doth God as he is the first and general cause meeting with several conditions operate severally to the production of those several effects which are produced by them with things necessary before he produceth necessary effects But as the Suns concourse doth not determine this thing to this and that to that effect so doth not the general concourse of God determine this or that appetite to this or that object in this or that manner but when it meets with things so disposed it concurs in the production of that effect to which it was so disposed so that God concurring with free Agents makes them no more necessary then his concurring with necessary Agents makes them free It is the same infinite Power of God which constituted both and his concurrence destroys neither in its ordinate working I speak not of his extraordinary operation whereby he can and doth controul all the frame of Nature when and how he pleaseth nor doth Mr. Hobbs Nay I may say that God himself being absolutely free bounded with no limits having nothing above or about him which can stop or hinder his Almighty hand from working it is much more reasonable to think that his concourse should make even necessary Agents free and not to be bounded by their natures which he had given them rather then that this most free Agent should against himself make those which he had constituted in a free nature to be necessary because they are by that more like himself which every Agent endeavours Nay in his extraordinary works he doth often for the present shake off those bonds which his former Donation had confined them to so that by his extraordinary concourse he makes them cease from their former operations which by their natures they were necessitated to do as the fire not to burn the water not to run down its channel and the like which are apparent to every man So then though Gods will and concurrence is a cause of those actions yet not being a terminating cause but concurring with that nature which he had given them that concurrence doth not necessitate that operation which he had given to man viz. freedom to do or not to do But he proves the contrary in his following words which are these SECT XII The consequence of this Paragraph examined His meaning conjectured and refuted Every deviation contradicts not the Power and Omnipotency of God Voluntas facere fieri distinguished in God Men not justly punished with Damnation if necessitated to sin Mr. Hobbs censured for obtruding those Doctrines in Divinity amongst his Political Discourses The actions of the King and Subject alike necessitated by Mr. Hobbs his Chain of Causes ANd did not his will assure the necessity of mans will and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth the liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the Omnipotency and liberty of God I do not observe how this consequence can be deduced out of the premises for if God endowed man with liberty and free power in his nature why should it follow if God do not necessitate his actions that mans will would cross and impede the power and liberty of God For the will of God is that man should act freely the free actions therefore are according to his will and the necessitation would be contrary to his will But I think he means that if mans free power could sin against the will of God then man should be able to contradict and stop his Omnipotency and Liberty To understand this therefore consider with me that Gods Dominion over this World is like that of a King in a Kingdom he gives Laws and Rules to the Suâ—â—â—cts which if they observe they shall live happily under him but if not he will punish and afflict yea perhaps destroy the offending parties It is an opposition to the Kings power that when men break his Laws and he shall go about to punish them they shall then rebel against him and oppose the power of the County or of the Kingdom or that power which he musters up to do Justice upon them then indeed his power is contradicted and impeded God whilst men live here with these natures hath given Rules and governs them by such Laws as he hath appointed them for their good if they observe those Laws happy are they but he seldom puts in his Omnipotency to make men do the one or the other never to make men break his Laws he ordinarily doth not vary the nature of man or any thing Men may and may not keep his Commandments I do not now dispute of the nature of Grace or any thing of that kind they that do not shall be punished as the other blessed and then comes in his Omnipotency if man could resist or impede that that were contradicting his power but these sins only oppose his concourse which inclines but not necessitates a mans nature so that there is Gods voluntas facere fieri his will which we should do which it is impossible for God to oppose and there is his voluntas facere to do himself which it is not possible for man to oppose The first appears in this life the second in the other nor is it any contradiction to the Divine Power which hath so established it and without which it were impossible for his Power to joyn with his Justice in punishing Offenders at the last day for how can a man justly be punished for what was not in his power to do otherwise yea much less can he punish him in Justice who makes him commit that fault which he punisheth which God must do if he with his co-operation in the act determines mans power to that evil which he punisheth and for which condemneth him to Hell Certainly this is the most abominable impudent Doctrine for sinning that ever was read in any Author that ever writ of this Subject and the most derogative from that infinite Essential Goodness that should cause or make men do evil for no more then fire can cool or act against its nature no more can God who is essentially good goodness it self act that which is evil It is in vain for a man to say it is not evil God doing it for it is an evil which God hates and punisheth and therefore must be evil in his esteem I do not now speak of that Language used by some Of Gods afflictions working with some men which comes not in this discourse to be disputed of but that God doth work these sins which he punisheth this is abhorrent to the thought of a Religious man And now I must censure Mr. Hobbs not only for ill and false Doctrine but for having such a delight in it as in this place unnecessarily to obtrude it where there was no reason for nor use of it for let any man consider what this hath to do with liberty of the Subject which is the Head he undertook to treat of the liberty of the Subject is neither
and inclination proceedeth from some causes and that from another cause in a continual chain whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes proceed from necessity The force of this Argument is invisible for though this will doth proceed from a cause as he expresseth it yet if that immediate cause from which it proceeds be not necessary yea if any one Link in the Chain of Causes be free and not necessary the effect is not necessary for the arbitrariness of any one will make the effect such But this liberty of the Agent he speaks of looks only upon the immediate cause which in humane actions is free and may not be done yea very often the Agent may chuse the contrary That the first cause works with all second causes is as certain as any thing in the Mathematicks for there cannot be a second or a third or any number but it proceeds from a first And yet because the first hath an influence upon the rest it follows not that they are Cyphers but each out of that foundation hath its several operations So in this the first cause is Causa generalis and works with second causes which are derived from it But they have their several ways and powers of working Natural according to their natural inclination Animal according to the peculiar disposition of those Souls which inhabit them only man hath a free nature amongst bodily things in that resembling the Great Cause of Causes he is the Principle of those actions which he doth as a man voluntarily and therefore is capable of Commands actively to do and the other Creatures passively to be done or used and Man is used as a Master or Owner under God of them a Steward who must give an account of such of them as come within the sphere of his Dominion Let any man tell me how a man can be capable of commands if he were like them necessitated No man commands Fools Mad-men or Infants we might account them Fools or Mad who should do it but if he would have them act any thing he must work upon their predominant passion as we would do with Beasts because there is in them a deficiency of this high Power to be Master of their own actions It cannot be then that all those Precepts Councels Commands of God should be given to him who hath no power to obey And from thence we must needs conclude that they have a liberty to do or not to do But let us follow him SECT X. Mr. Hobbs his Supposition impossible without a Revelation The force of the word-See -His Hypothesis granted His Inference would not follow Causes not otherwise to seem then as they are in their own Nature SO that saith he to him who could see the connexion of thâ—se Causes the necessity of all mens voluntary actions would appear manifest This conclusion is founded upon an impossible supposal there is no possibility that a man in this world should see that Chain of Causes in Heaven hereafter he may but here he cannot without a mighty strange Revelation But suppose he could This word See denotes a clear apprehension What would follow then but that he should see such causes necessary which are necessary and such free which are free he would see them as they are not see them in a representation false and so not agreeing to their condition SECT XI Of Gods concurrence with humane actions No man a sinner if necessitated to sin Divine disposure necessitates not to Evil. God not the Author of those actions which are contrary to his commands He is truly the Author of those actions he adviseth Gods concurrence further illustrated from the influx of the Sun Liberal Agents not necessitated by the ordinary concurrence of God HE proceeds And therefore God that seeth and disposeth all things seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will is accompanied with the necessity of dâ—ing that which God will and no more nor less Certainly although I think very many men are too bold to discourse of both Gods Knowledge and Will as they do which are things too high for the weak sight of man to look clearly into yet men may confidently say as his Knowledge cannot be deceived to judge falsly so his Will cannot be deceived in willing that which is not good and therefore because men are free Agents in what they do and must give an account of their actions to him and be judged according to them by him it is not possible to conceive that he should know them other then free which liberty was his own gift And for his will since itâ— hath pleased God in his holy Word to reveal to us Rules by which we may know what is his will for us to do in doing which we please him and that he likes us as also what is against his will in doing which we shall anger and offend him and he will punish us although God be not only a general but the first cause which works with and in us yet it is not possible for man to think that God doth in that concurrence determine mans actions to such things which he himself hath declared evil and against his will and which he will punish and therefore it was too bold an Assâ—rtion to say That man doth no more or less then he is necessitated by Gods will which is to make no man a sinner for although as he spake God disposeth all things and that disposure must needs be to infinitely good and wise ends even the evils and things against his Rules of goodness yet his disposure orders such men according to their evil actions to suffer not makes them do evil that they may suffer But perhaps he explains this For though men may do many things which God does not command nor is therefore Author of them Nay I will tell him more men may do and many men do many things not only which God hath not commanded but which God hath forbidden and hath commanded they shall not do and surely then he is less Author of them But if a man do an act of advise or counsel of Gods without a Command yet that Gods Counsel is Author of Now these actions which are against Gods Command without doubt he is not Author of if he were he could not justly punish them But I would fain make out his sense which is this he doth not do it by Authority given by God but against it Well then Gods Authority is against evil but his power worketh this evil So he seems to affirm in his following words Yet they can have no passion nor appetite to any thing of which appetite Gods will is not the cause True indeed God is the first general cause but not the second and particular The Sun is an universal cause it shines upon the Earth Trees Plants and is the cause of their fertility but diversly according to the diversity of Constitutions it concurs with so
were Divine revelations from the Sanctity of the Persons who delivered it Hâ— answers that that may be feigned I reply It is improbable which were enough but I think I may go further and say it is impossible for the first clause that it is improbable we may discern Reason for it First in the Persons the Apostles who delivered these Revelations and affirmed they were such it is not probable they should be counterfeited all counterfeiting is for some end some wordly end for a man cannot think to get Heaven by counterfeiting and lâ—ing but the Apostles could have no worldlâ— end in what they did the asserting of these Revelations being the ready way to miseries and unhappiness which was foretold by their great Master our most blessed Saviour We have seen in this distracted world in which we have lived now and then a man proud with an imagined Enthusiasme persevere in an abominable lye even to death but for so many to do it and suffer for the relation of the same story it cannot be imagined And then consider that they were men blessed by God in having these Revelations and the relating them I say relating them for because the Doctrine was to be divulged to all Nations by them God assisted them with the gift of Tongues by which they were able suddenly to relate in their own Language to every Nation the wonderful things which concerned their salvation And from hence I will draw the impossibility of their feigning their sanctity in the delivery of these Revelations for as the Revelation was from God so the very delivery of them by the power of Tongues was from God who cannot countenance and make good a lye But yet certainly although their might be a possibility of being other I grant that for Arguments sake which I allow not yet when there is no probability of the contrary we have great assurance of that truth and his answer is most wicked as well as weak drawn from a possibility of feigning and counterfeiting in the Apostles CHAP. XXII SECT XI Mr. Hobbs his third Argument from the wisdom of the Apostles confirmed The miraculous consent of men to the revelations published by them An Argument from the propagation of Christianity against the opposition of the whole world A serious application and vow for Mr. Hobbs his conversion A Third Argument which he endeavours to put off is drawn from the extraordinary wisdome or extraordinary felicity of his actions all which saith he are marks of Gods extraordinary favour His answer to this is at the bottom of that page thus The visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that another has had a supernatural revelation of Gods will but only a belief everyone as the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser a firmer or weaker belief Thus far he I no â—answer to the first which concerns their wisdome I do not remember that I have read the wisdome of these men to be produced for proof of their revelations yet because he has put it down and given one answer to it I will urge something for it that it was and is a great convincing argument that such poor ignorant illiterate fishermen should attain or rather be endued from above with such wisdome as to be able to confute the greatest and best studied Philosophers and reduce them to consent to their revelations this must need prove that these men were assisted by some knowledg above Nature But let that pass since he makes no answer but for the other the success of Christianity that is a most rational argument and his answer confutes himself for whereas he saith the visible felicities of this World are most often the work of God by natural ordinate causes I retor it to him that the felicities of this world hapning to these men were nothing but that general propagation of the Gospel which was wrought against the force and power of all natural causes all the Emperors Kings and Princes of this World fighting against and suppressing it with all the force and tyranny which they were able to use so that their strength grew by oppression Sanguis Martyrum was â—emen Ecclesiae And M. Hobbs cannot think that that was a natural seed And so I will conclude this discourse for this time hoping that God will so assist him that he may see his own error and with his own hand blot out all these unworthy doubts which he hath cast upon Christianity CHAP. XXII SECT XII Mr. Hobbs his second Question propounded and discussed his assumption not clear the Argument changed and the Reader eluded by him His manifest declension of the divine positive Law and imposure of humane Laws in opposition to them censured The Law of Nature commands obedience to the positive law of God The pretensions of all Nations to divine institution observed ANd here I thought to have knocked off with the satisfaction of the first Quaerie but as I said before he made two enquiries the first concerning the assurance of these revelations I have spoke to that The second is how a man can be bound to obey the Laws so revealed This he saith is not so hard for if the Laws declared be not against the Law of Nature which is undoubtedly Gods Law and he undertake to obey it he is bound by his own act Thus far Mr. Hobbs but indeed he utters in my judgment a most obscure doctrine â—r if clear he speaks very weakly 'T is obscure for although the Law of Nature do oblige yet it is not apparent to every man what this Law of Nature is no not to learned men for in many cases it is disputed vvhether such or such actions are according to the Lavv of Nature or no And therefore although the major proposition be unquestionably true that the Lavv of Nature is instituted by God yet the assuming of a Minor to it this is the Lavv of Nature may be full of dispute and from thence it vvill be hard to conclude Again consider that vvhen the question vvas put in the former page it vvas concerning the obedience to the revealed lavvs of God hovv a man may â—e bound to obey them of vvhich he affirmed that vve could have no assurance and that I have immediately before refuted but novv his vvhole discourse runs upon mans obedience to humane Lavvs Thus the Notion and Conceipt shuffled and changed a Reader is distracted and vvhilst he finds something seemingly proved he thinks the undertaken proposition is clear for vvhere hath he satisfied yea but seemingly this Question How a man can be bound to obey the Revelations But saith he if he undertake to obey a Law which is not against the Law of Nature he is bound by his own Act. That is that Act by vvhich he saith rather than thinks he instituted a supreme and that Act only reflects upon humane Lavvs
Hobbs HIS LEVIATHAN Beginning at the seventeenth Chapter of that Book CHAP. 1. The Introduction to the whole Discourse I Have briefly touched the chief heads of his first Part. And am now arrived at his second part which is entituled of Common-wealths and this part begins at the seventeenth Chapter of the whole Book superscribed of the causes generation and definition of a Common-wealth He begins with the final cause most rightly which is causa causarum and sets the whole at work And I find no fault with what he writes concerning that Secondly I approve what he saith at the bottom of the 85. page That small numbers joyned together cannot give them security to live peaceably Small is a Relative small in respect of their Neighbours of whose injury they may justly be affraid unless they are supported with Natural or Artificial Fortifications or their number may be equalled by the weight of the internal vertue or gallantry of the Inhabitants some way or other it must be made up Thirdly I approve what he saith pag. 86. That be the People never so numerous I may add or strong yet if their actions are directed by their own particular Judgments and particular appetites they can expect thereby no Defence nor Protection His Reasons likewise I approve Fourthly I censure not his Conclusion in the same page That the Government of their Good must not be for one Life or Battel but Perpetual Fifthly He makes a very Ingenious Discourse upon the difference betwixt those sociable Creatures as Bees and Ants which Aristotle calls Political and hath very handsom applications concerning them to the middle of the 87. page but then I must begin to examine him with less approbation In the Margent there is noted the generation of a Common-Wealth and it begins thus CHAP. II. SECT I. This Generation censured first from that Word only which cannot be true THE only way to Erect such a common Power as may be able to defend them from the Invasion of Foreigners and the Injuries of one another and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own Industry and by the fruits of the Earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly is to confer all their Power and strength upon one man or upon one Assembly of men that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will which is as much as to say to appoint one man or Assembly of men to bear their person and every one to own and acknâ—wledg himself to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act or cause to be acted in these things which concern the common peace and safety and therein to submit their wills every one to his will and their Judgment to his Judgment Thus far he A bold and strange assertion in that severe Language the onâ—ly way what Mr. Hobbs no other Certainly there have been many Common-wealths in the World which have lived peaceably and quietly and enjoyed the fruits of their Labours and have abounded with all the comforts of their association And yet I dare speak it with confidence there was never any thus generated that is to appoint one man or Assembly to bear their Person and to allow themselves to be Authors of his Actions to submit their Wills to his Will and their Judgments to his Judgment SECT II. A Supream cannot receive his Authâ—rity from the People 1. COnsider here for fear I may forget it hereafter that the King or Supreme by him is but the Person as he most improperly styles him and they the Multitude the Authors of what he doth so that he acts only by their Authority as you may see those words expounded in the 16. Chap. pag. 8â— and 82. so that by him the People give the Supreme Authority which is a mighty diminution to all Supreme Authority and indeed an Incroachment upon the Praerogative of God by whom and whom alone Kings reign and Princes bear rule so that as we rightly say that all Authority in a Kingdom is derived from the King who is the Fountain of all Authority he makes a circle in it and saith the head of this Fountain is derived from the People SECT III. It is impossible they should do it BUT let us examine the possibilities of it Nihil dat quod non habet either formaliter eminenter or Virtualiter Nothing can give what it hath not Formally Eminentâ—y or Virtually Certainly neither of these can be affirmed of the People if they have it any of these ways it must be Conjunctim or divisim either as severed or conjoyned either as distinct or united but neither of these if severed then either every man had this Power or a few or one alone the first branch of this Division will abide the chief Dispute with him because he hath said before That every man hath right to every thing to all things to all riches persons wives lives what you will before they are covenanted into a body this hath been confuted heretofore yet this very occasion will be able to shew the absurdity of it further SECT IV. The Multitude cannot make a Leviathan because he had all their rights before FOr which let us lay a Foundation suppose this Kingdom were unsetled and yet now endeavouring to be setled and all the People being free and and without Covenant have right to all the things in the World these are met together to chuse a Leviathan as he terms him for setling their beings most securely In this Election what did they give him you will say the Authority over them all that is nothing he had that before by the Law of Nature I but he will say he hath upon this Election their Rights Their Rights are no more than what he had before he had by nature right to slay take make use of any thing conducing to his contentment though they were a hundred Millions they can give him no more than what he hath even by Nature I but he will reply he had Right before but now he hath Power I answer the Question here is not about Power but Right Power may be in Rebels Usurpers but not Right that is only in the lawful Soveraign but suppose we should examine his Power by these preceeding directions I doubt we shall find it most weak and unconstant SECT V. Their Power is most uncertain FOR if from the People they will vary with their unsetled resolutions for they who made the first being once taught that the Right of making Kings is in them will easily be perswaded that the unmaking is in their hands likewise and reassume that Power again Take that most abundant instance which that unhappy time we lately lived in affords us when Mr. Hobbs was first undertaken by me when this Doctrine of his was infused into the Kingdom they altered and changed the Government four or five times in a moment A very short space of time and none of those Leviathans lacked the
all these be knocked on the head thus This hath such a force of injustice that men with humanity about them cannot consent unto I leave this therefore and come to his 4th Inference CHAP. VIII SECT I. Mr. Hobbs his fourth Inference censured and refuted from his own conclusions He that impowers another to do justly though he make him Pleni-potentiary is not guilty of his unjust actions his first reason refuted FOurthly Because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the actions and judgments of the Soveraign instituted it follows that whatsoever he doth it can be no injury to any of his Subjects nor ought he by any of them be accused of injustice Accused What doth he mean by that to be convicted arraigned condemned This certainly he cannot because the power of Judgment supposeth Superiority which cannot be over the Soveraign in his own Kingdom But let us observe the consequence of this Argument out of these impossible premises that because by his fancy of the Institution every subject is Author of all his actions he can do no injury to any of them certainly this doth not follow by his own Doctrine for put the case that the Supreme doth authorize a Judge to hear and determine such causes doth the Supreme only do injustice in it when the Royal Authority gives power to the Judge who acts unjustly by that Authority which was given him by the Supreme or the Judge likewise who abuseth that Authority I believe no man will affirm it or if he do he must destroy Mr. Hâ—bbs his conclusion which makes the Kings acting by the Authority of the peoples grant not to offend in himself for which is his reason before spoke to if the Author do solely perform not the Actor or the person who immediately operates which he delivered before the King not the Judge doth unjustly when by his Authority the Judge decrees wickedly But he proceeds with another reason for saith he He that doth any thing by Authority from another doth therein no injury to him by whose Authority he acts This is not true generally a Judge judgeth by the Authority of the Supreme but if he Judge unjustly yea judgeth a cause against the King perhaps unjustly he then doth the King an injury by his own Authority Again a General with Plenipotency to kill slay c. from the King he turns now his Army to the Kings destruction perhaps doth not he then do the King an injury by his own power SECT II. Mr. Hobbs his second reason invalid from the falsity of his supposition Consent or dissent gives not the stamp of Justice or Injustice He that gives power to do any act may complain of ill Execution of that power HE goes on But by this Institution of a Commonwealth every particular man is Author of what the Soveraign doth and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author and therefore ought not accuse any man but himself nor himself of injury because to do an injury to himself is impossible It is first observeabâ—e here which runs throughout the whole Politiques that it is built totally upon that foundation which neither is nor is probable to be in any but is impossible to be in a great Commonwealth and therefore must needs fall of it self But supposing that impossibility let us consider his inference every man is Author of what the Soveraign doth the reason of that is before expressed because he covenants to avow his actions Now if he do avow them it follows not that therefore they shall be just many a man owns that act which is unjust his owning of it makes it neither just nor unjust These are qualitiâ—s inherent in the act not adherent to others Opinions or acceptance or disacceptance of them I but saith he Consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author I return that he may do that and complain that he himself hath done amiss men do and it is vertuously done of him who doth it but much rather of that which he acts by anothers hand that which may be good in the Institution may be spoiled and hurt in the Execution and although they did institute him with such a power yet his mannagement of it may be ill and unjust and that they may complain of SECT III. A man may do an injury to himself Mr. Hobbs his distinction between Iniquity and Injustice or Injury disproved and censured UPon this ground will appear the faultiness of what follows which is And therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself no nor himself of injury because to do injury to a mans self is impossible To the first piâ—ce I have shewed that though he were Author of Leviathans Power yet his evil usage of that power may be complained of To the second I think a man may injure himself when a rich man through niggardliness shall deny his belly or his back those expences which were necessary for the support of his health he deals unjustly with himself when another foolishly desperate shall adventure his life upon idle and frivolous occasions he deals unjustly with himself by hazarding so Noble a Creature upon so base and unworthy a prize These things and multitudes of more are unjust dealing towards a mans self But he hath a nice distinction at the bottom of this Paragraph It is true that they that have Soveraign Power may commit Iniquity but not injustice or injury in the proper signification I would he had expounded the proper signification At the first I was amazed at this distinction and did doubt there was some great and excellent Notion in it but duly considering the words I find they were airy and do signifie no more difference then if I had affirmed Mr. Hobbs or the Writer of Leviathan said this or that meerly nominal For what is iniquity but unequal dealings which in him who is bound to deal equally in distribution or commutation is injustice and indeed injustice is nothing else and injury what is that but not just or right and I am sure injustice is nothing else But where some Law directs this or that he doth otherwise This is the proper and genuine sense of the words and unless he had shewed us some more proper use of them there is no reason why we should be forced from this common acceptation Here now I might justly break off from further discourse of this business having answered what he objects but because I would give some satisfaction to the Reader in this Conclusion I shall a little insist further and shew that Leriathans or Supremâ—s may do unjustly SECT IV. A Soveraign may do injustice by himself and by his Ministers impowred and not punished by him IT will be a strong foundation for this discourse to produce the Actions of the King of Kings God himself which I may do in the eighteenth of Genesis ye may
my duty to shew such a thing to a heedless Reader SECT VI. Of mixed actions will desire and inclination distinguished confounded by Mr. Hobbs Of goods cast into the Sea for the preservation of the Ship and Passengers The dictate of Reason often disobeyed and the will violently carried by the sensual appetite Denominations are a principaliori SO now we will pass on to the next Paragraph I expect more of this stuff It begins Fear and Liberty are consisting I believe they are in a mixture as saith he when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for fear the Ship should sink This instance is commonly given to mixed actions which are compounded of voluntary and involuntary here is a part of both he doth throw his goods into the Sea this makes it voluntary he doth it grudging that makes it involuntary yet it seems the predominancy is in the will But now consider with me that these terms which he handled before and confounded together you may now find distinguished they are will desire and inclination these three to speak properly differ according to a threefold estate in man Natural Animal and Rational According to the first he hath inclination to tarry and remain in the world with the like agreeing to the second he desires meat drink to walk to talk and do all things which are pleasant to him According to the last to act such things as reason shall dictate Nay he may have an inclination to many things which Reason can say are not fit take the highest instance which can be given that is to live when Reason shall shew him that it is not fit to live upon such dishonest terms as are offered So likewise he may have an animal desire of pleasure which being found not fit by Reason the rational will controuls it Thus we see those three Appetites and to keep close to his instance man hath an inclination and a natural appetite to live and hath a sensual desire of his riches by which he hopes to live to the satisfaction of his sensual appetite but Reason prescribes that life is to be preferred before all the pleasures in the world So that here he saith right one may have a will to throw his riches into the Sea but his sensual desire is against it and that makes it have a degree of unwillingness Consider again that this act of throwing his goods into the Sea is in its own nature an unwilling act for no man would desire to cast that away which with so much hazard and pains he had got but in the particular when it comes to be yoked with that greater mischief of loosing his life then it is chosen before the other and yet it is oft grieved for when it is passed and gone which is a shrewd objection against the willingness of it for no man is rationally grieved for doing what he will but be it as he will yet the rational will the sensual desire and the natural inclination are not the same and although the rational will in that act doth command yet in many it doth not being violently carried away with the other So that he saith truth when he saith casting his goods into the Sea was a willing action although there was an earnest desire to the contrary and there was by reason of that some mixture of unwillingness in it yet denominatio à principaliori the predominant part gives the denomination invincibly So likewise what follows in another instance of him who pays his debts only to avoid imprisonment And what in the conclusion of that Paragraph he saith That generally all actions which men do in Commonwealths for fear of the Law are actions which the doers had liberty to omit therefore certainly they had liberty in themselves they might do or not do them SECT VII The deficiency of Mr. Hobbs his instance of water passing in its channel Libertas coactionis necessitatis further explained Liberty properly ad opposita NOw I come to a new business Liberty saith he and necessity are consistent as in the water that hath not only liberty but a necessity of descending by the channel This instance is not full for although there is a freedom to run in the channel yet the banks of the channel so confine it that the water can run no where else like a man who hath his shackles knocked off yet is confined to his chamber still and is a prisoner there But to understand this consider with me that this liberty which he speaks of concerning the water is a true liberty so far as I explained it according to his definition which is a liberty to run in the channel without external impediments but absolute liberty it is not because both it is impeded from overflowing the channel by the banks and likewise because it is restrained by its nature so that it is not absolutely liberty There is libertas à coactione a liberty from constraint of outward causes but there is no liberty à necessitate from the necessity of its nature without which there is no proper liberty any otherwise then a prisoner hath to live in Gaol But liberty is ad opposita to things of divers nature where the Internal Principle hath power to do this or that or at the least to do or not to do as he speaks at the end of the last Paragraph The doer had libertâ— to omit Now the water hath freedom to do it is not hindred from running in the channel but not so much liberty as School boys take one towards another when the weaker Boy should chuse the bâ—st the stronger would give him the worst and bid him chuse that or none for the water hath not liberty to run or not to run but only liberty to run SECT VIII Mr. Hobbs his former instance to voluntary actions His liberty to have or not to have written and dispersed these impious Doctrines HE procceds So likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do It is not so in the actions which men voluntarily do there is no necessity for them to do their voluntary actions they can chuse whether they will do them or not that man who doth vertuously can chuse and do vitiously And so contrarily he could have chosen whether he would have writ these wicked Doctrines which he hath taught If not let him confess it and I will prove him not to be a Man but a Beast and fit to be used as a Beast yea worse then a Beast to be like a stone which naturally descends or water which necessarily runs down its Channel and so ought to be used like it for indeed there is no one thing more peculiar to man then this liberty SECT IX Mr. Hobbs his Reason of the former Assertion invalid Of the first and second causes Men actively other creatures passively capable of commands Fools and Mad-men incapable of commands BUt he gives a reason for what he speaks And yet because every act of mans will and every desire