the concurse of God be only General and Indifferent it then hangs in suspense and has not efficace enough to reach its effect unlesse it be so or so disposed Whence also it follows that it is in the power of the second cause to resist or frustrate the concurse of God so that it shal not reach its effect Hence lastly it follows that the concurse of God is not efficacious and omnipotent which we shal anon prove 3 That the concurse of God as to its manner of working is not general but particular is asserted and demonstrated by some of the most acute of the Scholastic Theologues So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent 2. Dist 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 23. with several others But here it is objected 1. by Burgersdicius and others Objections against Gods particular concurse 1 If God concur by a particular concurse to the specification of the action then he may be said to walke discourse eat c. To this Objection we respond 1 by denying that God concurs to the specification of the action albeit he concurs by a particular concurse for an action is specified from its particular cause not from the first universal cause So that here is that which they cal a fallacie of many interrogations whereof one is true the other false Or we may cal it a begging of the Question in that they suppose That if God concur by a particular concurse he concurs also to the specification of the action which is an inconsequent consequence 2 Those Animal acts of walking eating c. ascribed to the second cause cannot be ascribed to God the first cause albeit they more principally belong to him because they procede not from pure efficience but from information to use the Aristotelean phrase or a bodie so organised Those actions signifie a relation to the particular subject whence they slow and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God as Bradward l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. S. 3. acutely replie shewing that ambulation eating c. do not denote pure efficience but a subject informed by such motions which are therefore proper to the said subject 2 But the main objection of Burgersdicius and others against Gods particular concurse is taken from sinful actions unto which say they God cannot be said to concur by a particular concurse unlesse we make him the author of sin This objection makes a great noise but has little of weight in it For 1 The deordination of any sinful act can only be ascribed to the second cause who is the Author of it not unto the first cause who only produceth the physical entitative Act. 2 That which is most sinful in regard of the second cause is so ordered by God as that it shal conduce to the greatest good as before and hereafter in the providence of God 6. Gods Concurse Efficacious Gods concurse is most Potent and Efficacious This Adjunct and Mode of operation is most expresse in Sacred Philosophie specially as to gratiose Influences which are most potent Sin is a mighty strong poison ay but medicinal Grace is a much stronger Antidote The powers of darkenesse and Hel are very strong but Christ the Captain of our Salvation hath Samson-like carried away the Gates of Hel upon his shoulders and led captivitie captive His Grace is most potent irresistible and victorions Thus Jansenius Augustin Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what precedes sufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimstes he addes This therefore is the true reason why no medicinal Grace of Christ ever wants its effect but al workes both to wil and to do because with Augustin Grace and the good worke are so reciprocated that as from Grace conferred the effect of the worke may be inferred so on the other hand from the defect of the worke it may be inferred that Grace was not given By which manner of reasoning it appears that Grace as the cause and the operation of the Wil as the effect are as the Philosophers speak convertible and mutually inseparable each from other For so Augustin speakes of the Conflict against Tentations Agis si ageris bene agis si à â—bono ageris so efficacious is medicinal Grace Yea Jansenins a voucheth that there is no manner of speech among the Scholastic Theologues so efficacious to expresse that the determination or predetermination of the Wil is from the Grace of God but Augustin assumes the same to demonstrate that the Grace of Christ is not such that the effect should be suspended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Wil but that the effect is most potently produced by it not if the Wil willeth but by working and determining the Wil to wil. So Habak 3.4 Habak 3.4 And his brightnesse was as the light he had bornes coming out of his hand and there was the hiding of his power And his brightnesse was as the light The brightnesse of Christ was exceding gloriose even like the brightnesse of the Sun in its meridian glorie Thence it follows he had hornes coming out of his hands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to send forth beams as hornes to irradiate and shine forth Beams and hornes have some analogie and ressemblance and therefore the same word among the Hebrews signifies both Hence the vulgar Version renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exod. 34.29 hornes whereas it signifies there beams as here Whence it follows out of his hands Hands here denote Christ's power as Act. 11.21 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hand signifies power the hand being the instrument of the bodie whereby it puts forth its power Thence he addes There was the hiding of his power i. e. his secret power lay wrapt up in his efficacious rays or concurse which is exceding influential and potent like hornes We find something analogous hereto in Plato Repub 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the first Cause of al good he compares him to the Sun and his concurse to the rays thereof in this manner Thou wilt say I presume that the Sun doth not only cause that things are seen but also that they are generated do grow are nourished although it be not the generation of those things Thus therefore determine that the chiefest good namely God doth give to those things that are known not only that they are known 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but also force and efficace for their existence c. Wherein he compares the efficacious Concurse of God to the spermatic potent influxe of the Sun which gives life sense motion nutrition angmentation and vigor to al manner of Insects Whence those blind Gentiles made the Sun under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Esculapius the supreme God of Medicine because the Virtues of Plants depend on the Sun See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
of Virtue did indeed come under the Apostles condemnation Rom. 8.6 c. of living after the flesh because they made their carnal Reason Free-wil and Self the only measures and springs of their pretended Virtue Lastly al moral Virtue according to philosophic Placits is but one so that the Virtues of Pagans must be supernatural or none at al as before Thence Greg. Nazianzen Orat. 3. in Julian speaking of the Platonists Stoics and peripatetics saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue to them is only a speciose name and in nothing more lasting than this life Thus Chrysostome Hom. 27. in Joan. It is not yet apparent to me that the Gentiles lived wel For if the hope of the celestial Kingdome and the commination of Hel with other such like sollicitude 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can scarce keep men in Virtue those who are persuaded of none of these things wil not embrace Virtue But if some of them counterfeit the same this they do out of desire of Glorie c. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated by Augustine and he grounds it on that eternal Veritie of our Lord Mat. 7.18 Mat. 7.18 Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit So contra Julian l. 4. c. 3. The unbelieving wil as every Christian grants is an evil tree which cannot produce any other than evil fruits i.e. sins only The like Cyril in Hos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Probitie in those that God hates is without its reward and good manners tending not to true good shal be always reprehended by him Not but that many Heathens as Christian Hypocrites may performe Acts and Offices materially good which yet may be deservedly as they are by the Ancients termed Sins as they procede not from Faith in Christ and Love to God the main Principes of al true moral Good So Chrysost Tom. 17. Hom. 17. Edit Paris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They are good workes i.e. materially but dead because they have not Faith 5. The distrioution of moral Good or Virtue into Justice and Pietie Albeit al Virtue according to its formal Idea and Reason be but one yet according to its objective material consideration it may be variously distributed Thus in sacred Philosophie moral Good or Virtue is distributed as to its object or mater into Holinesse and Righteousnesse Ephes 4.24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In Righteousnesse and Holinesse Righteousnesse comprehends al Second-table-duties which regard men and Holinesse al First-table-duties which regard God This distribution is most ancient and I presume was communly received among the Jews Sure I am Plato has it and as I conjecture from the Mosaic Institutes Thus in his Gorgias pag. 507. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now he that comports himself decently towards men doth righteous things but he that behaveth himself aecently towards God doth holy or pious things but he that doth both rightcous and holy things must necessarily be righteous and holy Wherein observe 1 That he distributes al moral Good into just or righteous and pious or holy 2 That he makes Justice or Righteousnesse to regard men but Pietie or Holinesse to regard God 3 That some may seem to be righteous towards men who yet are not pious or holy towards God as on the other hand some may pretend to be pious towards God who yet are not just and righteous towards men But 4 he that is just and righteous towards men in giving them their due as also pious and holy towards God in giving him his due such is indeed a virtuose man morally good just and pious Thus also Serranus on Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 136. takes notice how Plato distributes Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into Pietie and Justice the former relating to the Worship of God the later to men whereby our whole life is duely framed and regulated these being two seminal roots or commun heads of particular Offices and Duties Lastly Plato in his Minos pag. 319. saith That we should take diligent heed first that we offend not in word or deed against God and then that we offend not against men specially such as are divine A Golden Rule for moral Duties CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection Moral Libertie as to state in virtuese Habits Virtue gives 1 Dominion 2 Life Health Vigor 3 Amplitude 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 5 Beautie and Glorie Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in virtuose Acts. 1 The Contemplation of the first Truth 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 3 Total actual dependence on the first Cause 4 Conformitie to the divine preceptive Wil as also submission to his providential Wil. 5 Vsing althings in subordination to the Fruition and Service of God Moral Libertie as to exercice the greatest because it brings 1 Order 2 Spontaneitie and suavitie 3 A Divine Life 4 Amplitude 5 Freedom from Sin 6 Stabilitie of Spirit 7 Improvement of Virtue 8 Formal Beatitude § 1. Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection THE general Idea and Nature of Moral Bonitie having been discussed we now procede to the discussion of Virtue as it is the origine and cause of moral Libertie Plato discourseth of Virtue in his Meno the title of which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue properly according to its orgination signifies a Power or Efficace it being derived from Vir which primarily signified among the Ancients a stout valiant man answering to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Hebrews So the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily and properly signifies warlike Virtue or Courage from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mars and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arits terrible valiant potent or as Vossius from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 marats to waxe strong Hence in the N.T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to expresse the Divine power and efficace of God as 1 Pet. 2.9 and 2 Pet. 1.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i.e. by his gloriose power Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is expounded by Hesychius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a divine power So the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies the gloriose power of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Hab. 3.3 Zach. 6.17 Neither is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used in the N. T. more than once if ever to denote a virtuose disposition of mind namely Phil. 4.8 So curiose were the sacred Pen-men in avoiding philosophic termes which had been so much abused But by moral Virtue we here understand an habitual disposition of Soul conforme to the Rule of Moralitie the Divine Law In which strict notion it has one and the same formal idea or reason with supernatural Grace as Jansenius Amesius and others understand it For that there is no real moral Virtue but what is supernatural has been sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Section § 4. Whence true moral Virtue is nothing else but a certain perfection whereby man is ordained and disposed towards God as Aquinas 1. Quaest 95. Others cal Virtue the
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens or nothing And such is sin not simply and purely nothing yet according to its formal reason not a positive real Being but a moral privation or as others a privative relation That Sin according to its formal Idea and Nature is privative was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers both Platonists and others Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the moral cause of sins because there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a positive idea of sin So Proclus argues from this place That there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Idea of sins because then it would follow that God should be the Cause and Author of sin And Plato himself informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an irregular affection and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of order also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice against Law Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privative Being and lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of moral Being as the night is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the privation of the Suns light But among the ancient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis than Simplicius on Epicbet cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin really is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of good Of which see Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Among the Schole-men this is strongly proved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dâ—st 34. Quaest 1. Suarez in 1.2 Tract 3. Disput 7. sect 3. pag. 275-278 Barlow Exercit. 2. § 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin we now procede to its Causes among which Mans Defectibilitie the first Origine of Sin if we wil ascend up to its first Origine we must reckon first the Defectibilitie of the human Creature as the original cause of al sin For to speak in the Platonic mode Man as al other Creatures being composed of something and nothing yea more of nothing than something hence passive power and defectibilitie is essential to his Being For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing Where there is place for Proficience there also remains a capacitie of Deficience Every Creature because made by God is capable of Proficience but because made out of nothing it is also capable of Deficience It 's true Man as made by God was void of al moral deficience or sin yet as Man he was never void of Defectibilitie and Mutabilitie he had a moral free-wil for good but a natural free-wil or defectibilitie as to sin which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin This is wel explicated by Suarez In a free Agent saith he the mode of failing in an act ariseth from the dominion he has over his act hence sin in a free cause doth not always suppose the like sin in the same cause for it may arise merely from the libertie of the Creature which is good That the Wil of Adam in his innocent state was capable of sinning was a natural defect conjoined with a natural perfection for it was also capable not to sin and this mutable capacitie being drawen forth towards a prohibited object was the first origine and root of al sin Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural libertie in it self good but evilly applied Adam's person being vitiated by that first Sin The Vitiositie of human Nature he thereby vitiated his own and our Nature Yea his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation whence there adheres a vitiositie to our natures whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato and other Philosophers Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in our head which I understand of Adam whereby our nature from the first generation is corrupted And Timaeus Locrus from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes pag. 103. explicates the origine of this Vitiositie thus Vitiositie comes from our Parents and first Principes rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners because we never depart from those actions which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents A great confession of a Pagan beyond what many that professe Christianitie wil allow So Plato in his Critias saith That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men i. e. in the state of Innocence but at length it being mixed with mortal i. e. upon the Fal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 human custome or sin prevailed to the ruine of mankind and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men So Leg. 5. pag. 731. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest Sin is ingenite in mens Souls And Grotius assures us That the Philosophers confessed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin whence the Platonist makes mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of an evil nature which Definit Plat. pag. 416. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Vitiositie in nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the natural disease or disease of nature Thence Plato in his Politicus pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Politie gives this demonstration of its necessitie because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved and al manner of disorders infeste human Nature and men being impotent are torne in pieces by their own lusts as by so many wild Horses And thence he concludes That from this plague of vitiositie men were driven to great straits and confusions The like Stobaeus Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus's Dictates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Phy how depraved is mans nature altogether otherwise there were no need of Laws Dost thou thinke that man is any thing more excellent than Bestes Truly but little except only in figure Brutes look towards the earth but man has an erect countenance Thus also Plato Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirmes That Souls living on the earth are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a brutish nature And it is said of Democritus that he affirmed The diseases of the Soul to be so great that if it were opened it would appear to be a sepulchre of al manner of evils Yea Aristotle albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiositie Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturally repugnant to right reason But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive our selves our evil is not from without it is fixed in our very bowels Again Al Sins are in al men but al do not appear in each man He that hath one Sin hath al. We say that al men are intemperate avaricious luxurious maligne
it list not as it ought A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings various coverts and hiding places for lust Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin as Mat. 23.14 Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing or a bad designe is justified by a good end or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule men bring down the rule to their lusts Again sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors Mens lusts make many controversies about sin they make great sins little and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. § 4. Not only practic Error Self-love a radical cause of Sin but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme So Repub. 9. pag. 574 c. he describes to the life the servile condition of a wicked person under the Tyrannie of Self-love how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into al sin So also in what follows pag. 577. of which hereafter Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ingenite evil in which they who indulge themselves have no remedie against sin Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to speak the truth self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils in which the life of man is involved And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves and thence misjudgeth things just good and honest being in this opinion that there is more honor due to him than to truth And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-lover acts a for himself according to his profit Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self which he makes his God and the only Centre in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet Self is the last end of self-lovers even in their highest acts of self-denial if they give their goods to the poor or their bodies to be burned for Religion it is al to please self They may crosse their own wils but never crosse self as their last end if they seek after God it is to advance self self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie mortifie and with so much severitie torment their bodies but thereby to exalt their inward excellences And as self-lovers make self the last End so also the first Principe of al they do Self-love ever affects self-dependence it would fain have a World of its own to live act and breathe in it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie as wel as interest It 's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with and thereby merit divine favor And alas how soon are men overcome by tentations when they are self-dependent and self-strong He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength wil soon be overcome by it Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of al sin Every self-lover is his own Idol and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself he is soon overcome thereby and so hurried into sin Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal vile and abominable to God Where self is predominant the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten and a bad intention makes the best workes bad Where self rules it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts wherefore he that cannot depart from self wil soon depart from God and tumble headlong into al sin Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence and most directly opposite to divine love The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God yea the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it the more tyrannie it is Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself his carnal self which is so potent to draw him into sin It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deifie it self not by being equal in nature with God but by being its first Cause and last End which is the spring of al departure from God and conversion to the Creature And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policie and many artifices to concele its self and sin How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love and thereby delude the Soul into sin There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal whence the later oft conceles it self under the vizard of the former The more a man loves himself the lesse he conceits he loves himself as the more mad a man is the lesse he judgeth himself so Self-love is so artificial in its colors as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice and vice with virtues face Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin it greatly advances sin The members of self-love are principally three 1 Concupiscence or adherence to the Creature as our last end 2 Carnal confidence or dependence on self as the first cause 3 Spiritual pride or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 8 9 10. § 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful or voluntary again involuntary into sins of Ignorance or of Passion We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato Phileb pag. 22. where he saith That those who choose sin do it either involuntarily and ignorantly or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie 1. As for involuntary Sins they are 1 Sins of Ignorance when the ignorance is not affected either from prejudice voluntary neglect or custome in sin as before § 3. 2 Sins of Passion or Infirmitie when the passion is antecedent to the wil and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil being vehement and violent For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil or but a languid remisse motion such as doth not force the wil the sin is not so much of passion as voluntary whence passions
of what he has Man is then said to live when he useth and enjoyeth things as he ought which sin deprives him of in that it makes him use things that are to be enjoyed and enjoy things that are to be used Thus it invertes the order of things Hence it was a commun Saying with Socrates as also the Stoics That al Vice is against Nature because human Nature as such was made to adhere unto God as its first Cause and last End which state man by sin doth relinquish and so by consequence lose the right use of his Being Life Reason Wil Affections and al human Acts. Such is the Repugnance of Sin to human Nature 2. Moral Evils or Sins are not only repugnant to human Nature Sins repugnant each to other but to themselves This greatly demonstrates the servitude and bondage of Sin for al moral Libertie implies Order Harmonie and Vniformitie which ariseth from Virtue but Lusts are extreme jarring dissonant and opposite each to other Oh! what strange discords confusions and seditions are there among lusts in the heart How is the heart distracted and as it were torne in pieces by them Lusts are extreme mutinous and lawlesse they keep no order Thence in sacred Philosophie it is said The corrupt mind cannot subject it self to the law of God Rom. 8.7 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 8.7 cannot keep the place order and ranke the Law of God has put the Soul into It alludes to Military order for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily denotes the order and discipline of Soldiers Yea it 's added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither indeed can be namely because the Law is the rule of order but Lusts are al for disorder they disagree among themselves as wel as from the Law of God Lusts have no end bounds measure what is sin but a confused Chaos of al manner of disorders How do sensual passions fight not only against Gods Law but against each other And oh what a slavery ariseth herefrom Thence sinners are described Tit. 3.6 Tit. 3.6 Serving lusts and diverse pleasures These sinful pleasures are not only diverse as to Number but also as to Qualitie as different and opposite each to other Thence Jam. 4.1 Lusts are said to maintain an intestine war in mens Souls whence al externe wars and contests arise Thus Plato makes frequent mention of the discords and intestine wars of Lusts So Repub. 5. pag. 444. he makes injustice to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Sedition of the Soul or Insurrection So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pag. 214. he makes al virtrose persons to be like each other and friends but as for profligate wicked men they differ as wel from themselves as each from other And in his Phaedo pag. 92. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al sin is ful of discord but virtue is harmonious The reason of this Discord and Repugnance among lusts is this Al concord and agreament in the Soul ariseth from its adherence to God who is the first Unitie so far as men depart from this prime Unitie so far they fal under confusion Nulla major poena nequitiae est quà m quod sibi suis displicet Sen. Epist difformitie and disorder And what greater punishment of sin is there than this that it is displeasing yea repugnant to it self How oft do men relinquish the lusts they longed for and then reassume what they relinquished What a conflict is there between avaricious and prodigal lusts But of this more in what follows 3. Sin most impotent and infirme Sin is the Disease of the Soul ful of impotence and infirmitie Al moral Libertie implies health vigor force and strength and wherein consistes the vigor and strength of any thing but in adherence to its first Principes The more any thing departes from Vnitie the more Division Contrarietie Dissolution and Infirmitie And is not God the first Principe or Cause of the Soul Doth it not by departing from him depart from its first Unitie and strength O! then how impotent and infirme is sin This is every where intimated in sacred Philosophie Ezech. 16.30 So Ezech. 16.30 How weak is thy heart i.e. how sick faint and impotent by reason of lust Yet it follows Seing thou doest al these things the workes of an imperiose whorish woman She had potent imperiose lusts but a weak heart to resist tentations Sin is said to be a poisonous bitter root which sheds its maligne influences on al our Affections and Actions Deut. 29.18 Thus Deut. 29.18 Apostasie is said to be a root bearing gal and bitternesse The Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rendred Gal signifies a poisonous herbe and so it must be rendred here a root whose influences and fruits are poisonous and bitter Thence the LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 springing up in gal or poison and bitternesse For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both gal and poison answerable to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the poison of some Serpents lies in their gal Act. 8.23 Peter alludes hereto Act. 8.23 where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the bitter poisonous root of corrupt nature So Heb. 12.15 Heb. 12.15 Root of bitternesse i.e. poisonous root of sin Nothing so poisonous and killing as sin Whence sinners are said to be Jer. 17.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick even unto death So Esa 24.4 languisheth as a feeble crazy consumtive bodie as v. 5. Basil in Psal saith That men are rendred by Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without wound and blemish whence they become 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inexpugnable and free as before Chap. 3. Thence it necessarily follows that sin is the wound and blemish of the Soul that which renders it most impotent and servile That sin is ful of impotence and infirmitie Plato once and again inculcates So Repub. 4. pag. 430. he saith An intemperate man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 weaker than himself whereas a temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more potent than himself i.e. than his sensual appetite Thus in his Timaeus pag. 86 87. he proves That the irregularitie of our affections is the worst disease So Repub. 10. pag. 608. he informes us That evil is that which dissolves and corrupts things but good conserves and relieves And thence he concludes That a servile Sinner hath nothing sound Lastly Repub. 1. he saith Vnrighteousnesse is the disease of the Soul 4. Sin is the spot stain and defilement of the Soul Sin the defilement of the Soul and therefore the greatest servitude Virtue gives a Nitor Lustre Splendor Beautie and Glorie to the Soul but Sin is the Blot and blemish of human Nature indeed nothing can pollute and defile the Soul but Sin and sinful Idols Hence we find mention Deut. 29.17 Ezech. 23.7 Deut. 29.17 Ezech. 23.7 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gillulim filthy Idols The word signifies both filth and Idols or sordid dunghil
also Cap. 18. pag. 223. God saith he knows things future by that whereby they are future namely by his Divine Wil. And he urgeth for this that Principe of Aristotle 1. Post 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cause But now God knows al futures certainly therefore by their most true cause even that which virtually contains al other causes and causations and this is no other than his own wil. That God knows althings future in the determination of his own Wil was the commun Hypothesis of the ancient Scholastic Theologues as of Augustin before them So Robert Grosseteste in his M. SS De Libero Arbitrio Thus Scotus assures us That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Wil which determination is not only necessary to cooperate with the free Creature but also to determine the Wil of the Creature to act freely This Hypothesis is also excellently well explicated and demonstrated by Alvarez de Anxil Grat. l. 2. Disp 7. p. 106. God saith he in the absolute efficacious Decree of his own Wil predetermining in particular al future Contingents as also free acts knows certainly and infallibly those to be future as to al circumstances as wel as to their substance Therefore from this Decree there may be assigned a sufficient Reason of the certitude of Divine Science as to al futurs which are not morally evil And he thus proves his Hypothesis A determinate cause which is so efficacious as that it cannot be hindred by any other cause must needs infallibly produce its effect but such is the Divine Decree Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows sin God certainly and infallibly knows al future sins in that Decree whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Wil to the entitie of the act of sin so far as the act is ens and to permit the moral evil of sin as sin c. as before 3. The Jesuites superadde to the two former Sciences of simple Intelligence and Vision Scientia media Scientia Media a middle Science whereby God is supposed to foresee such or such events to be future on condition that such or such causes he so or so constituted This Middle Science 1. supposeth that some events are certainly future independently as to the Wil of God which is altogether impossibly for a thing merely possible cannot pass from its state of possibilitie to a state of Futurition without some cause of that transmutation now there can be no cause of futurition but the Divine Wil as we shall prove hereafter Nothing can be future either absolutely or conditionately but what the Divine Will has decreed shal be future therefore the object of this Middle Science cannot be things future but only possible Doth not this Middle Science by feigning that future which is only possible overthrow the very foundation of the Divine Science as to things future Is it not impossible that the prescience of a thing future should precede the decree of its futurition So Avarez de Auxil l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoscible as future but what gives futurition thereto And what gives futurition to any thing but the decree and determination of the Divine Wil 2 It supposeth Gods Science to depend upon its object which also is impossible because then it should be variable and mutable as the object is Yea to speak properly the object of this Middle Science is not at al cognoscible or knowable For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with some degree of necessitie at least as to essence or existence what is not either necessarily existent or future cannot be known now the object of this Middle Science is not either existent or future therefore not cognoscible Again God takes not the reason or idea of his cognition from the things themselves or any Hypotheses they fal under which are al variable but from the invariable determination of his own Wil as before It 's true our Intuition and Cognition is formed by a passive reception of species from its object Nostra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis non sic intuitio divina and therefore it is murable and variable according to the variations of the object but can we imagine that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intuition and Cognition Should the principe and reason of the Divine Cognition procede from and depend on its finite object must not God also be finite passive and dependent Is not the Divine Idea before its Ideate yea eternal How then can it depend thereon 3 This Middle Science supposeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain For such as the object is such is the Science thereof a contingent object cannot give a necessary certain Science al Logic scientific necessitie is founded in physic necessitie That which may otherwise be cannot be necessarily known as Gods knowlege would be false if he knew those things to be future which shal never be so would it be incertain if the object be not certainly future if the object be certainly future it must have a certain cause of its futurition which can be no other than the Wil of God But now according to this hypothetic Middle Science God cannot divine which way mans Free-wil wil incline it self before it hath inclined to this or that object and doth not this render the knowlege of God only conjectural yea no knowlege at al For how can a thing be certainly known to be future without some cause determining it to be such That Gods knows althings future though never so contingent in themselves most certainly in the determination of his own Wil see Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. also Grosseteste de Libero Arbitrio Wherefore if God has a certain prescience of future contingents as without al peradventure he has we must search for the causes of this Divine Prescience not in the extrinsec objects which can never give it but in God himself and in the determination of his own Wil in regard of which al future contingents are necessary not absolutely but hypothetically on supposition of the said determination 4 This Middle Science enervates and destroyeth the Grace of God 1 It destroyes the Grace of Election in that it supposeth that Peter could from his own free-wil consent to the Cal of God provided he were put under such circumstances and invested with such commun aides even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glorie which they make to follow the prevision of his Faith by this Middle Science And thus the whole of Election dependes on the improvement of Free-wil and the prevision thereof by this Middle Science 2 It enervates and dispirits the whole of Christs Redemtion in that it makes al the efficace of Christs Death dependent on the prevision of mans assent and consent to him as Lord. It supposeth that Christ died for no man absolutely but only on
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
and dependence of al second causes Every Being by participation is limited and where there are limits of essence there necessarily are limits of Activitie and Operation A Creature can as wel give Being to it self as actuate it self independently as to the First cause whatever receives its Being by participation receives also its Operation in the same mode of Participation Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Creature as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence Yea it is no lesse than an implicite contradiction to say that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act as Suarez and others prove And the reason is most demonstrative for as Aristotle tels us The mode of operating alwaies follows the mode of essence If the essence depend on God for its production and conservation so must the operation Whatever is a Being by participation must also be an Agent by participation Yea the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation and therefore it requires the concurse and influxe of the First cause for its production conservation and promotion 3 From the nature of the First cause and its perfection If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause he is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent and most perfect For that very Act is a real Being or if you wil a mode of Being and so reducible to real Entitie it cannot be pure nothing because pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entitie or Mode and yet God not the First cause thereof then it necessarily follows that God is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent because he cannot produce that real Act neither is he most perfect because there is something in nature physically perfect which he is not the cause of Dependence on God as the First cause albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature yet it importes perfection in God neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it 4 From the Providence of God If God as the First cause concur not immediately to al Acts of second Causes how can he order direct and governe them so as they shal al determine in his own glorie Again how can he hinder such Acts as impugne his own ends and designes Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of second causes cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence which consistes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie 2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs not only to the Act but also the second cause it self and its wil if it be a free Agent God immediately concurs to second Cause self This Proposition may be demonstrated 1 by al the fore mentioned Arguments which prove Gods immediate concurse to the Act of the second cause for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he subject must needs influence and actuate that power wherefore God the First cause producing in the wil of man an act connatural thereto must necessarily actuate and influence the said wil in such a production 2 That gods immediate concurse reacheth the human Wil and not only its Act is evident because it determines the Wil to act For grant but this that the human Wil is not the First cause of its own act but dependent on God for the production thereof which the Jesuites grant it necessarily follows that it is actuated and determined by God in al its Acts. It 's true the human Wil is a free Agent and so a self-determining power but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause God determines the Wil to determine it self as he moves the Wil to move it self If God did not determine and move the Wil it could not determine and move it self 3 Sacred Philosophie is expresse herein that God workes immediately on the Wil as wel as on its Acts and Effects So Philip. 2.13 God is said to worke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to wil and to do And how can he worke to wil unlesse he worke upon the wil Can there be any way assigned how God should worke to wil and yet not immediately determine and move the wil Psal 139.9 10. So Psal 139.9 10. If I take the wings of the morning i.e. slie most swiftly as the morning and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea even there shal thine hand lead me and thy right hand shal hold me His mind is that he cannot flie from the immediate presence of God because whereever he goes his immediate hand or concurse must lead him To lead a man by the hand and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurse on the Wil and its Acts. 3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause The Act of the first and second cause the same For the explication of this Proposition we are to note that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect For albeit the influxe of the first cause be distinct from that of the second yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same Duo individuo opere operantes necessario agant unum idem cùm indivisa sit corum actio si autem agerent diversis actionibus oporteret operata esse divisa ficut è contrà actio indivisa non potest sacere divisa opera Grossetesle de Libero Arbitrio This is incomparably wel demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his Tractate De Libero Arbitrio in M. SS where he acutely proves That the Action of God and the second cause whereby the effect is produced cannot be deverse because the Effect is but one and the same which procedes totally from God as the first cause and totally from the second cause as hereafter Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Efficience of God Gods Active Efficience is nothing else but the immanent efficacious Act of his Wil which without al peradventure differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause yet Gods Passive efficience as it relates to the Act of the second cause is not really distinct therefrom for it 's no way incongruous or inconsistent that one and the same act procede from two different total causes of different kinds such as the first and second cause is Whence it follows that one and the same act both of first and second cause
immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind That the first and second cause immediately concur to the same effect by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated 1 from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause The Act of the second cause doth not as some conceive depend on any real influxe or concurse transient from the first cause and distinct from the act of the second cause but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause which is the effective principe of al effects This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. sect 3. p. 568. where he proves That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Creature but to the effect neither is an action the terme of an action Therefore to the universal influxe of the first cause there is no more required but that the action of the second cause procede from his Wil not that it procede by another externe action but it can procede immediately by it self from the wil of God Whence when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influxe of God either this influxe must be taken for the immanent interne Act as it influenceth the externe Act of the second cause or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively save according to some rational conception If we would speak properly it must be said that the action of the Creature is from God Whence he concludes in the same page thus By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause Whence it 's said that the concurse of the first cause is before that of the second because the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first Hence 2 we may farther demonstrate the Identitie of the act whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to al transient acts of the first cause distinct from it self For if the action of the second cause be from God by some transient influxe distinct from it self then that influxe being a Creature wil necessarily require some other transient influxe for its production and preservation and so into infinite 3 That the action whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect is one and the same may be demonstrated from the Inutilitie and needlesse supposition of any distinction between them For if there be supposed two distinct actions one of God another of the second cause as necessarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect then the action of the second is from God or not It cannot be said that it is not from God but only from the second cause because then it would be said that the Effect of the second cause is from God but not the Act which is against the nature of a finite limited Being as we have proved in the precedent Propositions If it be said that the act of the second cause is from God then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to suppose two distinct actions one of the first and another of the second cause as concurring to the same effect when as it is granted and cannot rationally be denied that the very act of the second cause is from God This Argument is wel managed by Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of al is this Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action yet the influxe or concurse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct 2. Having dispatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurse Gods concurse Independent and Absolute we now procede to a second Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto namely its Independence and Absolutenesse That the concurse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie The Absolute Independence of Divine concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophie Psal 51.10 Hence we find a creative efficace asscribed to Independent Medicinal Grace Esa 43.1 So Psal 51.10 Create in me a clean heart Esa 43.1 The Lord that created thee O Jacob c. So Esa 57.19 as elsewhere Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concurse 1 Workes of Creation are out of nothing and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to mater 2 Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent which admits no social cause for Creation being the production of something out of nothing which are termes as to Efficience infinitely distant none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same who can reconcile something and nothing but he who has al Being in himself 3 Workes of Creation are in an instant and therefore depend not on any Preparations or material Dispositions of the subject 4 Workes of Creation are Perfect and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concurse How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners Doth it not oft let some run on in ful career til they have one foot in Hel and then snatch them as flaming torches out of that sire Thus Ezech. 16.6 Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy bloud Live Christs Omnipotent Independent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes What timber or heart is there so crooked knottie and crabbed out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercie What heart so stonie so rocky out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham as Mat. 3.9 Mat. 3.9 Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another a Lion into a Lamb a stonie heart into a Son of Abraham doth not this argue Independent Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace So little is this gratiose concurse tied to or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions Obligations Merits Causes Conditions or moving Considerations without it self it is the freest thing in the world and therefore compared to the motion of the wind which bloweth where it listeth Joh. 3.8 Can we suppose Joh. 3.8 that any thing the Creature performes should lay the least obligation on Soverain Free Grace Is it not a childish thing to suppose that the infinite occan of Independent Grace should ebbe and slow according to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil that most mutable Moon But that not only Essicacious Grace but al Divine concurse is Independent
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
which being cast out of the neast by their Parents and very much affected with hunger slie up and down the Air making loud cries Which seems to agree to that of Job 38.41 Thus Aristotle and Elian tel us that the young Ravens are expelled from their neast by the old ones To this sense Vossius Mcy and others incline The former sense of the Hebrews is refuted by Calvin as also by Bochart de Animal Tom. 2. p. 203 c. who makes this case of the young Ravens the same with that of the young Lions Job 39.39 Psal 34.10 and 104.21 both of which by reason of their vehement appetite and unskilfulnesse to acquire food suffer great hunger and are in a more than ordinary manner supplied by the Providence of God What extraordinary provision God makes for the conservation of his own People wil hereafter occur in the Gubernation of God 6. Prop. The Conservation of a Creature and its first Creation or Production as they refer both to God differ only mentally Conservation continued Creation Creation gives Being and Existence unto things Conservation Continuation in Being Something 's are conserved immediately by God becuase subject only to him as Spirits That the conservation of such differs only mentally from their Creation is evident Other things are conserved by God not so immediately as to exclude Means yet so as that God conserves them immediately in and by those means Now that the conservation of such things also as to Gods immediate conservative influxe differs not really but only mentally from thier first production is manifest because conservation as to God whether it be by means or without means is but one act continued from the first instant of its Creation or Production not that there is any real intrinsec succession in Gods Active Conservation which is no other than his most simple volition but we conceive Gods Passive Conservation as successive in regard of the Creatures Duration Thonce Aquinas and his Sectators hold That Conservation is a continued Creation Which must not be understood of proper continuation but according to our manner of understanding or by reason of its coexistence to true continued succession For continuation properly so termed is only in things divisible but Creation and Conservation are one indivisible act without any successive duration or real continuation as to God but only a most simple indivisible permanence as Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. Sect. 2. p. 343. demonstrates Hence we may easily understand how Creation or the first production of things and their Conservation as to God differ only Mentally For the difference is only according to the different mode of our conception and expression Things are not said to be conserved in the first moment of their production nor to be Created in regard of their subsequent continuation For Creation connotes a negation of precedent Being but conservation on the contrary connotes the possession of Being before produced Creation includes a Novitie of Essence which conservation excludes and conservation includes precedent Existence which Creation excludes Nehem. 9.6 Thus Conservation is continued Creation as Nehem. 9.6 where God is said to preserve althings made by one and the same Act. John 5.17 So John 5.17 My Father hitherto worketh and I worke i. e. for the Conservation as wel as the first production of things neither are these Acts as to Divine Efficience really distinct albeit we may distinguish them as to second causes and means used by God for the production and conservation of things 7. Prop. Divine Conservation as to its Objects and Effects is various The Object of Divine Conservation Albeit the Conservation of God be in it self one simple Act not different from the first production of things save by some connotation only yet it admits various Objects and Effects 1 God conserves Individuals some to al Eternitie without the least corruption or alteration as Angels and Human Souls Other Individuals shal be conserved for ever yet not without some alteration and resinement as the celestial Bodies c. 2 Pet. 3.10 12. 2 Such Individuals as are the effects of Natural Generation or Production God conserves in their Species and in the whole for the corruptions and defects of some parts belong to the Constitution and Continuation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the whole Vniverse unto which there is more regard to be had than to any part albeit the parts also are conserved in their Species when they decay as to their individual Natures 3 God conserves also the vigor virtue and efficacitie of al second causes together with their Operations so long as they are existent CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin God the Supreme Gubernator The end of Divine Gubernation It s Order most perfect and immobile It hath the force of a Law Its use of means It s extent to althings Gods Gubernation as to Men particularly as to Sinners and Sin The Origine of Sin and its causes God not the Author of Sin How God is the cause of the material act of Sin How far Sin fals under the Divine Wil. Gods Wil about Sin Permissive not merely Negative but Ordinative Gods Judicial Gubernation of Sin What Attributes of God are most illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin § 1. HAving discussed the Conservation of God Divine Gubernation we now descend to his Gubernation whereof we find illustrious notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophemes touching Divine Gubernation they are very many and great as it may appear in the particulars thereof I shal at present give only the mention of Platonic Contemplations concerning it Thus Plato Phileb p. 28. What O Protarchus may we determine that althings and this which is called the Vniverse are governed by a certain temerarious power void of Reason as Fortune wil Or rather on the contrary should we not affirme with our Ancestors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the eternal Mind and a certain admirable Wisdome ordering al in the most accurate manner doth governe He saith that according to the Opinion of the Ancient Wise Men the Providence of God governes and moderates althings in the wisest manner and with the best order Thus also Iamblichus saith That the Egyptians when they introduce God under the Symbolic Image of one that governes a Ship thereby signifie his Domination and Empire as Gubernator of the Universe For as a Gubernator of a Ship in one moment doth easily move governe and direct the Ship so doth God the world We find the same similitude used by Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 as before Hence this Gubernation of God is that act of Divine Providence whereby he directes governes and brings al his Creatures to their proper ends in the most orderly manner This general Idea of Divine Gubernation may be resolved into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God is the Supreme Moderator God the Supreme Gubernator Eccles 8.4 Soverain Gubernator and absolute
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
8. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s 5. L. 3. c. 4. BREVIARIE OF CONTENTS The COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie Preface THE first Reformers of Philosophie Wiclef Wesselus Savonarola Picus Mirandula Lud. Vives Melanchton Stapulensis and Ramus 1. The Right Vse and Abuse of Platonic Philosophie 4. The Designe of this Discourse to render Philosophie subservient to Christian Theologie 6. A Proemial Scheme of Reformed Philosophie Philosophie Considered 1. Generally 1 in its Historie 2 In its generic Nature Cognition Which includes nine Intellectile Habits 3 In its Ends Adjuncts Differences Right Vse Abuse Parts and Characters c. 1. 2. Particularly 1. As Notional or Logic. Wherein consider 1 Its End the Refinement of the Intellect 3. 2 Its Parts touching 1 Simple Ideas or Notions both Objective and Subjective and these both first and second 4 5. 2 Propositions and Judgements 6. 3 Syllogisme and Discourse its Mater and Forme Figures and Modes 8 9. 4 Method which regardes the former three Parts 12. 2. Real Philosophie 13. 1 Natural Physiclogic and Mathematic Ib. 2 Moral Ethic or Private Oeconomic and Politic. Ib. 3 Metaphysic or Prime 14. BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophie CHAP I. Of Prudence the last End and chiefest Good Use Fruition and Delectation MOral Philosophie its Genus Prudence 2 Prudence its Nature and Object Ib Its Offices and Parts 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3. 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 4. The Subject of Prudence Conscience 5. The Law of Conscience Ib. Synteresis and Syneidfies what 6. The Rule of Purdence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 7. 1 Subjective right Reason Ib. 2 Objective right Reason 8. The Last End its influence in Morals 9 The last End as extensive as the First Principe and but one 10. The last End desired infinitely 11. God the Last End of al. 12. Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie the Last End of Man 13 To adhere to God as our Last End speakes Perfection 14. The Chiefest Good its Proprietles Ib. 1 It 's the Idea of al Good 15. 2 It 's the Preme Beautle Ib. The Nature of Beaurie Explicated 16. The Soverain Beautie of God 17. 3 The chiefest good most proper 18. Vse and its Regulation Ib. What Temperance is 19. The Vtilitie of things in reference to their Last End 20. Concupiscence the Fruition of created good for itself 22. Intention of God as the Last End how it must be ever actual 23. Fruition its Difference from Vse 25. Al Fruition importes 1 Love 26. 2 Vnion and Possession 28. 3 Communion with the best Good 29. By Contemplation and Love 30. 4 Delectation and Joy 31. Which requires 1 a sweet Good 32. 2 Possession thereof 33. 3 Action thereon 34. Adjuncts of Delectation 1 Realitie 35. 2 Connaturalitie and Agreament 36. 3 Vniformitie and Harmonie 37. 4 Puritie 5 Force 39. 6 Infinitude without excesse 40. The Effects of Delectation 1 Amplitude Ib. 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 41. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie THE Moralitie of human Acts. 42. Moral Bonitie in Conformitie to the Divine Law 46. The measure of Moral Good Perfect 48. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Ib. Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good 50. No human Law a perfect Rule Ib. The Divine Law the rule of Moral Good 51. Right Reason Objective Light 52. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule 54. The Parts and Causes of Moral Good 55. The Mater of Moral Good 56. Things Indifferent in Genere and Specie 57. No Action Indifferent in Individuo 58. A Virtuose Wil the Effective Principe of Moral Good 60. The best End Essential to Moral Good 62. The Forme of Moral Good in Conformitie to the Moral Law 63. How the Forme of Good Consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wel-doing Ib. How far Circumstances Moralise 64. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of Good 68. Al Good and Virtue Supernatural 69. The Difficultie of Moral Good 70. The Virtues of Pagans only lesser Sins 71. The Distribution of Virtue into Pietie and Justice 72. CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie MOral Virtue an Habitual Perfection 74. Moral Libertie as to State in Virtuose Habits 76. Virtue gives 1 Dominion 78. 2 Life Health Vigor and Force 79. 3 Amplitude and Enlargement 80. 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 82. 5 Beautie and Glorie 84. Moral Libertie as to Exercice 85. 1 Contemplation of God 86. 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 87. 3 Dependence on the first Cause 90. 4 Conformitie 1 To Gods Precept 93. 2 To his Providential Wil. 95. 5 The reference of althings unto God as the Last End 96. Moral Libertle of Exercice the highest demonstrated 1 From its Order 98. 2 From its Spontaneitie and Suavitie 99. 3 From its Vitalitie 101. 4 From its Amplitude 103. 5 From its Purgation of Sin Ib. 6 From its Stabilitie 104. 7 From its Improving Virtue 105. 8 From its Formal Beatitude 106. CHAP. IV. Of Sin and Moral Servitude SIN a Transgression of the Law 108. Sin as to its formal Reason Privative 110. The Causes of Sin 1 Mans Defectibilitie 111. 2 The Vitiositie of human nature 112. The Nature and Influence of Original Sin 114. 3 Practic Error 115. 4 Self-love 119. Sins of Ignorance Passion Wilful 121. The Moral Servitude of Sin 122. 1 Sin repugnant to human Nature 123. 1 As a Falling from God Ib. 2 As it strips of the Image of God 124. 3 As Enmitie against God 125. 4 As it divestes men of Humanitie 126. 2 Sins repugnant each to other 127. 3 Sin most Impotent 128. 4 Sin the defilement of the Soul 129. 5 Sin ful of Shame and Reproche 130. 6 Sin the Tyrannie of the Soul 132. 7 Sin ful of Penurie and Want 133. 8 Sin the Fetters of the Soul 134. 9 Sin Folie and Madnesse 135. 10 Sin makes Men Bestes 136. The Adjuncts and Effects of this Servitude 137. The Servitude of Sin 1 Voluntary Ib. 2 Necessary the Degrees and Kinds of this sinful Necessitie 138. 3 Infinite as to Number and Magnitude 141. 4 Penal with the Nature of Punishment 142. 5 Sin in it self the greatest Punishment 144. 6 Other Punishments of Sin 145. 1 Sin breeds Fear and Shame Ib. 2 Sin ful of Instabilitie 146. 3 Sin ful of Anxietie and Torment Ib. 4 Eternal Punishment of Sin 147. Sinners Dead in Sin 148. 1 The Death of Sin not Metaphoric or Hyperbolic but Real 149. 2 No Seeds of Virtue or Spiritual Life in Corrupt Nature 150. 3 The Impotence of Corrupt Nature to what is Good Vniversal and Total 152. 4 Man cannot prepare himself for the Reception of Virtue 153. 5 No Freewil in Nature to Moral Good 155. CHAP. V. Of Plato's Politie its Essential Constitution and Administration POlitic Philosophie what 158. Politie its Forme in Order 159. The Object of Politie the Multitude or Communitie 161. God the Founder of al Polities 162. Man's
that is intended or loved for it self which ought to be loved for it self 2 Every Intention of a Worker whereby any thing besides God is intended for it self that Intention is evil And the reason is invincible because every rational Creature ought to refer al his acts to God as his last end Hence according to the bonitie or pravitie of the Intention we may take a measure of the bonitie or pravitie of Use Every Intention of the Agent wherein any thing but God is intended as the last end is a depraved Intention because nothing is to be intended for it self but the last end Whence it follows that no Intention is right or morally good but that whereby we intend or love for it self that which ought to be intended or loved for it self namely the last end and chiefest good using and referring althings else as means subordinate thereto as it is acutely demonstrated by Ariminensis in 2. Sent. Dist 38. Quaest 1. Art 1. § 5. Having explicated the nature of Vse Fruition we may with more facilitie and expedition examine what Fruition imports As to use a thing is to intend elect and imploy it for the acquirement of some other thing so to enjoy a thing is by love to adhere unto it for it self without reference to any other thing Thus Jansenius Aug. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. gives us this difference between Vse and Fruition He that useth a thing has dominion over it to refer it to this or that end but he that enjoys any thing doth bring down his Soul by love unto a subjection thereto and is in that regard inferior to it though superior to whatever he doth use This Ariminensis in Sent. Part. 1. Dist 1. Quaest 1 2 3. has acutely determined where he gives us the nature of Fruition and its difference from Vse in these Conclusions 1 No Nolition is Fruition because every Nil is the slight of the wil and that which is ordained for some other 2 Every Volition is either Vse or Fruition because every thing is willed either for it self or some other 3 No Vse is Fruition because no one that wils a thing for another can be said to wil that thing as his last end because the volition of the last end is the cause of the volition of that which refers to that end but nothing can be the cause of it self Ergo. 4 Fruition and Vse may consist together in the Wil as to different objects 5 The Wil ought not to Vse God i. e. as a means conducible to some other end 6 A Love of Fruition must terminate no where but on God 7 To love any thing for God is nothing else than to love it because God is loved i. e. to love it as conducible to God In Fruition there are four considerables 1 Love 2 Possession of and Vnion with the Object beloved 3 Communion 4 Delectation and joy Of these in their order 1. Al Fruition imports Love For no man can enjoy what he doth not love al Love tends to Union specially with its last end Yea according to the Scholes there is a mutual Inhesion between the Lover and Beloved The Lover lives in the Beloved and the Beloved in the Lover which is most true in regard of that Love of Fruition whereby the Soul enjoys God for God lives in the Soul that loves him and the Soul lives in God who is essential Love This Love of Fruition is wel expressed by Plato Repub. 6. pag. 485. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But in that man whose affections are greatly ravished with one object they are infirme and remisse towards other things as rivers derived elsewhere His mind is that Love of Fruition is properly towards one object namely the last end But more expressely in his Phaedo he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that is wise desires always to be with and enjoy that which is better or his best good i. e. Union and Fruition is the main thing his Love aims at Every one is strongly carried forth by Love towards his last end yea those very acts of love and desire are fruition in part Thence Arist. Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Because al are wont to be conversant about what they love This intime connexion between Love and Fruition is excellently wel explicated by Jansenius August Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. Love of Fruition ordains and disposeth the Love towards its Beloved whom it regards as its first Principe or Cause and its last end in the fruition of which it expects perfect felicitie For what is Fruition but this to adhere to and acquiesce in another as its first principe and last end But now every thing that is ordained to another is in that respect necessarily inferior to that other Whence Love of Fruition keeps the Soul in subjection to God its last end but gives it dominion over every inferior good This Jansenius more fully explicates Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 16. pag. 149. Many saith he thinke they love not such things to which they are indeed intimately and strongly united but this is with facilitie detected by Fruition for Love cannot be wel understood without Fruition nor yet Fruition without Love because Love is the beginning of Fruition and Fruition the end of Love No man enjoys but what he loves and no man loves any thing as his last end but what he would enjoy whence as there is no Fruition but what is sweetened with Love so there is no Love but what tends to Fruition Therefore Love according to Augustine is nothing else but the Wil by its Pondus tending to Fruition What is Love but a secret Fountain streaming towards Fruition And what is Fruition but an Ocean of satisfaction in which Love is immersed and swallowed up Is not then Fruition near akin to Love Thence Augustine explicating the nature of Fruition tels us that to enjoy is to adhere to a thing for it self for if it be not adhered to for it self it is not properly loved or enjoyed but that other thing for whose sake it is embraced But to speak precisely every kind of Love is not Fruition but that only which solaceth it self in the embracements of its beloved which if absent the wil moves towards it by desires This is wel expounded by Plato Phaedro pag. 251. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Wherefore every Soul so long as it is pricked and wounded with desires it feels grief and is enraged thereby and then again it is recreated with the memorie of that first Beautie it once beheld And thus variously affected by reason of impatient furie it cannot sleep but wanders up and down with desire to see the first Beautie which when it has once got a glance of then breaking al bounds of Modesty it solaceth it self in the embraces thereof c. By al which it is apparent 1 That al Fruition of or love to any Creature for it self is sinful concupiscence 2 That
ease and delight but when the Soul logeth in divine Goodnesse it then finds ease and pleasure Every want wrings and pincheth the Soul it can never loge with ease til it loge in the chiefest Good by possessing the same whereby al its wants are supplied The Soul when it sits most uneasie as to inferior goods so far as it dwels in God and God dwels in it so far it finds ease Properly we never enjoy any thing til we find rest in it this the Soul finds so far as it possesseth God Whence springs delectation and pleasure Possession gives the obtainment of desires and desires so far as obtained fil with joy proportionable to the desires 3 The immediate effective Spring of Delectation and Joy is Motion or Action 3 Action a cause of Joy Whence Joy is defined by Cicero a sweet motion in sense Yea things in themselves bitter and irkesome how sweet are they oft made by exercice It is generally determined in the Scholes That operation and motion is the proper cause of Delectation and is not the operation and motion of the Soul in the fruition of the sweetest good of al the most noble and perfect Actings of the Soul on the chiefest good O what sweet inspirations of Divine suavities are they attended with Thus Plato Repub. 9. pag. 582. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. How great pleasure the contemplation of the first Being brings with it none but a Philosopher can taste So in his Phaedrus pag. 249. speaking of the Contemplation of the first Being he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is the most ravishing ecstasie and composed of the best things That al true pleasure ariseth from virtuose exercices about the sweetest good Aristotle in imitation of his Master Plato has wel demonstrated So Eth. l. 1. c. 9. p. 43. As in the Olympian Games not he that is most beautiful or most valiant carries away the Crown but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but they that contend for Victorie So in this human life they that do good are made partakers of good things And then he addes the reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Their life is indeed sweet and joyous of it self He is delighted or recreated in just things who by love embraceth justice To those that are studiose of virtue virtuose acts are of themselves pleasant and delicious i. e. they carrie in them their own reward a divine suavitie And he subjoins the reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But their life needs not pleasure as an additament or appendix but has pleasure included in it For besides what has been spoken he is not a good man who is not delighted in good actions Neither doth any cal him just who doth not take pleasure in just deeds or liberal who is not delighted in liberal acts So in other Virtues Whence he concludes If so then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 virtuose acts are of themselves sweet Whence he collects this general Conclusion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 formal Beatitude is the best fairest and sweetest thing i. e. Nothing so sweet as by virtuose acts to adhere to and enjoy the sweetest and best good And indeed herein Plato and Aristotle accord and agree with sacred Philosophie For David assures us that nothing was so sweet to him as the Contemplation and Fruition of God by acts of Faith c. So Psal 27.4 Psal 27.4 One thing have I desired to behold the beautie of the Lord Heb. to behold with singular delight For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 construed with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in signifies to see with great pleasure and delectation as v. 13. O! how sweet and delicious was it to David to look on the golden Arke the Symbol of Christs Humanitie and there by Faith to adore the Deitie So Psal 106.5 That I may see the good of thy chosen Psal 106.5 that I may rejoice in the gladnesse of thy nation Heb. to see in good i. e. to enjoy the good seen with pleasure and satisfaction for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 construed with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to enjoy with pleasure O! how deliciose is the fiducial contemplation of the sweetest Good What is formal Beatitude but the immediate gloriose perfect Intuition or Vision of the supreme Beautie And what infinite delectation ensues hereon What a joyous contemplation is it to behold the Deitie in the Arke of Christs Humanitie What infusions of Divine suavities flow hence Doth not the Beautie of the first Cause and fairest Good captivate al hearts that behold it How much spiritual delectation is there in one glance on the sweetest Good How soon is the holy Soul filled with divine suavities when it can in any measure contemplate the Glorie of the prime Beautie Thus Psal 104.34 My meditation of him shal be sweet Psal 104.34 I wil be glad in the Lord. Yea would not an appropriating view of the admirable perfections of God the sweetest Good turne Hel it self into Heaven Such are the divine suavities which attend virtuose acts in the Fruition of the sweetest Good § 7. 2. The Adjuncts of Delectation We now descend to discourse of and explicate the nature of Delectation in regard of its proper Adjuncts which are various 1 Al Delectation and Joy must be real and sincere 1 It is real and the more real and sincere it is the better it is And doth not this give a great advance to those joys and suavities which attend the fruition of our last end and sweetest good May any delices be compared with these in point of sinceritie and realitie What are al other pleasures in comparison of these but painted shadows yea mere lies This is lively illustrated by Plato Phileb pag. 40. where he stiles al terrene pleasures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phantasmes or Imaginations painted in our minds as when a man conceits he has a vast treasure of gold in his possession which he has not yet takes pleasure in such a sick dream Whence he addes There are false pleasures in the minds of men which yet by mens ridiculous figments imitate true pleasures And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither do I judge that we may consider pleasures in any other regard evil but as they are false Bâ— which he invincibly demonstrates that no pleasures are truly â—â—ch but those that are sincere real and substantial which he makes proper to virtuose men who adhere to the sweetest Good This real pleasure is elsewhere stiled by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sincere genuine pleasure which he makes to be peculiar to the fruition of the best Good This he more openly expresseth Repub. 9. pag. 580. where he assertes That a wise or virtuose man only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth taste of the most genuine and true pleasures So pag. 583. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither is there any true pleasure but that of a wise man Whereby he as Solomon understands a virtuose man
attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction Satisfaction These spiritual pleasures do not only amplifie and widen the Soul but also bring satisfaction Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the desires but never sil them with satisfaction they may slater and tickle the senses but never quiet the appetite the best they leave behind them is repentance This is wel explicated by Digby of the Soul pag. 460. The violence of fruition in those foul puddles of flesh and bloud presently glutteth with satietie and is attended with annoy and dislike and the often using and repeting it weareth away that edge of pleasure which only maketh it sweet and valuable even to them that set their hearts upon it and nothing heighteneth it but an irritation by a convenient hunger and abstinence Contrary in the Soul the greater and more violent the pleasure is the more intense and vehement the fruition is and the oftener it is repeted so much the greater appetite and desire we have to returne unto the same Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our last end doth not only widen but fil the Soul and crown its desires with satisfaction Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end where there is no rest there can be no perfect delight or satisfaction and where there is want there can be no rest every want wrings the Soul and keeps it in a restlesse condition So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the last end and sweetest good Thence Plato Conviv pag. 211. assures us That the contemplation of the first sincere most perfect Beautie is formal Beatitude that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction for they who arrive hereto are content to live alone in conversation with this first Beautie c. Of which see Philos General Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect 1. § 2. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie The Moralitie of human Acts. Moral Goodnesse in Conformitie to the Divine Law The measure of moral Goodnesse perfect The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good but the Moral Law Right Reason among the Philosophers the objective Law of Nature The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule The Parts and Causes of moral Bonitie 1 The Mater Things indifferent in genere specie Nothing indifferent in individuo A virtuose Wil the Principe of Moral Good The best End essential to Moral Good The forme of moral Good Conformitie to Gods Law How 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gives Forme How far Circumstances formalise Moral Good The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al Moral Good There is no real moral or natural Good but what is supernatural Moral Good most difficult The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only The distribution of Moral Good into Pietie and Justice § 1. HAving dispatcht the generic Idea and last End The Moralitie of human Acts. which has the place of a first Principe in Ethics we now passe on to the Moralitie of Human Acts and their Bonitie And here we should first treat of the natural interne Principes of human Acts namely the practic Judgement or Knowlege Volition Consultation and Election But having discussed these more largely in Court of the Gentiles P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. § 24. we shal not here undertake the discussion of them As for the Moralitie of human Acts there are great disputes in the Scholes Wherein the Esse morale of human Acts doth consiste Suarez in 1.2 which vulgarly they stile his Ethics Tract 3. Disp 1. pag. 207. discourseth largely of the Moralitie of human Acts under these heads 1 He makes the formal denomination or that forme whereby an Act is denominated moral to be more than an Ens rationis properly so termed or a figment of mens minds something in or appendent to the things themselves This we grant 2 He thence deduceth That the Esse morale in the act of the Wil besides its Entitie and substance addes a certain mode of emanation or moral dependence on the Reason adverting and the Wil freely working This Hypothesis needs animadversion and restriction It 's true the Moralitie of human Acts hath dependence on the Reason and Wil as the subject of those Acts for al moral Acts depend on the physic Principes of those Acts there is no moral Being but has its foundation in some physic or natural Being As al moral capacitie is subjected in natural so al moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its seat in the Creature and so supposeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto Thus Cyril Alexandr Compend Dialog de S. Trinit Tom. 5. part 1. pag. 673. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is holy by participation being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctitie that of it self existes primarily in proper nature namely as Man and Angel or any other rational Creature So Damascene Dialect cap. 59. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is first by nature which is inferred but infers not i.e. secundùm existendi consequentiam if there be Grace there must be human Nature wherein it is seated but if there be human Nature it doth not necessarily follow that there must be Grace Thus the human Understanding and Wil precede Virtue as the subject thereof Yet hence it follows not as Suarez seems to conclude that moral Acts receive their formal denomination from their relation to the Understanding and Wil. 3 Hence Suarez concludes that the Esse morale is a mode not physically and intrinsecally inherent in the moral act but in the externe act it speaks denomination from the free act of the Wil and in the very act of the Wil besides its physic emanation from the Wil it speaks denomination from the reason directing and the Wil acting with a plenarie power Though as it has been granted al Moralitie of human Acts doth presuppose the emanation of those acts from the Understanding and Wil as their main Principles yet it follows not hence that the formal reason of their Moralitie must be taken from this mode of emanation May we not as wel argue that al virtuose acts are formalised by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts because they flow thence But there lies a mysterie in this Jesuitic Hypothesis which when laid open wil soon evidence its vanitie and falshood The Jesuites and some other Schole-men in imitation yet on mistaken grounds of the ancient Philosophers place the formal reason of al moral Virtue in conformitie to right Reason Hence no wonder if they make al Moralitie formally considered to be a mode dependent on Reason and Wil. But the falsitie hereof wil appear by what follows If we consider the Moralitie of human Acts as stated by Plato it cannot be denied but that he also makes mention of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right Reason which he seems to make the measure of al Moralitie
Bonitie and Vice But what a vast distance there is between Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men we shal when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie sufficiently evince For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie so much darkened by scholastic niceties in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament Moralitie is but a mode or relation which cannot subsist of it self without a subject and foundation in Nature Can a man know and love God without reason and wil 2 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts but in their conformitie to if good or difformitie from if bad the perfect measure of Morals and what is the perfect measure of Morals but the moral Law 3 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode not absolute but relative appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason but something real is generally confessed and that on invincible grounds because it has real influences and effects Moreover that Moralitie is not an absolute mode but relative is as evident because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else Hence 4 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe Forme and Measure It 's a great Effate in the Scholes That the End specifies in Morals Althings are defined and measured by their last End but this by nothing The last end as a pregnant universal Principe conteins al Morals in its wombe 5 Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence saith Aquinas A moral Act receives its species from the object and end And Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 165. addes That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object not considered in its being but morally as subject to the Rules of Moralitie To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances which oft adde much to the being and intension of Moralitie 6 Prop. But yet we must conclude That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie formally considered is the Law of God This comprehends and gives measure to al other Rules of Moralitie the last end object and circumstances are al measured hereby Thus Scotus and other of the Schole-men determine That the Esse morale or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law unto which it is referred And the reason is most evident because al Moralitie speaks a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation to some Rule And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts but some moral Law And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers as also some late Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure § 2. Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule but evil so far as it comes short thereof And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie but the divine Wil and Law Thus Plato Repub. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is most distant from reason which is most remote from Law and Order i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good as they are conformed to Law and Order Whence Definit Platon pag. 4.13 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an obedience of virtuose Laws And on the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit that over looks Laws This Plato more fully explicates Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may as it seems to me wel be termed Salubritie whence the bodies health ariseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes we cal legal and Law whence men become legitime and orderly He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bodie which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformitie to Law This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art 9. pag. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own and as the Law establisheth But Injustice by which men possesse what is not their own against the precepts of the Law What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of al other Virtue and Bonitie or Vice But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law whether objective or subjective and formal denotes a conformitie to some Law The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object but the later that which constitutes an act as an act morally good 1 In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse which agrees thereto as objects as Suarez 1.2 Tract 3. Disp 2. strongly proves And the reasons are demonstrative For 1 If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful the act conversant thereabout can never be good because al moral good requires an integritie of causes an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular 2 The object of the Wil is good as good therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects 3 This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
indifferent in individuo No Action considered in individuo in its individual nature is morally indifferent i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances and in relation to its Principes Manner and End is either good or evil That moral Indifference hath place only in specie in the specific nature of Acts not in individuo in their individual nature is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe yea among the more sober of the Schole-men This was one of John Husse's Articles condemned in the Council of Constance Art 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa That there are no workes in individuo indifferent but this is an immediate division of human workes that they are either virtuose or vitiose This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites who strongly proves That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems that althings must be done for good c. So elsewhere he saith That God is the marque and scope unto which al our Acts as so many arrows ought to tend This is wel determined by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species which yet considered in individuo is either good or evil and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object but also from its circumstances And it 's necessary that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil at least as to the intention of the end For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts if any Act be not ordered to its last end it is so far evil if it be ordered to its last end it is then good c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo but al are good or evil for it is not lawful for a rational Creature so long as he is such not to returne that back to God which he received from God Again p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature and he that doth otherwise is deficient because nature is the measure of other things If therefore man puts forth an human Act he ought thereby to be converted towards God Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil not one of al these indifferent Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law they would be al good Yea our very natural and civil Acts as to their manner so far as they are morally good or evil are al regulated and determined by the moral Law For albeit the Divine Law be not as it ought not to be a general sum of Arts and Sciences nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law so far as they are moral and Christian according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences coincident for the most part in the mater but distinct in the manner of consideration Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie Thes 167. acknowledgeth There is not saith he any Act indifferent in individuo but every such Act if it procede from sufficient deliberation is either good or evil although not as to its object yet in regard of its circumstances The scratching of the head or the taking up of a straw is either good or evil This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant and disgustful to Libertines who would be so yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines yea scarce ever professedly denied by any save some sew who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination and such as are deliberate That no Acts in individuo are indifferent see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist 41. and in Thomam 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. 2. A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good Having discussed the Mater of moral Good we now procede to its next efficient Cause or Principe which is the Wil or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace The moral Law requires that to the constitution of an Act morally good there concur a good Principe now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end the action is good And what bends the Wil in this manner Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas ab hac enim est actio but virtuose habits So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act so many degrees there are of moral Good therein Moralitie as wel as Divinitie is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Wil which is the measure of good and evil The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man as also act Thus Plato Meno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is to wil and to be able to performe good Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he wil not to do unrightcously this is sufficient he shal not do unrighteously But more particularly Plato Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth This is not to be desired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that althings follow his Wil but that his Wil follow Reason i.e. that it prosecute what is good This is wel expressed by Simplicius in Epich c. 1. pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self on which our nature dependes then it is carried to things truly eligible yea to truth it self Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly desirable and attained by real election Simplicius here in imitation of Plato whom he much follows asserteth 1 That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. 2 That moral Good is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because most eligible Which derivation he borrowed from Plato What Virtue properly is and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good wil hereafter § 4. and sect 3. §
1 2. come under contemplation at present this may suffice to demonstrate that al moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuously inclined for the production thereof And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophie doth assord it might suffice Thus Solomon the wisest of mere men since the Fal Prov. 4.23 Above al keeping keep thine heart Prov. 4.23 for out of it are the issues of life i. e. al spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Principes where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God but dead Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and gloriose as to the mater of them yet if they flow not from this living Fountain they are but as your Automata those artificial Machines or Images called Puppits which seem to move their eyes hands feet c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial forrein impresses such are al moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuosely disposed morally dead albeit they may seem to have shadows of life Or look as no member of the bodie performes any action of natural life wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not so no action is morally good wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Wil. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring no living virtuose Act can procede from a dead corrupt Principe Being life and motion go together in Morals as wel as in Naturals such as the Facultie Spring and Principe is such wil the motion and operation be both in Grace and Nature as Medo has wel observed on Prov. 4.23 Thus Augustine on Mat. 7.18 where by the good Tree he understands a believing Wil which he makes essential to every good Act for if the Wil be bad the Act cannot be good and every unbelieving Wil is a bad Wil for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life there can be no love to God as the last End as the end formes the Wil so Faith formes the End Thence that of the supposed Ignatius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Faith is the Principe of life Love the end these two in unitie perfect the man of God And Chrysostome saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothing is good without Faith 3. The best End essential to moral Good To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 499. assures us That al Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good as before Sect. 1. § 2. This is wel explicated by Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 2.3 Art 8. It must be said that in Morals the forme of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end and the reason is most evident because the Wil is the Principe of moral Acts and the End the main Object and as it were the forme of the Wil but now the forme of an Act always follows the forme of an Agent whence in Morals it is necessary that what gives an Act its order to an end give it is also forme c. This is more nakedly laid down by Angustine Whatever good is done by man but not for that end for which it ought to be done albeit the office it self i. e. the mater of the Act seem good yet the end being not right it is sin This is wel explicated by Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. Two things are to be regarded in every act of a virtuose Wil 1 The office or worke it self done 2 The cause for which it is done or the End In the weighing the Bonitie of any Virtue our main regard must be to the End This is as it were the last rest and scope of the mind in acting that which the Wil its habit and act most incline unto This deservedly rules al Offices which flow from its Empire are tinctured with its color and sapor and ought to be referred to it This is the genuine cause why so many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philosophers touching the chiefest Good So again he saith That the Office it self is but as the Corps of Virtue which is animated by the End which gives forme and life without which the office is but as mater without forme or a carcasse without Soul Aristotle wel instructes us That the end is the measure of althings which is true as to moral Good Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 166. assertes That an human action takes its Bonitie or pravitie not only from the intrinsec end of the worke which is coincident with the object but also from the extrinsec which is the end of the Worker Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by their Acts as Ends And what is the last end of al good workes but the Glorie of God which though last in Execution yet ought to be first in Intention at least virtually if not formally in al we do Thence saith Angustine That is not true Virtue which tends not to that end wherein the best Good of man consistes And Gregor Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 29. Quaest 1. proves that Every volition which refers not to God for himself or to other things for God is vitiose 4. The last Cause The Forme of moral Good conformitie to the moral Law or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Forme which consistes in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law This may deservedly be termed the Forme of moral Good because it gives forme and measure to al the former Principes and parts For wherein consistes the Goodnesse of the Mater Principes and End but in their Conformitie to the Divine Wil and Law This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of al moral Good whereby al difference and perfection is to be measured Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reason Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of al moral Good by this we are to take our measures of al differences or perfection therein This Conformitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato under various emphatic notions as 1 it is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So Protag pag. 326. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al the life of man ought to consist of Concent and Harmonie i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law Hence 2 In his Phaedo he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Virtue consistes in Harmonie whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularitie So in his Timaeus pag. 47. he saith That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum So Stobaeus Serm. 1. de Virtut pag. 15. 〈◊〉
its chiefest good Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bonitie or the chiefest Good convertes althings to it self i. e. althings tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection 6 The more the Wil is conformed to the Divine Wil the more free it is and whose Wil is more conforme to the Divine Wil than his who actually and resolutely adheres to God Doth not such a Wil touch the Divine Wil in every point as two strait Lines 3. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in an actual Dependence on the first Cause total and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of althings Every Creature having something of Nothing or passive Power either physic or metaphysic and obediential it thence fals under the Law of Mutabilitie which is the root of Dependence Novitie of Being Deficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature as Eternitie of Being Immutabilitie and Independence is to the Creator For every Creature being only Being by participation hence Dependence becomes intrinsecal to it and inseparable from its nature as Suarez Metaph. Disp 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates Yea Disp 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates That Subordination or Dependence of a created Being both in acting and causing formally belongs to its essential reason as such because this dependence is founded not in any qualitie or proprietie of the Creature extrinsecal to its Essence but in the very intrinsecal limitation thereof So that the very Essence of the Creature as such is the root of this dependence and to suppose a Creature and not to suppose it to be dependent in essence and operation implies a contradiction Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only but also moral on its first Cause We find both mentioned by Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shews That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of al Beings whose conduct he that follows shal be happy And Epinom pag. 980. he assures us That he who praying to God doth trust in his Benignitie shal act wel So in his Timaeus pag. 27. he tels us That al who have any thing of an awakened mind when they attemt any mater either great or smal are always wont to cal on God Which is an high act of Dependence Thence Theages pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▵ AIMONION For there is a certain DEMON which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do c. What this Demon of Socrates was is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers who have written Books concerning it That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. § 4. It certainly importes his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power either Real or Imagiuary Yea Planto in his Timaeus saith That Beatitude or moral Libertie is nothing else but to have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Demon dwelling in him Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shekinah i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men Thence the Greek Fathers terme efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon in imitation of sacred Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indwelling Grace Which alludes to that of Paul 2 Cor. 12.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 12.9 that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwel on me It evidently alludes both name and thing to the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitation of God with and in men which denotes the highest Dependence And indeed herein consistes one main part of moral Libertie as to exercice Look as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause so doth al true moral Virtue on its first Cause Virtuose persons who are most feeble in themselves are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe Where there is a subordination of Causes either moral or natural it is the libertie of the inferior to depend on and receive from the superior Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual dependence on him If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences how soon do al moral Virtues wither and die away What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first Where there is a limited essence is there not also a limited dependent Activitie Can a dependent cause produce any more than a dependent effect Must not every mutable variable defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause That which had not Being from it self may it have Operation independently from it self Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first If the created Wil cannot subsist of it self may it expect the privilege of acting from it self independently as to the first Cause Is not the human Wil a mere passive though vital instrument as to the reception of divine influences albeit it be active as to its own operation Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be absolute and total Yea is not this Dependence immediate And O! how is the Soul enlarged according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult but with it the most difficult are most facile The Soul is wel compared to a Glasse without a foot which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken but if God withdraws his hand it soon sals to the ground and is deshed in pieces he need not take it and throw it against the wal it wil break of it self Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Munudaction also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and cooperation of God Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al manner of energie Cyril 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the aide from above Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the auxiliant or assistent Power Greg. Nyssen in Psalm saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue And Chrysostome in Gen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole of good is from the Grace of God Whence God is termed by Cyril in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Creator and Framer of al good and his efficacious Grace is termed by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficacious Aide as by Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence Of which more hereafter The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause but continual effusions and insusions into
movetur It 's a great Saying of the Platonists That one free is moved from infinite to infinite upon infinite i.e. a virtuose man in al exercices of Virtue is moved 1 From God as the first Cause and original Spring 2 To God as the last End and infinite Good 3 Vpon or according to the infinite Wil and Law of God as the measure and rule of al his virtuose exercices Whence also they tel us That the motion of a free Soul is circular from God as the first Cause to God as the last End and by God and his divine Wil as the measure Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in al the exercices of Virtue So that it fals under no coarctation or confinement either in regard of Principe or End or Rule but partakes in its measure of that Amplitude which its Principe End and Rule rejoiceth in For such as a mans first Principe last End and Exemplar is such is he as to libertie or servitude Quantò finis altior tantò actus volunâ—â— est libeâ—â— By how much the more ample and sublime the end is by so much the more ample and free is the Act. Again the virtuose Soul adhering to and depending on God as the first Cause obteins great enlargement Whereas sin being an aversion from God our first Principe and last End puts fetters chains limits and confinement on the Soul 5. Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes in the freedome from vitiofe Inclinations Affections and Motions Plato in his Timaeus 〈…〉 persuades us That the culture and cure of every thing consistes in giving it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 its proper diet and exercices and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitiose humors and maladies than to give it its proper virtuose exercices When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful than when it is most in virtuose exercitations Althings are purified by perfective fermentation and is not the Soul also purified from its noxious peccant humors by the divine fermentation of virtuose affections Thus Rom. 12.11 Rom. 12.11 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fermenting or boiling in spirit Syr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is spoken of boiling waters Job 41.22 So Job 30.27 LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 My bowels fermented or boiled The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuose exercices the more free they are to serve God and lesse obnoxious to the service of sin By how much the lesse we serve sin by so much the more free we are And who serve sin lesse than they who are most deeply engaged in virtuose exercices Plato Tim. pag. 89. tels us That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic exercitation What is health but the spirituose vigor of Nature And what more promotes this spirituose vigor than exercice And doth not this hold true as to the Soul Is not its most healthful purgation by virtuose exercitation Doth not this most promote the spirituose vigor and health of the Soul What makes the fire to conserve it self in its puritie but its grand and perpetual activitie Doth not also the running stream keep it self pure whiles the standing Pool gathers mud Are althings in Nature purified by motion Quantò virtus aliqua intensiùs tendit in aliquid tantò fortiùs repellit omne contrarium Aquin. and shal we not also allow the same efficace to virtuose exercices It 's true virtuose exercices do not purge out sin by their own innate force as Physic purgeth out il humors but by the divine promisse concurrence and benediction By how much the more intensely the virtuose Soul actually tends to its last end by so much the more strongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto 6. Virtuose Exercices most stable and permanent Virtuose Exercices are most stable firme and permanent Therefore most free Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes much in the firmitude stabilitie and permanence of such exercices Whence Plato in his Cratylus pag. 415. derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is always in fluxe or motion whence he makes it to be synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a facile and expedite progresse For saith he it always flows in an equal stable manner The Soul according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ever-moving Principe and therefore it ought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be always in action Now it is most certain that no acts of the Soul are more stable firme and permanent than virtuose acts Thus Arist Eth. l. 1. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtuose exercices are most permanent And he gives this reason of it Because blessed Souls live and dwel always in such Acts without tediousnesse or oblivion And Plato in his Cratylus tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sloth is the greatest bond and fetter of the Soul which obstructs al virtuose exercices The firmitie and stabilitie of every thing ariseth from its adhesion to its first Principe and last End and by how much the more the Soul departes from these by so much the more instable and sluctuating it is To stand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God under al the vicissitudes and various changes of this World argues great moral libertie as to exercice and wherein consistes the Souls adhesion to God as its first Principe and last End if not in virtuose exercices 7. Virtuose Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue Virtuose Exercices improve Virtue and so by consequence moral Libertie Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. assures us That when the faculties of the Soul grow sluggish and lazy they are rendred more infirme and impotent but by continual action they are made more robust and vigorous And doth not this Philosopheme hold valid in Morals as wel as Naturals Doth any thing render the virtuose Soul more robust and vigorous than virtuose exercices So pag. 103. The Soul is nourished and corroborated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by labors and exercices And are not virtuose labors of al most nourishing and corroborative Thence saith Seneca Labor nourisheth generose minds O! Generosos animos labor nutrit Sen. then how are virtuose minds nourished by the labors of Virtue As the native heat is preserved by the Pulse or twofold motion of the heart so is Virtue by its exercices It 's a trite Saying in the Scholes Cessation from acts diminish habits but continuance therein emproves the same It 's true there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits and virtuose which come by infusion because acquired habits are the natural products of their acts but virtuose habits are not naturally produced by virtuose acts but given in by God of mere Grace God rewards virtuose exercices with farther degrees and advances of Virtue or Grace and that of mere Grace So Mat. 13.12 Mat. 13.12 For whosoever hath to him shal be given 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
to contemplate the first Truth So in his Phaedrus pag. 247. he assures us That the contemplation of God with a pure mind furnisheth us with al other convenient cogitations for the Soul contemplating that which truely is and acquiescing in this contemplation is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasures and then having acquired the genuine Sapience or Science of that which essentially is and immutably such being as it were fested with these delices it again enters into the interior parts of Heaven and returnes home Wherein he gives us a lively description of those satisfactorie pleasures and delights which attend the contemplation of God Thus in the Scholes they usually determine That a contemplative life is more excellent than an active and they ground their determination on the preference that our Lord gives to Marie Luke 10.42 Luke 10.42 And their reasons are such as these because a contemplative life is 1 more tranquille and serene 2 more desirable for it self 3 more permanent and lasting 4 more self-sufficient and satisfactorie 5 more delicious and sweet 6 more agreable to mans more noble part the Soul 7 more divine and beatific Which being understood of the contemplation of God holds most true provided that this contemplation be rightly qualified namely that it be real pure spiritual lively distinct firme solid affective effective and influential on the divine life CHAP. II. Of Atheisme and the Existence of a Deitie The Origine of Atheisme 1 from Polytheisme 2 from vain Philosophie and carnal Politie 3 from the carnal Mind Pride c. Three sorts of Atheisme practic Atheisme worst The pestiferous Influences and punishment of Atheisme The Existence of the Deitie demonstrated from 1 Vniversal Consent 2 A first Cause against the Eternitie of Mater c. 3 A first Mover 4 The Order of the Vniverse 5 The innate Idea of a Deitie in the Soul 6 Practic Arguments from 1 Conscience 2 Religion 3 The politic World 4 The Atheists enmitie against a Deitie § 1. HAving given some summary general Idea of Metaphysic That there is a God we now descend to its principal Object namely God who may be considered either in regard of his Being or Operations As for the Being of God the first thing to be undertaken is the demonstration that there is a God Plato abounds with many pregnant and cogent Arguments to demonstrate the Existence of God against the Atheists of his Age. We shal reduce the whole to the following particulars First Plato explicates the original roots of Atheisme The Origine of Atheisme which began to spring up in his days with its prodigiose nature and pestiferous maligne influences 1. He expounds to us some of the principal roots of Atheisme Thus de Legib. 12. pag. 967. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are some who thinke that they who are much conversant in the studies of these Arts and Sciences namely Astronomie and other cognate necessary Disciplines become Atheists from an apprehension that things are made and governed by the necessities of certain natural Causes and not by the force and providence of the divine Wil. In which Platonic Philosopheme there are these Propositions worthy of our contemplation 1 That there was an opinion abroad that the Mathematics and other Sciences made many Atheists 2 That Philosophie abused made men Atheists by resolving al the Products Events and Phenomena of the natural and politic World into natural Causes not the divine Wil and Providence 3 That these Atheistic infusions and persuasions sprang not really from Philosophie but the abuse thereof These Platonic notions we shal endeavor more fully to explicate in the following Propositions 1. Atheisme 1. from Polytheisme Atheisme was not the first-borne of corrupt Nature but was ushered into the World by Polytheisme it s elder Brother and nursed up by vain Philosophie and carnal Policie So long as the Deitie maintained an awe and reverence towards it self in the consciences of men by a sense of its prodigiose operations in creating and governing the World Atheisme found no place in Nature We hear little of it til the beginning of the Roman Monarchie at which time God withdrew the sensible experiments and prodigiose effects of his Omnipotence which had so long preserved the old World from Atheisme But beginning now to governe the World more by wisdome without those miraculose operations before vouchsafed to the infant-world the effects of his power were not so sensible whence the brutish sensual World began to cal in question the very existence and providence of God and that from the many ridiculous Deities which were idolised by men For Polytheisme gave a great advance to Atheisme To multiplie the Divinitie is to destroy it he that has power to believe many Gods is very capable of falling into Atheisme to believe there is no God The corrupt mind of man observing bright impresses and characters of the Deitie in the workes of his hands began very early to worship the Creature instead of the Creator Rom. 1 19-23 Hence sprang up first Zabaisme or planetary Deities and then Hellenisme or Polytheisme a multiplicitie of al manner of Gods which laid a foundation for Atheisme For he that is inclined to believe a pluralitie of Gods may easily be induced to believe there is no God So intimate is the cognation and connexion between Polytheisme and Atheisme As the Atheist believes there is no God so the Polytheist or superstitiose person wishes there were none for al superstition has a legal fear wrapped up in its bowels which strikes at the very Being of the Deitie But albeit Polytheisme opened the dore to Atheisme yet it was hatcht nursed up and maintained by vain Philosophie and carnal Policie as we have at large proved Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. § 4. 2. 2. From vain Philosophie and carnal Policie Philosophie abused makes men Atheists by resolving al the Phenomena of Nature and States into natural Causes exclusively as to the Divine Wil and Providence This lies evident in Plato's Philosopheme before cited Who makes mention 1 of Astronomie and other parts of Mathematics as influential on Atheisme For the Pagan Astronomers then as many judicial Astrologers now held that there was a natural subordination of al inferior Causes and Effects to the Stars whence they reduced al natural effects yea many politic to abstract formes and figures to some insensible Influences or fatal Necessitie Again Mathematicians inuring themselves to ocular sensible Demonstrations expect the same in divine maters a bare Testimonie though never so divine signifies little or nothing with them whence they disbelieve every divine Mysterie which fals not under certain rational Demonstration Witnesse the great Leviathan of our Age and Nation for so he is pleased to title his Book who has not been ashamed to make public profession of his Atheisme and disbelief of althings which admit not of sensible Demonstration 2 Physiologie or natural Philosophie as also Medicine
and the same simply in the some forme In which excellent explication and demonstration of the Immutabilitie of God we have these observables 1 He makes mention of Gods in the Plural Number by reason of the severitie of their Laws and Customes but intends thereby one only God as before in the Unitie of God 2 He demonstrates this one God to be immutable because he cannot be changed either by any other or by himself That he cannot be changed by any other he proves because al change is for the better but God cannot be changed for the better because he is best The same argument he useth to prove that God cannot change himself For such a mutation would be either perfective or amissive God is not capable of any perfective mutation because he is the best and most perfect Being neither is it possible that he should affect any amissive mutation because none willingly change for the worse Proclus addes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 invariable because al mutation is a signe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of infirmitie as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is inconsistent with the omnipotent Essence In sum this Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence is that Attribute whereby God is said to preserve his own Being without the least power of not Being or conversion into any other Essence or increment and decrement or alteration and motion 1. God immutable in his immanent Acts. God is immutable in al his immanent Acts and Decrees There is a twofold mutation physic and moral physic mutation is by Addition or Ablation and Substraction of some real Entitie Moral mutation is either of Science and Knowlege as when a man judgeth that false which he before thought to be true or else of Wil and Purpose when a man wils that which before he nilled c. God is absolutely immutable in al these respects he is neither capable of physic nor yet of moral mutation either as to Knowlege or Wil. For al mutation either of Knowlege or Wil implies inconstance and imperfection if not imprudence and infidelitie which are al inconsistent with the Divine Being 1. Knowlege 1 God cannot be said to change in regard of his Knowlege because his Knowlege is not distinct from his Being he knows himself and althings else in and by himself he cannot know any thing that he did not know before neither can he know any thing otherwise than he did before He knows things successive without succession by intuition also things complexe by one simple intuitive act His Knowlege is as necessary and eternal as his Essence and therefore most perfect and immutable both extensively and intensively Objects known by God are variable but his knowlege of them and of their variations invariable Althings are the same to Gods knowlege as they are in their own Beings things past present future are present to God in al their circumstances and differences If Gods Science should be changed it would be about things future when they are present and so passe into preterite or what is past but this cannot be because those circumstances of future present past are al determined by the Divine Wil and so present to his Science of Vision Moreover no objects are the cause of the Divine Knowlege but on the contrary the Divine Knowlege and Wil the cause of al objects future present and past In sum God knows al particular objects and circumstances intrinsecally in the glasse of his own Essence and therefore invariably and uniformely Things both complexe and simple may varie but God knows them al invariably in the infinite claritie of his own Divine Essence and Ideas Every thing future if we compare it with the prescience of God it is necessary and necessarily known by him This Immutabilitie of the Divine knowlege Plato oft inculcates under his Divine Ideas by means whereof he makes God to have the most accurate absolute infinite eternal and immutable knowlege of althings So in his Timaeus pag. 28. as in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. as before P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. S. 1. § 4. and in what follows Chap. 4. 2 God is immutable in al the Acts and Decrees of his Wil. 2. Wil. For these also have one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence Again if Gods Wil were mutable his Knowlege must also be so for God cannot know things future but by the determination of his own Wil whence they receive their futurition It 's true God wils al mutations of things yet his Wil admits no mutation It 's one thing to change a Wil Deus non mutat voluntatem sed vult mutationem rerum Aquin. and another to wil a change For God by the same immutable Wil decrees that in such a period of time such a thing shal be and in another the contrary without any beginning to wil what he willed not before or ceasing to wil what he before willed God begins to wil or nil nothing al his Wils and Nils are eternal He hates nothing that he before loved nor loves any thing that he before hated neither doth his Wil admit any degrees of some or lesse No immanent Act or intrinsec denomination can happen de nov◠unto God albeit many yea infinite externe relative denominations may be attributed to him Thus the externe relative denomination of Creator is given to God in time not intrinsecally but extrinsecally the change of Creation was not in God but in the Creature the very act of Creation taken passively and extrinsecally is in the Creature and not really distinguished from it if we consider it actively as in God so it is the same with the Wil and Essence of God in which regard God may be said to be Creator from al Eternitie as his Wil is the productive cause of athings Thus al other externe relations and denominations attributed to God in time as Lord Father c. are not because of any new thing in God but in regard of something new in the Creature from God There is no new Act in God which was not from eternitie albeit the effects of those Acts were not from eternitie but in time Al mutations are proper to Creatures only because Creatures and the mutabilitie of the Creature can have no influence on the immutable God Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore God is altogether immutable and inalterable for he hath determined althings by his Prescience every thing according to its proper and convenient season and place Wherein note 1 That by Gods Prescience must be understood the Divine Decree whence his Prescience resultes and therefore oft put for it 2 That by this Divine Prescience and Decree althings though most mutable and variable as to their proper times and places are immutably determined 3. God is also immutable in regard of his Word Gods Immutabilitie in regard of his Word God being the first Intellect and Truth he cannot
another Sun so Christ he is the Parelius or reflexe Image of God who is in himself a Light inaccessible and ful of Glorie as 1 Tim. 6.16 Thence it is added and the character of his person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes an Effigies or expresse figure engraven or impressed Al the Divine Attributes and Perfections of God are impressed or engraven on Christ's human Nature in legible and golden Characters whence he is stiled Emmanuel God with us He is indeed the golden Arke wherein the Deitie lies couched a visible Image of the invisible Deitie whose mediatorie Offices and Relations seem imperfectly expressed in Plato's Demons of which before 2. The Scripture 2 The complexe objective grades of our ascent up to God are al divine Words or Revelations both preceptive and promissive whereby the Divine Nature and Wil is reveled to us as 1 Cor. 13.12 1 Cor. 13.12 For we now see thorough a glasse darkely We see the face of God in the glasse of divine Words and Ordinances yet only enigmatically and obscurely And Plato makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word whereby things divine are reveled to us which 3. The light of Grace if I mistake him not alludes to the sacred Scriptures 2 The subjective grades whereby we ascend up to the knowlege of God are al Divine Illuminations whereof we find great notices and Philosophemes in Plato 4. The light of Glorie as hereafter Chap. 10. § 1. 2 There are also Grades of Glorie whereby glorified Spirits ascend up to the beatific Vision of God of which elsewhere These are the various descents of God to man and the ascents of man to God whereby his incomprehensible Being is in some degrees apprehended though never comprehended by poor mortals CHAP. V. Of Gods Life Knowlege Wil and Power The Life of God in the Actualitie of his Essence Gods Life most spirituose self-moving Life it self immortal and the Cause of al Lafe Gods Science its Perfection Object both complexe and incomplexe particularly the human Soul The Mode of Divine Science by the Divine Essence and Ideas Gods Science most simple intuitive immutable certain absolute eternal and perfect Simple Intelligence and Science of Vision Middle Science what The Wil of God its Object Actualitie Independence Immutabilitie Absolutenesse Antecedence Perfection Libertie Efficace Distinctions Gods Power and its Identitie with his Wil Its Object things possible Its Infinitude § 1. HItherto we have considered the Essence of God as existent The Life of God we now procede to consider it as actuose which is usually termed the Life of God whereof we find great notices in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In sacred Philosophie Life is ascribed to God on various reasons 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in opposition to al false Gods or Idols and so it denotes the Veritie and Truth of his Essence and Existence as Mat. 16.16 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mat. 16.16 of the living God i. e. of the true very God in opposition to al false Gods So Act. 14.15 1 Tim. 4.10 as in the O. T. Deut. 32.40 Psal 84.23 Jer. 5.2 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by way of Eminence to distinguish his Actualitie and manner of acting from that of the Creature for al life consisting in a spirituose actuositie every thing is said to live so far as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-moving Principe as Plato phraseth it now God being the most pure Act and Spirit and the prime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-moving Principe which moves althings but is moved by-none hence Life in the most eminent degree belongs to God as Joh. 1.4 and elsewhere 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 effectively as he gives life to al either natural Act. 17.28 Deut. 30.20 or spiritual Hos 1.10 2 Cor. 4.11 Ephes 4.18 or gloriose Joh. 14.9 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essentially as the Divine Essence is in and of it self actuose For the Life of God is God himself hence when he swears by his life as Deut. 32.40 Deut. 32.40 he swears by himself And so men when they would swear by God they swear by his life 1 Sam. 14.39 Ruth 3.13 1 Sam. 14.39 And because Gods Essence is ever actuose therefore he is said to live for ever Dan. 4.34 Dan. 4.34 who liveth for ever So Rev. 4.9 This Life of God essentially considered is wel described by Plato in his Phaedo pag. 106. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God saith Socrates who is as I take it the very species forme or idea of life if any thing else be immortal can never die is confest by al. In which description of the Life of God we may consider 1 the mode of life he ascribes to God in that character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the very species forme or idea of life whereby the Life of God is essentially differenced from al other Lifes For no created life can be said to be the forme or idea of life The Angelic life is of al created lifes the most actuose spirituose and noble yet it cannot be said to be the species or idea of life because it contains not the whole of life for the species and forme contains the whole essence But now the Life of God is the species forme or idea of life because it contains in it self eminently and essentially al life whatever Spirituositie or Actuositie there is in any created life it is in a transcendent eminent degree comprehended in the essential Life of God 2 Plato makes this Life of God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 immortal So Aristotle lib. 2. de Coelo cap. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Energie or Actuositie of God is Immortalitie and this is life eternal This Immortalitie of the Divine Life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1. Tim. 6.16 natural absolute and essential as 1 Tim. 6.16 but the immortalitie of Creatures is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acquisite as Plato in his Timaeus or in the phrase of sacred Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by grace and free donation Angels and human Spirits are immortal by divine donation but they possesse not Immortalitie as the Divine Life doth But to explicate the Life of God more fully Of Life in its generic notion according to the Analogie it bears to the Animal and Rational Life we must a little examine what Life in its generic notion importes And here indeed we can give only some poor conjectures in as much as nothing is more difficult to be understood than Life albeit nothing more commun This is one of the Mysteries of Nature which not falling under the perception of sense farther than by its effects we can only give some probable conjectures of it But thus much we find by the effects to be included in the generic notion of Life 1 a spirituose Principe or Spirituositie So among Animals by how much the more spirituose they are by so much the more
is not manifest in his sight because he is present with al. Suppose there were a bodie as they fancied Argus ful of eyes or al eye would it not discerne althings round about it without the least turne or mutation of its posture So God being ful of eyes or al eye and present with al Beings is it possible that any thing should be hid from him Hence Plato held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 althings are ful of God and therefore nothing could he hid from him 3 Gods Omniscience may be argued from the Divine Ideas or Decrees Althings were the object of Gods knowlege before they were in being by reason of his Divine Ideas which were the original Exemplar of althings This Plato much insistes on both in his Timaeus and Parmenides as hereafter 4 Gods Omniscience may be demonstrated from his universal Causalitie in giving Being unto althings So Act. 15.18 Act. 15.18 Known unto God are al his workes from the beginning of the world 5 Gods Omniscience may be argued from his preservation of and providence over althings Plato Leg. 10. pag. 901 c. proves That Gods Providence extendes to the vilest and least of things whereof he has an accurate knowlege being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most wise Opificer and Framer of althings For every intelligent Worke-man must have a ful knowlege of his own worke in as much as the idea or knowlege of the Worke-man gives forme to the worke whence God being the most intelligent Framer and Disposer of althings he cannot but have an accurate knowlege of al. But to descend to the particular objects of Gods Science The Object of Gods Omniscience we may distribute althings intelligible into complexe or incomplexe Complexe Intelligibles are propositions and discourses Incomplexe 1. Complexe Intelligibles real things 1. The Divine Science has a ful comprehension of al complexe Intelligibles or propositions and discourses both divine and human mental oral and scriptural Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Wil of God or subsequent 1 Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Wil of God are such as belong to the Divine Essence as that there is a God That God is eternal immutable c. These God knows by his Essence alone and not by his Wil because antecedent thereto Complexe Intelligibles subsequent to the Divine Wil are al such whose truth is caused by and so dependes on the Divine Wil. These God knows not by his Essence simply considered nor by the things themselves concerning which they are affirmed or denied but by his own Wil. For as Gods Wil gives Being to althings so al propositions that belong to them depend on and are known by the same Divine Wil. In which regard that commun Saying The Reasons of good and evil are eternal if understood as antecedent to the Divine Wil it is most false For there is no natural or moral Veritie belonging to any created object or terme that can be said to be antecedent to the Divine Wil. That al complexe Intelligibles or Propositions subsequent to the Divine Wil are known thereby see Bradwardine de Caus l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. pag. 135. 2. 2. Incomplexe Intelligibles Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things possible or future 1 Things merely possible to God are known in his Divine Essence 2 Things future in his Wil which gives futurition to althings Things future as to us are distinguished into necessary and contingent but things contingent as to us are necessary in regard of the Divine Wil and therefore necessarily known by God That things most contingent are necessary in regard of Gods Wil and so certainly known by him is most evident because they are al present to God For what makes a thing contingent uncertain as to us but because it is future When it is present it is certainly known what it is wherefore althings being present to God by reason of his Divine Wil which gives suturition to althings therefore they must be al even things most contingent as to us certainly known by him Even among men those that understand the causes of things and their certain coherence with the effects may have a certain knowlege of an effect long before it is in being so an Astrologer foresees an Eclipse and shal not the omniscient God who gives Being to al Causes and actuates them in al their causalities and causal influxes be allowed a perfect knowlege of al effects Thus Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Who knows things present to come and past There is nothing so vile so inconsiderable but it fals under the omniscient eye of God Prov. 15.3 as Prov. 15.3 The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good God knows whatever is good by his Divine Wil the productive Cause thereof and whatever is evil by its opposite good as also by the positive Entitie or Act wherein the evil is seated which also fals under the determination of the Divine Wil so far as it is a real positive Being For he that perfectly knows a thing must needs know al the accidents modes and appendents thereof now al Evil being but a privation of what is good it cannot be hid from the divine Omniscience otherwise he should not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation Again Evil being but a privation cannot exist but in some positive subject neither can it be known but by the forme whereof it is a privation which being known to God thence the evil also must necessarily be known to him The principal object among incomplexe simple Intelligibles is the heart of man if this be known by God Gods Omniscience as to the human Soul then surely nothing can be hid Now that the human Soul and al its Principes Habits Cogitations Inclinations Ends Designes and Acts are al known to God is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for sacred Philosophie it is in nothing more positive and expresse To begin with that great series of Demonstrations Psal 139.1 c. O Lord thou hast searched me and known me Psal 139.1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast searched me narrowly sifted me to the bran thou so knowest me and al that is in me as he who knoweth a thing exactly after the most diligent and accurate inquisition So much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importes v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and uprising v. 2. thou understandest my thoughts afar off The sense is there is no part of my life hid from thee whether I sit or rise thou knowest it al mine actions and enterprises are known by thee as 2 Kings 19.27 al my thoughts are present to thee long before they are existent Lyra interprets afar off of Eternitie my thoughts were in thy Eternitie apprehended by thee before they were mine Thence it follows v. 3. Thou compassest my path v. 3. and my lying down and
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that we may determine that those things we see were not made of things apparent or were made of those things that appear not i. e. al the visible things of time were made according to the invisible Ideas of Eternitie there is nothing extant in this inferior sensible world but what had its Idea in the superior intelligible world of Divine Ideas Thus Plato in his Timaus pag. 28. treating of the Origine of the Universe saith God in the framing thereof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had an eye on the eternal Exemplar or Idea which as a seal impressed its similitude on althings made Whence that commun Saying among the Platonistes Plato Ideas vocar ex quibus omnia quaecunque videmus fiunt ad quas cuncta formantur Grosseteste This Vniverse is but the imitamen of the Divine Mind That by Plato's Ideas we are to understand the divine Decrees as the Exemplars of althings future Robert Grosseteste that great Impugnator of the Papal Tyrannie in his acute Tractate de Libero Arbitrio which is to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie Oxon. proves out of Augustin super Gen. Augustin saith Plato cals Ideas those by which althings we see are made and according to which althings are formed these are immortal immutable invariable Hear what an Idea is according to Plato An Idea is of those things that are necessary it is an eternal Exemplar such infinite Exemplars the natures of things of Men of Trees of Fishes c. have according to which whatever ought to be made is expressed These Exemplars of althings God hath in himself and thereby contains in his mind the numbers and modes of althings that are to be made or done He is sul of these figures or formes which Plato cals Ideas immortal invariable infatigable These Ideas in the Divine Mind Plato in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. discourseth more fully of and the sum of al his Philosophemes about them is this That these Ideas are most simple immaterial eternal infinite and immutable c. as we have more fully explicated and demonstrated Court Gent. P. 2. c. 9. § 4. Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect 5. § 3. l. 3. c. 2. sect 1. § 2. c. 4. sect 1. § 9. Thus we see how God contemplates and knows althings in the glasse of his own Divine Essence and Ideas How the divine Ideas represent the Creatures not as if the divine Ideas were to be considered as a formal concept but only as objective whence they are properly stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Exemplar which alwayes importes an objective concept according to which this or that is framed Thus also Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 19. pag. 225. Things understood by God move the Divine Intellect not properly but only metaphorically or objectively because the Ideas and similitudes thereof are in God i. e. his Divine Essence which most distinctly representes al Inteligibles And because God hath al these Ideas and similitudes from himself only and not from the things understood which are posterior he is not said to be moved by them to understand but very metaphorically and lesse properly Things future are according to their proper existence present unto God yet not simply but in some respect only namely in the Divine Wil and Prescience So Aquinas assures us That the Essence of God as understood by God is the Idea of things The Essence of God albeit it doth not formally contain things create by a formal convenience and similitude yet it doth contain them according to their formal representation The very Essence of God is the objective Exemplar of understanding himself as also of understanding the Creatures The Divine Essence representes althings according to their proper reasons which reasons of things in God are the very creatrix Essence which is the exemplary representation of al Essences as the sufficience of God is of al things possible and the Wil of althings future The divine Essence which representes althings as an Exemplar directes the operation of God in producing the Exemplates or things formed according thereunto For there is something in God that correspondes to al the perfections of Creatures not as if there were a formal similitude between the Idea and Ideate but there is something formally existing in God that representes al the perfections of Creatures Thus al the Creatures are in the Divine Mind representatively albeit they are not as to their own formal essences really the same therewith Some over and above this Representation make these divine Ideas to be also energetic and operative causes of things but this must be understood 1 either as they are conjunct with the divine Wil which is the prime Efficient of althings or 2 not of a proper efficience but only exemplary For an Idea in the mind of an Artificer albeit it worke not as a proper efficient cause yet it doth worke as an exemplary cause which is reduced to the efficient Thus the divine Ideas may be said to operate as they are the grand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exemplar according to which the divine Wisdome directes it self in the production conservation and disposition of althings These Ideas as was hinted are either of things merely possible and so they are represented by the divine Sufficience or Essence nakedly considered and belong to the simple Intelligence of God or else they are of things future and so they are represented by the divine Wil which is the Efficient of althings future For look as an Artificer has an Idea of his worke so God contemplates in his own Wil the original Exemplar of althings future as Plato Timeus pag. 28. One and the same knowlege of God receives diverse denominations according to the various state of the things known For if the things known be only possible then God contemplates them in his divine Essence but if they are future present or past then he contemplates them in the determination and decree of his Wil. Hence God by means of these his divine Ideas the original universal and perfect Exemplars of althings has the most perfect comprehension of althings whether possible or future past or present complexe or simple necessary or contingent absolute or conditionate The mode of Gods Science in the general being thus explicated Particular Characters of Gods Science we hence may draw several particular essential and proper characters thereof 1. Most simple As 1. hence it follows That the Divine Science is but one simple Act without the least shadow of composition or division Gods Science having one and the same Idea with his Essence it thence necessarily follows that in God the Intellect intelligible Species Object understood and Act of Intellection be one and the same The divine Essence is a spiritual light most intelligible and most intelligent of it self and althings else in the most simple manner Hence Plato makes his divine
of our Understanding is mutable because dependent on externe objects and Mediums but the Truth of the Divine Understanding immutable and therefore the measure of al Truth as Aquinas wel notes This is incomparably wel illustrated by Bradwardine l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God saith he by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes althings and al particles of time as they are most truely in himself for he needs not comparation or relation of things past or future to the present instant according to the manner of our human infirmitie but he understandes althings together and most clearly by his own Essence and Wil which represences althings uniformely and invariably As if there should be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens which should see by extramission and actively as God seeth it would then always see uniformely without al mutation every part of the Heavens turning round and the same part now in the East and anon in the South and then in the West Thus God in like manner sees al variable objects and parts of time with their distinct vicissitudes and successions without the least variation or succession because he sees althings not passively by species and impressions received from the things themselves but actively in his own Essence and Wil the active Principe of al. We poor mortals by reason of our infirmitie cannot distinctly apprehend al the particles of time always fluent and succeding each other and therefore we take the present instant which of al time is most actual and best known to us and make it the measure of past present and future time whence our knowlege also is successive and mutable but God who knows althings in his own Eternitie is not liable to such succession and mutation his Science being a pure necessary Act must needs be immutable and invariable albeit it terminates on objects in themselves most mutable and variable the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science because the mutable object is only the secundary object of Gods knowlege the primary object is the divine Essence which is immutable and therefore the divine Science such also Should Gods knowlege depend on the objects known then it would be mutable as they are but not otherwise God necessarily knows every Entitie both actual and potential wherefore 1 he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of 2 He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows 3 He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows 4 He cannot begin to know what he before knew not or not to know what before he knew because nothing begins to be future This immutabilitie of the divine Science as to things future arising from the determination of his own soverain Wil and not from any thing in the object is nervosely demonstrated by pious and learned Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio which lies buried in Exeter College Librarie Oxon. Wherein he copiosely demonstrates That the Causes Origines and Reasons of althings future though in themselves never so instable are most stable immutable necessary yea eternal in the divine Decree and Wil whence also the Divine Science is most certain necessary and immutable This he confirmes by Plato's Ideas which are immutable and invariable exemplars of althings future as before That the Divine Science is immutable and necessary so Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 39. pag. 130 140. Hence 4. The Divine Science is most certain and infallible 4. Divine Science most certain Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive and be deceived or to be ignorant of supreme Beings much lesse God The Science of God being necessary ad immutable it cannot but be most certain and infallible To know things certainly is to know them in their causes now Gods Wil being the Cause of althings he thence knows them perfectly Gods Science is as certain as the future events for where there is a determinate effect there must be a determinate cause and where the cause is determinate there the science also may be determinate The knowlege of things future in God is as certain as the knowlege of things present for every future compared to God the first Cause and his Science is necessary and necessarily future albeit as compared to the second causes some effects may be contingent or contingently future The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect namely the divine Essence it cannot but be most certain and infallible if there be any certaintie and infallibilitie in human Science how much more in divine Science which penetrates al Essences and Truths with the most perfect light and most simple intuition contemplating every Being and Truth as it is in it self in the glasse of the divine Essence The divine Intellect sees althings as existent in themselves by the infinite light of the divine Essence and therefore most certainly and infallibly as Esa 40.13 14. Hence 5. The Dâ—â—â—â—e Science is absolute and independent not conditionate and dependent on any create Object Thus Plato 5. Gods Science absolute and in dependent in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. makes his divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-subsistent and independent as to al externe objects and condition For otherwise saith he God should not have a certain knowlege of and soverain dominion over human affaires It 's impossible that any effect should be or be understood as future in any case but dependently on its efficient cause Now what is the first and universal Essicient of al effects but the Decree of the divine Wil on which every effect dependes more than on its proxime cause Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Wil so no Hypothesis or condition is cognoscible or knowable antecedently thereto Gods knowlege as it dependes not on the existence of created objects so neither on any Hypotheses or conditions that are appendent unto such objects placed in such circumstances For al futures whether absolute or conditionate are known by God not from the determination of second causes but from the determinatin of the divine Wil which is the first Cause For whence springs the futurition of things but from the determination of the divine Wil And must not then the determination of the divine Wil be precedent to the determination of the second CAuse And if so may we not then hence conclude that Gods Science arising from the determination of his own Wil dependes not on the existence of or any conditions that belong to future objects If the divine Essence be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent must not the divine Science which is identified therewith be also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent Or if the divine Science should depend on the mutable conditions of its object can it be any other than conjectural Where any science dependes on its
every facultie is by so much the more extensive by how the more immaterial it is hence the human Intellect by its act of understanding is said to become althings how much more true is this of the Divine Intellect which is in the highest degree spiritual The Divine Science albeit it be one most simple Act in it self yet it is most universal and infinite as to its object Thus Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 78. proves that Gods knowlege extendes to an infinitie of things because God perfectly knows his own Virtue and Power which is infinite Again by how much the more efficacious and clear any Intellect is in knowing by so much the more able it is from one to gather many things But now the Divine Intellect being infinitely efficacious it must therefore necessarily extend to an infinitude of objects So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 1. pag. 7. proves That the Scientivitie of God and his Intellect is never satisfied with any finite or infinite number of existent singulars of any one species or al but infinitely excedes each of them yea a whole multitude of al if they could be congregated together That the Science of God is most perfect essentially intensively and extensively see Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. Sect. 15. pag. 121. Having largely discussed the essential Modes or Characters of the Divine Science we now procede to its distinctions Gods simple Ditelligence with relation to its objects For albeit the Divine Science be in it self one simple Act identified with the Divine Essence yet this hinders not but that we may by some inadequate conception of reason distinguish this Science by reason of its object into different kinds The commun distribution of Gods Science is into simple Intellience and Science of Vision 1. Gods Science of simple Intelligence is of althings possible which he contemplates in the Alsufficience of his Essence For God being in the highest degree Intelligent he must necessarily understand althings that are intelligible but now whatever may be may also be known where-ever there is a possibilitie of existence there is some intelligibilitie Again God perfectly knows his own Essence and Power therefore he perfectly knows not only what is future but also whatever is possible Not that the existence of things possible is known by God but only their Essence which he contemplates in his own EssEnce Hence this Science of simple Intelligence is called by some Abstractive because it abstractes from the actual existence of its object 2. Gods Science of Vision Gods Science of Vision as to things future is that whereby he knows things as future in and upon the Decree of his Wil. Here we must premit that when we say Gods Science of Vision terminates on things as future the conjunctive Particle As must be taken not formally as if it denoted any reason of the Divine Cognition taken from the futurition of the thing but only materially and so it denotes only thus much that Gods knows things future to be future and that by the determination of his own Wil. Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 18. pag. 220 c. largely demonstrates these Propositions 1 That God doth not know things future merely by his Essence without the determination of his Wil because nothing is in its own nature future but by the Decree of the Divine Wil. 2 That God doth not know things future by the Divine Intellect only because the Divine Intellect considered in it self is not practic but only as subsequent to the Divine Wil. 3 That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie of the Divine Science because the Infinitie of the Divine Science being supposed it doth not thence necessarily follow that this or that thing be future 4 That God doth not know things future by the knowlege of their second Causes For such a knowlege implies discourse from the cause to the effect again such a knowlege would be contingent when the second causes are such 5 That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie or Immensitie of his own Scibilitie or Scientivitie 6 That god doth not know things future by the sole permission of his own Wil because then Gods knowlege should not be certain Hence he positively concludes God knows things future by his Wil. 7 That God knows things future by that which gives them their futurition namely by his Divine Wil. For as Aristotle 1. Post 2. instructes us To know a thing is to know it by its cause and is not the Wil of God the first Cause that gives futurition to althings Again how can God certainly know future contingents such as al human acts are but in and by some necessary certain cause And what certain necessary cause can there be of future contingents but the Divine Wil We may not then search for the causes of Divine Prescience in things future but in the cause of their futurition the determination of the Divine Wil. Not as if the decree or determination of the Divine Wil whereby things become future did in any moment of Nature precede the Divine Prescience but in one and the same moment of Nature God decrees what shal be future and foresees it future Thence he takes the reason of his knowing things future not simply from his Essence or sufficience nor yet from their presentialitie to God as the Dominicans persuade us but from the determination of his own Wil. Certainly Gods Wil is most efficacious omnipotent immutable and most known to himself and therefore it is necessary that whatever he wils should be future be so and known to him to be so for he wils not only the things themselves but also al their modes and conditions of contingence necessitie libertie c. Whatever gives any thing its futurition must necessarily also give it its cognoscibilitie or intelligibilitie as future wherefore the Divine Wil giving the former it cannot also but give the later Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 12. tels us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God may be deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for nothing can be hid from God yea he is the Inspector of althings And then he gives us the mode how God comes to know althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he beholdeth althings before they are produced eternally understanding every thing according to his voluntary eternal Intelligence i. e. his eternal Intelligence grounded on his own Wil. Thus Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 19. pag. 226. But here we must know that a thing as future in the Divine Wil and Predestination causally and not extrinsecally in its own proper nature is the cause or object of the Divine Science or Prescience For God no way needs extrinsec things as objects of his knowlege but he hath althings future with himself intrinsecally cognitivè causativè intuitivè seu scientificè cognitively causatively intuitively or scientificly from himself only and so he knows althings c. So
condition that men by their corrupt Wil embrace him 3 It overthrows efficacious Grace in the vocation and conversion of sinners in that it resolves al into a moral capacitie or power in corrupt Nature to convert it self 4 It subvertes the Covenant of Grace in resolving the whole of it into a Covenant of Workes 5 It destroyes the Grace of Perseverance in that it makes the perseverance of the Saints dependent on their own mutable Free-wil § 3. As for the Wil of God The Wil of God although it be not really different from his Vnderstanding and Essence yet we may in regard of its effects conceive of it as in some manner distinct The Wil of God is taken either properly for the Divine Volition Intention or Decree whereby althings receive their Futurition and Existence or else improperly for the legislative declarative significative Wil of God which is the measure of our dutie The former is that which we are first to discourse of whereof we find lively notices in Sacred Philosophie and something also in Plato Phileb p. 16. where being about to Philosophise of the Divine Wil as the original Exemplar or Idea of althings future he makes this Preface 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For althings that ever were invented being joined together by a certain affinitie and cognation with Art by means hereof are declared His meaning seems to be this that look as althings made by Art have their Idea in the mind of the Artificer according to which they are framed so althings of Nature have their Idea in the Divine Mind and Wil according to which they are accurately formed Thence he addes And truly the Ancients who were better than we and lived nearer to God delivered to us this report or Tradition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That althings consist of ONE and MANY which are said ever to be 1 That by these Ancients whence this Oriental Tradition came we must understand primarily the Hebrews has been sufficiently demonstrated P. 2. B. 3. C. 2. and elsewhere 2 That by this ancient tradition of One and Many we must understand the Divine Essence and Ideas or Decrees of the Divine Wil seems also manifest Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That we ought things being thus constituted alwaies to inquire after one Idea of every thing in particular and accurately to observe the same c. That by this ONE IDEA which we are to inquire after must necessarily be understood the Decree of the Divine Wil I think wil be evident to any that seriously considers Plato's Philosophemes of the Divine Ideas delivered in his Timaus and Parmenides of which before P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. § 4. And indeed he seems positively to assert Parmenid p. 134. That the Origine of these Ideas cannot be in the object but must be in the Divine Essence and Wil. We shall reduce the whole of our Philosophemes about the Divine Wil to the following Propositions 1. Prop. God primarily Wils himself and althings else in subordination to himself The Object of the Divine Wil. 1. That the Divine Essence is the primary object of the Divine Wil. is most evident 1. because the principal thing willed is to every one the cause of willing if therefore God should have any other principal object of his Wil besides himself he should have something besides himself as the cause of his willing which is impossible for nothing can move the Divine Wil but his own Bonitie 2 The Divine Essence is most amabile and appetible for it self therefore the primary object of the Divine Wil. 3 The primary object of the Wil ought to be equally proportionable thereto for the virtue and efficace of a facultie is measured by its commensuration and Adequation to its primary object and what is equally proportionable to the Divine Wil but the Divine Essence Hence 2 God by willing himself wils althings else in subordination to himself For he that wils an end wils althings else in order thereto God wils althings in order to his own Bonitie The Wil of God terminates on other things so far as they relate to the Divine Bonitie and participate thereof God wils himself Necessarily but althings else so far as they relate to himself Hence 1 God wils al singular Goods so far as they partake of goodness For God willing himself as his last end wils althings so far as they conduce to himself but every thing so far as it is good participates of and tends to the Divine goodness therefore as such it is willed by God Hence 2. Prop. The Wil of God considered in it self is but one simple indivisible pure Act. The Divine Wil one pure Act. Thus Plato Phileb 16. saith we ought always to inquire after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one idea of althings Whereby he notes that the Divine Wil as the origine of all things is but one The multitude of objects willed is no way repuguant with the Unitie and Simplicitie of the Divine Wil for God by one simple act wils himself and althings else Althings are one in the Divine Wil and Bonitie in as much as the Divine Bonitie is the exemplar of al Bonitie and the Divine Wil by one and the same act wils both the Divine Bonitie and al other Bonitie It is otherwise with the Humane Wil which by one act wils the end and by another the means conducing to the end whence the willing the end is the cause of willing the means but in the Divine Wil there is no such causalitie of end and means to be found in as much as by one and the same simple act it wils both end and means and al grant that the same thing cannot be the cause of it self Thence Suaxez Metaple Disput 30. § 16. p. 127 c. proves That Gods Wil is not a real power but the last pure Act for there is no receptive power in God althings that are in God are as actual as his effence and as pure from all Potentialitie Hence 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is most Soverain and Independent The Divine Wil Independent Thus the Platonistes generally assert that the Divine Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without cause and Independent and Plato makes his Divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-subsistent and Independent because althings else depend on them but they on nothing else This Independence and Self-subsistence of the Divine Wil is set forth in Sacred Philosophie under the notion of a Foundation 2 Tim. 2.19 2 Tim. 2.19 The foundation of the Lord standeth sure the Lord knoweth who are his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes the firm purpose of the Divine Wil As those that build great Palaces lay a firm foundation which dependes not on any part of the Structure but the whole Structure dependes on it so God being to build a Celestial House layes the eternal purpose of his own Wil as a self-subsistent independent foundation on which the whole
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
here cannot signifie disposed or prepared as the Remonstrants and their Sectators would perswade us for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differs much from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither is it any where in Scripture or any Greek Author as I can learne used to signifie an interne Qualitie or Disposition but it generally signifies to Ordain primarily in military affaires and thence in any other maters So Act. 22.10 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be here taken nominally but must signifie Ordained is most evident from the sense For it 's said they were ordained to eternal life as the terme not unto faith only as the means wherefore if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should signifie disposed the sense must be they were disposed to eternal life as many as were disposed for what is faith but a disposition to eternal life It 's most evident therefore that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must signifie not nominally but participally such as were ordained unto eternal life as the terme and unto faith as the means by the absolute and antecedent wil of God That Gods Wil properly so termed is ever Antecedent and never Consequent may be demonstrated 1 From the Eternitie of Gods wil. According to Plato the Idea or Decree of the Divine Wil is ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eternal and sempiterne Now if the wil of God and its Ideas be al eternal then not any one of them can be consequent to any act of the Creature which is in time 2 From the Simplicitie Independence and Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God supposeth his Divine Wil to hang in suspense and dependent on the mutable ambulatorie wil of man and is it possible that the prime cause should depend on or be influenced by the inferior second cause What must the Supreme Soverain Wil attend yea subserve the nods and becks of human created wil The act of willing in God cannot depend on any act of the creature as something consequent thereto because then as oft as the act of the creature is changed the wil of God must be changed 3 From the perfection of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God as stated by the Jesuites and their Followers supposeth an Antecedent imperfect wil consisting only in a natural Velleitie or imperfect inclination which is unworthy of the most perfect wil. 4 From the Omnipotence of God If God wils a thing antecedently to the act of the creature which shal never be then the wil of God is not Omnipotent but in the power of the Creature either to fulfil or frustrate the same And Oh! how incongruous are such Sentiments to the Divine Omnipotent Wil If Gods Wil be in the power of the Creature and dependent thereon then it may be wholly frustrated as to al its counsels and decrees touching the rational world 5 This distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is contumelious to the Beatitude of God For every one is so far blessed as he has his wil fulfilled To have our wils crossed or frustrated is accounted by al no smal portion of miserie may we then imagine that the Divine Wil properly so termed is ever frustrated 6 This distinction of Gods wil into antecedent and consequent is also injurious to his Bountie and goodnesse Sacred Philosophie compareth God to a liberal Prince who deviseth liberal things Esa 32.8 and thereby establisheth his Throne Esa 32.8 But the liberal deviseth liberal things and by liberal things he shal stand It 's spoken of Christ as Mediator or the great King of Sion as appears vers 1. who deviseth al manner of liberal things and thereby stands or is established on his Throne as the word denotes in the Hebrew Did not Christ keep open house and distribute al his gifts and good things liberally and freely his Throne would not be established he would have no Subjects to fil up his Kingdome But now the distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent cuts asunder al the nerves and ligaments of Christs Liberalitie in that it makes him to have an imperfect Antecedent wil towards al but a Consequent Wil towards none but those who can by their good merits purchase his favor This distinction of Gods Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is excellently wel refuted by Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 1. Distinct 46 47. where he concludes thus Al the good things that we have are given us by God out of his Bountie and Grace and this speakes that God wills them to us by an Antecedent Wil because no cause antecedes in us but al our good things flow from his Bonitie 7. The Divine Wil most perfect Prop. The Divine Wil is most perfect This Adjunct of the Divine Wil is but the result of the former and that which makes way to what follows The perfection of the Divine Wil may be considered intensively extensively or effectively 1. Intensively 1 The perfection of the Divine Wil considered intensively consistes in its not admitting any intension and remission or latitude of degrees but being alwaies intense in the highest degree For the Divine Wil having one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence it is one simple pure Act without the least gradual remission or intension Hence it is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the perfect Idea of good which admits no latitude of degrees no velleitie or incomplete wil. That Gods Wil is always perfect and complete without the least velleitie or conditionate volition may be demonstrated 1 from the Simplicitie and pure Actualitie of God For al composition and latitude of degrees is inconsistent with a pure Act. 2 From the Identitie of the Divine Wil with the Divine Essence which admits not the least latitude of degrees 3 From the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. For al Velleitie being but an imperfect wil denotes a progression to a more perfect and so mutation 4 From the Wisdome of God For al Velleitie implies ignorance and supposeth that God understandes not fully what the issues and events of the human wil may be 5 From the Omnipotence of God Al Velleitie notes impotence to accomplish what we wil. We may not therefore imagine that Gods Wil is capable of any Velleitie or conditionate incomplete volition either formally or eminently but that it is ever most perfect as to degrees because it is the same with the Divine Essence 2 The Divine Wil is most perfect extensively 2. Extensively as to Objects in that it extendes it self to al objects So in sacred Philosophie Act. 17.26 Acts 17.26 And hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation It is said that God hath determined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by his soverain perfect Wil given termes bounds measures and limits to althings the Divine Wil is infinite and unlimited it receives limits and termes from nothing but gives bounds and termes to althings Hence God is
said by Plato always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to play the Geometer i. e. to measure out to althings their just essences virtues perfections and limits for Geometrie according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians from whom Plato borrowed the notion signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil as it gives measures and termes to althings 3 The divine Wil is most perfect effectively 3. Effectively as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie where we hope fully to demonstrate That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of al effects The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively as compared with the human wil. 1 If we consider the divine Wil absolutely so its perfection may be demonstrated from its Simplicitie pure Actualitie Eternitie Immutabilitie Omnipotence c. as before 2 If we consider the divine Wil relatively or comparatively as compared with a create human or Angelic wil so its perfection appears 1 in this that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things whereas every create wil presupposeth goodnesse in things that it wils every create wil dependes on because it 's moved by the goodnesse of its object but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil but what is in it self whereas every create wil has a formal reason cause and motive without it self whereby it is moved and influenced 2 In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means but in the divine Wil both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. 3 In mans wil Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act but in God by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature Nolition and Volition are the same We may not imagine that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act but whatever he wils not that it be that he wils that it be not also whatever he wils not that it be not that he wils that it be 4 Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice he may not wil but what is just but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice he doth not wil things because just but they are therefore just because he wils them Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat illud etiam vult ut non fiat item quicquid non vult ut non fiat id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat 5 Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie he wils what he doth but he cannot do al that he wils termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie But God doth not only wil what he doth but also do what he wils his power is as extensive as his wil he can do what he wil his Wil is omnipotent because the same with his Essence as Psal 115.3 8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free The Divine Wil most free Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free if the divine Wil were not free because this is the first Principe of al Libertie as take away the first Cause you also destroy al second Causes so take away libertie from the divine Wil you take it away also from al create wils Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute precedent and regulant libertie in the human wil is conditionate subsequent and regulated The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind now the divine Libertie is the first in that kind and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting but now God is the most perfect Cause therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting which is to act freely Yea the divine Wil is so infinitely free as that it is moved by nothing without it self it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Bonitie whereby it is moved which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge For every create wil as it has a first Cause whereby it is moved physically so a last end whereby it is moved morally but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both these regards and therefore most supreme and perfect The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra or to those ad extra 1 The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant not antecedent for al the operations of God ad intra i. e. such as terminate on himself namely loving himself c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature not from election and choice God cannot but love himself he necessarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself without the least indifference either of Specification or Exercice And yet even in these Acts ad intra which terminate on the divine Essence and are attended with a natural necessitie the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie This is wel expressed by Jamblichus a Sectator of Plato de Myster Aegypt It is saith he necessary that God be as he is not by an extrinsec violent necessitie but by a natural and most voluntary seing he never would be other than he is Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie 2 If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra such as terminate on the Creature so it is not only concomitant but also antecedent i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature not from any necessitie of Nature but by election and choice For al Creatures as referred to the Divine Bonitie are but means wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them This some cal Libertie of Election because al election properly regards the means Again God in willing his own Bonitie necessarily wils althings so far as they participate of his own Bonitie Now the divine Bonitie being infinite there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Lastly if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of
Nature and not from free election there could nothing be contingent as Suarez and others prove But here occurs a knotty objection What indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God which is thus urged How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent libertie of election when as they are the same with the Divine Essence and so attended with the same natural necessitie This objection has greatly perplexed the acutest Wits among Scholastic Theologues Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. answers thus That between the state of possibilitie and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a prioritie of origination not of time but of nature But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he explicates in what sense it may be said that God could before nil what he now wils It is manifest saith he that God could not either in regard of Time or Eternitie before nil privatively or positively what he now wils but only by a prioritie of Nature or Cause namely by a prioritie of the volutive power in relation to its act By the volutive power we must understand Gods Wil as the effective Principe not that it is really a power in God So Gregor Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 45. pag. 161. answers sundry objections relating to this Hypothesis and at last concludes That the Wil of God as the first Cause of things may be said to be both necessary and contingent necessary as the same with the divine Essence and yet contingent as it might not have willed the futurition and existence of things Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. Disp 7. pag. 114. saith That we may conceive signum rationis a moment of reason before the Decree of the divine Wil determing what should be future And Disput 116. pag. 913. he distinguisheth indifference into privative and negative Negative Indifference he makes to be that which in it self is not more determined to this object than to that or to act than not to act and in this regard addes he the divine Wil was before it determined to create the world in that signo rationis moment of reason indifferent to create or not create the world c. which negative indifference importes no privation of perfection in God Al these solutions are much of the same import and may be resolved into this That the divine Decrees may be considered as they are in themselves and with respect to the divine Essence and so they are necessary or as they terminate on the Creatures and are the cause both of their futurition and existence and so we may ascribe to them a moment of reason nature or causalitie in which they might not have been And this we stile Antecedent Libertie or Libertie of Election which importes no mutabilitie in the divine Wil but only a prioritie of Causalitie which very wel accordes with the necessitie of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Libertie of the divine Wil Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grantes That a necessitie of Immutabilitie agrees to the Divine Wil and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Libertie 9. Prop. Gods Wil is most efficacious and irresistible Gods Wil irresistible This Adjunct of the divine Wil is expressely laid down in sacred Philosophie So Esa 46.10 My counsel shal stand Esa 46.10 and I wil do al my pleasure The like we find in Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The counsel of Jupiter was fulfilled Thus also Rom. 9.19 Who hath resisted his Wil By which the Apostle excludes al manner of resistence not only actual but also possible That the divine Wil is most efficacious and irresistible may be demonstrated 1 from Gods prime universal Causalitie God according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most soverain Cause and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of al second Causes which are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ministerial instrumental Causes of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who gives essence to althings Now the first universal Cause of althings cannot be resisted by any second particular cause For herein lies the difference between the first universal cause and second causes these may fail of their effect by reason of some other cause impeding but the first universal cause can never fail of his effect because he contains under his Jurisdiction and Soverain Power al other causes he that gives Being and Power to althings can be resisted by nothing Now how is God the first universal cause of althings Is it not by his Divine Wil We may not conceive any other causal executive Power in God but his Divine Wil he effectes and operates immediately by his wil without any distinct executive power as we shal prove anon 2 From the Omnipotence of the Divine wil. The Psalmist informes us Psal 115.3 Psal 115.3 and 135.5 6. That God doth whatsoever he pleaseth So Psal 135.5 6. Gods Soverain wil backt with Omnipotence is invincible The Psalmist shews the transcendent universalitie and efficace of the Divine wil above the human men wil what they can do but God can do what he wil because his wil is omnipotent If Gods wil were not Omnipotent he could not do whatever is possible for he workes althings by his wil neither is he on any other account stiled in the Creed Omnipotent or Almighty but because he can do what he wil. The Divine Omnipotent wil alwaies obtains its effect because its volition is its operation it s fiat is its factum esse its word its deed Thence that of Augustin Gods wil is most certain because most potent Of which see more fully Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 46 47. and Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. I wil not saith he have him for my God who is not Omnipotent in Acting who has not a most Omnipotent Dominion over my infirme wil who cannot in the most Omnipotent manner make me to wil and do what he wils who hath not a wil universally efficacious infrustrable indefectible and necessary in causing yea whose wil is not to me necessitie 3 From the Beatitude of God Aristotle as reason assures us that al men do what they wil if they can because herein their Beatitude seems to consist So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And if he could and would he hath also done it for al when they can and wil act for there is no impediment Beatitude is the supreme end of al rational Appetition therefore what men desire they do if they can as Aristotle subnectes Hence the Divine wil if it could not do what it would it should not be blessed because Beatitude is the ultimate terme of al volition So Bradwardine l. 2. c. 27. Yea I constantly and freely avouch I wil not have him for my God whose most blessed wil poor miserable sinful I can when I please pul down from the Throne of his Dignitie and subjugate c. 4 From the Infinitude of
God An Infinite Agent can neither be hindred from doing what he would nor forced to do what he would not a Passive Subject cannot resist an Active Principe or Agent unless it has at least equal power How then is it possible that a poor infirme impotent Creature should resist the Divine Wil Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing being not to be hindred or frustrated any manner of way For who knows not that it altogether follows if God can do any thing and wil do it he doth it c. But of this more when we come to the Causalitie of God C 7. § 4. Having explicated the Adjuncts of the Divine Wil Gods Wil 1. Decernent or preceptive we now descend to treat briefly of its Distinctions and to omit that spurious Jesuitic distribution of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent which is most injurious and repugnant to the perfection of the Divine Wil as has been demonstrated we may distribute the Wil of God in regard of its object and our apprehensions 1. into Decernent or Decretive and Legislative or Preceptive Gods Decernent or Decretive Wil is usually termed in the Scholes his Voluntas Beneplaciti and his Legislative Preceptive Wil Voluntas Signi This distribution has its foundation in Sacred Philosophie for God is oft said in Scripture to wil things that are never offected as the salvation of Reprobates or the like which cannot be understood of his decernent decretive Wil but may very wel of his preceptive Wil. But to clear up this distinction we are to consider 1 That Gods decernent or decretive Wil is univocally and properly said to be his Wil but his voluntas signi or preceptive Wil is only equivocally or analogically and figuratively such Gods decretive Wil is the Divine essence decreeing althings and so properly and univocally stiled his Wil but his preceptive Wil is only analogically or figuratively termed his Wil 1 Metaphorically as Princes signifie their interne wil by their externe commands which are thence termed their Wil. 2 Metonymically as Gods Precepts are effects or adjuncts which partly revele his interne wil and pleasure Yet they are not in a strict proper univocal sense the wil of God as Sanderson De Obligat Conscient p. 132. Davenant against Hoard p. 392. and Ruiz prove Hence 2 Gods Decretive and Preceptive Wil are disparate or diverse but not opposite The things decreed by God and the things commanded by him may oppose each other but the wil decreeing and the wil commanding do not oppose each other because they are not ad idem the Decretive Wil of God is as it were his Law or the measure of his operation and permission but the preceptive Wil of God is our Law or the Rule of our operation and offices The Decree of God determines what he wil do or not do the Precept what we ought to do or not to do Gods Decernent Wil or good pleasure is the sole Rule and Reason of al his actings towards the Creature but his Reveled Wil is the sole Rule Reason and Measure of al the Creatures actings towards him 3 The Decretive Wil of God is ever Absolute efficacious and particular but the preceptive wil of God is sometimes absolute sometimes conditionate sometimes universal sometimes particular sometimes efficacious and sometimes not 4 Gods decretive wil is interne and immanent called in Scripture his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good pleasure which is the measure of his own Affects and Effects But Gods preceptive wil is externe and therefore not the measure of Gods Affects or Effects but only of our Dutie 2. Gods secret and reveled Wil. Deut. 29.29 Hence follows another distinction of the Divine Wil into Secret and Reveled which is much the same with the precedent mentioned Deut. 29.29 The secret things belong unto the Lord our God but things which are reveled unto us i. e. Gods secret Wil is the measure of his operation but his reveled wil of ours So Prov. 25.2 It 's the Glorie of God to concele a thing Gods wil is stiled secret 1 as the things he wils are unknown to us 2 as the causes and reasons of his Wil cannot be penetrated by us 3 as it is as it were the Law Rule or measure of his Divine operations Gods reveled wil is so termed because it is his pleasure reveled either in his Word or Workes every act of Gods Providence shews somewhat of his Wil as wel as his Word 1 Gods Wil reveled in his Word is either promissive or preceptive Reveled promisses are the measure of Gods Benefices towards us Reveled precepts are the measure of our Offices or Duties towards God 2 Gods reveled providential Wil is either directive or afflictive There is a conformitie which the rational Creature owes to each of these reveled wils of God To the wil of God reveled in his word there is an active conformitie or obedience due to the promissive reveled wil there is an obedience of faith due to the preceptive an obedience of love and subjection To the providential wil of God both directive and afflictive there is a passive obedience of Submission Resignation and Dependence due Lastly this reveled wil of God is never opposite to albeit it be oft diverse from his secret wil and the reason is because they are not about the same object Gods secret wil regards the events of things his reveled wil the duty of man either active or passive 3. Aquinas and others distinguish Gods Wil into Complacential Gods Wil Complacential Providential and Beneplacite Providential and Beneplacite 1 Gods Complacential Wil is his simple complacence in al the good Actions Habits and Events of men yea it extendes not only to moral but to natural goods as Gen. 1.31 There is a perpetual necessary volition in God which taketh pleasure in al good whether create or increate Such is the infinite Bonitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature as that it cannot but take infinite complacence in al good This they cal Gods Love of simple complacence of which see Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 6. § 2. p. 38. and Disp 19. p. 214. 2 Gods Providential Wil is that whereby he is said to wil and intend an end when he in his providence either graciose or commun affords such means which have an aptitude to produce it As where God sends his Gospel he may be said really to intend the salvation of those to whom it is sent albeit they are not al saved because he vouchsafeth them those means which have a real aptitude to produce the same were they but really embraced and improved In this regard Davenant and others affirme that Christs death is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an universal remedie applicable to al and that God by his Voluntas Providentiae as Aquinas stiles it intended it as such This intention or wil of God
in Divine Actions but what he wils yea because he wils it Thus Carthusianus in 4. Dist 46. Quaest 1. The whole order of Justice is originally reduced to the Divine Wil whatever God wils is just neither is his Wil properly restrained by Justice So Scotus l. 4. Dist 46. Quaest 1. That is always just which is actually willed by the Divine Wil and because it is actually willed by the Divine Wil. The Rule of Justice whereby men are to act ties them up to one part of the contradiction so that they are unjust if they act not so but there is no such Rule of Justice to be affixed to God farther than the free constitution of his own Wil has tied him up Gods Wil reveled is a Rule of Justice to us his Creatures but his absolute soverain Wil is that alone that regulates him in al his actions Therefore learned Davenant saith That God cannot wil any thing but salvâ justitiâ i. e. he can do nothing contra justitiam yet he may wil and do many things praeter justitiam i. e. he may freely decree and do many things where salvâ justitiâ he might as freely have decreed and done the contrary So Lombard l. 1. Dist 43. God could have omitted what he doth and have done what he omits without injustice Hence 2. Prop. Gods ordinate Justice towards the Creature has one and the same Idea with his Veracitie or Fidelitie Gods ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie Psal 119.123 Thence in sacred Philosophie the Righteousnesse of God is oft put for his Veracitie and Fidelitie in making good his word So Psal 119.123 For the word of thy righteousnesse i. e. the word of thy promisse which thy righteousnesse or fidelitie is obliged to make good So Psal 31.1 89.14 There is indeed in God no Justice properly so termed in which respect he may be said to be obliged to his Creature but that which we stile the Justice of God towards his Creature is no other than his Fidelitie which presupposeth some constitution of the Divine Wil wherefore abstracting such a constitution God cannot be said to do any thing repugnant to his Justice For what is Justice according to its general Idea but to give every one his own And what has the Creature that it may claim as its own but what it receives from the Divine Wil Again Justice is a Conformitie or Equalitie according to the obligation or debt which every one fals under Justitia Dei est agere secundum condecentiam Bonitatis aut Veracitatis suae Albert p. 1. tract 19. q. 77. and what obligation or debt can there befal God with relation to his Creature but what his own goodnesse and wil laies upon him How can God be obliged to any but by his own wil and word What then is his Justice but to act according to the condecence or congruitie of his own Veracitie or Bonitie as the Schole-men determine Hence in things where there is no expresse declaration of the Divine Wil Covenant or Promisse on God part if he should pretermit that which he doth or do that which he pretermits if he should deal more severely or more mercifully with any than he doth there could be no injustice fastened on him Hence 3. Prop. There can be no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No acception of persons with God or Acception of persons charged on God This is expressely laid down Rom. 2.11 of which before And the reasons are most evident 1 Because Acception of persons has place only in him who is under an obligation to distribute justice not according to his pleasure but according to certain Qualities Reasons or Conditions inherent in or appendent to the persons to whom the said justice is to be distributed But now God is under no obligation but what flows from his own soverain pleasure to distribute rewards or punishments to any 2 Acception of persons cannot have place in the distribution of good things merely gratuitous and free but only in such as are of debt But now Gods distributions of good things are merely gratuitous Thus Aquinas Acception of persons is only of a thing due and therefore it cannot be ascribed to God None can owe any thing to another but by this that he doth in some manner depend on or hath received something from another but God dependes on no one neither doth he receive any thing from any other Acception of persons has place only where in the dispensation of things due any favors one more than another with respect to some circumstance of the person contrary or beside the merits of the cause Therefore albeit God give out of his mere liberalitie inequally to persons equal yet this is not Acception of persons because there is nothing due Hence 4. Prop. There is an infinite distance between the Justice of God The difference between the Justice of God and Men. and of men 1 Al human Justice ariseth from an obligation and debt but Gods Justice from the mere free constitution of his Wil Man wils things because they are just but things are therefore just with God because he wils them 2 Many things that are injust with men are just with God The rule of Justice which tieth men to do justly doth also render them injust when they do otherwise But now God where he hath not brought himself under an obligation by his own free constitution and promisse hath a libertie of acting or not acting of doing this or the contrary in the distribution of rewards and gifts If he should not do what he doth or if he should do what he doth not his Justice were the same If God spoil the Egyptians to enrich his people or if he enrich the Assyrians by the spoils of his people he is just stil Where God hath not obliged himself by his own Word he has a libertie of doing one thing or the contrary without injustice Yet 5. Prop. So far as God hath obliged himself by the constitution of his own Wil and Word Gods Justice regards the Qualities of its object his ordinate Justice ever regardes the Constitution and Qualities of the object Gods ordinate Justice being the same with his Veracitie and Fidelitie it alwaies respects such Qualities and Conditions as its object by reason of his own constitution is invested with For God in the executions of his ordinate Justice assumes the qualitie of a Judge and a Judge cannot duely abstain from the administration of Justice neither is Justice duely administred unlesse the Qualities of the objects and merits of the cause be fully inspected and considered Gods ordinate Justice as Rector and Judge of the Al is chiefly exercised in the reduction of althings to that equalitie and order which his Divine Wisdome and Wil has prescribed unto them Hence these two things necessarily follow this Divine ordinate Justice 1 It never exerts it self but where those Qualities and Conditions which it has prescribed its object be
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal supreme Cause but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving essence to althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
2 Al second Causes if compared with the first are but instruments of his principal concurse Thus not only Aquinas Bradwardine and the more sane Scholastics but also Averroes de Somno Vigilia where he affirmes That second causes are moved by the first as instruments by the Artificer But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Scholes Whether the Wil in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause According to the former distinctions I should answer 1 That according to the general notion of an Instrument the Wil may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument yet as it actes Grace it is an active instrument 2 That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Instrument a rational Instrument an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God In receiving the first Grace the Wil is only naturally remotely and passively vital as it is a piece of human Nature but in the actuating what Grace is received it is a spiritually vital instrument Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitalitie and Instrumentalitie for the acting of Grace Hence 3 the Wil may as to the acting of Grace so far as it is clothed with Divine habits be termed in some respect a principal Agent under God specially if compared with the effect produced It 's true if the Wil be compared with God even in the acting of Grace received it is but a mere instrument because both Habit and Act are received from God yet if we consider the Wil as invested and qualified with supernatural habits which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Bodie whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects in this regard we may stile it a principal cause though I must confesse the notion of an Instrument used by Aquinas and others seems more adequate and genuine to expresse its causalitie by in as much as al is from God by supernatural infusion § 3. Having inquired into the Concurse of God in regard of its object Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with Gods Wil. we now procede to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature The Scholastic Theologues in their debates about the concurse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Wil are greatly divided some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or motion of God whereby the Wil is determined to consent and act others in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a transient qualitie together with the operation of the Wil others in the very operation of the second cause or Wil as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination whereby the first cause makes the second to act others place this concurse as to gratiose effects in certain pious inspirations cogitations and indeliberate motions of love injected by God Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place if we consider the concurse of God with relation to its passive Attingence or as it terminates on the second cause and effect yet if we take it strictly according to its formal Idea I conceive no one of these opinions explicate the true nature thereof Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurse we must consider what relation it has to the Divine Wil whether it be really distinct therefrom or not And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. § 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil which being supposed as it has been demonstrated it naturally follows that Gods concurse as to is active Attingence and effective principe is nothing else but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God For Gods executive power being the same with his Effective Wil it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is the same also Hence Sacred Philosophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made and governed or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal 39.9 and 115.3 and 135.6 Mat. 8.2 3. 2 Chron. 20.6 and elsewhere as before C. 5. § 4. Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades that Athenian Gallant in this manner Doest thou know saith Socrates by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind Alcibiad Yes Socrat. How Alcibiad If thou wilt O Socrates i. e. by thy precepts and institutes Socrat. Thou mayst not say so Alcibiad How then Socrat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if God wil. Meaning that Gods wil was omnipoten and so could without more ado merely by his act of volition worke virtue in young Alcibiades But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis namely That the Divine Wil is of it self operative we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God as the first cause of althings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered Gods concurse not his essence absolutely considered For 1 If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered he should act althings by a natural necessitie not with any precedent Libertie and then Gods making the world yea things most contingent would be as absolutely and naturally necessary as his loving himself It 's true Gods loving himself and al other immanent Acts have a concomitant Libertie or Divine spontaneitie attending them yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind But now Gods workes ad extra such as terminate on the Creature have not only a Concomitant but also Antecedent Libertie or some kind of Indifference so that God could according to a signum rationis or prioritie of nature not have willed them 2 If God should worke althings by his Essence absolutely considered things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future and so Gods Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision And the reason of the consequence is most evident because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible which shal never be as to things future which are to be 3 Again Gods Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate and his Sufficience the same with his Efficience if he wrought al things by his Essence absolutely considered 4 Hence also it would follow that God should alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in al operations For Causes that worke from a Necessitie of Nature worke to the utmost of their power 2. Prop. Gods concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God No executive
power in God distinct from his Wil. This Proposition has been already demonstrated C. 5. § 4. Yet for more abundant conviction let us examine the Origine Necessitie and Vse of an executive Power in the Creature and then we shal see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators who on false Hypotheses presume That a substance cannot act immediately without some executive power which they make a species of Qualitie Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle yet there stil remains a place for executive powers in nature when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately specially in its immanent acts without any executive power And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil without any executive power For he is present in and with al effects and therefore needs no executive power to supplie his absence Again the Wil of God is Omnipotent as c. 5. § 3. and we shal anon prove it more fully and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils Is not the Divine Wil proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible and if it be so can it not then execute its own pleasure without any executive power Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis namely That the Wil and Executive Power of God are really the same and not so much as rationally or formally distinct Thus Joan. Major 2. Sent. Dist 1. q. 1. proves That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil without any executive Power formally distinct of which hereafter § 5.4 Prop. Thus Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. with others of whom in the next Proposition And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis in that he acknowlegeth That the concurse of God as it regardes the effective principe is the same with the Divine Wil which concurs with the Creature to its act This he cals concursus ad intrà the interne concurse which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá Yet I must confesse elsewhere namely Disp 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God the same with his Essence containing in it eminently al create perfections And so some Divines as wel as Philosophers assert an executive power in God Thus Heereboord Select Ex Philosoph Disp 8. endeavors to prove that Gods concurse whereby he influenceth things ad extra is not simply his volition because Gods volition simply is an immanent Act but his concurse is a transient Act ad extra But this Argument seems to be of no weight because we easily grant that the concurse of God quoad Attingentiam passivam as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God and the same with the concurse of the second cause or effect but that which we are now discoursing of is the concurse of God in regard of its active Attingence as it regardes God the Principe and in this respect we only assert That the concurse of God is the same with his volition simply considered This wil be further evident by the next Proposition 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self Omnipotent and Efficacious The Divine Wil Omnipotent This Proposition is most evident 1 because the Divine Wil cannot be frustrated Thus Suarez 1.2 ae Tract 3. Disput 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We must say saith he that when God wils absolutely and efficaciously that man wil somewhat the human Wil cannot discord from the Divine The reason is clear because the Divine Wil efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated seeing it is infinite So Bradward l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing nor impedible and frustrablein any manner Who knows not that it necessarily follows if God can do any thing and wils it he doth it 2 The Divine Wil being the universal first cause of althings it cannot but be most efficacious For is not this the main difference between the first and second cause the universal and particular cause that this may fail of its effect but that can never A particular cause oft comes short of its effect by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause that may impede the same but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect because there is no other cause can interpose to hinder it 3 The Wil of God is infinite therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equalise the power of the Agent there can be no prevalent resistence what then can resist the Divine Wil which is infinite 4 If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy For every one is so far happy as his Wil is fulfilled as Aristor Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. 5 It 's a common Hypothesis in the Scholes grounded on the highest Reason That it is impossible but that the Divine Wil should attain its effect So Aquinas Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self operative and influential on al second causes and effects Thus Augustin De Trinit l. 3. c. 4. The Wil of God operative of it self The Wil of God is the first and supreme cause of althings Again A thing is said to be done by God acting when it is done by God willing Apud Dominum hoc est velle quod facere qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin in Psal 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest For 1 if Gods Wil were not of it self Operative and Effective it were not the first principe and cause of althings 2 The wil of man is in some things Operative of it self and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Wil of God And if it be in somethings operative of it self why not in althings May we not then hence conclude That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Wil or any other second cause but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other second cause necessarily follows This is evident in the first Creation of althings for by Gods fiat or volition which is eternal althings were made in time without any other impression or concurse received and if Gods first Creation of althings was by his simple volition without any transient concurse what hinders but that al other efficience of God should in the same manner consiste in the simple volition of his wil without any transient
concurse Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God as the Word of Creation Gen. 1.3 Conservation Psal 107.20 Gubernation Destruction Restitution c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine Wil as mans Wil is expressed by his word of which hereafter § 4.6 Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward Caus Deil l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensiâ— Sent. 1. Distinct 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest 3. § 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurse for it being nothing but the simple volition of God Particularly as to gratiose effects it thence necessarily follows that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects Esa 55.10 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie So Esa 55.10 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and maketh it to bring forth and bud that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater so shal my word that goeth forth out of my mouth it shal not returne unto me void but it shal accomplish that which I please and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it 1 This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word but also of his efficacious word of concurse productive of things Psal 72.6 So Psal 72.6 2 Gods effective operative word or concurse is compared to the Rain which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth straining it self through the liquid Air as through a Sieve dividing it self into millions of drops and immediately watering every inch of earth that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture gradually and immediately according to its exigence just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes operations and effects specially such as are gratiose Hos 14.5 The like allusion we find Hos 14.5 I wil be as the dew to Israel he shal grow as the lillie Esa 26.19 The like Esa 26.19 For thy dew is as the dew of herbes The dew you know fals in a silent quiet night in millions of smal imperceptible drops and being of a gentle insinuating nature gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth tempers and allays the heat thereof specially in those hotter countries and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants which by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie it comfortes refresheth and encourageth calling forth the fruits hereof and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and delight much more efficaciously than sudden great shours or land-flouds which are more violent but lesse beneficial Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart in millions of drops which gradâ—aly insensibly and immediately insinuate thereinto causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively than al the shours of Divine wrath or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences but soon drie up again and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways sometimes they terme it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitant or indwelling Grace sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its immediation as to al Objects Operations and Effects Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us That according to the ancient Tradition God has not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the middle of althings i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings and is more intimate and immediate to them than they are to themselves So also in his Parmenides he tels us That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings influencing al both smal and great Whence he termes al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Co-operators with God But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation 1 When we say Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate we do not thereby exclude al means as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments but that God concurs immediately in and with al means As in order to health God prescribes and useth means yet he concurs immediately in and with those means so in supernatural effects God useth Ministers and Ordinances yet concurs immediately in and with them 2 God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects not only by the immediation of Virtue but also immediatione suppositi by the immediation of his Essence for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence or Wil as the effective Principe of althings The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Propositions 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes but also by the Jesuites Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. sect 1. and others And the reasons are invincible 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Aristotle in his Physics l. 8. c. 5. Metaphys l. 2. c. 12. assures us That in Agents per se and properly subordinate the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause And the reason is evident because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act Neither is it sufficient to say that the second cause is subordinate to God as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting And who knows not that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior not only quando but quatenus agit both when and as it actes 2 From the limitation
and Absolute may be proved by these invincible Reasons 1 From the Independence of the Divine Wil the first cause of althings The first cause according to Sacred and Platonic Philosophie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause and dependence Thus Plato Repub. 6. p. 509. where bringing in God under the notion of the chiefest good and the first cause of althings he gives him this character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is not mere essence but somewhat more august than essence transcending al finite essence both in Dignitie and Virtue So elsewhere he makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme effective cause of althings and therefore Independent as to al subservient instrumental causes Yea he wil have God the first Cause to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being it self and Eternitie it self and thence no way dependent on second causes And the Platonistes generally make God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential and so most independent And alas how absurd and monstrose is it that the concurse of the first Cause should depend on the second cause Is not the Divine Wil the first effective Principe of althings the same with the Divine Essence May we not then as wel make the Essence of God to be dependent as his Wil. 2 From the pure actualitie and simplicitie of the Divine Wil. Al dependence implies a passive receptive power as to that on which it dependes there is no dependence without some passive power either physic or metaphysic But now Gods Wil as it is the effective Principe of althings has not the least passive power therefore no dependence 3 From the Primatie and Superioritie of the first Cause Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God solely being without Principe or independent he is the Framer of althings c. God being the first Cause of althings must necessarily be independent in his Causalitie and Essence For where there is dependence there is inferioritie and subordination And may we presume that the concurse of the first Cause is inferior and subordinate to that of the second cause Doth it amount to lesse than a contradiction to say the first Cause dependes on or is subordinate to the second cause What! can it be first and yet subordinate What is this but to be first and yet not first but second For dependence and subordination is an effential mode of the second cause as independence of the first 4 As the concurse of the first Cause is independent so also absolute yea therefore absolute because independent for that which dependes on nothing without it self must needs be absolute That the Concurse of God is absolute and no way dependent on any conditions of the subject or object it workes upon specially as to gratiose effects is most evident from sacred Philosophie Eph. 2.8 9 10. So Ephes 2.8 9 10. He saith v. 8. For by Grace ye are saved through faith and that not of your selves it is the gift of God It 's true it workes through faith but yet not as a condition in the power of Free-wil to performe but only as Faith is the Organ or Canal through which medicinal Grace is conveighed into the Soul the whole is the Gift of God and why v. 9. Not of workes lest any one should boast As if he had said Alas if this medicinal Grace should be suspended on any moral or Evangelic conditions to be performed by us then there were indeed room for boasting which Christ wil not allow of Are the derivations of the fountain suspended on any conditions the streams can performe doth not the stream owe al that it has to the free independent and absolute communication of the spring Thence it follows v. 10. For we are his workemanship created in or by Christ Jesus unto good workes i. e. look as God created and formed the first rude confused Chaos not for any foreseen goodnesse in it but out of a pure nothing so Christ frames the New Creature not for any foreseen conditions it can performe but unto al conditions or good workes as Esa 19.25 We have an excellent discourse against conditional Grace in Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. pag. 83. By the predication of this conditional Grace which enables us to act if we wil there is nothing gained but the total subversion of Christ's medicinal Grace and the substituting in the room thereof the Grace of a sound Wil such as Adam had and Angels now have and thus Christ hath died in vain for the proper Grace of Christ which he by his Passion hath brought to heal our infirmities Gratia medicinalis non est talis quae dominatrici samulando voluntati vel influit vel non influit prout imperanti sese determinare vel haerere placet sed prorsus talis quae simulac pulsat fores rumpit ostia repugnantémque domat voluntatem tollit omnem ejus resistentiam rapit eam secum ex invita volentem ineffabili suavitate facit Jansen August Tom. 3. is such as doth not only worke the effect if we wil expecting when our Wils wil move but it enables us to wil for herein lies the precise difference between a sound and sick Wil. That the influxe and concurse of God is absolute may be demonstrated from the absurditie yea impossibilitie of a conditionate concurse in God How absurd is it to conceit that God wil concur with the human Wil in the act of willing upon condition that it wil Yea how impossible is such a conditionate influxe For if there be any condition required to Gods Concurse then he concurs to the working of that condition or not if not then there is some act of the Creature produced without the Divine Concurse If God doth concur to that condition then absolutely or on some other condition if absolutely then his former concurse is not conditionate for he that requires any condition of his act and gives that condition may be said to act absolutely besides if God concur absolutely to the later condition why not also to the former act If God concur to the second condition conditionately then also to the third c. and thus there wil be a dore open to a progresse into infinite which Nature but much more the God of Nature abhors Hence 3. Gods Concurse is previous and antecedent Gods concurse previous and antecedent For the explication of this Adjunct or Mode of Operation we are to consider that he Prioritie here meant is not of Time but of Causalitie as the causalitie of the First cause is in order of nature antecedent to the causalitie of the second cause for therefore the second cause cooperates because the First cause operates The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse is most evident in gratiose Operations and Effects Thus Isidorus Pelusiota lib. 2. Epist 72. Edit Commelin 1605. pag. 121. An evil tree saith he cannot bring forth good fruit Mat. 7.18
contradiction for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal and being from eternitie Is not that which is without beginning eternal And can we imagine that to have a beginning which is from eternitie Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God For 1 the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent God Creation is the most perfect of al actions by which a participate Being may be communicated because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude whence it is manifest that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any but the first cause who is Being essentially and of himself no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being 2 That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created which requires an infinite active power in the Agent For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon but a mere obediential objective power or nothing there the distance between the Power and Act is as to efficience infinite and impertransible by any finite power therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together 3 From the Nature of Creation which is not a successive but a momentaneous Action but al the productions of second causes as they are inferior to and Instruments of the first cause are successive motions for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession 4 From the limitation of al second causes For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Beings To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude And the reason is evident because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction but only the negation of a material cause Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be demonstrated 1 From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act must necessarily precede al mater and thence be the cause thereof that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest whence it follows that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing 2 From the universal efficience of God as the first cause Every Agent so far as it is confined to mater so far it is particular and limited for to be confined to mater in acting is to act in order to some determinate species whereunto that mater refers wherefore that Agent which is universal and commensurate to al effects possible cannot be confined to mater such is the first cause 3 From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation By how much the more universal the effect is by so much the higher the cause is and by how much the higher the cause is by so much the more it is extended to al effects Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal and the cause most high there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed 4 Al productions out of mater suppose successive motion and Transmutation but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede as to Duration the effect produced by such a mutation or motion but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created therefore it cannot be successive out of preexistent mater 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated Chap. 5. § 4. of Gods executive power as c. 7. § 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophie its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil. Gen. 1.3 Thus Gen. 1.3 and God said Let there be light Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here and elsewhere ascribed to God thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings Thus Maimonides More Nevochim Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates That this Speech or Word whereby althings were made must be understood of the Divine Wil not of any proper Speech because al Speech whereby any thing is commanded must necessarily be directed to some Being existent and capable of receiving such a command but there was no Being then existent therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3 The world was framed by the Word of God So 2 Pet. 3.5 By the Word of God the Heavens were of old An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God but to shew that as we when we wil have any thing done expresse our Wil by our word of command so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht by his Fiat or Creative Word See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God § 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues Thus Joan. Major Sentent 2. dist 1. q. 3. proves That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition without any other productive power And his Arguments are these 1 The Human Wil doth not want any
other executive power to execute its commands unlesse it be in such things as it cannot by it self reach but the Divine Omnipotent Wil reacheth althings therefore it can execute its own commands without the mediation of any executive power 2 The Efficacious Wil of God touching A. gives existence to A. otherwise the Efficacious Wil of God were impedible and so some one might resist his Wil. 3 Our Wil can by its mere volition produce some effects namely Habits it can also move other Powers by its Empire Therefore the Divine Wil can by its sole volition produce al effects Thus Augustin on Psal 144. With God to Wil in to do because althings receive Being from his Wil. The like Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Althings that the Lord hath willed he hath done and no man hath resisted his Wil he willed that althings were made and they were made and he wils that the world consistes and it consistes and al that he wils he can do and they are done From this Active Creation of the Divine Wil God is said by some to be a Creator from al Eternitie Thus Gregor Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. dist 28. q. 3. fol. 122. This denomination is not extrinsec but intrinsec to the Divine Essence and Wil. Hence Plato stiled the World in regard of this active Creation Eternal as it lay from al Eternitie in the Divine Wil and Ideas For the Active Efficience of the Divine Wil is every way sufficient to denominate the Passive Power of the World as creable 5. Passive Creation is something in the thing created not really Passive Creation a Mode of the thing Created but mentally or modally only distinct from it For the explication of this Proposition we are to note 1 That Passive Creation doth not so much regard God as the thing Created God in Creating the World was not reduced from Power to Act as al Creatures are when they act for Gods Active Efficience was as has been demonstrated from al Eternitie and no other than his Divine Wil neither was there at the passive Creation of the World any new act in God which was not before in him but there was an accession of an act or existence to the things Created which was not before whence by an extrinsec denomination God is said to be Creator at the passive Creation of things as by an intrinsec denomination he was Creator from al Eternitie in regard of his Active Efficience or Decree 2 Albeit we conceive and expresse Passive Creation under the notion of a mutation yet it is not properly such because al proper mutation implies a succession of one thing after another which Creation admits not being momentaneous and al at once without any terme from which or fluxe which al mutation includes 3 Some and those not vulgar Scholastics hold That passive Creation is no way really but only mentally distinct from the Creature So the Passive Creation of a Man is really and essentially the same with a Man Thus Ocham in Sent. 2. q. 9. and Greg. Ariminensis in Sent. 2. dist 1. q. 4 5. with the Nominals generally who presume that Action is not a middle thing between the Cause and Effect And their Arguments in this Case are not to be contemned for they prove it 1 From the special Reason of Creation which is not an Accident but the very substance or Essence of the thing Created for if it were some middle thing between God and the Creature distinct from both it must be a Creature and so the terme of some other Creation and this of some other which would open a door for a progresse into Infinite 2 From the Essential Reason of a Creature for Dependence on the first Cause is of the Essence of the Creature therefore it is in the Creature and not really distinct from it Now the prime and essential dependence of the Creature on the first Cause is Creation wherefore it can be no more distinguished from the Creature than the Essence of a thing is distinguished from it self That the Dependence of a Creature on its Creator is not distinct from its Essence they prove by many and strong Arguments of which hereafter C. 11. § 6. 4 Suarez Metaphys Disput 20. S. 5. p. 529. with others assert That Creation is somewhat in the thing Create not really distinct as a proper entitie yet ex natura rei as a mode thereof But this Controversie is not material neither doth it want an easie way of reconcilement for Suarez's modal distinction in effect as he limits it amounts to little more than a mental distinction at least that which they stile rationis ratiocinatae which has some foundation in the things distinguished However they both agree in this that Passive Creation is in the thing Created Hence it follows 6. That the Relation of the Creator to the Creature doth not-suppose any mutation in God For Creation may be considered either actively or passively if we consider it actively so it is attributed to God by an interne denomination it being the same with the Wil of God if we consider it passively so it is the same with or not really distinct from the Creature and ascribed or attributed to God only by an extrinsec denomination and relation which speaketh no mutation in God See what precedes of Gods Immutabilitie C. 4. § 1. § 2. The Providence of God demonstrated From the Creation of God we passe unto his Providence whereof we find Illustrious Ideas and Notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophemes touching the Divine Providence we shal give the mention thereof in the particular Ideas of Providence we shal here begin with Plato's demonstration of Gods Providence which he gives us largely De Leg. 10. p. 900 c. where he proposeth the blasphemous Antithesis of an Atheistic Spirit denying the Providence of God in this manner But thou indeed being carried away with a certain blind and rash madnesse because thou canst not belch forth thine Indignation against God himself neither can the venome of thine enraged Mind reach him therefore thou fallest into this Affection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That albeit thou grantest there is a God yet thou deniest that he takes care of Human Affaires This Antithesis which Epicurus afterward espoused Plato greatly opposeth as that which is most unworthy of the Divine Infinitely wise Bountiful and Soverain Being In the general he affirmes That it is not difficult to demonstrate this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Gods Providence is as wel occupied about the least as about the greatest and most excellent things But p. 901. he descendes to particular Arguments 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore whether it be God or whether it be Man that neglectes any affair is it not for one of those two causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Either because he conceives it no way refers to the whole if smal things are
there are many things considerable 1. It includes an eternal Wisdome and Counsel as the origine thereof Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 3. c. 29. explicates the precedent definition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Butaf al Providence be the Wil of God it 's necessary that althings ordered or made by Providence be according to right Reason best and most becoming God and that nothing may be better done In the Scholes Providence according to its generic Idea is said to be the Reason of Order whereby al means are duely disposed towards their end what then is the Providence of God but a Divine Reason eminently subsisting in the supreme Rector of althings whereby althings are most wisely disposed to their last end by most apt means Thus in sacred Philosophie the Providence of God is described as invested with infinite wisdome and counsel Psal 139.1 2. So Psal 139.1 O Lord thou hast searched me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast sounded me and penetrated into my most intimate parts Whence he addes and known me i. e. most intimately Thence he procedes to particulars v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and up-rising c. Of which before in the Divine Science Ch. 5. § 2. We find Gods providential knowlege as to Celestial bodies wel illustrated Psal 147.4 5. Psal 147.4 He telleth the number of the stars he calleth them al by their names Termes borrowed from Generals mustering or taking an account of their Soldiers or else from Masters of Families taking account of al their Domestics or from Kings numbering their Subjects And what mean these expressions but to illustrate and expresse the most particular Providence of God founded on his infinite knowlege of althings which are in apparence innumerable as the Stars in the Firmament Gen. 15.5 So v. 5. his understanding is infinite Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his understanding there is no number The reasons of his Providence are more in number than the things he provides for yea every way infinite These infinite Reasons and Intelligences of Divine Providence are expressed by Plato under the terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligence Thus in his Philebus pag. 28. Al the wise consent in this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Divine Mind it King of Heaven and Earth So in his Phaedo pag. 97. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It is the Divine Mind that disposeth and directes althings according to their due orders and is the cause of althings And that this providential Intelligence and Wisdome extendeth to althings even to the most minute and least Beings Plato assertes Leg. 10. pag. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. To conceit that God who is most wise and both wil and can provide for his own creatures should take care only of greater maters but not of the least whereof the care is more facile how absurd is this But to treat more accurately and philosophically of the infinite Reasons and Wisdome of Divine Providence The eternal Law of Providence we must run it up to the Spring-head of that eternal Law consisting in those Divine Ideas loged in the mind and wil of God The Scholes philosophise much of the eternal Law whereby althings are governed to their respective ends yet they speake so confusedly as that it is difficult to understand what they mean thereby whether the Law of Divine Decrees or the Law of Nature inherent in the things governed Plato seems to speake more intelligibly than many Scholastics touching this eternal Law making it to be no other than the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees according to which God frames and governes althings So in his Timaeus pag. 28. he saith That God in the framing the World had his eye 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the eternal Law or Exemplar Hence Plato cals Fate whereby the Ancients expressed Providence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Adrastie which Cicero interpretes the eternal Law And Apuleius a great Explicator of Plato saith Fate was that by which Gods inevitable cogitations and undertakements were accomplisht And Pindar sang 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the eternal Law was Queen of althings both mortal and immortal This eternal Law as it regardes Providence is nothing else but that order method purpose or counsel which the most wise God hath from al eternitie determined with himself in his Divine Decrees as the rule of his Gubernation and Disposition of althings for his own Glorie Have not althings that are some operation and that not violent or fortuitous but regular and orderly And can any thing exert any regular operation but in order to some end preconceived by some intelligent Agent And what is that which directes moderates regulates and orders althings to their respective ends but the eternal Law Thus Augustin The eternal Law saith he is nothing else but that increate Divine Reason or Wil of God commanding that the natural order be conserved Every action wil not serve for every end therefore there must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Rule or Law to suit actions to their ends Do not then althings so far as they tend to their last end act and move by some Law And what is the supreme Law whereby al the Divine operations of Providence are regulated but the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees It 's true every particular singular Creature has a Law impacted and impressed on its Being which is an irradiation or beam of the eternal Law and therefore called by some though improperly the eternal Law by others more properly the Law of Nature For the eternal Law properly respectes the workes and operations of God who is both Worker and the Law of his working the perfection of the Divine Essence and Wil gives perfection and measure to al his workes al Gods providences and workes own him not only for their Worker but also for the Law whereby they are wrought his Divine Wil and Decrees being the measure of al his Operations So that by this eternal Law althings are bounded and limited not only in their Essences but also in their Operations and al the Divine reasons of Providences are to be resolved into this eternal Law which is ful of infinite Reasons Wisdome and Counsel albeit our shallow capacities cannot comprehend no nor apprehend the same alwaies in al workes of Providence Hence it follows The Wisdome of Providence active that the Divine Reason Wisdome and Counsel that attendes the Providence of God is not merely speculative but practic and active for al Laws properly and primarily tend to action Whence in sacred Philosophie the wisdome of Divine Providence is illustrated by that of a wise Builder skilful Physician expert discreet Master of a Familie c. Thus also Plato Leg. 10. pag. 902 c. istustrates the same by much the same ressemblances namely by the wisdome of a skilful Physician also of an expert Gubernator of a Ship of a prudent
moreover working immediately both by the immediation of Virtue and Essence in and with those means Hence Esa 28.26 God is said to teach the Husbandman to plough i. e. how to cultivate and manage his Ground as also to sow his Seed c. That no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence No second cause can act but in subordination to God and by his Providence but in Virtue received from and subordination to God the prime Cause is most evident 1 Because where diverse Agents subserve one Supreme Agent it 's necessary that the effect be produced by them in commun as they are united in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent For many cannot produce one effect but as one Now the subservient Agents of Providence are so far one in their executions as they are subordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent 2 The complement of the Virtue and Efficace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influxe of the First Agent and is not God the first Agent in al executions of Providence 3 Al Operation consequent to any influence is ascribed to that which gave the influence as the proper cause thereof And do not al second Causes receive their influence from God Must not then al their Executions and Operations be ascribed to him as the prime Cause 4 Al Actions that cannot subsiste without the Impression and Influence of some Agent must be attributed to that Agent as the cause thereof Now can any executions of second Causes subsist without the impression of the first Cause must they not then al be attributed to him 5 Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act may be said to be the cause of that Act as an Artificer by applying the virtue of any natural thing to any action is said to be the cause of that action Now is not al application of any Virtue in providential executions from God Is he not then the cause of al such executions 6 Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as such And are not al second Causes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent 7 Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its last end And who in al Providential Operations ordains things to their last end but God the first cause of al 8 As particular Causes are referred to particular Effects so the universal Cause to universal Effects and is not God the Universal Cause of al Effects 9 To substract or withdraw any providential execution from Gods Ordination and Efficience what is this but to subvert the best Order even the subordination of second Causes to the first 10 God is intimely present with and in al providential executions and therefore cannot but influence the same The mover and moved are always together God is the prime mover in al motions and therefore present with al the application of Actives unto Passives is by him That there is not the least execution of Providence but what is influenced by God see Aquinas contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67 68 70 76 77. Not to mention the various means Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit instruments and second causes which God employs in his Providential Efficience there is one which deserves a particular disquisition namely Fire which is in its kind an Vniversal Mundane Spirit the most potent Instrument of Nature and Art and that which subserves the Spirit of God the Supreme increate Universal Spirit in al material productions of Providence As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit Gen. 1.3 Moses gives it us Gen. 1.3 under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light or Fire part of which was dispersed among the Celestial Lights or Fires and part diffused into the bowels of the Earth for the Conservation Animation Vivification and Nutrition of al parts of the Universe Plato makes frequent mention of Fire as the most potent natural principe or Mundane Spirit whereby althings are fomented agitated animated and perfected So in his Timaeus p. 31. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Nothing seems void of Fire c. So p. 56 58. he makes Fire to be the Universal Spirit diffused throughout al parts of the Universe And elsewhere he cals Fire 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the great Opificer of various effects And not only the Chymists but also the Stoics and most of the Ancient Philosophers ascribe to Fire an Universal Efficience as to al corporeous Effects Whence do al Minerals Metals and Stones receive their Origine but from subterraneous Fires What gives rise to al Vapors and Fountains but Fire Whence procede the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea with its saltnesse but from Fire What gives Life and Motion to al Insects but Fire either Celestial or Terrestrial Whence springeth the fermentation of humors in the bowels of the Earth at Spring with the vegetation and fructification of Plants but from Fire What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Mans Bodie but a more pure aethereous Fire These things are more largely demonstrated in our Philosoph General P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Physics May we not then hence conclude That Fire is a second Mundane Vniversal Spirit under the Spirit of God most Efficacious and Potent in al natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence § 4. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal Having finisht the principal and instrumental effective Principes of Providence we now procede to its Object which according to sacred Philosophie is of the most universal latitude according to the extension of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience There is nothing so high as to be above Divine Providence nothing so low as to be beneath it nothing so ample and extensive as that it cannot be limited by it nothing so free as to second causes but it is necessarily determined by it nothing so natural and necessary but its operation may be suspended by it as the fiery Furnace wherein the three Children were lastly nothing so evil but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it Among the ancient Philosophers there were different persuasions about the object of Divine Providence and its latitude Epicurus and some before him altogether denied the Providence of God as before Aristotle as Grotius affirmes confined the Providence of God to Celestial bodies yet Laertius saith he held That the Providence of God did reach 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. even to things celestial and that he disposed things terrestrial according to the Sympathie they have with things celestial Some among the Hebrews held that Gods Providence extended to men but not unto bestes which sentiment some impute to Pythagoras who much imitated the Hebrews Some also among the Arabians asserted a Providence about Universals or things in commun but not about Singulars which sentiment Justin Martyr in the beginning of his Colloque with
And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent What then can we suppose should impede Divine Providence 3 Al providence supposeth an Act of the Wil and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious Bradwardine frequently assertes and demonstrates That God permits nothing but what he wils It 's true man oft permits things that he neither wils nor doth because he cannot hinder them but there is no mere permission with God without some Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie Efficacitie and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282 c. spends a whole Chapter to prove That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God not only permitting but actually disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative As 1 Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner 2 The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence c. And then Cap. 33. he demonstrates That where-ever there is any permission of God there also is his actual Volition Hence 2. 2. Immobile and fixed Gods Providence gives to al second Causes and Events a most immobile immutable fixed and certain order things most contingent and free as to second causes are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence Hence the Stoics as also Plato expressed this fixed order of providence by Fate which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternitie whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence That providence puts into things a fixed immutable order is evident because 1 nothing fals out but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wisdome and an omnipotent Wil. 2 Al particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient to the Universal Cause and therefore subject to his Order Yea this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain because it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil Efficience and Gubernation as more fully anon 3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it workes upon The Necessitie and Immobilitie 3. Connatural and agreable that attendes the Providence of God doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes but confirme the same Therefore men act freely because the Providence of God determines them so to act So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence because it determines althings to act according to their Natures it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Wil but sweetly though necessarily moves it to the end appointed Gods manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them For 1 Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power Virtue and Efficacitie to worke 2 Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigor imparted 3 Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence 4 Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly yet powerfully order the manner of working as also perfect the same Is it not then most sweet and connatural in al its Executions Hence 4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect 4. Beautiful and perfect al its executions are in Number Weight and Measure Doth not the Wise Man assure us Eccles 3.11 That every thing is beautiful in its season Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God What are al the travels and births of time but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light Have not al issues and events not only natural and necessary but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits constituted by Divine Providence which renders them most beautiful and perfect Are not those very products which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed most beautiful in their time and place as they relate to Divine Providence Is not God infinitely wise to order althings in the best manner And is he not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees Is not that which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed in regard of Gods Providence and Execution most beautiful as Christs Crucifixion What must we say of al that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches Persons and Things Doth it reach the Providence of God Is it not only in regard of second causes and our mistakes as to the first cause Cannot yea wil not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of al this confused chaos It 's true Sacred Philosophie tels us of evil dayes which should come to passe in this last Scene of the World but whence springs the evil of these later days Is it not from the Lusts of Men not the Providence of God Are not the worst of days Naturally good yea Morally also to those who are good and do good Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil If Men were better would not the Times soon prove better Yea are not those very Disorders and Confusions that arise from the Lusts of Men ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole As in Nature varietie addes Beautie so in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beautiful It was a great saying of a Stoic He that wil take upon him to mend things let him first take upon to mend God Certainly nothing is done by God but that which to leave undone were not so good Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts are not so if we consider the whole Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved that God provides and governes althings according to his most wise Wil he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature or Essentially As therefore he is good he provides for he that provides not for such as are under his care is not good but as he is wise he takes care to provide the best things Therefore it becomes us attending to these things to admire al to praise al to receive without curiose inquisition al the workes of Providence albeit they may seem to many injust because incognite and incomprehensible as in what follows That the Providence of God is most perfect see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 28. p. 270. 5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible 5. Mysterious The Providences of God are much like his Being very ful of mysteries So Psal 36.6 The Judgements of God are said to
be a great deep And Psal 97.1 The Lord reigneth let the Earth rejoice Psal 97.1 2. because al his Judgments and Executions of Providence are most Equal and Righteous Yet it follows v. 2. Clouds and darknesse are about him i. e. Albeit his Government is most Righteous yet much darkenesse and mysterious Providences attend it there are deep mysteries in his Providential Procedures albeit Righteousnesse and Judgement are the habitation or establishment of his Throne as it follows Gods Providences are always mater of our Admiration but not of our Comprehension or Imitation To measure Providence by our shallow Reason what is it but to set the Sun by our false Dial It 's wel observed in the Life of Padre Paul p. 114. In the successe of human things Divine Providence is ever to be admired where human prudence vanisheth out of sight it being most certain that in actions there is an eternal force and a long chain of Causes so far without us that neither our knowlege or any consideration of ours can ever come near The workes of Providence are much like many curiose pieces of Nature and Art whereof we see the frame and operations but that which is the interne moving principe and gives the greatest force to the operations we see not So in the workes of Providence we see the Executions and Effects but O! how mysterious are the interne Reasons Is there not a particular though mysterious Providence ordering and directing the Operations of every individual and single Essence And is there not in every worke of Providence something Divine which doth puzle the most sharpe-sighted Reason and hath more in it than the most acute Philosopher can discover And why is it that the most of men mistake and censure Providence but because they cast their eye on some few particulars but consider not the whole frame and complexe It 's above our narrow Capacities to contemplate the whole frame of Providence and is not this the genuine reason why we misjudge and mistake the parts That is not disorder in the whole which seems so in some one particular as in the motions of a Watch. These mysteriose procedures of Divine Providence are wel expressed by Damascence Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. We must saith he admire al the workes of Providence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 albeit they may appear to many injust because Divine Providence is unknown and incomprehensible and our cogitations and actions and things future are known to it only Thence he addes towards the close of the Chapter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But we must know that there are many modes of the Divine Providence which can neither be explicated by speech nor comprehended by mind § 6. The distributions of Providence From the Adjuncts of Divine Providence we passe on to its various Distributions which are for the most part Modal only not Specific As 1 Providence in regard of its Object is distributed into General and Special General Providence is that which respectes althings in general Special Providence that which respectes some under a special relation to God as his people 2 Providence in regard of its manner of working is distributed into Mediate and Immediate Mediate Providence is that wherein God makes use of Means for the execution thereof of which before Immediate Providence is when God produceth Effects without the use of Means 3 Providence is distributed into Ordinary and Extraordinary Ordinary Providence is when God in the production and governing of things observes that Order which was constituted at first by himself Extraordinary Providence is when God in the Production Conservation or Gubernation of things breakes that natural Order constituted by himself Of Miracles The Effects of such extraordinary Providences are by a Metonymie of the Effect termed Miracles A Miracle properly is a Specimen of Creation because the constituted order of Nature being broken the Mater has only an Obediential Power for the production of the Effect Hence nothing but Omnipotence or Infinite Power can properly and physically in a way of principal efficience produce a Miracle It 's true the Ministers of God have when called to it by him been Instruments of doing Miracles yet their concurrence or efficience was only Moral and Instrumental they wrought al in the Name of God in a way of faith and dependence on him and for the manifestation of his Glory Wherefore our Lord Christ by working Miracles in his own Name and Autoritie without any moral dependence on another gave an evident Conviction and Demonstration of his being God For no Creature can worke a Miracle by its own Principal and Physical Efficience No this is the Prerogative of the first Cause and Omnipotent Deitie because every Miracle is educed out of nothing either as to the thing it self or at least as to the mode and manner of its being wrought In Nature and according to the ordinary course of Providence every passive power has an active power suited to it and by the application of Actives to Passives the effect is produced where therefore there is a defect of passive or active power and yet the effect is produced that we cal a Miracle which may be said to be wrought out of nothing three manner of ways 1 When there is no substrate mater at al to worke on 2 If there be a substrate mater yet when the mater is so inhabile and unapt as that it has no natural passive power or capacitie for such an effect Or 3 when there is a natural passive power and capacitie in the substrate mater yet there wants an active Principe or Efficient for the educing the effect out of that mater In al these regards a Miracle may be said to be produced out of nothing and so the peculiar effect of Divine extraordinary providence And indeed the very names both Latin Greek and Hebrew import a power extraordinary and Divine To let passe the origination of the Latin which is obvious Miracles are called by the Greeks 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as they are Signes of the Divine Efficience and Presence given for the succur of our Faith 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Powers as they are manifestations and demonstrations of Divine Omnipotence which is most illustrious therein 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prodigies or tremendous Signes such as not only ravish men into admiration but leave also a terror and astonishing stupor on the mind So Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Prodigie is a thing that leaves an astonishment on the Beholders by reason of the Miracle that is wrought Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which terrefies and astonisheth Al which note that Miracles are the peculiar effects of extraordinary Providence The former Distributions of Providence seem only modal Providential Conservation proper to God its formal essential and specific distribution is into Conservative and
Gubernative Conservation and Gubernation are usually estimed the proper adequate species of Providence Providential Conservation is that Act of Gods Wil whereby he makes things to persist and persevere in their individual Existence Vigor Acts and specific Essences or Species As for the particular Ideas of providential Conservation we shal draw them forth in the following Proposition 1. Prop. God is the necessary Conservator of althings No Creature is sufficient to conserve it self or any thing else no particular Agent as such can be properly stiled a conservant Cause because conservation is but a kind of continued Creation That no Creature is sufficient to conserve it self without the immediate conservative influxe of God is evident 1 because every Creature has but a fluid transient nature wherefore it needs the conservative concurse of the first cause to fixe its fluxible Being It was a great and good Effate of Heraclitus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Althings are in fluxe nothing is permanent i. e. the natures of things create are like a river the parts whereof are always in fluxe neither doth the same part ever returne again but emties it self into the Sea where it is swallowed up so al Creatures are in continual fluxe and if God who alone is pure Act and immutable did not fixe their Beings by his conservative influxe they would soon drop into their primitive nothing 2 It implies a contradiction that a Creature should persevere in its being without Gods conservative concurse Doth it not implie a contradiction to say that God made a thing and yet that thing was not made and caused by God Now to say God hath made a Creature which needs not his conservative influxe what is this but to say that God made a Creature which yet was not made by him So essential is Divine Conservation to the very essence and existence of a Creature as Bradwardine pag. 162. Thus also Aquinas 1. Quaest 104. demonstrates That it is not a thing communicable to any Creature that it should conserve it self in Being without God 3 Whatever is Ens by participation necessarily dependes on that which is Ens by essence for its existence and subsistence Al create Beings in their very essence depend on Divine Conservation because every effect that dependes on any cause directly and of it self primarily for essence must necessarily also depend thereon for conservation But now God is so the cause of al effects that they from their very nature and by an intrinsecal necessitie depend on him for Being therefore also for conservation as Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. pag. 540 c. God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah in some sense Al Being as Exod. 3.14 I am i. e. nothing hath essence existence and persistence in Essence but from the pure Actualitie and Efficience of God 4 If God educed althings out of nothing by his efficacious Wil then it necessarily follows that the Wil of God must be the Conservatrix of althings For althings are so far and so long existent as God wils they shal be Indeed what is conservation but continued creation or the continuation of a thing made in Being Is it not necessary then that the same Divine Wil that at first gave Being to any thing conserve the same thing in Being Thence Aquinas 1. Quaest 104. proves That God conserves every thing by the same virtue and operation by which he produced it i. e. by the efficience of his Wil. 5 There is great proportion and Analogie in point of conservation between the workes of Art and Nature For look as every worke of Art doth presuppose a principe and worke of Nature as wel for its conservation as first production so every worke of Nature doth presuppose a Divine Efficience for its conservation as wel as for its first production Is it impossible that a piece of Art should conserve it self without mater and is it possible that any worke of Nature should conserve it self without Divine Efficience 6 No impression can remain on any effect longer than the vis impressa or force and action of the Agent continue and what is the essence of any Creature but vis impressa or force impressed by God thereon Al create Essences are but impressions or participations from God and therefore essentially require new force and efficience every moment for their conservation and continuation 7 Unlesse God conserve althings how can he order dispose and governe them to their respective ends Not only the operations but the very essences of things are ordered by God to his own Glorie and how can this be if the essences of things are not conserved by God That God is the necessary Conservator of althings see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 65. Bradward l. 1. c. 2. pag. 146 c. 2. Prop. Gods conservative Influxe and Efficience is most intime and immediate in althings This Proposition is most evident Gods conservative Influxe immediate 1 From Gods power to annihilate althings For if things were conserved by God only mediately he could not annihilate them so long as that intermediate conservant Cause should concur to their conservation as it 's wel demonstrated by Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 45. pag. 160. 2 From the passive power or potentialitie of al Creatures For every potential or thing in power must be actuated by some Act immediately now every Creature in respect of God is but a potential Being and therefore must be actuated immediately by God who is a pure Act and that not only in its operation but also for the conservation of its Being 3 From the Omnipresence of the Divine Essence God being not circumscribed or defined to any space but immense in his Being it thence follows that he is intimately and immediately present to al Beings and by this his immediate presence and volition conserves the same As the creatrix Essence was immediately present by the Divine Volition in the first Creation of althings so the conservatrix Essence is also immediately present in the conservation of althings God is not more distant and remote in the conservation than he was in the first causation of things God is more intimate to every thing than the most intimate part of its own Essence is Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 30. Sect. 7. pag. 70. proves That God doth not diffuse his creative or conservative Action but is intimately in every thing conserving of it c. So Bradward pag. 164. 4 From Gods prime Causalitie and the subordination of al Creatures to God Every second cause whether causant or conservant cannot cause or conserve any effect but in dependence on and subordination to God the first Cause Hence the Efficience of God must intervene between it and the effect whether it be for causation or conservation whence it follows that the Divine Efficience both in causation and conservation is more immediate than the efficience of any second cause Again the causalitie of the first Cause is more essential and necessary than that
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause
the same manner as they who follow Arius he divides and supposeth Subjects inducing Hypostases subordinate among themselves and conceits the Holy and Consubstantial Trinitie to be three distinct Gods And albeit Learned Cudworth B. 1. C. 4. p. 590. against Atheisme endeavors to wipe off this aspersion yet he grants the conclusion as hereafter But to speak the truth I find no express mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Trinitie in Plato only he speaks confusedly of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Father Lord and of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mind c. But among the later Platonistes of the Schole of Alexandria ' specially those of the golden succession the Sectators of Ammonius Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus Proclus we find frequent mention and notices of a Trinitie which they thus distinguish 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Supreme self-being whom also they stile 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the one and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Good 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine mind the Creatrix or Framer of althings who is also termed by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the seminal Word or Reason that gives Being to althings 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Soul of the Vniverse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first Soul as c. 8. § 2. These more distinct notices of a Trinitie I am very apt to perswade my self they received not so much from Plato but from Ammonius the famose Head of that Succession who was either a Christian or a friend to their Sacred Philosophie out of which he stole most of his choisest Philosophemes and incorporated them into the bodie of his Platonic Philosophie in order to a refinement thereof which albeit his designe might be good yet it proved the peste and subversion of the Christian Theologie at least among those of that Schole For Origen his Scholar following in his steps out of too fond a love for Platonic Philosophie reduced Sacred Philosophie to Platonic Dogmes which proved the original cause of the greatest Errors that befel the Church in succeeding Ages Thus he makes the Three Persons in the Trinitie to be according to the Three Platonic Hypostases One not in Essence but Wil only So Origen contra Celsum l. 8. p. 386. Edit Cantabr 1658. Where having cited that Act. 4.32 There was of al the Believers one Heart and one Soul he brings it to prove what our Lord affirmes Joh. 10.30 I and the Father are one And thence in what follows concludes thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore we religiosely worship the Father of Truth and the Son who is Truth as being truely two in Hypostase but one in concord consent and identitie of Wil So that whosoever sees the Son shall in him see God as in the Image of God c. Hence Origen in imitation of these Platonistes supposed an essential dependence of the Son the second Hypostasis on the Father as also of the Spirit the third on the Son of which essential dependence and subordination see Cudworth against Atheisme L. 1. C. 4. p. 581 c. Yea Origen in his Comments on John wil needs persuade us That the Word in Divine things is taken only metaphorically How far Origen's Platonic Philosophemes laid the foundation for the Arian and other Heresies touching the second and third Person in the Trinitie see Court Gent. p. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 8 9. Samosatenus also had his pestiferous infusions from Plotinus's Philosophemes about the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Arius his from the same Schole as we have more fully proved in our Discourse of the Vanitie of Philosophie B. 2. C. 1. § 8. But whereas Amelius of old and some late Socinians would fain persuade us that John borrowed his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Joh. 1.1 from Plato it 's evident that he had it from the Sacred Philosophie among the Hebrews for in the ancient Chaldaic Thargum we find frequent mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word of Jehovah whereby they understood the Messias as Gen. 3.8 Psal 2.12 and 27.1 as elsewhere Yea Celsus would needs persuade us That the Christians came to cal their Jesus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THE SON OF GOD from their Pagan Ancestors who called the World made by God the Son of God But this is refuted by Origen Contra Celsum l. 6. p. 308. Edit 1658. Where he proves that this Character of Jesus was to be found in the Writings of Moses and the Prophets who writ long before the Grecian Philosophers That al those confused notices of a Trinitie among the Platonistes were originally traduced from Sacred Philosophie see Clem. Alexandr Strom. 5. p. 436. Eusebius praepar Evangel l. 11. from cap. 14. to 23. Philos General Part. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect 5. § 2. and l. 3. c. 4. sect 1. § 13. also Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. c. 5. § 7. Learned Cudworth in his Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. sect 35. p. 548. saith We may reasonably conclude that which Proclus asserteth of this Trinitie as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles to be true that it was at first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Theologie of Divine Tradition or Revelation or a Divine Cabala viz. amongst the Hebrews first and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other Nations However addes he we freely acknowledge that as this Divine Cababa was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the Pagans so was it by diverse of them much depraved and adulterated For 1 the Pagans universally called this their Trinitie a Trinitie of Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the First the Second and the Third God 2 Whence p. 557. he procedes to demonstrate that the direct designe of this Platonic Trinitie was nothing else but to lay a foundation for infinite Polytheisme Cosmolatrie and Creature-worship Where by the way he wel observes That these Pagans who so much cried up this Platonic Trinitie were the only public and professed Champions against Christianitie and the Christian Trinitie 3 He addes p. 559. That the Three Hypostases or persons asserted by the Christians are truely and really one God and not one only in Wil as Origen and the Platonistes avouch 4 He informes us p. 564. That Proclus and other of the Platonistes intermingle many particular Gods with those three Vniversal Principes or Hypostases of their Trinitie as Noes Minds or Intellects superior to the first Soul and Henades and Agathotetes Vnities and Goodnesses superior to the first Intellect too thereby making those particular Beings which must needs be Creatures superior to those Hypostases that are Universal and Infinite So great confusions yea contradictions attendes the Platonic Trinitie which yet is too much admired CHAP. VII Of Gods prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general God the first Cause demonstrated The Object of Divine Concurse Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the