Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n
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A57655
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Leviathan drawn out with a hook, or, Animadversions upon Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan by Alex. Rosse.
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Ross, Alexander, 1591-1654.
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1653
(1653)
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Wing R1960; ESTC R1490
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70,857
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139
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The end moveth the efficient 22. The end presupposeth the means 23. A voluntary cause is free and indifferent so is not the natural cause 24. The matter is capable of forms 25. The The form is the cause of distinction and determination 26. The generical unity is less then the specifical and this then the numerical 27. Identity is founded upon unity c. Many more I could set down but these are sufficient to let us see how much Mr. Hobbs is deceived in saying Metaphysick is repugnant to natural reason He tells us cap. 46. That every part of the universe is body and that which is not body is no part of the universe If he speaks of integral parts I grant what he saith but if he means by parts that which we call essential to wit matter and form I deny them to be bodies His drift is to infer that souls are bodies because parts but I deny them to be parts no more then the vital and animal spirits are parts of the arteries and nerves that contain them or wine a part of the vessel that holds it Spirits are contained in the world but are no parts of it But when he saith That that which is no part of the universe is nothing and consequently no where He will make God to be nothing and no where for I hope he will not make him a part of the universe nor will he make him corporeal He carps at Aristotle for defining heaviness to be an endeavour to go to the center of the earth Aristotle doth not make this a definition but a description of heaviness for indeed the essential forms of inanimate things are not easily to be found by man in this life in which our best science is but ignorance therefore the Phylosopherâ— differ so much in this very thing of gravity and levity some holding them to be forms of the elements and causes of motion others hold them to be passive principles onely of motion and that the mover is the generator which hath lest an impression in light and heavy bodies to asâ—end and descend some hold gravity and levity to be substances others but accidents but however the peripateticks have gone as far as reason and the light of nature can direct them God will not in this world have us to know all things our cleerest light here is but a glimmering but if this description of Aristotles please not Mr. Hobbs he should have done well to have given us a better and then we will turn his disciples but its more easie to carp then mend or immitate Carpere vel noli nostra vel aede tuaâ— So he laughs at Phylosophers for saying stones or metals have a desire or can discern the place they would be at as man doth But he laughs at his own shaddow for Phylosophers grant that in inanimate things there is a natural appetite to move towards their own place which is nothing else but an inclination or disposition which he cannot deny except he will deny nature it self but that stones can discern as man does is his own dream not the saying of Phylosophers for they teach the contrary to wit that this natural desire or aptitude is without all knowledge or discerning by this he shews how little he is acquainted with their writings Phylosophers tell us that in condensed matter there is less quantity then before and rarefied when more Upon this he asks cap. 46. If there can be matter that hath not some determined quantity or if a body were made without any quantity at all I answer no for the quantity is an inseparable conâ— comitant of matter so that it increaseth decreaseth as the matter doth A body can be no more without quantity then fire without heaâ— Experience teacheth us that as any thing shrinks and thickneth it decreaseth in quantity and so it increaseth as it is extended and rarified He carps at the souls infusion at the cause of sense at the cause of willing at occult qualities and at some other peripatetick tenets at which he onely shews his teeth not being able to bite them save onely that he calls this vain Phylosophy affirming the â—ame out of Stâ—Pauls words but indeed St. Paul never called Phylosophical truths vâ—in for so he should condemn divinity to which Phylosophy is subservient besides truth cannot be repugnant to truth and Phylosophy is one of Gods special gifts by which even the Gentiles were brought to the knowledge of God and made inexcusable there are vain opinions among some professors of Phylosophy as there are among some Divines must therefore Phylosophy or Divinity be condemned as vain he that speaks against Phylosophy doeth both bewray his ignorance and malice in disparaging men for making use of those arms which God hath given us to fight withall against the enemies of truth and to destroy the field of good corn because the envious man hath sown some tears among them To speak against Phylosophy is to speak against the light of reason which God hath kindled in our mindes But he calls it cap. 42. vain Phylosophy to say that God is no cause at all of injustice To free God from injustice is not vain Phylosophy but true Divinity whereas the opinion of Mr. Hobbs is the heresie of the Libertines who made God the author of sin or of the Manichees and Valentimans who held that God made sin But I would know how can the fountain of justice be in any sort the cause of injustice or can he be the author of sin that is the punisher of sin that makes laws against it that invites upon promise of reward all men from it how can he be free from hypocrisie that grieves and is angry for sinful actions whereof he is the cause himself How can he hate injustice if he be the cause of it he must needs love his own work and consequently sinful actions How can God deface his own work by sin or his own image in man How can it be otherwise but man must delight in sin without remorse when he knows that God is any wise the cause thereof Therefore to make God at all the cause of injustice is in effect to make him no God It stands then well with Philosophy and Divinity also to say God is not at all the author of sin he permits it indeed for his glory for the exercise of his servants and the condemnation of the obstinate sinners but is no more the cause of it then the rider is the cause of that lameness in his horse which proceeds from his own unruliness or the Sun the cause of stinke which ariseth of putrifaction Again this which he cals vain Philosophy is it which brings us to the knowledge of divine and humane things which perfects the will by uniting it to goodness and the intellect by uniting it to truth It 's ridiculous what he saith of Good and Evil to wit That it is not the appetite of privat men but the law which is the
have I sinned He may as well say that the right to do what David pleased was given him by God and therefore no injury in killing Uriah was offered to God which contradicts his assertion but indeed neither assertion is true for neither God nor Uriah gave right to David to do what he pleased to say that God gives to sinful men right to act what they please is to make God the author of sin and to say that Uriah gave right to David to kill him is to make him accessary to his own murther And to say that a Tyrant doth not wronge the innocent when he murthers him causlessly is to put no difference between an unjust Tyrant and a just Judge when he executes a Malefactor deservingly now when David saith To thee onely have I sinned he speaketh so because God onely knew his intention that he meant to murther Uriah when he placed him in the forefront of the army He saith That whether a Common-wealth be monarchical or popular the freedom is still the same This I deny for in an absolute monarchy there is no liberty but meer slavery such is the condition of those who live under the Turk the Muscovit Prester Iohn and the Magol in other governments there is more or less liberty according to the condition of the times and people and the disposition of the Governors for there was more liberty under Augustus Titus Antoninus Aurelius and other Monarchs then under many Popular States Fallitur egregio quisquis sub principe credit servitum numquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio And under Democracy there is at some times more liberty then at others to say then that the freedom under a Monarchy and Popular government is the same is as much as if I should say a child is as free under a rigid and cruel Schoolmaster as under an indulgent Mother Where there is continual fear there can be no liberty and such is the condition of those that live under Tyrants He slights Aristotle's opinion concerning Democracy for saying there is more liberty there then in any other government yet he refels none of Aristotle's reasons which are these 1. In Democracy all the Citizens have a vote in chosing of their Magistrates 2 All have a right to govern as well as to be governed 3. Magistrates for the most part are chosen by lot rather then by suffrages 4. They are not chosen for their wealth 5. Nor is the same man chosen often into the Supreme Office 6. Nor may he stay too long in his Office 7. That Judges are chosen out of all degrees and orders of the people 8. That the Supreme Senate which is chosen out of all the people hath the chief authority over the Common-wealth 9 That publick officers have their allowance and maintenance 10. That the meanest trades of the people are not excluded from publick offices and honours 11. By often changing of Supreme officers way is made for the advancing of many and occasion of abusing the Supreme power is taken away For these reasons Aristotle held there was under Democracy more liberty then under Monarchy In his twenty eight chapter he tels us That the Subject did not give to the Soveraign the right of punishing and that this right is not grounded on any concession or gift of the Subjects These words are plainly contradictory to what he said before cap. 28. Namely That the Subject is the author of all the actions and judgments of the Soveraign And again Every particular man is author of all the Soveraign doth and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign complaineth of that whereof he himself is author and therefore David had right to do what he pleased given him by Uriah for which cause he did Uriah no injury to kill him Here is a plain contradiction The subject giveth right to the Prince to do what he pleaseth even to murther him and yet giveth no power to punish him Is it likely that any subject is so mad as to covenant with his Prince that he shall have right to murther him without cause and yet when he hath just cause he shall have no power to punish him Chap. 28. He saith That mans pride compelled him to submit himself to Government This is a Paradox for mans pride made him rebel against Government but not submit to it Before man grew proud he submitted himself to be governed by God so did the Apostate Angels but their pride made them affect equality with God and consequently rebel and refuse to obey and to be governed it is not pride then but humility that makes man submit to government For pride loves to be still uppermost as the word sheweth superbire quasi superire So proud Atraeus in Seneca Thes. Act. 5. Equalis astris gradior cunctos super altum superbo vertice attingens polum so the proud man by the Psalmist is compared to a high Cedar in Lebanus and proud Nebuchadnezar in Daniel to an exceeding tall tree whose top reached to Heaven Lucifer in Isay 14. 14. saith I will assend above the hight of the clouds I will be like the most High We know that pride hath been the cause of so much troubles and wars in the world because proud men will not submit to government nec ferre potest Caesárve priorem Pompeiúsve parem Caesar will not submit to be governed by Pompey nor Pompey by Caesar Mr. Hobbs might have observed this in the naming of Leviathan which he alledgeth for as Iob saith he seeth every high thing below him and is King of all the children of pride and so he acknowledgeth himself in the beginning of the next chapter that men for want of humility will not suffer the rude and combersom points of their present greatness to be taken off In his twenty ninth chapter amongst the diseases of a Common-wealth which he saith proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines he reckons this for one Thâ—â— whatsoever a man doth against his conscience is sin The Christian schools and pulpits never held this for a disease or seditious doctrine till now I beleeve Mr. Hobbs his doctrine is rather seditious for if it be no sin to act against the conscience people may rebel when they please without sin though they know that rebellion is against the conscience for the Apostle tels us that we must be subject to the higher powers not onely for wrath but also for conscience sakeâ—Rom 13. 5. It is the curb of conscience thaâ— restrains men from rebellion there is no outward sorce or law so powerful as that inward law â—â— the conscience no castle so inpregnable as this hic murus ahaencus esto There is no Judge so severâ— no Torturer so cruel as an accusing conscienceâ— this Saul Iudas Orestes and too many more knew who would rather be their own executioners then endure the continual tortures and be tormented with the fire-brands of those