just nor dispraise nor honour nor punishment but this is false therefore all things are not done by Fate But Chrysippus not allowing this necessity yet maintaining that nothing happened without precedent causes distinguisheth thus Of Causes saith he some are perfect and principall others assistant and immediate When we say all things are done by Fate from antecedent causes we understand not the perfect and principall causes but the assistent and immediate He therefore answers the former objection thus If all things are done by Fate it followeth that all things be done by antecedent causes but not by the principall and perfect but by the assistent and immediate which though they be not in our power it followeth not that the appetite likewise is in our power This Argument therefore concludes well against those who joyne necessity with Fate but nothing against those who assert antecedent causes not perfect nor principall What assent is and how it commeth to be in our power we have already shewn in the Logick Hence it followeth that notwithstanding that all things are necessarily coacted and connected by Fate with a certain principall reason yet saith Chrysippus our mindes are so obnoxious to Fate as their property and quality is For if at the first by nature they were formed soundly and profitably all that power which commeth upon them extrinsecally from Fate they transmit easily and inoffensively but if they are harsh ignorant and rude not supported by any helps of good art although they are pressed by little or no conflict of fatall incommodity yet by their own unluckinesse and voluntary impulsion they rush into continuall sins and errours which thing maketh that this naturall and necessary consequence of things which is called Fate be by this reason For it is as it were fatall and consequent in its kinde that wicked minds should not be without sins and errours an instance whereof he bringeth not unapposite As saith he a rolling stone if you turn it down a steep place you first give it the cause and beginning of its precipitation but afterwards it rolleth headlong of it selfe not that you make it do so any longer but because its figure and the volubility of its form is such In like manner order and reason and necessitie moveth the beginnings of causes but the impetuousnesse of our thoughts and mindes and our own actions are guided by every mans private will and minde Thence continueth he the Pythagoreans say Men of their own accord their ills procure As conceiving that all ills proceed from themselves and according to their own appetites when they sin and offend and according to their own minde and signe For this reason he denyeth that we ought to suffer and hear such wicked or idle or noxious or impudent persons who being taken in some fault and wickednesse have recourse to the necessity of Fate as to a Sanctuary affirming that they have done wickedly is not to be attributed to their temerity but to Fate CHAP. XX. Of Not-Bodies or Incorporealls and first of Dicibles HItherto of Bodies we come next to the second place of Physick concerning Not-Bodies or Incorporealls Incorporeall is that which may be but is not contained in bodies Of those there are four kinds Dicibles Vacuum place and Time Dicible is that which consisteth according to rationall phantasy a mean betwixt notion and thing Of this already in the Logick CHAP. XXI of Vacuum and Place THe second incorporeall is Vacuum which is the solitude or vacuity of a body In the world there is no vacuum neither in the whole nor in any part Beyond it there is an infinite vacuity into which the world shall be resolved Of this already in the Chapter concerning the world Next is Place Place is that which is fully occupated by the body or as Chrysippus defines it that which is or may be occupated by one or more things Thus it differs from vacuity which hath no body and from space which is occupated but in part as a vessell halfe full of wine CHAP. XXII Of Time LAst of the Incorporealls is Time Time is according to many of the Stoicks the motion of it selfe not of heaven and had no beginning of generation Chrysippus saith that Time is the measure of slownesse or swiftnesse Zeno defined it the intervall of motion and measure of slownesse and swiftnesse according to which all things were and are Possidonius saith that some are wholly infinite as all Time some only in part as the past and future for they are joyned together by the present He defined Time the intervall of motion or the measure of swiftnesse and slownesse one part of it being present the other future the present connected to the future by something like a point It is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 attributed to the least part of Time that falleth under sense subsisting according to the difference of past and future Chrysippus saith that Time is the intervall of motion the measure of swiftnesse and slownesse a consequent intervall to the worlds motion according to which all things are and are moved unlosse rather there be a two-fold Time as the Earth and Sea and Vacuity and Universe have the same names with their parts And as vacuity is every way infinite so Time is both waies infinite for the present and future have no end He likewise asserts that no entire present is Time for continuous things being divided into infinite Time likewise admitteth of the same division so that no Time is properly present but so called after a lesse accurate manner The present only is subsistent unlesse it be understood as of Categorems as walking is attributed to him that walketh but not to him that sitteth or lyeth Thus much for the STOICALL PHILOSOPHY CLEANTHES CAP. I. His Life CLeanthes was of Assus an Aeolian City fortified as Stralo describes it both by Nature and Art sonne of Phanias He was first according to Antisthenes a wrastler and comeing to Athens having no more then four Drachms he apply'd himself first to Crates then to Zene whom he heard constantly and persevered in his Philosophy and Opinions He was much commended for his laboriousnesse in as much as being poor he went by night to the Gardens to draw water and in the day time studied Philosophy Hence he was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The drawer of Water Being cited to the Court to give an account how he lived being so healthfull and lusty hee produced the Gardener under whom he drew water and a woman for whom he ground meal to witnesse how he subsisted The Areopagites wondring hereat allotted him 10. minae which Zeno would not suffer him to accept Antigonus gave him 3000. minae On a time leading some young men to a spectacle the wind blew back his Cloak and discovered that he had no Coat whereupon the Athenians much applauded him and as Demetrius the Magnesianâ—aith â—aith bestowed a Coat upon him Antigonus who was his Auditor asked
of Socraâ—es but extended to such friends as conversed with him whereof him self gives these instances Charmides Son of Glauco going to exercise in the Nemean race as he was discoursing with Socrates was by him upon notice of the voice dissuaded from going to which he answered that perhaps the voice onely meant that he should not get the victory but said he however I shall advantage myself by exercising at this time which said he went to the Games where he met with some accident which though it be not related is acknowledg'd to have iustified the counsell given him by the Daemon Tymarchus and Philemon Son of Philemonides having plotted together to murther Nicias Son of Hircoscomander were at the same time drinking with Socrates Timarchus with intention to execute what they had determin'd offer'd to rise from the table saying to Socrates well Socrates drink you on I will but step a little way and return immediately Rise not said Socrates hearing the Daemon as soon as he spake for the Daemon hath given me the accustomed sign whereupon he sate stil presently after he offer'd again to be gone Socrates hearing the voice withheld him At last as Socrates was diverted by something and did not mind him he stole away and committed the murther for which being brought to execution his last words to his brother Glitomachus were that he was come to that untimely end for not obeying Socrates Another time seeing his friend Crito's eie ti'd up he asked him the reason who answering that as he walked in the field one pulling a bough it gave a jerk back and hit him in the eye Then you did not take my advise replies Socrates for I call'd you back making use as I have accustomed of divine presage That it had likewise a great influence upon the soules of those who conversed with him and liv'd with him he alledgeth as examples Aristides Son of Lysimachus and Thucydides Son of Melissus The first leaving Socrates to go to the wars lost with his company the habit of learning which he acknowledg'd to have gained not by any verball instructions of which he had none from him but by being neer him seeing him and sitting in the same room with him The second as easily by the same means attained the same habit And not only to particular persons but to generall affairs did these predictions extend He foretold some friends the defeat of the Athenian Army in Sicily as is attested by Plutarch and mentioned by himself in Plato where he gives another fair example or rather tryall of the truth of the Daemons predictions speaking of a businesse whereof the event was at that time doubtfull You will hear saith he from many in Sicily to whom it is known what I foretold concerning the destruction of the Army and we may now have an experiment if the Daemon speak true Samionus son of Calus is gone in an expedition the sign came to me he goes with Thrasylus to war against Ephesus and Jonia my opinion is that he will either be slain or at least in much danger I greatly fear the whole design These are his words in Plato delivered as before the event of that action which fell out according to his prediction for Thrasylus was repulsed and beaten by the Ephesians the Athenians put to flight with the losse of foure hundred men of which Victory the Ephesians erected two trophies this was in the twentie one year of the Peloponnesian war We have alledg'd the universall consent of Authors that Socrates had such a spirituall attendant yet is there some disagreement concerning the name more concerning the nature of it It is commonly named his Daemon by which title he himselfe owned it Plato sometimes calls it his Guardian Apuleius his God because saith Saint Augustine the name of Daemon at last grew odious But we must observe that he did not account it a God but sent from God and in that sence affirmed the signes to come from God to wit by mediation of this spirit This besides other places we may argue from his first Epistle where he speaks of the sign it selfe he useth the word Daemon when of the advise whereof that sign was the instrument he names God Thus are we to understand these and all other places of the same nature in Plato where Socrates speaking of the Daemon saith if it please God you shall learn much and the sign from God did not offer to stay me As for the signe or manner of the prediction some affirme it was by sneezing either of himselfe or others if any chanced to sneeze standing before him behind him or on his right hand he went immediately about that which he intended if on the left hand he refrained or desisted if he sneezed himselfe before the enterprise it was applausive if in the action disswasive There needs not much argument to prove this opinion If this sternutation proceeded either from chance or his naturall constitution it could not have that provident supernaturall effect if it proceeded from some more excellent outward cause we recurre to the Genius Others confine this prescience within the soule of Socrates himself that he said his Genius advised him they interpret it as we usually say his mind gave him or so inclined him In this sense indeed Daemon is not seldome taken but this is inconsistent with the description which Socrates gives of a voice and signes ab exteriore besides this knowledge is not above humane nature Plutarch having exploded the opinion of Terpsion concerning sneezing conjectured first that it might be some apparition but at last concludes that it was his observation of some inarâ—culate unaccustomed sound or voice conveighed to him by some extraordinary way as we see in dreams This avoids not the inconvenience of the former if Socrates did first of himselfe interpret this sound it is the same with the last opinion that his soule had a Prophetick inspiration if by any help it will come at last to the Genius Some conceive it to be one of those spirits which have the particular care of men which Maximus Tyrius and Apuleius describe in such manner that they want only the name of a good Angell But there want not those who give it that appellation Lactanius having proved that God sends Angells to guard mankind addes and Socrates affirmed that there was a Daemon constantly neer him which kept him company from a child by whose beck and instruction he guided his life Eusebius upon these words of the Psalmist He hath given his Angells charge over thee that they should keep thee in all thy waies We learn out of Scripture saith he that every man hath a Guardian appointed him from above and Plato doubteth not to write in this manner All soules having chosen a condition of living they proceed in order thereunto being moved by the Daemon which is proper to every one and is sent along with them
OF GEOMETRY ENTER HERE meant not only of the measure and proportion of lines but also of the inward Affections CHAP. VI. How he instituted a Sect. HAving thus setled himself in the Academy he began out of the Collection he had made from others and his own invention to institute a Sect called from the place where he taught Academick He mixed the Heraclitian discourses with the Socratick and Pythagorick following in sensibles Heraclitus in Intelligibles Pythagoras in Politicks Socrates Whereas Philosophy saith St. Augustine concerns either action or contemplation thence assuming two names Contemplative and Active the Active consisting in practise of morall Actions the contemplative in penetration of abstruse Physicall causes and the nature of the Divinity Socrates excelled in the Active Pythagoras in the Contemplative But Plato join'd them into one perfecâ— kind which he subdivided into three severall parts Morall consisting chiefly in Action Naturall in Contemplation Rationall in Distinction of true and false which though usefull in both the other yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation So that this Trichotomy contradicts not the other Dichotomy which includeth all within Action and Contemplation And as of old in a Tragedy the Chorus acted alone then Thespis making some intermissions of the Chorus introduc'd one Actour Aeschylus a second Sophocles a Third in like manner Philosophy was at first but of one kind Physick then Socrates added Ethick thirdly Plato inventing Dialectick made it perfect Of these three parts as they were held by Plato and the rest of the old Academy we cannot have a generall better accompt then this of Cicero Sect. 1. Ethick The first concerning well living they sought in Nature affirming that she ought to be obeyed and that in nothing else but Nature was to be had that chief good whereto all things should be referr'd that the ultimate being of desirable things and end of all good in the mind body and life were acquir'd by Nature Those of the body they placed in the whole and in the parts Health Strength Beauty in the whole in the parts sound Sence and a certain Excellâ—nce of particular parts as in the feet swiftnesse strength in the hands clearnesse in the voice in the Tongue plainnesse of expression Of the mind were those which are proper to comprehend the power of wit which they divided into Nature and Manners To Nature they ascribed quickness of apprehension and memory both proper to the mind and wit To manners belonged study and a kind of wisdom formed partly by continuall exercise partly by reason in which consisted Philosophy it self wherein that is begun and not perfected is called progression to vertue what is perfected Virtue perfection of Nature of all things in the mind the most excellent Thus of Minâ—s The Adjuncts of life that was the third they asserted such things as conduced to the practise of Vertue Sect. 2. Physick Of Nature for that was next they so treated as to divide it into two things One the efficient the other giving it self to this that thereof might be made somthing In that they conceived to be a power in this a certain matter to be effected in both matter could not cohere unlesse contained by some power nor the power without some matter for there is nothing which is not enforced to be some where that which consists of both they called Body and Qualitie Of Qualities some are primary others arising from these the primary are uniform and simple hose which arise from these are various and as it were multiform Air Fire Water and Earth are Primary of these arise formes of living Creatures and of those things which are made of the Earth These principles are called Elements of which Air and Fire have a faculty to move and effect the other parts Water and Earth to suffer To all these there is subjected a certain matter without form destitute of quality out of which all things are expressed and formed It is capable of admitting all and of changing all manner of waies in the whole and in every part This resolves nothing to nothing but into its own parts which are divisible into infinite there being in naâ—ure no least which cannot be divided Those which are moved are all moved by intervalls which intervalls likewise may be divided infinitely and that power which we call quality being moved and agitated every way they conceive the whole matter to be throughly changed and by that means those things which they call qualitative to be produced of which in all coherent nature continued with all its parts was effected the World beyond which there is not any part of matter or body The parts of the World are all things therein kept together by a Sensitive nature wherein is likewise perfect reason It is also sempiternall for there is nothing more strong whereby it may be dissolved This power they call the Soul of the World God a certain providence over all things subâ—ected to him regarding in the first place heavenly things next on the Earth those thing which appertain to man The same they somtimes call Necessity because nothing can be otherwise then is by him ordained a fatall immutable continuation of eternall order somtimes Fortune as producing many things not foreseen or expected by us by reason of the obscurity and our ignorance of the Causes Sect. 3. Dialectick Of the third part of Philosophy consisting in reason and dissertation they treated thus Though Iudgment arise from the Sense yet the Iudgment of truth is not in the Senses The mind they affirmed to be Iudge of things conceiving her only sit to be credited because she alone seeth that which is simple and uniform and certain This they called Idea All sense they conceived to be obtuse and slow and no way able to perceive those things which seem subject to sense which are so little as that they cannot fall under sense so moveable and various that nothing is one constant nor the same because all things are in continuall alteration and fluxion All this part of things they called Opimative Science they affirmed to be no where but in the Reasons and Notions of mind whence they approved definitions of things and applyed them to all whereon they discoursed They approved likewise explications of words by Etymologies They used Arguments and marks for things to prove and conclude what they meant to explain In this consisted all the discipline of Dialectick that is of Speech concluded by Reason This accompt in generall Cicero gives of the old Academy Plutarch Laertius Apuleius and others have made collections more particular we shall make choice of that of Alcinous as most full and perfect which by reason of the length is referred as an Appendix to Plato's life CHAP. VII His Inventions HE added much to learning and language by many inventions as well of things as of words To omit Dialectick of which we treated last Phavorinus attributes to his invention discoursing by
sicknesse For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature and Parent of all good things but he having generated many great things most apt and usefull other things also incommodious to those which he made were aggenerated together with them coherent to them made not by Nature but certain necessary consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 As saith he when Nature framed the bodies of Men more subtle reason the benefit of the World would have required that the head should have been made of the smallest and thin bones but this utility would have been followed by another extrinsecall inconvenience of greater consequence that the head would be too weakly defended and broken with the least blow Sicknesses therefore and diseases are engendred whilst health is engendred In like manner saith he whilst Vertue is begotten in Man by the counsell of Nature vices like wise are begotten by contrary affinity CHAP. XVIII Of Nature NExt Iupiter Possidonius placeth Nature By Nature they somtimes understand that which containeth the World somtimes that which produceth things upon Earth both which as we said is to be understood of God For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World hath perfect sence and reason which power is the Soul of the World the mind and divine Wisdom Thus under the terme of Nature they comprehend both God and the World affirming that the one cannot be without the other as if Nature were God permeating through the World God the mind of the World the World the body of God This Chrysippus calleth Common-Nature in distinction from particular Nature Nature is defined by Zeno an artificial fire proceeding in the way of generation which is the fiery spirit the Artist of formes by others a habit receiving motion from it self according to prolifick reason and effecting and containing those things which subsist by it in certain definite times producing all things from which it self is distinct by Nature proposing to it self these two ends Utility and Pleasure as is manifest from the porduction of man CHAP. XIX Of Fate THe third from Iupiter according to Possidonius is Fate for Iupiter is first next Nature then Fate They call Fate a concatenation of Causes that is an order and connexion which cannot be transgressed Fate is a cause depending on Laws and ordering by Laws or a reason by which the World is ordered Fate is according to Zeno the motive power of matter disposing so and so not much diftering from Nature and Providence Panaetius assirmeth Fate to be God Chrysippus desineth Fate a spirituall power governing the World orderly or a sempiternall and indeclinable series and chain of things it self rolling and implicating it self by eternall orders of consequence of which it is adapted and connected or as Chrysippus again in his Book of Definitions hath it The reason of the World or Law of all things in the World governed by Providence or the reason why things past have been the present are the future shall be For Reason he useth Truth Cause Nature Necessity and other termes as attributed to the same thing in different respects Fate from the severall distributions thereof is called Clotho Lachesis and Atropos Lachesis as it dispenseth to every one as it were by lot Atropos as it is an immutable dispensation from all eternity Clotho in allusion to the resemblance it hath with spinning and twisting of Threads Necessity is a cause invincible most violent and inforcing all things Fortune is a Cause unknown and hidden to humane reason For some things come by Necessity others by Fate some by deliberate Counsel others by Fortune some by Casualty But Fate being a connexion of Causes interlaced and linked orderly compriseth also that cause proceedeth from us That all things are done by Fate is asserted by Zeno in his Book of Fate and Possidonius in his second Book of Fate and Boethus in his 11th of Fate Which Chrysippus proves thus If there is any motion without a cause then every axiom is not either true or false for that which hath not efficient causes will be neither true nor false but every axiom is either true or false therefore there is no motion without a cause And if so then all things that are done are done by precedent causes and if so all things are done by Fate That all axioms are either true or false Cicero saith he labour'd much to prove whereby he takes away Possibles indeterminates and other distinctions of the Academicks of which see Alcinous Chap. 26. In answer to the sluggish reason if it be your fate to die of this sicknesse you shall die whether you have a Physician or no and if it be your fate to recover you shall recover whether you have a Physitian or not Chrysippus saith that in things some are simple some conjunct Simple is thus Socrates shall die on such a day for whether he do any thing or not it is appointed he should die on such a day But if it be destin'd thus Laius shall have a son Oedipus it cannot be said whether he accompany with a woman or not for it is a conjunct thing and confatall as he termes it because it is destin'd that Laius shall lie with his wife and that he shall get Oedipus of her As if we should say Milo shall wrastle at the Olympick Games and another should infer then he shall wrastle whether he have an adversary or no he were mistaken for that he shall wrastle is a conjunct thing because there is no wrastling without an adversary Thus are refelled all sophismes of this kinde you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not for it is no lesse determined by fate that you shall have a Physician than that you shall recover They are confatall Thus there being two opinions of the old Philosophers one that all things are so done by Fate that Fate inferreth a power of Necessitie as Democritus Heraclitus Empedocles and Aristotle held the other that the motions of our souls were voluntary without any Fate Chrysippus as an honourable Arbitratour took the middle way betwixt these but inclining most to those who conceived the motions of our souls free from necessitie The Antients who held all things to be done by Fate said it was by a violence and necessitie those who were of the contrary opinion denyed that Fate had any thing to do with our assent and that there was no necessitie imposed upon assents They argued thus If all things are done by Fate all things are done by an antecedent cause and if appetite then likewise those things which follow appetite therefore assents also But if the cause of appetite is not in us neither is the appetite it selfe in our power and if so neither those things which are effected by appetite are in our power and consequently neither assents nor actions are in our power whence it followeth that neither praise can be