the doctrine of Scientia media So that when the Jesuites are reconciled to the Dominicans in the point of actuall existence of all things in eternity And the Dominicans to the Jesuites in the point of Scientia media then these men with whom I deale are like to prevaile which I doubt will hardly be before Elias comes Thirdly consider if when one cause is principall overruling the other the effect must be imputed rather to the principall then to the other It followes evidently that when the causes doe equally concurre without any such overruling of one the other then the effect is equally imputable unto each consequently the sin For such is this Authour's language in this Argument is equally imputable to both to God as well as man And he is to be accounted the Author of it as well as man I appeale to every man's
impose or can impose any such necessity on things neither are creatures capable of such necessity But if we speake of such necessity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty by causes intermediate it is to be said that all things doe not come to passe of necessity but some doe and some doe not God will have some things come to passe by the mediation of causes necessary those come to passe necessarily Others come to passe by the mediation of causes contingent and those come to passe contingently Whereby saith he 't is manifest that they say not well who say that all things come to passe of necessity in reference to the Divine will because as hath been shewed in respect of the Divine will all things come to passe freely and therefore speaking absolutely they may not come to passe although upon supposition that they are willed they cannot but come to passe but this is only necessity upon supposition 1. Indeed if men did sinne against their wills and virgins sometimes are ravished men are slaine by force full sore against their wills they deserved no punishment But is it possible that a man can will that which is evill against his will Every ordinary Scholar in the University knowes that axiome Voluntas non potest cogi the will cannot be forced Lipsius his speech fatali culpae fatalis poena fatall faults have fatall punishments this Authour saith is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason As if he would teach the very maintainers of fate yea the very first to understand themselves For fate wherewith our doctrine is charged by our opposites is commonly called Fate Stoicall Now Zeno was the father of the Stoicks yet when his servant was taken playing the theife pleaded for himselfe saying it was my destiny to steale Zeno answeared him in his own language that it was his destiny to smart for it too right in this same sense that Lipsius spake Yet Zeno knew full well that he punished his servant freely And Zeno is well knowne to have been a great Master of morality for all this which could not consist with denying the liberty of man's will as this Authour well knowes And Austin censureth those who feared to subject the will to all manner of necessity as men transported with vaine and causelesse feares manifesting thereby that some necessity may very well consist with a man's liberty Magistrates though they believe with Austin that Not any thing comes to passe unlesse Allmighty God will have it come to passe And with the Church of Ireland that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever should in time come to passe And with Aquinas that the roote of contingency is the effectuall will of God yet may they well thinke it reasonable enough to punish offences seing that God decrees that some things even all the actions of men shall come to passe contingently as well as other things shall come to passe necessarily For to come to passe contingently is to come to passe avoidably and if they be the actions of men freely also It is incredible that any sober man should remissely punish faults for the exorbitancy strength sake of the passions whereby they were committed but rather in consideration of the potent causes which raised such passions in them under a colour of justice And we commonly say the greater the temptation is the lesse is the sin So Peter surprised suddainly with feare denied his Master Yet what saith Aristotle In some things no force is suffecient for excuse but a man ought to dy rather any manner of death then commit them For those things in Euripedes are rediculous which moved Alcmaeon to kill his mother Indeed Plato maintained that things done through passion were not voluntary But Aristotle a better Master then he disproves it and by excellent reasons confirmes the contrary And whatsoever Popilius the Roman Pretor judged of her who slew her mother provoked by her Mothers fact in murthering her children yet let our lawes be consulted and the opinion of our Judges in such a case and whether such a one were not to be condemned and whether Popilius his judgment deserves to be admitted for the correction of the lawes of our land and working a reformation in this particular We should soone have a wild world if every one being provoked by the insolencies of others should thrust themselves into the throne of God for the execution of vengeance Yet none more unfit for this then the daughter to execute God's vengeance upon the mother that bare her Yet it was wont to be held If I forget not that potestas patria originally was power of life and death But all is fish that comes to this Authour's net like as her fact who poisoned her husband and son for killing a son of hers destroying two for one without all authority most unnaturally and that not hastily but in a deliberate way by poisoning And doth it become Christians to admire such heathenish courses of men nothing acquainted with the divine providence And was this so doubtfull a case whether so wicked a wretch avenging her selfe by poison secretly given upon her husband and son for the death of another son of hers that the sentencing thereof should be put over untill an 100 yeares after But what of all this These willfully affect revenge the execution whereof belongs not to them but it is just with God to punish sinne with sinne one man's sinne by another As of Senacherib the Lord professeth that he would cause him to fall by the sword in his own land this was brought to passe by his own children falling upon him furiously and as unnaturally as the actions of any of these How was innocent Naboth used and by publique sentence condemned to be stoned to death and accordingly executed by the practise of wicked Iezabel Yet Solomon spareth not to professe that every man's judgment commeth of the Lord. Never were more abominable courses executed upon any then upon the holy son of God Yet these were all foredetermined by the hand of God and the counsell of God as the Apostles with one voice acknowledge By the same providence was Ioseph sold into Egypt God working thereby the preservation of them that sold him Thus Sihon was hardened and the Canaanites and the Egyptians with Pharaoh their King to their own destruction Thus the Lord punished David's foule sinne by the murther of Amnon contrived by his own brother and by the sword of Absolon rising up against his own father and by the sword of Shimei's tongue cursing David wherein David acknowledged the hand of God Thus he punished the Idolatry of the Gentiles by giving them over to vile affections and so prostituting them to abominable courses What outrages were committed by Senacherib that proud and blasphemous wretch upon the people of God yet is he called the rod of God's wrath and the staffe in his hand is
Synod of Palestine 1200. yeares agoe to this day The difference of opinions here feigned by him about the point of Reprobation amongst our Divines is like the feigning of a knot in a bulrush For what is a peremptory denying of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall other then a denyall of that grace and glory which is prepared in the decree of election to the sonnes of God though indeed neither of them make it a denyall which is done in time but rather Gods decree to deny it For do not the latter Divines maintaine it to be peremptory as well as the former For what difference doth he devise between a flat denyall and a peremptory denyall and as for the latter decree belonging to reprobation here mentioned namely a preordination of the man thus left to the torments of hell do not the latter Divines acknowledge this decree to belong to Reprobation also Only they professe that God preordaines none to eternall torments in hell but for their sinnes actuall as well as originall of as many as live to ripenesse of age Now I would faine know what Divine of ours maintaines the contrary 1. Our Divines in saying Reprobation is Decretum quo statuit non misereri do manifest that not denying grace but the decree of denying it is Reprobation Walaeus speaketh of no common endowments though that be a truth which here is attributed unto them else how should they be called common endowments 2. If he decrees to leave Reprobates without grace and consequently under that necessity of sinning into which all are cast by the sinne of Adam it is nothing strange I thinke that God should accordingly leave them therein though in a different manner the Lord prostituting some to their own lost's and to the power of Satan more then others and making some even by the ministery of the Gospell proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitius puniantur as Austin some where speaketh If Gods decree cannot be frustrated as here is avouched I wonder he should charge us with teaching that God decreeth this or that immutably For if he should change any of his decrees they should undoubtedly be frustrated Indeed we do not say that God decrees Hypothetically to give grace to wit upon condition that men will make themselves fit for it and for failing herein to deny them grace And I am very glad to observe so good correspondence in the suffrages of Protestant Divines in the Synod of Dort and our English also with them Sect 3. 3. God both decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves of his alone absolute will and pleasure This is the third branch 1 That they say so witnesse the suffrage of our English Divines We affirme that this non election is founded in the most free pleasure of God And that no man lying in the fall is past over by the meere will of God is numbred by the same Divines among the heterodox positions To this purpose also speake The Palatinate Ministers The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God That God passeth over some and denyeth them the grace of the Gospell the cause is the same free pleasure of God Thus the Divines of Hessen God decreed to leave some in the fall of his own good pleasure The proofe of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen and doth not bestow upon them meanes necessary to beleive c. and this out of his most free pleasure This they joyntly affirme and prove it by this reason especially All men were lookt on as sinners If sinne therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate he should have reprobated or rejected all But he did not Reprobate all therefore for sinne he reprobated none but for his owne pleasure in which we must rest wthout seeking any other cause 1. Now from these two things layd together viz. 1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning 2. That he hath left the Reprobates under this necessity it will follow that he is the Authour of the reprobates sinnes 1. Because Causae causae est causa causati the Cause of a cause is the cause of its effect if there be a necessary subordination betweene the causes and the effect whether it be a cause by acts negative or positive But God is the cheife or sole cause by their doctrine of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of reprobates namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace therefore he is by the same doctrine the true and proper cause of their sinnes 2. Because Removens prohibens that which withdraweth and withholdeth a thing which being present would hinder an event is the cause of that event As for example he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs is the cause of the falling of that stone And he that withdraweth a pillar which being put to uphold a house is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house But God by their opinion withholdeth from reprobates that power which being granted them might keep thē from falling into sinne therefore he becometh a true morall cause of their sinnes In whose power it is that a thing be not done to him it is imputed when it is done sayth Tertullian In cuius manu est quid ne fiat ei deputatur cum iam fit It will not suffice to say that God by withholding grace from reprobates becometh only an accidentall not a proper and direct cause of their sinnes For a cause is then only accidentall in relation to the effect when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause For example Digging in a feild is then an accidentall cause of the finding a bag of gold when that event is neither expected not intended by the husbandman in digging But when the event is lookt for and aymed at then the cause though it be the cause only by withholding the impediment is not accidentall As a Pilot who withholdeth his care and skill from a ship in a storme foreseeing that by his neglect the ship will be drowned is not to be reputed an accidentall but a direct and proper cause of the losse of this ship This being so it followeth that God by this act and decree of removing and detaining grace necessary to the avoyding of sinne from reprobates not as one ignorant and carelesse what will or shall follow but knowing infallibly what mischeife will follow and determining precisely that which doth follow viz their impenitency and damnation becomes the proper and direct cause of their sinnes That God of his meere pleasure sheweth mercy on some and hardeneth others is the expresse word of God Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardneth Now to shew mercy is to give the grace of faith and obedience as appeares
by the opposition of it to obduration which is such as whereupon followeth disobedience as appeares by the objection following hereupon Thou wilt say then why doth yet cōplaine For who hath resisted his will Now God complaineth of nothing but disobedience Againe to give faith is to shew mercy For to have faith is to obtaine mercy Heretofore ye have not believed but now have obtained mercy through their unbeliefe Where to believe to obtaine mercy are made equipollent of the same signification And in reason if God did deny faith because of some unpreparednesse in the creature then God did expect that the creature should first prepare himselfe and make himselfe fit for faith that so God might bestow it upon him so grace should be conferr'd according to workes which is contradictious to expresse testimony of holy scripture testifying that God hath saved us called us with an holy calling not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace all along hath beene condened in the Church of God for Pelagianisme Thus we have beene entertained with a discourse containing nothing but the opinion of our Divines which none of us deny Yet in the proposing hereof he hath wasted a whole leafe and more Now he comes to his argument drawen from these two layd together 1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning 2. That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity Hence he concludes that God is the Author of the reprobates sins But this we utterly deny Therefore this he undertakes to prove by two reasons 1. Because the cause of the cause is the cause of its effect if there be a necessary subordination betweene the causes and the effect But God is the cheife or sole cause by their doctrine of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace For answer whereunto I say first begining with the minor 1. That the want of supernaturall grace is not the immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates nor the cheife cause much lesse the sole cause And I prove it evidently Let instance be given in any sinne committed by a Reprobate let it be the sinne of murther or of fornication or of theft or of lying For if it were then every reprobate should be guilty of murther of fornication of lying of stealing For positâ causâ principali immediatâ ponitur effectus Where a principall and immediate cause doth exist there the effect must needs exist But it is apparent that albeit every reprobate doth want supernaturall grace yet every reprobate is not guilty of murther of fornication lying and stealing Secondly If the want of supernaturall grace were the immediate and principall cause of all the sinnes of reprobates then not only every Reprobate should be guilty of committing all the sinnes formerly mentioned but at all times every one of these sinnes should be committed by them Because at all times they want supernaturall grace And the truth is every one of these sinnes may be abstained from without supernaturall grace and for carnall respects Only without supernaturall grace they cannot be abstained from in a gracious manner as namely out of faith in God and love to God He that hath neither faith nor love cannot abstaine from these vile courses out of faith and love In like sort heathen men in their generations have beene exceeding vertuous according to the worlds account of vertue in moderating their passions and ordering their conversation aright one towards another and all this hath beene performed by them without supernaturall grace Thirdly The immediate cause of all their sinnes rather of the two is their naturall corruption whereby they are habitually turned away from God and converted unto the creature in an inordinate manner Like as the immediate cause actionis laesae of a naturall function of the body imperfect is the disease or infirmity that hath seised upon some part of the body And the Physitian who is able to cure it and will not is the cause why it continueth uncured But no wise man will say he is the cause why this or that member in a sicke mans body doth not performe its operation as it should In like manner as touching the vicious actions of the soule the want of supernaturall grace is the cause why those vicious actions continue uncured because God alone by his grace can cure them but no sober man that is well in his wits should say that is the cause of vicious actions but acknowledge rather the corruption thereof to be the cause of these vicious actions And indeed all morall philosophy referres the cause of every vicious action unto the vicious habit depraving the will and inclining it to vicious courses Fourthly Yet farther to represent the wildnesse of this Authours discourse The vicious habit it selfe is not the sole cause no nor the principall and immediate cause of a vicious action in particular For if it were then that particular vicious action should alwayes be committed by it So that an impure person should alwayes commit fornication a Lyar should alwayes lye a Theife should alwayes steale a Murtheret should alwayes commit murther For it is a rule generally received that the immediate and principall cause being existent the effect must needs exist also And indeed albeit habits whether good or evill do worke after the manner of nature inclining and swaying the will to the accomplishment of them Yet the will of man being a free and not necessary Agent proceeds not to worke but according unto judgement and occasions and opportunityes from without And albeit a purser that maintaine himselfe by robbery hath a faire opportunity offered him to advantage himselfe to take a purse yet if upon consideration he finds himselfe too weake to goe through with it or that he cannot do it safely he will forbeare For albeit a vicious habit doth naturally and necessarily incline him to a naughty end yet in the choice of the meanes conducing to this end he is free How much more plainely doth it appeare that the want of supernaturall grace is farre off from being either the sole cause or the immediate or the principall cause of any sinne committed by a Reprobate Rather of the two the intestine corruption of the Reprobate is the cause of his sinnes and the want of grace is the cause why this corruption is not cured Now albeit a Physitian may sinne in not curing a sicke person when it lyes in his power to cure him For we are in charity bound to do to others as we would have others do unto us yet God is bound to none I will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion 2. Observe how sluttishly he carryeth himselfe in the next reason taken from removens prohibens His rule proceeds both of withdrawing and withholding a thing which being
but that to him sinne is to be imputed when it is done by Tertullians rule approved by this Authour quite contrary to the judgment and doctrine of Austin putting this difference betweene man and God the creature and the Creator that if we suffer others to sinne when we can hinder them rei cum ipsis erimus but how many sinnes sayth he do we see committed in the world which could never come to passe if God would hinder them Shewing how our doctrine opposeth Gods mercy according to his conceit and coming to deliver things more closely as he sayth and comprehending that which he hath to say under 4. particulars The 2. whereof this That it was the sinne of our nature not by generation as I have shewed but by Gods owne voluntary imputation The proofe whereof and the confirmation of it out of M. Calvin being set downe at large in some 13. lines or more in M. Hords discourse is here utterly left out which will be the more remarkable by comparing it with what he delivers concerning another attribute of God here inserted and which he pretends also to be impugned by our doctrine p. 54. where he seemes to sup up that which here he delivered Num. 3. These words are inserted I thinke I may conclude with the words of Prosper He which sayth that God would not have all men to be saved but a certaine set number of predestinate persons only he speaketh more harshly then he should of the height of Gods unsearchable grace Nay he speakes that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy especially to the sonnes of men The 8. objection of the Galles was this That God will not have all men to be saved but a certaine number of persons predestinate Now Prospers answer hereunto is very large and it begines thus If about the salvation of all mankind and calling them unto the knowledge of his truth the will of God is maintained to be so indifferent throughout all ages that God may be shewed to have neglected no man altogether the unsearchable depth of Gods judgement is hereby assaulted For why did God suffer all nations in ages past to walke in their owne wayes when the Lord chose Iacob to himselfe and dealt not so with every nation And why are they now become Gods people which before were no people of God c All this makes nothing for this Authour The next is directly against him not only at large but in this very particular wherein he alleadeth Prosper not in his answer to this 8. objection but in his sentence proposed afterwards upon it For what is this Authours meaning in citeing him to affirme that God not only willeth their salvation whom he hath predestinated but all men also or at least that such as say the contrary do speake more harshly then we ought to speaks of the depth of Gods inscrutable grace but to cast a colour that Prosper concurres with him and judgeth that God is indifferunt to save all But the reason why he only saves some and not others is because some prepare themselves for grace and accordingly he bestowes it upon them Others do not prepare themselves and accordingly God doth not bestow it upon them Now prosper directly contests against all such as maintaine this opinion and that in two particulars 1. In taking upon them to give the reason of Gods judgements and that drawen from the wills and actions of men and which is no lesse impiety in thinking that grace is bestowed by way of reward for good workes Or restrayned from men by reason of their evill workes His words translated run thus But whosoever referreth the causes of Gods workes and judgements throughout to the wills and actions of men and will have Gods dispensations varied according to the changeable condition of mans free will such a one professeth the judgements of God to be scrutable and his wayes such as may be found out And that which Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles durst not touch this man thinkes he can unlock and make known And that which is a fruit of no lesse impiety the very grace of God whereby we are saved is given by the way of reward for good workes and denyed or restrained for evill workes So that in each particular Prosper is directly contrary this Authours tenet Now seeing the most part of men have not the grace of salvation that is such a grace as is of saving nature And the reason by God doth not give it them is not in consideration of their evill workes let any other sober and judicious Aminian be judge whether God can be sayd to will their salvation in such a sense as we speake of it when he denyeth them the grace of salvation and that not for their evill workes sake but which necessarily followeth hereupon meerely according to the good pleasure of his will And indeed in Prospers large answer to this eighth objectionto the Galles which taketh up almost a whole columne in Austin this Authour finds nothing at all to fasten upon for his advantage But yet you will say in his eighth sentence which he proposeth it is as this authour alleadgeth I grant it but observe his censure well The inscrutable depth of Gods grace may suffice to keep us from speaking so rashly as to say that God wills not all to be saved but only a certaine number of persons predestinate Where observe first he counts it an harsh speech to say that God willeth not that all men shall be saved the reason whereof undoutedly is this because it is expresly contradictory to a text in Scripture But then if we object how can God be sayd to will their salvation whom he hath not predestinated to whom he will not give the grace of salvation that not for their evill workes sake but according to the meere pleasure of his will Now Prospers answer in my judgement is this The depth of Gods inscrutable grace will beare us out in it so that we need not cast our selves upon so harsh an expression as to deny that God will have all men to be saved which is contradictious to the letter of Gods word In effect it is as if he should say It is a secret This I take to be Prospers meaning and herein I remit my selfe to the judicious But sure I am that Prosper is directly contrary to that opinion whereunto this Authour by vertue of this sentence of his desires to draw him In like manner the Authour of the booke De vocatione Gentium which is commonly thought to be Prospers though Vossius affects to entitle it unto another upon no other ground but because he conceits that Authour not to be so rigorous in the doctrine of predestination as Prosper But let the judicious compare Prospers cariage in this particular with that Authours and observe whether they do not exactly agree For that Authour holds up that text of Paul God will have all to be
decrees to damne him for all his actuall sins aswell as originall sinne and finall perseverance in them And that in the same moment he foresaw all their sins not that the foresight of their sinnes is antecedent or subsequent to but concomitant or conjunct with his decree of their damnation in the same moment not of time onely but of nature also Undoubtedly actuall sinnes are more apt to justifie God in damning any man than sinne originall yet you maintaine that God decrees to damne a man without the foresight of that which doth more justifie God in damning any man onely you deny that he can decree to damne any man without the foresight of that which doth lesse justifie God in the actuall damnation of any one You will have the foresight of mans actuall sins to follow the decree of damnation which I dare not avouch not onely because it is harsh to mens affections but because it is repugnant in my judgement to manifest reason onely I deny the foresight of all sinnes to be antecedent to this decree I say t is neither antecedent to it which is the dissolute opinion nor subsequent after it which is the rigid opinion and each of them equally untrue but it is conjunct or concomitant to it in the same moment of nature both these degrees being the decrees de mediis and so making up one formall compleat decree de mediis ad eundem finem tendentibus which is the manifestation of Gods glory in the way of justice as I have shewed at large in my third digression amongst those which I heare are lately brought into your hands But I wonder not a little what you are fallen upon in the next place 8. As touching the election and reprobation of Angells I have nothing to say because the Scripture saith nothing It is true that it could not be made ex communi massa corrupta because there was none such But why it might not be out of the foresight of their personall obedience or disobedience I know no great matter to object Nor will it follow that if they were elected upon such considerations we must be so too for our case is wholly different as the Scripture denyeth that of us Resp Hitherto you have discoursed as it were out of the month of our Divines who yet as I have shewed in my eighth Digression are for the most part nothing for this opinion which you propose being rightly understood But in this point not one is for you nor ever could I observe any of our Divines that maintained not the election of Angells to be of as free grace as the election of men or the reprobation of Angells to be of as free Soveraignty and absolutenesse in the denyall of grace as the reprobation of men Arminius never durst professe this which you doe but still puts it off as a matter he hath nothing to doe withall treating onely of the predestination of men which he would never have done had he any hope to make good that opinion which you seeme more to incline unto than to the contrary But though you see no great matter to object against it yet others doe that hold it absolutely impossible to be otherwise namely impossible that any thing in the creature should be the cause of the will of God quoad actum volentis or of predestination quoad actum praedestinantie Insomuch that Aquinas professeth never any man was so mad as to maintaine that there could be any cause of the will of God p. 1. q. 23. Art 5. in Corp. Cum praedestinatio includat voluntatem sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis Dictum est autem suprà quod non est assignare â—iusam divine voluntatis ex parte actus volendi sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum c. Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud Nulius ergo fuit it a insanae mentis qui diceret merita esse causam Divina praedestinationis ex parte actus praedestinantis sed hoc sub questione vertitur utrum ex parte effectus praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam Et hoc est quaerere utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis alicui propter aliquam causam And whereas Suarius hath laboured to helpe himselfe with a shifting distinction betweene causa and ratio as if there might be ratio voluntatis divinae from without though not causa and finding these tearmes promiscuously used by Aquinas in his summes flyeth out to his booke contra Gentes and Ferrarienses thereupon to get hold of somewhat therehence for his advantage yet I have endeavoured to beat that fox out of his holes in my third Digression upon election 2. Are they not called in Scripture the elect Angells Now marke Austins discourse If upon the foresight of mans obedience God elect any man it shall not be said Non vos me elegistis sed ego vos elegi but on the contrary rather vos me elegistis non ego elegi vos For if election of Angells followed upon their obedience they did first choose God that is choose to obey him before God did choose them that is choose to save them 3. If Angells were elected upon their obedience then either by necessity of nature this came to passe or by the free constitution of God It cannot be said by necessity of nature Ergo by his free constitution whence it followeth that God did ordaine that upon the obedience of Angells he would ordaine them to eternall life Now judge you whether one decree of God can possibly be the object of another decree all decrees of God being eternall and the objects of Gods decrees being meerely temporall as appeares in the decree of creation preservation redemption vocation justification sanctification salvation 4. No good act can be wrought but by God and by his grace it is he that workes in us both the will and the deed of his good pleasure Doe you not thinke it is so in Angells also otherwise what cause have they to give God thankes for their election as namely if it sprang from their obedience But suppose you deny this yet all confesse no naturall action can be wrought much lesse gratious without Gods concourse as the efficient cause thereof Now consider doth God concurre modo nos velimus which is Suarius his devise consider I pray you the contradiction included in this Tenet God is the cause working not onely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perficere but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle as they confesse Now is it possible that God concurreth ad velle modo nos velimus can the same thing be the condition of it selfe It may as well be before it selfe Againe supposing we doe velle it is not possible by the power of God that we should not velle for factum infectum reddere me Deus quidem potest But this I have farther prosecuted in a Digression by it selfe
proving that God doth determine the will to every act thereof and shewing the great concurrence herein and upon what grounds of schoole Divines from Albertus Magnus his dayes downwards But I proceed with you 9. To that which you say concerning infants I thinke I may answer that although there were no other thing that made way to their salvation or damnation but onely the fall of Adam yet it followeth not that God decreed to permit Adams fall as a Medium tending thereunto For what if he decreed to save or damne some sine mediis supposing them in a state immediately capable of salvation or damnation as by Adams fall and their originall sinne contracted hereupon they were yet I adde farther concerning infants that are saved there is somewhat else decreed to make way to their salvation besides Adams fall namely an application of Christs merit to them in baptisme or otherwise And for those that are damned since their originall sinne makes them immediately justly damnable it was enough for God to decree to leave them in the state they were and so to damne them there being no other remedy to bring to passe his end in the matter Resp In generall observe I pray you the disproportion of your Tenet concerning Infants and others God doth not decree to damne Infants as you say but upon the foresight of all the sinne for which they are damned but God doth decree to damne all others not upon the foresight of all their sinnes for which they are damned nor upon the foresight of those sinnes for which they are chiefly damned and which doe justifie God most in their damnation but onely upon the foresight of originall sinne for which least of all they are damned and which doth least of all justifie God in their damnation But I come to the particular scanning of the parts 1. You utterly mistake my wordes I said not the fall of Adam was the onely way or any way for the salvation of Infants But this I said and say the fall of Adam was the onely way of manifestation of Gods mercy in the salvation of Infants For mercy supposeth misery and the misery of Infants is onely in respect of sinne originall not at all in respect of sinnes actuall wherein they are nothing culpable Now to the manifestation of Gods mercy in their salvation the permission of Adams fall and their fall in Adam was a Medium and I prove it thus if God did permit Adam to sinne and these Infants in Adam to this end namely to the manifestation of his mercy in their salvation then this permission of Adams fall and their fall in Adam was a Medium tending to the manifestation of his mercy in their salvation But God did permit Adam to fall and these Infants in Adam to this very end Ergo. I prove the Mâ—â—â—r thus he did permit Adam to fall and these Infants in Adam to the manifestation of his own glory in them But no glory of God is more conveniently manifested in the permission of Adams fall and these Infants in Adam than the glory of his mercy in the pardoning of their sinnes and saving their soules in despight of sinne Therefore this is to be accounted the end as much as any 2. I nothing doubt but that infants are saved sine mediis I spake not of the Media of their salvation but of the manifestation of Gods mercy in their salvation I make no question but that they are saved by the merits of Christ whether they have the ordinary meanes of applying Christ unto them or no. 3. Touching reprobate Infants I prove the permission of Adams fall and their fall in Adam was a Medium tending to the manifestation or Gods justice in their damnation For if God did permit Adam to fall and them in Adam to this end namely to the manifestation of his justice in their damnation then this permission was a Medium tending thereto But to this end God did permit Adams fall and their fall in Adam which I prove thus He did permit it for the manifestation of his own glory as to this end he doth all things But no glory of God is so conveniently manifested hereby as the glory of his justice in their damnation unlesse you will say with Alphonsus Mendoza and Didscus Alvarez that rather the manifestation of Gods glorious grace towards his elect in consideration that he could have made them vessells of wrath as well as others is the cause why God doth not save all but permits a multitude to sinne after much different courses and damnes them for sinne 4. Since their originall sinne you say they are justly damnable But I pray consider how came they to be thus justly damnable was it onely by the will of Adam was it not by the will of God also That the first sinne of Adam alone and no other is imputed to his posterity how could this come to passe but by the will of God 2. That the sinne of Adam becomes fatall to all his posterity and not so the sinne of any man else to his posterity how is this but by the will of God 3. Could not God have derived a child from Adam in the state of his innocency if he had so thought good 4. How come we to be borne in originall sinne but by the will of God who could have destroyed Adam after his sinne and made another Author of generation of mankind In all this appeares the will of God and forceth us to acknowledge the power of God over his creatures to dispose of them as he thinkes good But along to the rest 10. Although we say the fall of Adam was considered in the decree of Gods election yet we doe not say it was preintended neither indeed can God properly be said to intend any thing which he permits onely wherefore it followeth not upon our opinion that the fall of Adam was the end of mans salvation and damnation or that it was to be in execution after it For the respect of Media and Finis is where things are intended onely But you will say God intended the permission of the fall though not the fall it selfe and if that were first in his intention the same consequents follow I answer it was one thing to consider Adams fall as a thing that would be if it were not hindered another thing to resolve positively to permit it And though perhaps God did both yet we make the former act onely to have beene precedent to his election not the latter Resp 1. I spake nothing of Gods intention that Adam should fall but onely of Gods intention to permit him to fall and shewed that if the permission of Adams fall was first in intention and then mans damnation it will manifestly follow that in execution it shall be last that is God shall first damne men for sinne and afterwards permit Adam to fall into sinne and all in Adam To this you say that it is one thing to
for me includes many things as the benefits which arise unto me by the death of Christ may be conceived to be many But let these benefits be distinguished and we shall readily answer to the question made and that perhaps differently as namely affirmatively to some negatively to others as thus Doe you speak of Christs dying for me that is for the pardon of my sins and for the salvation of my soule I answer affirmatively and say I am bound to believe that Christ died for the procuring of these benefits unto me in such manner as God hath ordained to wit not absolutely but conditionally to wit in case I doe believe and repent For God hath not otherwise ordained that I should reap the benefit of pardon and salvation by vertue of Christs Death and Passion unlesse I believe in him and repent But if question be made whether I am bound to believe that Christ died for me to procure faith and repentance unto me I doe not say that I am bound or that every one who hears the Gospel is bound to believe this Nay the Remonstrants now a daies deny in expresse tearmes that Christ merited this for any at all I am not of their opinion in this but I see clearly a reason manifesting that Christ merited not this for all no not for all and every one that hears the Gospel For if he had then either he hath merited it for them absolutely or conditionally Not absolutely for then all and every one of them should believe de facto which is untrue for the Apostle saith Fides non est Omnium Nor conditionally for what condition I pray can be devised upon the performance whereof God for Christs sake should give us faith and repentance In like sort if I am demanded whether God did decree of the meer pleasure of his will to refuse to give grace and glory unto some and to inflict upon them damnation To this I cannot answer at once there being a Fallacy in the demand But distinguish them I answer and say that as touching the poynt of denying grace God doth that of his meer pleasure but as touching the denyall of glory and the inflicting of damnation he doth not decree to doe these of meer pleasure but rather meerly for sin to wit for their infidelity and impenitency and all the bitter fruits that shall proceed from them So that Reprobation according to our Tenent rightly stated is the decree of God partly to deny unto some and that of his meer pleasure the grace of Faith and Repentance for the curing of that infidelity and hardnes of heart which is naturall unto all and partly to deprive them of glory and to inflict damnation upon them not of his meer pleasure but meerly for their finall continuance in sin to wit in infidelity and impenitency and all the fruits that proceed therehence 2. Now as for the cause of this decree as likewise of all the decrees of God when any of our Divines say that it is the meer pleasure of God as in some places it is expressed of some decrees let them be understood aright not as if they distinguished between the decree of God and the good pleasure of his will for we know full well that the decree of God is the good pleasure of his Will what decree soever it be but hereby we only exclude all causes from without moving God to make any such decree like as when it is said Deuteron 7. 7. The Lord did not set his love upon you nor chuse you because ye were more in number then any people but because the Lord loved you as much as to say The Lord loved you because he loved you Where we cannot soberly devise any distinction between love and love as between the cause and the effect only hereby is excluded all cause from without Now we are ready with open face to professe that of the Will and decree of God there neither is nor can be any cause from without all things from without being temporall and the Will of God being eternall and the Will of God quoad actum Volentis being the very Essence of God For God is a pure Act and that indivisibly One whereby he is said to Bee whatsoever he is as wee doe conceive variety of perfections in God yet all these are but one indivisible Act in God and by this one indivisible Act he both knowes all that he knowes and willeth and decreeth all that he willeth and decreeth Man when he willeth any thing as likewise an Angel when he willeth ought they produce an act of willing passing upon this or that object but it is not so with God in whom there is no accident And therefore Aquinas was bold to professe that never any man was so mad as to professe that merits were the cause of Predestination as touching the act of God predestinating and why so why surely upon this ground because predestination is the will of God and like as nothing can be the cause of the will of God as touching the act of willing so nothing can be the cause of divine predestination as touching the act of God predestinating His words are these in the same place Sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis dictum est autem suprà quod non est assignare causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi But because like as the love of God is sometime taken for the good thing which God bestowes like as Jansenius interprets that place Iohn 14. 21. He that loveth me shall be beloved of my Father to wit of the effect of the Fathers love and we commonly say that Passions are attributed unto God not quoad Affectum but quoad Effectum in like sort the Will of God is taken for the thing willed as 1 Thes 4. 3. This is the will of God even your sanctification that is this is willed by him Therefore Aquinas distinguisheth a double consideration in the will of God one quoad actum volentis and so it hath no cause from without another quoad res volitas and so it may have a cause So likewise in predestination as considering it either quoad actum Praedestinantis and so it hath no cause or quoad effectum Praedestinationis and so it may have a cause as there he professeth both touching the will of God in generall and touching Predestination in speciall Of the will of God in generall thus Non est assignare causam voluntatis divinae ex parte actus volendi sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum in quantum scilicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud And of predestination in speciall thus Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur utrum ex parte effectus praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam hoc est quaerere utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis alicui propter aliqua merita Now thus
out of measure through the abundance of revelations Therefore saith he I take pleasure in infirmities in reproaches in necessities in persecutions in anguishes for Christs sake for when I am weak then am I strong And had not Joseph as good cause to conceive that it was the will of God that he by the unchast motions of his wanton Mistris should be provoked unto unclean courses as David had to perswade himselfe that it was Gods will by the rayling of Shimei he should be provoked unto revenge that so by the power of his grace strengthning them against such provocations they might come forth of their severall temptations as gold out of fire more bright more resplendent then before Ioseph was a faire person and well favoured Genes 39. 6. Now this was a sore provocation to a lustfull eye Beauty is said to be of a dangerous nature as that which makes a man either Praedonem alienae castitatis or Praedam suae But Joseph had a gracious and a chast heart his beauty gave him no encouragement to prey upon others chastity but being a congruous baite to the lustfull appetite of his Mistris it was in danger to expose his own chastity to be preyed upon And as Austin said of Gods providence concerning Shimei ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo occulto inclinavit Who seeth not that the like may be said of Gods dealing with Ioseph's Mistris and that without all aspersion of unholinesse unto God For if he gives Men or Women over unto their lusts what will be the issue but uncleannesse Rom. 1. 24 26. When God gave them up to vile affections what followed but this even their Women did change their naturall use into that which was against nature vers 27. and likewise also the Men left their naturall use of the Women and burned in their lust one toward another and Man with Man wrought filthinesse and received in themselves such recompence of their errour as was meet Here we have a strange course of Gods providence in punishing sin with sin For these Gentiles in defiling themselves one with another in a most unnaturall and abominable manner are said to receive such recompence for their errour as was meet In few words what is meant by provocation unto any sin Is it to doe that whereupon man may take just cause or occasion to doe that which he doth without blame like as the Corinthians provoked Paul as a foole to loast himselfe as himselfe expresseth it for he adds ye have compelled me But this cannot be affirmed of Tiberius his ministers in provoking Drusus and Nero. For no provocation could be sufficient to make them unblameable in convitiating their Prince much lesse can it be said that God provokes any man in this manner neither doe I think that any of our adversaries as malevolent as they are dares impute any such crimination unto us as if wee attributed any such discourse unto providence divine What then is it to provoke unto sin Is it to doe somewhat upon the consideration whereof mens passions being moved they cannot but sin But this in like sort is equally as untrue as the former even of those provocations which were made upon Drusus and Nero by the practises of Tiberius Or is it the doing of somewhat whereupon occasion is taken to sinne to blaspheme this hath no colour of truth in it For even man without all transgression may doe many things whereupon occasion is taken of doing evill and therefore we distinguish of Scandalum datum Acceptum Nay though man knowes offence will be taken upon the doing of some things yet if the doing thereof be commanded by God he must doe them what occasion soever is thereby taken to offend Indeed if they are things indifferent I must abstaine from the doing of them in case I know offence will be taken thereat and that thereby I shall lay a stumbling block in the way of my Brother For Paul professeth that if meat would offend his Brother he would never eat meat rather then offend his Brother But no such obligation lies upon God For he knoweth full well how some will abuse his mercies others grow worse and worse by his judgements breaking forth into blasphemy thereupon yet no wise man will say that God is the more unholy in the shewing of mercy and in the execution of judgement He professeth in plain termes that to them who feare him he will be a sanctuary but as a stumbling block and as a rock to fall upon to both the houses of Israel and as a snare and as a net to both the Inhabitants of Ierusalem Isai 8. 14. As for the last clause of this odious Parallel concerning the end of Tiberius his course in this namely that so he might cover his cruelty in their death under pretext of justice Undoubtedly I should think the putting of them to death was just in case they did convitiate their Prince whatsoever their provocations were For hereby they deserved death yea everlasting death and damnation His sin was in causing them to be provoked hereunto and so also it might be in the manner of their execution For it is written of him that fame necavit he famished them I know Tiberius was cruell enough but by the story it seems that policy wicked policy moved him unto this first to intend their deaths because he saw the affections of the people towards them belike for Germanicus his sake a worthy man according to those times For when he found that in the beginning of the yeare vowes were made on their behalfe to wit for their preservation he dealt with the Senate that such rewards ought not to be tendred but towards such who were of experience and of ripenesse of age and that hereupon the inward character of his affection towards them being discovered he laid them open to every mans criminations variaque fraude inductos ut concitarentur ad convitia concitati perderentur accusavit per literas amarissimè congestis etiam probris judicatos hostes fame necavit And anon after the same Author discovers the reason of all this to wit that seeing Germanicus was but his adopted Sonne and one Drusus by name was his naturall sonne and his own sonne Drusus being dead leaving a sonne Tiberius behind him he desired to make him as his naturall sonne his successor in the Empire Aelium Sejanum ad summam potentiam non tà m benevolentia provexer at quà m ut esset cujus ministerio ac fraudibus liberos Germanici circumveniret Nepotemque suum ex Druso filium naturalem ad successionem Imperii confirmaret Sure we are God hath no need of any such politique courses neither hath he need of any pretext of justice to take a mans life from him It is confessed now of all hands that God can annihilate the holiest Angel by power absolute And if it be in the power of God to keep any man
yet are driven to devise what may be said to excuse them as in the very point of Free-will they desire to excuse Chrysostome Sixtus Senensis Bibliothâ—â— lib. 5. annotat 101. Uel dicendum est sicut etiam Annianus in Praefatione Commentariorum Chryjostomi in Math. annotavit Chrysostomum interdum naturae nostrae vires plus aequo extulisse ex contentione disceptandi cum Manichaeis Gentilibus qui hominem asserebant vel naturâ malum vel fati violentia ad peccandum compelli Nay what think we of Vossius himselfe from whose labours it is and nothing of their own that our Arminians would seem to breath so much Antiquity This Vossius professeth they mistake him that taketh him to be of any other opinion in the poynt of predestination then Austin was of De Historicis Lat. lib. 2. cap. 17. Yet doth he acknowledge that Austin did reject the opinion of the Ancients both Greeks and Latines who went before him in the point of predestination Histor Pelag. pag. 655. Patres Graeci Latinorum illi qui ante Augustinum vixerunt ipseque aliquandiu Augustinus verba Apostoli interpretari solent de electione quorundam ad salutem secundum fidem pietatem praevisam aliorum reprobatione aeterna ob praescientiam malorum operum quae in vita acturi essent Sed Augustinus here comes in the Adversative rejectâ hâc opinione existimabat Apostolorum loqui de quorundam electione ad vitam aliorum item praeteritione non habitâ vel in his vel in illis ratione sive bonorum sive etiam malorum quae personalia forent And which is more then this Pag. 653. professeth a third interpretation of that passage Rom. 9. 11 12 13. differing both from Austins interpretation and from that of the Fathers Greeke and Latine that went before him and makes it disputable which is truest though this third opinion hath no footstep amongst the Ancients and thus he carrieth himselfe notwithstanding all the pretence of his reverence of Antiquity And to vindicate Austins interpretation as well as the rest from countenancing absolute reprobation he calls in to help at a dead lift the doctrine of the Jesuits concerning Scientia Media And I desire upon no better termes to contend then this in Scholasticall Divinity whether this doctrine be not a most unsober invention without all ground And whereas Vossius acknowledgeth Austins opinion to be for the absolutenesse of election and he professeth himselfe to be of Austins opinion I dare appeale to any learned Divines sober judgement whether this doctrine of Scientia Media doth not equally justify the absolutenesse of reprobation as the absolutenesse of election Yet after all this I would not have any think that I reject any of these ancient Fathers that seem to be most opposite to Austins opinion in the point of predestination I think they may be fairely and Scholastically reconciled without acknowledging so much difference between them as Vossius maketh and that by such an interpretation as sometimes is admitted by Vossius himselfe of his own phraise of his own distinction though he dreames not of the applyable nature of the same to the will of God in predestination His distinction is of Voluntas Dei antecedens voluntas consequens and this he makes equivalent to that other distinction of the will of God to wit Absoluta Conditionalis Now this Conditionall will of God he interprets not quoad actum volentis but quoad Res volitas Like as Doctor Jackson professeth in expresse termes that the former distinction of voluntas antecedens consequens is to be interpreted namely quoad res volitas and not quoad actum volentis Now according to this construction there is no difference between them and Austin nor the least impediment to the making of the will of God both in predestination and reprobation to be most absolute For though sinne be acknowledged to be the cause of the will of God in reprobation quoad res volitas that is in respect of the punishment willed thereby this hinders not the absolutenesse of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis And unlesse we understand the Fathers thus we must necessarily charge them with such an opinion whereof Aquinas is bold to professe That never any man was so madde as to affirme to wit that any merits should be the cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinantis And why so to wit because predestination is the act of Gods will and there can be no cause of Gods will quoad actum volentis Now who seeth not that by the same reason there can be no cause of divine reprobation quoad actum reprobantis for even reprobation is the act of Gods will as well as predestination and every way it must be as madde a thing to devise a cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis They did all generally agree saith this Author upon the contrary conclusion Now the contrary Conclusion to absolute and unavoidable reprobation is to maintain conditionall and avoidable reprobation but this is not the contrary conclusion here specified by this Author but rather that damnation was avoydable such is his loose discourse whereas there is no question at all concerning damnation whether it be conditionall or absolute We all confessing that like as salvation is not ordained to befall any man of ripe years but upon the performance of faith and repentance and finall perseverance therein so damnation is not ordained to be the portion of any but upon their finall perseverance in sinne In like sort as touching the possibility of salvation not one Divine of ours that I know denyes the possibility of any mans salvation while he lives in this World Doctor Jackson indeed hath an opinion that a man may proceed so farre in sinne in this life that the doore of repentance may be shut upon him Wee have no such opinion We acknowledge that as God calls some at the first houre so may some be called at the last houre of the day yea the Thiefe upon the Crosse yea inter Pontem Fontem In a word We say plainly that it is possible for any man at any time to be saved by grace giving repentance without repentance none can be saved which is I presume without question between us In like sort it is possible for any man to repent provided that God be pleased to give him repentance and whether God will give him repentance or no we know not Therefore the Apostle instructs Timothy after this manner The servant of the Lord must not strive but must be gentle towards all men apt to teach suffering the evill instructing them with meeknesse that be contrary minded 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if at any time God may give them repentance that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill of whom they are taken Prisoners to doe his Will Here is clearely an acknowledgement of a possibility of repentance
decree it selfe And the same Aquinas elsewhere professeth that No man was so mad as to affirme that merits are the cause of Predestination as touching the act of God Predestinating and that it cannot be the cause thereof he proves because nothing can be the cause of Gods will as touching the act of God willing but as touching the things willed by God as formerly he had proved The same doctrine in effect is taught by Durand in 1. dist 41. q. 2. Bonaventure applies the same distinction to reprobation it selfe Odium aeternum saith he implies two things Principale significatum connotatum c. primum non est ex meritis sed secundum This he explicates in the words following Quod patet si resolvatur quia Odium est propositum puniendi Propositum autem nullus meretur sed paenam that is Hatred or reprobation is Gods purpose to punish Of this divine purpose there is no meritorious cause but only of the punishment The same was the Opinion of Gandavensis Scotus Halensis as I have shewed in my Vindiciae Now judge I pray with how little judgement or modesty this Author intimates Beza to be the author of the doctrine of absolute reprobation Perhaps he will say his meaning is that he was the author of the Upper-way as touching the making of the object of Predestination mankind not yet created But to this I answer that Beza doth so indeed but he was never called to a conference hereabouts and consequently he never declined it And that which was declined he makes to be declined by the abettors as well as the authors which cannot be understood of this nice and Logicall poynt as touching the object of reprobation The main question is whether there be any cause of reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating the Negative whereof was maintained very generally amongst Schoole-Divines before Beza was borne And was it ever known that those I have named did shrink in their heads or decline the triall thereof What a silly thing is it then to inferre that because Beza at such a time did decline the disputation hereof and the Contra-Remonstrants at another time therefore it is suspectable to be an untruth Yet let us examine his instances Beza he saith did decline the sifting of this doctrine to wit of predestination for on that they were moved to dispute I doubt this Author speaks by rote and that he is nothing at all acquainted with the story hereof either in Osiander or in Beza but transcribes only what another hath prompted unto him For it is apparent by Osianders History that they did conferre thereof It is true he stood off at the first and gave reasons for it but at length he and his fellowes condescended to the instance and importunity of their Adversaries and so came on to the Conference hereabout His words are these Praefat. in 2. part Respons ad Acta Colloq Mompelg Quamvis quò evasura essent reliqua satis prospiceremus mane nihilominus mutata sententia Illustriss Principe salutato in reliquam sequentem Collationem consensimus eâ tantùm conditione additâ ne propter proximum Paschae Festum ea disceptatio longius protraheretur Et ita demùm ad audiendas D. Andreae declamationes rursum processimus Was it this point alone the sifting whereof as this Author phraseth it Beza declined It is apparent they were no lesse then three Points This appears by the second part of Beza's answer Ad act Colloq Mompelg as also by the answer of Jacobus Andreae as if he were the mouth of the Prince namely that if they list not De Tribus illis conferre yet he thought it fit that Theses written by them on those three Articles should be rehearsed in the hearing of all which afterwards Beza and his fellowes might take home with them to addresse an answer to them afterwards as they thought good And these three Articles were concerning Predestination Baptisme and the putting down of Images in Churches Concerning all which Jacobus Andreae gives his reasons why he thought it fit they should entertaine farther Conference Whereunto Beza makes answer in his Praeface to that second part of his Answer Ad Act. Colloq Mompelg It is true this reason Beza gave why he thought it not fit in that place publiquely to dispute thereof to wit of predestination Quod haec gravissima quaestio publicè in illo caetu allatis utrinque contrariis sententiis disceptari absque nonnullorum offendiculo non posse videretur For both the mysterious nature of it is such as few are capable of it the Massilienses professed as much as appears in Prospers Epistle unto Austin De his taceri exigunt saith Prosper quorum altitudinem nullus attigerit And to the same purpose even they who durst not dislike Austins doctrine thereof professed as much as appears by the Letter of Hilarius unto Austin Consentientibus etiam his qui hanc definitionem improbare non audent ut dicant Quid opus fuit hujusmodi disputationis incerto tot minus intelligentium corda turbari Then again it was in a Lutheran Assembly and amongst many brought up in the hatred of the doctrine which Beza maintained who in all likelihood would be the more exasperated Causas verum tacendi tongum est omnes quaerere saith Austin quarum tamen est haec una ne priores faciamus eos qui non intelligunt No wise man saith our Saviour putteth new wine into old bottells Quanto minus sapit saith Beza in that Preface of his qui de praest antissimo vino prius in utres faecibus adhuc vappa obsitos immittendo quà m de repurgandis illis apparandis cogitet Lastly Beza perceiveth the practice of Jacobus Andreas standing upon a place of advantage to urge them to conferre upon such a poynt the truth whereof is most harsh to carnall affections that so he might have the better opportunity to make them odious And truly what Jacobus Andreas was I know not but Beza sets him forth as a man of a most malevolent disposition to the French Protestants and our Saviour hath admonished us Not to give that which is holy unto doggs or to cast pearle before swine Yet Andreas to serve his turne and to draw them into a snare pleads that the doctrine of Predestination is not so to be put over in the Schooles ut non opus sit eam rudi imperito populo ponere yet Hunnius a man of the same profession is so farre different from Iacobus Andreas that he thinks it not fit to preach before the rude people of prescience divine but very sparingly how much lesse would he think it fit to Preach before them of Predestination divine De Praedest quest respons pag. 394. his words are these Interim hoc repeto quod supra monui rudioribus quibus Apostolus vult lac propinari non cibum solidum apponi non esse multum de praescientiâ Dei disputandum
of the number One of the Souldiers was billeted in an old Widdowes house and another being a Goldsmith told him and another consort of theirs he had a devise to put mony in all their purses for he knew how to make a Rex-dolar of three-pence sylver and in that Widdowes house they would ply their businesse very securely To work they went and casting plates of Tinne to the quantity of one of those Dolars and stamping them full and faire this Gold-smith with the quantity of three pence silver sylvered them over very fairely and least they should seem too light hangs them up in the chimny in a bagge that the smoak might bring them to the sadder hew Thus having met with a mine of Sylver in their lodging one is imployed as a Merchant-man to goe to the Staple of Cloth and he laies out their coyne in cloth whereof afterwards they made good silver indeed at length one of them paying a debt of his to a Dutchman in Delfe in one of these Rex-dolars he found the Dutch to betray some suspicious gestures and interpretations upon the coyne That was a faire warning to an intelligent man of armes and hereupon they get them packing ing away with all speed and home they come and make themselves merry with the relation In like sort these Remonstrants shew a great deale of Tinne and trash in these argumentations and they have not so much as three pence silver to colour it therewithall to cheat the World if they will be cheated But they hope the colour of some dishonour by their adversaries doctrine redounding unto Christ will be taken for a peece at least of good silver I confesse I am somewhat the more merrily disposed at this time For being taken off from the midst of a sentence by the courteous invitation of a Gentleman to come unto him to his Inne He was pleased to entertaine me with such good discourse that it did not a little refresh my spirits His reaches were after new discoveries for the advancement of learning and endoctrinated me more in one halfe hower then seventeen years study in the University For whereas I never learned there more causes then foure he was pleased to acquaint me with nine which I took some pains to learn without book and they were these Matter Forme Workman Will Power Time Finding out Accident End And most courteously offered himselfe to enlarge on every one of them but having left off at a broken sentence I was desirous to return to my studies Theologicall and to let those Philosophicall progresses alone But I protested unto him seriously that he had informed me more in the number of causes in a short space then Oxford had done in many years he entreated I would consider of them and I promised I would and conferre of them too with all the Schollers I companied with which he took in very goo part and so I took my leave And finding my spirit not a little elevated with this recreation I resolved forbearing my usuall time of supper to follow these studies close that night which truly fell out very happily For one of those causes being found out otherwise called Invention as for Judgement I doe not remember that it was admitted into the number I made use of it very happily in finding out or discovery of the foppery of these Remonstranticall argumentations Now I proceed to the second Question as more seasonable to the present occasion And here first they begin with their former artifice making infidelity on the part of reprobation answerable to faith on the part of election which is most untrue as formerly I shewed Only the not curing of infidelity by the grace of faith is made by us subordinate to reprobation as the curing of naturall infidelity by the grace of faith is made by us subordinate to election But they goe on as in shaping our Tenent at pleasure so in basting it with their very liberall censures as absurd and execrable in such sort as the bare commemoration of it they take to be sufficient to represent the horrour of it and to confute it and this they commit to the judgement of all the faithfull of Christ And indeed their best strength lyeth in setting forth their Adversaries doctrine in such colours as the Devill is painted with And in this particular they conceive good hope no doubt that propitious Readers will conceive hereby that the infidelity of man is made by their Adversaries the work of God as well as Faith Whereas it is well known that there is so little need of working men to infidelity that all being borne in sinne and corrupted and estranged from the life of God through the fall of Adam infidelity is as naturall and hereditary to a man as any other corruption And it is as well known and undeniable that none can cure it but God by faith but this he cures in whom he will by giving Faith to whom he will and if he refuse to cure it in any that and that alone is enough to make him a vessell of wrath that so Gods glory may be manifested upon him in the way of justice vindicative But come we to their Arguments 1. The first is this If Infidelity followeth Reprobation unto destruction then God cannot in justice destroy Reprobates for their infidelity For there is no greater injustice then to destroy a man for that that followeth necessarily upon reprobation which is the work of God To this I answer 1. According to mine ordering the decrees divine Secondly according to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent in ordering them 1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine In no moment of nature or reason is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity or leaving the infidelity of some men uncured to wit by denying them faith by denying the grace of regeneration But the decrees of creating all in Adam of permitting all to fall in Adam in bringing all men forth into the World in the state of Originall sinne of leaving this originall sinne uncured in them and last of all of damning them for their sinnes are decrees not subordinate but coördinate as decrees de Mediis tending joyntly to one supream end which is the manifestation of Gods glory upon them in the way of justice vindicative as also to shew the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy whom he hath prepared unto glory to wit by beholding in others that miserable condition which through Gods meer grace and goodnesse they have escaped 2. According to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent I answer 1. Many of them doe not maintaine that infidelity is consequent to the decree of damnation but in the foresight of God precedent rather as appears by the Brittish Divines their Theses De Reprobatione and Alvarez professeth the same The denyall of grace and so the permitting of naturall infidelity to remain uncured they make consequent as it seems to a negative decree of denying glory And
Parentemque caeterorum the Caeteri belike were such spirits as wee call Angells And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles and this was called Necessity and such a Necessity cui ne Deos quidem that is inferior spirits resistere posse Quae verò ab Astris geruntur talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ industriâ labore queant in quo sua est Fortuna Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa id dici Fatum quod tamen necessitatem non afferat electioni That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things we read the one the cause of Good the other of Evill and that every creature was a substantiall part of one or both and that man in his nature was compounded of both and that his corruption was essentiall from the supream Author of evill and not such as acrewed to him of disobedience We read But of their opinion that all things were determined by them both good and evill I no where read but in this Authors Legend Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up The 19 th is this Voluntatem malè agendi quod vocant liberum arbitrium nob is à naturâ ipsâ insitam non rebellione nostrâ accersitam vel ex inobedientiâ natam Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholiques made by the Pelagians I find no mention at all of this He should have shewed from whom he takes this that understanding their Opinion aright we might the better judge of the reproachfull comparison which he makes 2 To the consideration of which comparison of his I now addresse my selfe He proposeth two things one whereof he saith must needs be maintained The First whereof is this That all actions naturall and Morall good and evill and all events likewise are absolutely necessary Concerning which I say First I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright the very notions of absolute necessity and necessity not absolute There is no greater necessity then necessity of nature And this necessity is twofold either in Essendo in being or in Operando in working God alone is necessary in being and his being is absolutely necessary it being impossible he should not be as not only we believe but Schoole Divines demonstrate and that with great variety of evident and curious conclusions As for the other necessity which is in respect of operation First this is no way incident unto God speaking of operation ad extrà and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature such as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father and the wonderfull Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Sonne But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the creature and that only in such creatures as by necessity of nature are determined one way as fire to burne heavy things to move downwards and light things upwards the Sunne Moone and starres to give light and the heavens to turne round all naturall Agents in a word distinct from rationall are thus determined to wit to work that whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature but yet so that being finite they are subject to superiour powers and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them even to powers create all of them to power increate Whence it comes passe that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary especially in respect of God who can either set an end to all when he will or restraine their operations at his pleasure We know the Three Noble Children when they came forth of the fiery oven had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to passe most necessarily doe indeed come to passe meerely contingently in respect of the will of God Neverthelesse we willingly professe that upon supposition of the will of God that this or that shall come to passe it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come to passe like as upon supposition that God knowes such a thing shall come to passe it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come to passe but how not necessarily but either necessarily according as some things are brought to passe by naturall agents working necessarily after the manner aforesaid or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to passe by rationall agents working contingently and freely And therefore as touching the Question of the Schooles about the root of contingency Aquinas and Scotus concurre in resolving it into the Will of God but with this difference Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God as an efficacious agent For the will of God is so efficacious that he can effectually procure both that things necessary shall be brought to passe necessarily and things contingent contingently and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof to wit both agents naturall for the produceing of necessary things necessarily and agents rationall for the producing of contingent things contingently and freely Thus God preordained that Josias should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jewes to returne into their Country yet what sober Divine hath made doubt whether Josias and Cyrus did not herein that which they did freely And as in doing so in abstaining from doing For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken as also that when the Jewes all the Males came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem None of their neighbours should desire their land Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question whether the Souldiers did non as freely abstaine from breaking Christs bones as from ought else and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstaine from invading the land of Israel And how often is this phrase used in Scripture Necesse est of some things coming to passe which yet came to passe as contingently and freely as ought else And unlesse this be granted that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God or that they are works produced freely and so every action pleasing in the sight of God For the Scripture expressely professeth that God it is who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight And whatsoever God workes in us or bestows upon us in time the same he determined to work in us and to bestow upon us from everlasting For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Ephes 1. 11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting it being the same with God
himselfe Now I come to the second 2. And that is this That all mens ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills and this he saith is upon the matter all one 1. Now this is most untrue there being a vast difference between the actions of men and the ends of men The ends of men being the works of God And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God that with Vorstius shall dare to affirme that all the works of God were not determined from everlasting or being determined they are alterable and that in such sort as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men especially considering that the very acts of mens wills being wrought by God as all sides now a daies confesse it consequently followes that they were also determined from everlasting by the Will and Counsell of God What should I alleage the 11 th Article of Ireland for this God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away but established rather There is no Arminian that I know dares deny either that every act of man is wrought by God or that look what God doth work in time the same he did before all time decree and that from everlasting I know there is a main and a most Atheisticall difference between us on one part but I doe not find them willing to shew their hornes directly therein but carry the matter so as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement either of the temporall not eternall condition of decrees divine or at least of their alterable nature whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves to be of any such Atheisticall beliefe Let us instance in particular Let the salvation of some and damnation of others be the ends this Author meaneth Now dare any of them with open face professe that the salvation of the elect and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlasting determined by God Be the supream ends of God concerning man the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some in the way of vindicative justice on others Dare any of them professe that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God or being so determined dare they professe that these divine decrees are alterable or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature What a prodigious assertion were either of these If they dare not say Gods will is changeable What an unshamefac'd course is this to obtrude upon us an alterable that is a changeable condition of Gods decrees But perhaps you may say here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees but of mans ends And I willingly confesse there is not And I am perswaded this Author dares not in plain termes professe that Gods decrees are alterable But hereby you may perceive and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan and how mens carnall affections which are more in love with errour then truth doe make them to shut their eyes against the one and open them unto the other It were a very harsh thing to say plainly that Gods decrees are alterable and that being determined by him they might be undone or made undetermined by the wills of men Therefore the Devill finds a means to draw us to entertain the same blasphemous opinion not barefac'd but hoodwickt as it were and that is by changing the phrase For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends But give me leave to unmask the Witch and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this Mens ends are either so called as intended by man himselfe or as appoynted by God If this Author speak of mens ends as intended by man himselfe wee willingly grant that they are alterable at his pleasure as for example Man intends one thing to day he may intend another thing to morrow he intends one thing this houre he may intend another thing the next and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions And no marvail considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections studious of change and subject to innovation as the Moone partly of an improvident disposition he knows not what a Yeare what a Month what a Day what an houre may bring forth And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes But of such ends of man to wit as intended by man it is manifest this Author speaks not But of ends appointed by God these be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purposes and intentions which is as much as to say without the change and revocation of Gods decrees And an end not yet actually existing but only in intention can admit of no other alteration then in intention which this Author considering not though perhaps he abhorres to say Gods decrees are changeable and alterable and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-doore yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in and in the dark and mufled or veyled only with a different phrase a different expression Yet forthwith he takes a new course For whereas by the word unalterable he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends should be of an alterable condition in the words following he changeth his tone and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all but left unto man to be determined as when he saith In vaine is our freedome in the actions if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined Whereby it is manifest he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined And this end can be no other then salvation for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive and which they labour to attaine every one naturally seeking after Summum bonum after happinesse So that in the issue it comes to this The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God but left to be determined by his will and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause and that moving cause I guesse to be his finall perseverance in faith and repentance whereupon and not till then shall this mans salvation be determined by God as much as to say that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him some one that breaths the same spirit of opposition to Gods truth
Deum out of God Therefore if any cause hereof be to be found it must be within God otherwise it must be confessed that all things became future by absolute necessity of nature If to help this they will devise something within the nature of God to be the cause hereof let them tell us what that is Not the Science of God for all confesse that secluding the divine will Gods knowledge is the cause of nothing If they say the will of God they concurre with us in embracing the same Opinion which they so much abhorre Nothing remaines to fly unto but the Essence of God If they plead that I demand whether the Essence of God working freely be the cause of the futurition of all things or as working necessarily If as working freely that is as much as to confesse in expresse termes that Gods will is the cause thereof But if they say the divine Essence is the cause hereof as working necessarily hence it followes that all things good and evill come from God as working by necessity of nature See I pray and consider the abominable and Atheisticall opinions that these Arminians doe improvidently cast themselves upon when they stretch their witts to overthrow Gods providence as it is carryed in the 11 th Article of Ireland which is this God from all Eternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away but established rather In the Conclusion that which he vaunts of as touching the Fathers is meer wind for he gives you nothing but his word for it which of what credit it deserves to be I leave to the indifferent to judge And as for the plucking up of the rootes of vertue which he fables of Consider I pray what Sect of Philosophers were ever known to be more vertuous then the Stoicks and how was Zeno himselfe honoured by the Athenians for his grave and vertuous conversation Hath not Erasmus delivered it as out of the mouth of Hierome that Secta Stoicorum was Secta simillima Christianae Yet I no where find that they brought in any necessity that was not subordinate to the Will of the supream God But these Arminians bring in a necessity of nature from without God to make him to doe this or that if he doth any thing or at least to make God himselfe a necessary Agent devoyd of all liberty and freedome contrary to that of Ambrose concerning the manner of Gods working namely that it is Nullo necessitatis obsequio but solo libertatis arbitrio But according to these Divines it must be quite contrary Nullo â—ibertatis arbitrio solo necessitatis obsequio And thus much as touching the first sort of this Authors Reasons which he accounts only Inducing I come to the other sort which he esteemes convincing THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK Wherein are Examined those Arguments against the Absolutenesse of DIVINE REPROBATION WHICH M r HORD Took to be of a CONVINCING NATURE OXFORD Printed by Leonard Lichfield Printer to the Vniversity M. D. C. LIII The Second Part of this Discourse consisting of ARGUMENTS CONVINCING whereof there are Five sorts The First sort of Convincing Reasons Drawn from Scripture DISCOURSE SECT I. THOSE of the Second sort by which for the present I stand convinced that absolute reprobation is no part of Gods truth are drawn from these five following heads 1. Pregnant Testimonies of Scripture directly opposite unto it 2. Some principall attributes of God not compatible with it 3. The end of the Word and Sacraments with other excellent gifts of God to men quite thwarted by it 4. Holy and pious endeavours much hindered by it if not wholly subversed 5. The grounds of comfort whereby distressed consciences are to be relieved are all overthrown by it It it contrary to pregnant places of Scripture even in terminis as will appeare by these instances 1. Ezech. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner but that the wicked turne from his waies and live And least men should say 't is true God wills not the death of a repenting sinner the Lord doth in another place of the same Prophet extend the proposition to them also that perish Ezech. 18. 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth In this Scripture we may note three things 1. Gods affection to men set forth 1. Negatively I have no pleasure in his death that dyeth 2. Affirmatively But that the wicked turne 2. The persons in whose destruction he delighteth not wicked men such as for the rejecting of grace dye and are damned If God have no pleasure in their death much lesse in the death of men either altogether innocent or tainted only with originall sinne 3. The truth of this affection as I live cupit sihi credi saith Tertullian Lib. de paenit cap. 4. God would faine have us to believe him when he saith I will not the death of him that dyeth and therefore he bindes his speech with an oath O beatos nos quorum causa Deus jurat O miserrimos si nec juranti Domino credimus Happy are we for whose sakes the Lord vouchsafeth to sweare but most unhappy if we believe him not when he swears Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men he did never out of his own pleasure take so many millions of men lying in the fall and seale them up by an absolute decree under invincible damnation for such a kind of decreeing men to everlasting death is quite opposite to a delight in mens eternall life TWISSE Consideration TO say that this or that opinion is untrue because it doth in terminis contradict places of Scripture is a very superficiary consideration yet it is not the first time that I have found it to drop from an Arminians penne But that it is a very superficiary consideration I prove thus For to deny God the Sonne to be equall to the Father is in terminis to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture Phil. 2. Where it is expressely said of God the Sonne that he thought it no robbery to be equall to the Father yet notwithstanding it is agreeable to that of our Saviour where he saith the Father is greater then I and so vice versâ In like manner to say that God cannot repent is in terminis to contradict pregnant places of Scripture again to say that God can repent is in terminis to contradict other as pregnant places of Scripture yet neither of these is unsound because each phrase is agreeable to Scripture in some place or other And the reason hereof is because in terminis only to contradict the Scripture is not to contradict the Scripture But when we contradict the meaning of Scripture then and not till then are we justly said to contradict
the Scripture And the reason hereof is because the word of God consists not in the outward barke or bone of the letter but in the inward pith and marrow of the meaning And as for contradiction unto Scripture in terminis it may easily be proved that to deny Gods delight in the destruction of obstinate sinners is to contradict a very pregnant place of Holy Scripture as namely Prov. 1. 24 25 26. Because I have called and ye refused I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded but ye have set at naught all my counsell and would none of my reproofe I will also laugh at your calamity I will mock when your feare cometh when your feare cometh as desolation and your destruction as a Whirlewind And yet never a whit the more is any contradiction found in Scripture for this because though they contradict each the other in terminis yet there is no contradiction if we consider the true meaning As for example it is both true that the Father is greater then the Sonne as touching the Sonnes Manhood And the Sonne equall to the Father as touching his Godhead So of repentance it cannot be attributed to God as it signifies change of mind or counsell but it may be attributed unto God as it signifies change of sentence according to that of Gregory Deus mutat sententiam consilium nunquam So as touching Gods pleasure or delight in the death of a sinner as it is the destruction of the creature he delighteth not in it but as it is a just punishment of the impenitent creature he delights therein Thus Piscator reconciles it on Ezech. 18. v. 23 32. Surely God delights in the execution of justice as well as in the execution of mercy as Jer. 9. 24. I am the Lord which exerciseth loving kindnesse judgement and righteousnesse in the earth for in these things I delight saith the Lord. 2. Here first the Author declines from the former phrase of having no pleasure in the death of a sinner to not willing the death of a sinner which phrases have no small difference as Piscator observes upon that in Ezech. 33. 11. for saith he potest homo velle id quo non delectatur ut aegrotus potest velle potum amarum quo non delectatur potest enim eum velle non perse sed propter aliud nempe ad recuper andam valetudinem And to deny that God willeth the death of as many as dye is in terminis to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture as where it is said that God worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Ephes 1. 11. And therefore seeing the inflicting of death is Gods work he must will it But this Author is more happy for invention then his fellowes For whereas others of his opinion work upon the place as it is rendred in the vulgar Latine Nolo mortem peccatoris this Author hath found out an argument from the very phrase of our last English translation to advantage his cause as when from Gods having no pleasure in the death of a sinner he quaintly inferres therefore God doth not of meer pleasure will or decree their death But how superficiary this is also and how fouly it falls in the issue upon the Author himselfe as usually it falleth out with men that affect new and quaint inventions I hope to discover in due place Farther observe that place Ezech. 33. 11. I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked according to our last English translation and that Ezech. 18. 23. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should dye doe differently render one and the same phrase in the Hebrew in the death of the wicked Ezech. 33. 11. which is word for word according to the Hebrew that the wicked should dye Ezech. 18. 23. which being not according to the precise termes of the originall it followeth that hereby our Translators did expound the sense of the Hebrew which is word for word in the death of the wicked and so accordingly that phrase Ezek. 18. 32. in the death of him that dieth importeth as much as this that he who dyeth should dye And as for Tertullian that which he alleadgeth out of him neither makes for him nor against us we all believe what the Prophet delivereth but we enquire about the sense of it But in the same place Tertullian interprets the place not absolutely but comparatively thus Vivo inquit Dominus paenitentiam malo quam mortem and indeed thus it is accommodated more then once in the Book of Common prayer as first in the generall absolution then in one of the Collects upon Good-Friday There is a double pleasure that God may be said to take in the one but a single pleasure only in the other For in the death of an impenitent sinner God delights only in the execution of justice but in the conversion of such a one that he may live God delights both in the execution of mercy which is equivalent to his delight taken in the execution of judgement and over and above he delights in their repentance For like as of such as fall from God it is said His soule hath no pleasure in them so of such as turne unto him it is as true that his soule hath pleasure in them 3. But give we him leave to enjoy the interpretation he affecteth yet consider I pray whether he doth not enjoy it tanquam Diis iratis and to his bane for marke I pray his argument and consider whether I doe not from the same argument most strongly conclude against him 1. His argument runnes thus If God delighteth not in the destruction of wicked men he did never out of his own pleasure take so many millions of men lying in the fall and seale them up by an absolute decree under invincible damnation Now from the rule of contraries I herehence dispute thus If this be a good consequence which he makes then on the contrary it followes that seeing God doth take pleasure and delight in mans eternall life as this Author expressely acknowledgeth therefore he did out of his own pleasure take so many million of men lying in the fall and seale them up by an absolute decree under invincible salvation Now this conclusion is as directly opposite unto him in the poynt of election as his conclusion is opposire to ours in the poynt of reprobation And my argument must be of the same force and validity with his because Contrariorum contraria est ratio Yet I will not content my selfe with this answere 2. Therefore consider I pray in the next place the true meaning of this phrase I have no pleasure in these places of the Prophet the Author himselfe though he doth not plainly professe what is the meaning of it as it became him to doe and not to depend upon colour of words suitable yet by his drift he manifests the meaning of it to be this that God doth not bring
themselves God took not that pleasure in them as to give them his custodient grace to keep them from withdrawing themselves which grace and that out of his good pleasure he afforded unto others But this grace comes in no account throughout with this Author like unto the Remonstrants who would have no other notice taken of any other counsell of God then that whereby he decreeth to save believers and damne unbelievers But if you call them to enquire of Gods decree to bestow the grace of Faith and repentance upon some and not on others as whether it proceeds absolutely or conditionally they usually lend a deafe eare to this whereby it is as cleare as the Sunne what estimation they make of the grace of regeneration of the grace of Faith and of repentance and after what manner they give God the glory of it By the way observe I pray how he makes the state of man in being a reprobate consequent to his withdrawing himselfe which undoubtedly is a Temporall act and accordingly the act of Reprobation whereby a man is denominated a reprobate to be meerely Temporall and consequently such an act must election be also viz. not eternall but Temporall Still he keepeth himselfe in his strength of confusion as most advantageous for him as in saying God forsakes no man till by actuall sinnes and continuance in them he forsaketh God But albeit God forsaketh no man as touching the inflicting of punishment untill man commits actuall sinne and continueth therein impenitently yet before this God did forsake him as touching the denyall of this grace custodient from sinne and the denyall of the grace of repentance to rise out of sinne which yet he grants to many as in shewing mercy to whom he will like as whom he will he hardneth and so accordingly cures in some that naturall infidely and hardnesse of heart wherein we are all borne and leaves it uncured in others Now consider we his argument following which is this If God reject no man from salvation in time or in act and deed till he reject God then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree but such a one as he foresaw would reject and cast off God Now this argument not one of our Divines deny not only as it is applied to reprobation but neither doe we deny it applied unto election For we willingly professe that like as God bestowes salvation on none but such as he then findes believers penitent and given to good works in like sort wee all professe that God decrees to bestow salvation on none but such as he foreseeth will believe repent and become studious of good works Like enough many doe wilfully dissemble the true state of the Question between us others ignorantly mistake it The question is not whether God decrees to bestow salvation on such as he foreseeth will believe and reject those from salvation whom he foreseeeth will not believe but of the order of reason between these decrees of God and the foresight of obedience the one side and disobedience on the other that is whether like as faith repentance and good works in men of ripe years doe precede their salvation as disposing causes thereunto so the fore-sight of faith repentance and good works precede election as disposing causes or prerequisites thereunto In like manner on the other side whether as finall perseverance in sinne precedes damnation as the meritorious cause thereof So finall perseverance in sinne as foreseen by God precedes reprobation as the decree of Damnation as the meritorious cause thereof So that the argument here mentioned which is all his strength in this place rightly applyed must runne thus Faith repentance and good works actually existent precede salvation as the disposing causes thereunto therefore faith repentance and good works foreseen precede election as the disposing causes thereunto and what is this but as good as in expresse termes to professe that election is of faith repentance and good works though it be in direct contradiction unto Saint Paul professing in terminis to speak in this Divines language that the purpose of God according to election is not of works So on the other side Finall perseverance in sinne precedes damnation as the meritorious cause thereof therefore finall perseverance in sinne foreseen precedes the decree of damnation as the meritorious cause thereof And then what is to make reprobation to be of evill works if this be not Whereas Saint Paul look by what arguments he proves that election is not of good works viz. because before Jacob and Esau were borne or had done good or evill it was said of them the Elder shall serve the Younger by the same argument it is equally evident that Reprobation is not of evill works Yet we acknowledge an exact conformity between Gods decrees and the execution thereof because like as God damnes no man but for sinne so he decreed to damne no man but for sinne where sinne is in each place made the meritorious cause of damnation not of the decree of damnation And like as God bestowes salvation on no man of ripe years but by way of reward of faith repentance and good works so he decreed to bestow salvation on no man of ripe years but by way of reward of faith repentance and good works where faith repentance and good works are in each place made the disposing causes to salvation but not to election There was never any so madde saith Aquinas as to say that merits are the cause of predestination as touching the act of God predestinating and Why but because so is the cause of predestination to be enquired into as the cause of Gods will is enquired into but formerly he had shewed that there can be no cause of Gods will as touching the act of God willing Now let every one judge whether the act of reprobation be not as clearly the act of Gods will as the act of predestination and consequently whether it be not equally as mad a course in Aquinas his judgement to devise a cause of reprobation as to devise a cause of predestination on the part of Gods will And no marvail for the act of Gods will is eternall all the works of the creature are temporall Then the act of Gods will is God himselfe for there is no accident in God and therefore they may as well set themselves to devise a cause of God as a cause of Gods will His phrase of casting off is ambiguous if it signifieth the denyall of salvation it followeth disobedience if it signifieth the deniall of grace it precedes disobedience in what kind soever 3. Our velle and facere are both temporall in God it is otherwise for his deeds are temporall and may admit the works of men precedaneous thereunto but his resolutions are his decrees and they are all eternall and can admit no work of man precedaneous thereunto yet is God as just in the one as in the other For like as he damnes no man but for
that he saith he proves by Iohn 16. 9. The spirit shall convince the World of sinne because they believe not in me Reprobates therefore are bound to believe But now they cannot be justly bound to believe if they be absolute and inevitable Reprobates for three causes 1. Because it is Gods will that they shall not believe and it appears to be so because it is his peremptory will that they shall have no power to believe for its a Maâ—ime in Logick that Qui vult aliquid in causâ vult effectum ex ista causa necessario profluentem No man will say that it is Gods serious will that such a man shall live when it is his will that he shall not have the concourse of his providence and the act of preservation now will any say that forget not themselves that God doth unfainedly will that those men shall believe whom he will not furnish with necessary power to believe Now if it be Gods will that absolute reprobates shall in no wise believe they cannot in justice be tied to believe For no man is bound to an act against Gods peremptory will 2. Because it is impossible that they should believe they want power to believe and must want it still God hath decreed they shall have none to their dving day without power to believe they can no more believe then a man can see without an eye and live without a Soule Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia To believe is absolutely impossible unto them and therefore in justice they can be tyed to believe no more then a man can be bound to fly like a Bird or to reach heaven with the top of his finger 3. Because they have no object of saith Credere â—ubet dâ— fidei nulium objectum 〈◊〉 This decree makes God to oblige men to believe and to give them no Christ to believe in and to punish them as transgressors of the covenant of grace when yet they have no more right unto it or part in it then the very Devills Can God justiy bind men to believe a lye To believe that Christ died for them when it is no such matter If a man should command his Servant to eate and punish him for not eating and in the mean time fully resolve that he shall have no meat to eate Would any reasonable man say that he were just in such a command such a punishment Change but the names the case is the same TWISSE Consideration IN this discourse on the poynt of Gods justice this Author seems to storme and shewes great confidence of bearing downe all before him but the more ridiculous will it prove in the issue when it shall appeare that all this wind beats down no corne He takes his rise from a particular opinion of Zanchy whose opinion is that all even Reprobates are bound to believe they are elected in Christ unto salvation though never they shall believe nor can believe But doth this Author himselfe concurre with Zanchy in this opinion If he did I presume it were upon some better ground then the authority of Zanchy and in all likelihood we should have heard of those grounds or doth himselfe believe that that passage Ioh. 16. 9. He shall convict the World of sinne because they believed not in me doth evince as much or import as much as that is whereunto Zanchy drives it If he doth not concurre with Zanchy in either of these why should he tye us to the particular authority of Zanchy Must we be bound to stand to every interpretation of our Divines or every particular opinion of theirs wherein perhaps they were singular Secondly suppose this opinion of Zanchy be a truth and suppose we concurre with him herein will it from this opinion follow that therefore even Reprobates have power to believe Who seeth not that it is a flat contradiction to the antecedent For the Doctrine of Zanchy as here it is related is this that even Reprobates though they cannot believe yet are they bound to believe Now will it herehence follow that therefore they have power to believe Whereas it is manifestly supposed in the antecedent that they cannot believe And to my understanding the distinction of Elect and Reprobate in this case is most unseasonable For to what end doe we Preach unto our hearers that all sorts of men are bound to believe but this to wit that every one that heareth us being privy to his condition may understand that he of what condition soever he be which is supposed to be better known to him then to the Preacher or at least as well is bound to believe But as for these different conditions of elect and reprobate no man can be privy to the one untill he doth believe nor to the other untill finall perseverance in unbeliefe And if I list I could alleadge the opinion of another Divine who is very peremptory in his way professing that the Ministers calling upon us to believe is no commandement at all but like a Kings gracious Proclamation unto certain malifactors who are all accused of High Treason giving them to understand that in case they will voluntarily confesse their sinne and accept of his gracious pardon offered them he will most graciously pardon them But if they will not but stand rather to their triall presuming to acquit themselves right well and prove themselves to be true Subjects let them stand to the adventure and issue of their tryall And that thus the covenant of grace is offered to be received by them only who feare to come and dare not come to the tryall of the Covenant of works But I will not content my selfe in putting off Zanchy in this manner although by the way I cannot but professe that were I of their opinion who teach that God gives unto all and every one when they come into the World a certain grace for the enlivening of their wills whereby they are enabled to will any spirituall good whereto they shall be excited I see no reason but that the way is open to everlasting life as well by the covenant of works as by the covenant of grace for let perfect obedience be the spirituall good whereto they are excited let them but will it as it is supposed they can and then God will be ready to concurre to the doing of it like as to the work in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 resipiscere modò velimus so also I should think to work in us perfect obedience modò velimus And in this case I pray consider what need were there of faith in Christ on their part more then on the part of the Holy Angells certainly there would be no need of repentance Thirdly therefore consider we the constant Doctrine of Divines not that Reprobates are bound to believe but that all that heare the Gospell are bound to believe but in what sense Piscator saith as I remember that the thing which all such are bound to believe is
all causes meritorious If it be farther said that not so much the foresight of sin as to speak more properly sinne foreseen is the cause of reprobation I reply against it in this manner sinne foreseen doth suppose Gods decree to permit sinne and consequently if sinne foreseene be before reprobation then also the decree of permitting sinne is before the decree of reprobation that is the decree of damning for sinne But this cannot be as I endeavour to prove by two reasons The first is this There is no order in intentions but between the intention of the end and the intention of the means and the order is this that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means Therefore if the decree of permitting sinne be before the decree of damning for sinne the decree of permitting sinne must be the intention of the end and the decree of damning for sinne must be the intention of the meanes But this is notoriously untrue For it is apparent that damnation tends not to the permission of sinne as the end thereof for if it did then men were damned to this end that they might be permitted to sinne But far more likely it is that sinne should be permitted to this end that a man might be damned which yet by no means doe I a vouch other reasons I have to shew the vanity of this argumentation I rather professe that permssion of sinne and damnation are not subordinate as end means but coordinate both being means tending joyntly to a farther end which under correction from understandings purged from prejudice and false principles I take to be the manifestation of Gods glory in the way of justice vindicative 2. My second reason is if permission of sinne be first in intention and then damnation it followes that permission of sinne should be last in execution but this is most absurd namely that a man should be first damned and then suffered to sinne 2. My second principall argument is this Reprobation as it signifies Gods decree is the act of Gods will now the act of Gods will is the very will of God and the will of God is Gods essence and like as there can be no cause of Gods essence so there can be no cause of Gods will or of the act thereof Upon some such arguments as these Aquinas disputes that the predestination of Christ cannot be the cause of our Predestination adding that they are one act in God And when he comes to the resolution of the question he grants all as touching actum volentis that the one cannot be the cause of the other But only quoad praedestinationis terminum which is grace and glory or the things predestinated Christ is the cause of them but not of our predestination as touching the act of God predestinating And I think I may be bold to presume that Christs merits are of as great force to be the cause why God should elect man unto salvation as mans sinnes are of force to be the cause why God should reprobate him unto damnation The same Aquinas a tall fellow as touching Scolasticall argumentation hath professed that no man hath been so mad as to say that merits are the cause of predestination quoad actum praedestinantis and why but because there can be no cause on mans part of the will of God quoad actum volentis Now reprobation is well knowne to be the will of God as well as election and therefore no cause can there be on mans part thereof quoad actum reprobantis And it is well knowne there is a predestination unto death as well as unto life and consequently t is as mad a thing in his judgement to maintaine that merits are the cause there of quoad actum praedestinantis God by efficacious grace could breake off any mans infidelity if it pleased him that is by affording him such a motion unto faith as he foresaw would be yeelded unto this is easily proved by the evident confession of Arminius formerly specified Now Why doth God so order it as to move some in such a manner as he foresees they will believe others in such a māner as he foresees they will not believe but because his purpose is to manifest the glory of his grace in the salvation of the one and the glory of his justice in the damnation of the other Herein I appeale to the judgement and conscience of every reasonable creature that understands it in spight of all prejudice and false principles to corrupt him 4. In saying sinne foreseen is the cause of Gods decree of damnation they presuppose a prescience of sinne as of a thing future without all ground For nothing can be foreknown as future unlesse it be future now these disputers presuppose a futurition of sinne and that from eternity without all ground For consider no sinne is future in its own nature for in its own nature it is meerely possible and indifferent as well not to be future as to become future and therefore it cannot passe out of the condition of a thing meerely possible into the condition of a thing future without a cause Now what cause doe these men devise of the futurition of sinne Extra Deum nothing can be the cause thereof For this passage of things out of the condition of things possible into the condition of things future was from everlasting for from everlasting they were future otherwise God could not have known them from everlasting And consequently the cause of this passage must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it seeing nothing without God was from everlasting Therefore the cause hereof must be found intra Deum within God then either the will of God which these men doe utterly disclaime or the knowledge of God but that is confessed to presuppose things future rather then to make them so or the essence of God now that may be considered either as working necessarily and if in that manner it were the cause of things future then all such things should become future by necessity of nature which to say is Atheisticall or as working freely and this is to grant that the will of God is the cause why every thing meerely possible in its own nature doth passe from everlasting into the condition of a thing future if so be it were future at all And indeed seeing no other cause can be pitched upon this free will of God must be acknowledged to be the cause of it And consequently the reason why every thing becomes future is because God hath determined it shall come to passe but with this difference All good things God hath determined shall come to passe by his effection All evill things God hath determined shall come to passe by his permission And the Scripture naturally affords plentifull testimony to confirme this without forcing it to interpretations congruous hereunto upon presumptuous grounds that these arguments proceed from
Gods will yet this will of God he calls forthwith a conditionate will and that according to the ancients in these words de hac conditionatâ illâ Dei voluntate extant longe plurima apud veteres Scriptores By which it is manifest that voluntas conditionata is by Vossius so called and in his opinion by the ancients not on the part of God willing as if there were any condition thereof which Bradwardine hath disproved as a thing impossible well neere 200 years agoe but on the part of the things willed by God now the things willed by God are either absolutely so willed or conditionally as for example pardon of sinne and salvation are only conditionally willed by God to wit upon the condition of faith and repentance but as for the gift of faith and repentance they are willed by God to be bestowed absolutely to wit according to the meer pleasure of Gods will hence it followeth that the will of God to conferre salvation is only voluntas coditionata and denominates not a man absolutely predestinated but only conditionally still understanding it not quod actum volentis but quoad res volitas as Vossius himselfe interprets it and that according to the ancients In like sort the will of God to inflict damnation is a conditionate will according to the same construction that Vossius makes of a will conditionate according to the Fathers and denominates not a man absolutely reprobated but only conditionally Now this being the will that Zanchy and Bucer speak of most preposterously doth this Author shape a man hereupon to be termed an absolute predestinate or an absolute reprobate For in this respect like as the will of God in this case is accounted not absoluta but conditionata so the person denominated hereby in all equity is to be accounted not predestinated absolutely but conditionally nor reprobated absolutely but conditionally But in respect of another will of God I willingly confesse one may be accounted predestinate absolutely and another reprobated absolutely to wit in respect of the will of giving the grace of faith and repentance unto one and denying it to another And that because faith and repentance are not given and denied upon any condition but absolutely according to the meer pleasure of God as we are ready to maintaine But herehence no species of contradiction ariseth for like as it is no contradiction to say that God willeth absolutely unto Paul the grace of faith and repentance and conditionally willeth unto him and every one salvation to wit upon condition of faith and repentance In like sort there is no contradiction to say that the same man is predestinated absolutely unto faith and conditionally unto salvation In like sort it may be said without all contradiction that the same man is both reprobated absolutely from faith and yet reprobated conditionally from glory unto condemnation And lastly in like manner there is no contradiction to say that the same man is predestinated conditionally to obtain salvation and yet absolutely reprobated from faith especially seeing it is all one to be predestinated conditionally to obtain salvation and conditionally to obtain damnation For he that is ordained to be saved in case he believe is therewithall ordained to be damned in case he believe not The ground whereof is that of our Saviour Whosoever believeth shall be saved whosoever believeth not shall be damned Now if God may both will unto a man salvation conditionally to wit upon condition he believeth and yet withall will the deniall of faith absolutely unto him without all contradiction as I have already proved it followeth that without all contradiction a man may be said both to be predestinated to obtain salvation conditionally viz. In case he doe believe and so to be predestinated absolutely to be hardned or to have the grace of faith denyed him So that this Authors conclusion depends meerely upon confusion of different denominations of a man said to be absolutely or conditionally predestinated which may be in respect of different things whereto he is predestinated to the one absolutly to the other conditionally and consequently without all contradiction For he that is absolutely reprobated from the grace of faith may yet be conditionally predestinated unto salvation For to be conditionally predestinated unto salvation is to be conditionally predestinated unto damnation and what sober man will say that there is any contradiction in this to say that the same man is both conditionally reprobated unto damnation and absolutely reprobated from faith Faith being such a gift of God that like as God absolutely bestowes it on some so as absolutely he denies it to others But as for condemnation that is inflicted on none but for sinne like as salvation is bestowed on none of ripe years but as a reward of obedience In like manner God decreed not either to bestow the one or inflict the other but conditionally to wit upon condition of faith on the one side and upon condition of infidelity on the other Now if such confusion be committed in these denominations of the predestinate and reprobate absolutely and conditionally on the part of things willed by God as namely in respect of grace and glory on the one side and in respect of the denyall of grace and glory together with inflicting of damnation on the other How much more must this confusion be augmented if not only different things willed by God as before mentioned are confounded but over and above the act of Gods will is confounded with things willed by him For as for the act of Gods will that it admitts no condition I have formerly demonstrated by diverse arguments one whereof and that invincible is this If sinne be the cause or condition of Gods will or decree of damnation then either by necessity of nature or by the constitution of God not by necessity of nature as all confesse nor say I can it be by any constitution of God as I prove thus If by the constitution of God then God hath ordained that upon the foresight of sinne he will ordaine men unto salvation where the eternall ordination of God is made the object of Gods eternall ordination a thing utterly impossible it being apparent that nothing can be the object of Gods eternall ordination or decree but things temporall The similitude whereby he illustrates not his conclusion but the pretended absurdity of our doctrine is most aliene For God is not like unto a creditor Who resolves upon no termes to forgive his debtor one farthing of his debt and yet makes offer to remit the whole debt upon some conditions For as God hath professed that whosoever believeth shall be saved so Hath not God resolved that whosoever believeth shall be saved Was ever any of our Divines known to deny this But herein they joyne issue with their adversaries as the Contra-Remonstrants did with the Remonstrants namely in maintaining that this is not the whole decree of predestination But that there is another
nature then all things must be acknowledged to come to passe by necessity of their owne nature which is to deny God But if things be of their owne nature meerly possible and indifferent to become either future or non-future then there must be acknowledged some cause whereby they are brought out of the condition of things meerly possible into the condition of things future And this cause must exist from everlasting otherwise it should not be so ancient as the effect thereof for it is well knowne that all things future have been future from everlasting otherwise God could not have foreknown them from everlasting but all confesse that God from everlasting foreknew every future thing Therefore the cause making them to passe out of the condition of things meerely possible such as they were of their owne nature into the condition of things future was also from everlasting Now consider where was this cause to be found Not without God for nothing without God either was or is everlasting without beginning therefore is it to be found within God or no where Consider in the next place what is that within God which is fit to be the cause hereof We say 't is his decree but this Author cannot away with that Therefore Si quid novisti rectius isto candidus imperti Certainly the knowledge of God cannot be the cause for as Aquinas saith that causeth nothing but as joyned with Gods will and therefore it is commonly conceived that foreknowledge doth rather presuppose things future than make them so nothing then remaines to be the cause hereof but the essence of God Now the essence of God may be considered two waies either as working necessarily or as working freely if it be the cause of things future as working necessarily then it followeth that God shall produce them by necessity of nature which utterly overthrowes Divine providence What remaines then but that we must be driven to confesse that Divine essence makes them future as working freely which is as much as to professe that Gods will and decree is that alone which maketh things to passe out of the condition of things meerly possible in to the condition of things future And I challenge the whole Nation of Arminians and Jesuites to answer this argument Yet this decree we willingly acknowledge is a permissive decree but look that we understand that aright also thus God decreeth this or that evill to come to passe by his permission like as good things he decreeth shall come to passe by his effection and that upon Gods permission it is necessary that that which he permits shal come to passe is acknowledged not only by our Divines but by Vorstius by Arminians by Navarettus the Dominican as I have quoted thē in my Vinditiae gratiae Dei which yet they deliver without clear expressing how which I perform thus look what God decrees to permit it is necessary that it should come to passe but how Not necessarily but contingently freely And the Scripture is expresse as before expressed that the most barbarous actions cōmited against Christ by Herod Pontius Pilate together with the Gentiles and people of Israell in their contumelious usages of him were all predetermined by the hand and counsell of God Marke the issue of this Authors most frivolous discourses for this will whereof he speakes whereby God is pretended gratiously to will mans Salvation conditionall as much as to say 't is Gods will that a man shall be Saved in case he believe in Christ now what Christian was ever known to deny this Secondly consider whether this deserves to be called a will to save more than a will to damne for like as 't is certaine a man shall be saved if he believe in Christ so it is most certaine a man shall be damned if he believe not and withall consider to which of these the nature of man is most prone whether to faith or to infidelity DISCOURSE SECT VII BUt by this opinion the gifts of nature and grace have another end either God doth not meane them unto those that perish albeit they doe enjoy them because they are mingled in the world with the elect to whom only they are directed or if he doe he meaneth they shall have them and by them be lifted up above the common rank of men ut lapsu graviore ruant that their fall may be the greater for how can God intend that those men should receive them or any good by any of them whom he hath by an absolute decree cut off and rejected utterly from grace and glory More particularly by this doctrine 1. Christ came not into the world to procure the Salvation of them that perish because they were inevitably preordained to perish 2. The word is not sent to them or if it be it is that they might slight it or contemne it and increase their damnation by the contempt of it and so these inconveniences will arise 1. That God is a meere deceiver of miserable men whom he calls to Salvation in the name of his Sonne by the preaching of his word because he fully intends to most men the contrary to that which he fairly pretends 2. That Ministers are but false witnesses because in their Ministry they offer Salvation conditionally to many who are determined to damnation absolutely 3. The Ministry of the Word canot leave men inexcusable for Reprobates may have this just plea Lord dost thou punish for not believing in thy Sonne when thou didest call us to believe by the preaching of thy Word thou didest decree to leave us woefull men in Adams sinne to leave us neither power to believe nor a Christ to believe in how canst thou justly charge us with sinne or encrease our punishment for not believing in him whom thou didest resolve before the world was that we should never believe in That Ministry gives men a faire excuse which is given to no other end than to leave them without excuse 4. The Sacraments by this opinion signify nothing seale up conferre nothing to such as are not Saved but are meere blankes and empty ordinances unto them not through the fault of men but by the primary and absolute will of God 5. Lastly other gifts bestowed upon men of what nature soever they be are to the most that receive them in Gods absolute intention 1. Unprofitable such as shall never doe them good in reference to their finall condition 2. Dangerous and hurtfull given them not of love but extreame hatred not that they might use them well and be Blessed in so doeing but that they might use them ill and by ill using of them procure unto themselves the greater damnation God lifts them up as the Divell did Christ to the pinacle of the Temple that they might fall and loades them with knowledge and other goodly indowments that with the weight of them he might sink them into Hell and so by good consequence Gods chiefest gifts are intended and laid as snares
manner who shall deliver me from the body of this death And receiving a gracious answer concerning this concludes with thankes I thank my God through my Lord Jesus Christ if I have a will to believe to repent I have no cause to complaine but to runne rather unto God with thankes for this and pray him to give that power which I find wanting in me And indeed as I may adde in the fourth place this impotency of believing and infidelity the fruit of naturall corruption common to all is meerely a morall impotency and the very ground of it is the corruption of the will therefore men cannot believe cannot repent cannot doe any thing pleasing unto God because they will not they have no delight therein but all their delight is carnall sensuall and because they are in the flesh they â—annot please God and because of the hardnesse of their hearts they cannot repent sinne is to them as a sweet morsell unto an Epicure which he rolleth under his tongue Fiftly dost thou blaspheame God because of Leprous Parents thou art begot and conceived and borne a leprous child What impudency then is it in thee to challenge him for injustice in that the spirituall leprosy of thy first Parents is propagated to thy soule Lastly if thou renouncest the Gospell what reason hast thou to complaine of want of power to embrace it so farre as not to renounce it hast thou not as much power to believe as Simon Magus had as many a prophane person and hipocrite hath that is bred and brought up in the Church of God Hadst thou gone so farre as they and performed submission unto the Gospell by profesing it surely thou shouldest never be brought to condemnation for not professing of it but rather for not walking according to the rule of it which thou promisedst when first thou gavest thy name to Christ I come to the third 3. Look what the Word promiseth that doe the Sacraments scale the word promiseth Justification Salvation to all that beleive the same doth the Sacraments seal As Circumsion Rom. 4. 5. Is said to be the seale of the Rightiousnes of faith so is Baptisme it did in our Saviours dayes and in the dayes of his Apostles seale to the believer and penitent Person the assurance of the forgivenesse of their sinnes over and above Baptisme is the Sacrament of our birth in Christ and the Lords Supper of our growth in Christ each an outward and visible signe of an inward invisible grace But what is the grace were of the Sacrament is a signe Is it a power to doe good if a man will Call you that grace which is not so much as goodnesse for certainly goodnesse consists not in a power to doe good if a man will but in a definite inclination of the will it selfe to delight in that which is good and to be prone to doe it But this grace whereof Baptisme is a signe is suo tempore conferenda like as Circumcision was even to those Jewes who yet were not regenerated untill they were partakers of the Gospell Jam. 1. 18. Of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth Writing unto the twelve tribes of the Jewes And it is very strange to me that regeneration should so many years goe before vocation But this opposite Doctrine and the sealing of a blanke is nothing strange to me I was acquainted with it twenty yeares agoe and I seeme plainly to discerne the chimney from whence all the smoake comes 4. As for other gifts bestowed on the Reprobates 1. We willingly confesse they shall never bring them to salvation be they as great as those who were bestowed on Aristotle Plato Aristides Sophocles and the most learned morall and wise men of the World that never were acquainted with the mystery of Godlinesse it was wont to be received generally for a truth that Extra Ecclesiam non est satus But Arminians take liberty to coyne new Articles of our Creed 2. But yet they may doe them good hereby they may Proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitius puniantur For certainly it shall be easier in the day of udgement for Cicero then for Cattline for Augustus than for Tiberius for Trajan than for Heliogabalus 3. And therefore it is certainly false that they are hurtfull and that they proceed out of extreme hatred And as for love the Scripture teacheth us that Jacob was loved of God and Esau hated each before they were borne Such is the condition of all the elect as Jacob of all the Reprobates as Esau and in Thomas Aquinas his judgement Non velle alicui vitam aeternam est ipsum odisse Knowledge I confesse of the mysteries of Godlinesse where life and conversation is not answerable doth encrease mens condemnation neither is God bound to change the corrupt heart of any man if they are workers of iniquity Christ will not know them at the great day though they have Prophesyed in his name and in his name cast out Devills neither was it ever heard of that the graces of edification and graces of sanctification must goe together and that God in giving the one is bound to give the other As for being proud of them pride for ought I know requires no other causes but domesticall corruption but he that acknowledgeth God to be the giver of any gift and hath an heart to be thankfull for it I make no doubt but he hath more grace than of edification only certainly the gifts they have sinke them not to hell but their corrupt heart in abusing them And hath a man no cause to be thankfull unto God for one gift unlesse he will adde another The Gentiles are charged for unthankfulnesse Rom. 1. But it seems by this Authors Divinity it was without cause unlesse we will with this Author say they all had sufficiency of meanes without and power within to bring them to salvation and what had Israell more Or the elect of God more in any age True for according to the Arminian tenet an elect hath no more cause to be thankfull to God for any converting grace than a Reprobate In a word what good act wrought in the heart of man whether of faith or of repentance or any kind of obedience hath man cause to be thankfull to God for when God workes it in him no otherwise than modó homo velit and so they confesse he workes every sinfull act Have they not in this case more cause to thank themselves than to thank God And unlesse we concurre with them in so shamelesse unchristian gracelesse and senselesse an opinion and in effect if God converts the heart of man according to the meere pleasure of his will and hardeneth others all the gifts that he bestowes on man are censured by this audacious censurer as Sauls bestowing Michal on David Jaells courtesy and usurers bounty c. or a baite for a poore fish as if God needed any such course
day to the Senate House and meeting by the way with him who had given him that warning he called him by his name and to shew his fearlesse condition sayd The Ides of March are come true S r quoth the other but they are not yet past The mortall wound in the Senate House was given him before he feared it for of thirty and odde wounds there received it is written that every one of them was mortall His heroicall spirit bare him out neverthelesse not against the feare for that was now out of season but against the sense of mortall paine in such sort as not to commit any indecent thing in dying under the hands of so many Assassinates either in word or deed for not a word of distemper was uttered by him only to Brutus his neere Kinsman and deare unto him when he came upon him in like manner as the rest he said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and took care to gather his garments in such sort about ut honeste caderet Heaven and hell are ordained by God as the portion of the righteous the one of the wicked the other I hope this Author will not deny but that Heaven according to his phrase was unavoydably obtained by our Saviour yet this nothing hindred his hope but rather confirmed it by casting out of feare And the hope of Christ is the first thing this Author instanceth in while he amplifies the nature of hope but in his large expatiation thereon according to his course he spent so much time that he might well forget it before he come to the accommodation of it unto his Argument And indeed hope in Scripture phrase is the looking for of Christ and the glory he brings with him and what a senselesse thing is it to conceive that the more sure we are of blessednesse the lesse we should expect and look for the enjoyment of it Doth not our Saviour bid his Disciples Luke 10. 20. not to rejoyce in this that Devills are subdued unto them but rather to rejoyce in this that their names are written in heaven Now let any sober man judge whether this joy shall be of force to expectorate our hope and not rather to confirme and increase it As for Hell I know none are assured thereof as of their due portion but the Devills yet they feare and tremble never a whit the lesse for that But men while they live on earth not one of them in particular that I know are or have any just ground to be assured of their damnation For albeit faith in Christ may well be an assurance of mans election yet nothing but finall perseverance in infidelity or impenitency can be a just assurance to any man of his damnation As for the eternall states of men they are not existent but only in Gods intention and consequently to alter their eternall states is to alter Gods intentions Now what Arminian of these daies that is of any learning and judgement dares boldly affirme that it is in the power of the creature to alter Gods intentions In like sort with what sobriety can any man deny that every man is determined either to salvation or damnation the prescience of God being sufficient hereunto and we acknowledge that none is ordained by God to be damned but for finall perseverance in sinne unrepented of none to be saved of ripe yeares but by way of reward for his faith obedience repentance As for power and liberty to choose either let that be first rightly stated Moses Deut. 30. 19. or the Lord rather by him professeth that he hath set before them life and death and exhorts them to choose life the meaning whereof is to choose that the consequent whereunto is life now that was obedience unto the lawes and holy ordinances of God Now as touching the power and liberty to choose this we say 1. That this power was given to all in Adam and we have all lost it in him through sinne for we all sinned in him as the Apostle in expresse tearmes professeth Rom. 5. 12. 2. The power that we have lost in Adam is no naturall power but a morall power like unto that whereof the Lord speaketh by the Prophet Jeremy Jere. 13. 23. Can a Blackamore change his skinne Or the Leopard his spotts No more can you doe good that are accustomed to evill Nor will any sober man judge that such an impotency as this doth make a man excusable In the like sort our Saviour unto the Jewes Iohn 5. 44. How can yee believe that receive Honour one of another and seek not the Honour that comes of God only So that this impotency is meerly morall arising from the corruption of their wills Had a man a will to believe to repent but withall had no power to believe and repent though he would here indeed were a just cause of excuse but all the fault hereof is in the will of man This our Britaine Divines at the Synod of Dort upon the 3. and 4. Articles of the second Position expresse in this manner The nature of man being by voluntary Apostacy habitually turned from God the creatour it runs to the creature with an unbridled appetite and in a lustfull and base manner commits fornication with it being always desirous to set her heart and rest on those things which ought only to be used on the by and to attempt and accomplish things forbidden What marvell then if such a will be the bondslave to the Devill The will without charity is nothing but a vitious desire inordinata cupiditas Aug Retract 1. 5. 3. Yet the same Austin professeth Lib. 1. de Gen. cont Manich cap. 3. credere possunt ab amore visibilium rerum temporalium se ad ejus praecepta servanda convertere si velint And ad Marcel De spiritu littra proves at large that fides in voluntate est Only it is the grace of God to prepare the will ut velit and so to encrease with the gift of charity ut possit so that there is a great deale of difference between posse si velit and posse simpliciter in Austins judgment posse si velit is lesse then velle but posse simpliciter is more then velle 4. Lastly what meanes this Author to discourse thus hand overhead of power and liberty to choose whether as if whatsoever they pretend their true meaning were that man hath power to believe and repent without grace For as for power to believe and repent through Gods grace no man denyes Why then doth he not try his strength on this point which indeed is the criticall point of these controversies and wherein it will clearly appeare whether they differ one iot from the Pelagians For the question between the Pelagians and the Catholiques in Austins dayes was not about the possibility of willing or doing that which is good but only about the act of willing and doing And herein they granted instruction and exhortation requisite All the question
case we produce the same act of willing and doing that which is good is this to worke in us both the will and the deed Consider I pray is it not true that God is as ready to concurre with us to any sinfull act in case we will concurre with him and doth he not concurre with man to the produceing of any sinfull act in case man at that time doth produce it And will any sober man say that this is also for God to worke in him both the will and the deed of every sinfull act And why might we not say so if God workes it only by concourse Lastly to worke in us both the will and the deed provided that man will concurre to the working hereof not otherwise is this to worke it according to his good pleasure and not rather according to mans good pleasure And how I pray or in what sence doth he say that God by his providence will not suffer this doctrine to have any stroke in our lives For if he suffers it not then he hinders it let it therefore be made appeare how he hinders it To concurre with us if we will concurre with him in the producing of any act of Godlinesse is this to hinder our carnall security If so then to concurre with us to the producing of any sinfull act is to hinder our Godlinesse Surely to give power whereby men are enabled to doe any spirituall good if they will is not to hinder carnall security for such a power is given to all by universall grace yet this doth nothing hinder the carnall security of many thousands Or doth he hinder it by exciting us to the contrary Yet if this doctrine as we conceive be apt to drowne us in carnall security how can he be sayd to hinder us from it For either the doctrine must yeeld to such excitations exhortations from carnall security or such exhortations must yeeld to the doctrine especially considering what Austin sayth that if there be any difference betweene docere and suadere or exhortari yet even this doctrinae generalitate comprehenditur And for incogitancy which is a second device pretended as the cause why this doctrine doth not expose us to carnality is it not incredible these poynts being so much ventilated by them as none more The Church of God having been exercised with none more as I think these hundred yeares that men should not think of or consider of those dangerous consequences in manners as these doe forge in their own braines And as for the last imputing our Godlinesse to some good practicall conclusions may I not justly say that if ever any man wrote with the spirit of giddinesse this Author deserves to have a chiefe place amongst them For compare his answer to the second objection with this There he saith such dissolute conclusions as these following doe arise out of this doctrine of ours If I be chosen I must of necessity believe and be saved If I be cast off I must as necessarily not believe and be damned what need I therefore take thought either way about meanes or end Now will it not as well follow what need I therefore take thought of holinesse of obedience For even these are as good practicall conclusions Believe and thou shalt be saved Repent and thou shalt be saved and whosoever bebelieveth not shall be damned As these Be ye holy as I am holy Without holinesse no man shall see God If ye consent and obey ye shall eate the good things of the Land And by the way observe I pray with what judgement he calls them practicall conclusions whereas all save two of them are exhortations rather then conclusions And those two to wit Without holinesse no man shall see God and Godlinesse hath the promises both of this life c. I should take them to be principles rather then conclusions Whether simple men doe apply their braines to ponder and consider this doctrine or no I know not but certainly the learned and Godly maintainers of it have had cause enough to ponder it and consider it throughly and have given evidence enough of their thorough consideration of it yet have they fetcht no such sequells out of it If simple men doe and our adversaries be of the number of them and content themselves with such simplicity yet is it not enough for us that the Apostle doth not the holy Apostle S. Paul but expressely enforceth the contrary there from namely that because of God worketh in us the will and the deed according to his good pleasure therefore it becomes us to worke out our Salvation with feare and trembling Now which of us doe most exactly concurre with the Apostle in mainning that God doth worke in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure I am very well content that all the World both wise and simple both Learned and unlearned may judge 2. As touching the second First let us consider how the objection is shaped Secondly as it lies with what judgement and sobriety it is impugned 1. It is true men are absolutely elected or absolutely rejected but we content not our selves with generalities wherein as Aristotle hath observed doe lurke many equivocations Neither doe we delight in confounding things that differ Election and rejection or reprobation and in generall the will of God may be considered either Quoad actum voluntis as touching the act of God willing or as touching the things willed Of this distinction this Author takes no notice It is fit for some and advantagious to fish in troubled waters Now as touching the act of God willing both Aquinas hath proved that there can be no cause thereof and withall professeth that never was any so mad as to say That merites can be the cause of predestination quoad actum praedestinantis as touching the act of God predestinating And Bradwardine hath curiously disputed this way that no will of God is conditionall to will quoad actum volentis And Piscator against Vorstius hath proved the same after his way and by variety of demonstration this way may be convinced as in part I have shewed in this discourse both on the part of election and on the part of reprobation And both D r Jackson in his booke of Providence professeth that the distinction of Voluntas antecedens and consequens or antecedent and consequent will in God is to be understood quoad res volitas as touching the things willed as much as to say non quoad actum volentis And Gerardus Vossius drawing the distinction of will antecedent and will consequent unto the distinction of will absolute and will conditionall applyes it only quoad res volitas and so interpriteth Fathers discourse thereof And of a conditionall will gives this instance God will have men to be Saved in case they believe where faith is clearely made the condition of Salvation a temporall thing the condition of a temporall thing not the condition of Gods will to
like as none were more opposite to the Epicures then they so none were more religious and devout among the Heathens then they Yet there is no opinion so true or good but by a prophane heart may be abused But as for the efficacy of Gods will we are so farre from maintaining that it takes away either the liberty of mans will or the contingency of second causes that we professe with Aquinas that the root of all contingency is the efficacious will of God and with the Authors of the Articles of the Church of Ireland Artic. 11. That God did from all eternity ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe and yet neither the liberty nor the contingency of second causes is thereby destroyed but established rather DISCOURSE The Fift and last sort of Reasons It is an Enimy to True Comfort SECT I. I Am come to my last reason against it drawn from the Vncomfortablenesse of it It is a doctrine full of desperation both to them that stand and to them that are fallen to men out of temptation and in it It 1. Leads men into temptation 2. Leaves men in it And therefore it is no part of Gods word for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good newes to men a store-house of sweet consolations for them that stand and such as are fallen These things are written saith the Apostle Rom. 15. 4. That by patience and consolation of the Scriptures we might have hope implying that therefore was the word written and left to the Church that by the comforts contained in it those poore soules that look towards heaven might never want in any changes or chances of this mortall life a sweet gale of hope to refresh them and carry on their ship full merrily towards the Haven It leads men into temptation and into such a one too as is as sharpe and dangerous as any the tempter hath The Devill can easily perswade any man that makes absolute reprobation a part of his creed that he is one of those absolute Reprobates because there are more absolute Reprobates even an hundred for one then absolute chosen ones and a man hath a great deale more reason to think that he is one of the most then one of the least one of the huge multitude of inevitable castawaies then one of the little flock for whom God hath absolutely prepared a Kingdome Such a man is not only capable of but framed and fashioned by his opinion for this suggestion which is a very sore one if we may believe Calvin Bucer and Zanchius Calvin tells us Quod nulla tentatione vel gravius vel periculosius fideles percellit Satan that the Devill cannot assault a believer with a temptation more dangerous And a little after he saith It is so much the deadlier by how much commoner it is then any other Rarissimus est cujus non interdum animus hac cogitatione feriatur unde tibi salus nisi ex Dei electione Electionis autem quae tibi revelatio Quae si apud quempiam semel invaluit aut diris tormentis miserum perpetuo exeruciat aut reddit penitus attonitum So ordinary is the temptation that he who is at all times free from it is a rare man we are to conceive that he speakes of those that believe absolute reprobation and so dangerous it is that if it get strength he which is under it is either miserably tormented or mightily astonished And a little after this he saith againe Ergo si naufragium timemus sollicité ab hoc scopulo cavendum in quem nunquam sine exitio impingitur He that will not wrack his soule must keep from this rock Bucer also hath a passage like to this Vt caput omnis noxiae tentationis saith he repellenda est quaestio sumusnè praedestinati Nam qui de hoc dubitat nec vocatumse nec justificatum esse credere poterit hoc est nequit esse Christianus This doubt whether we are predestinated or no Must be repelled as the head of every pernitious temptation for he that doubts of this cannot be a Christian Praesumendum igitur ut principium fidei nos omnes esse a Deo praescitos Every man therefore must presume it as a principle of faith that he is elected This very speech of Bucers Zanchy makes use of to the same purpose We see then by the restimony of these worthy men that this temptation is very dangerous and ordinary too to such as think there are absolute reprobates The truth of both will farther appeare by the example of Petrus Hosuanus a Schoolemaster in Hungary who intending to hang himselfe signified in a letter which he left in his study for the satisfaction of his friends and Countrymen the cause of it in that writing he delivered these three things 1. That he was of Calvins and S. Austins opinion that men are not dealt withall secundum bona or mala opera according to their works good or evill but that there are occultiores causae more hidden causes of mens eternall condition 2. That he was one of that woefull company of absolute castawaies Vas formatum in ignominiam a vessell prepared to dishonour and that therefore though his life had been none of the worst he could not possibly be saved 3. That being unable to beare the dreadfull apprehensions of wrath with which he was affrighted he hanged himselfe For these are some of his last words there recorded Discedo igitur ad Lacus Infernales aeternum dedecus patriae meae Deo vos commendo cujus misericordia mihi negata est I goe to those infernall lakes a perpetuall reproach to my Country commending you to God whose mercy is denyed mee Out of this example we may easily collect two things 1. That men who think that there are many whom God hath utterly rejected out of his only will and pleasure may be easily brought to think by Satans suggestion that they are of that company And 2. That this temptation is very dangerous I conclude therefore the first part of my last Reason that absolute Reprobation leads men into temptation TWISSE Consideration AS I remember when this Author first had resort unto some prime stickler for the Arminian way to conferre with him there about it was told me that this Authour should alledge that our doctrine of election was a comfortable doctrine but then on the other side it was alledged that granting that yet with all it did expose to dessolutenes of life And therefore I little expect any such argument as this to be proposed least of all to be ranged amonst the nūber of those that are taken to be of a convincing nature Yet is it the lesse strange because the Apostle telleth us of some that their course is proficere in pejus to growe worse and worse But let us consider whether he speeds any better in this then in the former And whereas he saith It is a doctrine full of desperation both to them that stand
a true crimination but by flying to Gods absolute proceedings in giving or denying grace And albeit in this poynt wholly consists the Crisis of this Controversy yet this Author utterly declines the sifting thereof as some precipice and breake-neck unto his cause to wit Whether God gives and denyes grace according to the meere pleasure of his will or according to mens workes albeit the issue of all his comforts comes to this namely that either God is not the Author of our faith which now adaies the Remonstrants with open mouth professe that Christ merited for none or if to juggle with the World they pretend an acknowledgement that God is the Author of it yet they plainly professe that he dispenseth it to some and denyes it to others according to some good condition or disposition he findes in the one and which he findes not in another But let us take into consideration what these solid grounds of comfort are whereof a Minister is bereaved by our Doctrine Three I find here mentioned A treble Universality 1. of Gods love 2. Of Christs death 3. Of the Covenant of grace As if universality now adayes were a better Character of the Arminian faith then of the Roman Religion I may take liberty to equivocate a little when this Authour equivocates throughout and that in a case wherein iâ— is most intollerable in a case of consolation to be ministred to conscientia timorata as Nider calls it a poore afflicted soule as this Authour expresseth it To the discovery whereof I will now proceed having signified in the first place that all these consolations are no other but such as every Reprobate is capable of as well as the Children of God which is so apparent as needs no proofe only in the issue of their Tenet the faith of them freeth a man from the conceit of being an absolute Reprobate So that in effect it comes to this Thou poore afflicted soul be of good comfort for if thou wilt hearken unto me and imbrace those solid grounds of comfort which I will reveale unto thee assure thy selfe they shall be as the Balme of Gilead unto thy soule whereby thou maist be confident that albeit it may be thou art a Reprobate and that God from everlasting hath ordained thee unto damnation that yet certainly thou art no absolute Reprobate no more then Cain or Esau Saul or Judas or the Devills were For these my principles will assure thee that there never was nor is nor shall be any absolute Reprobate throughout the world 2. I come to the examining of them particularly to shew that every one of them is as it were against the haire So evident are the testimonies of Scripture against them all and they are obtruded upon a superficiary and most most unsound interpretation of Scripture in some places For 1. as touching the first the universality of Gods love For hereby Gods love is made indifferent unto all and consequently towards Esau as well as to Jacob whereas the Scripture professeth that God loved Jocob and hated Esau and this the Apostle makes equivalent to the Oracle dilivered to Rebekah concerning them before they were borne 2. He might as well have proposed it of the universallity of Gods mercy whereas the Scripture expressely distinguisheth between vessels of mercy vessells of wrath 3. This love is explicated by them to consist in a will to save all Now election is but Gods will to save and the Scripture plainly teacheth and it is confessed by all that I know excepting Coelius Secundus to whom this Authour it seemes is most beholding for his story of Spira that though Many are called yet but few are chosen And whereas it is confessed that the most part of men are Reprobates that is from everlasting willed unto condemnation yet never the lesse they beare us in hand that all men even Cain and Judas yea and as I think the Devills and all were willed by God unto Salvation And that there is no contradiction in all this And every poore afflicted soule must believe hand over head that all this is true what species of contradiction soever be found therein which this Authour from the begining of his discourse to the end hath taken no paines to cleare least otherwise he forfaits all hopes of comfort upon such soveraine grounds as are here proposed by faith wherein aman may be as well assured of his Salvation and freedome from damnation as any Reprobate in the World For albeit he be a Reprobate and God should reveale this unto him yet upon these grounds he may be confident that he is no absolute Reprobate 2. I come to the Second comfortable supposition and that is the universality of Christs death namely that he died for all Now this is opposite to Scripture evidence as the former yea and to Christian reason if not more For albeit God so loved the World even the whole World that he gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believes in him should not perish but have Life Everlasting which gives a fair light of exposition to those places where Christ is said to have dyed for the sins of the World yea of the whole world to wit in this manner that whosoever believes in him shal not perish but have everlasting life yet the Scripture speaks as often of Christs death in a restrained sense as where it is said Christ gave himselfe a ransome for many And that his bloud was shed for his Apostles and for many for the remission of their sinnes And that Christ should save Gods people from their sinnes And that God hath purchased his Church with his bloud And Christ gave himselfe for his Church And that he is saviour of his body And that he dyed for the elect And in the 17 of John our Saviour would not pray for the World but only for those whom God had at that time given unto him and who afterward should believe in him through their word And look for whom he prayed with exclusion of the rest for their sakes he sanctified himself Now that this is spoken in reference to the offering of himselfe up unto God upon the crosse it was the joynt interpretation of all the Fathers whom Maldonate had read as he professeth on that place and there reckons up a multitude of them Then againe Christs death and passion we know was of a satisfactory nature and therefore if he dyed for all he satisfied for all the sinnes of all men why then are not all saved Why is any damned Is it just with God to torment with everlasting fire for those sinnes for which he hath received satisfaction and that a more ample one then mans satisfaction can be by suffering the torments of Hell fire For therefore it shall never end because it shall never satisfie Againe how many millions were at that time dead and in hell fire and did Christ satisfy for their sinnes by his death upon the Crosse and they continue still to
be tormented Againe the obedience of Christ in generall is of a meritorious nature even meritorious of everlasting life Now if Christ hath merited everlasting life for all and every one how comes it that all and every one doe not enjoy Everlasting Life Shall not God the Father deale with his owne Sonne according to the exigency of his merits whether it be that they are so meritorious in their owne nature or by the constitution of God either meerely or joyntly with the dignity of their nature in reference to the dignity of the person who performed them as being not only man but God even the eternall Son of God one the same God with his Father Blessed for ever Now it can be made good that all sins of all men are fully satisfied for by the death of Christ that Christ hath merited in better manner Everlasting Life for all every one then they could have done for themselves although they had passed the whole course of their lives as free from sinne as the very elect Angells this I confesse is a comfortable doctrine with a witnesse though God leave men to themselves and to the power of their owne free wills to doe what they list And I see noe reason but that in the midst of all Ryot and excesse they may be as confident of their Salvation as if they had all faith as of certaine Lutherans it is written as I saw in a letter of an English Divine writen from Rome I make no question but their answer will be that albeit Christ hath thus satisfied for all sinnes of all and every one and merited Eternall Life for all and every one yet the benefit of his merits and satisfaction by Gods Ordinance shall redound to none but such as believe and repent and persevere therein unto death And what comfort can herehence arise to an afflicted soule unlesse she doe believe and repent If she doe believe and repent our Doctrine gives assurance to such of their election the Arminian doth not Here I presume they will say that every one may believe if he will repent if he will and may they not as well say that every soule afflicted with despaire may leave of to despaire if they will and consequently leave of to be afflicted if they will And I confesse this way of consolation hath a very short cut if the afflicted soul would harken unto them Especially considering that I doe not find that in these their discourses they take any notice of any sinne to hinder this no not so much as of the sinne against the Holy Ghost or of that sinne which S t John calleth a sinne unto death But I doe much doubt whether this were the manner of comfort which the Prophet Esay thought himselfe enabled for by Gods grace when he sayd The Lord God hath given me the tongue of the Learned that I should know how to speake a word in season to him that is weary he wakeneth Morning by Morning he wakeneth mine eare to heare as the learned Wherefore let me make bold in behalfe of the Patient to move unto you a question Doth not the Scripture teach us that faith is the gift of God that repentance is the gift of God Act 11. 18. 2 Tim 2. 25 How then is it possible for me to believe and repent unlesse God give me the grace of faith and repentance I presume you will answer that God gives faith and repentance first in as much as he gives all men power to believe and repent And secondly in as much as he concurres with them to the act of faith and repentance in case they will But I pray thee tell me is not the will to repent also the gift of God And if I have not as yet the will to repent how is it possible I should repent Can any man repent without a will to repent Is not repentance chiefly the charge of the will But you will say I suppose that even this will to repent God is ready to worke in me if I will repent But in case a man will repent what need hath he of any Divine assistance to cause in him this will to repent seeing he hath it already Lastly doth not God give a man a power to refuse to believe to refuse to repent if he will And is he not as ready to concurre with him to any sinfull act if he will and to worke the very will also of doing it in case he will And are not these then the gifts of God as well as others To conclude what think you of the gift of faith hath Christ merited it for us or no It seemes by your Doctrine he hath not as when you teach that albeit Christ hath satisfied for all merited Everlasting life for all yet the benefit of Christ obedience and death is by the ordinance of God applyable to none but such as have faith wherby it appears that you do not make faith to be any of those benefits which redound unto us by the obedience of Christ For though it be decent to say that salvation as a benefit procured by Christs obedience can redound to none but to such as believe yet it is very indecent to say that faith it selfe as a benefit of Christs death shall by the ordinance of God redound to none but to such as believe And indeed the Remonstrants now adaies doe openly professe that Christ merited faith for none And they are to be commended for dealing ingenuously and confessing that whereunto the Genius of their Tenet doth carry them Our Arminians deale not so plainly but as they pretend that faith and repentance are the gifts of God so they pretend that Christ merited them for us to wit he merited universall grace for all and every one whereby every man may believe if he will and repent if he will And how comfortable this particular is I have already shewed for it is as much as to say you may cease to despaire if you will you may cease to be afflicted if you will Secondly Christ merited that God should concurre to the working of faith and repentance in them provided that they would worke it in them selves Yea the very will to believe and repent God will worke in them modo velint So that still the resolution of all comfort is into a mans owne free-will For God gives not faith and repentance to whom he will or according to the meere pleasure of his will but rather according to mens workes And this direct Pelagianisme condemned so many hundred years agoe is that most comfortable doctrine of Christianity which our Arminians doe afford And this discourse as touching the universality of Christs death may be applyed also to the universality of Gods love which ends in this that all men shall be saved if they doe believe and that every man may believe if he will and that God is ready to worke faith and repentance in them provided that they will
be as ready to worke it in themselves 3. And now I come to this Authors third Topick place of consolation drawn from the universality of the Covenant of grace Now this is as strange as any of the former or rather much more and when the Covenant of grace is so much enlarged we have cause to feare that it is confounded with the Covenant of Workes And indeed if it were true as some of this sect professe namely that there is an universall grace given to al for the enlivening of their wills wherby they are enabled to will any spirituall good whereunto they shall be excited and to believe if they will and from the love of temporall things to convert themselves to the keeping of Gods Commandements if they will I see no reason but that the Law is able to give life though the Apostle supposeth the contrary and the way is as open unto man for justification by the workes of the Law as it was unto Adam in the state of innocency And if the Covenant of grace be universall and ever was for that I take to be this Authours meaning then God was no more the God of Abraham and of his seed then of all the World nether was the people of Israel more the Lords portion then any other Nation of the World yet Moses was sent unto Pharaoh in their behalfe with this Message Thus sayth the Lord Israell is my sonne my first borne wherefore I say unto thee Let my sonne goe that he may serve mee if thou refuse to let him goe Behold I will slay thy sonne even thy first borne Ex 4. 22 23. Thus God accounts them albeit they were miserably corrupted with Idolatry as it appeares Ez 20. 6. In the day that I lift up my hand upon them to bring them forth of the Land of Egypt 7. Then sayd I unto them Let every one cast a way the abominations of his eies and defile not your selves with the Idolls of Egypt for I am the Lord your God 8. But they rebelled against me and would not heare me for none cast away the abominations of their eyes neither did they forsake the Idolls of Egypt then I thought to poure out mine Indignation upon them and to accomplish my wrath against them in the midst of the Land of Egypt 9. But I had respect unto my name that it should not be polluted of the Heathen So he proceded in despite of their sinnes to carry them out of the Land of Egypt and brought them into the wildernesse and gave them Statutes and Judgments and his Sabaths v 10 11 12. But they rebelled against him in the Wildernesse whereupon he thought againe to poure out his indignation upon them in the Wildernesse to consume them v. 13. But he had respect unto his name v. 14. amd his eie spared them and would not destroy them v. 17. And againe when their Children provoked him by rebelling against him whereupon he thought of powring out his Indignation upon them v. 21. Neverthelesse he withdrew his hand and had respect unto his name v. 22. Then as touching the generation of that present time he professeth he will rule them with a mighty hand v. 33. And the issue thereof is no worse then this I will cause you to passe under the rod and bring you into the bond of the Covenant v. 37 And againe marke with what a gratious promise he concludes v. 43. There shall ye remember your wayes and all the workes wherein ye have been defiled and ye shall judge yourselves worthy to be cast of for all your evills which you have committed 44. And ye shall know that I am the Lord when I have respect unto you for my names sake and not after your wicked waies nor according to your corrupt worke O yee house of Israel saith the Lord God Here is the peculiar fruit of the Covenant of grace to master their iniquities to bring them unto repentance and to deliver them from the dominion of sinne and Satan If God performe this Grace to all and every one throughout the World then is the Covenant of grace universall and all and every one are under it but if there be few very few over whom sinne hath not the dominion then certainly very few are under the Covenant of grace For the Apostle plainly signifyeth this to be the fruit of the Covenant of grace where he saith Sinne shall not have dominion over you for ye are not under the Law but under grace Rom 6. 14. And the like we have Heb. 8. 8. I will make with the House of Judah a new Testament 9. Not like the Testament that I made with their fathers in the day that I tooke them by the hands to lead them out of the Land of Egypt For they continued not in my Testament and I regarded them not saith the Lord. 10. For this is the Testament that I will make with the House of Israell after those dayes saith the Lord I will put my Lawes in their mind and in their heart I will write them and I will be their God and they shall be my people 11. And they shall not teach every man his neighbour and every man his brother saying Know the Lord for all shall know me from the least of them to the greatest of them 12. For I will be mercyfull unto their unrighteousnesse and I will remember their sinnes and their iniquities no more According to this Covnant proceed those gratious promises whereof the Scriptures are full I have seen his wayes and I will heale them Es 57. 18. I will heale their rebellions Hos 14. 5. The Lord will subdue our iniquities Mich. 7. I will circumcise your hearts and the hearts of your children to love me with all your heart and with all your soule Deut 30. 6. I am the Lord your God which sanctify you c And therefore these comforts which here are so much magnified as only and fully sufficient for the releeving of an afflicted soul in the hour of temptation are but so many lies to speake in the Prophets phrase that this Author holds in his right hand and if through the illusions of Satan he take hold of them they may cast him into a dreame like unto the dreame of an hungry man who eateth and drinketh and maketh merry but when he awaketh his soule is empty For all these comforts so magnificently set forth have no force save in case a man believe them now if a man believeth our doctrine can assure him of Everlasting Life and so of his election which the Arminian cannot For we teach that which our Saviour hath taught us He that believeth in the Son hath Everlasting Life and he that obayeth not the Sonne shall not see life but the wrath of God abideth upon him But as for the performing of faith they leave that unto man together with Gods concurrence And in like sort for the maintenance of their faith they teach a man to put
Egyptians so in the sight of the children of Israel and of the bordering Nations No contradiction at all in this no more then Gods word is found to contradict it selfe And nothing but ignorance makes our adversaries so bold as to impute contradiction to us in this We grant willingly that God did intend that most should never believe and repent For as much as he intended to deny the gift of faith and repentance unto most as it is apparent he doth neither dares any Arminian deny it Only they feigne that God would give faith and repentance unto all in case they would prepare themselves which not only includes manifest Pelagianisme but over and above ends in non-sense as I have but erst and often times before made as cleare as the Sunne Gods eternall rejection of many thousands which is impossible to be avoided for how is it possible that what was from everlasting should be avoyded by man or Angell who are brought forth in time not to have been from everlasting though it be all one with the answers of the tempted and is contradictory to the comforts which this Author deviseth out of his own braine and proposeth too in a most colluding manner as before I have shewed and withall not so well sorting with the manner of comforts which he feignes and at meere pleasure obtrudes upon us which yet he cannot evacuate without betraying the shamefull nakednesse of his cause when denying God to bestow the gift of faith and repentance absolutely on whom he will and according to the meere pleasure of his will he is driven to manifest how he takes sanctuary in Pelagianisme maintaining the grace of faith and repentance to be conferred by God on men according to their workes and that in a most unsober manner as I have shewed at large yet notwithstanding is this eternall decree of God concerning the rejection of man nothing contrariant to better grounds of consolation ministred by our doctrine then any can be ministred by Arminians as who doe not so much as undertake to minister better comfort to any then such as is common to them with Reprobates But as for all those that are brought up in the Church of God who we can assure them that there is no cause excepting guilt of that sinne which is unto death or which is against the Holy-Ghost why any of them should conceive themselves to be Reprobates nay the affliction of conscience being the most ordinary meanes whereby God doth prepare men for a comfortable translation out of the state of nature into the state of grace they have cause to conceive comfort in this that these feares and terrours may be as pangs of child-birth to deliver their souls into the world of the sons of God and this vally of Achor a doore of hope this Bethany a house of sorrow or mourning the high-way unto the vision of Peace as Bethany was commonly taken by our Saviour in his way unto Jerusalem For conclusion we have heard a strange cracking of thornes in this but all proves but a squibbe their best light of consolation goes out in an unsavoury snuffe of Pelagianisme Let us remember though Thunder and Earth-quakes and Lightning have their course in the vaine imaginations of men yet God is still and ever will be in the small voyce of his word Let us give Gods truth the glory of our consolation As for Errour and that dangerous errour in defacing the glory of Gods grace let us never seeke any comfort therein and let them that love it take what comfort in it they can I doe not envy them but rather pitty them I would their hearts served them to have compassion upon them selves DISCOURSE SECT IV. SEcondly it leaves a Minister weake grounds only and insufficient to quiet the tempted and therefore it makes him unable to comfort His grounds that are left him are insufficient because they cannot convince and make it evident to the understanding of the tempted that he is not that which he feares i. e. a Reprobate out of temptation probabilities will uphold a mans hopes as they did Manoahs wife Judg. 13. 22 23. If the Lord would kill us he would not have received a burnt offering at our hands nor shewed us all these things because men are not so mistrustfull then but in temptation men are very suspitious and incredulous like Jacob who would not be perswaded that Joseph was alive and a great man in Egypt till he saw the Chariots that were sent to fetch him thither Gen. 45. 25. And like Thomas who would not believe that Christ was risen till he saw the print of the nailes and speare Iohn 20. 25. They will not believe any thing that is said for their comfort till it be made so apparent that they have nothing to say to the contrary My selfe have known some who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofes to their protestations nay to their oathes too before they would believe their words of comfort And in this temptation men are so strongly possest with a feare of the greatest evill in the World eternall rejection from God that they will not easily without manifest conviction believe the contrary But such grounds as these a Minister that holds absolute reprobation hath not he can say nothing that is able to make it appeare infallibly and unavoydably to the tempted that he is no absolute reprobate All that he can say is Be of good comfort you are a believer you are a true repenting sinner therefore no reprobate for faith and repentance are fruits of election and arguments of a state contrary to that which you feare But this the tempted will deny he will say that he is no believer c. And how will the Minister convince him that he is He must prove to him by the outward acts of faith and repentance for they are only apparent to him that he doth repent and believe but this proofe is not demonstrative doth not convince him because opera virtutum simulari possunt the externall acts of saith repentance or any other grace may be counterfeited The Devill may seeme to be an Angell of light Wolves may goe in Sheepes cloathing Judas may make the World believe by his Preaching and following Christ that he is a true Apostle And Simon Magus though he remaine in the gall of bitternesse and bond of iniquity may be thought by his receiving of Baptisme to be a true believer And so may any Hypocrite by some exterior act of faith and repentance cosen the best discerner of spirits among men and gaine the opinion and esteeme of a true penitent and believer Actions externally good or good in appearance may be evill indeed for want of a good rule a good manner a good end some other good circumstances with which an action which is good must be cloathed For bonum non oritur nisi ex integris and so by consequence cannot certainly prove the man that doth
touching the Act of God reprobating we say as Aquinas saith concerning the Act of God predestinating namely that no cause can be given thereof as from man like as no cause can be given of God's will God's will being eternall but whatsoever is in man being Temporall But as touching the things decreed or willed by Reprobation these are either the deniall of grace or inflicting of damnation As touching the deniall of grace we clearely professe that like as God of his mere will and pleasure doth shew mercy on some in bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them so God of his mere will and pleasure doth harden others in denying unto them the grace of saith and repentance and thus it is that Doctor Fulke maintaines God's election reprobation to be most free of his owne free will not upon the foresight of the merits of either of thē but touching the inflicting of damnation we maintaine that God neither doth inflict damnation nor ever did decree to inflict damnation of his owne mere pleasure and will but altogether for sinne either originall or actuall further we maintaine that in no moment of time or nature God doth decree to damne any man before he foreseeth the sinne for which they shall be damned 2. As touching the second we willingly grant that by vertue of God's decree it necessarily and unavoidably followes that whosoever dieth in finall impenitency shall be damned neither doe I thinke this Authour dares to avouch the contrary Secondly as touching finall impenitency wee willingly professe that upon supposition of God's decree finally to harden a man and to deny a man the grace of repentance It being clearely the gift of God as Scriptures testifie Act 5. 31 and 11. 18. 2 Tim 2 25 it is impossible that such a man should repent neverthelesse both repentance is possible and finall impenitency is avoidable simply to wit by grace 3. But this Authour loves not to explicate himselfe but I suppose he secretly maintaines that every man hath such a power by grace wherby he may repent if he will concerning which Tenent of his we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power but we deny that such a power is grace we say it is nature rather and that for this reason looke by what power a man may repent if he will by the same power he may ref use to repent if he will Now if this were grace then were grace inferior to a morall vertue for no morall vertue leaves a man indifferent to doe good or no to doe good or evill but inclines and disposeth the will only to that which is good so Justice disposeth a man only to just actions not indifferentlie to that which is just or to that which is unjust T is true neverthelesse a man that is just may doe an unjust Act if he will but this is not by vertue of the habit of Justice wherewith he is qualified But only by reason of the freedome of his will wich is naturall unto him for justice undoubtedly inclines a man's will only to that which appeareth just and so every morall vertue inclines the will only to a vertuous Act not indifferently either to acts vertuous or to acts vicious like as on the contrary a vicious habit inclines the will of man only to acts vicious not indifferently to acts vicious or to acts vertuous Secondly grace is supernaturall it were a Monster in Divinitie to say that supernaturall grace doth indifferently incline a man either to good or evill it is impossible it should incline a man save to acts supernaturall now every supernaturall act must needs be gratious it cannot be sinfull or evill lastly whosoever hath a willto repent such a one hath not only a power to repent but actually doth repent as touching the cheifest facultiein the change whereof repentance doth consist for that is the will and it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed in every kind of that which is truly good and surely to have a will to repent is a good thing if he want power let him and us pray for that out of that will and desirewe have to repent ut quod volumus implere valeamus that what we desire to doe we may be able to doe and we have no cause to feare that God will despise so gratious desires To these speeches let me adde that of Remigius Arch-bishop of Lyons who to Rabanus Arch-bishop of Mentz objecting that Saint Austine wrote a booke called Hipognosticon against Pelagius and Coelestius wherein he denied that Reprobates were properly praedestinati ad interitum predestinate to destruction answereth that Saint Austine said not so but some other man as it is supposed to purge the Church of calumnie which some ill affected ones did cast upon it namely that it taught that God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing and did withdraw the word Praedestination from the point of Reprobates and gave it only to the Elect and so gave great occasion of further Errour and mistake In this speech of his it is clearely implyed that it was the constant Doctrine of the Church then that Reprobates lye under no necessitating Decree of Perdition Here we find inserted a passage taken out of Remigius Arcsh-bishop of Lions his answer to Rabanus Arch-bishop of Mentz as it is to be found in the Historie of Gottescalchus written by Doctor Usher Arch-bishop of Armach pag. 107. Now that discourse of Remigius is not in answer to Rabanus Arch-bishop of Mentz but unto Hincmarus Arch-bishop of Remes And withall this Authour is pleased to geld it as he thinkes good For whereas Remigius hath it thus quasi Deus sua praedestinatione necessitatem imponeret hominibus in suis impietatibus permanendi in aeternum pereundi This Authour renders it thus That God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing leaving out altogether the former namely of imposing upon men a necessite of perishing in their impieties And every sober man may well wonder at his dealing in this especially seeing he hath left out that which is most materiall and most considerable for neither by Austin's Doctrine nor by our Doctrine hath God imposed upon any a necessitie of perishing but such as finally persevere in their impieties And will any man that is well in his wits oppose this Sure I am nor Hincmarus nor any other was knowne to mee to oppose this in the Church of God Neither is there any necessitie inherent in man on whom it is said to be imposed but a consequent denomination to God's unchangeable or irresistable will to damne all such as persist finally in their sinfull courses without breaking thē off by repentance All the question is about the necessity of Reprobates persisting in their impieties which might be objected as it seemes was objected against Austin's doctrine of Predestination by this Authour is objected against ours now by this
nostrum Dei per praevenientem gratiam nostrum per subsequenteÌ„ liberam voluntatem The good that we doe is both God's worke and ours of God by Grace preventing ours by free will following To this Remigius answers and first he saith Hincmarus discoureseth after such a manner as if a good worke were partly God's worke and partly ours And againe as if the beginning of a good worke were God's but the effect thereof of man's free will although as he Hincmarus doth endeavour to temper this speech of his by the addition of grace not by the fulnesse of it gratiae adjunctione non etiam plenâ—tudine by the adjunction of grace not also by the fulnesse of it So he should have done saith Remigius cum verè totum sit Dei seeing indeed the whole is God's worke As the truth it selfe saith without me ye can do nothing And the Apostle what hast thou that that thou hast not received whence the blessed and glorious Martyr Cyprian hath so defined it saying we must glory in nothing seeing nothing is ours and concludes thus Bonum itaque nostrum totum Dei est quia totum est ex Deo nihil boni nostri nostrum est quia nihil boni nostri est ex nobis Therefore our good workes are holy God's and noe good of ours is ours because it is not of us and to reconcile this seeming contradiction in calling it our good yet denying it to be from us he concludes thus omne bonum nostrum totum Dei est donando totum nostrum est accipiendo Every good thing of ours is wholy God's in as much as he gives it and it becomes ours full and whole for as much as we receive it Fulgentius is plaine for it to lib. 1. ad Monium pag. 6. These whome God foresaw would dye in sinne he decrees should live in endles punishment I may take in Saint Austine and Prosper also who are judged to be the Patrons of he absolute Decree as it is set downe in the Sublapsarian way even they doe many times let fall such speeches as cannot fairely be reconciled with absolute Reprobation I will only cite Prosper for Saint Austine speakes in him he discoursing of some that fall a way à Sanctitate ad immunditiem from holinesse to uncleannesse saith they that fall away from holinesse to uncleannesse lye not under a necessity of perishing because they were not predestinate but therefore they were not predestinate because they were knowne to be such by voluntary praevarication Not long after speaking of the same men he saith Because God foresaw they would perish by their owne free will therefore he did not by any predestination lever them from the children of perdition And againe in his answer to the twelvth objection he hath these words God hath not withdrawne from any man ability to yeeld obedience because he hath not predestinated him but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience therefore he hath not predestinated him They are I confesse the wordes of Fulgentius in the 25 chapter of his first booke ad Monium and in the very next chapter he doth expresse himselfe in this manner on the point of predestination unto glory praedestinavit illos ad snpplicium quos à se praescivit voluntatis malae vitio decessuros praedestinavit ad regnum quos ad se praescivit misericordiae praevenientis auxilio redituros in se misericordiae subsequentis auxilio mansuros He predestinateth those untopunishment whom he foresaw to be such as would depart from him through the fault of a naughty will and he predestinated to the kingdome those whom he foresaw to be such as would returne unto him by the help of mercy prevenient and would persevere in him by the helpe of grace subsequent So that upon the same ground he may as well deny predestination unto salvation to be absolute in the opinion of Fulgentius as predestination unto damnation Now Vossius in his preface to the Pelagian Historie having first confessed that all Antients agreed in this That God did not ordaine any other unto eternall salvation then such who by his mere gift of grace should have the beginning of faith and good will and persevere in that which is good as it was foreseen by him In the next place acknowledgeth that Austine and Prosper and the Authour of the booke de vocatione Gentium and Fulgentius unto this common opinion of Catholiques did adde this That this praescience Divine did flow from God's absolute Decree to save them This I say Vossius writes though I see no cause to regard his judgment in this Argument His distinction is very well knowne of will absolute and will conditionall which will conditionate he examplifies thus as when God will have salvavation conferred upon a man in case he doth believe what one of our Divines doth deny a conditionall will in this sense in reference to salvation Now what one of the Antients the Pelagians excepted can this Authour produce that doth affirme any such will to be in God for the bestowing of faith upon a man For to maintaine this were in plaine Termes to maintaine that it was the will of God that grace should bestowed according unto workes But if the grace of God be bestowed merely according to the good pleasure of God as Saint Paule saith God hath mercy on whom he will By this it is aparent that this decree is absolute and consequently that predestination is absolute And thus Austine coupleth together the doctrine of the bestowing grace not according unto workes And his Doctrine of predestination as inseparable each to be granted or denied together with the other Because this Authour pretends it to be needles to cite Austine and sufficient to cite Prosper adding that Austine speakes in him to wit after he was Dead such is this Authours jugling course with his Reader therefore I will represent Austine himselfe proposing the objection made by the Massilienses against Austin's doctrine of predestination as it was sent unto him by Prosper and then answering it not leaving it unto Prosper to answer for him See the objection sed aiunt ut scribitis neminem posse correptionis stimulis excitari si dicatur in conventu Ecelesiae audientibus multis It a se habet de praedestinatione definita sententia voluntatis Dei ut alii ex vobis de infidelitate accepta obediendi voluntate veneritis ad fidem vel accepta perseverantia maneatis in fide c. But they say as ye write that none can be stirred up by the Goad of correption if it be said in the Congregation in the hearing of many such as touching predestination is the determinate sentence of the will of God that some of you receiving an obedient will shall come from infidelitie unto faith or receiving perseverance shall continue in the faith But the rest who continue in sinfull delights therefore you have not risen because the succour of
preparatur Reprobatis in quantum scil Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata quae à se ipsis habent non à Deo The foresight of sinnes may be some reason of reprobation as touching the punishment which is prepared for Reprobates in asmuch as God decreeth to punish wicked men for their sinnes which they have of themselves not of God But of reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating there can be noe more cause thereof then there can be a cause of God's will as touching the act of God willing And upon this very ground it is that Aquinas professeth that * never any man was so mad as to affirme that there may be a cause given of predestination as touching the act of God predestinating Let us therefore forbeare to impute any such opinion to Prosper or any other of the Antients which none ever was so mad as to maintaine in the judgment of Aquinas The same answer will serve for the next derived out of the same place in Prosper As for the third of withdrawing strength of obedience This indeed was objected unto Austine as if in his opinion God did so wheras I have shewed also how Austine signifies that he had nothing to doe with that and therefore he leaves that quite out And indeed Austin's is cleare and expresse that as many as God hath not predestinated those he never bring 's unto wholsome and spirituall repentance whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Christ Cont Iulian Pelag lib. 5. cap. 4. And consequently he never brings them to any true obedience The whole sentence in Prosper hath no more moment then the former and therefore admits the same answer A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some person of note and those Saint Austin's followers too who lived about 400 yeares after Saint Austin's time Remigius the great Patron of Gotteschalke the zeatous preacher and publisher of absolute reprobation in those times in his answer to that epistle which we suppose to be the Epistle of Rabanus saying that God did make the nations of the world and that he doth will that all men should be saved he gives such an answer as cannot stand with absolute reprobation This saith he is very true because God layeth on noe man a necessity of perishing as he hath laid on none a necessity of sinning And a little after he is plainer Those whom God did fore know would live and dye in their wickednesses for reasons most just should perish as himselfe saith Him that sinneth against me even him will I blot out of my Booke In the Valantine Synod assembled in the favour of Gotteschalke we may find these words Therefore doe the wicked perish not because they could not but would not be good and by their owne fault originall or actuall also remained in the Masse of perdition And in the end of their 3. Cannon they pronounced Anathema to those that hold that men are so predestinated unto evill as they cannot be otherwise That any should be saith the Councell predestinated unto evill by the power of God so as he cannot be otherwise we doe not only not believe but also if there be any that will believe so great an evill with all detestation we denounce them accursed as the Councell also did This Authour grants Remigius to be a Patron of absolute reprobation But these words of his this Authour saith cannot stand with absolute Reprobation Remigius undoubtedly thought they could otherwise he must have renounced the Doctrine of absolute reprobation and the Patronage thereof which yet he did not as this Authour acknoledgeth Now is it enough for this Authour to say that these words cannot stand with absolute Reprobation and barely to say it without proving ought and truely I have found such to be the imperious carriage of this Authour in manuscript now I see it in print But let us endeavour to cleare Remigius by proving the Contrary indevour to cleare Remigius by proving the contrary Therefore it is well knowne that the Terme absolute stand's in opposition to Conditionall Now this distinction of will absolute and will Conditionall Gerardus Vossius doth accommodate in respect of the things willed of God and gives instance of God's will of saving which he saith is conditionall forasmuch as God purposeth not to bestow salvation on any but such as believe faith being by God's ordinance the Condition of obtaining Salvation In like sort Doctor Iackson in his book of Providence acknowledgeth the distinction of voluntas antecedens and consequens is to be understood not on the part of God willing but on the part of things willed Now the things willed in the decree of Reprobation are two contrary to things willed in Election For as in Election God doth will the conferring of grace and the conferring of salvation soe in Reprobation God doth will the deniall of grace and inflicting of damnation Now Remigius in the passages here produced speakes altogether of God's will to inflict damnation and he denies that God's will is to inflict damnation on any man absolutely but only conditionally to wit in case of finall perseverance in sinne and so say we with Remigius But as touching God's will to deny grace we utterly deny that God will have grace to be denied upon a condition for nothing can be devised to be the condition thereof but sinne either originall or actuall And if upon such a condition grace should be denied it should be denied to all seeing before grace is given all are found to be under sinne actuall or originall and consequently all should be Reprobates even every mothers sonne 2. And if to avoid this it be said although all be sinners yet grace is denyed to none but such as want a certaine particular obedience Then upon the performing of that obedience grace should be conferred this is as much as to say that Grace is conferred according unto workes which doctrine hath ever been abominated by the Orthodox in opposition unto the Pelagians Now the Apostle clearely makes for us in this professing that God hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth Now though there passages produced out of Remigius carrie some shew against absolute reprobation from glorie or unto damnation yet have they noe colour or shew of opposing absolute reprobation from grace As for necessitie of perishing that is merely conditionall to wit in case of finall continuance in sinne without repentance And as for necessitie of sinning that we confesse is found in all in state of nature Corvinus confesseth it to be the doctrine of Arminius that all men naturally are cast upon a necessitie of sinning And Doctor Potter proposeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England that in a naturall man there is no libertas a peccato libertie from sinning which yet is to be understood aright not but that it is in his power to abstaine from any particular sinfull act for
againe the word of God came to Semaiah the man of God saying speak to Rehoboā the son of Solomon King of Iudah unto all the house of Iudah Benjamin to the remnant of the people saying Thus saith the Lotd ye shall not goe up nor fight against your brethren the children ef Israel returne every man to his house for this thing is from me Here we have Gods word for it Who can deny that the hardening of Pharohs heart that he should not let Israel go the selling of Ioseph into Egypt by the hands of his unnaturall brethren came to passe by the will of God I proceed to prove the same truth by evidence of reasō First because God permits sin to come to passe as all confesse though he could hinder it if it pleased him that without all detriment to the free will of the creature why then doth he permit it but because he would have it come to passe accordingly permission is reckoned up by Schoole Divines amongst the sinnes of Gods will like as allso is Gods commandment Now what God commandeth if it be done it is said to come to passe by the will of God albeit the things that God commandeth seldome the things he permits allwayes come to passe according to the common tenet of Divines even Vostius Arminius not excepted Againe it is the common opinion of all that therefore God permits sin because he can and will worke good of it which plainly supposeth that sinne shall come to passe if God permits it consequently it must needes be the will of God it shall come to passe Thirdly it is granted on both sides that the act of sin is Gods worke in the way of an efficient cause not the outward act onely which is naturall but the inward act of the will which is morall even this as an act is the worke of God How can it be then but the deformity and vitiousnesse of the act must come to passe God willing it though not working it considering that the deformity doth necessarily follow the act in reference to the creatures working it though not in respect of Gods working it Lastly all sides agree that God can give effectuall grace whereby a man shall be preserved from sin infallibly Wherefore as often as God will not give this grace which is in his power to give doth it not manifestly follow that he will not have such a man preserved frō sin To these I added the testimony of divers as that of Austin Not any thing comes to passe unlesse Good will have it come to passe either by suffering it to come to passe or himselfe working it If good he workes it if evill permits it 't is true of each that he wills it cap. 96. It is Good saith Austin that evill should come to passe And Bellarmine himselfe so farre subscribes hereunto as by professing that It is good that evills shoul come to passe by Gods permission The same Austin confesseth that The perversity of the heart comes to passe by the secret judgment of God And againe that after a wonderfull and unspeakable manner even those things which are committed against the will of God to wit against the will of his commandment do not come to passe besides the will of God to wit the will of his purpose Anselme the most ancient of schoole Divines in his booke of the concord of foreknowledge with free will Considering saith he that what God willeth cannot but be when he wills that the will of mā shall not be constrained by any necessity to will or no and withall will have an effect follow the will of man In this case it must needs be that the will of man is free and that also which God willeth shall come to passe to wit by that will of man Now observe what in the next place he concludeth hence In these cases therefore it is true that the worke of sin which man will doe must needs be though man doth not will it of necessity And in his concord of predestination and free will In Good things God doth worke both that they are and that they are good in evill things he workes onely that they are not that they are evill Hugo de sancto Victore 1. De sacr 4. p. 13. When we say God willeth that which is good it sounds well but if we say God willeth evill it is harsh to eares neither doth a pious mind admit of the good God that he willeth evill for hereby he thinkes the meaning is that God loves and approves of that which is evill therefore the pious mind abhorres it not because that which is said is not well said but because that which is well said is not well understood To these I adde the testimony of Bradwardine at large A man reputed so pious in those dayes that the Kings prospe ous successe in those dayes was cheifly imputed unto his piety who followed him in his warres in France as Preacher in the camp In the last place I make answer to the Sophisticall arguments of Aquinas and Durandus and the frothy disputation of Valentianus all of them standing to maintaine the contrary Now let every sober Christian judge of this Authors proposition when he saith that If God doth will and procure sin c. he is worse then the Devill For I have made it evident by variety of Scripture testimonyes by reason and also with the concurrence of diverse learned Divines that it is Gods will that sin should come to passe even the horrible outrages committed against the holy sonne of God were before determined by Gods hand and counsell Now what followes herehence by this Authours dicourse but that the holy Apostles yea and the Spirit of God do make God worse then the Devill So little cause have we to be impatient when such horrible blasphemyes are layd to our charge when we consider what honourable compartners we have in these our sufferings Yet see the vanity of this consequence represented most evidently For albeit the will of Gods decree be powerfull effectuall and irresistable and consequently every thing decreed thereby shall come to passe powerfully effectually irresistibly yet this respects onely the generality of the things eveniency not the manner how For onely things necessary shall by this irresistible wil of God come to passe necessarily But as for contingent things they by the same irresistable will of God shall come to passe also but how not necessarily but contingently that is with a possibility of not comming to passe Now the free actions of men are one sort of contingent things They therefore shall infallibly come to passe also by vertue of Gods irresistible will but how Not necessarily but contingently that is with a possibility of not coming to passe in generall as they are things contingent And in speciall they shall come to passe not contingently onely but freely also that is with a free power in the
how this Authour chargeth our doctrine after the same manner was the doctrine of Austin charged above 1200 yeares agoe let the indifferent hereby take notice of the congruity of our doctrine with the doctrine of Austin in this particular and the congruity of this Authours spirit in charging us with the spirit of the Semipelagians in charging Austin after the same manner Secondly consider the objection there made t' is this Quod quando incestant Patres filias matres filios vel quando Servi Dominos occidunt ideo fiat quia ita Deus predestinavit ut fieret When father commit incest with their Daughters and mothers with their sonnes Or when servants kill their Lords therefore this comes to passe because God hath so predestinated that it should come to passe Consider in this objection the fault of these abominable courses is not layd upon those that commit them but onely upon God as if Gods predestination did worke in such a manner as to compell men or women to commit such and such abominations And so Prosper conceives the Argument to proceed as if this were their intention And accordingly makes answer Si Diabolo objiceretur quòd talium facinorum ipse Author ipse esset incentor were it objected to the Devill that he were the Authour of such sinnes and did inflame men to the committing of them which indeed is the Devills course and not Gods yet I thinke sayth he that the Devill might in some sort disburthen himselfe of this crimination talium scelerum patratores de ipsorum voluntate vinceret and make it appeare that their owne wills were the committers of such sinnes Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium probaret tamen se non intulisse vim criminum Because though he tooke pleasure in the fury of sinners yet might he justifie that he forced no man to sinne After the same manner proceeded the 11. objection of the Galles Quod per potentiam Deus homines ad peccata compellit God by his power compells men to sin And as touching the notion of predestination it is true the Antients used that onely in reference to those thinges which were wrought by God Nihil ergo talium to wit of wicked actions negotiorum Deus predestinavit ut fieret Predestination being onely of such things which come to passe by Gods working of them Yet the same Austin professeth that such things which come to passe by Gods permission of which kind are all manner of sinnes even those came to passe God willing thē though not by Gods predestinating of them And as touching Senacherib who was slaine by his owne sonnes the Lord professeth saying I will cause him to fall by the sword in his owne land And upon Amaziah the Priest of Bethel the judgment was pronounced from the Lord Thy wife shall be an harlot And whatsoever comes to passe it is Gods will it should come to passe sayth Austin how much more that which comes to passe in the way of judgment 2 I come to his second reason to examine whether he carryeth himselfe any thing more handsomly in that If God be the Authour of sinne he cannot be the punisher of sin This argument is better shaped then the former but forthwith he tells us that he cannot be in justice the punisher of that whereof himselfe is the Authour Wherein are two particulars neither of which were expressed in his argument the one is the application of it to the same sinne whereof he was the Authour which was not expressed in the Argument And without this application the Argument is of no force For earthly Magistrates are sinners yet the punishers of sinne in others yea of the same kind of sinne As though a Magistrate be a profaner of the name of God yet he may execute the law on them who doe profane the name of God and that justly Then what is it that makes a man the Author of sinne It is well knowne that though it be unlawfull for a man to permit sinne if it be in his power to hinder it yet unlesse God permit sinne it cannot be committed by any Nos certe saith Austin sieos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare Scelera permittamus rei cum ipsis erimus Quam vero innumerabilia ille permitit fieri ante oculos suos quae utique si voluisset nullâ ratione permitteret Certainely if we suffer those over whom we have power to commit sinne we shall be guilty together with them But how innumerable are the sinnes which he suffers to be committed before his eyes which if he would he could hinder so that by no meanes they should cōe to passe Or is he the Authour of sinne who is the efficient cause of the act of sinne It is Aquinas his doctrine that the act of sinne is from God and that in the kind of an efficient cause and it is commonly received to be the first cause in the kind of efficients subordinate to none and all other subordinate to him Nay more then this Scotus professeth and after him the Dominicans that God determineth the will to every act thereof though sinfull as touching the substance thereof but how Surely no otherwise then to come to passe agreeably to their nature necessary acts necessarily free acts freely So Barwardine maintaines that God necessitates the will of the creatue but how To performe acts thereof freely Suppose they did maintaine that God in his omnipotency did impose a necessity upon our wills as Suarez imputes to our Divines that they so teach Yet in this case Suarez the Jesuite will justifie them that therein they deliver nothing that either doth include contradiction or that doth exceed God's omnipotency Neither did I ever meet any colour of reason why God might not as wholy determine the will to any free act thereof as concurre with the will to the producing of the same act And that in the concurrence of God and man to the same act the first cause should be in subordination to the second or the second cause not in subordination to the first is against all reason and obnoxious to manifold contradiction as I have shewed in my Vindiciae Whereas for God to move a creature to every act of his congruously to his nature and so to determine him is most agreeable to reason and nothing at all obnoxious to contradiction And yet notwithstanding I see noe sufficient reason to conclude these determinations as touching things naturall such as is the substance of every naturall act there being a power to performe that in a naturall Agent Of supernaturall acts the case is different It seemes to me enough that God will have this or that evill come to passe by his permission For when God created the world out of nothing what transient action of God can be imagined when there was no matter at all for any such transient action to worke upon God's will was sufficient
or ability at all in the issue of avoiding their sinnes but must of necessity commit them Thus they teach and therefore by just consequences they make God the Authour of sinne as it will plainly appeare by these following considerations Poets tell us there was a time when Giants on earth set themselves to fight against God in heaven because the place of his habitation was out of their reach they laid mountaine upon mountaine hill upon hill Pelion upon Ossa that so they might make their approaches unto him beseige him in his own fastnes this fable is a monumēt of the shipwrack of that truth among heathen-men which the Lord had preserved unto his Church upon record in his holy word For when after the great Deluge in the dayes of Noah men began to be multiplied upon the face of the earth they consulted how they might fortify themseves against the like inundation for the time to come and thereupon encouraged thēselves saying Goe to let us build us a City and a town whose top may reach unto the Heaven that we may get us a name least we be scattered upon the whole earth But how didthe Lord deale with these presumptuous adventurers The Poet 's faign that Iupiter destroyed them with his thunderbolts and as for one of them Typhoeus by name a proud fellow he laid him fast enough under the hill Aetna in Sicily where he breaths out smoak fire like the great Polan out of a Tobacco-pipe somewhat bigger then a good Caliver But the Scripture tels us how that for their saying Goe too let us build c. the Lord answered them with a Come on let us goe downe and there confound their language that every one perceive not one anothers speech This Author herhaps is but a Pygmie for bodily presence yet he may be a Gyant for his wit and found 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to fight against God in a spirituall way in the opposing of his truth As Gamaliel sometimes advised the high Priest with his counsell to take heed lest they were found even fighters against God It is true this Author no doubt perswades himselfe that he fights for God in as much as he affects to free him from being the Author of sin But let not the simple Reader be deluded with shewes but seriously consider whither all this doe which he makes about the point of Reprobation doth not clearly tend to the overthrowing of God's free grace in election which is so much the more foule because he doth it underhand as conscious to himselfe of his owne impotency to impugne it openly or fearing the generall opposition of our Church against him therefore he practiseth to undermine it And this I have found to be his course divers years agoe in his private undertakings to draw proselytes unto him namely to decline the point of grace of election to deale only upon Reprobation and there to put his concurrent to begin as if he would have a young Divine to inform a Sexagenarian as I have seen under his own hand But see the hand of God upon him in confounding his language as when he stands for Reprobation evitable avoidable reproacheth his adversaries for maintaining Reprobation inevitable unavoidable This is the phrase of his Schoole For I do not remember to have met with it any where but in him his disciples Now what man of common sense doth not observe this phrase to be appliable only to things that are to come but of a contingent nature so that they may be avoyded declined but by no means apply able to things already done that more then many thousand years agoe For what sober man could heare with patience another discourse of the avoidable nature of Noah's flood now in these daies to maintain that it is at this day avoidable what fustian like to this Might he not as well take liberty to discourse of the Aequinoctiall pasticrust It was wont to be said that this alone God himself could not perform namely to cause that which is done to be not done As Aristotle in his Eth relates a saying of one Agatho to that purpose Now reprobation is confessed by all to be of the same age with election election was as the Apostle tels us performed by God before the foundation of the world And is not this Author then besides himself when he pleads for evitable avoydable Reprobation But albeit this Author makes the worst of our opinions and expressions yet I will not requite him by making the worst of his that were base inglorious and to be overcome I will therefore hearken to the Apostles counsell where he saith Be not overcome with evill but overcome evill with good I will make the best of his and according to the distinction of God's will used in Schooles as it is taken either quoad actum volentis or quoad res volitas as touching the act of him that willeth or the things willed So I will imagine that he speaks of Reprobation which is the will of God not as touching the act of God Reprobating making such a decree but as touching the thing decreed this thing decreed he will have to be of an avoidable nature Now this we willingly grant utterly deny that this any way hinders the absolutenes of God's decree We say with the 11 article of the Church of Ireland that God from all aeternity did by his unchangeable councell ordain whatsoever should in time come to passe yet so as hereby neither the contingency nor liberty of the second causes is taken away but established rather So that whereas we see some things come to passe necessarily some contingently so God hath ordained that all things shall come to passe that do come to passe but necessary things necessarily contingent things contingently that is avoidably with a possibility of not comming to passe For every University Scholar knows this to be the notion of contingency yet will not I content my selfe with the article of Ireland for this Aquinas thus distinguisheth For having proposed this question Whether the will of God doth impose a necessity upon the things willed To this question this Author with whom I deale would answer affirmatively saying it doth impose a necessity on all such things or at least obtrude such an opinion upon us himself undoubtedly thinks that in case Gods will be absolute it must cause a necessity upon all things willed therby both which are utterly untrue this last utterly denyed by Aquinas For first every will of God is absolute in the judgment of Aquinas which I prove thus That will which hath noe cause or reason thereof is absolute This proposition I presume this Authour will not deny But the will of God hath no cause in the judgment of Aquinas therefore every will of God is absolute by his doctrine Yet this absolute will of God imposeth not a necessity upon all things
ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari etiamsi optimè vivat se itaque velle pro suâ libidine vivere Ut ut enim sollicite lahoret non tamen posse decretum Dei infringere Respondet hic Christus Omnem palmitem c. qnod dicitur Quid ad te de occultâ Dei praedestinatione Hoc tu videris ut tu in me maneas fructum feras reliquae dispensationi prudentiae Dei committenda sunt Nam etiamsi videar is ad aeternam salutem praedestinatus non tamen fructum feras abjicieris in ignem tanquam infructuosus palmes He instances in Saul then whom there was not a better man in Israel That which is here cited out of Marlorat his Expositio Ecclesiastica it is set down as in Calvin's Commentary but no such thing is found in Calvin And it may be that is the fault of the Printers mistaking And Marlorat's own exposition succeeds in a few words thus Quae ideò dicuntur non ut fideles inde ansam arripiant de suâ salute dubitandi sed ut carnalis securitas ignavia ab hominibus tollatur And the next sentence whence this question is taken seems to cohere with this though a great C. as if it were Calvin's comes in between and it begins thus Certum est enim dècretum Dei à nemine infirmari posse quia Deus non est ut homo qui poenitentiam agat retractet sententiam semel decretam Then followes the passage here alleadged and at the heels of it these words Time igitur in solam Domini eligentis manum respice ut salutem per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum assequaris Undoubtedly Marlorat approves of Brentius his exposition otherwise he would not have placed it in his Expositio Ecclesiastica Now Brentius brings in the very saying for which Maldonat is criminated as the objection of some carnall person Therefore when Marlorat seems to justifie such a saying it must be in another sense and that either of good workes in shew of which Brentius also observed that such might have been found in Saul Or of workes in distinction from faith And accordingly he concludes with exhortation feare that is not to be secure how good soever his workes are but to have an eye to God and trust only to him that so he may obtain salvation through Jesus Christ Calvin in Ioh. 15. 6. Arescere dicuntur instar emortua sarmenta quae à Christo resecta sūt quia sicuti initiū vigoris ab ipso est ita continuus tenor Non quòd ex electis aliquem contingat unquam execari sed quia multae hypocritae in speciem ad tempus florent virent qui postea in reddendo fructu spem domini frustrantur They are said to to wither like a branch cut off such as are cut off from Christ because like as the beginning of their vigour is from him so also their continuance Not that at any time it falleth out that any of Gods Elect is cut off but because many Hypocrites carry a faire shew for a time as if they were green and flourishing who afterwards in rendring fruit make void the Lords Expectation 2. The decree of Reprobation as touching one part of it cannot be executed without sin For it is a decree of inflicting damnation for sin so that there is no place for damnation where sinne and that as a meritorious cause preceeds not I had thought this Authour needed not to runne out to Piscator and Maccovius for proofe of this neither Arminius nor the Authour is of any other opinion I am confident then that the decree of damnation cannot be executed on any without the precedency of sin in the party who is to be damned But there is another part of Reprobation For as Aquinas speakes it includes the will of permitting sin Now the execution of this decree which consists in the permitting of sin doth not require the precedency of sinne For when God first permitted the Angels to fall this permission of his did not require any precedency of sinne in them nor the permission of Adam to fall it cannot be said without manifest contradiction that it did For before the first sinne there was no sinne Piscator saith that God created men for this very purpose that they might fall he saith hoc consilio which is as much as to say with this purpose not for this purpose to wit to permit them to fall And God purposing this purposed that they should fall by his permission For Arminius confesseth that in case God permits a man to will this or that Necesse est ut nullo argumentorū genere persuadeatur ad nolendum It must needs be that no argument shall perswade him to will that which God permits him to will And that it is good that evill should come to passe by God's permission both Austine hath affirmed Bellarmine subscribed And shall it not be lawfull for God to will that which is good Undoubtedly neither justice punishing nor mercy pardoning can be manifested without sin either to be punished or pardoned or both neither is it credible to me that this Authour thinks otherwise And is not the manifestatiō of God's mercy on some and his justice on others the supreme end of God's providence towards mankind and consequently by the most received rules of Schooles first intended even before the permisson of sinne For if the permission of sinne were first intended then by the same rule of Schooles it should be in the last place executed that is God should first manifest his mercy and justice in pardoning some and punishing others and afterwards suffer them to sinne such is the learning and judgments of these Divines And as for the foresight of sin it is apparent that it presupposeth God's purpose to permit it and more then that it presupposeth the fruition of it Now it is well knowne that sinne in its own nature is meerly possible How comes it to passe that from the condition of a thing meerly possible it hath passed into the condition of a thing future This cannot be done without a cause and that cause must be eternall for the effect was eternall For from everlasting sinne was future for from everlasting God knew it to be future Now there is nothing everlasting but God himselfe therefore he must needs be the cause of this transition whereby a thing meerly possible in its own nature became future And therefore either by his knowledge he was the cause thereof or by his will and decree Not by his knowledge for that rather supposeth thē to be future then makes them such It remaines therefore that the will of God and that alone makes every future thing to passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible into the condition of a thing future and that from everlasting Let this Authour satisfie this argument and I will ease him of all further paines and lay down the bucklers before
holy Ghost himselfe whose expressions are the same for substance with the expressions of Piscator It is farther observable that Piscator saith That Reprobates by reason of this Divine ordination doe sinne necessarily I answer Piscator was an excellent Scripture Divine but noe School-divine and therefore noe marvaile if he want the accuratenesse of Scholasticall expression Yet I salve him thus They sinne necessarily upon suspicion that God will have them to sinne by his permission but this is noe necessity simply so called but only secundum quid But God decrees the manner of things comming to passe as well as the things themselves as before I shewed out of Aquinas Soe that all be it it must needs be that sinne come to passe in case God hath decreed it shall come to passe yet if the question be after what manner it shall come to passe I answere not necessarily but contingently and freely that is not onely with a possibility of not comming to passe but with a free power in the creature to abstaine from that sin which is committed by him For God ordained that every thing that doth come to passe shall come to passe agreably to the nature thereof and accordingly moves every creature to worke agreeably to their natures Necessary agents necessarily contingent agents contingently Free agents freely And as formerly was mentioned every sinfull act is a naturall act and a man hath free power even in the state of corruption either to doe or to leave undone any naturall act And Piscator in other places dealing with Vorstius clearely professeth as I well remember though the the place come not to my memory that wicked men doe commit those things freely which are committed by them And it is an excellent saying of Austine that Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia Liberty without grace is not liberty but wilfullnesse indeed they shew too much will therein rather then too little and in denying liberty to them that want grace he speakes of liberty morall which is only unto true good not of liberty naturall which hath place only in the choice of meanes and is inseparable from the nature of man But true morality sets a mans soule in a right condition towards his right end 4. It may be this Authour could not be so inconsiderate as not to perceive that even those expressions concerning Gods decree which he criminates in our Divines are Scripture expressions therefore to helpe his cause here he imputes unto them that they maintaine that God decreed this immutably as if himselfe could be content to grant that these things are decreed by God but not immutably And would this Authour have the will of God to be of a mutable condition like unto ours I am confident he dares not professe so much for albeit he licks his lips at a conditionall decree yet how doth he conceive this to be mutable For to resolve to save men upon condition of faith and repentance and perseverance and damne others in case they continue in infidelity and impenitency if accordingly none be saved but such in whom faith and repentance and finall perseverance therein is found none damned but such as persevere in sinne unto death what change is there in all this Unlesse this be it that God did not resolve to save any particular person untill his finall perseverance was accomplished And so God may be said in processe of time to change from not willing to willing one man's salvation and another man's damnation In which case God's decree also should not be eternall but begin in time Againe as touching that which followes of of God decreeing that Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne I answer to decree not to regenerate Reprobates is to decree that Reprobates shall not be regenerated for they are not able to regenerate themselves and to decree that they shall not be regenerated is to decree that they shall live and dye in sinne by God's permission he resolving never to shew such mercies to take them of from their sinfull courses by repentance And so long as they are not borne of God they will not heare his words as our Saviour testifies saying Yee therefore heare them not because ye are not of God As for sinne procured by the hand of God which he obtrudes upon our Divines not one passage doth he produce for that Yet as I remember I have read such an harsh expression in Piscator dealing against Vorstius which at this time doth not come to my remembrance but withall I remember that Piscator being charged therewith by Vorstius forthwith represents certaine passages of Scripture concerning Gods's providence in evill and appeales to the judgment of every sober Christian whether to do that which therein is attributed to God be not to procure sin It is apparent that Joseph acknowledgeth that the Lord sent him into Egypt yet was this brought to passe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren And it is no lesse plaine that God hardened Pharaohs heart that he should not let Israel goe And by Arminius his Definition of effectuall grace it is evident that by Gods denying it sin doth follow infallibly And so likewise upon Gods permission of willing this or that he professeth that it must needs be that by noe kind of argument shall such a one be perswaded to nill it I come to the meanes whereby he is said to procure it The first is by withdrawing grace necessary for the avoyding of sin Now of this he gives no instance out of any of our Divines 2 I know no grace which this Authour accounts necessary that any of our Divines teach to be withdrawen by God 3 God indeed doth not determine their wills to that which is good but this Authour doth not account any such determination necessary to the avoyding of sin 4 Prohibition denuntiation of judgment dehortation and such gracious actions God doth neither withdraw nor withhold from the wicked who are partakers of this grace as well as Gods children as often as they meet in the same congregation for the hearing of Sermons 5. An effectuall restraint from sin I know none but the feare of God yet this he withdrawes not from the wicked for they never had it nor from the children of God only he doth not stirrre it in them at all times so often as he suffers them to sin which yet may be to gracious ends As I for the confirmation of their faith that nothing no not sin shall separate them from the love of God when they shall find the goodnesse of God minding them of their errours and bringing them to repentance 2 As also to make them smart for their former security and wantonnesse in beholding the uncomfortable issue of it 3 To provoke them to walke more carefully and circumspectly for the time to come standing upon their guard and keeping the watch of the Lord. 4. To cure their pride according to that of Austin Audeo dicere
for the preservation of the integrity of her mind in the opinion of the world and that they might know that she consented not unto Tarquinius but was forced by him So then the act is it they doe or choose to doe for some motive or other which whether it be pleasure or profit or credit they get thereby that makes not the act sinfull but only that it is against some law or other forbidding it And this act all sides confesse is the worke of God as well as the worke of man as in whom we move like as in him we live and have our being And Bradwardine maintaines that of every act of the creature God is a more immediate cause then the creature it selfe whoâ—e act it is This he proves of the creatures conservation of the creatures action of the creatures motioÌ„ to this he proceeds by certaine degrees And in all this God doth not transgresse any law as man doth too often in the performing of many a naturall act and only in performing acts naturall is sinne committed never in performing any act supernaturall all such acts are in a peculiar manner the work of grace 2. God overruleth no man's good projects or purposes otherwise then as when accepting their intentions he will not have them put such in execution because perhaps he hath reserved that for another time person As when David was purposed to build God an house was encouraged therein by Nathan yet the Lord sent Nathan shortly unto David to give him to understand that he reserved that work for Solomon his Son yet so well accepting David's purpose that he promised to build his house But if God at any time overruleth the wicked projects and purposes of men whether good or evill let us blesse him rather for this then curse him by cursing them that maintaine this good providence Yet in overruling them whether he doth it immediately or by the ministry of his good Angells not by working immediately upon the will as this Authour dreameth For that is not the way to worke agreably to the reasonable nature of man though so he worke also by generall influence affoarded coÌ„mon to all agents but by representing to the understanding congruous motives to divert them from that they doe intend whether in a gracious manner as he diverted David from his purpose to massacre the whole house of Nabal or only in a naturall way whereby he diverts wicked men from their ungodly designes by representing the danger thereof to make them feare so to restraine them Will the Devill himselfe be over prone to blaspheme God for this yet in this alone he doth more then either the Devill or man can doe though this be not all that he doth For he doth cooperate to every designe and execution of the creature be it never so abominable which neither man nor Angells can doe And he hath power to give over unto Satan and to harden any man and that more effectully then any Devill can doe The Devill could not say with truth that He would harden Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel goe Nor when he had let them goe I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them to bring them back The Devill could not say in truth as the Lord did to David I will take thy wives before thine eyes and give them to thy neighbour and he shall lye with thy wives in the sight of the sunne Nor as he said to Ieroboam Behold I will rent the kingdome out of the hands of Solomon and will give ten tribes to thee Nay the very permissioÌ„ of sin so as whereby it shall infallibly come to passe is not in the power of any creature but in God alone And shall it follow that because God doth more both as touching the act it selfe and touching the sinfull condition of it then any creature can doe therefore God is the Authour of sinne whereas when God moves a man or carrieth him on to any good morall workes whether in doing that which is vertuous or abstaining from that which is vitious this man shall certainely sinne though not in so great a degree unlesse God be pleased over and above to regenerate him and to bestow faith and love on him for as much as in this case though he doe an act vertuous yet shall he not doe it in a gracious maÌ„ner though he doe abstaine froÌ„ an act vitious yet he shall not abstaine froÌ„ it in a gracious manner Let this man therefore proceed maintaine if he thinks good that except God doth bestow the spirit of regeneration upon all and every one throughout the world he is the Authour of sinne not only when he moves them to such acts which are evill but also when he moves them to the doing of such as are vertuous or to the abstaining from those that are vitious As for his phrases noe wise man will regard them but only such as are content to feed on huskes for want of better food As when he talkes of motion uncontroulable which makes a noise as if men's wills would controule his motion but cannot whereas God as the first mover moves the creature most congruously unto his nature without which motion of his the creature could not move at all The like noyses makes the phrase immutable decree as empty things many times give the greatest sound whereas by vertue of God's immutable decree it is that it cannot otherwise be then that as necessary things cannot but come to passe necessarily so contingent things cannot but come to passe contingently and the free actions of men freely But by the way he manifest's how he licks his lips at a Mutable decree of God even of that God with whom as St. Iames speaketh there is no variablenesse nor shadow of change He doth acknowledge we maintaine potentiam in se liberam but then he saith we doe not maintaine liberum usum a most absurd distinction For noe power deserves to be stiled free save that it is of free use and exercise And what a prodigious thing is it to affirme that it is not within the almighty power of God to cause that this or that shall be done by a reasonable creature freely this is it that Bradwardine proposeth to the judgment of all to consider whether it be not an unreasonable thing to deny this unto God God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe and maketh them doe those only actions which his omnipotent will hath determined and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions have prescribed Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines whereas neither determining nor necessitating as I said before are the expressions of our Divines but of Papists yet he laies not this to the charge of Papist's Noe nor to the charge of Bellarmine for saying that God doth not only rule and governe but wrest and bend them and that to one evill
rather then to an other If Scholars of our Universities use any such phrases it is no other then they find in use among School-divines It is true indeed Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this This Authour sides with the Jesuites but why doth he not take to taske any one chapter in Alvarez on this point to answer to overthrow their grounds which are no other then the very word of God and cleare reason doth justifie And the ground of the Jesuites in opposing is meerely an invention of their own concerning a certaine knowledge of God called a middle knowledge a vile invention and a palpable untruth and controulable of manifest contradiction For they suppose a thing knowable by God as future before God's will hath passed upon it to make it future being in it's own nature meerly possible and consequently cannot passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible into the condition of a thing future without a cause Now noe cause can be devised hereof with any colour of reason but the will of God For first the cause hereof must be eternall seeing the thing it selfe of the cause whereof we dispute is eternall to wit the fruition of any thing This I say was eternall for it is known with God from all eternity Now there is noe eternall cause to be found but in God alone therefore the cause why things meerly possible in their own nature became future and that from everlasting must be found in God alone Therefore it must either be the will of God or the knowledge of God that did make it future and seing the knowledge of God rather supposeth them to be future then makes them so what remaines but that the will of God must necessarily be the cause hereof Nay consider whether the Jesuites themselves doe not manifest more ingenuity by farre then this boisterous Theologue that thinks to carry all with the blast of his words the resolution of whose arguments generally neither having the word of God for their ground nor any confest principle of reason Whereas not the greatest Angell of God will take upon him such an authoritative manner of discourse For did we grant that God by his Allmighty will did impose any necessity upon our wills Yet Suarez confesseth that so to worke doth neither involve any contradiction nor exceed the Allmighty power of God Whereas we are ready to prove and have already proved that their doctrine of God's concourse without subordination of the second causes to the first implies flat contradiction We say the wills determination of it selfe is the worke of God otherwise faith and love and every gracious act shall not be the worke of God Againe the wills determination of it selfe is no other then the wills operation and this Authour that opposeth us dares not deny the wills opperation to be the worke of God But what School divine can he produce that delivers himselfe in so absurd a manner as to say that God first determines the will and that afterwards the will determines it selfe especially speaking of such actions of the will as are produced by the power of nature The wills determination of it selfe we say is the worke of God moving the creature agreably to the nature thereof that is to be carried necessarily to that which is it's end and appeares to be good in genere convenientis and freely to the meanes which appeare to be good in genere conducentis as fit to pronounce the end intended All confessing Durand excepted that God works the act the question whether he works the act absolutely the will a second agent subordinate unto God as to it's Creatour Or conditionally modo vellimus provided that we will it God the first agent subordinate to the will of the creature This Authour will have it to be wrought by God that is conditionally in dependence upon and expectation of the operation of the creature which we say is most absurd First because thus the first agent is made subordinate to the second agent which is most unaturall Secondly observe a manifest contradiction For the question is about actus volendi the act of willing in man Now if God produce this act upon supposition that man produceth this act then the same act is produced by God upon supposition that it is produced by man If it be produced by man what need is there of God's producing it by way of supplement Thirdly by this meanes the thing is made the condition of it selfe For hereby it is said this act is made upon condition that it doth exist so the selfe same thing shall be before after it selfe 4. Thus man's production of the act shall be noe worke of God which holds off faith and repentance as well as of any naturall act in this Authours opinion Fiftly It is not possible the will can produce the act unlesse God produceth it If then God doth not produce it unlesse the will doth produce it in this case there shall be noe act produced For if I goe not to London unlesse you goe with me nor you goe to London unlesse I goe with you here is no going at all till one saith I say I goe and his resolution carrieth the other with him if the others depend thereupon 6 Whereas to helpe at a dead lift the Jesuiticall doctrine of Scientia media middle knowledge is called in after this manner God foreseing that at such an instant the will of man will produce such an act if God be pleased to concurre and upon this foreknowledâ—e God resolves to concurre This doctrine I have already confounded by shewing the apparent falsity of this supposition For seeing the wills producing such an act at such an instant is a thing merly possible in it's own nature no more future then not future It is impossible that this should passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible into the conditioÌ„ of a thing future without a cause And noe cause hereof can be but the will of God as I have often proved It followes that the wills producing such an act depends rather upon the will of God to have it produced then on the contrary that Gods producing such an act dependes upon the creatur's will to produce it As for that which followes of the absolute dominion that the will of the creature should have over it's action I presume he meanes independent it sounds more like the voice of the Devill then of a sober Christian Yet it is more then I know that Lucifer himselfe challengeth any such absolute Dominion over his actions unto himselfe If he doth I know noe greater sinne that hee or the creature can be guilty of unlesse in case grosse ignorance doth excuse it To deny God to be the first Agent is to deny his God-head and if hee be primum agens hee must be primum liberum too the first free agent And to make our selves to be prima libera the first free agents what is other
then to advance our selves into the very Throne of God's Soveraigntie and doe wee not feare least his wrath smoake us thence And if all this that hee contends for were granted him that nothing but mere necessitie were found in the motion of men's wills yet Suarez will justifie us from speaking contradiction or delivering ought that exceeds the compasse of God's omnipotencie And what if all the world were innocent yet God should not be unjust in casting the most innocent creature into hell fire as Medina professeth and that by the unanimous consent of Divines and Vasquez the Jesuite acknowledgeth this to be in the power of God as he is Lord of life and death and in the last chapter of the booke de praedestinatione gratiâ which goes under Austin's name there is an expresse passage to justifie it And albeit that worke be not Austin's yet it is lately justified to be the worke of a great follower of Austin's and as Orthodoxe as he namely the worke of Fulgentius as Raynaudus the Jesuite hath lately proved and justified that passage also together with that which is usually brought by School-Divines to prove it out of the twelfth chapter of Wisedome and shewes the right reading as followed by Austin and Gregory And withall represents a pregnant passage taken out of the fifteenth Homily of Macarius to the same purpose And out of Chrysostome in his 2. De compunctione cordis about the end thereof And out of Austin upon Psalme the seventieth about the beginning And to these he addeth Ariminensis Cameracensis Serarius and Lorinus all maintaining the same And this is evident by consideration of the power which it pleased the Lord to execute upon his holy Son and our blessed Saviour and by the power which he gives us over brute creatures This I say if all that he contends for were granted should rather be concluded therehence namely that in this case the creature should be innocent then that God should be the Authour of sinne especially considering that God performes in all this noe other thing then belongs unto him of necessitie as without which his moving of the second causes it were impossible the creature should worke at all which we have made good by shewing the manifest absurdity of their contrary doctrine who maintaine a bare concourse Divine either in subordination unto the agency of the creature or without subordinating the operation of the creature to motion Divine But we doe subordinate it as without which the second cause could not worke at all and by vertue whereof it doth worke and that freely so farre forth as liberty of will is competent to a creature but not so as to make the creature compeere with his Creatour Let man be a second free Agent but set our God that made us evermore be the first free Agent least otherwise we shall deny him the same power over his creatures that the Potter hath over the clay of the same lumpe to make one vessell unto honour and another unto dishonour This power in my maker the Lord hath given me eyes to discerne as taught us in his holy word and an heart to submit unto it and to his providence in governing my will even in the worst actions that ever were committed by me without any repining humour against his hand though I thinke it lawfull for us in an holy manner to expostulate with God sometimes in the Prophets language and say Lord why hast thou caused us to erre from thy waies and hardened our hearts against thy feare Which yet I confesse he brings to passe at noe time infundendo malitiam by infusing any malice into me who naturally have more then enough of that leaven in me but non infundendo gratiam not quickning in me that holy feare which he hath planted in me of which grace I confesse willingly I have a great deale lesse then I desire though the least measure of it is a great deale more then I doe or can deserve Neither shall I ever learne of this Authour after his manner to blaspheme God if at any time hee shall harden my heart against his feare Though this Authour speakes commonly with a full and foule mouth yet his arguments are lanke and leane and of noe substance but words As when hee saith that God over-rules men's wills by our opinion Now to overrule◠a man is to carry him in despight of his teeth Wee say noe such thing but that God moves every creature to worke agreably to it's nature necessary things necessarily contingent things contingently free Agents freely though nothing comes to passe by the free agency of any creature but what God from all eternity by his unchangable counsell hath determined to come to passe As the eleventh Article of Ireland doth professe by the unanimous consent of the ArchBishop Bishops and Clergy of that Kingdome when those Articles were made So I speake warily and circumspectly the rather because one Doctour Heylin doth in a booke intituled The History of the Sabbath professe Chapter 8. page 259. That that whole booke of Articles is now called in and in the place thereof the Articles of the Church of Ireland confirmed by Parliament in that Kingdome Anno 1631. A thing I willingly confesse at first sight seemed incredible unto mee namely that Articles of Religion agreed upon in the dayes of King Iames should be revoked in the dayes of King Charles but expect to heare the truth of that relation For the Authour thereof hath never as yet deserved so much credit at my hands as to be believed in such a particular as this But to returne this Authours text is nothing answerable to the margent For first imperare to command is one thing and to over-rule is another thing though he that doth imperare command ought is commonly accounted the Authour thereof as a cause Morall from whom comes the beginning of such a worke But utterly deny that God commands evill and the truth is wee acknowledge noe other notion of evill then such as the Apostle expresseth in calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an incongruitie to the law of God which law commands somethings and forbids other things I come to his third reason 3. I grant wicked counsellours and perswaders are deservedly accounted the Authors of sinne The common use and acception of the words as I shewed in answer to the first is observed to denote such Therefore Cicero makes Authour and disswader opposite and by law they are punishable in the same degree with the Actors But God is noe counsellour or perswader to any lewd course but forbids it and disswades it and that with denuntiation of the greatest judgments among trangressours 2. I willingly confesse that councelling is farre inferiour to enforcing yet in Scripture phrase earnest intreaty or command is oftentimes exprest by compelling as Mat 14. 22. Mark 6. 45. Luk 14. 23. Gala 6. 12 and 2. 14. 1 Sam 28. 23. 2 Chron 21. 11. And noe marvaile
as he could easily shew but that he feares to be overlong It is nothing but froth It is not the first time I have had experience of such like Pyrgopolinices eloquence of his Bradwardin hath demonstrated that the will of God is absolute throughout speaking of his decree and none conditionall and his demonstration is this If there be any will of God conditionall then the condition whereupon it proceds must be willed by God or no to say it is not is to acknowledge some things to exist in the world in the producing whereof God hath noe hand which is generally disclaimed And Durand who affirmes some such thing is opposed generally and indeed his arguments are very sleight But if God doth will that condition then either he wills it absolutely or conditionally If absolutely then the cause is gained For then that which was first willed was willed also absolutely not conditionally As for example if God wills a man's salvation upon condition of faith if withall God's will be and that absolutely to give him faith it followeth that God wills that man's salvation and that absolutely If it be answered that the condition is willed not absolutely but upon another condition of that other condition I enquire whether God willed it or noe If noe then something is produced in the world in the production whereof God hath no hand which is very inconvenient If you grant that he willed that also I farther demand whether he willed it absolutely or conditionally If absolutely then all that depended thereupon were absolutely willed and so the cause is obtained If you say this condition was willed also conditionally so a way is made to a progression in infinitum which is a thing unsufferable by the consent of all And as many as are put to give instance will forthwith manifest the nakednes of their cause This demonstration of Bradwardine I sometimes represented to this very Authour in our private walking and communication and he professed it was a very ingenious argument As for the other terme Irresistable this manifests this Authour's meaning that some will of God speaking of his decree is of a resistable nature Whereas St. Paul to the contrary plainly gives us to understand that God's will is irresistable the Psalmist saith that the counsell of the Lord shall stand And my counsell shall stand and I will doe whatsoever I will And therefore his decrees are resembled to mountaines of brasse As for the lost terme necessitating For the Gentleman paies us in words for want of better coine not considering that words are but winde he would cheat his Reader by this presuming he would be so simple as to believe that God by this decree of his takes away the liberty of the creature but it doth not nor any contingency as the eleaventh article of Ireland doth particulate and Bradwardine who peculiarly useth this phrase understands hereby noe other necessitie then upon supposition which Alvarez shewes by generall concurrence of School-Divines that it may well stand with absolute contingency and liberty it being noe other necessity then that which is called secundum quid in some respect And such a necessitie Arminius maketh consequent to permission Bradwardine is express that God necessitates the will to produce a free act And he nothing differs from Aquinas his doctrine where he maintaines that God's will imposeth noe necessitie upon the creatures will because he ordaines both necessary things come to passe necessarily and contingent things contingently that is with a possibility to the contrary likewise free actions freely that is with a free active power in the Agent to doe otherwise But come we to the consideration of the passages produced out of the Ancients For I presume they are the choicest For though he feared to be overlong and therefore could not exhibit all yet therefore it behooved him to represent the best And I believe he could produce more of this nature For I have been an eye witnes of it under his hand now foure yeares agoe And though he produce them not I hope to doe it for him ere we part to shew how little I feare his concealements and somewhat of the Predestinarians also being glad of such an opportunity to discover the wildnesse and precipitation of his judgment touching that which is called the predestinarian heresy here touched by him The first is a passage taken out of the Church of Lyons denying that God hath layed a necessitie of sinning on any man Another out of Remigius both represented yea many more of this nature by that most reverend and most learned Arch-Bishop of Armagh Doctor Usher in his history of Goteschalk 138. and 173. To these I answer First these Ancients are about 850 yeares after Christ yet marvailous orthodoxe considering those times in the point of predestination And let no man think that they deny a necessity of sinning laid upon all by originall corruption the consequent of Adam's prevarication If they were of any other opinion should it become us to follow them in this Doctor Potter acknowledgeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England that libertas à peccato liberty from sinne is not incident to a naturall man it is true he desires to quash it by saying there is yet in man Libertas à necessitate à liberty from necessitie but from what necessity From the necessity of sinning If so why should he then deny a liberty from sin yet he never taketh any paines to cleare this from contradiction but blindfoldly followes Bernard without caring much to understand him And he looks to be pardoned because Vossius did so before him M. Fulke in his answer to the Rhemish Testament usually distinguisheth between libertas à peccato libertas à coactione liberty from sinne and liberty from constraint and denying all liberty from sinne to a naturall man yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction I have taken some paines to shew Doctor Potter's superficiary carriage in this and to cleare Bernard which it may be I will adde to this by the reason of the homogeneous nature of it In the meane time liberty from sinne is utterly denied to a naturall man and that by the doctrine of our Church And noe marvaile seeing Arminius himselfe and Corvinus those great patrons of natures power doe acknowledg this as before I mentioned only they say God is ready to remove this necessitie of sinning from all and every one 2. But the meaning of Remigius and the Church of Lyons is the same with that of Prosper formerly mentioned in his answer to the objection of Vincentius where he confesseth Hominem non redemptum Diabolo esse captivum a man not redeemed is captivated by Satan and that creatura peccatrix poenalem dominationem Diaboli merito patitur cui relicto vero domino sponte se vendidit The creature sinning deservedly suffers the dominion of Satan by way of punishment as to whom he sould him selfe voluntarily Haec
of Adrumetum were the Authours of it And this Interpolatour takes Vossius his part and labours by certaine arguments to make it good against he judicious observations of that most reverend and learned Arch-Bishop of Armagh It may be I shall represent my answer thereunto by waâ—â—â— digression but first I must dispatch my answer to this I have in hand Sect 6. Many distinctions are brought to free the Supralapsarian way from this crimination all which me thinks are noâ— better then mere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate and give noe true satisfaction to the understanding There is say they a twofold decree 1. First an operative by which God positively and efficaciously worketh allthings 2. A permissive by which he decreeth only to let it come to passe If God should worke sinne by an operative decree then he should be the Authour of sinne but not if he decree by a permissive decree to let it come to passe and this only they say they maintaine It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sinne for otherwise there would be none Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder He suffered Adam to sinne leaving him in the hand of his own counsell Ecclus 15. 14. He suffered the nations in time past to walke in their own waies Act 14. 16. And dayly doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sins And this he doth not because he stands in need of sinne for the setting forth of his glory for he hath noe need of the sinfull man Ecclus 15. But partly because he is summus provisor supreme moderatour of the world and knoweth how to use that well which is ill done and to bring good out of evill and especially for that reason which Tertullian prelleth namely because man is made by God's own gracious constitution a free creature undetermined in his actions untill he determine himselfe And therefore may not be hindred from sinning by omnipotency because God useth not to repeale his own ordinances 2. It is true also that a permissive decree is noe cause of sinne because it is merely extrinsecall to the sinner and hath noe influence at all upon the sinne It is an antecedent only and such a one too as being put sinne followeth not of necessitie And therefore it is fitly contradistinguisht to an operative decree And if that side would in good earnest impute noe more in sinfull events to divine power then the word Permission imports their maine conclusion would fall and the controversy between us end But first many of them reject this distinction utterly and will have God to decree sinne efficaciter with an Energeticall and working will Witnesse that discourse of Beza wherein he a verreth and laboureth to prove that God doth not only permit sinne but will it also And witnesse Calvin too who hath a whole section against it calling it a carnall distinction invented by the flesh and effugium a mere evasion to shift off this seeming absurdity that that man is made blind Deo volente jubente by Gods will and command who must shortly after be punished for his blindnes He calleth it also figmentum a fiction and saith they doe ineptire play the fooles that use it By many reasons also doth he indeavour to lay open the weaknes of it taxing those who understand such Scriptures as speaks of God's smiting men with a Spirit of slumber and giddinesse of blinding their minds infatuating and hardening their hearts c. Of a permission and suffering of men to be blinded and hardned Nimis frivola est ista solutio saith he it is too frivilous a glosse In another place he blameth those that referre sin to God's prescience only calling their speeches argutiae tricks and quirks which Scripture will not beare and those likewise that ascribe it to God's permission and saith what they bring touching the Divine permission in this businesse will not hold water They that admit the word permissive doe willingly mistake it and while to keep of this blow they use the word they corrupt the meaning For 1. Permission is an act of God's consequent and judiciary will by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedome and committing such sins day by day as they might have avoided and to which he proceedeth lento gradu slowly and unwillingly as we may see Psal 81. 11. 12. Israel would none of me so I gave them up c. Ezeh 18. 39. Goe and serve every one his Idoll seeing ye will not obey me c. Rom 1. 21. 24. Because when they knew God they glorified him not as God therefore God gave them up unto their hearts lusts to vile affections and to a Reprobate mind Rev. 22. 11. He that is unjust let him be unjust still In these places and many more we may see that persons left to themselves are sinners only and not all sinners but the obstinate and willfull which will by noe meanes be reclaimed But the permission which they meane is an act of God's antecedent will exercised about innocent men lying under no guilt at all in God's eternall consideration 2. Permission about whomsoever it is exercised obstinate sinners or men considered without sinne is no more then a not hindring of them from falling that are able to stand supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning in the parties permitted but with them it is a withdrawing or withholding of grace needfull for the avoiding of sin and so includeth an absolute necessitie of sinning For from the withdrawing of such grace sin must needs follow as the fall of Dagon's house followed Sampson's plucking away the Pillars that were necessary for the upholding of it Maccovius in two disputations expounding this word Permission circumscribes it within two acts The first of which is a Substraction of Divine assistance necessary to the preventing of sinne And having proved it by two arguments that none may thinke he is alone in this he saith that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses and produceth two The first of them is our reverend and learned Whitaker some of whose words alleadged by him are these Permission of sinne is a privation of the aid which being present sinne would have been hindred The second is Pareus for saying that that helpe which God withdrew from Adam being withdrawen Adam could not soe use his endowments as to persevere And this doctrine saith he is defended by our men as it appeareth out of Pareus lib de grat primi hominis c. 4 p. 46. Their permission therefore of sinne being a substraction of necessary grace is equivalent to an actuall effectuall procuring and working of it For Causa deficiens in necessariis est eficiens a deficient cause in things necessary is truely efficient and so is but a mere fig-leafe to cover the foulenesse of their opinion Here we have a very demure discourse proceeding in a positive manner proceeding from one that takes upon him to
be a Master and dictator of sentences wherein there is little or nothing sound that he delivers of his own or to purpose that he delivers of others Nothing of any colour of pertinency besides what he delivers in the last place touching our opinion of the nature of permission of sin And I willingly confesse The divine permission of sin is a very obscure point and in my judgment most come short in the explication thereof Arminius hath a large digression upon this place of Permission in generall and of permission of sin in speciall It was the first peece of Arminius the examination whereof I undertook only with a mind to search after satisfaction therein And finding noe content therein I gave my selfe to enquire thereof in a positive manner wherein I proceeded very farre setting downe in foule papers as they came to hand whatsoever came into my mind thereabout which grew into a large proportion and then set my selfe upon preconceived grounds reasonably well disscurssed by me to deale with Arminius some five Sections after the beginning of his discourse on this argument which five first Sections I took not into examination untill I had dispatched the whole And having an occasion to deale upon this argument when I came to the defence of M. Perkins his answer to the third crimination whereupon I deale in the second book of my Vindiciae I thought good to digresse after the second Section to call a certaine proposition of M. Perkins to account which was this Quod Deus non impedit ideo evenit quia Deus non impedit It is the third Digression of the second book the title whereof is this Propositio illa Perkinsii quod Deus non impedit ideo evenit quia Deus non impedit sub examen revocatur There is noe digression throughout that book of mine that affords more variety of Philosophicall and Theologicall contemplations then that and all about the nature of permission First in things naturall Secondly in things morall And these first in good things Secondly in evill things In the course whereof many obscurities and difficulties doe offer themselves to be cleared solved by distinction where comming to an end I deliver my selfe in this manner I perceive in how slippery an argument I exercise my selfe too much exposed to the calumny of adversaries and too apt to incurre the dislike of good men whereas in all my labour I aime at nothing else then according to my power to explicate the mystery of Divine providence governing all things after a wonderfull manner And to dissemble nothing but represent all difficulties that doe occurre that both my adversaries may have at hand what to impugne Our Divines wherein to take paines either by way of explication of what yet remaines obscure or by confirmation of what they shall find to be sound yet unsufficiently proved Now that Digression of mine being so large I wonder not a little that no one particular thereof is here called to an account by this Divine And so may others too when they shall consider against whom this man's stomach workes most For he cannot be ignorant of my answer to M. Hoord his proselyte if not therein to himselfe Againe the exception here in the last place taken against our doctrine of permission is exactly the same with Arminius his exception against Mr. Perkins in dealing upon the third crimination which there I have answered at large and that in such manner that I willingly professe I was utterly to seek at this time of what I had there delivered so that upon my consulting the place the things I there met with seemed new unto me in discovering many waies the inconsequence of Arminius his discourse which yet is the very same with this of Mr. Mason's Yet he hath not replied upon any one line of all that I delivered there though they are above 600 in the second Edition of that book But it may be he takes that for noe better then an idle discourse yet an answer it is to this very exception of his 't is enough for him to convince the justnesse of that exception made by Arminius by sound argument And what is that but a rule given by him upon his own credit without indication of the least authority to confirme it And though on the contrary I have divers and sundry waies manifested the falsenes thereof well I am not resolved to suffer him to passe unanswered how idle soever his discourse may appeare to be Foure distinctions of ours he proposeth to invade not one of them is pretermitted by Arminius in his answer unto Perkins nor any part of that his answer pretermitted by me But this is written in English for the indoctrinating of the people as I remember what was said of M. Hoord's discourse namely that it was fit to be coppied out and communicated unto the Country He saith these distinctions are delusions of the simple when he proves it then it will be time enough to believe it But whereas he saith they give noe true satisfaction to the understanding this is rightly to be understood to wit in reference to an Arminian understanding corrupted with the leaven of Pelagidnisme Yet is he not privy to the understanding of all so much as of all that are of his own Tenet But suppose they doe not The distinctions used by School-Divines to accommodate God's predestination with man's free will are many and learned but Caietan professeth of them all that they doe not quietare intellectum satisfie the understanding but what followes Therefore saith he Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei I captivate mine unto the obedience of faith to wit because Scripture is evident for both And why should it seeme strange that God's providence in governing the world should be of a mysterious nature And however this Authour may censure Caietane in this yet Alvarez professeth that herein doctissimè piissimè loquitur he speakes most learnedly and most piously Yet permission in the judgment of Suarez is not merely a negation of prohibition but conjunct with a positive operation in concurring to the act of sinne which Aquinas hath proved to be à Deo from God though the obliquity of the act be not And the truth is man himselfe is not operative in sinne otherwise then as touching the substance of the act For sinne as sinne hath noe cause efficient but deficient only as Austin hath long agoe delivered neither hath he been opposed herein by any that I know Observe how with him to hinder and absolutely to hinder is made all one yet to will and absolutely to will in God is not all one in his opinion I doe not find that God left Adam in the hand of his counsell For he forbade him to eate of the forbidden fruit which is somewhat more then to disswade from it And yet to perswade or disswade another is not to leave him in the hands of his own counsells For it is to impart
an inordinate act and distinguisheth the act from the inordination of it q 79. art 2. He proposeth the question whether the act of sin be from God and in the conclusion resolves it thus Cum actus peccati sit ens necessariò est à Deo Considering that the act of sinne is a thing having being necessarily it is of God And in the body of the Article Dicendum quod actus peccati est ens est actus ex utroque habet quod sit à Deo The resolution is that the act of sinne is both a thing that hath being and an act and in each condition it hath that it is of God And he proves this both by authority and by reason As for the defect of this act that non reducitur in Deum tanquam in causam sed in liberum arbitrium that is not charged upon God as the cause thereof but on a man's free will And he illustrates it thus Sicut defectus claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam non autem in virtutem motivam à quâ tamen causatur quicquid est motionis in claudicatione Like as the defect called halting is charged upon a crooked legge as the cause thereof and not upon the motive faculty though from it proceeds all the motion that is found in the halting Neither did I ever read any School Divine that contradicted this distinction Mr. Mason doth without alleadging any authority for it Yet he might have alleadged Arminius opposing after this manner though before him that I know not any 1. We say not only of many sins but of every sinne which hath any act therein that the Acts themselves are sinfull because every such sinne being actuall it is Actus cum defectu an act with a defect that is an act defective As Aquinas speakes in the place immediatly before alleadged and this defect is in respect of the law of God As Austin defineth sinne to be dictum factum concupitum contra legem Dei A thought word or deed against the law of God And this is enough I thinke to denominate it sinfull But the argument used by this Authour is the very same which was formerly used by Arminius and whereunto I have answered lib. 2. de permiss Sect 21 and that after this manner Be it so that the act it selfe is forbidden and consequently the act it selfe is inordinate but what will it therefore follow that these two are not to be distinguished to wit the act and the inordination of it a strange liberty of disputing A man's hand is sometimes inordinate as being monstrous either having too much or too little as either wanting five fingers or having more then five what therefore shall it not be lawfull for us to distinguish between the hand and the monstrosity of the hand 2. The wall it selfe is white what therefore shall we not distinguish between the wall and the white colour of it A man himselfe is vertuous and vicious shall this hinder us from due distinguishing between the man and his morall condition whether vertuous or vicious Many other arguments are represented by Arminius which this Authour toucheth not yet in the place forementioned I have shaken them all to peeces such is the rotten condition of them And over above I have proved not that in every sin the act is to be distinguished from the inordination of it but that in every sin of commission there is place for this distinction and that after this manner Every sinne of commission is an act inordinate but in every inordinate act we are to distinguish between the act it selfe and the inordination of it And that the act and the inordination of it are two I prove thus That if they are one and the same then we may well say that the act is an inordination but this is most false For nothing can be affirmed or predicated of the same thing both in the abstract and concrete God himselfe excepted As for example you may say of a wall that it is white you cannot say of it that it is whitenes For the wall is in the predicament of substance but whitenes being a colour is in the predicament of quality 2. Againe an inordination is a privation of order But no act is formally a privation and consequently neither can it be formally an inordination 3. An entitie positive a terme privative cannot be one and the same formally but two distinct notions Now every act is a positive thing but inordination is a mere privation 4. Lastly God is confessed by all to be the cause of the act but if the act be all one with the inordination he should be the cause not of the act only but of the inordination that is of the sinfullnes also 2. Observe his shifting carriage It is our Tenet that God is the Authour of the action it selfe but not of the obliquity and himselfe hath expresly acknowledged this to be our tenet in the beginning of this Section Now whereas he makes shew here of proving that we make God the Authour not of the action only but of the obliquity also he performes no such matter but only this that we make the object of God's decree not the action only but the aberration also but in all this there is no contradiction unto us We willingly grant that in as much as God permits sinne he will have sinne come to passe by his permission every good thing that comes to passe he will have it come to passe by his being the Authour of it and effecting it the evill that comes to passe he will have come to passe also not by his being the Authour of it and effecting it but only by his permitting of it So that still that of Austin holds good Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit Not any thing comes to passe unlesse God will have it come to passe And according to the eleaventh article of religion established in the Church of Ireland God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever in time shall come to passe and according to the expresse word of God testifiing that the tenne Kings in giving their Kingdomes did herein doe the will of God And that the horrible outrages committed upon the person of the holy Son of God by Herod Pontius Pilate the Gentiles and people of Israel were by the hand and counsell of God before determined to be done We say sinfull courses not hand over head but unrepented of lead unto damnation but not as meanes For they are neither man's meanes for if they were then the end also whereunto they tend should be intended by him Neither are they any meanes of God For all meanes are the workes of him that intends the end So is not the sinne of man the worke of God but the permission of sinne is his worke And this is the meanes which he intends thereby to bring to passe his intended end which yet
as I have shewed in my Vinaiciae For Peter Lombard disputing on either side about this concurrence leaves it indifferent to the Reader to imbrace either part Either the affirmative that God doth concurre to every act though it be sinfull or the negative Yet I say as many as doe maintaine the affirmative doe so maintaine God's motion upon the creatures will as to move it only agreably unto it's nature namely to work freely not necessarily Like as he moves necessary Agents to work necessarily and contingent Agents to worke contingently And if this Authour be ignorant hereof which may well give him boldnes For who so bold as blind Bayard What doth he other in all this but betray his own shame comming to discourse on such an argument as an asse comes to play upon an harp as the proverbe speaks But if he be not ignorant of this what unshamefastnesse doth he manifest all along making bold only upon the simplicity and ignorance of his Reader to gull him and abuse him and draw him along to oppose the free grace of God in predestination and regeneration under colour of making God the Authour of sinne in the point of reprobation which yet he despaires of making good against us without notorious untruths and that undoubtedly delivered against his own knowledge For what Authour hath he produced to justifie this that any of our Divines maintaines that God necessitates the will of man to sin Not any that I know using this phrase Necessitate but Papists and among'st them none that I know but Bradwardine a man renowned in his time both for eminent learning and eminent piety as appeares by Sir Henry Savill's preface unto that book of his and he no where affirming that God necessitates any man unto sinne but only to the substance of the act that not so as to make the will work necessarily as the phrase imports in a vulgar eare and unto a popular judgment whereupon alone this Author takes his advantage most unconscionably but agreably to ' its nature that is contingently and freely For were he able to produce any one of our Divines that affirmeth this why doth he not Is there anyâ—hing throughout this whole discourse that more requires he should name the man and quote the places where this is affirmed then this Yet here we find a blank he carrieth it on magnificently upon his own bare word which deserves no credit at our hands And is it possible to believe so foule a crimination without all evidence produced unlesse faction and partiallity hath blinded his eyes Should he have laied to our charge that we maintaine that God necessitates the will to any good act and to overrule the will therein we should utterly deny it without distinction It is true he overrules the will of the flesh but not the will of the Spirit the regenerate part but moves it agreably to ' its nature and to worke not only voluntarily but freely whatsoever it worketh For albeit the regenerate part is like a morall vertue though as much transcendent to it as a thing supernaturall transcends a thing naturall inclining only to that which is good yet is it alwaies moved to this particular good rather then unto an other most freely Like as a man's naturall corruption inclines a man only to evill yet to this kind of evill or to this particular evill rather then to that Man is moved most freely So that if we maintaine not that God workes a man to every good act otherwise then freely let the very conscience of our enemies judge whether we can maintaine that God necessitates the will either of men or of Devills unto sinne For it is apparent that God hath a Double influence unto a good act One unto it as unto an act and that is influence generall Another unto it as unto a good and gracious act and that we acknowledge to be an influence speciall and supernaturall But as touching an evill act all sides confesse that God hath but a single influence thereunto and that generall namely as it is an act not as it is evill And albeit this influence which we call concurrence unto the act be joyned with an influence into the will of the creature to move it to the producing of the same act yet this motion is no other theÌ„ whereby the will is moved to worke agreably to ' its nature that is freely Like as all other Agents are moved by God the first Agents to worke agreably to their natures necessary things to worke necessarily contingent things contingently So that in all this there is no overruling of the will no liberty taken from her but rather she is maintained and established in her free condition and moved agreably thereunto like as in the eleaventh Article of Ireland it is expressed For after it is laid downe that God from all eternity did by his unchangable counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe It is forthwith added that hereby no violence us offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather But because of another claw that here is subjoyned by this Authour it is to be considered that the liberty of the creature is not equall unto the liberty of the Creator God himselfe But like as all other causes are but second causes God alone the prime cause All other Agents but second Agents God alone the first Agent So likewise all other free Agents are but second free Agents God alone primum liberum the first free Agent So that no liberty of the creature doth or can exempt it from the Agency of God In whom we live and move and have our being what a proud thing presumptuous were it for the creature to aspire unto such an exemption Who oppose us in the point of free will more then Papists Yet see how Alvarez disputes against this vise and presumptuous conceit so much maintained by the Jesuites and after taken up by the Arminians who live by their scraps as if they would be content to wash their dishes The Jesuites discourse thus That the will may be free she must have the Dominion of her act true saith Alvarez debet habere Dominium sui actûs non tamen oportet quod habeat primum absolutum Dominium sui actus she must have the dominion overher act but not the first and absolute deminion of her act And Disput 117 he proposeth this question Whether the will hath her dominion of her act and what dominion this is In the resolution whereof he proposeth three conclusions 1. The free will of man hath the dominion of her act as the next cause thereof In this conclusion the Divines on both sides doe concurre 2. Free will created in the actuall use of Dominion and power which she hath over her acts depends on God as of an absolute Lord predeliberating and predetermining before the foreknowledge
of the creatures future cooperation what the free will will doe in particular This conclusion is held of all those Divines who maintaine that God by his motion or effectuall grace not only morally but efficiently and physically doth cause us to worke that which is good it is proved saith he by all those reasons whereby it hath been formery shewed that God by his decree effectuall motion doth predetermine all second causes even such as are free to worke preserving their liberty and nature 3. The dominion of her act is not first in the power of free will created but in the power and dominion of God especially in respect of acts supernaturall Our meaning is that all dominion actuall use of dominion which the created will hath as causa proxima the next cause or doth exercise over her free acts which she produceth proceedeth from God as from the cheifest first cause efficient ought to be resolved into him as into the first Authour first absolute Lord thereof And the truth is the question of free will is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous distincion For as for free will unto good that is merely Morall and the resolution thereof is according to the resolution in the point of originall sinne But free will unto actions in generall under an appearance of good this is naturall liberty and the resolution thereof depends upon a right understanding of God's naturall providence in governing the world and working with all creatures in their severall kinds such operations as are agreable to their severall conditiōs The first liberty consists in disposing man aright towards his end like as morall vertues tend to this But the second liberty consist's only in the right use of the meanes unto what end soever is projected by us The appearance of good moving herein is only in genere boni conducentis in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded whether that end can be good or evill right or wrong But the appearence of good moving in the former is only summiboni of our cheifest good the enjoying whereof will make us happy But to returne this Authour with whom I deale in present stands for the will of man's absolute dominion over her acts as before he did expresse whereas Alvarez professeth utterly against this Neither doe I blame him for contradicting Alvarez in this but for carrying himselfe like a positive Theologue nor so only but like a peremptory Theologue contenting himselfe to dictate rules to others without all proofe save this that otherwise we make God the Authour of sinne Yet this is not any expresse Argument of his neither but he obtrudes premise upon us which I thinke was never affirmed by any Divines of these dayes unlesse it be by some Libertines against whom none that I know have disputed more effectually then some of those very Divines which here are traduced by him But observe the vile and abominable issue of this Authours doctrine in this particular making man as he is a free creature to be the Lord of his own free act yea and to have the absolute dominion thereof as formerly he did expesse Sect 3. For seing the act of faith of repentance and the like are free acts if liberty cannot be maintained unlesse a man hath the absolute dominion of his own act hence it manifestly followeth that God doth not determine the will to believe to repent or to any good work yet the Scripture professeth that God is he who makes us perfect unto every good worke working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Iesus Christ That it is God who worketh in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure So that if a man should live Methusalch his age and spend that whole time in a gracious conversation yet that God doth worke in him either the will or the deed of one gracious act more it is merely of his good pleasure so little cause have we to presume of perseverance in that which is good by out own strength And againe all this God workes in us for Christ his sake Christ hath deserved even this at the hands of God his father What then is the meaning of this that God should cooperate with us to the will and the deed provided that we will Consider the absurdity of this upon the supposall of the possibility of such a cooperation which yet by evident reason may be demonstrated to be utterly impossible Did Christ merit any thing for the Angells yet doth he not cooperate with them to every act of theirs as well as to any of ours Nay is it possible that any act should exist without God's operation And is it reasonable to subject such a course of Divine providence to the merits of Christ Thus we see whereunto this Authour tends in this discourse of his namely so to maintaine God to be no Authour of sinne as withall to maintaine that he is no Authour of that which is good no not of faith repentance or any gracious act that is freely performed by any creature man or Angell we on the other side desire endeavour so to carry our selves that while we vindicate God from being the Authour of evill we may not therewithall deny him to be the Authour of any thing that is good and gracious which is this Authours course as appeares manifestly in the issue And observe his crafty cariage foxe like Had he dealt upon predestination and the efficacy of grace and therein professed plainly that faith and repentance being free acts every man's will hath an absolute dominion over them and therefore God doth not determine the will thereunto For that were to make God the Authour of faith and repentance how many thousands would have been ready to have flowen in his face and abhorre such abominable doctrine Therefore he baulks that and deales only upon reprobation and here he layeth to our charge that we make God the Authour of sinne by necessitating and determining the will to sinne though his premises herein I have shewen to be most false therefore he maintains that God doth not determine the will so much as to the act whereunto the sinfulnesse accrewes both because man's will is free and because so he should be the Authour of sinne And if once he can make his Reader to swallow this he doubts not but to take him in the point of predestination and grace also and make him wary to take heed of maintaining that God determines or necessitates the will of man to any good act whether it be of faith or of repentance and that for feare of denying man to have the absolute dominion over his will to worke himselfe to faith and repentance at his pleasure and secondly for feare of makeing God the Authour of faith and repentance and every good act Like as by saying that God doth determine or necessitate the will to sinne we make him the Authour of sinne
I consider this Authour's compounding of these termes absolutely and antecedently I begin to suspect that like as then a thing comes to passe antecedently when it comes to passe by an Antecedent decree in this Authour's language though most absurd So in his language the things are said to come to passe by absolute necessity when they come to passe by an absolute decree the decree in his opinion being sufficient to make a thing come to passe necessarily an absolute decree to make it come to passe absolutely necessarily This undoubtedly is his meaning upoÌ„ which I am stuÌ„bled are I am aware Now let the sober Reader judge how farre these odde conceits are from all sobriety Did not God decree to make the world nay did he not absolutely decree this and antecedently not conditionally and consequently What therefore will it here-hence follow that the world had it's existence necessarily and that by the way of absolute necessity I had thought this had been the peculiar and incommunicable perfection of God himselfe namely to exist necessarily and that in the way of absolute necessity As for all other things which are but God's creatures they have only a contingent existence derived originally from the free will of God the Creator For this I take to be the transcendent perfection of God To be most necessarily to worke most freely Necessity and that absolute being the greatest perfection of being So that Bradwardine conceives this to be the prime and originall perfection of God esse necessario to be necessarily On the other side freedome in the highest kind is the greatest perfection 〈◊〉 operation and God alone so workes as without subordination to any superiour Agent but no creature man or Angell so workes as without subordination to God the first Agent the first cause the first free worker Now I come 〈◊〉 the second particular of this second inconvenience 2. And that is that our doctrine taketh away the conscience of sin and this we willingly grant is consequent upon the former For if sinne be no sinne there is no cause why any man should be troubled with the conscience of sin But all this being grounded upon a vile and most untrue imputation never yet proved namely that we make all actions both good and evill to come to passe by absolute necessity there can be no more truth in the consequent then there is in the Antecedent We say that every sinne that is or ever was committed in the world is and ever was committed freely not only voluntarily much lesse doth any sinne come to passe by any absolute necessity For albeit there be some things that come to passe necessarily by necessity of nature as proceeding from Agents naturall working naturally and necessarily Yet is no worke of nature wrought by any absolute necessity God being able to set an end to nature and the works thereof whensoever it pleaseth him and while nature continueth according to the good pleasure of God he restraines the course thereof or changeth it as he thinks good How much lesse doe the actions of men not only in respect of God's agency who is the first cause but in respect of man's agency a second cause and working deliberately and freely come to passe not necessarily but contingently and freely So farre off are they from comming to passe by absolute necessity to exist by absolute necessity being the incommunicable perfection of God himselfe But I confesse this Authour sheweth some humanity in the proofe of it to wit out of the Tragedian very judiciously and learnedly Fati est ista culpa nemo fit fato nocens It is the fault of fate or destiny and what comes to passe by destiny is no fault of man's Yet Zeno the great Patron of Fate finding his servant in a fault when his servant excused himselfe upon fate saying it was destiny that he should steale made a ready answer saying Et caedo it was his destiny also to be punished So farre was he from justifying or excusing his servant upon any such ground or forbearing to punish him And doth not this Authour know that Iocasta for all her acknowledgment of fate governing all things yet in conscience of her incestuous courses destroyed her selfe in the same Tragedian But consider indifferent Reader whether this Authour doth not carry himselfe as if he were dealing with little children and his purpose were not to informe them but to abuse and mocke them For is that all waies the faith or opinion of the Tragedian whatsoever he puts into the mouthes of this or that Actor Doe not they represent the absurd pretences of some as well as the reasonable discourses of others Then againe who are they that maintaine Fatum destiny Where hath he found this maintained by any of our divines Yet I confesse this Authour deales ingeniously in one thing to wit in walking so fairely in the steps of this forefathers For thus the Pelagians accused the doctrine of Austin not only after he was dead as appeares by Prosper's Epistle ad Ruffinum but even while he was living as appeares by Austin himselfe Nec sub nomine gratiae fatum asserimus quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet fati nomine nuncupari profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus sed de verbis contendere non amamus neither doe we maintain destiny under the name of grace in saying grace is not prevented by any merits of man But if some are pleased to call the will Allmighty God by the name of faâ—e or destiny we avoid the profane novelties of words but we doe not love to strive about words Where observe how first the same crimination was made against Austin's doctrine by the Pelagians which this Authour makes against ours 2. The doctrine which the Pelagians opposed in this crimination was this Grace is not conferr'd according unto workes 3ly Austin disavowes all antecedency of workes to the bestowing of grace how much more to the decreeing of grace to be bestowed on any which yet is the beloved Helena of this Authour therefore he talkes so oft against an Antecedent decree Then againe it is manifest that the greatest maintainers of destiny and sate did not maintaine it in any opposition to the free wills of men And Austin him selfe professeth that such a necessity as is expressed in these words Necesse est ut fiat it must needs be that such a thing shall come to passe containes no inconvenience nor is any way prejudiciall to the free wills of men His words are these Sienim necessitas nostra ida dicenda est quae non est in nostra 〈◊〉 â—â—detiamsi nelumus efficit quod potest sicut est necessitas mortis ManifestuÌ„ est 〈◊〉 nostras quibus recte aut perperam vivitur sub tale necessitate non esse Multaâ—â—im 〈◊〉 quae si nolemus non facerimus Si autem illa desinitur esse necessitas
secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut aliquid ita sit vel ita fiat nescio cur eam timeamus ne nobis liv◠〈◊〉 voluntatis auferat If that is to be accounted our necessity which is net in our power but whether we will or no worketh as it can such as is the necessity of death It is apparent that our wills whereby we live well or ill are not under the the necessity of fate For we doe many things which if we would not we should not doe them But if necessity be defined to be such a thing as when we say it must needs be that a thing be thus or thus come to passe I know not why we should feare least such a necessity should bereave us of free will And this Austin delivers to meet with the vaine feares of those who placed our wills among'st those things which are not subject to necessity least so they should loose their liberty Observe this well and compare it with the present discourse of this positive Theologue who thinks to outface Austin with the authority of his bare word In the words following he manifests that he speakes all this while of necessity in respect of God's decree not simply but considered as irresistable by the way making no bones of avouching some decrees of God to be resistable notwithstanding the Psalmist's protestation Whatsoever the Lord willeth that hath he done both in heaven and earth And St. Paul's emphaticall expression of the same truth saying Who hath repsted his will But this Divine is a brave fellow and thinks to carry all with his breath For where hath he given us any reason to prove that any decrees of God are of any resistable condition But let his decrees be never so irresistable and let that be true which Austin saith that Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit Not any thing comes to passe unlesse God will have it come to passe And after Austin the Church of Ireland in their Articles of religion Yet if God will have every thing come to passe agreeably to the nature condition thereof thus necessary things necessarily contingent things contingently as Aquinas hath not only said but proved hereby is no impeachment to the liberty of the creature but an establishment thereof rather as the Arch-Bishops Bishops and Clergy of Ireland have professed in the foresaid Article that I may shew some authority for my sayings as this Authour represents none for his but carrieth himselfe like a Master of Sentences as if he were in his own sufficiency of more authority and credit to be believed then the Pope in a generall Councell And albeit my selfe after many others and some formerly mentioned have shewed in a large digression to this purpose that necessity upon supposition may well stand with contingency and liberty simply so called And in the first place have instanced in necessity of infallibility consequent to God's prescience which though Cicero thought could not consist with man's liberty yet Christians have alwaies been of a contrary opinion untill the Sect of the Socinians arose and Arminians are very apt to shew them so much courtesy as to beare their bookes after them Secondly I have proved a necessity upon supposition of God's decree to permit sinne For the Lord takes upon him to be the keeper of us from sinne as Gen 20. 6. He professeth as much to Abimilech that he kept him from sinning against God In case God will not keep a man from sinne what can be expected but that he will undoubtedly sinne without any prejudice to the liberty of his will considering that of Austin Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia Liberty without grace is not liberty but wilfulnesse Thirdly and lastly upon supposition of God's will And this I prove evidently to passe on every thing which God foreseeth as future considering that contingent things are merely possible in their own nature and cannot passe out of the condition of things merely possible into the condition of things future without a cause And no other cause of this transmigration can be devised with any colour of reason or probability save only the will of God Neither doe I find that digression of mine in any the least part weakened or so much as assailed by ought that this Authour hath delivered Who sheweth himselfe upon the stage rather to brave his opposites with the bare authority of his words then with sound argument to dispute ought Sect 2. Because it taketh away the desert and guilt of sin Offences if fatall cannot be justly punished 2. The reason is because those deed for which men are punished or rewarded must be their own under their own power and and soveraignty but such are no fatall acts or events Neither temporally nor eternally can sin be-punished if it be absolutely necessary Not temporally as God himselfe hath given us to understand by that law which he prescribed the Jewes Deut 22. 25. Which was that it a Maid commit uncleanesse by constraint she should not be punished His reason was because there was no cause of death in her what she yeilded to was through compulsion being overborne by power As a man that is wounded to death by his neighbour so was a Virgin in that case a sufferer rather then a doer This particular law is of universall right No just punishment can be inslicted for sinne where there is no power in the party to avoid it The speech of Lipsius is but a mere crorchet contrary to reason Fatali culpae fatalis poena fatall faults must have fatall punishments Did magistrates thinke mens offences unavoidable they would thinke it bootlesse and unreasonable to punish them Nay not only so but we see by dayly experience that Judges following the direction of reason have very remissely punished such faults as have been committed through the power of the head strong exorbitant passions Yea we may read of some who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all Valcrius Maximus telleth that Popilius a Roman Praetor sitting in judgment on a woman who had in a bitter passion slaine her mother because she had murthered her children neque damnavit neque absolvit neither cleared her nor condemned her And Aulus Gellius reporteth of Dolabella the Proconsul of Asia that when a woman of Smyrna was brought before him who had poysoned her husband and son for murthering a son of hers which she had by a former husband he turned her over to the Arcopagus which was the gravest and most renowned judgment seat in the world The Judges there not daring to acquit her being stained with a double slaughter nor yet to punish her being provokt with just greife commanded the accuser offender to come before them an hundred yeares after And so neither was the womans fact justified the lawes not allowing of it Nor yet the woman punished because she was worthy to be pardoned If wise
said to be God's indignation And if God leaves any man to his corruption and offers occasions and temptations from without which are naturally apt to actuate such corruptions and withall gives them over to the power of Satan what is to be expected but that they will breake forth into murther as in Senacherib's sons and the Jewes crucifying the Son of God into stealth sacrilegious as in Achan into adultery and that in an incestuous manner as we see in Absalom into insurrections an example whereof we have in the ten Tribes revolting from Rehoboam into treasons as Iudas betraying his own Master and into all manner of outragious villanies whereof the Scripture makes plentifull mention and of the providence of God therein As for God's determining to the act that is nothing at all materiall to the point in hand though this Authour in his crude conceits is much intoxicated therewith For as much as whether the wicked are exercised in actions good for the substance of them or in abstaining from that which is evill they never a whit the more either performe the one or abstaine from the other in a gracious manner and all for want of grace supernaturall which God is not bound to bestow on any All sides confesse that Divine concourse is necessary to every act as without which the creature cannot move For in God we move as well as in him we live and in him we have our being And about this concourse a question is made to wit Whether God's influence be only into the act and that upon condition modo nos velimus provided that we will is as absurd and contradictious a conceit as can be devised seing the greatest question is concerning the act of willing And is it possible that God shall worke this act upon condition that it be wrought by us why if it be wrought by us what need is there of God's working it Can the same act be the condition of it selfe and so both before and after it selfe To avoid this precipice others fly to God's prescience that at such an instant man will produce such an act of will provided that God will produce it which is worse then the former For hereby each Agent 's operation is made the condition of the other whence no operation at all can proceed Then againe a thing is fained to be foreseen by God as future which hath no cause of the futurition thereof being in it's own nature merely possible that is no more future indeed then not future And nothing but the will and decree of God can make it passe out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future as is made manifest by invincible reason Therefore we say the influence of God necessarily required to every action is made into the will it selfe moving it agreably to the nature thereof to doe whatsoever it doth not voluntarily only but freely also taking liberty aright and as it ought to be taken that is in the choice of meanes tending to an end whether that end be a man's right end or no. For it is confessed by Moralists that the motion of the will towards it's congruous end is naturall and necessary not free But this brave Gentleman carrieth himselfe aloft and superciliously despising to enter into any of these lists of argumentation and as if the matter were conclusum contra Manichaeos confidently supposeth without all proofe that we maintaine that all humane actions come to passe by absolute necessity Whereas to the contrary 't is evident that nothing in the world hath it's existence by absolute necessity saving God alone 'T is true God's decree is unalterable and whatsoever comes to passe comes to passe by his will saith Austin and the Church of Ireland By the effectuall will of God saith Aquinas as which he makes the roote of all contingency And therefore as necessary causes worke necessarily by the will of God so by the same will of God doe contingent Agents worke contingently and free Agents worke voluntarily and freely And observe the immodesty of this Authour he tells us what Zeno's servant pleaded for himselfe with his Master but he doth not tell what Zeno answered him that he conceales it is enough for him to gull and cheate poore ignorants The Adrumetine Monks he saith were misled by Austin a vile imputation cast upon that man whose memory hath been alwaies honourable in the Church of God and the memoriall of his opposites rots Did Austin misleade them did he draw them into errour If they did mistake Austin shall it be true therefore to say they were misled by him How many mistake and misunderstand God's word what then shall we be so audacious and blasphemous as to say they are misled by the word of God Why may not such impudent persons proceed and say they are misled by the holy Ghost Then that which he saith of these Monks as misled by Austin it is a notorious untruth Cresconius and Felix that came over to Austin of their own heads to complaine of some in their Monastry laid to their charge indeed that they so taught grace that they denied freewill that this they pretended to have learned out of Austin's booke written to Sixtus the Presbyter But Austin was not hasty to believe this crimination And therefore he saith disjunctively of that Monke of whom they complained Aut librum meum non intelligit aut ipse non intelligitur either he understands not my booke or himselfe is not well understood by his brethren If the information were true then that Brother of whom they complained mistooke Austin For Austin doth not any where so maintaine grace as to deny free-will But if that Brother understood Austin aright in that foresaid booke of his then he maintained no such opinion as Cresconius and Felix laid to his charge but they rather misunderstood him And this appeared to be most true afterwards For Florus was the man whom Cresconius and Felix accused and whom Austin desired of Valentinus the father of them that he would send over unto him as Coccius acknowledgeth accordingly he was sent over to Austin as appeares in Austin's booke De corrept gratiâ cap. 1. With whom when Austin had conferred he found him most orthodoxe as himselfe professeth in the chapter mentioned and therein much rejoyced and withall signifieth to Valentinus that they deserved rather to be checked who misunderstood Florus And therefore when Austin in his Retractations comes to take notice of his booke De gratiâ libero arbitrio and the occasion of writing thereof he sets it downe not absolutely because of those who so doe maintaine grace as withall they deny free-will but with a disjunctive addition thus or because of those who thinke when grace is maintained therewithall that free-will is denied The first was delivered in reference to the crimination made before him by Cresconius and Felix against Florus but the latter was according to Austin's suspicion
so with Prosper as that he calls him no Catholique who is of this opinion Whosoever saith that men are urged to sinne and to be damned by the predestination of God as by a fatall unavoidable necessity he is no Catholique They did also make the Arausican counsell denounce a curse against such That any are predestinated by the divine power to sinne we doe not only not believe but with the greatest detestation that we can we denounce Anathema to such if there be any such as will believe so great an evill Thus farre of my â—easons against the upper and more harsh and rigorous way 2. Undoubtedly if sin cannot be punished temporally it cannot be punished eternally We have no need I should thinke of the Authority of any fathers to justifie this Where doth this Authour find that we maintaine that a man is good or evill not freely but by necessity that Tertullian is brought in as opposing us here Yet we thinke this is worthy of distinction For was not Adam made by God habitually good Durand I am sure maintaines that in his creation he was endued with all Morall vertues this we read in Scripture that all things which God made were very good as other things were made very good in their kind So I presume man was made very good in his kind and how this could be unlesse he were made vertuous I cannot conceive So likewise man being brought forth in the corrupt masse when afterwards he is made good either in the way of justification or in the way of regeneration these are no free acts of Man but rather the free acts of God I presume this Authour dares not say that man regenerates himselfe But as for the denomination of goodnesse and badnesse in man that ariseth from any actions of his I willingly grant all such goodnesse or badnesse is acquired freely not necessarily And as Tertullian takes necessity to wit in opposition unto liberty So I presume doth Hierome too otherwise these two Fathers were yoaked together unequally in this place Now we know no such necessity domineering in man as stands in opposition to liberty Much lesse doe we maintaine any necessity over the will of man depending upon fatall constellations And as Epiphanius and Austin discourse thus of necessity in reference to fatall constellations So it seemes likely that Hierome and Tertullian did discourse of necessity in the same sense To sinne by the will of God in Prosper is to sin by the predestination of God as appeares both by the Objection it selfe and Prosper's answer thereunto throughout Now predestination in the fathers meaning is of no other things theÌ„ such as God purposed to worke And accordingly we answer that no evill in the world as evill comes to passe by God's will to worke it but only by God's will to permit it And it is Austin's expresse professioÌ„ that Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit Not any thing comes to passe unles God Almighty will have it come to passe but how Not all after one manner but after a different manner some by working them others by permitting them vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo either by suffering it to come to passe in case it be evill or himselfe working it in case it be good Fulgentius justifies this sense in his sentence here alleadged For to sinne by God's will in Prosper is all one with being made an offender or made to sinne by God in Fulgentius Now we say God makes many a man good by regeneration but he makes none evill only he doth not cure that naturall or habituall viciousnesse which he finds amongst men in all For He hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth and indeed he is bound to none St. Bernard clearely maintaines that there is noe liberty from sinne in any naturall man and consequently every naturall man is cast upon a necessity of sinning and therefore that liberty from necessity which he grants to man can be no other then liberty from compulsion And so Dr. Fulke usually makes the distinction run between Liberty from sin and liberty from coaction denying the one he grants the other That the Antients did call that necessity which ariseth from the will of God upon the will of the creature by the name of destiny This Authour brings not the least colour of proofe neither do I thinke he is able to bring any save only of the Pelagians who traduced Austin's doctrine of predestination by the name of destiny And so they traduced his doctrine in denying that grace was conferred according to mens workes whereupon it was that he built his doctrine of predestination as is apparent De bono perseverantiae c. 15. In the second I wonder this Author observes not how he contradicts himselfe For if they used these words Necessity compulsion promiscuously doth it not evidently follow that they distinguished them not but alwaies tooke them of equivalent signification But I doe not find that Austin tooke necessity of the same signification with compulsion when he distinguisheth of necessity saying some necessity is such as whereby a thing befalls a man whether he will or no as the necessity of death and to such a necessity he saith the will is not subject Another necessity there is as when we say It must needs be that this or that come to passe and he confesseth plainly that the will may be subject to such a necessity without danger or prejudice to the liberty thereof 3 And well they might hold that God's judgments were not just on sinners if they were held by any absolute necessity under the power of their sins We say that nothing hath either existence or continuance by absolute necessity save God alone But I guesse this Authour calls that necessity absolute which flowes from God's absolute decree Now if he will have God's decrees to be conditionall it stands him upon to prove it not boldly suppose it Especially seeing Aquinas hath professed that never any man was so mad as to say that there is any cause of God's predestination as touching the act of God's predestinating and that there can be no cause hereof he proves because there can be no cause of God's will as touching the act of God willing as formerly he had proved And Doctor Iackson in his booke of providence confesseth that the distinction of God's will into a will antecedent and a will consequent is not to be understood as touching the act of God willing but as touching the things willed And accordingly seeing reprobation in it 's kind is the will of God as well as predestination in it's kind it followeth that as there can be no cause of the will of God as touching the act of God willing no cause of predestination as touching the act of God predestinating so neither can there be any cause of Reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating And looke how mad
a thing it is for any man to maintaine that there is some cause of predestination as touching the act of God predestinating So as mad a thing it must be every way to avouch that there is a cause of Reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating And truely the Apostle St. Paul plainly manifests that upon what ground he proves that Election is not of good works namely because before Iacob or Esau were borne or had done good or evill it was said The elder shall serve the younger upon the same ground we may be bold to conclude that Reprobation is not of evill workes And the same reason manifests that faith and infidelity are excluded from being the causes the one of Election the other of Reprobation as well as good and evill workes And both Piscator by evidence of Scripture and Bradwardine by evidence of reason have demonstrated that no will of God is conditionall which is to be understood as touching the act of God willing And it may be evidently further demonstrated thus If any thing be the cause of God's will then either by necessity of nature or by the constitution of God Not by necessity of nature as is evident and all confesse there being no colour of truth for that besides such an opinion were most dangerously prejudiciall to God's soveraignty and liberty If therefore they say it is by the constitution of God maske I pray what an insuperable absurdity followeth hereupon For seing God's constitution is his will it followeth that God did will that upon foresight of this or that he would will such a man's salvation and such a man's damnation And thus the act of God's will is made the Object of God's will even the eternall act of God's will Whereas to the contrary it is apparent that the objects of God's will are things temporall never any thing that is eternall But as touching things willed we readily grant it may be said there is a cause thereof as School-Divines doe generally acknowledge And thus Gerardus Vossius speaks of the conditionall will which he faith the Fathers doe ascribe to God For this is the instance which he gives thereof as for example when God ordaines to bestow salvation on a man in case he believe here faith is made the condition of Salvation but not of the will of God And in like manner we willingly grant that reprobation is conditionall inasmuch as God intends to inflict damnation on none but such as die in sin without repenance But albeit predestination as touching this particular thing willed may be said to be conditionall according as the School-men explicate their meaning and reprobation likewise as touching the particular of dānatiō mētioned yet no such thing cā be truely affirmed either of the one or of the other as touching the particulars of grāting or denying the grace of règeneratiō which are intended also by the decrees of predestinatiō reprobatiō For albeit God intends not to bestow salvation on any but upon condition of faith nor damnation on any but upon condition of finall impenitency and infidelity Yet God intends not to bestow the grace of regeneration on some for the curing of their naturall infidelity and impenitency Nor to leave the same infidelity and impenitency uncured in others by denying the same grace of regeneration unto them This I say God doth not intend to bring to passe upon any condition For if he should then grace should be conferred according unto works which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine and all along in divers Synods and Councells against the Pelagians So that albeit God proceeds according to a law in bestowing salvation and inflicting damnation yet he proceeds according to no law in giving or denying the grace of regeneration for the curing of our naturall corruption but merely according to the pleasure of his will as the Apostle testifies saying He hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth And if the conferring and denying of this grace be absolute how much more are the decrees hereof to be accounted most absolute And consequently that one man is delivered from the power of his sins whether originall or habituall another is not but still continueth under the power of them This I say doth must needs come to passe by vertue of Gods absolute decrees Yet no absolute necessity followeth hereupon First because no greater necessity then that which is absolute can be attributed to the existence and continuance of God himselfe Secondly God did absolutely decree to make the world yet no wise man was ever known to affirme that the worlds existence was and is by absolute necessity In like sort God did absolutely decree that Iosiah should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar That Cyrus should build his Citty and let goe his captives That no man should desire the Israelites land when they should come to appeare before the Lord their God thrice in the yeare That God would circumcise their hearts and the hearts of their children to love the Lord their God withall their heart and with all their soule To put his feare in their hearts that they should never depart away from him To cause them to walke in his statutes and judgments to doe them To worke in them both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure Yea to worke in them every thing that is pleasing in his sight through Iesus Christ Likewise that Absolom should defile his fathers Concubines that the Jewes should crucify the Son of God that some through disobedience should stumble at the word that the Kings should give their kingdomes to the beast Yet these actions were done by them as freely as ever they did ought in their lives All these things I say by Scripture evidence were decreed by God to come to passe The good by God's effection the evill by God's permission and decreed absolutely on their parts that did them if not let it be shewed upon what condition on Absolon's part he should defile his fathers Concubines upon what condition on the Jewes part they should crucify the Son of God upon what condition on their part others through disobedience should stumble at God's word And upon what condition on their part the Kings should give their kingdomes to the beast And if they take Arminias his way let them reply upon mine answere to Arminius if Bellarmin's let them reply upon my answer to Bellarmine that we may not trouble the world with out Tautologies If a different way from both these I shall be glad to be acquainted with it give it such entertainement as according to my judgment it shall be found to deserve So that with Epiphanius though we are ready to concurre in denying destiny which as before we heard out of him was a necessity derived from the starres yet with Austin we may still hold that the wills of men need not to be exempted from all necessity to maintaine the liberty
comprehended under sic velle which Austin calls tantum augeri munere charitatis to have the gift of charity so much increased in him as thus Tantum Spiritu sancto accenditur voluntas eorum ut ideo possint quta sic velint ideo sic velint quia Deus sic operatur ut velint The will of God's children is so inflāed by the Holy Ghost that therefore they are able to do good because they have a will to it in such a manner that is with such fervency and eagernes therefore they have a will to it in such a manner because God so workes as to make them willing to wit in such a manner Secondly we say that to believe if a man will to repent if he will is to be accounted nature rather then grace which I prove thus Supernaturall grace is not inferiour to a morall vertue but a morall vertue doth more then leave a man indifferent to doe vertuously if he will For it inclines the will to vertuous courses only and not vitious Like as vice inclines the will only to vicious courses and not to vertuous how much more doth supernaturall grace not leave a man indifferent to doe good if he will but inclines the will only to such things as are pleasing unto God and not to things displeasing unto him Againe to have power to believe if we will is to have power to have faith if we will But this Austin hath expressely professed to belong to the nature of man in distinctio fró the grace of the faithfull Posse fidē habere sicut posse charitatē habere naturae est heminū fidē habere sicut charitatē habere gratiaeest fideliū The nature of man makes him to have power to have faith to have charity but the grace of the faithfull makes a man to have faith to have charity It may be objected out of the former place taken out of Aust deCor grat c. 11 that habere justitiam si velit is gratia prima to be righteous if he will is the first grace I answer Austin there speakes of the grace that Adam had before his fall which was this posse si velit to abstaine from eating the forbidden fruit And this first grace is called grace in this respect that there was in Adam no flesh lusting against the Spirit So that if Adam had but a will to abstaine he should have no cause to complaine as Saint Paul doth To will is present with me but I find no meanes to performe that which is good Now such a posse si velit is not found in any man now a daies no not in the regenerate But all men that have a will to doe good by the grace of God have withall a posse secundum quid a power in part a weake power but this is not sufficient to denominate them simply able to doe that which is good unlesse the love of God be increased in them so as to overcome the will of the flesh lusting against the spirit as I have represented Austin thus expounding it Thirdly whether tends this that all men have power to believe if they will to repent if they will But to maintaine that faith and repentance are not the gifts of God bestowed of his free grace on whom he will but that they are the workes of man's free will directly contradictory to the word of God expresly professing that faith is the gift of God and that not of our selves So repentance is the gift of God yea that it is God who worketh in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ Heb 13 21. Yea both the will and the deed and that of his good pleasure 4ly If all reprobates have power to believe and repent if they will and so consequently to persevere if they will how comes it to passe that not one of them doth believe repent and persevere seing it is confest among Philosophers that such contingents as depend upon the free will of man are equally propendent on either side to passe as often one way as the other But proceed we along with this Authour 1. Here he grants expresly that the state he speakes of is the state of originall sin in which state we acknowledge that man hath not libertatem à peccato freedome from sinne And Doctor Potter towards the end of his answer to Charity mistaken confesseth it to be the doctrine of the Church of England Yet doe not we say but that it is in the power of any man to abstaine from any particular sinne it being but a naturall act and a man hath free power to performe any naturall act or to abstaine from it so farre forth as to become very vertuous as much as any man among the heathen many of whom have been renowned for vertuous conversation Calvin in the passages here alleadged hath nothing concerning either the guilt of Adam's transgression passing upon his posterity or the corruption derived therehence unto them but only of their falling from eternall salvation in the one that all are enthralled to eternall death in the other And that Adam's fall hath enwrapped all in eternall death in the third My passages quoted and related out of my Vindiciae are more to the purpose I say indeed the guilt of Adam's transgression is derived unto us that is to our persons by imputation but that very sinne of Adam was the sin of our natures as Austin speaks Non modo natura facta est peccatrix sed genuit peccatores Not only our humane nature became a sinner but also begat sinners And accordingly it is justly imputed unto our persons otherwise how could it be just with God to condemne any man for originall sinne which yet is expresly acknowledged by Mr. Hoord And the Apostle saith expresly that in Adam all have sinned And Austin gives the reason of it De Adamo omnes peccatum originale trahunt quia omnes unus fuerunt All draw originall sinne from Adam because all were that one So that I have noe cause to doubt but this Authour is of the same opinion untill I find him to avouch the contrary and so much the rather because he finds it is the opinion of Bernard also And that the corruption consequent is derived to us only by propagation I thinke it is without doubt amongst all who concurre not with Pelagius in maintaining that it is derived unto us by imitation and so only Yet notwithstanding it cannot be denied but that God might have caused the punishment of Adam's sinne to rest upon himselfe only and immediately destroyed him and created another and propagated mankind from him Yea supposing his ordinance of propagating mankind from him yet God of his mercy might have derived others from him of his mere grace indued with the holy Ghost if it had pleased him like as whom he justly damnes for sinne he might have caused them to have lived one yeare or more longer and in that
our answers thereunto which formerly were but two but now are inlarged with the addition of a third The first whereof is for the forme of it changed throughout The comparison of the waies of God with the mysterious attributes of God is changed not only as touching the forme but as touching the matter here is no pleading for a reasonable service of God as there was His making man's understanding purged from prejudice and false principles as it was proposed there purged from prejudices corrupt affections and customes as it is proposed to be the Tribunall according to whose judgment interpretations of Scripture concerning what is just in the courses of God must be allowed or disallowed I have sufficiently canvased there Let the Reader be pleased to turne to it and compare my answer to this Sub-section and observe how little spirit he had so much as to question against any one peece of my answer Here he addes a reason of his former uncouth paradoxe to wit that Iustice in men and God are for substance but one and the same thing though different in degree as the greater and lesser light I have sufficiently profligated this in the first Section concerning God's attributes For this very rule he premiseth in generall to the ensuing discourse of his most congruously wilde premises and grounds to wild discourses The difference he puts between the wayes of God the mysteries of godlinesse I have there also refuted shewing that albeit some wayes of God's justice are agreable to the judgment of man as these mentioned Es 5. and Ezek 18 yet all are not as there I shew at large And lastly because he likes rationall discourse so well I am contented to deale with him at his own weapon by six rationall demonstrations justifying the absolutenesse of God's decrees in answer whereunto he is content to carry himselfe very judiciously even as mute as a fish The second answer of ours which he brings in to reply upon is inserted a new that I come to consider in the next place as I find it set down pag. 10. 71. 72. It is answered that these decrees are set down in Scripture to be the will of God and therefore they must needs be just For God's will is the rule of all righteousnesse To this answer I have these things to reply 1. This rule in divinity is much abused by the maintainers of absolute reprobation and may not be admitted in their sense and meaning For God's will is not a rule of justice to himselfe as if things were therefore just because he willeth and worketh them but his justice rather is a rule of his will workes which are the expressions of his will He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them because they are agreable to that justice which dwells in the Divine nature as he maketh nothing which hath not potâ—nitam objectivam a power of being created without implying contradiction to himselfe or any thing in him So he willeth and doth nothing but that which may be willed and done salvá justitiâ— without wrong to his justice St. Hierome speaking of the Prophet Hoseas taking a wife of fornication Hos 1. 2. Saith it was done in typo typically not â—â—ally quia si siat turpissimii est because if it had been dâ—ne indeed it had been a most foule thing But thou wilt answer saith he Deo â—ubente nihil turpe est God commanding it nothing is dishonest Thus much we say saith the father that God commandeth nothing but what is honest but he doth not by commanding dishonest things make those things honest which are abominable plainly giving us to see what he thought viz that God doth not will a thing of make it good but willeth it because it is in it selfe good antecedently before the act of God's will about it And thus much doth Zanchy though a rigid maintainer of absolute reprobation not obscurely confesse in his treatise De naturá Dei where he letteth â—all such speeches as make God's justice antecedent to his will and therefore the rule of it rather then a thing regulated by it Neither can God will any thing saith he which is not just And againe The Princes pleasure hath the strength of a law is a Rule saith he among the Canonists But this is true where the King is just and a 〈◊〉 nothing but what is just In which words he plainly maketh the justice of the King amâ—â—edent to that will of his which must be a law Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose God's will therefore is not a rule of justice to himselfe To whom then To us For by it we are first to â—quaâ—e all our thoughts words and deeds Secondly to examine them when they are spoken and done Primum in aliqâ—o 〈…〉 regula â—ostcricrum supremum inferiorum 2ly I reply that theâ—â— absolute accrces of mens inâ—vitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will The scriptures teache us no such matter And therefore to say that they are is but a mere begging of the question It hath alwaies been ordinary with false teachers to make Gods word a father to their false opinions that they may stand the faster and winne the greater credit The Papists ground their Transubstantiation the Lutherans their conâ—ubstantiation and obiquity upon the Scripture Hoc est corpus meuÌ„ This is my body And the defenders of absolute reprobation doe so too They make their cause to be Gods and entitle his word to it because they see it is the surest way to defend it being herein like to some contentious people who being in law and having a bad cause which they are like to loose they entitle the King to it that they may the better uphold it 3ly Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will The reason is because it is odious to right reason begetteth absurdities For nulla veritas parit absurda no truth begetteth absurdities Divers truths are revealed in Scripture which are above but not contrary to right reason whether they be matters of faith or life Faith and reason nature and Scripture are both Gods excellent gifts And therefore though there may be a disproportion yeâ— there can be no repugnancy between them The worship which God requireth is Cultus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a reasonable 〈◊〉 And the word of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 milke reasonable and without guile These things therefore being laid together it will appeare to be but a mere shift and evasion when absolute reprobation is prâ—ved to be unjust and therefore unworthy of God to say Gods will is the rule of justice this is part of Gods revealed will and therefore most just whatsoever reason may cavill and say to the contrary Doth not this Authour observe the contradictious nature of this proposition Gods will is a rule of justice to himselfe For a rule of justice to any one is a rule to
have answered it and shewed the absurd interpretation that he makes of it He vaunts that he hath proved reprobation absolute to be unjust when he hath performed no thing lesse But making only a greate cracke he goes out like a squib and throughout meddles not with one argument that our Divines bring out of Scripture or reason to justifie their doctrine concerning the absolutenesse of reprobation And it is apparent that he denies the absolutenesse of election as well as the absolutenesse of reprobation and consequently must necessarily maintaine that grace is given according to works whereupon it was that Austin grounded his doctrine concerning the absolutenesse of Predestination And upon the like ground have we as good cause to ground our doctrine concerning the absolutenesse of reprobation it being every way as evident that Grace is not denied according unto works as that it is not granted according to mens works And the Scripture is equally as expresse concerning both where it is said that as God hath mercy on whom he will so also whom he will he hardneth Pag 75. 76. Treating of God's sincerity Sub-sect 1. There are two passages inserted taken out of Piscator before the passages alleadged out of Zanchy and Bucer For having said that Now God's meaning is by this doctrine that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory shall have neither forthwith he gives instance in Piscator thus And so Piscator saith Grace is not offered by God even to those who are called with a meaning to give it but to the Elect only Gratia non offertur à Deo singulis â—licet vocatis animo communicandi eam sed solis electis In the same booke he hath such an other speech Non vult Deus reprobos credere liâ—etliâ—gua profiteatur se velle Though God in words protest he would have reprobates to believe yet indeed he will not have them they make God to deale with men in matters of salvation as the Poets feigne the Gods to have dealt with poore Tantalus They placed him in a cleare and goodly river up to the very chin and under a tree which bare much sweet and pleasant fruit that did almost touch his lips but this they did with a purpose that he should tast of neither For when he put his mouth to the water to drinke it waved away from him And when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it it withdrew it selfe presently out of his reach so as he could neither eate nor drinke Just so dealeth God with reprobates by their doctrine He placeth them under the plentifull meanes of salvation offereth it to them so plainly that men would thinke they might have it when they will yet intendeth fully they shall never have it withholding from them either the first grace that they cannot believe or the second grace that they cannot persevere Did not those gods delude Tantalus yes doubtlesse And if God doe so with reprobates what did he but delude them and dissenible with them in his fairest and likeliest offers of salvation that he makes them And this doe Zanchius and Bucer grant by evident consequence as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs which cannot stand with their conclusion and therefore I suppose fell unwarily from them This treatise of Piscator De praedestinatione against Schaffman I have the second editition printed at Herborne Anno 1598. But these words according to their quotations here are not to be found the severall distinct passages are distinguished by numbers which in all editions hold the same not so the pages Yet the latter passage quoted p. 143. I meet with in mine p. 128. According to the like difference I try whether I can find out the other but in vaine But yet I meet with such matter of discourse as whereunto this passage is very congruous to be there delivered if any where yet no such thing is there delivered as num 74. Schaffman's argument is this If God calls all to salvation then he will save all To this Piscator answereth The proposition is false But he calls with animo simplici atque vero a simple mind and true Sane saith Piscator as much as to say I grant that but so as that he calls them with condition of repentance and faith Therefore as he promiseth salvation seriously unto them that performe this condition and therefore performes this promise So on the contrary he doth seriously threaten death and damnation to them who doe not fulfill the condition and performes unto him that commination Then though God be not capable of hypocrisy yet he doth not alwaies will that what he commands shall be alwaies performed by him to whom he gives that command Whether by commanding he meanes to prove a man as to prove Abraham he commanded him to sacrifice his Son or because to him whom he commandeth he will not give grace to performe that command as he deales with reprobates And num 120. To Schaffman's objection which was this God is no hypocrite he answers thus But yet he gives not grace to all to performe what he commands theÌ„ For promiscuously he commands as well reprobates as elect to believe as many as he calls by the preaching of the gospell but he gives this grace to his elect alone according to that To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdome of heaven but to them it is not given So that undoubtedly God offers grace to wit pardon of sinne with a purpose to communicate it to all that shall believe according to the judgment of Piscator neither doth he offer it with a purpose to communicate it to any unlesse they believe But the grace of faith is not offered to any with a purpose to communicate it upon a condition For then grace should be conferred according unto works which is manifest Pelagianisme As for the other which I meete with p 128. num 120 take it at full and not as it is dismembred by this Authour who cares not how he calumniates so he might advantage his own cause Schaffman's objection was Deus est unius linguae voluntatis God is both of the same tongue and will Whereto Piscator answers thus Your meaning is that God look what he professeth with his tongue that he willeth But this saith he is not alwaies true nor in all particulars For by his tongue that is by speech uttered he professed that he would have Abraham to sacrifice his Son Isaac yet he would not have him sacrificed With his tongue he professed by his servant Ionas that he would destroy Nineveh within forty dayes yet he would not so doe With his tongue by the ministers of the Gospell he professeth that he would have the reprobates to whom he speaketh among his Elect to believe the Gospell in as much as he commands them so to doe yet he would not have them to believe in as much as he will not
and then to return For in the second part which is newly come forth I finde little considerable save some few chapters touching contingency My greatest businesse about him is to understand his language Now to draw to an end as your first Thesis is an acknowledgement of the eternity of Gods decrees so the second of their unity both in time and nature God willing all things uno eodem actu Now judge I pray whether of the two opinions is most suitable hereunto that which makes the decrees of God before spoken of coordinata conjuncta or that which makes such a concatenation of them by consequents after consequents as for example Gods decree of raising men out of sin presupposeth the foresight of sin the foresight of sinne presupposeth the decree to permit sin the decree to permit sinne supposeth the foresight of the futurition of the creature and the foresight thereof supposeth the decree of creation especially considering Aquinas his argument whereby he proves that praedestinatio Christi cannot be the cause praedestinationis nostrae to wit because God by one and the same act predestinates both Christ and us And withall considering that praerequisitum will as much hinder the unity of Gods decrees as Causa I had thought to have gone over your Theses more exactly but seeing the length already spun out I resolve to be the briefer 3. Whereas in your third you conceive the order of Gods decrees is to be understood 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I judge rather Durands instruction to be more sound before mentiotioned to wit that there is onely prioritas amongst them secundum rationem and that he expounds thus quando ratio unius sumitur a ratione alterius as ratio mediorum sumitur a ratione finis And priority in intention is onely of the end in respect of means tending thereto as you rightly conceive it in your fourth Thesis 5. Of the fifth I have already spoken enough wherein I have laboured partly to discover the errour of your argumentation and yet withall so as to give you satisfaction in your own way 6. The sixth containes onely an inference upon the former and the inference is not suitable for your assumption in the former Theses did but contend that God must consider it here you inferre that he must presuppose it But it followeth not For to consider it 't is sufficient that it is conjunctum But to presuppose it is to maintain that it is antecedaneum Besides it is as much peccant against the order between the end and the means as the former whereof I have spoken sufficiently 7. Of the seventh your reason you confesse is the same as before to wit in the fifth which I have already considered Neither is there any necessity why one should be before the other they may nay must be both together intended For consider if the pardoning or curing of sinne be in intention after the permitting of sinne then it should be before it in execution which were as much as to say that God must first pardon and cure sinne before he can permit sinne This is plainly irregular that irregularity which you conceive on the contrary is onely in shew and rising meerly from confounding intention with execution Better to say God doth first intend to cure sinne and then intends to permit it for herehence followeth a due order in execution to wit first sinne is permitted and after cured then to say God first intends to permit sinne and after to cure it for herehence proceeds a most preposterous order in execution namely that first sinne shall be cured and then the being of sinne permitted And indeed when men say God doth first intend to permit sinne and then to cure it it seems their meaning is onely this not that God doth first intend c. but that God doth intend first to permit sinne and then to cure it which is most true 8. Like as in your eighth Thesis you doe expresse it ere you are aware and no otherwise 9. And as in your eighth so in your ninth you do expresse it most congruously thus we may conceive God decreeth to permit the occasion first and afterwards to make that use of it which he intends which I say is most congruous constituting this priority onely in execution not in intention I come to your conclusions drawn from the premises 1. Gods decree to manifest the glory of his power and goodnesse ad extra is before his decree to create mankind because that is a decree de fine this de medio Resp 1. Though this be a truth yet it is not the whole truth for it seems by power and goodnesse you understand onely that power and goodnesse which was shewed in his creation but this was not the last end For this end was obtained the very first moment of Adams creation after which Adam lived above 900 yeeres and all mankind since many thousands and every one knowes the last end of a mans worke is of chiefest consideration when he sets himselfe to make his worke neither doth it become the wisdome of man to carry himselfe otherwise as Beza professeth saying Statuere deum prius ordine causarum decrevisse hominem condere quam quid eo condito faceret deliberaret here is the point marke it well is such a thing as quo nihil absurdius dici potest quum finis in omnis sapientis artificis mente praecedat ipsius operis aggressionem ut certissimum sit dei de humano genere decretum creationem et ipsius creationis fines omnes antecessisse wherein he distinguisheth betweene finis creationis and finis hominis creati And as the creation manifested his power and goodnesse in making man out of nothing so man by this almighty power thus made was made and intended to be made to a certaine end which cannot be imagined to have been in any other kind than to be either a vessell of mercy or of wrath And when Solomon saith God made the wicked against the day of evill and withall signifieth that even this also was for himselfe that is for the manifestation of his glory this cannot be in the way of that power and goodnesse you speake of but something else even the making of him a vessell wherein one day shall shine the glory of God in the way of justice and soveraigne power over his creatures 2. And therefore it cannot be as you conclude in the second place that Gods decree to create mankind is before his decree to manifest his mercy or justice in mankind For though that be a decree to produce a subject yet considering that this is the decree touching the end whereto he makes him in all reason the decree of the end whereto a subject is made is before the decree of making the subject to that end And we have an expresse testimony of the Holy Ghost for this namely that as God created all things for himselfe so he created the wicked against the day
lib. de corrept gratia cap. 10. this passage credimus Deum sic ordinasse Angelorum hominum vitam ut in ea prius ostenderet quid pâ—ssct eorum liberum arbitrium deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium Apply this to man first he shewed what his free will could do wherein but in his fall Secondly quid posset gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium how was this shewed but in the raysing of some and derelinquishing others As for the circumstances wherewith you charm this strange saying they serve you in no stead man is in doubt what end to resolve on upon the event or non-event of something because he knowes not whether it will fall out or no so if God were to seek whether upon his permission of Adam to sinne he would sinne or no he might be uncertain what to intend But you suppose that before God decreed to permit him to sinne he knew he would sinne if he were permitted And as for the distinction of particular and generall it cannot be accommodated to ends for ends intended are onely particulars for they are intended to be produced and such things are onely singulars like as by singular means they are produced and actiones versantur onely circa singularia Again it is untrue that Gods decree was negative For as Austin saith Enchirid. cap. 100. Non utique nelens sinit sed volens And actus volendi is positive in God And again Cap. 95. Non ergo fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo Your selfe ere you are aware draw neer to the truth which breakes forth as loath to be suppressed As when you say a man suffers an house to fall because he can dispose of it many waies being fallen to his own behoofe Apply this to God concerning the fall of Adam permitted by him So saith Austin Nec sineret bonus fieri male nisi omnipotens etiam de malo facere posset bene Here is the generall de malo facere posse bene What are the specials in the passage by your selfe alledged they are two ut ostenderet gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium Now consider I pray posse de malo facere bene is not causa adaequata why God should permit fieri male But onely velle de malo facere bene For this power of his extends to infinite particular sinnes which he doth not permit And Austin acknowledgeth both not onely the posse as you doe when he saith nisi posset de malo facere bene But the velle also and that according to the specials of gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium As appeares in the passage alledged by you For he saith Deum sie ordinasse hominum vitam non quia posseâ— ostendere sed ut ostenderet quid posset gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium So that he plainly manifests that the cause moving God so to deale with Angels and men was not his power to shew but his will and resolution to shew both the power of his grace and of his justice which applied to men is shewed in raising some after they are fallen and derelinquishing others I conclude as Abigal said to David Hereafter it shall be no griefe unto you nor offence of mind that I have been a means to keep thee from running a dangerous course in the way of life So hereafter it may be no regret unto you that Gods providence hath brought you to this conference whereby to preserve you from running dangerous courses in the way of faith You in your Letter acknowledge reprobation absolute which is utterly contradictory to your opinion seeing you premise before it the consideration of that sinne for which men are damned For you premise the consideration of sinne originall And many thousand infants are damned onely for that and all that are damned are damned for that though not onely for that An Answer to a Discourse of D. H. about predestination By Dr. TWISSE 1. THe reasons why our Divines fall upon the corrupt masse as the object of predestination is not onely that which you alledge viz. because commiseration and dereliction presuppose the corrupt masse c. but also and much more rather as I conceive because the very last end of predestination being as you acknowledg the manifestation of Gods glory per modum misericordiae parcentis in some per modum justitiae punientis in others could not be intended without presupposition of sinne For neither could God possibly intend to spare any nor justly intend to punish any if he had not considered them as in a state of sinne Resp The question is whether Gods intention that is his decree to spare or punish presupposeth sinne You thinke it doth and that it cannot possibly be otherwise I thinke it doth not nor can possibly be so that any thing in man can be pre-required to the decrees of God yet I proposed the onely speciall arguments that ever I observed in sixteen yeares study in these points and answered them You perceiving the inconsequence of that argument as it seemes perswade your selfe there is another argument of more force than that But marke I pray with what issue In foregoing the proofe I proposed and answered you instead thereof bring no proofe at all but rely upon this proposition God could not possibly intend to spare any nor justly intend to punish any if he had not considered them as in a state of sinne without all proofe as evident of it selfe And if you marke it well you shall find that this proposition is the same proposition in effect the best proofe whereof that I found I laboured to overthrow by shewing the inconsequence thereof divers wayes And seeing you rely finally hereupon without proofe you begge the question and instead of giving a new reason you give none at all And the truth is I find many apt to be carried away with the plausible shew of this proposition and either looke not at all farther for any proofe thereof or if they doe they proceed no farther than thus The manifestation of mercy in sparing and justice in punishing presupposeth sinne therefore the decree or intention of manifesting Gods mercy in sparing and justice in punishing presupposeth sinne which was in effect the same consequence or enthymeme which I proposed to answer as you may easily perceive if you marke it well for commiseration and manifestation of mercy are all one Now because this proposition is such a witch to bewitch mens fancies to entertaine it I will endeavour to discover the vanity of it and that in the very decrees of men all which are temporall whereas Gods decrees were eternall The decree of shewing mercy in pardoning sinne doth no more presuppose sinne than the decree of shewing the power of balme in curing a green wound doth presuppose the wound or the decree of shewing the power of a cordiall against poyson doth presuppose the empoysoning of a mans
their p. 47 l. 2 praeoptat l. 23 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 48 l. 5 6 degree l. 8 degree of diminution l 10 any paine p. 49. l. 18 my argument p. 50. l. 7 in this l. 22 will p. 51. l. 22 the corrupt p 53. l. 33. permittente Deo p 55 l. 1 But God by this opinion doth will and procure it by a powerfull and effectuall decree which cannot be resisted p. 56 l. 5 this will l 53 signes of p. 57 l 8 God p. 59 l. 9 of Thomas p. 60 l 16 as holily p. 61 l. 45 is just p. 62. l. 4 restraines ib l. 14 good works l. 22 that therefore God l. 28. double evill l. 48 for it by p. 63 l. 5 Potan p. 64 l. 7 efficacy of l 16 supposition l. 18 necessarily but either necessarily or c. l. 19 supposition l. 24 of Aquinas l. 26 on Gods Marg pro culpa p. 65. l. 34 quotation l. 45 to feare l. 48. emortui sarmenti quia Christo resecti sunt l. 49 multi p. 66 l. 7 saith not l. 12 nill that l. 25 futurition l. 47 from sin l. 56 or whither he abstaine from that which is evill he doeth not abstaine from it in a gracious manner p. 67 l. 12 this of l. 24 you hearts l. 51. mans infidelity p. 68 l. 57. manner of appointing hereunto for if they be at all appointed hereunto undoubtedly they are precisely appointed thereunto p. 69 l. 12 supposition p. 70 l. 28 second way p. 73 l. 24 as we l. 44 severally p. 74 l. 46 author of the Sin l. 48 del good p. 76. l. 13 will not p. 78. l. 3 futurition l. 29 procure l. 30 as a second p 80 l. 12 of England l. 22 but we l. 31 against l. 38 if he should worke them contrary to their natures then c. p. 81 l. 7 effecting p. 83 l. 29 of sin p. 84 l. 24 acts p. 85 l. 1 any naturall act l. 50 mere pleasure as the apostle professeth that God hath mercy on whom he will it is evident that God of his mere pleasure c. p. 86 l. 18 as uncapable p. 89. l. 59 nec recte p 93 l. 30 will doe p. 94 l. 2 nill it p. 97 l. 36 the cause l. 54. my answer p. 100 l. 44 with their p 102 l. 56 and that p. 104 l. 4 Credible p 105 l 2 agent p. 118 l. 41 or vitious p. 121 l. 41 will of p. 127 l. 14 of destiny p. 134 l. 44 asserâ—oribus l. 47 quin author l. 50 I propose p. 140 l. 21 so as to come to passe p 146 l. 22 pillar had not l. 23 del pillar had p. 147 l ult why God p. 151 l. 38 so p. 157 l. 7 without which p. 164 l. 56 it may p. 186 l. 47 decrees p. 193 l. 2 wherein 't is manifest that finall perseverance in sin goeth before l. 3 But if you farther proceed to make it good according to your usuall course thus finall perseverance in sin goeth before damnation Ergo c p 195 l. 35 mine l. 54 decrees p. 198 l. 36 is in p. 199 l 10 and some l. 11. privatively A VINDICATION OF Dr. TWISSE FROM THE EXCEPTIONS OF M r JOHN GOODWIN IN HIS Redemption Redeemed BY HENRY IEANES Minister of Gods Word in Chedzoy OXFORD Printed for T. Robinson 1653. TO THE Reverend and Learned Mr IOHN GOODWIN SIR I Have assumed so much boldnesse as to examine some passages that you have in your Booke entituled Redemption Redeemed against D. Twisse wherein I believe that you your selfe will acknowledg that I have carried my selfe as a fair adversary as an adversary only unto your opinions and not unto your person which I love honour as in other respects so for the good and great gifts and parts God hath bestowed on you Many of my friends have earnestly disswaded me from this vindicatioÌ„ assuring me that I must expect from you insteed of a reply nothing but a libell But for my part I shall hope and pray unto the Almighty for better things of you However I am not hereby deterred from entring into the lists with you However I am not hereby deterred from entring into the lists with you neither shall I deprecate your utmost severity in rationall argumentation for the discovery of any thing that you conceive to be weake and unsound in this my discourse You may perhaps think and say that so small a trifle is unworthy a diversion from your more serious employments but for that I am contented that the learned Reader judge betwixt us Indeed I had long ere this finished an answer unto your whole Book but that there was a generall and as I think a just expectation that some in the University of Cambridge who dissented from you would comply with your faire invitation of them to declare themselves in some worthy and satisfactory answer to the particulars propounded in your Book But upon their long silence which I can neither excuse nor will I accuse as being altogether ignorant of the causes thereof I renewed my thoughts of setting about this worke and intended in the interim to have annexed to this piece of D. Twisse a Table referring unto such passages in this and other of his Books as doe in great part satisfy whatsoever you have delivered in your forementioned Treatise in opposition unto the absolutenesse of Divine Reprobation But from these resolutions I was quite taken off by certain information that the Learned M. Kendall heretofore Fellow of Exeter Colledge in the University of Oxford hath undertaken you But I detaine you and the reader too long with Prefacing I shall therefore presently without more adoe addresse my selfe unto the encounter with you In three places you except against D. Twisse I shall consider them severally To begin with the first M r GOODWIN p. 25. 26. c. 2. §. 20. IT is indeed the judgement of some Learned men that the purpose or intent of God to permit or suffer such or such a thing to be done or such or such an accident to come to passe supposeth a necessity at least a syllogisticall or consequentiall necessity of the coming of it to passe But that the truth lieth on the other side of the way appears by the light of this consideration If whatsoever God hath decreed or intendeth to permit to come to passe in any case upon any termes or any supposition whatsoever should by vertue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to passe then all things possible to be or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be must be yea and this necessarily For doubtlesse God hath decreed and intendeth to leave naturall causes generally to their naturall and proper operations and productions yea and voluntary causes also under a power and at liberty to act ten thousand things more then ever they will doe or shall doe For example God intendeth and hath decreed to permit that fire
suadetur quocunque modo quantumvis efficaciter necesse est ut fiat nec quod dissuadetur quocunque modo quantumvis efficaciter necesse est ut non fiat Ergo multo minus ex co quod permititur aliquid fieri vel non fieri sequitur necessario oportere illud fieri vel non fieri Secondly from naturall actions he proceedes on to morall and he begineth with good and gracious actions in which he resolveth that naturall permission hoc est non in genere morali sed Physico can have no place for saith he this would suppose that the creature can be carryed unto actions truly good without any speciall supply or assistance of Gods spirit and grace which we deny can be in the state of nature entire and pure how much lesse is it possible in the state of nature corrupted whence also saith he it would follow that God doth not antecedently worke and cause every act truly good and that by a speciall supply aid or assistance As for Gods permission of good actions in genere morali he referreth to what he hath spoken touching the like permission of naturall actions only he addeth that God allwayes concurreth unto an act truly good by a speciall assistance that both as a Physicall and Morrall agent wherefore saith he in this gracious administration of things there is no place at all for permission as it is opposed unto effection or farthering for God worketh causeth and promoteth every good worke in his children although permission may have roome there as it simply signifieth non-hindrance for questionlesse God doth not hinder the good workes of his people which he himselfe causeth and worketh Thus you see that by D. Twisse his opinion good workes doe not follow upon Gods bare single and sole permission for they cannot be performed without the powerfull operation of Gods holy spirit which worketh in us both the will and the deed Lastly as touching evill or sinfull actions in them divine permission challengeth a proper and peculiar place both as permission is opposed unto efficiency as also unto restraint First as 't is opposed unto efficiency for the obliquity of them being a privation is not capable of an efficient cause Secondly as 't is opposed unto restraint for God doth not hinder sinfull actions many times though it be alwaies in his power But now if we speake of the permission of sinfull actions in genere morali or suasorio so all unanimously affirme that God perswadeth or exhorteth none unto evill for if God should interpose his authority by commanding advising or exhorting whatsoever should be done hereupon would be lawfully done But though God himselfe doth not exhort or perswade unto sinne yet he gives way many times and that justly unto the temptations of Satan and his instruments nay he himselfe by his providence layes before men outward objects and occasions suitable unto their inward corruptions as a goodly Babylonish garment two hundred sheckles of silver and a wedge of Gold of fifty sheckles weight before the covetous eyes of Achan beautifull and naked Bathsheba before the lustfull eyes of David Next he suffereth those corruptions that is either he doth not cure them by his renewing grace or he doth not bridle them by his restraining grace but lets them have their full swinge without check or controll In his children he doth not actuate and rouze their graces but lets them lye as it were in a deep sleepe c. Besides he concurreth unto those motions of the soule as touching the entity of them unto which men are stirred by view of objects that are agreeable unto either their unsubdued or unbridled lusts From the complication of all these a particular obduration and sinfull action followeth so that you take in also the concourse of God so farre as concernes the substance or matter of such a sinfull action Now from this variety of providences going before a sinfull action D. Twisse drawes this following conclusion Ex quib us manifestum videtur ex solâ permissione nequaquam consequi quod fiat aliquid proinde etiam minus verum videtur illud Perkinsei Quicquid Deus non impedit ideo fit quia Deus non impedit From which it seems manifest that it in no waies followeth that a thing cometh to passe upon Gods sole permission and therefore that of Perkins seemes not to be true whatsoever God doth not hinder therefore cometh to passe because God doth not hinder it In the next place he bringeth in and answereth objections First This is the opinion not only of Perkins but of Piscator also Secondly our adversaries by name Vorstius and Arminius grant it and their concession should be embraced as making much for the defence of our opinion Thirdly there is a reason which at the first blush seems convincing unto which not only Vorstius but also Piscator yeeldeth and 't is drawn from the nature of Relatives For seeing permission and the thing permitted are Relatives it seems necessary that they exist together upon supposall then of the permission of the coming to passe of such a thing it seems necessary that that which is so permitted doe come to passe Unto these he dispatcheth an answer severally in the same order as they were propounded First as for our Divines he acknowledgeth that they have so thought but truth is to be preferred before any testimony Amicus Socrates Amicus Plato magis amica veritas For 't is but reason that we should have regard unto and care of only truth that so we may with the Apostle say we can doe nothing against the truth but for the truth Secondly he sheweth how that for the existence of a thing Piscator doth not acquiesce in Gods sole permission but flyeth unto Gods government and that so powerfull as that it bowes bends and turnes the wills of men whither he pleaseth As for the concessions of Arminius and Vorstius seeing they are erroneous a patronage of our opinio◠drawn from them is not to be valued so much as to be built upon Verum tanti non est hujusmodi patrocinium ut errone is quantumvis propitiis innitamur assertionibus As for the reason that is of no force or strength for we may as well conclude that because God did from eternall will or decree to create the World therefore the World from eternall was created or because God from eternall foreknew that the World should be therefore the World did exist from eternall for there is no lesse relation between the willing of a thing and the thing willed the decree of a thing and the thing decreed the foreknowledge of a thing and the thing foreknowne than there is between the permission of a thing and the thing permitted And there is between them as a relation so also a reciprocation whereupon it followeth that if God willeth or decreeth a thing it is willed or decreed if he foreknowes a thing it is foreknown if he permits a thing
Answerably unto which fire cannot be said to be permitted to fire or blow up such a barrell of Gunpowder between which and it there is such a distance M r GOODWIN OR if it be said that God hath decreed that such a sparke or coale shall fall into the said barrell of Gunpowder now is not the decree barely permissive but operative and assertive and such which ingageth the decreer to interpose effectually for the bringing of the thing decreed to passe But such decrees as this in matters of that nature we deny to be in God IEANES IF By matters of that nature you meane in such contingent things as the falling of a Sparke or Coale into a Barrell of Gunpowder why Doctor Twisse hath an argument which he takes to be unanswerable clearly evincing that whatsoever thing comes to passe that is good with a transcendentall goodnesse or Metaphysicall God hath decreed it by an operative or effective decree You have it in his examination of M. Cottons Treatise c. p. 68 69. As also in his Consideration of that Scoffing Pamphlet of Tilenus viz. the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practise p. 18 19. Nay I say more saith he that every thing which cometh to passe in the revolution of times was decreed by God which I proove by such an argument for answer whereunto I challeng the whole nations of both Arminans and Iesuites It cannot be denied but God foresaw from everlasting whatsoever in time should come to passe therefore every thing was future from everlasting otherwise God could not foresee it as future Now let us soberly enquire how these things which we call future came to be future being in their own nature meerely possible and indifferent as well not at all to be future as to be future Of this transmigration of things out of the condition of things meerely possible such as they were of themselves into the condition of things future there must needs be some outward cause Now I demand what was the cause of this transmigration And seeing nothing without the nature of God could be the cause hereof for this transmigration was from everlasting but nothing without God was everlasting therefore something within the nature of God must be found fit to be the cause hereof And what may that be Not the knowledge of God for that rather presupposeth things future and so knowable in the kind of things future then makes them future therefore it remaines that the meere decree and will of God is that which makes them future If to shift off this it be said that the essence of God is the cause hereof I farther demand whether the essence of God be the cause hereof as working necessarily or as working freely If as working necessarily then the most contingent things became future by necessity of the Divine nature and consequently he produceth whatsoever he produceth by necessity of nature which is Atheisticall therefore it remaines that the Essence of God hath made them future by working freely and consequently the meere will and decree of God is the cause of the futurition of all things He speakes indeed of Gods will and decree indefinitely but that thereunder he comprehends an operative or effective decree is undeniable But the force of this reason you may think easily to evade by your deniall of Gods fore-knowledge your reasons for which denyall I shall in the next place proceed to examine Mr GOODWIN pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2. THat Prescience or fore-knowledge are not formally or properly in God is the constant assertion both of ancient and moderne Divinity The learned Assertours of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their Adversaries the Schoolemen and Papists in this Nor is it any wonder at all that there should be peace and a concurrence of Judgement about such a poynt as this even between those who have many Irons of contention otherwise in the fire considering how obvious and neere at hand the truth herein is For 1. If foreknowledge were Properly and formally in God then might Predestination Election Reprobation and many other things be properly and formally in him also in as much as these are in the letter and propriety of them as competible unto him as foreknowledge Nor can there be any reason given for a difference But unpossible it is that there should be any Plurality of things whatsoever in their distinct and proper natures and formalities in God the infinite simplicity of his nature and being with open mouth gainsaying it 2 ly If foreknowledge were properly or formally in God there should be somewhat in him corruptible or changeable For that which is supposed to be such a fore-knowledge in him to day by the morrow suppose the thing or event fore-known should in the interim actually come to passe must needs cease and be changed in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge in the Propriety of it being res futura somewhat that is to come Thirdly and lastly there is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same with any thing which is in God The reason is because then there must either be somewhat finite in God or somewhat infinite in the Creature both which are unpossible But if Praescience or fore-knowledge being properly and formally in the Creature should be properly and formally also in God there should be somewhat in the Creature univocally and formally the same with somewhat which is in God Therefore certainly there is no fore-knowledge properly so called in God IEANES DIverse Heathen Philosophers I have found censured for denying of Gods Prescience or foreknowledge as Cicero by Austin lib. 5. De Civ Dei cap. 9. Seneca by Aureolus 1. distin 38. Aristotle by Vasquez and others But that Christian Divines either ancient or moderne unlesse you will appropriate that name unto Socinians are so unanimous in impugning of Gods foreknowledge is great newes unto me and not only unto me but unto all others I believe that have read any thing in either ancient or Moderne Divinity Hierome in his third book Adversus Pelagianos teacheth as Franciscus Amicus informes me that he who takes away Prescience from God takes away the Godhead Eum qui a Deo praescientiam tollit divinitatem tollere As for Austin whom you quote in the Margent against this Prescience of God let any one read that place but now quoted Lib. 5. De Civ Dei cap. 9. and he must needs confesse that he is a zealous Assertor of Gods foreknowledge against Cicero who opposeth it in favour of the liberty of mans will And so saith Austin Dum vult facere homines liberos facit sacrilegos multò sunt autem tolerabiliores saith he qui vel sydera fata constituunt quam iste qui tollit praescientiam futurorum Nam consiteri esse Deum negare praescium futurorum apertissima insania est
naturaliter scire desiderat quare cum per partem proximam habeat voluntatem universaliter efficacem posset illa scire non novitèr quia tunc non semper esset actualissimus scientissimus perfectissimus beatissimus immutailis penitus contra tertiam partem sextam necessario ergo aeternalitèr omnia vera novit Thirdly from his unchangeablenesse which is affirmable of all his other Attributes and consequently of his knowledge But now his knowledge if it were not of things whilest they were to come it would by actuall existence of them be enlarged and so changed This argument is urged by Durand Cumel Rada Suarez and others God knowes thing whiles present for otherwise he should be ignorant of that which men and Angells know therefore he knew them whiles future otherwise by the presence of them something de novo should accrue unto Gods knowledge which cannot be without a change Suarez also argueth to the same purpose The last sort of arguments which I shall mention are drawn from Gods actuall providence or efficiency God is the cause of all things of him saith the Apostle are all things Rom. 11. 36. Now he is the cause of all things by his knowledge and by his will First by his knowledge and that practicall which is resembled unto that of an Artificer who hath a foreknowledge of what artificiall workes he resolves upon for he hath samplers and patterns of them in his mind Rada propounds this argument very briefely Secondly the will of God is the cause of all things as is demonstrated by Bradwardine and by Aquinas and such as Comment upon him in prim part Q. 19. Art 4. Now the will of God is unchangeable from within and irresistible from without and therefore in it all things future may be certainly and infallibly foreknowne Bradwardine from Esay 46. 10. Declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times the things that are not yet done saying my Counsell shall stand inferres the infallibility of Gods prediction from the firmenesse immutability and unresistiblenesse of his will The Prophet signifies saith he that he can therefore declare the things that are not done because his Counsell shall stand and he will doe all his pleasure Quasi velit innuere quod per hoc annuntiet vei annuntiare possit ab exordio novissimum quia omne suum consilium volunt as immutabiliter stabit siet De causa Dei lib. 1. cap. 218. pag. 224. This argument Cumel inforceth by comparison with mans foreknowledge of things in their causes A Mathematician can foreknow an Eclipse of the Sunne or Moone in its cause and therefore much more can God foreknow all future contingents in the determination of his own will As for the testimonies you bring in the Margent they and diverse others are alleadged generally by the Dominicans to prove the existence of things in Eternity and it is very strange unto me that you take no notice of the common answers that are usually given unto them The place out of Gregory is misquoted but that might be an escape of the Printer in my booke it is Moral lib. 20. cap. 25. And a little after he gives the reason why prescience is not properly in God Praescire dicitur qui unamquamque rem antequam veniat videt Et id quod futurum est priusquam praesens fiat praevideâ— Deus ergo quomodo est praescius dum nulla nisi quae futura sunt praesciantur Et scimâ—â— quia Deo futurum nihil est ante cujus oculos praeterita nulla sunt praesentia non transeunt futura non veni uni Quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit erit in ejus prospectu praesto est Et omne quod praesensest scire potest potius quam praescire The ground upon which both Austin and Gregory deny foreknowledge to be in God is because nothing is future but all things are present unto God Unto all these and diverse other Testimonies which occurre in the Dominicans I shall rehearse the answers of severall men First Rada Par. prim controv triges Art 2. pag. 493. Adomnes authoritaies unica solutione sit satis Dico enim quod non intelligunt sancti omnia esse Deo secundum rem praesentia sed secundum esse objectivum cognitum omnia enim in seipso videt intuâ—tur Secondly Suarez gives the same answer but he explaines himselfe more fully The Fathers saith he speake by way of exaggeration to declare the perfection and exactnesse of that knowledge which God hath of things to come for he knowes them so distinctly and accurately with all their circumstances as if they did exist actually present This knowledge of them therefore is not so much abstractive as intuitive not so much prescience as science Thirdly D. Twisse De scientia media pag. 390. gives the same answer that Bradwardine did unto the like saying out of Boetius and Anselme above 200 yeares agoe to wit That all things are present unto God in esse volito as decreed by him sunt ei praesentia id est per suam insuperabilem immutabilem voluntatem praesentialiter determinata decreta certitudinaliter ut fiant futura And this you may see how he cleares both out of Austin and Gregory Fourthly Becanus gives another answer which I take to be the more satisfying And 't is that the scope of both Austin and Gregory is to shew That there is not such a prescience or fore knowledge in God as there is in us viz imperfect and conjecturall c. From your Testimonies I come to the examination of your Reasons M r GOODWIN NOR is it any wonder at all that there should be peace and a concurrence of judgement about such a poynt as this even between those who have many Irons of coâ—â—ention otherwise in the fire considering how obvious and neere at hand the truth herein is For 1. if foreknowledge were properly and formally in God then might Predestination Election Reprobation and many other things be properly and formally in him also in as much as these are in the Letter and propriety of them as competible unto him as foreknowledge Nor can there be any reason given for a difference But unpossible it is that there should be any plurality of things whatsoever in their distinct and proper natures and formalities in God the infinite simplicity of his Nature and being with open mouth gainsaying it IEANES YOur Argument with open mouth gainsayeth that which no body will affirme but is mute in the proofe of that which only will be called for to wit That whatsoever is properly and formally ascribed unto God is really distinguished from Gods Essence and his other attributes If you think I doe you any wrong by this censure reduce your Argument unto Categoricall Syllogismes and make the best of it you can Mr GOODWIN SEcondly if foreknowledge were properly or formally in God there should be
it in regard of the things or perfections signified by those words and not barely in regard of their imposition This limitation Aquinas puts unto the Question p. 1. Q. 13. art 6. Nomina quae proprie de Deo praedicantur quantum ad rem significatam per prius dicuntur de Deo quà m de creaturis quia a Deo hujusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant sed quantum ad impositionem nominis per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis quas prius cognoscimus unde modum fignificandi habent Mr GOODWIN pag. 29 30. cap. 3. Sect. 3. IF it be objected that this argument lieth as strong against the propriety of knowledge as of foreknowledge in God in as much as foreknowledge is every whit as Properly and Formally in the Creature as knowledge I answer True it is there is no knowledge neither in God according to the precise and formall notion of Knowledge or in such a sense wherein it is found in men And this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned doe infallibly demonstrate Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit really and essentially distinct from the subject or soule wherein it resideth yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein and of separation from its Whereas that which is called knowledge in God neither differs really or essentially from his nature or from himselfe but is really one and the same thing with him as will farther appeare in the following Chapter nor is it either capable of growth or of decay or of separation Only in this respect knowledge of the two is more properly attributable unto God then foreknowledge viz. because foreknowledge in the proper notion or formall conception of it includes or supposeth a liablenesse to a change or expiration viz. upon the comming to passe of the thing foreknown which must of necessity come to passe in time whereas knowledge imports nothing but what may be permanent and perpetuall and so is of the two more appropriable unto him who changeth not IEANES HEre you plainly flinch from that which is likely to be controverted between us for you have not so much as the shadow of an argument to prove that knowledge is not in God according to the precise and formall notion of knowledge but you spend a whole Section in the proofe of that wherein you are sure to meet with no adversary at all viz. that there is no knowledge in God in such a sense wherein it is found in men why Sir the concession of this will no waies advantage you or prejudice us 't is the first part of your disjunctive proposition that calls for proofe in which why you are so silent I cannot guesse unlesse it be that you are conscious of the falsehood of it therefore dar'd not to propound it Categorically but only disjunctively the truth of disjunctive propositions is salved if but one part of thē be true So thē perhaps you thought how ever the World went you would be safe and secure as having two strings unto your bow I will say no more of this but that it is very unlike M. Goodwin thus to decline the combate and runne unto the maintenance of a fort where you could not reasonably expect so much as one assaylant If you be pleased to returne into the field againe and come up roundly to a charge I meane a proofe of that which you have not yet so much as offered or pretended to prove viz. That there is no knowledge in God according to the precise and formall notion of knowledge I shall be willing and ready to encounter you and I doe hope that by Gods assistance I shall be able to stand the shock of all your Argumentation M R GOODWIN pag. 105 106. Cap. 6. Sect. 14. IT is the sence of one of the greatest Patrons of the adverse cause that the precept or injunction of God is not properly the will of God because saith he he doth not hereby so much signify what himselfe willeth to be done as what is our duty to doe I confesse that no signification whatsoever whether of what a man willeth or decreeth to be done or of what is the duty of another to doe can properly be said to be the will of the signifier but yet that will wherewith or out of which God willeth or commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe is as properly his will as that whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done My will or desire that my Child should obey me or that he should prosper in the world is as properly my will as that whereby I will or purpose to shew the respects of a father unto him in providing for him being as proper naturall and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within m◠whereby I will the latter as that act it selfe of this faculty wherein I will the latter is For the Principle or faculty within me of willing how numerous or different soever the acts of willing which I exert by vertue of this faculty may be is but one and the same And this faculty being naturall there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it which should make some to be more proper and others lesse though some may be better and others worse But this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God Therefore if the precept or preceptive will of God be not properly his will neither can any other will of his or any other act of his will be properly such If so then that will of God or act of will in God whereby he willeth or injoyneth faith and repentance and consequently salvation unto all men is as properly his will as that whereby he willeth the salvation of any man Therefore if there be any secret or unrevealed will in God whereby he willeth the destruction of any man at the same time when he willeth the salvation of All men be it with what kind of will soever these two wills must needs enter-feare and contradict the one the other Nor will that distinction of the late mentioned Author salve a consistency between them wherein he distinguisheth between the Decree of God and the thing decreed by him affirming that the thing which God decreeth may be repugnant to or inconsistent with the thing which he commandeth though the decree it selfe cannot be repugnant to the Command The vanity of this distinction cleerely appeareth upon this common ground viz. that Acts are differenced and distinguished by their Objects Therefore if the object of Gods decreeing will or the thing decreed by him be contrary to the thing preceptively willed or commanded by him unpossible it is but that the two acts of his will by the one of which he is supposed to will the one and by the other the other should digladiate and one fight against the other Therefore certainly there is no such paire or combination of wills
by the other his commandement which is without him performed usually by the Ministry of the creature and therefore not his will properly so called I utterly deny the consequence of your argument and how just and reasonable this my denyall thereof is will appeare if you please to reduce your Enthymeme into a Categoricall Syllogisme for then you will find the proofe of its consequence to depend on this That whatsoever acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects doe digladiate and one fight against the other and this is a proposition so grossely false as that I am very confident you cannot back it with so much as one either testimony or reason That acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects is a common and received rule but that all acts are opposite whose objects are repugnant is an assertion that as yet I never so much as read or heard of in any either Philosopher or Divine and 't is this alone will serve your turne to conclude a digladiation or repugnancy between the Decree and the Command of God from the opposition that D. Twisse admitteth to be between the things Decreed and the things Commanded 2. If we take opposition and repugnancy as the Ramists who divide it into disparation and contrariety we may safely say that Gods decree and his commandement are things opposite for they are disparate but this will no wise prejudice D. Twisse who speakes in the language of the followers of Aristotle neither will it any waies advantage you for the opposition or repugnancy that is between things disparate is only as touching an essentiall predication one of another we cannot say that Grammar is Logick or that temperance in a man is fortitude and so we cannot say that Gods decree is his commandement or his commandement is his decree not of a denominative or concretive predication of the same subject the same man may be valiant and temperate a Grammarian and a Logician See Scheibler Top. cap. 14. n. 7. cap. 15. n. 19. MR GOODWIN IT is impossible that I should inwardly and seriously will or desire the death of my Child and yet at the same time seriously also will and injoyne the Physitian to doe his best to recover him IEANES IF you would hereby insinuate that we affirme that God doth inwardly and seriously will or desire the death or damnation of his Children and yet at the same time also seriously injoyne his Ministers who are spirituall Physitians to doe their best to recover them out of the snare of the Divell you doe wonderfully misconceive and misreport our opinion for we say that unto none hath he given power right or priviledge to be his Sonnes but unto such as believe on his name and all those who believe he hath ordained unto eternall life and will keepe by his power unto salvation but of this see our Author In the first Book of this Treatise p. 133. 134. 137. What hath been said is sufficient to convince him that will not wilfully and obstinately shut his eyes against the light that the command of all who heare the Gospell to believe and repent and the purpose of God to deny faith and repentance unto many are not contradictory I shall before I discharge my selfe of this Section evince as much briefly concerning this latter purpose and that purpose or decree out of which the command proceedeth and which is signified thereby Here we must premise that the commandement of God doth signify a decree or decreeing will of God though not such a decree or will as the Arminians usually shape for themselves 1. It signifieth the decree of God concerning the commandement it selfe 2. Concerning the thing commanded First then the command of God signifieth Gods will or decree of the commandement it selfe of the externall transient act of commanding Eph. 1. 11. God worketh all things after the Counsell of his own will Gods commanding then of things in time is a signe that from everlasting he did decree to command them But secondly It signifieth a will or decree of God also concerning the thing commanded viz as touching the obligation to it not as touching the existence or non-existence of it it signifieth that God from everlasting did decree that the thing commanded should be mans duty should be a thing Morally good but it doth not signify or reveale that the thing commanded should actually exist and be performed by every one unto whom the command is propounded Indeed the obedience of the elect for whose salvation only the commands of God are given was both commanded and decreed or determined by God Ezek. 36. 26 27. And hence we may inferre that the command of faith repentance obedience c. all which God hath determined to be necessary unto salvation doe imply and reveale in a generall and indefinite way that God from eternity did purpose to worke faith repentance and obedience in those whom he had designed to salvation But this concession will not satisfy Arminians who will be contented with nothing unlesse we will grant them that God willeth and desireth the faith repentance obedience and salvation of Reprobates which we cannot doe but withall we must renounce and disclaime Gods omnipotency and immutability These things thus briefely premised That Gods purpose or decree of commanding faith and repentance unto all that heare the Gospel and his purpose or decree to deny faith and repentance unto many are not contradictory is manifest because Gods purpose or decree of commanding faith and repentance referres unto the thing commanded faith and repentance only as concerning the obligation to them not as touching the existence of them now to decree and purpose to bind and oblige all to faith and repentance and to decree and purpose that some yet shall never actually believe and repent cannot be proved by any rules of Logick to be contradictory Before I proceed unto the consideration of your next and last passage against D. Twisse I shall only represent unto you that our Author whom you take to be one of the greatest patrons of that cause which you account adverse doth dislike the accommodation of that distinction of voluntas signi and beneplaciti or a secret and revealed will unto 1 Tim. 2. 4. the place which you have under debate as well as you though I confesse upon different grounds In his Booke against Jackson pag. 534. he informeth us that neither Calvin embraceth it nor Beza nor Piscator but all concurre upon that interpretation which Austin gave many hundred years agoe Peter Martyr proposeth it saith he amongst diverse others but embraceth it not neither doe I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it Cajetan indeed embraceth it and Cornelius de Lapide and Aquinas amongst other interpretations If you take saith he speaking to D. Jackson a liberty to put upon us the opinions and accommodations of distinctions used by Papists you may in the next place make doubt whether we have not subscribed to the Councell of