necessary part of our Religion so must we resolutely do still or else we shall be worse than the Light of Nature teacheth Heathens themselves to be § 14. God hath many waies to cause the Effects of Sin without causing the Sin it self as by impediments to other waies by altering Recipients Objects Concauses and many others which I have elsewhere enumerated He can will and procure that Christ shall die by the sinful malice and action of the Iews without willing or causing their malice will or action as bad As he can procure a man to be in the way where a Murderer cometh with a disposition to murder and can direct the Bullet c. § 15. When one and the same word doth signifie both the Sin and the Effect of the Sin it occasioneth the error of men that cannot distinguish And so if the Scripture should say That God is the Cause of it they think it includeth the Sin with the Effect So Murder signifieth both the will and action of the Murderer and the death of the man murdered as the effect Absolom's Constuprations signifieth both his sinful will and action and the effect of both The revolt of the Israelites from Ieroboam the giving up of Kingdoms to the Beast and many such-like in Scripture are ascribed to God as the Cause not as the words signifie the sinful will and action of the Malefactor but only the produced effect of both saving when God's permission only is understood § 16. They that deride it as absurd that God should decree will and cause the Effect and not the Wills forbidden Act are too bold with God in measuring his Counsels and Actions by the rule of their vain Imaginations Yet many give us instead of Scripture and Reason but such a confident derision and say How absurd is it to say that God willed decreed and caused that Christ should be murdered and yet willed decreed or caused not that any should murder him That God should will and cause David's Concubines to be defiled and not will or cause that Absolom should defile them That He should will and cause the Kingdom to be rent from Rehoboam and yet not cause any one to will or do it c. But is all false that is not agreeable to their imagination Or is this a convincing way of reasoning It is not from imperfection but perfection that God doth not will or cause mens Sin But it is from his perfection that he causeth the effect as being the Lord and Ruler of the World Sin is not a capable Object of God's Volition or an effect which he can cause But the effect is God cannot love or cause Iudaâ—'s will or act in specie of betraying Christ nor the Iews will or act in murdering him But God can will and cause that Christ shall be betrayed and killed by such individual persons as he foreknew were by their wickedness disposed thereunto § 17. All good men have so deep a hatred of Sin and zeal for God's Holiness and confess that Sin is of the Devil and it is his special character to be the Author of it that when zeal against an Adversary in Disputation can yet make many put that character on God yea as the prime Efficient which is more than a Tempter and this as a part of the Honour of his Providence and think they serve God and his Truth by bitter reviling the contrary-minded it is a dreadful instance how far Faction and Contentious Zeal may carry men And yet when we see how carefully many avoid Sin when they have thus honoured it as God's work it is a notable instance how far good men may err in notions and yet practically hold the contrary truth and what great notional Errors must be pardoned to each other as they are pardoned of God § 18. God punisheth Sin with Sin without causing that Sin at all that is 1. He justly demeth his Grace to the rejecters of it and their Sin is the consequent of that Privation as a drunken man's wandering is to ones denying to lead him 2. God maketh it a punishment when man hath first made it a Sin q. d. If thou wilt commit such a Sin it shall have this penal nature and effect As if in the Law of Nature God decreed that excess of Drink or Meat should breed Sickness that taking a sweet Poison should torment you that Venery should bring the Pox that Prodigality shall impoverish men c. Here Man first maketh it a Sin and then God maketh it a Punishment And Sin it self being the deformity and misery of the Soul hath two relations at once in time the first in order of Nature is the sinfulness caused by Man and the second the penal relation caused by God whose Act indeed was antecedent in his Law of Nature making Nature such that it should so suffer if it will so do and yet the Effect is consequent to mans Act. CHAP. IX Of Natural Power and Free-will § 1. THE Glory of God on his Works is their expression of his Perfections by the Impression of them which he hath made And He hath communicated Being and Substantiality as the substratum and therein the Virtues of Vital Power Wisdom and Goodness or Love and these are his Image upon Man § 2. The more Power therefore a Creature hath the more he glorifieth the Power of God And the most powerful Creatures as the Sun do more shew forth his greatness than the most impotant Therefore to deny or extenuate any Power given of God is to dishonour him in his works So absurd is it to think that the Power ascribed to Man is dishonourable to God as if you took from the Workman all the Praise that you give to his Works § 3. All Man's Power is passive from GOD and superiour Causes but it is naturally active as to things inferiour and in it self § 4. God endued man at first with a threefold Power 1. Natural 2. Moral 3. Political which is a Ruling Power over Inferiours § 5. Man's Power was partly essential or inseparable and partly accidental or separable 1. To have the three Powers or Faculties of Vital Activity Intellection and Will is essential and Man cannot be a Man without them But to have these in promptitude and strength is but as health or strength to the Body a separable thing 2. To have some moral Power to know and desire and practise some moral Good it seemeth is inseparable from Man in via for all men naturally have some notitiae communes and differencing sense of moral Good and Evil Else men should be as bad as Devils But to be truly Holy was separable as Health and so was lost 3. To have some superiority over Brutes and Parents over their Children it seems is inseparable or is not separated for it continueth in Nature But the true Majesty of this superiority was lost by Sin § 6. No Creature hath any Power but what is totally derived from God and
no Cause nor Dependance upon any Creature § 12. But there are other Acts of God's justice which are comprized in Reprobation or Rejection as the word is commonly understood As 1 Cutting off a sinner untimely in his Impenitency 2. Denying him some inward helps of Grace which once he had or was fair for so far as that is quid positivum and depriving him positively of some Means of Grace for his sinful refusal or abuse or for abuse of other Means and Mercies And all these punishments God so far decreeth as he Executeth which is upon none but such as by sin against the Law of Grace deserve them § 13. But where Negations are no Punishments nor Privations they fall not under the notion of Positive Effects or Objects and so are not fit to denominate a Positive Decree or Will Therefore when it is not a Punishment Not to give Faith Repentance Preaching c. is no act of Reprobation As not to give that Faith Repentance and Pardon which he needed not to Adam in Innocency not to give them in act to Infants c. § 14. Yea when a Penal Privation is only the consequent of God's not Acting and not of any Positive Act there the Ratio Poenae is of God and is quid positivum and God causeth it by that Law which did make the debitum poenae But yet the Negation or Privation in which it consisteth is Nothing or nothing of God's causing and therefore not fit to denominate a distinct Decree e. g. Not to give special Grace Pardon Iustification Glory to Iudas is nothing and so as nothing not the object of a positive Decree But both the positive acts by which any Mercy is withdrawn and also the relation of Punishment which is in these Nothings or Privations is caused by God and therefore Decreed by him As if God say This shall be his punishment that will not Eat that he shall die of Famine Here not eating is nothing but the penal reason which is in Famine which is but the privation of Meats resulteth from the Law of Nature and will of God § 15. By all this it appeareth that Election and Reprobation go not pari passu or are not equally ascribed to God For in Election God is the Cause of the means of Salvation by his Grace and of all that truly tendeth to procure it But on the other side God is no cause of any sin which is the means and merit of Damnation nor the Cause of Damnation but on the supposition of Man's sin So that sin is foreseen in the Person Decrâ—e'd to Damnation but not Caused seeing the Decree must be denominated from the Effect and Object But in Election God decreeth to give us his Grace and be the chief Cause of all our Holiness and doth not elect us to Salvation on foresight that we will do his Will or be Sanctiâ—ied by our selves without him Therefore Augustin Prosper and Fulgentius still make this difference That the decree of Damnation goeth on foresight of sin but the Decree of Salvation containeth a Decree to give that Grace that shall certainly Save us An ANSWER TO Mr. Polehill's Exceptions about Futurition SIR IAm much chidden already for writing many Books and Answering so many that object and am told That if the Case well Stated will not satisfie men no Answer will do it bâ—eause it is for want of their Receptive Capacity which long and right Studies must help them to and not a meer Answer to their Objections I very highly value the worthy Gentleman whose Papers you sent me hearing of few if any among us more commended for Knowledge and Piety The question is but whether it be he or I that by half confused conceptions of the matters in question speaketh in the Dark or which of us hath the more ripe digested and ordered thoughts hereof And must others be troubled with such Cases It is those that he pleadeth for that have made the edge of the Razor so thin that they or I do Cut our Fingers with it and have spun such subtile Notions which if their wits when they have done be not subtile enough to manage they will oft slip through or be as Spiders Webs As to the first Controversie of Futurity or Possibility this Gentleman's method will do me no good being no whit fitted to that which I expect I should expect from him that he had taken notice of my Distinctions and Explications â—f Futurity and that he had directly pleaded only for that sort or sence which I deny and had Answer'd the Reasons which both in the First and Second Part I bring against it But it is not so And to Dispute at such rates is but to try who shall live longest to have the last word it being easie at this rate to talk against one another as long as we live which I cannot expect and therefore shall give any man herein the best All that he hath said against me is materially Answered in the Book already and if he perceive it not how can I help that More Books are not like to do it nor have I leisure for such tasks Yet briefly I return I. As to my sence of the words Future and Possible 1. As they are predicated of the thing future or possible they are termini diminuentes quod realitatem existentem and futurity as it is rei ipsius futuritio is nothing 2. Whether Time be any thing distinct à re durante or Nothing is a Controversie which I conjecture Mr. P 's Pen and mine are never like to decide It is enough for me now to say that I take it for nothing Distinct 3. Yet shallow man that seeth not uno intuitu the Universe as God doth nor hath his essential Eternity is in motion where there is mensura motus and must think of things by partial Conceptions and must make past present and future his differing Notions in Duration 4. The internal Conceptâ—â— in man of a thing as future that it will be is quid reale for it is an act of the mind and a Verâ—um mentis and an act dâ— niâ—ilâ— A mental Negation is a real act To think and say in the mind the World was not from Eternity Darkness Death c. are nothing are real thoughts 5. The verâ—â—â— prolatum ore vel scripto sin will be c. the Suâ— will rise c. is quid reale It is a Word a Proposition 6. The fundamentum or premises from which such a Conclusion may be fetch'd iâ— quid reale e. g. God's Will or Knowledge or any necessitating Cause 7. God that knoweth man knoweth all his mental Conceptions and his Propositions de futuro without Imperfection knowing our Imperfection and so knoweth whether they are true or false 8. God's willing and knowing that things were are or will be are all one ex parte Dei being nothing but his simple perfect Essence thus knowing and willing But ex parte rei cognitae aut
of the aptitude of your Phrase I suppose we differ not about the thing intended as long as you hold no eternal Accidents or Composition in God and that nothing is eternal but himself which I must think you do in Charity If you take futuritio rei for the modus or relation of a humane Conception or Assertion de futuris I suppose we shall not differ de re nor will you say that it is eternal 3. If you speak but suppositively that if there had been such a conceptus or Assertion from Eternity it would have been true we differ not 4. If you take Futurition extra mentem to be any thing Substance Mode Accident or any Reality or aliquid rei and that from Eternity I deny it and say That they that make an universal Spirit and they that make Matter and Motion to be eternal with God are more excusable than they that make a thing called Futurity distinct from God yea the Futurity of Sin to be eternal and God the eternal Cause of that eternal Effect I purposed at the first glance to have answered the second Paper also about God's decreeing Sin but when I had read it I was unwilling 1. Because it is but too largely answered materially in my Book already and more fully in old Papers that lie by me which I cannot transcribe 2. Because I hear so much Good of the worthy Author that I am not willing to be drawn to dispute a Case which cannot be handled justly without opening so much Evil in that which I must oppose as will sound harsh towards one that I so much honour Men are so apt to feel that as touching themselves which is spoken to their Cause If Hobbes who wrote the Treatise of Necessity against Bishop Bramhall had sent me that Paper I should readily have answer'd it But here I fear it Only I tell the Author that I have been as strongly tempted that way as most others and do acknowledge that it is the greatest difficulty in all these Controversies to conceive how free will can act otherwise than God doth predetermine it But I am satisfied in the Solution and fully satisfied that the Predeterminant Opinion which I oppose doth certainly inferr the Religion of Hobbes the denial of Christianity and leaves us no Religion but that Good and Evil Happiness and Misery are Differences all made by God himself as Light and Darkness Angels and Serpents are made to differ by him And I am not willing to let go Christianity 〈…〉 such Objections as these And it had been m 〈…〉 that he had answered what I have said to Alvarâ— Mr. Sterry c. on this Subject and taken notice of my Answers to the most of his His talk of Casualty is his sum by which if he mean that which had not a predetermined Cause Sin is casual till the Sinner determine his own will But if he mean that which is unknown to God it is not casual And the Assertion That such things are not knowable to God I have confuted at large which he here taketh no notice of If I shall find that Necessity make it my duty to give any such Paper a particular Answer if I have time I may do it But I think enough is said of that already and my leisure from better work is small RI. BAXTER CHAP. VII Of God's Providence and predetermining Premotion and Miracles § 1. THE word Providence is variously used by Writers Sometimes as comprehending God's fore-knowledge and decrees themselves Sometimes as comprehending all his Works Sometimes as comprehending all his works which follow the Creation And sometimes as signifying only his effective disposal of Persons and Things in Motions and Alterations as dictinct from Legislation which only maketh Duty and Right § 2. In CREATION God Glorified his Three Essential Principles or Attributes 1 His Omnipotency eminently in giving BEING to all things 2. His Wisdom eminently in the ORDER and Composure of all 3. His Love or Goodness eminently in the GOODNESS and Wellfare of all For he made them Good and then Rested Yet so as that all these Attributes were glorified in each part of the Effect § 3. From hence a posteriore he is in the one Relation of CREATOR Related triply to the World and specially to the Rational part That is 1. As the MAKER of things which is Creator in the narrow sence 2. As ORDINATOR 3. As BENEFACTOR And thus he is the Author of NATURE § 4. From this fundamental Relation of CREATOR and the nature of the Creature made and continued by Conservation which is a continued Creation or Efficiency there resulteth a threefold Right and further Relation to God 1. A Ius Dominii or Right of PROPRIETY and so he is our OWNER and may do with all things what he will and must be the disposer of Events 2. His Ius Imperii including Doctrine or Right of Government which to things meerly Natural is Natural Government and to Moral Agents it is Moral Government by Doctrine Laws and Executions And so he is our KING or RULER 3. His Ius Amoris ut finis or Right to be the end of all and by the Ratiâ—nal Creature to be chiefly Loved and absolutely for Himself as the Best and most Amiable and so he is our ultimate END Where LOVE is considered not only as an act of Obedience to a Rector as all other duties are but eminently as it is the final perfective Act of man closing with the final Object and so above the common nature of meer Obedience § 5. All God's after works and all our Duties to him must be observed as respecting all these Relations of God to us and our answerable Relations to him For therein is the Nature Order and Harmony of them discerned to be Glorious And unskillful confounding them is a spoiling and prophaning or dishonouring of them And thus the various acts of Providence must be set each in its proper place § 6. God being the fons naturae and having settled the frame of Nature or created Beings and second Causes in a fixed state and order in which one thing is united to another and adapted to its proper work in concurrence with the whole we must not expect that God do ordinarily violate this his established Course For his Works shall shew somewhat of his Constancy and Experience telleth us that really thus He doth § 7. But we must not dream that God is involuntarily tied to his own Work or hindered by second Causes or the course of Nature from doing what He would but His free-will delighteth it self in this Constancy and ordered Course of Nature and use of second Causes which have still all their being force and order continued by Him § 8. And the number and operations of second Causes are so unknown to us that when things seem Miracles to us it is hard for us to say that God useth no second Cause in effecting them But it is enough to the use of Miracles to
know that their extraordinary production hath an answerable extraordinary use and signification of God's Will § 9. And no doubt but Nature and all its parts are absolutely in the Power and Government of God's Will And He can and doth turn things up and down as He pleaseth without making any breach in his established Order If the Husbandman can turn the course of Rivers to water his Grounds by meer Impediments and Receptivities without any alteration of the natural motion of the Water how much more must we ascribe to God in using Nature without overthrowing it § 10. It is Atheistical or absurd to set God and Nature in opposition competition or separation and to say as some Philosophers This or That natural Causes can do without calling in God as the Determiner Whereas natural Causes are nothing and do nothing but by God And there is no less of God in the effects of Nature than if He did the same himself alone In Him we Live and Move and Are. § 11. And it is no better in them that say that God doth not operate proximately and immediately where Nature or second Causes work but only remotely As immediately signifieth without any medium or second Cause so God doth not then work immediately But as it signifieth proximately He doth For an infinite being cannot be essentially distant from any Creature or Effect Nor is it possible that the second Cause can be nearer to the Effect than God who is as near as if he used no such Cause § 12. And the Dispute Whether God do proximately effect immediatione suppositi or only virtutis seemeth to have a false supposition viâ— That God's Virtue is not his suppositum and that the virtus divina may be where the suppositum is noâ— If by suppositum they mean God's Essence as Essence existing and by virtus they mean his Essence under the formal notion of Power Wisdom and Love then they are but two inadequate Conceptions of the same simple Being and therefore God thus ever operateth immediatione essentiae virtutis essentialis But if they mean that God hath â— virtus which is neither his Essence nor a Creature we believe them not § 13. The Controversie between Durandus and his Followers and the Jesuites and Dominicans about the necessity of a moving Concourse besides the support of Nature seemeth to me thus reconcileable 1. God as he is fons naturae is the Living God the prime Active Principle who by constant vital Activity is the Spring of all the Action in the World and is not to be dreamt of as one that had made the World and then left it to it self and withdrew his hand and is fallen asleep 2. But the Living God moveth not all things alike but every thing according to its nature and place for his Influx is received ad modum racipientium 3. The Nature of some Creatures is essentially Active and so inclined to act that they will act if their Nature be not by others or want of concurrent Necessaries hindered Such is every Soul or living Principle and Fire And other Creatures are naturally Passive only ex se or at least principally So that for God to continue Fire or Souls or any naturally-active Principle is to continue a nature essentially inclined to move or act 4. It is supposed that these Natures are not solitary but parts of the universe and are continued with all necessary circumstant Beings and Objects and that the whole frame of Nature and cooperating Causes are continued e. g. That the Sun doth not stand still while the Life of a Plant or Brute is continued 5. All this being supposed by Durandus Aureolus a Dola and all sober men the Question debated is Whether there be further necessary another immediate Divine Motion or Concourse to every motion of a Creature natural or free besides all this aforesaid And 1. Let it be consider'd that God's Essence being but one his Act which ex parte agentis is his Essence is not distinguishable saving ex connotatione effectus And if this be all that is meant That as ipse motus distinguitur a causis so God's Will Power and Agency may be distinctly denominated 1. As from the second Causes and 2. also from the Motion it self as more than the Causes this none can deny nor is it a Controversie But if the question be of the necessity of another distinct way of Divine Causation of the motus besides that by second Causes before mentioned they can prove no such necessity For is it mediate or immediate Causation or Efficiency which they mean we speak not of immediate as it signifieth proximate which is granted but as signifying sine causis secundis If it be mediate by second Causes that God must further concurr those are natural Causes or some other if natural it 's a contradiction to say that Besides God's moving by natural Causes which is granted he must also move by natural Causes as if Ideâ— were not Idem Unless they will say it must be by some other natural Causes which they do not nor can assign nor yet any other that are not natural But if they mean that to every motion there must be an immediate operation of God to it withoâ—â— that which he doth by second Causes even by God alone without any second Cause I then ask Doth God move any thing in the World by any second Cause or not If not then not by the Sun not the Coach by the Horses the Arrow by the Bow the Stone by the Hand the Pen by the Writer c. If yea then is it the whole or part only of that motion which is made by second Causes and God by them If the whole habetur quaesitum If part how prove you that God cannot make the whole motion himself by second Causes as well as part but must needs leave the other part of the same motion to be done without second Causes And it would follow that no second Cause no not the noblest in the World as the Sun and God as acting by it hath and exerciseth à vis adequata to the smallest motion even of a Leaf Whereas God in Nature maketh natural Power with his own as he is fons naturae adequate to its Actions And let unbyassed Reason judge Whether if a Rock should be held up in the Air if God conâ—inue the natural Gravity of it with all the rest of the frame of Nature could not that Rock fall without another motion of God which is without any second Cause to thrust it down If He continue the nature of Fire was it not a greater Miracle that it burnt not the three Witnesses Dan. 3. than to have burnt them or than its ordinary Action Why else should there need ten thousand fold more natural Power to hold up the said Rock or to quench a City on fire or to stop a River or the Winds than to move them supposing natural Causes if there need an
Miracles Therefore a Servant of Christ may most comfortably suffer Martyrdome for his testimony to the Deity Christianity the Life-to-come or Charity and Justice against Malice and Persecution and Cruelty which even a Miracle would not justifie more than for a disputable Opinion § 20. It 's a great Question How a true Prophet might be known antecedently before his Prophecy was fulfilled And it 's of great moment to consider the difference between a Legislative Prophet and a meer particular Message Moses and CHRIST the Legislators confirmed their Laws and Word by multitudes of uncontrouled Miracles For Life and Death lay upon mens Obedience or Disobedience to them And if a Prophet did reprove any Sin against that Law the Miracles that confirmed the Law did justifie them But if it were but a Prophecy about some other temporal Event as Ieremy's of the Captivity it needed no Miracle for it was but a temporal Suffering that followed the not believing them The Law of God which should here be handled I shall speak of afterward CHAP. VIII Of God's causing or not causing Sin § 1. HOw certainly the Doctrine of the necessity of immediate efficient physical predetermining Premotion doth make God the principal Cause of all Sin I have so oft shewed and so fully proved that I shall here be very short upon that Subject § 2. To say that God is the principal determining Cause of every sinful act with all its Objects and Circumstances called the materiale peccati and also the Cause of the Law that forbiddeth it and the Person that committeth it is to make him the chief Cause of Sin as far as it is capable of a Cause even of the formal Cause § 3. To say That such a Cause is the Cause only of the Act but not of the Obliquity is absurd because the obliquity is a Relation necessarily resulting from the Law and Act with all its modes and circumstances And the obliquity can have no other Cause § 4. To say That God willeth and loveth and causeth Sin not as Sin but for good ends and uses is to say no more for God than may be said for wicked men if not for Devils save only that God's Ends are better than theirs § 5. To say That God willeth not Sin but the Existence and Futurity of Sin is but as aforesaid to say that He wills not Sin as Sin or sub ratione â—ali but that it exist for better ends or else it is a contradiction For to will or cause Sin is nothing else but to will and cause the existence of Sin § 6. They that say That God willeth the Existence of Sin as it is summe conducibile to the Glory of his Justice and Mercy yea and that per se and not only per accidens do wrong the Glory of God's Holiness and Wisdom A Physician can love his own skill and compassion and the honour that cometh to him by curing a Disease without loving or willing the Disease it self but only supposing it as an Evil which he can turn to Good § 7. They that say That God is the Cause indeed of our Sin but is no Sinner himself because he is under no Law say nothing in the latter but what all grant and nothing in the former but what God's Church doth commonly abhorr excepting some few singular presumers § 8. They that hold That God doth by immediate physical efficient predetermining Premotion principally and unresistibly cause every sinful act with all its modes and circumstances do certainly deny all certainty of Faith and so subvert all Christianity For the formal Object of all Divine Faith is God's Veracity that God cannot lye if God could lye our Belief could have no certainty Now God speaketh to us but by inspired men and not by an essential voice of his own And if God cause as aforesaid all the Lyes that ever were spoken by Men or Devils in the World then no man can be sure that he doth not so by Prophets and Apostles or that ever they say true And God's Veracity then is gone § 9. They that think â—o evade this Evidence by the difference of Predetermination and Inspiration and say God inspireth no Lyes though he predetermine all by physical Premotion do labour in vain For 1. No man can ever prove that any Inspiration doth interest God more in the Act or Lye than physical Predetermination doth For how can God be more the Author of any Act than by effectual premoving the Creature to act it and that by immediate physical Predetermination What doth Inspiration do but so move the Mind Will and Tongue of a Prophet No man can name more that Man is capable of 2. But if there were a difference we are not capable of understanding that difference so well as to prove that God can cause all the Lyes in the World by predetermining Premotion and yet can cause none by Inspiration shall none believe him that know not this difference 3. And were it intelligible it would be only to inspired men themselves So that I am past doubt that we must part with all Certainty of Christianity and of all Divine Belief if we receive this Doctrine of Predetermination because the objectum formals fidei is then gone § 10. They that say that if we make not God the Predeterminer to every act in specie morali and in every comparative respect and mode we shall make Man a God by making him a Causa prima do thereby as much conclude God to be the first and principal predetermining efficient Cause of every wicked Habit as of Malignity or Hatred of God c. because a Habit hath as much Entity as an Act Therefore if it deifie Man to make him the first Cause e. g. of a Lye or Murder in specie then so it will do to make him the first Cause of the Habit. § 11. If it be as impossible for Man to do any thing but what he doth or not to do all that he doth without God's foresaid predetermining Premotion as it is to be Gods or to overcome God or make a World then if Men are counted Sinners and condemned it is for not doing such impossibilities for not doing what God alone can do or for not overcoming Almighty premoving Power § 12. â—t cannot rationally be expected that they that believe that God is the chief Cause and Willer of all Sin should think it very bad or themselves bad for it or that when God hath unresistibly made all men to sin he yet hateth it and sent his Son into the World to testifie his Hatred by dying for it and that he is serious in all that he saith against it in his word nor that such men should hate it and rather die than sin § 13. Therefore as the Church of God hath ever abhorred to make God the Cause of Sin and kept up the sence of the Evil of Sin for our hatred of it and departing from it and our Humiliation as a
man can do any more good than he doth and so That he hath no meerlysufficient Grace to any one act in all his life § 28. The Controversie about sufficient Grace is the same in the true meaning of it with that of the Power of Mans Free-will For when by sufficient Grace we mean nothing but the enabling a Man to the act or giving him Power to do it the stress of the Question is Whether Man hath truly any Power to do more than he doth For if he have such a Power Grace hath given it him if it be for a Work that Grace is needful to So that indeed were it not for Custom and Expectation this Question should be handled under that of the Power and Liberty of Man's Will § 29. No man hath at the present Grace sufficient for his Salvation if he have longer time to live Because the Grace or help of the present hour is not sufficient for the next but there must be continual Supplies from God supposing that we distinguish of Grace by the distinct numerical acts and hours for and in which we need it But if you distinguish of Grace by the species of Acts for which it is needful and not by the numerical acts then it may be truly said that the same Grace in specie which a Believer hath to day may be sufficient to his Salvation or to his life's end § 30. But if you speak de gradu that Grace may be sufficient to one thing which is not sufficient to another And so 1. An Infidel may have Grace sufficient to forbear some Sin or avoid some Temptation or use some means that tendeth to Faith and Repentance who hath not Grace sufficient to believe and repent unto Salvation 2. A man may have Grace sufficient to enable him to believe and repent unto Justification and yet not have at that instant Grace sufficient to enable him to love God above all as God with a fixed habitual Love and to live an holy life for the Spirit and Sanctification are promised on condition of Faith and Repentance 3. A sanctified man that is yet but weak may have Grace sufficient to live to God a holy life at present and yet not have Grace sufficient for greater trials of Duty and Temptation And therefore Augustine and all his Followers still say That the Grace of Perseverance is a Gift over and above the Grace of meer Sanctification in the weakest degree § 31. By all this it is evident that he that disputeth of the sufficiency of Grace must first distinctly tell us 1. Whether he mean extrinseck Grace or intrinseck 2. If extrinseck Whether he mean it comprehensively of all extrinseck Grace together or only of some particular part of sort 3. If the latter Whether he speak of the sufficiency of Christ's Death and Righteousness Sacrifice Merit Intercession c. or of the sufficiency of the Gospel-Covenant or Promise or of the sufficiency of Preaching Praying and other means or of the Scripture-Records c. 4. If he speak of intrinseck Grace Whether the Question be of Sufficiency ex parte Dei agentis which none must question or ex parte effecti 5. If the latter What is the effect whose sufficiency he questioneth 1. Is it a Grace or Power to do some more common good use some means forbear some evil as the Unregenerate may do 2. Or is it a Power truly to repent and believe 3. Or to love God habitually and live holily 4. Or to overcome greater Temptations and persevere 6. And he must tell you whether he speak 1. De specie whether the Grace or Power sufficient to this sort of Acts or Duty be sufficient to another or to all 2. Or de gradu Whether this degree be sufficient against a greater degree or sort of Temptation 3. Or as men use to distinguish Grace and Help by numerical Acts and Hours Whether the Grace of this Hour and Act be sufficient for the next or for all The sence of all these Questions is distinct 7. But his last and greatest difficulty will be to tell you truly and plainly what is that Grace which is the subject of his Question of its sufficiency in the general nature of it and as related to the thing which it is called sufficient to § 32. For by Grace he meaneth 1. Either somewhat ex parte Dei agentis 2. Or ex parte effecti or 3. Quid medium 1. Grace as it is in God the Agent 2. Or as it is in Man the Recipient 3. Or as it is somewhat between both § 33. I. Grace as it is in God is nothing but his Essence not as Essence but as an essential Power Intellect and Will denominated by Connotation from the effect This is commonly agreed on God doth operate per essentiam and not by Accidents § 34. II. If they mean any mediate thing between God and the Effect either they speak of the first effect or a second and so on If they speak but of secondary effects and the meaning be only whether one effect be a sufficient Cause for another they mean either an outward or an inward Grace or Effect If an outward then the sence of the Question is Whether some other Work of God be sufficient to move the Will of Man And then it must be told what other Work you mean Whether an Angel or the Planets or the Word or Preacher or an outward Mercy or Affliction or what it is But if you speak of the very first effect then the fancy is almost proper to Aureolus among the Schoolmen to think that there is something from God antecedent to the Creature and Motion which may be called Action or Energy or Efflux which is neither the Creator nor a Creature neither Cause substantial nor Effect but Causation As if some Beam of Virtue or Force went from God to produce every Creature and Motion which is neither God nor the Creature or Motion But this is commonly and justly rejected as feigning a third sort of Entity between God and the Creature which it passeth the wit of Man to conceive of what it should be ☞ And if God do immediately per essentiam cause that middle Entity or Action or Force which he saith is no Creature why may he not as well immediately per essentiam cause the Creature and motion it self This therefore cannot be the thing meant by Grace in this Question To question the sufficiency of God's Essence is intolerable To question the sufficiency of a mediate divine Efflux or Action which is between God and the Creature and Effect is to dispute in your Dream of a Chimera an unproved and a disproved and commonly-denied Entity To dispute of the sufficiency of Angels Scripture Sermons c. to work Grace is not the thing commonly intended in this Controversie of Grace Each several sort of means may be sufficient in its own kind and to its own use but no one of them is sufficient to the
out of their Churches which should be the Porch of Heaven is the way to be shut out themselves of the heavenly Jerusalem If those that have long reproached me as unfit to be in their Church and said ex uno disce omnes with their Leader find any unsound or unprofitable Doctrine here I shall take it for a great favour to be confuted even for the good of others excluded with me when I am dead Jan. 21. 1691. Richard Baxter THE CONTENTS Chap. 1. HOW to conceive of GOD. Pag. i. Chap. 2. How to conceive of the Trinity in Unity p. vii Chap. 3. How to conceive of the Hypostatical Union and Incarnation p. xxiii Chap. 4. How to conceive of the Diversity of God's Transient Operations p. xxx Chap. 5. Whether any point of Faith be above 〈◊〉 contrary to Reason p. xxxii Chap. I. Prefatory Who must be the Iudge of Controversies The true Causes of the Divisions of Christians about Religion p. 1◠Chap. 2. The Doctrines enumerated about which they chiefly disagree p. 22 Chap. III. Of God's Will and Decrees in general Th. Terms and several Cases opened p. 2◠Chap. IV. Of God's Knowledge and the Differenc◠about it p. 4◠Chap. V. Of Election and the Order of Intentio◠and Execution p. 3◠Chap. VI. Of Reprobation or the Decree of Damnation the Objects and their Order p. 4◠An Answer to Mr. Polhill of Futurition p. 4◠Chap. VII Of God's Providence and predetermining Premotion Of Durandus's way p. 7◠Chap. VIII Of the Cause of Sin What God doth and doth not about it p. 82 Chap. IX Of Natural Power and Free-will p. 89 Chap. X. Of Original Sin as from Adam and nearer Parents p. 94 Chap. XI Of our Redemption by Christ what it doth how necessary p. 89 Chap. XII Of the several Laws and Covenants of God p. 99 Sect. 1. Of the Law or Covenant of Innocency made to Adam Divers Cases p. 113 Sect. 2. Of the Law of Mediation or Covenant with Christ When and what it was p. 121 Sect. 3. Of the Law or Covenant of Grace in the first edition What it was p. 126 Sect. 4. Of the same Law with Abraham's Covenant of Peculiarity and the Mosaical Iewish Law of Works p. 132 Sect. 5. Of the Law or Covenant of Grace in the last edition the Gospel Divers Cases about it opened p. 138 Chap. XIII Of the universality and sufficiency of Grace What Grace is How far universal and sufficient p. 154 Chap. XIV Of Man's Power and Free-will since the Fall Adrian's Saying That an unjustified man may love or chuse God's Being before his own What to ascribe to Grace and what to Free-will in good p. 173 Chap. XV. Of Effectual Grace and how God giveth it Doubts resolved p. 181 Chap. XVI Of the state of Heathens and such others as have not the Gospel What Law the Heathen World is under and to be judged by Whether any of them are justified or saved The Heathens were the Corrupters of the old Religion and the Jews of the Reformed Church Mal. 1. 14 15. and Sodom's Case c. considered p. 188 Chap. XVII Of the necessity of Holiness and of Moral Virtue p. 203 Chap. XVIII Of the necessity of Faith in Christ where the Gospel is made known p. 212 Chap. XIX Of the state of Infants as to Salvation and Church-membership p. 216 Chap. XX. Of the nature of Saving-Faith its Description and Causes p. 226 Chap. XXI Of justifying Righteousness Iustification and Pardon The several sences of the words and several sorts of them Our common Agreement about them p. 238 Chap. XXII Of the Imputation of Righteousness Christ's righteousness in what sence ours and imputed and in what sence not p. 256 Chap. XXIII How Faith justifieth and how it is imputed for Righteousness Several questions about it Repentance c. resolved p. 267 Chap. XXIV Of Assurance of our Iustification and of Hope What Assurance is desirable What attainable What Assurance we actually have Who have it The nature and grounds of it Whether it be Divine Faith p. 279 Chap. XXV Of Good works and Merit And whether we may trust to any thing of our own 1. What are Good Works 2. Whether they are necessary to our Iustification or Salvation 3. Whether they are rewardable or meritorious 4. What is their place use and necessity 5. Whether to be trusted to p. 282 Chap. XXVI Of Confirmation Perseverance and danger of falling away 1. Whether all Grace given by Christ be such as is never lost 2. Whether that degree be ever lost which to Infants or Adult giveth but the posse credere 3. Whether any lose actual justifying Faith 4. Or the Habit of Divine Love and Holiness 5. Whether some degree of this may be lost 6. If Holiness be not actually lost is the loss possible 7. Whether there be a state of Confirmation above the lowest Holiness which secureth Perseverance 8. Or doth Perseverance depend only on Election and God's Will 9. Whether all most or many Christians are themselves certain of their Perseverance 10. I◠such Certainty fit for all the justified 11. Is it unfit for all and doubting a more safe condition 12. Doth the Comfort of most Christians rest upon the Doctrine of Certainty to persevere 13. Doth the Doctrine of eventual Apostasie inferr Mutability in God 14. Why God hath left the point so dark 15. What was the Iudgment of the ancient Churches herein 16. Is it of such weight as to be necessary to our Church-Communion Love and Concord p. 300 Chap. XXVII Of Repentance late Repentance the time of Grace and the unpardonable sin p. 314 BOOKS Printed for and Sold by Iohn Salusbury at the Rising Sun in Cornhil A Rational Defence of Nonconformity wherein the Practice of Nonconformists is vindicated from promoting Popery and ruining the Church imputed to them by Dr. Stillingfleet Bishop of Worcester in his Unreasonableness of Separation Also his Arguments from the Principles and Way of the Reformers and first Dissenters are answered And the case of the present Separation truly stated and the blame of it laid where it ought to be and the way to Union among Protestants is pointed at By Gilbert Rule D. D. The Christian Laver Being two Sermons on John 13. 8. opening the nature of Participation with and demonstrating the necessity of Purification by Christ. By T. Cruso Six Sermons on various occasions By T. Cruso in 4◠The Conformists Sayings or the Opinion and Arguments of Kings Bishops and several Divines assembled in Convocation A new Survey of the Book of Common-Prayer An END of Doctrinal Controversies c. CHAP. 1. How we may and must conceive of GOD. § 1. A True Knowledge of God is necessary to the Being of Religion and to Holiness and Glory No man can love obey trust or hope beyond his knowledge Nothing is so certainly known as God and yet nothing so defectively known Like our Knowledge of the Sun of which no man doubteth
nothing but God as Agent vel in hoc modo as a Creature in motion differeth modally from the same quiâ—sant But God hath no Modus which is not Himself though not an adequate Conception of himself You must not conceive of God as of a Creature which first by self-motion altereth it self or is moved by another and then moveth another thing But God diversifieth things without diversity and changeth things being himself unchanged § 8. V. As to the Controversie Whether God make and move things only Volendo as Bradâ—ardine and many others say or also Executive agendâ— by excited Power Quoad reâ—â— both are true because Power and Will in God are really the same But as to our Conception and Expression it is a fuller expression to say that he doth it by Will and Power because our Conception of mâ—er Volition is as of quid immanens which doth not efficiently go forth of it self but command in Man the executive Faculties and so conceiving of God after the manner of men Volition is not an adequate conception of his causing Efflux without Active Power But they that conceive of Volition as transient and potently efficient do mean the same thing and really differ not from others § 9. VI. God's Will as it is his Essence hath really no parts no division no change no priority or posteriority but perfect Simplicity and Eternity § 10. VII God's will as it is himself hath no Cause but is the Cause of every Creature And to ask a Cause of the first Cause is absurd § 11. VIII All the effects of God's Will ad extra have their divers natures orders and seasons priority posteriority or simultaneity which we may sobeâ—ly enquire after § 12. IX God's will though but one as related to the objects and effects may by us be diversly denominated And so we distinguish of his Creating will and his Redeeming will his will to Save and his will to Damn his will to save Peter and his will to save Iohn and so of all the rest of the Objects In all which we mean not a Diversity of Essences or Faculties in God or Acts ex parte agentis really differing but only one and the same Will diversly conceived of and denominated by reason of the diversity of objects or effects to which it is related and so by Connotation the Will it self is thus distinguished § 13. X. This distinction and denomination of God's will hath extrinsick Reasons which some call Causes from the various termini as the same Light shining into several Rooms the diversity being real only ex parte recipientis And so God's Will may be said in this Sence to begin and to end to have diversity priority and posteriority of Acts which are all to be judged of by the Order of the Objects § 14. XI The great question which the Schoolwits trouble themselves with and Vasquez with abundance more pronounce unsearchable and past our reach is What is the Cause that God's Will is terminated thus or thus on this Object rather than on that To which I take the boldness to answer for the ending of that Dispute By the Reason of Termination you must mean either 1. The Reason of the Being of that Object or Terminus rather than another or 2. The reason of the Relation of God's Will to that terminus rather than another and so of the denomination or 3. The reason of the being of that Act of God so terminated 1. For the first the cause of all the effects of God's Will is his Will it self And so of all the diversities effected 2. The reason of the Relation of God's Will to those effects and so of the connotation and denomination is the Will and the Effect as from which the relation doth result 3. And the Being or Act of the Will thus terminated is God's essence which hath no Cause And what would you have more § 15. But this satisfieth not Men that still think of God as of themselves but they go on still and ask What is the Cause that God's Will 〈…〉 to make this World or Creature rather than another or to give the first grace rather to one than to another that his Will is terminated rather on Peter than Judas in election c. But I must but call you back to consider again distinctly of what was answered before 1. The Cause of all the effects of Creation c. is God's Will 2. The cause why his Will is related to that effect à posteriore is the position of the effect with God's Will 3. The cause why God hath such a Will is not to be asked for God's Will hath no Cause And if you add But what is the cause that à priore his Will is thus related and denominated as decreeing this or that I say A priore there is nothing in God's Will but it self which hath no Cause we dream of priorities and posteriorities and varieties in him when we think of the following effects But when there was nothing but God really to terminate his will there was no ground for any real relation and relative difference And to talk of Relationes rationis in God himself as to non-existent Creatures and ask the cause of them is â—ash presumption while we know that there was nothing in God but God who hath no Cause And the question respecting nothing but what was eternally in God himself whatever you will call his Essential Will fore-related to the future Creature you must needs say that it had no Cause § 16. But if the question go further Why God willeth not other Creatures or other effects and so his will is not effectively terminated on such it is after to be fullier answered and now it is enough to say that Nothing hath no Cause § 17. And when we say that God's will may be denominated as divers prior and posterior and changeable as related to Objects that are such this is to be understood only of those acts which are to be denominated by Connotation of what is divers and mutable ex parte termini still remembring that ex parte Dei there is really no diversity or mutation And therefore such denominations are given of God's will chiefly as related to existent Objects which are his Acts called Love and Hatred or Complacency and Displacency e. g. we may say that God is displeased with Paul or Manasseth unconverted and he is pleased with them when converted the change being only in them Yet the same denomination may be used also of God's purposing Will. As e. g. we may say that before Christ's Incarnation God had this Decree I will send my Son to be incarnate and die for Man's redemption But now it is not fit to say that God hath yet such a Decree when the thing decreed is past nor a Decree that He will create Adam and the rest of the World which is created § 18. But whoever liketh or disliketh any of these modes of Speech must still
willeth them to be future or because they are future from the free Agent 's Will Ans. 1. God's Knowledge ex parte sui is his Essence and hath no Cause for it is no Effect God's Understanding Will and Power are essentially One but as various inadequate conceptions they only make up perfect Unity and are not Causes and Effects to one another much less caused by any Creature 2. But Futurity is caused by that which causeth the thing future And therefore the futurity of Sin is caused by Man that causeth Sin so far as it is capable of a Cause of which more in due place But as Futurity is not Existence so it needeth not an existent but sometimes only a future cause 3. And God's Intellect is terminated on things as Intelligible and that is as they are And so on things that are future by his own will as such and on things future by Man's Will as such as far as Futurity is an object of an eternal mind § 9. The many Disputes de scientia simplicis intelligentiae purae visionis mediae I think best abbreviated according to the forementioned Principles God's essential Understanding is but One Things intelligible are many God's simple Intellect may be variously denominated as related to and terminated on various intelligible Objects and so according to their Order But this signifieth no real diversity at all in God but in the things known Nor must we dream that Scientia simplicis intelligentiae is like man's a knowledge of certain Logical Notions or Propositions by way of Thinking as to know that This is possible and the other is possible and that is convenient as if God needed such second notions to know by but it is infinitely above Man's mode of knowing His Knowledge is first effective and then intuitive and this without diversity or change in God § 10. It is a great aggravation of the Presumption and Prophaneness of many voluminous School-Disputes about the unsearchable nature of divine Intellection that the certain Knowledge of our own great ignorance even about every silly Creature and of God's incomprehensibleness and infinite distance do not prevail to repress such audaciousness and bring men to more Modesty and Reverence of God And how much more learnedâ—y and wisely doth he answer abundance of their Questions who saith I know not than they that by presumptuous conclusions take on them to know what they do not nor ever will do in this World CHAP. V. Of ELECTION § 1. ELECTION in Scripture sometimes signifieth God's actual choosing or taking one Man or People from among others to himself either for his special Complacency and Service by Sanctification or Conversion or to some special Office as David was chosen from among his Brethren And sometimes it signifieth God's eternal Will or Decree so to choose call or sanctifie and save men at a determinate time as in Eph. 1. and elsewhere § 2. God will convert justifie adopt and save some men by his Grace § 3. Therefore it is certain that God from Eternity did will or decree so to do For the event in time maketh it fit so to denominate God's eternâ— will Though there was nothing before the Creation really but God and so real existent Man was not the Object of his Will and Man in esse cognito was nothing but God himself there being nothing else from Eternity except as Eternity comprehendeth Time § 4. In the same manner as God bringeth men to Grace and Glory he willeth or decreeth to do it For his Decree to do it is no real Act of God distinct from his Essence but it is his simple essential will denominated from the effect related to it Therefore the Controversies about Election â—re resolved into those about the giving of Grace â—nd Salvation and there will be clearlier opeâ—ed § 5. Glorification Perseverance Adoption â—ustification Sanctification Faith and Repentance â— or Vocation preparatory common Grace and â—he Gospel and other means of Conversion are â—everal Gifts of God's Grace through Christ Therefore God's Decrees to give them may be â—liversly denominated from relation to the effect The Decree to glorifie may be distinguished from the Decree to convert to justifie â—c And yet where all these are really conjoined and are but as the parts of one Engine the several gifts which make up One Salvation as the object â—or effect is in that sence One so may God's Decree be called One as related to it So that they that say God's Decrees about our Salvation are many and they that say They are one do both speak Truth and disagree not § 6. They that will denominate God's Volitions or Decrees according to the Order of Intention must not mean that Ex parte Volentis God hath really many thoughts Volitions or Decrees and that the first is de fine and the next de mediis But only that in the order of real Causation one of God's Gifts or Effects is made to be a Cause or Means to the production or attainment of another and so the latter is to be Man's End intended in the use of the former and so Man is first to intend the End before he useth the Means But no Gift Work or Creature is to be called God's End except when we speak Vulgarly after the manner of Men that which we will not defend as proper Speech § 7. Yet God may be said to will and nâ—â— One thing to produce or Cause another whicâ— importeth only that it is a second Efficient Causâ— of that Other and the other an intended Effect and also that the other is to man to have rationâ—â— finis and so may be called finis operis operanâ—â—â— secundarii § 8. God is not an Efficient Cause of Himself or any thing in Himself and therefore not properly an End to Himself because there is nothing in Him Caused But if any will speak otherwise as if there were in God himself Eternal Causatioâ— Efficient and final and Eternal Effects and thereby explain the Doctrine of the Trinity let them remember that they venture on singular Expressions and such as favor of Imperfection but we hope that they differ from the Commoner way but in a Logical Notion rather than in a real Conception § 9. If we may not say that God is his owâ— End for every End hath a Means and there is no Means to God's Beings or Perfections then he is not properly said to have any End For nothing but Himself can properly be his End § 10. Yet when by an End we mean but improperly the ultimate Effect and not any thing which to God is Causa agendi and so declare that we take the words End and Intention equivocally as to God and Man the phrase may be used And in that sence we must say that God's will as Efficient being the Beginning of all things God's will as fulfilled and pleased is the End of all which yet signifieth not any diversity or change in God for his
Non-futurity or Nothing be therefore any thing God's knowing that it will be and yet is not proveth that the thing future is nothing and therefore Futurity no modus rei but a Name put by us on Nothing from God's Will to make it Supposing it be not Sin which God will not make but hath another Cause I had thought you had known how commonly the School-men prove That things that are not may be certainly known by God yea how the Nominals prove his Knowledge of future Contingents from his meer Perfection so that Socinus is not unanswered in those things and yeâ— Futures and Futurity are no beings At least you may see Answer enough in Strangius and Le Blank 〈…〉 two Authors well worth your reading Those 〈…〉 hings are certo futura which God will certainly make or certainly knoweth will be done and 〈…〉 et Futurity be nihil reale I would you had told me whether you take the Reality of Futurity to be 〈…〉 n esse rei extrinsecae or in esse objectivo intrinseco The former you are not able considerately to believe that nothing can have any real mode accident or affection if none of these what is 〈…〉 t then You must needs hold to the latter and then in man the futurity of things is nothing real â—ut the mode of his Cogitation or Conception as I have afore said we may have real thoughts that here is not such or such a thing but will be in which we frame a real Idea of that which will be and is not in our minds from the helps of similitudes or words and so say Such a thing thought on and named but not in being will be But in God there is nothing but God the Creature is of him and is in him dependently as their Cause and Comprehender but not as constituent of his immanent acts Why you add Suppose nothing to have some Verity is above my reach I think Nothing hath no Verity But 1. God's Knowledge that it will be hath Verity 2. The Proposition This will be may have Verity 3. But the thing future hath not Veritas rei Futurity as in re hath no more Entity than Possibility But to will or know that quid nominatum can be and that it will be are two real acts in Man and two extrinseck Denominations of the Divine Will and Intellect When you have answered what I said of Dr. Twisse I may review it Ad 4. You say Future is nothing ergo â—â—thing is future I am glad that the Creed a 〈…〉 Bible are not thus worded Future in your fir 〈…〉 Proposition signifieth the Affection or somewh 〈…〉 real of the thing future and so it is nothing 〈…〉 you take future so in the second it is fuâ—ile 〈…〉 true being but a gross expression of Nothing hath real Futurity which is aliquid rei But according to common use your second Propositio 〈…〉 will be taken for a denial of the Saying Somewhat will be and this is a real truth You say th 〈…〉 Proposition is identical as Nothing is Nothing We speak not of the Being or truth of Propositions or Conceptions but of futurity it self as incomplexum You after confess I told you so May you not equally say Negations Non-existents Non-futurity are nothing ergo Nothing is a Negation Non-existent Non-future Answer one and you answer the other Negations in mente are Thoughts and in the Mouth they are Words but in re negata they are nothing So I say of Non-futurity and Non-existence Frail Man dreameth that the mundus naturalis is the same with the mundus fantasticus notionalis in his Brain and Oh! how commonly do Words and Thoughts go in Disputes for Extrinseck Realities Ad 5. Because God decreeth to do any thing you and I when we know it may truly say This will be and will be is no being but Gods will and our knowledg and our words are Alas that so much skill is necessary not to be deceived by ambiguity of words God's Knowledg and your Knowledge and your Words may be all true and yet Futurity ex parte rei futurae hath no proper Verity metaphysical physical or moral being no subject capable of any such You say Did not the Futurity of the World result from a Decree It 's 〈…〉 earisome at every Sentence to repeat Distinction and open Confusion The futurity of the World is nothing Extra mentem Divinam humanam extra propositionem de futuritione Why talk you of our designing another Origin when we are proving that it 's nothing and needs no Cause And why answer you not what I wrote against Dr. Twisse before you call for an Answer to him Or at least why answer you not Strangius but impertinently talk of the Serpent Socinus If Socinus had no more wit than to take the Futurity of Sin for a Being Substance Accident or Mode no wonder if he knew not how to deny that God is the Cause of it And why do you not attempt to answer me who tell you That if you take it to be a real Being and eternal you must take it to be God himself for nothing else is eternal But I pray you say not like your former arguing about nothing The eternal Futurity of Sin is God himself ergo God is the eternal Futurity of Sin The Subject and Predicate are not so convertible as you seem to make them You say if we say Futurity is nothing then it is a wonder an independent on God and his Will self-originated and unpreventable c. You write no wonders to me this rate of Discourse being common in the World and hath been in most Ages Is Nothing a wonder Is it a wonder for nothing to be independent but yet that which hath no dependent Being may so far as a Nothing be at God's will that he continue nothing or make something the first non agendo the second agendo as he pleases that is by willing or not willing And it were a wonder indeed for Nothing to be self-originated or that Nothing should spring from any thing as an efficient Cause But reductively some Nothings may be ascribed to God's Non-agency as Beings good are to his action As God is improperly called the Cause of Darkness because he there maketh not Light so improperly he may be said to be the Cause of Nothings because he made not the contrary Something 's You say then there is fatum Stoicissimum on God and all his Works and this Futurity binds the Almighty that he cannot do as he pleaseth in Heaven and Earth This is a wonder indeed that Nothing should be stronger than God and rule him and the World If Dr. Twisse hold Sin to be nothing doth it follow that it binds God because it 's nothing Doth Death bind God because it is but the privation of Life or vacuity si detur vacuum because it is nothing Or when there was nothing but God did Nothingness bind God Is that God
bound or conquer'd that can turn Nothing into Something at his pleasure Non-futurity is nothing therefore it hath no Cause Is this Nothing the Ruler of God and All things because he causeth not that which is not causable Alas that good men should keep up dividing Controversies at this rate of reasoning You say If it have no Cause it can have no Impediment and so there is Fatum Stoicissimum We all talk at the rate that we understand The World was nothing before it was made and so had then no Cause in the esse causae as being no effect Relations in esse being simultaneous Doth it follow that God was subject to Fate There was no Impediment indeed to Nothingness it is not necessary that Nothing be hindred lest it become Something God can make somewhat where there is nothing at his pleasure and can make a future Nothing to become an existent Something And what should be the medium I wonder that tempted you to think otherwise Did the nothingness of Angels before their Creation hinder God from making them Or can nothing have a ruling Power Ad 6. Again you stick not at the repeating of the contradiction of a self-originated Future or Nothing and think God's Decrees endangered by nothing because it hath no Cause What a dreadful thing is this Nothing To be self-originated is to be Something of it self And if Futurity be nothing then it is something of it self And you offer not a Syllable to prove these Contradictions You add To what purpose shall Decrees be Ans. To produce the thing decreed in its proper time and place and not to make them something before they are any thing nor to make an ens Rationis to be a real extrinseck Entity You strangely say To decree such a Futurity is a nullity for it can never come to pass What can never come to pass Futurity Say also To decree Non-futurity or that there shall be to us but one Sun but one Saviour is a nullity because Nothing can never come to pass What is it for Nothing to come to pass It is come to pass without a Cause that there is but one Sun to us but one Saviour and other Nothings The Decree or Will of what shall come to pass is no nullity for it shall all come to pass and yet the Decree made not the word shall be to signifie a real Entity distinct form or model of the thing that shall be The Decree that there shall be a World was fulfilled and yet shall be was not a being before t 〈…〉 World unless it was God's Essence You Phrase importeth as if Futurity must come to pass as a thing Decreed and question whether there was a futurity of that futurity and so in infinitum For the word Coming to pass importeth futurity of futurity and not eternity You say To decree in compliance with it is below God over All for it will come to pass whether God decree it or no. Alas that Speaking should be so hard an Art What iâ— it to decree in compliance with nothing Hath it any sence How is it that Nothing will come to pass It 's true that Nothing will be Nothing without a Cause and therefore without a Decree And therefore let the reverence of God make you consider whether it be meet for us in the dark to ascribe to God such Decrees of nothing and to number Nothings and make as many Decrees Such a dance and game of notions we may more boldly use about our selves than about God till we know him better You add God in decreeing doth not decree the thing into being in the instant of decreeing but He decreeth the Futurity of it and if that be nothing he decreeth nothing Ans. Wrong thoughts will have wrong words All that you should have inferred is That His Decree effecteth nothing till the time come which is true For He decreed only to effect it at such a time But doth it follow that God decreeth nothing but Futurity because the thing decreed is not presently done Thus you must say That God decreed not the World nor CHRIST nor Salvation but Futurity only The Decree or Will of God was That the World CHRIST Resurrection c. shall be at such a time shall be is no being and yet it is a being when existent which God decreed but his Decree maketh it not a being till it exist Dr. Twisse will over and over tell you that God's immanent acts do nihil ponere in objecto And I have oft told you truly that you or I little know what we say when we divide God's Eternity into parts and assign him his praeteritum futurum And it would put you hard to it to tell me clearly and surely what God's Eternal Decree is before the effect exist our present common-received School-Divinity will call us Blasphemers if we say that before the Creation there was any thing but God and any thing in God but God and that God had any real accidents And therefore it saith that he doth operari per essentiam and not per accidentia And therefore that God's Decree before the effect was nothing but his Essence But it is his Essence denominated not as such but as related to the things decreed though yet they be not If you will forsake this common Theology and place acts in God which ex parte agentis are but Accidents and not his Essence and say This is consistent with his Simplicity and Perfection you will let in a Body of new Divinity and we shall not know when we have all God's Accidents noâ— how to order them His freest Acts are his Essential Will freely acting but those free acts themselves before the effect are nothing but God himself We must not place in God a number of Thoughts Images Notions Accidents as we do in Man But your Phrase savoureth of other Thoughts Ad 7. Here you are for yea and nay you will suppose no Propositions in God and yet you argue that then what will remain of a Decree I said But that God knoweth not by Propositions bâ—â— yet that he knoweth Propositions If you hold That God knoweth by Propositions and Argumentations say so that I may know what to speak to If you hold That He hath no Decrees what is it that you plead for But to answer your Question God's Decree is not a forming of Propositions in his mind or any change in himself or addition to his Being But it is His simple will that such and such things shall be emanative communicative productive of them in their season There are some that think that as Time-Divisions are the measures of imperfect Creatures and God's Eternity hath none such so that it is an ascribing Imperfection to God to say That he hath Decrees de futuris distinct from a productive Volition which in the most proper sence should be denominated from the produced Existent as such But in this I interess not my self as knowing that we
Infinite Power moreover to the act and none to the cessation And by this Rule it would follow that all Motion in the World is supernatural For if God cause it ut sons naturae he causeth it in the natural course if he do not it 's all supernatural and miraculous Moreover if all this satisfie not Disputes if it be worth the Cost they may try the Case thus Supposing that God hath told no man his Secrets when he will immediately move any thing without second Causes and that no second Causes nor his own Operation by them can move any thing without another immediate Motion Let them cut down the Pillars or undermine their Houses and say that by meer natural Causes the House cannot fall Let them set fire on their Houses and say that by meer natural Causes they cannot be burnt Let them drink Poison and say By meer natural Causes it cannot hurt us Or let them cut their Flesh c. For God never told them that he will immediately concurr and then there is no danger Perhaps they will say That Experience telleth us that God doth usually concurr with them I answer And is not that because he worketh by them What Experience or Reason have you that God should still work immediately with them and yet not by them We can prove that He worketh as the first Cause But if you will prove that He doth it not as the first Cause moving the second Causes but by immediate concomitancy let us hear your proofs Lastly let it be noted that when they that affirm all Motion to be by immediate concomitant Concourse or Predetermination do pretend that they do it lest God's Causality should be denied or extenuated it is a meer deceit For all are agreed that there is no less of God in the Operations done by second Causes or Nature than in immediate Operations without second Causes such as God exerciseth on the first created Motor and how else he please God is as much in one as in the other § 14. For the understanding of the nature and use of miraculous acts of Providence it must be considered 1. That God that made the World of Natural Agents and things Passive moved by the Active is not to be feigned without good proofs to alter any of the Works which he hath made which we see he continueth in the course that he made them without any mutation of their Natures § 15. God can change and cross and use as he pleaseth the Actions of Natural Agents without changing their natures and inclinations One Natural Agent or moved Passive may be resiâ—ed and turned back or overcome by another â—nd yet there may be nothing but natural motiâ—n in them all A stronger Stream may drive â—ack a weaker A Canon may cross the ordiâ—ary motion of the Air As a great Dog may â—aster a little one or a Woolf devour a Lamb â—nd a Bird a Worm or Fly and yet there be â—one but natural and sensitive motion So God â—an dry up or stop the Red Sea or Iordan and â—y Winds carry Caterpillars to and from Aegypt and such like and by one natural â—otion overcoming another It 's hard for us â—n most Miracles to say that God doth more than this § 16. But it is certain that God hath a rank of free Agents that act arbitrarily and that these have a great measure of power over natural and necessary Motions As man is a free Agent and driveth his Sheep to what Pasture he pleaseth and guideth his Horses and Oxen in their way and furrow to do his will by their natural and sensitive necessitated motion and as a Miller can make the natural course of the Wood and Water and Mill-stones and Horse all to serve his intention without changing the nature of any one of them so much more can God and free Agents under God attain their freely chosen ends by Ordering and not Changing Natural and Sensitive Movers § 17. We so little know what Arbitrary Free Agents that are invisible Spirits God hath set over this Passive World and what power he hath given them to use Natural Agents as they themselves freely will that it greatly disableth us to resolve all the Difficulties of the Cause of Sin and Misery and about the nature of Miracles But it is a clear truth that it is by such Free Arbitrary Agents primarily that natural Agency is crost and overcome in Miracles the one Natural Agent be employed to resist another as to quench the heat of Fire to stop the course of Winds and Water c. Yet it is some voluntary free Agent that thus useth natural Agents against each other Scripture tells us that God useth Angels as Rulers and Protectors of lower Agents And that there is a kind of a war between these and Devils And how far the prevalent Wills of good and bad Angels or voluntary Agents may be the Cause of Evil or be the Actors of Miracles by setting one moved Agent against another and yet all but Natural motion that is caused by these free Agents Mortals do not know and therefore should not be peremptory in judging § 18. But though we know not that in Miracles God useth not second Causes some natural and some free in waies unsearchable to us yet may we be assured by Miracles of his will and attestation when we find that things are done quite out of the way of his ordinary Providence in the uncontrouled confirmation of some prophetical Revelation For God is the Governour of the rational World and his moral Government must be by the intelligible signification of his will de debito what shall be due from us and to us And if Miracles be used to deceive us they cannot be done without him whatever second Cause there be And if he should use them tho' by second Causes to deceive us we are utterly remediless and therefore guiltless And God that 〈…〉 at h neither impotency ignorance nor badness cannot need a Lye to govern Man when he hath 〈…〉 de it part of his Image on Man and needful to Mens Justice to each other to hate Lying § 19. A Miracle controuled by contrary Evidence is no notification of God's Attestation It may be permitted for several good ends For God by controuling it giveth us sufficient remedy against Deceit And there are two waies by which a Miracle may be controuled First by greater conquering Miracles used for some contrary Doctrine or Cause so the Aegyptian Magician's Miracles were controuled by Moses Secondly when it is some unquestionable Truth or Duty or Word that is already better proved which that Miracle pretendeth to contradict As if a Miracle were done by a Deceiver to prove that there is no God no Life-to-come or against Mercy or Justice or to disprove Christianity the greater Miracles which have confirmed the Gospel and the evident Light of Nature which proveth the Deity and Life-to-come and the Duty of Love and Justice do controul such deceiving
dependent on him and still upheld by him and used under him § 7. Though some would have more Power ascribed to Nature and others appropriate more to Grace yet in this it is no Controversie How much is to be ascribed to God For both Nature and Grace and the Powers of both are totally from God But all the question is Which way God giveth it to man § 8. In general we should be most cautious 1. That we disparage not any Power or Endowment which is God's own Work whether natural or gracious 2. That we give not too much to any Work that is proper to Man § 9. Natural Power of Vital Action Intellection and Volition is supposed by God as Lawgiver in his Subjects that is that we are Men. § 10. Every act of Knowledge Faith Repentance Love and Obedience is done by our natural Powers or Faculties and none without them § 11. The word Moral Power signifieth 1. Sometimes a Power to moral actions and so natural Power in Man is also moral in some degree 2. Sometimes a Holy Disposition especially in the Will to such holy moral actions which is the Rectitude of our natural Powers or the Health of them in a saving degree or sort and is the Gift of Grace since Sin departed 3. Most frequently I use the words for such a degree of God's helping or healing Influx or Grace as is short of a Habit for promptitude and facility but yet puts the soul in such a disposition by which Man can do the Act and it may come to pass without more Grace whether it do or not which the Dominicans call Sufficient Grace and I rather call Necessary Grace 4. Sometimes it is meant as causa moralis for that which is Power Reputatively § 12. Power hath several degrees some can act easily yea is hardly restrained some can act with difficulty yet constantly some difficultly and very rarely some can act but the Impediments are so great and its weakness such as that it never will do what it can And these we call a moral Impotency as being reputative impotency in these three last degrees § 13. Sin hath debilituted Man's very natural Vivacity and Activity to things spiritual and also darkened and undisposed his Understanding to them but especially disâ—ffected him and perverted his will with an indisposition averseness and enmity to God And none of these are cured but by the Grace of Christ quickening or strengthening and awakening illuminating and converting the Soul Of which more after in due place § 14. Adam had Power to have stood when he fell God took no power from him nor let out such a Temptation as he could not resist But Sin entered at his Will and corrupted it before he lost his Power § 15. There is therefore in 〈…〉 such a thing as a true Power to do more good and less evil than we do § 16. And there was such a Power in Adam's Will by which he could have willed what he did not â—ill and by which he could have rejected the Temptation And this without any other Grace than that which he then had and used not § 17. Otherwise all the sin of Adam and the World would be resolved into the necessitating Will and Work of God and so all Faith would be subverted § 18. Therefore Man's Will was such a Faculty as could be a causa prima of the moral modification or specification of its own Acts Not a causa prima simpliciter but thus secundum quid For else God must be the causa prima of Sin which is the ill modification of that Act. § 19. I know that to Nature the Reasonings of our late Infidels to prove That every Act of the Will is as truly necessitated as the motions of a Clock do seem plansible and hard â—o answer because it seemeth strange that in any mode of Action Man should be a first Cause of it and that a Creatures Act should have no superiour Cause in any mode But on the other side the Evidence is cogent 1. That God is able to make a self-determining Power that can thus do For it is no contradiction 2. That it is congruous that below the happy Race of confirmed Spirits there should be a Race of such undetermined free Agents left much to their own self-determining Power 3. And Experience perswadeth us de facto that so it is 4. And they that deny it must unavoidably make God the prime Cause of all Sin in a higher degree than it is or can be ascribed to Satan And is all this with the rejection of Christianity more eligible than the Concession that God can and doth make a Creature with such self-determining Free-will as can as a first Cause of its modified act sin without God's Predetermination And by his help could forbear Sin when he doth not The Contest is Whether GOD or Man shall be counted the causa prima of Sin we say Man is the first Cause and GOD is none at all Some say God must be the causa prima of all that can have a Cause in it and rather than deny him the Honour which is given to Satan they will deny Christianity and deny him to be holy and to be GOD. § 20. GOD made this natural Free-will that Man might be a governable Creature fit to be morally ruled by Laws and rational Motives and as part of God's Image on Man CHAP. X. Of Original Sin § 1. BY one man Sin entred into the World and Death by Sin and so Death passed upon all in that all have sinned § 2. We were not in Adam distinct Persons really for our Persons then existed not and therefore did not inexist § 3. God doth not repute us to have been what we were not for he judgeth truly and is not mistaken Therefore he judged not Peter and Iohn to have been those Persons in Adam then nor Adam's person the same with theirs § 4. Therefore we were not then when he sinned persons guilty in Adam for Non existentis non sunt accidentia § 5. We were Seminally or Virtually in Adam when he sinned Which is but that he had that Virtus generativa from which we naturally sprang in time But to be Virtually in him is Not to be personally in him but Potentially it being as to Existence terminus diminuens § 6. As soon as we were Persons we were Persons derived by Generation from Adam Therefore with our Persons we derived Guilt and Pravity For he could beget no better than himself § 7. When Adam sinned his whole Person was guilty and no part innocent Therefore his very Semen prolificum had its part in the guilt according to its Capacity And though it was not a guilty Person it was a part of a guilty Person and a part that was the Semen personae so that when that Semen became a pâ—rson Cain it became a guilty person the guilt following the subject according to its Capacity And so downward by Propagation
Word of God And I think that I have elsewhere proved that Generative Traduction of Souls and yet God's present yea immediate Causation of their Essence which may be called Creation are here Consistent Which here I must not now repeat Vid. Meth. Theol. and Reasons of Christian Religion CHAP. XI Of our Redemption by Christ. § 1. SIN having made Man guilty and depraved unfit for duty and felicity odious to the most Holy Righteous God and lyable to his Justice the eternal Wisdom and Word of God did interpose and by Mercy did save Man from the deserved rigour of Justice promising Actual Redemption in the fulness of time and on that supposition giving fallen Man a pardoning and saving Law or Covenant of Grace with answerable help of his Spirit and Means and outward Mercies fitted to his Recovery and Salvation § 2. But God would not have this Recovery and Salvation to be perfect at the first but gave Man a certain proportion of Common Deliverance and Mercy binding him to a Course of Duty in the performance of which he should receive more by degrees till he were perfected As Phisicians cure their Patients § 3. Therefore God did enter into Judgment with fallen Man and did sentence him absolutely to some degree of Punishment even to Labour Pain the penalty of the Cursed Earth and finally to Death which Temporal Punishment God would not remit nor give him a Saviour to procure the pardon of it but only to the Faithful to turn all this unto their Benefit and to deliver them from the greater everlasting Sufferings § 4. And their own sinful pravity and privation of Holiness and communion with God which also was their greatest punishment by Consequence God would not at once nor in this Life perfectly save them from and therefore accordingly pardoned them their punishment but by the forementioned degrees For he is not perfectly pardoned or saved who is yet left under so much penalty § 5. Some thinking it hard that for 4000 Years the World should have no Existent Mediator and that an Existent Faith in the future Mediator should be more necessary than an Existent Mediator and his Work and thinking withal that it would solve many Textual Difficulties objected by the Arians and explain the Appearances of Christ to the Patriarchs have conceived that Christ hath a threefold Nature viz. The Divine Nature a created Super-Angelical Nature to which the Divine Nature was united before the Incarnation and the Humane Nature assumed at the Incarnation and that so we had an Existent Mediator from the time of the Fall But whatever conveniences this Opinion may seem to have I find no satisfactory proof of it in Scripture nor that the Christian Church did ever hold it And it is overmuch boldness to take up so great a Doctrine as a third Nature in Christ which the Church of Christ was never acquainted with And the Texts that seem to be for it are capable of the common Exposition § 6. If any think that this was the Judgment of abundance yea the most of the Antient Writers before the days of Arius because they have such unhappy expressions of Christ which the Reader may find truly Collected to his hand by Petavius de Trinitate and that it is fitter to Expound them as speaking only of Christ's second Nature than to account them all Arians or to honour the Arians by making them on their side I answer I leave every Man to his own judgment upon perusal of the Fathers words allowing all Charity that hath sufficient ground But I cannot perceive that these Writers talk of any more Natures in Christ than two and pious ends must be served by no Fictions and Untruths I think that we must rather gather with Petavius there that the Votes in the Nicene Council tell us that then the greater part of the Church were against Arius and therefore they were so before because they held in so great a point the Faith which they had received from their Fathers And that the greater part of Writers might differ from the greater part of the Church And withal these Writers having more than other men to do with the Heathen Philosophers and Orators who were prejudiced against the Doctrine of the Trinity did shun their Offence by too much stretching their speeches to that which they thought they could easilier digest which gave Arius his advantages The Conclusions either way are harsh and sad but I leave others better to avoid them § 7. The Deity it self may not unfitly be called our REDEEMER before the Incarnation though not so fitly a MEDIATOR and though Redemption by Christ's Death and Merits in the Flesh was not then wrought Because the word Redeeming is oft taken for a merciful Delivering though without a price and also because the Price was promised from the beginning But thus the word REDEEMER is equivocal signifying either the Deity as a promising undertaking Saviour or the Mediator who was promised and who performed the undertaken means § 8. The MEDIATOR himself being purely the Gift of the Divine Love and Mercy it was no inconvenience that God then had all the Glory and that Faith then acknowledged no other existent Saviour but God himself the infinite Good § 9. It troubleth men much to open how Christ was any true Cause of our Pardon and Salvation as a Mediator before his Incarnation And what his merits sacrifice and intercession could do before they did exist And the common Answer is That Moral though not Physical Causes may cause before they exist and so operate as foreseen foredecreed or willed But these Logical notions must not be used to put off the Question instead of satisfactorily answering it This tells us not whether by a Moral Cause they mean a True Cause of some moral Being or something morally called a Cause which indeed is not so but quasi causa Nor yet whether they mean a Cause efficient final or constitutive Nor yet whether they mean a Cause of any thing in God or only of some following effect § 10. It must be concluded that Christ's merits sacrifice and Intercession make no real Change in God his Understanding or Will and therefore have no such Causality § 11. But God's Promise first and Christ's Merits and Sacrifice next make a Change in the state of things laying that Ground-work or necessary Antecedent and Condition upon which it becometh meet right and just for God to give the rest of his mercy which this is the Condition of and the true meritorious Cause And so the Change was neither on GOD nor immediately on Man but for Man on the state of things which God and man were both concerned in It is a causa ordinis while that is done first which is prerequisite to what is to follow And it is a causa rei benefici◠while it not only removeth moral Impediments of our Pardon and Salvation but also setteth matters in such a state in which it becometh congruous
meet right and just for God to pardon and save us which is a remote disposing the fall'n sinner to be a due Recipient of God's following promised Grace And thus it is in both senses a moral Cause as it is a Cause of our Right and of Congruity and as it is though not indeed yet morally reputatively or Quasi causa physica realis of our Pardon Grace and Salvation by making them become just right and due And being thus far a Cause of the effects ad extra per extrinsecam denominationem ex connotatione relatione ad objectum it may be called with cautelous sobriety a Cause of God's own Intellections and Volitions For though in themselves they are God's Essence yet for God to know us to be redeemed and to will our present Pardon and Salvation as Redeemed ones are words that speak more than God's Essence as in it self and include the termination of his Acts on these Objects as such and so denominate God's Essence distinctly from the Objects which else would never be distinguished nor have but one name being really but one § 12. Yet all these diversifying distinguishing denominating Causes of God's Intellections Volitions and Operations must not even denominatively or relatively be counted or called Efficient Causes of God's Acts nor strictly final but objective And therefore here it must be considered what Cause an Object is which Philosophers are not well agreed in But I think I may safely say That as to moral acts the Object is to be reduced to such a cause materialis or constitutiva as they are capable of not of the Act as an Act but as this act in specie denominated from the receptive terminating matter or object And though to Man to know this or that and to will this or that ad extra seem somewhat really different or modally at least from knowing and willing our selves or some other Object yet in God it is not to be called ex parte sui a real or modal difference at all § 13. Yet I assert not that the Ratio prima of all these Diversities of the Divine Acts is ex terminis seu recipientibus For the first Reason is in and of God himself For it is God that maketh all diversities of Effects and Changes and so it is from those divers Effects of his own Will that his Will is relatively ex connotatione termini diversly denominated But that in God which is the Ratio prima diversitatis is not divers but his one simple essential Will so that it is the diversity of Objects which is the immediate Reason of distinguishing God's acts of which before § 14. These things premised I come nearer to the Question if that which existeth not do truly cause it must be either efficiently constitutively or finally The two first are denied by the common Reason of Mankind That which is not cannot effect Nothing can do nothing And to say it is not is to say it constituteth not And as it is certain that causa finalis non efficit yea is but causa metaphorice operans so it is certain that no Creature causeth any thing in God no not finally § 15. Those that say That Christ and his death and merits did not cause before Existence in esse existenti but in esse cognito as constituting the Divine Idea's 1. Must remember that the esse cognitum as they call it is no esse rei cognita at all Therefore if only the esse cognitum do cause then it was not Christ and his Merits that caused 2. In Man for an esse cognitum to cause his further acts is but for one Thought to cause another Thought or a Volition or Nolition And these Thoughts and Volitions are really divers and constituted by reception of intromitted Objects But God is no Recipient nor knoweth any Object as we do by intromission Nor hath he any such Thoughts or Idea's of Creatures as are really divers ex parte Dei but only by extrinsick denomination § 16. If it be said That then God should know nothing till it is because a denomination must be from something and nothing can be no Object or terminus and so of his Will I Ans. 1. God doth not know any thing as existent now which doth not exist now But our Now is in his Eternity and his Eternity without partition comprehendeth all our Times prae and post ab and ad are Prepositions of no signification in and of Eternity but only In And therefore as Augustine saith his Prescience is but his Science so denominated from the Order of Objects but noteth not any difference in him who hath neither prae nor post How this is to be understood without making the Creature eternally exist I have elsewhere fully opened § 17. That plain truth therefore which must here satisfie us is That God who is the first efficient and ultimate final Cause of all things and caused by none did of his free abundant Mercy undertake the saving of sinful Man and notwithstanding his Threatning and Man's Defect resolving to make advantage of our Sin and Misery for the Glory of his Wisdom Love Mercy and Justice he promised that the Eternal Word should in due time assume Man's nature and therein do and suffer that which should glorifie him more than Man's Perdition would have done and which should make it just and meet for him to save the Guilty both inceptively at the present under the Promise for 4000 years and afterward more fully at Christ's Incarnation and finally to perfect all in Glory So that the Work of our Salvation is one entire frame composed by Divine Wisdom and Love where one part is the Reason of another though none be the Cause of any thing in God And Christ's Mediation though coming after 4000 years yet was then to do that which should make it meet and right and just for God to pardon Sin before Even as in a Building the several parts may be the reason of each other because they must be all compaginated and fitted to their relative places and uses And though the Foundation make not the Superstructure it upholdeth â—itâ— And as Aquinas briefly faith Deus non propter hoc vult hoc sed vult hoc esse propter hoc nothing is the Cause of God's Will but it is God's Will that one thing shall be for another And when all his Work must be one Frame the part last made may be a reason of the former And so Christ's merits and sacrifice though after 4000 years perform that for which it became just and meet before for God to pardon Sinners For though it was not then existent yet besides the Decree the Promise Prediction and Publication made it useful to its ends in respect to GOD and Man § 18. So then though the Cause be not truly a Cause till it exist and though all the Pardon and Salvation given for 4000 years was before the existence of the merits and sacrifice of
Impotency Pravity or ill Disposition by which it is averse to Holiness and prone to Sensuality must be cured by Grace where common Grace and special cause common and special Effects in the Cure § 13. The moral Power given by Grace consisting in the right Disposition of the Will is not of the same kind with the Natural Power or Faculty And the Words CAN and CANNOT used of both sorts have not the same signification but are equivocal otherwise Sin and Grace should change mans Species Those Disputants therefore that confound them for the sounds sake deceive the Auditors § 14. We must say then That quoad vires vel potentiam naturalem every man can believe who hath the use of Reason Objects revealed and extrinseck necessary Causes that is He wanteth not the natural Faculty or Power nor needeth another natural Faculty but only the Excitation Illumination and right Disposition of that which he hath But as to the said right Disposition or moral Power no one can truly repent and believe without that Grace which must so dispose him Common Grace must dispose him to a common Faith and special Grace to a saving Faith § 15. It is more proper to say That an Unbeliever and unholy Sinner will not repent and believe than that he cannot though that also may be truly said if well explained But the meaning is not that he cannot though he sincerely would Nor yet that he cannot be willing for want of the natural Power of willing But 1. That he hath a Logical and 2. A moral Impotency that is an Indisposition he wanteth both Disposition Habit and Act but not the Faculty § 16. It is an abusive miscarriage of those Disputants who in the Words CAN and CANNOT use to confound not only as aforesaid natural and moral Power but even Logical also which is neither and signifieth no more but that in ordine probandi such Premises being put the Conclusion Can or Cannot follow For so it may be truly said That no man can do speak or think any other than he doth and nothing can ever come to pass but what doth come to pass even from Gods fore-knowledge this will follow For seeing nothing ever will be otherwise than God foreknoweth it will be a Disputant will say It can be no otherwise but he must only mean that posita praescientia divina the Conclusion cannot be true that the Event will be otherwise when yet as to the nature of Causation we must say sensu physico morali that it Can be otherwise oft-times though it will not be otherwise § 17. These things considered it appeareth that we are commonly agreed as followeth 1. That all Men have natural Powers and Free-will to good even spiritual good that is Whenever such good is chosen or willed it is done by the natural Power or Faculty and when it is not willed it is not for want of a natural Faculty but its due Disposition § 18. 2ly That as to Civil or Law-power and Liberty all men have much more than Liberty granted them by God to repent and believe For Helps and a Command are more than Leave or Liberty But Liberty from the Penalty for sin belongeth only to the pardoned § 19. 3ly That as to Ethical Power and Liberty which lieth in a right Disposition of mans Faculties every man hath it so far as Grace hath prevailed and wrought it in him and none any further § 20. Or as Liberty is denominated from the Evil which we are free from 1. All mens wills are free from being constrained to sin 1 By natural inclination of the faculties themselves 2. Or by the senses 3. Or by Objects 4. Or by Men 5. Or by Devils 6. Or by God Because the rest cannot and God will not no not physically premove and predetermine it thereto § 21. 2. The wills of all men are free from any Commands to Sin that is God cannot command it for else it were no Sin and if men command it their Commands are null and lay no obligation on the will to obey them § 22. 3. We are free from sinful Dispositions so far as Grace freeth us and no further Therefore by common Grace men have common Liberty and by special Grace saving Liberty but none perfect Liberty here and no unsanctified man hath saving Liberty of Will that is such by which he is duly disposed to such acts as have a flat Promise of Salvation And where now doth our difference remain § 23. Obj. The difference is Whether a bad man can change his own will Ans. Your can meaneth the natural Power or the due disposition As to the first he can that is he hath those faculties which want not natural Power to act better But as to the latter he cannot without Grace that is through indisposition he will not § 24. Q. But is not Grace the only cause of the Change Ans. Grace only causeth the first Impress on the Soul which moveth it to act but the Soul or will it self is a Cause of the Act else it were not Man but GOD that doth repent believe obey c. § 25. Q. But is it Grace or Free-will that is the chief Cause Ans. Grace no doubt Which is commonly acknowledged by the several Parties § 26. The very marrow then of all the question about the Power and Liberty of the Will is that so often before mention'd Whether Man's Will be made of GOD such a self-determining Power as can truly do any more good than it doth or forbear more evil without any more Grace from God than that which it hath while it doth no more And whether ever the Will can and do make a various use of the same degree of Divine Assistance And this as is said is confessed of the Angel's Case and Adam's For if Adam had not Power to have stood when he fell by the same Grace that was given him but fell because God withdrew or with-held such necessary Grace without which he could do no other than he did we may then lay by these Controversies and think how to answer Infidels § 27. Those persons that make others odious by their revilings for holding Free-will or denying Free-will without telling men what Freedom it is that they mean natural ethical legal or logical Freedom from Coaction necessitating Premotion natural Inclination or viâ—ious Disposition c. should be rebuked by the Lovers of Truth and Peace as the Peace-breakers of the Church and World that presume in their proud ignorance to reproach others for that which they understand not § 28. They that say That the Liberty of the Will as natural is not violated but by Coaction and that Coaction is nothing but making a man will against his Will in the same respect and act and so that to will and to will freely is all one and that to will by Coaction is a contradiction viz. to will and nil the same and that God predetermineth all mens wills to all sinful
their Office nor how our Souls do use the Corporeal Spirits c. And when Christ hath told us That the Wind bloweth where it listeth and we hear the sound of it but know not whence it cometh and whither it goeth and so is he that is born of the Spirit Ioh. 3. 8. Should not this with the experience and consciousness of our Ignorance suffice to keep us from bitter Contendings about that which is certainly beyond our reach and from presumptuous boldness with the unsearchable things of God § 11. Whether you will with Bradwardine and many others say That it is God's meer Volition that effecteth all things ad extra or whether you will say with the most That it is not his Will alone but his Will as operating by his executive Power the meaning seemeth to be the same and the difference to be but notional as is aforesaid For they that speak in the first manner mean That it is not God's Will as in it self immanently considered but his will as going forth to produce an effect which emanation or exertion is from the effect called by those that speak in the second manner God's Executive Power § 12. The prime Reason of the Effect is God's Wisdom Will and Power as the Cause And so the prime reason why Means and Grace become effectual whenever they are effectual must be from God the prime Cause § 13. The first Impress on the Soul moving it toward the Act e. g. Faith is the first Grace internal sub ratione effecti And this God himself worketh on man as on a meer Patient tho' not antecedently to all former acts of Man or all preparative dispositions usually yet antecedent to that Act of Man to which it moveth So that as to this 1. Man is passive 2. and the Divine Operation or the powerful Will of God is not only sufficient but effectual for that Impress or Motus is effected § 14. Though God being a Spirit moveth not by such Contact as Bodies do on each other yet must we conceive of his motion and the motion of all Spirits on Bodies as analogous to corporeal Contact and as a motion by Efflux and eminent Contact of Virtue and Essence according to the more excellent nature and operation of Spirits or else we cannot conceive positively of them § 15. It is already proved that God useth various degrees of Impress or Motion on Souls of which some do by their proper power or degree so ascertain the effect that the Argument is alwaies good as a causa where-ever God doth so move there the Effect that is the Act e. g. Faith or Consent followeth And this Grace is effectual ex propria vi vel virtute But that God sometime operateth by a less Impress or Motion which doth not from its own force inferr the effect but so far disposeth the Mind or Will to the Act that the man can do it without any more grace which is it that is called Sufficient Grace as aforesaid § 16. It is a thing not to be believed that this latter degree of Divine motion is never eventually effectual to the Act Seeing 1. it is granted that there is such a Power in Man's Will as câ—n act in some cases by that degree of Grace called Sufficient And frustra fit potentia quae nunquam reducitur in actum 2. And it 's granted that the Angels and Adam did act by such help Therefore as to acts preparatory before special Faith few do affirm that they are all done by such Grace as is necessarily effectual ex propria vi alone but that sufficient Grace leaveth them often to Man's Will § 17. Therefore all that remaineth is to resolve what is the reason of the certain effect when we believe To which I say 1. It is ever an effect of two Causes at least God's motion and man's faculty and so both must be said to be the Cause of the effect 2. But man's will is no Cause save a recipient Cause of God's Part or Impress 3. God sometimes at least maketh so powerful an Impress as doth necessarily determine man's will by a Necessity consistent with his Liberty 4. It cannot be proved by any man that no man believeth by that sufficient Motion which doth not necessarily determine his will seeing many preparatory acts are done by such a motion And it 's probable that it is oft so 5. But the certainty of this or when and how oft it is so no man can know § 18. But by which degree of Grace soever the effect be produced still God's Will is the chief cause of it which can procure the effect infallibly when it doth not necessitate Yea and his premotion or impress called Sufficient is incomparably more the cause than Man's Concourse is though God leave some part of the Causation to man's Free-will § 19. But when the Effect doth not follow that is when men believe not it is man's will by omission and resistance that is the chief cause and culpable and not God's omission or non-determination § 20. The same degree of divine Impress or Motion which prevaileth with a Soul predisposed by common Grace is not enough to prevail with some others that are ill or indisposed Though God's Absolute Will and Answerable Operation would prevail with any how bad soever CHAP. XVI Of the State of Heathens and others that have not the Gospel § 1. THE opening of the several Laws or Covenants of God before hath taken up most that is necessary to be said about this point The question Whether any but Christians are saved is agitated on both sides by so much the sharper Censures by how much the nearer it seemeth to concern the Fundamentals of Religion § 2. On one side some say That nothing is more fundamental than God's Nature and Government and Beneficence and the Attributes which belong to him in respect to each And they say That for God to be the Ruler and Benefactor of the World and to be also gracious and merciful and Love it self and a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him are our Fundamentals which are not consistent with this That all the World since Adam except a few Believers or Jews and Christians that were born from Adam under as absolute a necessity of being remedilesly damned as of dying § 3. Here they use first to consider of the number viz. 1. That it is not past the sixth part of the World that are called Christians 2. That the far greatest part of these perhaps twenty to one have not competent means to understand what that Christianity is which giveth them their name and which as to the name they profess The Circassians Mengrelians and other Georgians the Armenians the Muscovites the Cossacks the most of the Greeks and Abassines yea and Papists besides the Copties Syrians Nestorians Iacobâ—tes Maronites Christians of St. Thomus c. and too many Protestants are bred up in so great ignorance that multitudes of them never are
How fain would some men differ if they could or seem to do it when they do not § 32. IV. As to the fourth Question I answer 1. We are all agreed That God will not pardon justifie or save any without both Faith and Repentance and Desire as necessary moral Qualifications of the Receiver And this shall serve turn if any like not the term Condition and be willing to be quiet § 33. 2. Faith in a narrow Sence as signifying meer Assent is distinct from Repentance but Faith in that sence as is meant in Baptism and hath the Promise of Justification and Life is more the same with Repentance than many perceive For Repentance is the change of the mind from evil to good And the Good necessary to our Salvation is a fiducial practical Consent to the Covenant of Grace or a practical Faith in God the Father Son and Holy Ghost And to turn to this is to repent and be converted even to turn from the contrary Acts and Objects to this fiducial consenting Belief in God the Father Son and Spirit and what else is repenting but this Change § 34. 3. It was never Paul's meaning under the name of Works to exclude Repentance and all Acts of Faith save one and Thankfulness and Desire and Hope and Prayer c. while they keep their place in subordination to Christ They do but confound sacred Doctrines and mens minds that so imagine § 35. And the same Spirit that saith He that believeth shall be saved saith also He that calleth on the Name of the Lord shall be saved Rom. 10. 13. And we are saved by Hope Rom. 8. 24. and we are saved by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost Tit. 3. 5 6. and by believing the Articles of the Creed 1 Cor. 15. 2. and blessed are they that kee◠his Commandments that they may have right to the Tree of Life that right is our righteousness and may enter in c. Rev. 22. 14. By taking heed to himself and to Doctrine Timothy was to save himself and his Hearers 1 Tim. 4. 16. Many such Texts I have elsewhere cited which are all true § 36. V. As to the fifth Question it is answered before in the Description of Faith As the Father Son and Holy Spirit are one God so Faith in them is one Faith and no man can truly believe in Christ that believeth not in the Father our belief in God as God and Love to him is that Salvation to which Christ is to bring us And the Consent to use the remedy includeth the consent to have Health or to be saved And our Belief in God as our Redeemer even Christ is the chief part of our mediate Faith In a word all that Belief which is necessary to the Baptized is necessary to our Iustification But that is our Belief in Father Son and Holy Ghost in the measure that they are revealed CHAP. XXIV Of Assurance of our Justification and of Hope § 1. ASsurance of Perseverance and Salvation is not here to be spoken of but only of our present Iustification And they are distinct Questions 1. What Assurance is desirable 2. What Assurance is attainable 3. What Assurance we actually have and who have it 4. What is the nature and grounds of this Assurance § 2. I. Some pleaded so much for the usefulness of Uncertainty and Doubting as if it were the safest condition to keep us humble and watchful as excited Luther and other Reformers to take them for utter Enemies to Christian Comfort And certainly Assurance is a most desirable thing it kindleth in us the love of God it maketh Duty sweet it maketh Sufferings easie and Death less terrible and Heaven more desired and consequently cureth an earthly Mind and leadeth man to a heavenly Conversation and putteth Life into all his Endeavours Whereas a man that is still utterly in doubt of his state of Salvation and right to Life will be loath to die and therefore love this present World and have less thankful and loving Thoughts of God and his Redeemer and so all sin will have advantage and Holiness a great impediment An Infidel will confess that such Assurance is exceeding desirable § 3. II. And no doubt but a comfortable degree of Assurance is attainable or else God would never have so fully differenced the Righteous and the Wicked and commanded all to examine and try themselves and to make sure But this I have often elsewhere proved § 4. III. But all true Believers have not Assurance of their Justification because they are not certain that their Faith is such as hath the promise of Justification He that believeth perceiveth that he believeth but yet may be uncertain that his Faith is so sincere as no unjustified man can have § 5. Their Justification is real or true or certain in it self but the Evidence of it may be dark and their perception of the Evidence defective from whence it is to them uncertain that is not known with that full satisfaction of mind which we call Assurance § 6. Yea Experience telleth us That it is but a small part of the most religious Christians who will say themselves That they are certain of their Iustification and of those few that are forwardest to say so all have it not § 7. Therefore justifying Faith is not Assurance that we are justified otherwise all should have assurance that have Faith and justifying Faith in order of Nature goeth before Iustification but Assurance that we are justified followeth it we cannot be assured that we are justified but by being assured that we believe But it 's absurd to say I am assured I am justified because I am assured that I am justified But this is only against the Antinomians § 8. No man hath perfect Assurance that is the highest degree in this Life For if all our Graces be imperfect our Assurance must needs be imperfect § 9. IV. This Assurance then is not properly Divine Faith or a Belief of God's Word but it is a clear and satisfying perception of our own Justification because we are clearly satisfied that God's Promises are true and that we are true Believers § 10. This Certainty is not by an immediate Word or Revelation of the Spirit in us but yet the Spirit is all these ways the cause of it in the Faithful 1. The Spirit working us to God's Image and Will is our assuring-Evidence or the Minor in that Argument whose Conclusion we are assured of as the Spirit in the Word is the Major 2. The Spirit in Believers helpeth them to perceive his own Works in them and know their Evidence 3. And also to rejoyce in that perception This is the Witness of the Spirit which we mean and not immediate Revelation § 11. Though Hope be sometimes about things certain yet it is often also about that which we are not certain of And more have true Hopes of Salvation than have Assurance of it or of their Title