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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A41659	The court of the gentiles, or, A discourse touching the original of human literature, both philologie and philosophie, from the Scriptures and Jewish church. Part 2, Of philosophie in order to a demonstration of 1. The perfection of Gods word and church light, 2. The imperfection of natures light and mischief of vain philosophie, 3. The right use of human learning and especially sound philosophie / by Theoph. Gale ...; Court of the gentiles. Part 2	Gale, Theophilus, 1628-1678.	1670 (1670)	Wing G138; ESTC R11588	456,763	496

and addes thereto courage and successe For addes he either we must say that the Gods meddle not with the causes and beginnings of our actions or else that they have no other way to help and further men by Thus Plutarch And whereas 't is object●d that thus to ascribe unto God a predetermining particular immediate Influence upon and Concurse with the will to every ●ct thereof is to make him the Author of Sin c. Plato Repub. 10. gives us a good solution to this objection in saying 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●ll blamable Ca●salitie belongs to the particular Agen● which ch●●seth 〈◊〉 God is a blamelesse cause Agen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In all Evils God workes what is righteous and good only This is more fully explicated by Simplicius in Epict. Enchir cap. 1.24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is no way the cause of sin for he being in himself good Acts the Soul in sinning only according to its own nature i. e. voluntarilie out of the riches of his goodnesse but he do●s not concurre to its sin otherwise than as the Soul it self wills it His meaning is that God concurreth to sin only as the Vniversal cause of Goodnesse so that God's Concurse thereto does not at all hinder but that the Soul voluntarilie chooseth it Neither is the qualitie of the effect to be ascribed to the Vniversal cause but to the particular which is the alone Moral and therefore culpable cause of Sin whereas God 's Vniversal causalitie thereto is only Physical or natural and therefore not morally Evil. That the Souls Voluntarie agencie is sufficient to render its act Morally good or Evil albeit we allow God a predetermining Influence and Concurse thereto is evident from that of Aristotle Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in things voluntario praises and dispraises have place i. e. in virtues and vices so agen Eth. lib. 3. cap. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is voluntarie and sin nothing lesse is likewise voluntarie Whereby 't is evident that Aristotle requires nothing more on the part of the Soul to render its acts Morally good or Evill but that they be voluntarie § 29. Having dispatcht Aristotle's contemplations about the Wil's Voluntarinesse and Libertie which is the Essential adjunct of every humane act we now proceed to his speculations about the Moralitie of humane Acts or their mora clonstitution as good or Evill This moralitie of human acts in general according to Aristotle has for its foundation or basis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a voluntarie free agent as before but the chief measures thereof are 1. the End so Aristotle Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing is defined or measured by its end i. e. the End has the same place in morals as the forme in Naturals or as the first principles in speculatives 2. Not only the End but also the Law of Nature which Aristotle stiles Right reason has an essential influence on the moralitie of human Acts according to which they are denominated morally good or Evill for by conformitie thereto they become morally good and by difformitie morally Evill so Arist Eth. lib. 3. cap. 8. stiles a Virtuous act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which moves according to the disposition or order of Right reason c. We shall begin with Aristotle's notions about things and Acts morally good which he stiles Virtues whereof we have this general account in his Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is as it seems a power conquisitive and preservative of goods also a power well-productive of many and great matters yea of all things about all But this definition of virtue being too general that which agrees as well to Natural as moral Virtues we proceed to that which is more special The great seat of Aristo●e discourse about moral virtue is his Ethicks lib. 2. cap. 3.4.5.6 cap. 3. he gives us this general Idea of Ethick or moral virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is supposed therefore that virtue is such as being conversant about pleasures and griefs is productive of that which is best But sin is the contrarie Aristotle Eth. l●b 2. cap. 4. b●gins to discourse more distinctly of moral virtue and its Genus whether it be a Power Affection or Habit of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Seing there are in the Soul these three Affections Powers Habits which of these must virtue be so Plutar de Virtut Mor. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are these three in the Soul a Facultie an Affection and an Habit A Facultie is the Principle and matter of an Affection an Affection is the motion of a Facultie an Habit is the strength and conformitie of a facultie gained by custome Arist· demonstrates 1. That Virtue cannot be an Affection or Passion because Affections are good or bad only from good or bad Habits 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Our passions are well or ill disposed from those Habits which possesse them therefore our Passions are in themselves capable neither of virtues nor of vices whence it follows that virtues and vices are habits 2. He demonstrates that Virtues are not Passions because they are Elections 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtues are certain Elections or at least not without Election 3. He demonstrates the same from the different motions of Passion and Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To these we may adde that we are not said to be moved but to be disposed according to Virtues or vices but we are said to be moved according to passions Lambinus on this text of Arist Eth. lib. 2 cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Comments thus Every thing so far as it is moved so far it is said pati to suffer Thence amongst the Greeks our Affections are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Passions and so are opposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to practice For the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Affection which is moved is moved by External objects and the Passive power as it is moveable is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But in the Action of Virtue albeit External objects concurr yet a good man is not absolutely moved by them as in the Affections but according to the dictate of right reason Therefore in the Affections the principle moving is External and the principle moved internal viz 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But in Virtues the object is External which of it self has no efficacie but as it is admitted by right reason The principle moved is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the passive power but the prinple Acting and moving is some good habit or Virtue And for this cause we are said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not to be moved for we consider not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the passive power in virtues but by Accident but we are said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be disposed by Virtues i. e. we are in some sort so framed that we may with facilitie act Virtuously 2.

VI. The several Distributions of Platonick Philosophie Platonick Philosophie as to it's Matter distributed into 1. Pythagorick 2. Heraclitick 3. Socratick 2. Into Contemplative and Active 3. Into Moral Natural and Rational 4. Into Theoretick and Practick This distribution suits not with Plato's Philosophie 5. The Adequate division of Platonick Philosophie 1. Into Organical which is Logick and 2. Essential which is 1. Natural wherein is comprized 1. Physicks both Contemplative and Active and 2. Mathematicks 2. Moral which is either Ethick Oeconomick or 3. Politick 3. Supernatural or Theologick § 1. HAving discoursed of Plato's Forme or Mode of Philosophizing we now proceed to the Matter of his Philosophie with it's traduction from the Jewish Church and sacred Scriptures Plato's Philosophie as to it's Matter in general admits of sundrie distributions 1. As to it 's Original it was reduced by the Ancients unto the Pythagorick Heraclitick and Socratick So Laertius in the Life of Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He mixed the Discourses or Reasons of the Heracliticks Pythagoricks and Socraticks For in sensibles he follows Heraclitus in Intelligibles Pythagoras in Politicks Socrates 1. That Plato collected the choicest materials of his Philosophie especially of his Theologie out of the Pythagorean has been before demonstrated chap. 3. sect 3. where we have shewn how he was instructed by Archytas the Tarentine Timaeus the Locrian Epicarmus and other Pythagoreans whilst he had his ●bo●e in Italie besides the Instructions he gain'd from Pythagorean Books Aristotle in his Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 6. stiles the Platonick Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in many things conformable to the Pythagoreans And Lud. Vives tells us that the Platonists as to Theologicks doe generally Pythagorize More particularly Plato Symbolizeth with and therefore seems to have derived from Pythagoras these following Notions namely 1. That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. according to his description Gen. 3.14 2. That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vnitie c. 3. That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One and many One in Divine Essence and many as to his Divine Ideas or Decrees 4. That all things are made Governed and Ordered by God 5. Plato follow 's Pythagoras exactly as to the constitution of Divine Worship and its Regulation by the Divine Will and Rites against all Images Superstition or Will-worship 6. Plato Symbolizeth with Pythagoras in Daemons and Daemon-worship 7. Plato held also with Pythagoras the Soul's Immortalitie Metempsychosis with other opinions of which see Book 2. chap. 8. Now that all these Pythagorick Principles were of Jewish origination has been sufficiently proved 2. As to Sensibles Plato is said to follow Heraclitus whose Philosophie as we may presume he suckt in from Cratylus Heraclitus's Disciple whom Plato after Socrates's death heard The maine Principles that Plato imbibed from the Heraclitick Philosophie referred to the first Principles of the Universe especially touching Fire which Heraclitus made to be the first great principle of all things wherein Plato very far Symbolized with him asserting that the Heavens were Fire of which hereafter Now that Heraclitus was according to Aristotle's Character of those Ancient Philosophers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that greatly affected and admired Oriental Jewish Traditions touching the first Origine of the Universe is evident by what Plutarch in the Life of Coriolanus reports of him where having discoursed of Gods Omnipotencie and man 's Incredulitie thereof he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Many of the Divine operations or traditions according to Heraclitus flie from our notice by reason of unbelief By which it seems evident that Heraclitus had some notices of and great reverence for the Oriental Jewish Traditions which I suppose he received if not immediately from these Oriental parts or persons from the Pythagoreans for he was but a branch of the Italick Sect with whom he Symbolized in many principles especially in that of Fire to be the great principle of all things as before chap. 7. sect 10.3 Laertius tells us that as to Politicks Plato followed his Master Socrates Apuleius de dogm Plat. addes that Plato received not only Moral but also Rational Philosophie from Socrates's fountain Yea Plato himself in his Dialogues attributes unto Socrates some of his Natural Philosophie By which it 's evident that this Distribution of Plato's Philosophie is not to be taken strictly but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for it 's evident that he received also from the Pythagoreans not only Theologick but also some Politick and Natural Principles as his Communitie from the Pythagorean Schole his Notions about the Origine of the Universe from Timaeus Locrus of which more hereafter Yea in all these both Sensibles Intelligibles and Morals Plato received much emprovement from Egypt c. as before § 2. A Second Distribution of Platonick Philosophie is into Contemplative and Active so Austin de Civit. Dei lib. 8. cap. 4. Therefore saies he seeing the studie of Wisdom consists in Action and Contemplation hence one part thereof may be said to be Active the other Contemplative whereof the Active appertains to the government of Life i. e. the institution of Manners but the Contemplative to the inspection of Natures causes and the most sincere Truth Socrates is reported to have excelled in the Active but Pythagoras to have insisted so far as his Intelligence would reach on the Contemplative Thence Plato joyning both together is commended for having perfected Philosophie thus Austin Indeed this Division of Philosophie into Contemplative and Active seems to have had it's foundation in the Jewish Scholes under their Babylonian transmigration especially amongst the Essenes who seeme to bave been the first that addicted themselves to Monastick life occasioned from their persecution which drew on this distribution of their life into Active and Contemplative whence Pythagoras traduced the same as before Book 2. chap. 6. § 7.8 Though we must confesse that none of the Ancients treat so fully and distinctly of Contemplative and Active Philosophie as Plato So in his de Repub. 2. he distributes Discipline into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gymnastick or Active and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Musick whereby he expresseth Contemplative Sciences Under the Gymnastick or Active Discipline he rangeth such virtues as conduce to practice or moralitie as Temperance Fortitude Justice c. Unto Musick or Contemplative Discipline he reduceth the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Musical Theoretick virtues which consist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Contemplation and the Queen of all he makes to be Religion whence he calls the Contemplation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Idea of the chiefest good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the highest Discipline c. Philo Judaus that great Platonist discourseth at large partly on Jewish partly on Platonick principles touching Contemplative and Active Philosophie Aristotle also seems to approve of the same distribution though under different termes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Practick and Theoretick Philosophie

the same with forced or not free and forced or not free that which has not its principle in its s●lf whence it necessarily follows 1. That Voluntarinesse is the same with Libertie 2. That Voluntarinesse and Libertie exclude not all kind of necessitie but only such as is coactive 3. That Voluntarinesse and Libertie include no more in their essent al Idea but a rational spontaneitie This is farther evident by Plato's Ideas of Voluntarines and Libertie Platon defin fol. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Voluntarie is that which moves it self according to judgment c. which is the same with the following definition of what is free 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is free which acts from it self This rational Spont●neitie or Libertie is stiled by Plato sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Soul-duction sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-service as also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-action Thus also Libertie is defined by the Stoicks Laert. in Zeno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Libertie is a power of self-action Whence the Greek Fathers Basil c. call free-will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-power and the Scripture useth a word of the like import 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-Election 2 Cor. 8.27 This self-moving power which is alone essential to Voluntarinesse or Libertie is expressed by Arist Eth. lib. 3. cap. 8. under this notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is in our power which we use so or so for which we are said to be voluntarie or free This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he makes only Essential to Libertie and Voluntarinesse is excellently well expressed by Epictetus and Simplicius on him Epict. Ench. cap. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The things in our power are the conception impetus appetition and extension of the Soul and in one word all our acts Simplicius here speaks forth Aristotle's mind as well as Epictetus's fully thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. He saies those things are in our power of which we are Masters and of which we have power Such are the internal motions of the Soul proceeding from our own judgment and Election So again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 When the Soul acts according to its own nature then it is moved freely and voluntarily internally from it self and from this spontaneitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what is free may be well defined Thus Simplicious who makes here all the natural acts of the Soul to be free 2. This freedom to consist in a rational spontaneitie or voluntarie motion of the soul Hence he proves at large in what follows p 23.24 Edit Salmas that all Necessitie is not contrarie to Libertie but only that which is Extrinsick Coactive and Compulsive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore we are to say that there is a twofold necessitie one contrarie to Libertie another consistent therewith Wherefore external necessitie destroyes Libertie for no one externally compelled is said to do or not to do any thing freely but all internal necessitie necessitating to act according to their own nature this does the more preserve Libertie For a self-moved according to the nature of a self-moved is necessarily moved by it self neither is it for this said to be moved by another for the necessitie is not external but complicated with the nature of the self-moved yea preservative thereof and conducing to its proper operations Thus Simplicius who gives us here an excellent description of humane Libertie and its Combination with internal voluntarie necessitie which if well understood and embraced would put an end to all those Scholastick clamours of the Pelagians and Jesuites against God's necessitating determining efficacious concurse which puts only an internal voluntarie not external coactive necessitie on the will and therefore is no way destructive to its Libertie But then Simplicius proceeds to demonstrate that a Libertie of Contrarietie as the Scholes term it or an Indifferencie to this or that is not essential to humane Libertie Take his own words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither must we needs say that in all things free-will Libertie supposeth a power of acting contraries for Souls which allwa●es adhere to good and choose good have both Free-will and Election for Election is not forced of that good without Ind●fferencie to the contrarie c. By which he fully proves that actual Ind●fferencie is not Essential to Libertie Thence he proceeds to prove that Libertie is essential to the will and an unseparable adjunct of every vital humane Act. So pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore they that destroy Libertie destroy the natural extension and constitution of the Soul c. So that nothing destroys Libertie but what destroys the natural inclination or Voluntarinesse of an human act This is farther evident by the following definition he gives of a free act Simp. in Epict. cap. 2. pag. 34. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is free which has the self-power and dominion of its own exercise This he farther explains in the same page thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is manifest that the things in our power are our proper acts and things not in our power but in the power of others are other mens acts Whence it apparently follows 1. That every human act of the Soul is in the Soul 's own power and so free albeit it be necessarily predetermin'd and act●ated by God's Efficacious concurse 2. That this Libertie of human acts implies nothing more as essential thereto but a Rational spontaneitie or voluntarie self-motion We have insisted the more largely on these notions of Simplicius about human Libertie and its identitie with Voluntarinesse because he seems of all Aristotle's commentators the best to understand his mind Farther that Aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which is in our power whereby he expresseth Libertie imports no more than voluntarinesse or Rational spontaneitie is evident from that excellent determination of Greg. Ariminensis in Sent. lib. 1. Dist 17. Q. 1. That an action be in the power of an Agent it is not necessarie that every principle be the forme of the Agent for then no act of the will whether good or evil would be in its power because God is the productive principle of every act Therefore I say that there is nothing more required to bespeak an action to be in the power of the Agent than that the action flow from his own will So also Austin That is in our power which willing we do The contemperation and consistence of God's Efficacious necessitating concurse with human Libertie is excellently set forth by Plutarch in the life of Coriolanus fol. 193. thus But in wondrous and extraordinarie things which are done by secret inspirations and motions Homer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doth not make God to take away human Election and Libertie but to move it and then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In which God makes not the action involuntarie but openeth the way to the will