Ledesm de Aâ—xil dis 2. Ruiz de scient d. 15 16 33 36 c. For non entis non est Modus vel Relatio If you add that it is Denominatio extrin eca I answer it must be then God himself only as denominated Knowing or Willing that This or that shall be which is not properly the futurity of the thing For otherwise it must be a denomination of Nothing 83. Obj. The Object is before the Act of Knowledge Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future Answ 1. To be future is a word whose sound deceiveth men as if it signified some being which is not so 2. God cannot know that a thing will be unless it will be But this signifieth no more but that he cannot know this proposition to be true This or that will be unless it be true But 1. there were from eternity no propositions 2. And the proposition is not true before it is a proposition 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind whence it hath its first being 4. But if you might suppose God to have eternal propositions their Being is considerable before their Verity and the Verity hath its Cause But that cause is nothing but what is in God himself which is either his Decree of what he will Cause or his foreknowledge of what will be caused by a sinning Creature And neither of them as a cause of the truth of the proposition causeth that the Thing will be nor yet is any other existent Cause supposed but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent knoweth also that this agent will freely sin In all which the futurity is Nothing nor is any existent cause of it necessary But only the truth of the proposition would result from the Infinite perfection of Gods knowledge 84. Obj. The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not Answ 1. Futurity being Nothing is neither true nor false * * * According to Greg. and the Nominals sence of Relations before cited two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other One as a future Cause and another as a future effect And if there were now no Being but hereafter per impossibile a Being would arise of it self it is future though there be none to know it But this futurity hath no Cause And it is no more but that this Proposition Hoc erit would be True if there were any to conceive it 2. But all that you can truly mean is but this that whether it be thought on or not this is a true proposition Hoc vel illud futurum est Which is true when there are propositions extrinsecal which no man thinketh of But 1. God hath no propositions 2. Much less extrinsecal from Eternity But if he had any they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge 3. And they have no Cause 4. If they had been uttered by words they needed no Cause but his perfect knowledge 85. Obj. Futurity is the Object of Gods knowledge and the object is a †††To the Question An praescientia Dei sit Causata à rebus Bonavent answereth in 1. dist 38. q. 1. a. 1. Praescita Causa sunt praescientiae Divinae non essendi sed aut Inserendi aut Dicendi Secundum rationem essendi Praescientia potest esse Causa aliquorum praescitorum licet non omnino sed nullo modo è converso Secundum rationem Inferendi sunt mutuo causae quia mutuo antecedunt consequuntur antecedens est causa consequentis Secundum rationem Dicendi futurum est causa praescientiae non è converso Nam praescientia dicitur scientia ante rem constat ergo quod importat ordinem ad posterius si scitum esset semper praesens esset scientia sed non praescientia Bonavent 1. dist 38. dub 3. saith Gods knowledge called Approbation connoteth effectum bonitaâ—em but when it is called simplex Notitia it connoteth only the event but in it self is one Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many wayes diversified both of Knowledge and Will cause of the act God knoweth things to be future because they are future as he knoweth existents because they exist Answ Still I say 1. Futurity is Nothing and Nothing hath no Cause 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God and God hath no Cause nor is an Effect 3. At least that which is Nothing cannot be the Cause of God 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things because they will be but only that he fore-knoweth that they will be 86. Gods meer fore-knowledge nor his meer Will without efficient Power or Action causeth not the thing future and therefore is not the Cause that It will be But where Knowledge and Will with Active Power cooperate they are true Causes of the thing And nothing is a proper Cause that It will be but what will Cause its being 87. By all this it is evinced that God Causeth not the futurity of sin And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin pass è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum And consequently that the Learned and pious Dr. Twisse his Achillean argument which is the strength of his Book de Scientia Media is but delusory As the excellent Strangius also hath fully manifested And his admired Bradwardine is as weak in his attempts on the same subject and proveth God the Cause of all futurition by no better reasons than he proveth that without him there would be no impossibles yea that non posset esse impossibile When it were impossible any thing should be were there no God and yet that impossibility is nothing and needeth no cause It 's strange how some Learned men confound Things and Nothings and the Notions and Names of Nothings with the Nothings named So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 18. p. 221. will tell us how God knoweth complex objects and distinguisheth those that are antecedent to Gods Intellection from those that are consequent The former sort are such as these God is God is eternal omnipotent c. These he saith are the Causes that God knoweth them being before his knowledge of them The other about Creatures are after it and caused by it Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface Non proprie distincte sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio ignarus homuncio excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare But see how the world is troubled with this prophane * * * Hervtus in his Quodlib puts the question Whether it be not a Mortal sin in a Divine to omit things necessary and to treat of curiosities But he was too guilty himself to answer it as plainly as he ought presumption and how justly Paul cautioned us against seduction by vain Philosophy and what danger the Church is in of losing Faith Religion and Charity and peace in a game
It seemeth to me a presumptuous playing with the Majesty of God to affirm that we must ascribe to him infinite Positive Volitions that infinite Atoms Names c. shall not be when even to men we only ascribe reductively and morally the nolition of things evil 7. It is certain that God suspendeth his Velle facere about non-entities And why not as well his Nolle or Velle non esse as aforesaid But here after others a late philosophical Physicion saith that Nothings may be Bona Moralia though not Naturalia I answer It is not true save by a reductive improper speech Morality is Modality The negative Commandments forbid evil and command the nolivion and resistance of it To murder c. is evil and to nill it and positively resist and subdue all in us that tendeth to it is good But the bare non occidere is not moral Good All moral Good is radically in the Will and no farther in any forbearance of an act than a positive act of the Will makes it Obedience And yet here I go not so far as Ockam as I have said elsewhere I grant that when the positive nolition and restraint of an act to which we are inclined or tempted is the good of obedience the not-doing of the Act is loco materiae circa quam and so must go to an adequate conception of the duty although it be no proper part nor good in it self But Ockam goeth further and maintaineth that the external act of duty with the internal Volition hath no more moral goodness than the Volition alone But I think that the action is a subject or loco subjectâ— of a derived secondary goodness as Scotus asserteth They that are against this are moved with a fear lest we make God an Idle Spectator and not the Governour of the World But they consider not 1. That the suspension of his Powerful Operation inferreth no such thing God is not Idle because he Causeth not or maketh not infinite Nothings or possibles to exist Not is he the less Governour of the World And yet Idleness and Government are words that more directly signifie non-operation and operation than any meer Volitions or Nolitions Men may thrust out words but no rational answer against this argument 486. 2. And note well that Gods not knowing or not-nilling nothing is from his Perfection and not any privative Ignorance or Negligence For he knoweth all that is an object of Knowledge and willeth all that his Wisdom judgeth meet to will or nill respectively So that to tell God that he is Ignorant if he know not an unintelligible object or Idle if he Will or Nill not at our direction is as much blasphemy as to tell him that he is Impotent if he cannot sin or cause Contradictions to be true The case is the very same 487. Object But Scripture oft ascribeth both Nolitions of Nothings and Knowledge of them unto God Answ And so must we in that sense as the Scripture doth We will say and must say of some Nothings that God Nilleth them I hope the Learned will not take it amiss if I speak where the Schoolmen are too silent as well as desire silence where they unprofitably speak as long as the case is 1. Weighty 2. And made plain 3. And I go the middle healing way 488. In all these cases and respects we ascribe Nolitions unto Godâ— I. He that by a Positive operation causeth a limited cause may be said to cause the limitation of effects by consequence And he that positively willeth realities with such limitations from whence the consequence necessarily followeth Nothing else will ever be is said Morally or â—reputatively or by Consequence to Will that Nothing else shall be And he that knoweth all things that belong to the perfection of knowledge is improperly said to know all Nothings in that he knoweth that Nothing more is or will be And so as knowing Beings is by consequence reputatively or morally called the knowing of Nothings by men we are sain to use such terms of imperfection even of God lest we seem to make him Idle or Ignorant When we say that God is the Cause that thâ—re is no more creatures we mean but that he causeth not more creatures And so to say that God willeth that there shall be no more Worlds meaneth but that God willeth not that there shall be more 489. II. This Interpretative consequential Act which is but morally so called is fitlier expressed in the gross of universal Nothings than of millions of imaginary particulars It is fitter to say that by willing a limited or finite World God willed that there should be nothing more than to say He willed that there should not be a Sun in every mans pocket or Heaven and Earth in every mans fist c. Though as to the truth all is one 490. III. When God positively willeth the Positive hindering of a thing he may morally be said to Nill the thing or to Will that it shall not be That there are Positive Impeditions of God by Dr. Twisses leave I have elsewhere proved But then you must suppose that as the fountain of Nature as it were by a Decree he hath resolved to continue the Nature of things and his natural Concurse which supposed their Natures may incline them to such Action as needeth Positive Impedition So God hindered the fire from burning and the Lyons from killing Daniel it's like Dan. 3. 6. Certainly if a man can stop a Cart-wheel with a Stone or bind a man in chains God can do the same And mens Inclination to sin needeth a Positive Impedition Now though non-agere is nothing and hath no cause yet he that destroyeth or hindereth the Cause of Action is morally said to be the Cause that there is no Action Though strictly it be but destroying the Cause of Action and so preventing further action And this moral language even of God is the fitter because it is of Moral things 491. IV. And here Gods Law being called his Will though it be formally but de debito yet being materially de re ipsa a double reason will thence arise For when God forbiddeth and condemneth sin c. 1. He doth very much to hinder it and that positively and so he doth by his grace 2. And his prohibition may be called his Nolition signified 492. V. And God properly willeth the Being and Truth of Negative propositions viz. This or that will not be and knoweth them as made by man at least And as I said sin as the subject of a proposition is not sin or hath no harm in it As sin repented of or the object of repentance and hatred maketh up a Virtue and is not sin indeed but the knowledge of it So here But yet hence the phrase may be borrowed and it may be said that God Nilleth the existence of such Possibles because he willeth the truth of the proposition They shall not be 493. VI. But here note that when
in Heylin's Life of Archbishop Laud and which you may still hear in all parties in their ignorant censures of one another by the names of Calvinists and Arminians And yet the Church of Rome is justly condemned by us for its uncharitable Cruelty against Dissenters when thus we thereby condemn our selves SECT VIII More of Gods Fore-knowledge and of Permission of Sin 140. BUt to leave this Wilderness and speak more of things certain or such as belong to us in our measure to know It is certainly unknown to mortals formally what knowledge is in God as is aforesaid and much more in what Manner he knoweth either Futures or Contingents or any Creatures ex parte scientis 141. If any particular manner therefore offer it self to your minds as that which probably seemeth to be the right it may afford you reason therefore to suspect that it is not the right Because it is certain that the Manner is past our reach And what man can comprehend is infinitely below God 142. If the Case of Aarons Sons the Bethshemites Uzzah Uzziah and others that presumed too boldly to meddle with holy Rituals and Ceremonies was so dreadful what is theirs that profanely toss Gods own Name and pretend to know that of himself which they know not and turn his secrets profanely into matter of Contention against the Churches of Christ 143. Either Futurity as such is Intelligible in it self to God or else the things future are Intelligible as in Eternity or else futurity is intelligible only in its Causes We can think of no other way but God hath more than we can think of If it be Intelligible in it self or as things are In Eternity the Controversie is mostly ended The perfection of Gods understanding then is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible But if it be only in the Causes it is either as those Cases necessarily will Cause or else as freely and contingently The first Cause reacheth Pennottus propugn l. 3. c. 11. n. 1. noteth that even the reconciling of the certainty of Divine pre-science with contingency was quite past the power of mans understanding in this life in the opinion of these subtile Schoolmen Gabriel 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ockâ—m ibid. q. 1. Marsil 1. q. 40. How much more difficult will it be to reconcile Gods Dâ—crees and most of all his premotion if pre-determining with contingency Plainly and honestly saith Bonaventure in few words in 1. d. 37. q. 2. Divina Cognitio quia à re non Causatur nec dependet ideo potest esse certa de re contingenti not our Controversie For sin hath no necessitating Cause but free The second is the same difficulty with that in question viz. How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cause mans Will will this or that way determine it self Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cause which hath no antecedent reason to prove its future self-determination to this more than to that 144. If we go to the Jesuites Scientia Media as it deserveth not that name so it is insufficient to this use For all those circumstances in which God sore-knoweth that the will shall determine it self are such as necessitate the will so to do or not If they say the first they give away their own cause and the cause of Religion speaking of sinful Volitions If the latter the case is still as difficult and the same as if they had never mentioned those circumstances or conditional knowledge viz. How God knoweth that a will still free and not necessitated will choose sin rather than duty For from non-necessitating circumstances it followeth not 145. If we go the way of Scotus and say that he fore-knoweth it in the determination of his own will de rerum futuritione either that will is supposed to be a Causing efficient will or not If it be it reacheth not the case of sin seeing Gods will doth cause no sin But if not then still the difficulty is the same as before How God that willeth the Event but causeth it not doth know that his Will shall be done For it is not from the Cause to the Effect To say that his own Immutability proveth it is no proof For if his Immutability Cause not the Effect ariseth not from it And to say that his Omnipotency or Absoluteness inferreth it is no proof unless his Omnipotency Cause it And to say that it followeth Logically Necessitate Consequentiae though not Causally necessitate effecti vel consequentis that what God willeth to be shall be is most certain And so is it from his fore-knowledge which medium yet the Scotists say is here insufficient But that is because it is here supposed that what God so knoweth or willeth to be future he willeth to be future by the causation of some Cause for he willeth not any thing to be without a Cause Besides that still sin is not willed by him to be future at all * * * See in Alliaco after cited the notable reasons by which the Nominals confute Scotus in this opinion which yet Dr. Twisse Praef. ad l. de scient Med. saith did first invite him to School-divinity 146. And here I am to confute the foresaid reason of Rada recited Thes 130. God saith he fore-knoweth sin in that he knoweth that he decreeth to permit it And Dr. Twiss often saith that all confess that Permission certainly inferreth the event of the thing permitted I answer †††This also Annatus de Scient Media cont Twiss granteth him cap. 5. §. 1. But not as ex ratione permissionis but by hypothetical Connotation Because we use the word Permission about that which aliunde will be if permitted So that it is a Compound notion when thus used There is not so much as any great appearance of the Truth of the consequence unless limited To Permit is nothing but non-impedire not to hinder And if a thing will come to pass because it is not hindered then the world would have been made without God and man saved without God if he would not hinder it Try if your work will be done meerly by your not hindering it 147. Indeed the word Permission is oft used as a complicate notion signifying both the permission and the event permitted But that 's nothing to the nature of proper permission it self 148. A man may be hindered 1. Morally and that 1. By Commands 2. By Threats 3. By Promise and perswasion 4. By Gifts 5. By terrifying stripes on himself or others In all these respects God permitteth not sin but hindereth it by them all 149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Physically And that 1. By toâ—al restraint and disabling 2. Or by lesser impediments which make not the act impossible but difficult God doth not alwayes thus hinder sin and therefore thus he permitteth it He doth not disable the sinner e. g. to lie And he doth not alwayes render it difficult to
him But it followeth not necessarily that this will be done because it 's possible no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done 150. * * * Ruiâ— de praedet Tr. 2. diâ—p 12. §. 1 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed viz. Increatam permissionem Deus non praedâ—finit Creata permissio simul complecâ—itur quâ—rundam rerum productionem aliarum rerum negationem quibus positis peccatum permittitur And if by permission they will mean quid positivum it must have a positive Will and Cause but what 's that to the Negative or meer non impedire Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguoâ—s words His reason §. 2. is Permission of sin is good 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum And he said that permissio increata is not decreed 2. Negatio motivorum c. 3. Prodâ—ctio Constitutio circumstantlarum 4. Generalis concursus Ans 1. Nothing is not Good meer Negations are Nothing 2. Moral Negations or Logical that is Denyal and restraints are something and have a Cause 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause but so is not a meâ—r non-impedition which is proper permission But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent and an indifferent agent and a contrarily disposed agent To permit a stone to ascend will not make it ascend To permit the Air to move will not make it move But to permit a stone in the Air to fall I think with Durandus is enough to make it fall supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin 151. But yet here we must distinguish 1. Between a necessary and a free agent 2. Between Adams sinning and ours 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly or that hath many disswasions or but few 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general that is of not living innocently yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth nor is it a valid consequence He is a bad man Ergo he will do this and that and the other Sin Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin than to the contrary So that bare permission will not inferr the Certainty of all sin atleast and therefore will not here serve turn 152. But saith Rada it is not common permission but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin Answ 1. God did not so by Adam at first 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn as well as effectual If so then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin as to live without God But if not so then while Necessary Grace called sufficient is continued the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him till Adam cast it away It is therefore no good Illation Deus permittit aliquem peccare ergo peccat unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help which is more than proper permission 153. And it must be remembred that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin He alwayes hindereth it so far as to forbid it to threaten damnation to affright men from it to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it Only by doing no more nor effectually changing or restraining sinners but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means he permitteth sin 154. But it is also confessed that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited some of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given And so some are without that Teaching those mercies or those corrections which others have But yet they are still under a Law of Grace 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity Truth and Goodness which is Natural doth continue Otherwise it is confessed that Permission would inferr sin materially but no sin formally if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason Free-will or executive power 156. But I easily confess that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * * * Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass in sinful actions could be proved that would certainly inferr the event of sin And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will sin may be fore known in that decree And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind they had never omitted that easie solution of the Case How God fore-knoweth sin But this I have elsewhere confuted and shall add a little here 157. But first having disproved all these presumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future sin I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfie us which is That Gods Understanding is Infinite and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible But How his understanding reacheth them what Idea's he hath of them how they are Intelligible to him with such like are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men who know not their own ignorance And no manner of understanding is properly Divine which mortals can comprehend SECT IX Of Predestination and Free-will of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford 158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution and be after his Volitions in order yet because I am now only to speak of it as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin and as quid decretum I shall touch it here It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of besides himself Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties and a Power to Act or not act at this time or to choose this or that and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency So that when ever any Act is done as an Act in genere God is the first Cause of it For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth and by his Vital Influx And there is
de praescientia Ipsa enim non habet necessitatem consequentis sed consequentiae Quia necessario infertur sequitur Deus praescivit hoc Ergo hoc erit Sed tamen non necessario praescit quia in actu praesciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens Sic intelligendum est quod Voluntas Dei absoluta connotat eventum rei ideo est ibi necessitas consequentiae sed non consequentis quia non mutat eventum rei unde sicut praescientia quia necessario infert effectum non potest falli sic voluntas absoluta quia necessario infert that is in arguing non potest impediri Annatuâ— de scient Med. cont Twiss de Libertate cap. 6. seemeth not to understand him as to this Necessity consequentiae which is not at all Causal of the event but of the Conclusion in arguing Leaving it out from whence the event is Ita Trigosius in sum Theol. Bonav Effectus contingentes liberi si comparentur ad scientiam providentiam Voluntatem Dei dicuntur necessarii secundum quid sive ex suppositione quae necessitas vocatur conditionalis consequentiae non tamen absoluta consequentis Quoniam istae consequentiae sunt optimae Deus praescivit hoc futurum Ergo erit Deus vult aliquid fieri Ergo fiet eo modo quo voluerit quando voluerit Quia non stat dari antecedens verum consequens falsum Istis ad amussim congruentia sunt Aquinatis illa Quamvis Voluntas Dei sit immutabilis invincibilis non tamen sequitur quod etiam effectus sit necessarius necessitate absoluta sed solum conditionata sicut de praescientia dictum est But the word effectus here is more than the rest say And more fully ibid. sect 18. pag. Vol. min. 230. Quid quod Scholastici nominatim vero Aquinas Durandus nec quenquam novi aliter sentientem N. B. non aliam agnoscunt necessitatem rerum ratione Voluntatis Dei quam quae dici potest necessitas consequentiae And yet plainer ibid. sect 18. pag. 332. c. 2. At ea necessitas quam juxta nostram sententiam oriri putat Arminius ex Decreto Dei revera non tam ex Decreto Dei fluit quod monuit Perkinsius vere quam ex suppositione decreti divini in Argumentatione scilicet quoties scilicet posito decreto Dei de re aliqua futura legitime infertur necesse esse ut suo tempore futura sit At hujusmodi necessitas nihilo minus evincitur ex suppositione actus liberi cujuscunque quam ex suppositione decreti Divini etenim posito quod existat actus liber necesse est ut existat 175. We are all agreed then what Necessity it is that fore-knowledge decree and providence inferr as to the acts of sin viz. of Logical consequence Let them now but make it good that their Physical efficient predetermining premotion causeth no other and I will contradict it no more 176. But whereas they constantly say that God predetermineth mans will to the mode as well as to the act that it be done freely as well as that it be done if Willingness and freedom were all one I would grant it on their grounds But if an Immediate-Physical-predetermining efficient premotion and an invincible causation of Habit and Act by the first Cause bring no other necessity but of Logical sequel and be no real cause of the thing it self I confess I understand not what they mean nor know what Liberty is if the will have not a Power to act without such a Predetermination 177. The same I say of Camero's and others way of predetermining by Vid. Bellar. de lib. arbitr l. 3. c. 8. prop. 6. Pennot propug li. 1. c. 23. p. 46 47 c. Scot. 2. d. 25. Henric. quodlib 1. q. 16. Bannes 1. p. q. 83. a 1. dub 2. Cont. 2. Suar. Met. q. 19. sect 6. Vasquez 1. p. d. 67. n. 14. a chain of necessitating Causes viz. that God by the object necessitateth the act of the Intellect in specie 2. And that the Intellect necessitateth the will For all cometh to one if all sinful Volitions be necessitated Nor will it satisfie any man well that Camero doth resolve all mans sin into the Devils temptation as a necessitating cause till he know into what to resolve the Devils sin And he may turn Manichee in time that can believe that God gave the Devil power to necessitate innocent man to sin and bring all sin and misery on the world much more he that saith that God did all this himself 178. As there is Libera Voluntas and Liberum arbitrium or Libertas Voluntatis Libertas hominis so there is a coaction or constraint of the Co-action in sensu composito is a contradiction and impossible but not in sensu diviso to be forcibly or by unresistible power made willing of unwilling Yet in a large sense I confess that Voluntarium quà tale est liberum Will and of the Man I should take my Will to be constrained if by an unresistible power it were suddenly made impious in act and habit or either But the man is not said to be constrained so long as he hath his Will 179. The unhappy descriptions of free-will which I mentioned Jansenius hath To. 3. li. 6. de Grat. Salvat cap. 5. 6. And Annatus de Incoacta Libertate confuteth them at large As Implicat contradictionem ut Voluntas seu Volitio non sit libera sicut implicat ut Volendo non velimus Latet Contradictio in eorum dictis qui dicunt Voluntatem id est Volitionem esse posse quae non sit libera Apud Augustinum esse liberam esse aliquam hominis Angeli Voluntatem seu Volitionem pro iisdem prorsus usurpantur Voluntas seu Volitio libera Voluntas idem est sicut Velle libere Velle Impossibile est ut Velle non sit liberum Lege etiam Annatum Petavium Cont. Vincent Lerinens Pennoti propugnacul haec plenius tractans 180. The Liberty of the will consisteth not in such an Indifferency as Leg. Guil. Camerar Scot. Disp. Philos Moral qu. 4. for Gibieâ—fs sence of Liberty as not involving defectibility leaveth it in aequilibrio equally inclined to this or that As Macedo against Tho. White confesseth with others For then all Habits or Inclinations to this rather than that destroyed Liberty But in an Indetermination with a Power of self-determining which power is called Indifferent because it is a Power to this or that and not because it is equally inclined no nor equally a Power to either For there may be inequality 181. When Dr. †††Twiss de Scient Med. l. 2. c. 3. p. 265. Annat de Scient Med. Disp. 1. c. 6. §. 5. p. 135. Twisse with Bradwardine * * * Vid. Bradward l. 3. c. 10 11. passim about the definition of free-will which
ipsa Dei essentia quae est necessaria Alliac Camer in 1. q. 12. D. See in Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 24. how they are confounded about the ordering of Gods decrees as to the order of Intention and Execution His Solution supposeth that Unius objecti Volitio est ratio determinans ad aliorum volitionem When as ex paâ—te Dei there is but One Volition and that hath no cause and the Ratio is a deceiving ambiguous word and his Decrees are his Will and therefore are all but one 374. 4. They cannot deny but that all our conceptions of God are improper and analogical or metaphorical more or less and that what Knowledge and Will in God is formally no mortal knoweth And should we dispute then audaciously about this Order 375. 5. None can deny but that these Mysteries require the highest reverence and that it 's dreadful to take Gods Name in vain and dally with the Consuming fire And yet shall we presume 376. 6. They all confess that our Lord Jesus his Prophets Apostles or Scriptures lead them not this way and decide not these Controversies so as that they can stand to their decision alone 377. 7. They cannot deny but that desiring arrogantly to be as Gods in Knowledge was our first Parents sin that ruined them and us and that this was Satans first successful game And that our disease is like to be such as its original 378. 8. Lastly They cannot choose but know that it is the troubling of the Church with new Articles and new practices and leading them from the simplicity that is in Christ even as the Serpent beguiled Eve with the promise of more knowledge which hath been the great plague and divider of the Churches in all Ages though the Apostle foretold them that It was this that he feared of them And are we not self-condemned if after all this we will censure and reproach one another and foment divisions for that which most certainly no mortal understandeth 379. I. And first your very foundation is uncertain that God doth properly Intendere finem Nay it is certain that as Aquinas afore-cited Vasquâ—z saith that Gods own Goodness is not a final Cause of his Volition supposing that movere ad Electionem medii is final Causality Ruiz asserteth the contrary taking final Causality to be first esse primum objectum And thus men strive about artificial notions Vasq 1. d. 82. c. 1. Ruiz de Voâ— Dei d. 15. §. 1. p. 159. But that nothing is the Ratio Volendi but his own Goodness see Albert. 1. p. tr 20. q. 19. m. 1. a. 1. Alex. 1. p. q. 35. m. 3. Henric. quodl 4. q. 19. Gabr. 1. d. 14. q. 1. a. 2. Dried de Concord p. 1. c. 3. Vasq disp 82. Scotus 1. d. 44. Molin 1. q. 19. a. 5. saith though Vult hoc esse propter hoc non tamen propter hoc vult hoc He prescribeth Ends to Man and setteth Ends to Means which are fiâ—es operis But that he Intendeth an End Himself must be said very improperly or very uncertainly or not at all The truth is that we must say that God doth finem intendere because we must speak of him after the manner of men or not at all But it is not true in the same sense as we speak it of man and as the word properly signifieth but equivocally 380. For 1. To Intend an End is to make that End a Cause why we choose the means as most say But Gods Election or Actions have no Cause All deny that there is in God Cause and Effects or that propter hoc vult hoc 381. 2. In man to Intend an End doth imply that a man yet wanteth his end and that it is somewhat that he needeth or at least doth not yet obtain But God needeth nothing and hath no end that is desired or wanting nor but what he continually possesseth or enjoyeth as well now as hereafter 382. 3. We know no such thing as Intendere finem where the Act and the End are the same Intendere is not the same with Finis But in God they are the same He that is most simple hath no Intention which is not Himself and no End which is not Himself and so both are one 383. 4. Our Intendere finem is not the same really with Electio mediorum But God hath no Intention but what is really the same with Election though not denominatively connotatively and relatively 384. 5. Divines usually say that Nothing below God himself can be his End But where there is no means there is no End or intention of it But to God there is no Means He is not a Means of himself And no creature can be a means of him If we say that any thing can be a means ut Deus sit vel ut sit Maximus Sapientissimus Optimus it were no better than Blasphemy God then hath not an End like man 385. Yet necessity constraineth us to use the phrase but these things must still be understood when we use it 1. That no creature can be Gods End unless you will call an object as terminative an End or else an Effect 386. 2. That it is not Gods Essence and perfections that is an end as to any medium But it is his Will For his Free Will is the Beginning and the Complacency of that Will is the End of all things But if you call God his own Object and so call the final Object an End so we must consider God as Loving Himself and Himself is the End or final object of his own Love or Complacency and he himself as Loving himself is said to Act on that End or Object And indeed eternal self-knowledge and self-love which some of old ventured to call the second and third Persons are the Great Immanent Acts of the Divine Essence with the sibi vivere And it seemeth the chief Notion of Holiness in God that he Loveth Himself in primo instanti and that he is most Amiable to his Creatures in secundo instanti and that he is the Cause and End of all that is good in them Thus a final object of his own and our Love or Complacency God is past all doubt And secondarily his Will is pleased and fulfilled in all his works 387. 3. Yet by that Complacency we mean not that God is passive or receiveth any Delight from the Creature or hath any addition by it to his felicity But as he is a Communicative Good by way of Efficiency as the first efficient Cause so is he a felicitating Good to the Creature as its End and he is Love taking the creature into its nearest Communion with him which is his Complacency and the End of all things And hence it is that God is said when he had finished his works to Rest complacentially in all as very Good 388. 4. As the Complacency of Gods Will is his End in the formal notion so far as it may be said of God
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
move another to do it will not stand with proper permission 585. Obj. But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting Answ 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingness as such that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the same act Which is but to say that God causeth me to Will sin and not to Will-nill-it 2. If you mean more I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and phâ—sical premoving predetermination of the first cause 3. But if all this were so it 's nothing to the present case and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin but only that man is a Cause also caused by the first Cause and that God Willeth and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely 586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cause our Holiness and our sin For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness than to Will it and to predetermine the will of man to it besides commanding it which is a moral act and we speak only of proper efficiency He doth but will that Holiness be and cause all that hath any entity in it And so they say he doth about sin 587. Obj. He loveth our Holiness for it self and so he doth not sin Answ The first is denyed by themselves if you speak of Gods end For they confess that God only is his own end for which he loveth all things 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition 1. The efficient which is all that is now in question they must confess is equal to both if he equally will the existence of both Object But he hath a Complacence in Good only Answ 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient Therefore if sin be the fulfilling of his Will he hath a complacency in it The formal reason of a pleasing object to God is as it is the fulfilling of his own Will And to break his Law they make to be such ergo pleasing 2. But if it were not so that 's nothing to our Case of the efficient Will 588. 4. To avoid tediousness in sum This opinion seemeth to me to leave very little or no place for the Christian Religion For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei which is Veracitas Divina and leaveth no certainty of any word of God For if he do will and predetermine by premotion ut fiat omne mendacium quod fit then we have no way to know that he did not so by the Prophets and Apostles 2. It maketh the Scripture false which saith so much of Gods hatred and unwillingness of sin 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holiness which is made the great reason of our holiness 4. It maketh mans Holiness to be no Holiness but a common or indifferent thing 5. It maketh sin so little odious as being a Divine off-spring as will destroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly sorrow repenting confession and all practice of means against any sin 7. It will hardly let men believe that Christ came into the world and did and suffered so much to save men from sin and to destroy it 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctifie souls and mortifie sin 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell and that God will damn men for ever for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination unavoidably 10. It seemeth to give Satans description to God and more For Satan can but tempt us to sin but they make God absolutely to will that it be and physically to predetermine us to it And so Christ that came to destroy the work of the Devil the father of lies malice and murder should come to destroy the work of God 11. It taketh away the reason of Church discipline and purity and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedness 12. It would tempt Magistrates accordingly to judge of vice and vertue good and bad in the Common-wealth 589. Now to their arguments 1. Rev. 17. 17. God put it into their hearts to do his will and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beast Answ 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome with the effects will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark as not to be fit to found such a doctrine on 2. It was the effect of the sin that God willed and not the sin 3. He is not said to put the sin into their hearts whether pride covetousness cruelty c. but only to do his pleasure and agree or make one decree to give up c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts which with their own sins would have that effect which he willed If a thief have a will to rob God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way 590. But for brevity besides what is said I shall farther direct the â—mpartial Reader how to answer all such objections And withall let the â—onfounding cavillers against distinguishing see what blasphemy and subversion of Religion may enter for want of one or two distinctions which â—onfused heads regard not 1. Be sure to distinguish the name of sin from the nature 2. And â—emember that no outward act is sin any further than it is Voluntary by privation or position of Volitions 3. Distinguish between the Act as it â—s Agentis and as it is in Passo 4. And between the Act and the effect 5. Between the effect of a single cause and of divers causes making a compound effect 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the â—ontrary and one forbidden object compared with another 591. And then all this satisfying Truth will lye naked before you 1. That the same name usually signifieth the sin and the effect of sin or the Act as Acted and as Received Adultery Murder Theft usually signifie the Acts of the Adulterer Murderer Thief as done and as received â—n Passo and as effecting 2. That the former only is the sin viz. first the Volition Nolition or Non-Volition and secondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will And no more The reception of this act in Passo is not sin as such nor the most immediate effect of this act It is but the effect of sin 3. And you will see that the same effect may have several causes a Good and bad And so God may be a cause of that effect which mans sin also concurreth to cause And God doth not therefore Will or Cause the sin 4. And you will see that God may morally cause the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden though both make the act sinful and yet
but rather than another 603. As the Wind hath its natural course and so hath the Water and the Miller Causeth neither of them but supposing them doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient they shall fulfil his will and he is the Cause of the effect viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn so is it easie for God to use mens sins permitted to his ends without willing them * * * Even Vasq in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of mens non respondere vocationi God is Causa per accidens ut removens prohibens dum negat auxilium efficax congruum But this is but a Controversie about a Logical name causa per accidens which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applicable to God as to mans sin 604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons And the first is because †††Pet. Alliac Cam. 1. q. 14. A. Secundum Bradward alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle nec habet solum non velle Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri sed ideo secundum hunc modum dicitur permittere quia non approbat ea neâ— impedit ea fieri cum possâ—t sed secundum Magistrum Deus permittit ea quia nec vult ea fieri nec vult ea non fieri quia si nollet non fierent sed solum non vult per consequens non habet actum voluntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri Saith Bonaventure that plain and honest Schoolman li. 1. dis 47. dub 2. Diâ—â—ndâ—m quod non est sigâ—um quod Deâ—â— velit illud quod â—â—â—â—â—iâ—â—itur sed quod velit illud quod ex â—o elicitur Alliâ—co â—â— q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec prâ—cipit nec â—â—â—â— nec consulit sed indulâ—â—t talis Permissio est signum Voluntatis Dei quia aliquem actum significat in siâ— permittente ita Deuâ— non permittit mala culpae â—â— Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle nec habet nolle sed solum non Velle ut flat Et talis Permissio non est signum Divinâ— Voluntatis quia â—ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command And what is permitted and that for good infallibly cometh to pass Answ All this is before confuted * * * If he really holâ— with Bradward li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale seeing he permitteth it But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my self obliged to regard nor do I coâ—sent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardinâ— than in him See Alliaco before of Bradward It 's false that non impedire efficaciter is a sign that one wills the thing The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties could also lock up or guard some men and effectually keep them from the sin And doth he Will it because he doth not so And it 's false that all cometh to pass that is not hindered 605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grosly viz. Both sides confess that the substrate act is done God not only willing it but effecting it v. g. Absalom 's congress with his Fathers Concubines Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act but that the Volition of congress the internal elicite act was efficiently and Principally of God why then should it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done God willing it though not effecting it or any way failing of his duty Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessarily follow the substrate act in respect of the Creature though not of God Answ Hobbes could desire little more But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified that is as it is exercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalom to Will that Congress with his Fathers Concubines nor to Act it The nature of the Wind and Water and God as the Cause of Nature cause the wind and water to act and to act as they do on their own part But that they turn this wheel and milstone and run in this Channel rather than another is long of the Miller Absalom's Motus qua motus and qua cupido ordinata was natural from God but not as acted hic nunc towards this object And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action might be morally and penally from God 606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head and tell me that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature and so dependent I confidently answer you for God 1. No man is injurious to himself And God did not wrong himself when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power he resolved so far partially to suspend his own operation so as not to necessitate the will no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension in making no more Worlds or Creatures 2. You quite mistake We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx nor determine it but terminate it and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes God and Man and cannot be ordinarily by one alone because God hath otherwise appointed And again I beseech the adversaries to note How great and innumerable changes are made in the world by the various Disposition of Recipients The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill do not at all Change the Action of the Sun but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause that its Act hath such various effects And it is the Millers work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel Wheels c. which causeth the variety of effects And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx 607. His third Argument is God giveth not that effectual Grace without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided ergo he is willing that it be done Answ I deny the Consequent It only followeth that he doth not Absolutely and effectually Nill it If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poyson And his Children he effectually keepeth from it one he locketh up another he committeth to a Keeper another he keepeth the poison from But to a Traytor he saith I once forgave thee and saved thy life and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison and if thou do not it will torment and kill thee but if thou wilt take
of the effects and consequents of them But doth this signifie God willed your malice or your act God did bruise Christ which signifieth that he was a concause of his death but not that he willed or Caused the Jews to will or act his death And so of the rest 629. The rest of his instances are such as I have answered before or as the former answers fully invalidate And therefore I will not weary my self and the Reader with them 630. Cap. 18. p. 230. he asserteth that Sin is a Medium to Gods Glory and that not per accidens but per se Because sin by how much the worse it is in genere mali inhonesti by so much the better and fitter means it is in genere boni utilis conducibilis to Gods glory c. All which I have before confuted and think not his defence of it worth repeating 631. Many assertions he hath cap. 18. which all depend on the false supposition that Sin is a medium per se of Gods glory and the unproved supposition that God positively willeth the Permission of it which is nothing whence he inferreth that God Intendeth it in this and that order and much other vanity And still they confound sin in esse reali which is no medium with sin in esse objectivo which may be a part of holiness and no sin at all 632. Cap. 19. he argueth God useth men and devils in the very act of sinning as his instruments viz. to punish to try to humble c. ergo he willeth the event that they sin Resp Here is deceitful ambiguity in the words instruments and useth Properly an Instrument is an efficient cause moved by the principal to an effect above its proper virtue And so a sinner in and by the Act of sinning is no Instrument of God For God moveth him not to that Act as specified or circumstantiated so as is prohibited And being not at all so moved by him as David to murder Urias and to vitiate his Wife he is not properly thus his Instrument But sometimes the word Instrument signifieth a presupposed Agent whose Action another can improve to his own ends As the wind and water are improperly called the Millers Instruments of turning his Mill and the spring and poise are the Clock-makers Instruments of moving his Clock or Watch and a Mastiff Dog is my Instrument to keep away Thieves and a Greyhound is my Instrument to kill a Hare and a Ferret to catch a Rabbet and a Hawke to catch a Partridge c. And yet we cause not at all the Nature or Motion of the Wind or Water but we can hinder the Water nor the nisus of the spring nor the gravitation of the poise but set the recipients so as that the effect shall be done as we would have it nor cause we the fierceness of the Mastiff the inclination or motion of the greyhound ferret hawk c. but only tye them up and let them loose as our ends require But zeal maketh some men deride that God should be said to be no more the cause of sinning and they cannot allow him the skill of every dull Artificer or at least a will to use it without willing and causing the thing which he forbiddeth 2. And the word using signifieth sometime using by motion as I do my pen and sometime by ordination and adjoyning some concause or fitting the receptivity of the patient to the effect as aforesaid as we use wind water dogs hawks Thus only sinners by sinning are Gods used instruments supposing his natural concurse and support And they are not his Instruments thus neither in the same sence as these creatures are ours For their fierceness craft inclination action is good and we do and may will it for our ends But sin is not good And therefore God willeth not it at all but only the consequent of it or effect And that Effect is not Good as it is the effect of sin but as God setteth in and causeth the same effect which a sinner causeth as in generation per concubitum illicitum But when God willeth and causeth the effect and foreseeth and permitteth the sinful Volition and act which concurreth to that effect such a sin is improperly called his used instrument or medium but properly is none 633. To Gibieuf and others saying that God acteth not by sin as an instrument and willeth it not but the effects he answereth that It 's absurd because the sin it self is castigatory and hath such like effects and therefore God need not will that effect as after it But all this is from the fore-noted confusion It is not only the distant effect but the very immediate effect which is the Act it self ut recipitur in passo which God sometime is said to Will As he willed that Jobs Cattle were taken away and that Christ were killed and that Malchus eare be cut off and that Paul be scourged and smitten on the mouth and that the Apostles were oft imprisoned c. And yet God only foreseeth but willeth not that will and act of the agent which he forbiddeth 634. And here note that when the name of the Effect or Passion connoteth the sinfulness of the Act then it is less meet to say that God willeth it As to say that he willeth that we be persecuted murdered slandered belyed c. But if any will so speak they must mean only the Passion as distinct from the action And then the difference is but in nudo loquendi 635. To those that object that thus he maketh God the chief author of sin the effect being more to be ascribed to the Principal Cause than to the instrument he first ill-applyeth some frivolous distinctions and instanceth thus The hangman as the Judges instrument hangeth a man in malice or revenge Ergo the Judge much more in revenge Non sequitur Putting in Revenge which is but a Cause as if it had been the Effect which was in question And thus The Sword that killeth a man is not culpable ergo nor the striker Non sequitur As if the question had been of the Negation of an effect and not of the position of it And thus If two servants role a stone one being commanded and one forbidden one being father to the other The Son forbidden roleth it unlawfully ergo the father commanded much more non sequitur Resp 1. As if the act of the Father and the Son were the same act because the effect is the same which is notoriously false unless de specie 2. Whose Instrument do you suppose the Son to be If the Fathers it is because the Father commanded him contrary to the Master And if so the argument is good The Sons act was a fault who obeyed ergo the fathers more who commanded him saving that commanding maketh another no necessary Instrument because he can disobey But Gods premotion is supposed by you unavoidably to predetermine us 636. But pag. 255. he giveth the true
do Gods will and yet pray Let thy will be done are heard in that which is Gods will that the imitaters of the Devil be judged with the Devil For they that have despised Gods inviting will shall feel his revenging will SECT XXII The words of Fulgentius to the same sence 663. I Must crave of the Reader that he remember that my reciting the Judgement of these Fathers for the falling away and perishing of many that were in a state of Life is not at all as declaring my own judgement but Theirs none then that I read of thinking otherwise * * * Except Jovinian be truly accused by Hierome the brevity and obscurity of whose accusation and confutation leaveth us very uncertain what it was that Jovinian held But we are sure that the spirit oâ— uncharitableness and concention though in a good â—â—â—â— learnâ—d man had no â—â—all hand in the stigmâ—â—zing of him and Vigilantius as Hereticks I shall for the End sake be yet a little more â—edious in citing some of the sayings of Fulgentius Fulg. l. 1. de Verit. praedest cap. 6. To good men God giveth what good they have and keepeth it But to the wicked and ungodly God neither ever could prepare or give evil works which they should damnably serve nor did he ever put into them evil wills by which they should culpably will things unjust but he prepared for them the punishment of Hell that they might feel revenging justice in endless fire An evil will is not of God And therefore the just Judge doth punish it in men because the good Creator findeth not in it the order of his Creation And perseverance and contumacy in sin and pride because it is not of Gods giving is condemned by God revenging Et l. 1. ad Monim c. 26. He will punish in the wicked that they are bad which he gave not nor did he predestinate them to any iniquity and that they willed unjustly was none of his gift And because the persevering iniquity of an evil will ought not to remain unpunished he predestinated such to destruction because he prepared just punishment for them Observe that God predestinated wicked and ungodly men to just punishment not to any unjuâ—â— work to the penalty not to the fault to the punishment nâ—â— to the transgression to the destruction which the anger of a just judge requiteth sinners with not to that destruction or death by which the iniquity of sinners provoketh Gods wrath against them The Apostle calls them Vessels of wrath not Vessels of sin Cap. 27. The wicked are not predestinated to the first death of the soul but to the second death they are That which followeth the sentence of a just Judge not that which preceded in the evil concupiscence of the sinner Ibid. c. 23. It beseemeth believers to confess that the good and just God fore-knew indeed that men would sin for all things to come are known to him For they were not future if they were not in his fore-knowledge But not that he predestinated any to sin For if he predestinated man to any sin he would not punish man for sin For Gods predestination prepareth for men either the godly remission of their sins or the just punishment of them God therefore could never predestinate man to that which he had resolved both to forbid by his precept and to wash away by his mercy and punish by his justice God therefore predestinated to eternal punishment the wicked who he foreknew would persevere to the death in sin Wherein as his fore-knowledge of mans iniquity is not to be blamed so his predestinatioâ— of just revenge is to be praised That we may acknowledge that he predestinated not man to any sin whom he predestinated to be punished deservedly for sin And ad Monimum li. 1. pag. edit Basil 68. reciting Augustiâ—â—â— words he saith He taught that only pride was the cause of mans iniquity and that God predestinated not men to sin but to damnation and that they are not helped by God the cause is in themselves and not in God The same he reciteth again ex lib. 2. Aug. de baptis parvul that their wills be not helpt by grace the cause is in themselves and not in God The same he again repeateth pag. 69. 70 71 72. and that Augustine's mind was that good works God both fore-knew and predestinated But evil works that is sin he foreknew indeed but did not predestinate or decree For there is not Gods work but his judgement Therefore in sin Gods work is not because that sin should be done was not decreed by him But therefore there is his judgement because it is not left unrevenged that an evil man worketh without God working And ib. li. 1. pag. 15. That which is not in his work never was in predestination Therefore men are not predestinated to sin So p. 29. And p. 31. and forward And p. 29. No man justly sinneth though God justly permit him to sin For he is justly forsaken of God who forsaketh God And because man forsaking God sinneth God forsaking man keepeth justice 664. I am loth to weary the Reader with more Should I do the like by Augustines words it would be too wearisome His judgement is the very same as theirs I will only cite one passage out of him about mans Power to believe Tract 53. in Johan having shewed that God only foreknoweth mens sin and foretelleth it as the Jews but causeth it not he cometh to answer John 12. 39. They could not believe c. If they could not how was it their sin saying You hear the question brethren and see how deep it is But we answer as we can Why could they not believe If you ask me I quickly answer Because they would not For God foresaw their evil will and foretold it by the Prophet He blinded their eyes c. And I answer that their own wills deserved this also For God blindeth and hardeneth by forsaking and not helping which he may do by a judgement secret but not unjust This all religious piety ought to hold unshaken Far be it from us then to say that there is iniquity with God If he help he doth it mercifully if he help not he doth justly 665. By all this the Reader may see past all doubt that Augustine and his two disciples than whom none known to us in the whole world then went higher for Predestination and Grace did plainly take up with this that 1. GOD NEITHER CAUSED OR WILLED SIN no not ITS BEING or the forbidden ACT. 2. That OUR SIN was of OUR SELVES 3. That ALL GRACE and perserverance was OF GOD. 4. That ELECTION was ABSOLUTE of GOD's meer will and not upon his foreknowledge of any merits of mans 5. That God predestinated none to sin but predestinated men to Punishment ONLY ON THE FORESIGHT of their wilful sin 6. That he hardened men but by deserting them 7. That he never forsook them till they forsook him first
naturally happy is proper to God therefore Adam was to be led to it freely by a Covenant An. To be happy necessarily and independently and primarily is proper to God But you can never prove it any contradiction or impossible for God to make a Creature naturally happy nor that there are not such § 9. Here the M. S. citeth some words of his Gibieuf making our Being in God initially and finally to be our state of amplitude and liberty and our going out from God to be our particularity and state of necessity as if we were pre-existent in God and our individuation ceased upon oâ—â— return into him as our End An. But these are Platonick Phantasms And Gibieuf who was a devout Oratorian and talketh too oft of our Deification as Benedictâ—â— de Benedictis Barbanson Baker and other Fryers that talk phanatically must be read with caution and exception and as the Soul need not fear too near a Union with God as the loss of its individuation so neither must it desire or hope for such § 10. M. S. An unchangeable state of Happiness in the love of God is called Eternal Life An. No doubt but that is called Eternal Life in the fullest sense which actually endureth to eternity as to that particular Subject And so 1. The life of Glory perfectively 2. And a confirmed state of Sanctity here initially are usually called Eternal Life But 3. Whether the lossable state which the Angels fell from and Adam fell from or that measure of Grace which the ancient Fathers thought the justified may fall from be never so called also I cannot prove § 11. M. S. Adam's promised Happiness was 1. Essential in this perfect holiness or love of God 2. Complemental in the enjoying God iâ— all the sanctified Creatures in that Paradise but not to be translated to Heaven which Christ only procureth us An. I inclined to that Opinion 26 years ago when I wrote the Aphorisms which you oppose But I now incline more to the contrary and rather think man should have been translated to Heaven as Henoch and Elias were upon many reasons which I now pass by Though I take it yet to be scarce certain to us § 12. M. S. The Holiness of God is his loving himself as his End And the third Person proceeding by a reflex act of the infinite Will and self-love of God is therefore called the Holy Spirit An. 1. This notion of Gods Holiness that it is his Self-love is not to be contemned It seemeth to be so with this limitation that you confine not his Holiness to this but take this only as the most eminent among the inadequate conceptions of it For his whole Transcendency in Being Life and Knowledg as being adoreable by the Creature and its End and the Fountain of all created Goodness and specially of Morality is also Gods Holiness 2. But the saying that God is his own End seemeth improper though tolerable if spoken but analogically For God neither hath nor is to himself a Cause nor an Effect a Beginning nor an End 3. That the third Person proceedeth by a reflex Act of the infinite Will many School-men boldly say And so some say that he is Gods actual self-love which is â—he same that you call his Holiness And some say that he is the Divine Will or Love considered in it self as distinct from Vital Power and Intellect or Wisdom But of this I have spoken more largely else-where § 13. M. S. Adam's promised Reward was to be fixed in an unchangeable state of pleasing God by this Holy Spirit not by infusing any new quality which should unchangeably fasten him to the Rule for no created thing can unchangeably keep a man from falling An. 1. The promise to Adam is very obscure But Happiness it must needs be and everlasting 2. But it is past my reach to conceive how the Spirit of God can fix man in perfect holiness without any fixing quality as it 's called on his Soul A constant Act the Soul must have And 1. If that Act be caused by any Divine Impulse disposing the Soul so to act then that disposition is a quality 2. And if there be not both disposition and habit then the Soul will not in Glory be habitually or qualitatively holy but only actually 3. And a habit-acting being perfecter than an act without a habit or inclination the Soul will be more imperfect in Glory than in this state of Grace 4. Operari sequitur esse God fitteth all his Creatures to their works And as when he will give Immortality he will give a Nature fit for Immortality even indissoluble and incorruptible so when he giveth perpetuity of Love he giveth a nature or habits fit for perpetual Action Christ saith A good Tree bringeth forth good fruit and an evil Tree evil fruit Make the Tree good and his fruit good 5. The Operations of Love in Glory should be ex potentia aut violentia aut neutra if there were no intrinsick disposition or inclination to them In a word it is a contradiction for a Soul to be perfectly holy and not have the perfection of inclination to its Acts. 3. But if the meaning were that no holy quality alone sufficeth without Gods Influx that were no more than what must be faid of every Creature without Divine Influx no Creature can be or operate a moment No created thing of it self without God can continue How then should it keep a man from falling But if the Soul have any more goodness of nature or inclination in it than the Devils have it must be a created thing or God himself If only God that proveth not a Saint to be himself better than a Devil as to nature or disposition but only that God in him is better His reason why the Sun is naturally fixed to its Operations but not a glorified Soul is § 14. M. S. that one is a natural and the other a voluntary Agent One as Gibieuf saith Non agit sed agitur the other doth agere non tantum agitur An. 1. Gibieuf and you were deceived in thinking that such naturals non agunt Passive matter doth not Act ex principio essentiali unless Dr. Glissons and Campanellas Doctrine hold true But the three Active Natures Intellectual Sensitive and Vegetative and so Fire and the Sun do ex principio Activo essentali agere but nothing doth Act without an Antecedent Influx to action from the first Cause in which it is passive For no Creature is Independent 2. Voluntas est quaedam Natura quamvis libera To move naturally only and not freely is proper to Agents meerly natural distinct from free But to move freely and yet from a fixed principle which shall infallibly determine the Soul to act freely is not a contradiction nor that which Gibieuf should deny to the glorified § 15. M. S. Man though a Creature is the first Cause of his own action He moveth and sets himself on work else he were
Will or Power as if he could do no more But it is his Delight thus to govern the creature according to the nature and rank which he hath made it in and his non-volitions and non-operations of a higher sort are agreeable to his Perfection Wisdom and Liberty Higher action being used on higher creatures 3. Yet hath God placed and kept these free Agents not only under his Moral Government but also under his Dominion and disposal so that he will do with them as his own what he lift and none shall frustrate his disposing Will. 4. It pleased him first to make man perfect under a Law of Perfection making innocency or perfection the only condition of Life and the contrary of Death 5. When Man had sufficient Grace to have kept this Law not sufficient to ascertain the event but sufficient Power to have stood that is as much Grace as was necessary to his standing sine qua non esse potuit cum qua esse potuit he broke it and sinned against that sufficient Grace before God either denyed him any thing necessary or withdrew any from him 6. From whence it is clear that the Nature of Man's Will is such as that it is made to use a Power which doth not necessitate or determine it self or is determined necessarily but freely And that it is no Deifying of the Will nor extolling it above its Nature to say that it can act or determine it self without Gods pre-determinating premotion or by that same measure of help which at another time doth not determine it Though its Nature and its Act as such be of God yet so is its Liberty too and therefore by the Power and Liberty given by God the Will can act or not act or turn it self to this object or to that without more help than the said natural support and Concurse And this Power and Liberty is its Nature and Gods Image 7. From hence also it is evident that there is such a thing or operation of God as Grace Necessary called sufficient which is not effectual For God took no Grace away from Adam before he sinned nor let out any temptation upon him which he was not able to resist nor did he sin for want of necessary Grace but by that same degree of help might have overcome 8. God passing Sentence on faln Man for sin would not forgive him the temporal death nor common calamities of this life but cursed the creatures which he was to use as part of his penalty 9. But the Great evil which sin brought on man was the loss of Gods approbation and complacency and of his Spirits saving Communion and help and of Gods Image on man's Soul and of Communion with God herein and also his right to life eternal All which man 's own sin cast away and man was both the Deserver and Executioner without any change in God 10. Yet was all this privation penal in that God made Man such a creature as that his own sin should become his punishment or ruine if he committed it so that all Punishment is not determinatively of God though Gods Antecedent Will did make that which by man is made a Cause As in argument God saith antecedently If thou sin thy own sin shall be thy torment and misery and man saith I will sin Therefore it is Man that is the determining Cause of the Conclusion My own sâ—â— shall be my torment and misery So it is in Causation God antecedently to man's sin doth resolve I will make Man such a Creature with such a Mind Conscience and Will as that his Holiness shall be his Health and Joy and his immediate Receptive capacity of my favour and of his Communion with me and of his title to my spirit and Glory And that if he forsake me and his Holiness in the very Nature of the thing he shall lose all this Life Light and Love Joy and Communion and title to my Grace and shall feel the torments of his own Conscience telling him of his sin and loss This is Gods Antecedent Law Nay this is Gods Antecedent Creation to make man such a Creature Now if man sin his owâ— sin doth ipso facto become his misery and yet is not caused at all by Gods But yet that his Nature was made such as sin should prove a misery to was Gods Work And from that Antecedent Creation or Constitution the Relative form of a Punishment resulteth to the Sinner Even as God saith If thou Murder it shall be thy sin or Thou shalt not Murder And man doth Murder Here the Act that is sin is of man but that the Relation of sin belongeth to that act resulteth partly from the Law which forbiddeth it and yet God is not the Cause of sin though he Antecedently decreed Murder shall be sin if thou commit it So is it also with this sort of Punishment which is either sin it self or the effect or result oâ— sin immediately By which we see that when sin and punishment are found in one thing God is the Cause Antecedently of the formal Relation of a Punishment without being a Cause of the sin yea antecedently is some cause of the formal relation of the sin by his Law without causing any of the sin it self as the author of it As if God make man of such a temper as that surfetting drunkenness lust will make him sick and hazard his life Here God did no otherwise punish him than by making him such a man which he turned to his own destruction by his sin If a man make a thorn Hedge about his Garden that men may not steal his fruit and those that will shall â—rick themselves it is they that prick and punish themselves If God say He that will leap into the fire shall be burnt or into the water shall be drown'd it is they that do it that cause the evil and yet some formal relation of penalty may result to it from Gods conditional antecedent Law I say not that God executeth no other kind of punishment But these are the most common 11. Man having thus cast away Gods Image and his Innocency could beget a Child no purer holier or better than himself For he could not communicate that which he had lost So that our Nature is vitiated with Original sin and unhappy in the miserable effects Bradwardine hath a shift which serveth them that say man could do no good in Innocency without supernatural Help viz. Making that Help to be Gods Will that it shall be done But is not Gods Will called our natural Help when it is the foundation of Nature working by natural means It 's true that free will without Gods Will could do nothing 12. The promisory part of the Covenant or Law of Innocency became null or ceased with man's first sin cessante subditorum capacitate and so the Condition which is its modus So that no man ever since was under the Obligation of that Law as a Covenant of life
Creature doth preach him to us and all things must be sanctified and used to this holy end § 33. He setteth Death continually before our eyes assuring us of the shortness of our lives and shewing us how we must leave this world that we may read Vanity upon all and not be deceived by it § 34. By all this we see that this Kingdom of Christ is a sapiential frame of Moral Causes designed for the Government of man in right ordering his internal and external acts and glorifying eminently the wisdom of our Ruler § 35. And he that will think rightly of this excellent frame must have all these things in his consideration 1. That Christ himself is not only a Justifier and Actor of us but a Prophet Priest and King and that the Government is laid upon his shoulders Isa 9. 6. 2. That we are not only Patients and pardoned sinners but also Subjects and engaged Covenanters 3. That Christs Church is not like a Statuaries shop but a Kingdom and a School where all must learn and obey 4. That Christ hath not only Motive power but Laws Promises Threatnings c. to work by 5. That his great blessings of Glory are his Rewards and Hell at last after those here are his punishments foretold to work on souls 6. That he hath a day in which as Rector he will judge the world in righteousness according to what we have done in the body 7. That faith is wrought by Preaching and Love and Hope and obedience are the ends and uses of faith 8. That the felicity of individuals and in them of the Heavenly Society in one Glorified body with Christ is the end of all where Gods Remunerating Justice is to be glorified and his governing Wisdom and Love for ever § 36. From all this I conclude That they that slight all this work of God by the contemptuous name of Moral Suasion and take it to be a diminutive term as to the honour of it to call it Moral and by Means and talk of Gods work of Grace on the soul as if there were no more in it very honourable than a physical Motion and God Converted souls but as Boyes whip their Tops or Women turn their Wheels or the Spring moveth the Watch are Cartesian blind Theologues and overlook the very nature of that Theologie which they profess which is the Doctrine of the Kingdom of God over man And while they see little but Matter and Motion they are fitter mechanically to treat of or deal with Stones or Bricks or Timber than men â— being unfit to treat of humane Government much more of Divine SECT IV. How far God useth Means § 1. CHrist who is the chief means is used in all the Conveyances of Grace to any one in the world § 2. God hath a double work in Illuminating and Converting souls One by activity of exteriour appulsive causes The other within us on the Agid. Column Rom. Quodl 1. qu. 2. p. 5. citeth Dioâ—ys de div nom l. 3. as holding that every order of second causes is like a beam of light streaming down from God as so many cords let down to men to draw them up to God And if a man should take hold of one of them and ascend to Heaven he might imagine that Heaven did bow down to him when indeed it moveth not but he would draw himself up to it so when upon Prayer or other second Causes God doth us good he seemeth to incline and bend to us but it is not so but he is unchangeable and it 's we that are drawn and moved to him and by the use of means by us we are conjoyned to Gods purpose that the things may be done for us which he hath decreed Vid. reliq where he confuteth the contrary errours faculties of the soul without those causes I cannot better illustrate it than by the causing of sight hearing c. The Light without us is not only a terminating object as some dream but an Active thing or Action which operateth by appulse upon the eye And the Sun and Aire are the causes of it The eye is not only a passive Receiver as some dream but an Organ where the visive spirits and soul are Active And God worketh internally on this visive faculty by his influx to sustain it in its activity And by a congress of these two fires or Active causes the sensitive soul doth see Now we all know that God giveth the external light only per media by the Sun c. But how he sustaineth and actuateth the Visive faculty is more difficult His own influx or Causation is undoubted And that the same Sun ut causa universalis cherisheth and moveth the visive spirits But whether God move the sensitive faculty or soul it self by any superiour spirit or mediate cause in its motion or action towards and on the exteriour light is past our knowledge Though the order observed in other cases maketh it not improbable Even so in the Illumination of the mind and conversion of the will we are sure that beside the terminative object there is an external motion which by the foresaid means is made at least on the senses and imagination whatever it do further on the Intellect But in the superiour Influx on the soul it self what use God may make of Angels or other superiour spirits or causes we cannot tell We are sure as is said that if there be a second cause yet as to proximity it is never the less neerly from God And souls being Intellectual and for ought we know of the highest nature of Creatures though not the highest Degree neither is improbable that God moveth us by a second cause or that he doth it without § 3. But as Christs fore-described mediate Causality is still supposed so it is certain that God doth not only work as some think concomitantly with the word but by it as his Instrument Though his wayes of co-operation are past the reach of man yet this much is sure 1. That he adapâ—eth the means to do their work both word Minister c. 2. And that his concurse maketh the due Impression on the sense and imagination 3. And though no Philosopher certainly know whether the Images in the phantasie be meerly passive as to the Intellect or what use is made of them and the passions to Intellection and Volition yet such use as is naturally to be made of them for these ends God maketh and manageth them accordingly by skill and power § 4. But here MOTION the effect of Active force and ORDER of motion as the effect of GOVERNMENT must be well distinguished For it is not so much the second Causes of the souls Action as such that we are now enquiring after But of the ORDER and Rectitude of its Actions which is done by Government § 5. That God doth work Grace on man by means ordinarily as ordinarily he causeth natural effects by means and Miracles are rare may be proved by all
these following evidences § 6. 1. In that he hath made so large provision of means and that in an admirable frame which is as it were a Moral world Which he would never do in vain nor if he ordinarily workt without them that work which he hath appointed them to do It is the reason of the Brittish Divines in their suffrages at Dort Had not God decreed to work Grace by means he could have done it with a fiat § 7. 2. The Glory of this Kingdom or Sapiential Rule which is so constantly and largely given him in the Scripture Psal 103. 10. and 145. and 119. throughout and Matth. 25. As the Ship master or Pilot is praised who by a Helm can turn about the Ship as he will Jam. 3. 4. § 8. 3. God worketh on all things according to their nature And this is suitable to the nature of man And the Causation is answerable to the effect And ORDER is a moral effect which needeth not a Creation but a moral ordering Causation § 9. 4. Experience telleth us that those prosper best in grace that most faithfully and diligently use the means And we never knew of any man 1 Tim. 4. 15. Prov. â— 20 21. 3. 5. 8. 13. 4. in the world that came to Actual knowledge faith or Love without means but all by the causality of them § 10. 5. We find that the greatest neglecters and despisers of means are every where most graceless and the worst of men § 11. 6. We have Ministers and people frequent and strict commands to use means most diligently constantly and carefully § 12. 7. We have abundance of promises of Gods blessing upon the Licet omnis causa secundâ— proprie dicta causet effectum ex natura rei tamen quod ipsa sit causa non est ex natura rei quia solum ex voluntate Dei Alliac in 4. q. 1. F. use of means Act. 26. 17. I send thee to open their eyes and turn them Rom. 10. How shall they hear without a Preacher c. Isa 55. 2 3. Hear and your souls shall live Matth. 28. 20. I am with you alwayes c. Luke 10. 16. He that heareth you heareth me Psal 19. 7 c. The Law of the Lord is pure Converting the soul 1 Pet. 1. It is the incorruptible Seed that regenerateth us Heb. 4. The word is powerful and a searcher of the heart c. § 13. 8. When God will save a people he sends them the Gospel and Amos 8. 11. Prov. 29. 1â— when he will forsake them he taketh it away § 14. 9. The Devil sheweth his malice to souls and grace by opposing the means depriving men of them or keeping them from them or from the faithful using of them § 15. But it is none of my meaning that the bare means of it self doth change the soul or that it is the principal cause But only that God operateth Moral effects by Moral means as he doth Natural by Natural means being still the prime Cause of all himself § 16. If we thus conjoyn all Causes and separate not what God hath conjoyned it will help us the better to escape errour in this matter But if men will dream that all the honour or action that is ascribed to second causes is a derogation from God and a dishonouring of him they forsake the truth and injure him § 17. For if this were true that to honour the means or acknowledge Though God be proxiâ—uâ—â— not as in loco in all his operations yet seeing he operateth by second causes he doth it according to them as all experience tells us Therefore to end these Controversies we should consider more how those causes operate second Causes and their aptitude and efficacy is to dishonour God then God should be the greatest dishonourer of himself by making and using such causes and means And so many Creatures as there be in the world so many dishonours are cast on God and the excellentest Creatures would dishonour him most which sottish conceit must needs be joyned with Manichaeism that an ill God was the Maker of the World God is Glorious in all his works and shineth to us in them all SECT V. Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace and Means § 1. * * * Gerhard Tom. 2. de lib. aâ—b cap. 6. §. 1. supposeth that no cause of the efficacy of Grace is found in the will of man as being dead and vicious but yet that Grace doth not physically determine the will but so work as leaveth it a power to resist and that resistance is it that maketh the difference between man and man by making Grace uneffectual And Georg. Calixtus was of the same mind as you may see in his words de Minist Verbi p. 241. in Judic de Controvers num 33. See â—e Blank Thes de distinct Gratiâ— ALl that is Good in the Difference between man and man is Willed by God and Caused by him But nothing that is Morally Evil. § 2. As in Nature God seemeth to Cause Motion in genere by an equal universal Influx of the Sun which maketh no difference per se but per accidens But the wonderful variety of motions and effects is otherwise caused So it seemeth that Christ the Sun of Righteousness affordeth by his Means of Nature which he Politically manageth an indifferent influx or help for Action as Action to the souls of men which as Dr. Twisse frequently saith well is to be called Nature rather than Grace except as the repriving of Nature is Grace so far as it is meer Power to Act because it is equally indifferent to a good act as a bad and to do or not do § 3. The Power of Action as such being given by an equal Natural Universal Influx it is the ORDER of Actions where we must enquire of the difference and its Cause § 4. Action it self is not a proper substantial being but a Modus Rei But yet it is such a Mode as by the Cartesians leave requireth more Causation to it than a meer non agere doth But ORDO Actionum is but a modus modi § 5. ORDO is the beauty of the World and soul the genus of all Relation in fundamento and of all morality and worthy to have had a notable place in the predicaments And yet we know not what to call it whether any thing or nothing The ORDO Rerum is not Res And it is Rerum status which we better know in se than we know with what Logical Notion to cloth it § 6. This excellent Nothing is the summ of Morality in its form and the business of frail man on earth and much of the glory of the Church triumphant in Heaven It is Gods work and not ours to make new substances It is ours to keep ORDER in our selves as Gods work yea in the Actions which God by Nature enableth us to So vain a thing is man that
can do no more than this nor this but by the Power given him of God § 7. Vainly therefore do the Dominicans pretend that it is a Deifying of the Will of man to say that God can enable it to Cause the various ORDER of mans Actions by meer moral helps without Gods predetermining premotion to that order For this is to cause no Real being And he that is moved to the Act in genere needeth no more premotion from God to the disorder and sinfulness of the Act. § 8. And they that will call the production of faith a Creation in the strict and proper sense do not understand that Creatio est Rerum non ORDINIS rerum jam creatarum vel existentium An Act is of it self improperly said to be created in a pre-existent Agent That is not called created which is educed è potentia materiae nor that which is produced by the Potentia Activa prae-existentis forma Faith is an Act of the same Natural Power or faculty which we had before And Grace or rather Nature usually suscitateth that faculty to the Act as an Act in genere And Grace doth cause us to ORDER that act aright as to the due object and other circumstances But if any will call it a Creation I contend not about the name § 9. But the whole state of the Man Habitual Relative and Practical set together is called in Scripture a New Creature and the New Man tropically but not unfitly Partly because we are really new though not by another Humanity or Species of Natural Essence yet by many Accidents And partly because those Accidents are so great and make so great a change of our state as that they emulate a natural Essence and we use to say in common things that when an unlearned man is made learned and a poor man a Prince and a dying man healthful he is another man § 10. Though God be one and the same and Christ the same and the Law and Word and many Antecedent means the same to many on whom they have different effects This difference may be caused many wayes The Causes of difference As 1. By the diversity of other inferiour or concomitant second causes 2. By the diverse Disposition of the Receivers a common cause of varieties in the World 3. By the diversity of Impediments and temptations And many other wayes § 11. * * * I know that Bradwardine li. 2. c. 32. Cor. p. 612. saith that Deum non dare scientiam eratiam aut perseverantiam seu quodlibet munus suum creaturâ— capaci est causa quare ipsa non accipit non habet non è contra Et p. 614. Quicquid obex dicatur potest illa respâ—nsio corripi cum nullus possit hunc obicem tollere nisi Deus vel per Deum prius praetollentem si ipse cum voluerit tollere irresistibiliter tollitur Auferam cor lapideum c. The great question is How far the diversity of Receptive Dispositions is from God Answ 1. God made all equal at first in Adam 2. All were equal in sin by his fall 3. Cain and Abel differed from several causes and not one alone Abel differed from Cain in faith and obedience by Gods grace as the chief cause and his own will and agency as the second cause Cain differed from Abel by unbelief and sin by his own will and Satans temptations 4. The sins of later parents as of Cain Cham Esau Achan Gehezi c. make a further difference by depriving their posterity of some means helps or grace which else they had been equally capable of with others 5. It is certain that man hath much to do about his own heart by which he is to be the second cause of his own Receptive disposition and if he fail is the only cause of his indisposition § 12. Difference is but Dissimilitude And an alteration of one of the subjects which soever will make it dissimile or to differ from the other When the good Angels stood and the evil fell if you ask Who made the difference It was the Devils by forsaking their first estate Though Constitutively both their sin and the Angels obedience made the dissimilitude If you suppose Cain and Abel equally under grace at first and ask Who made the difference I answer Constitutively Cains sin and Abels righteousness maketh or is the difference But as to Reputative efficiency Cain made the difference by rejecting grace So if you should suppose two equally qualified with common grace and one of them to lose it the efficience of the difference is Imputable to him But if you suppose two equally lost in sin and one converted and not the other the Constitutive Causes of the difference are ones sin and the others repentance But the Imputable efficiency is Gods grace and mans repentance or will that is recovered § 13. But when Paul doth ask Who made thee to differ he meaneth Who gave thee that good by which thou differest and expoundeth it by What hast thou which thou hast not received And no doubt but all good is received from God And this would have held true if God had by equal operation done as much on the other which had been uneffectual by his indisposition or rejection § 14. Nature and Scripture perswade us that the same measure of help or influx is not enough to make one repent or believe which is enough to make another For the difference of souls and temptations and impediments plainly prove it The same strength will not move a Mountain which will move a Feather nor the same Teaching make an ignorant Sot to understand which serveth a prepared person § 15. Bodily aptitude or ineptitude do much to vary receptivities which are usually Gods punishments or rewards for Parents actions And oft-times for mens own Some by fornication gluttony drunkenness sports and idleness make themselves even next to Brutes § 16. But we have great Reason from Scripture to believe that though Gods Laws be equal and his Judgements where men do not make an inequality yet as a free Lord and Benefactor he dealeth not equally with all that are of equal merit Though he do no man wrong nor deny any what he promised in his Word but keep perfect Justice as a Governour yet he may do with his own as he list and he will be specially good to some though others see it with an evil eye § 17. Whether all that are elect have at first a greater measure of the Divine help and impress than any that are not converted no man can say of which more anon But certainly all the elect were fore-decreed by Gods will to that certain conversion which others were not so decreed to SECT VI. Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul § 1. THat which sticks in the minds of many is that God being Omnipotent all his operations must be equally unresistible and efficacious because none can conquer God But they must
have done it and will change another not so self-hardened thy gracelesness and destruction both absolutely and as compared to others that are converted is imputable only to thy self 2. And if thou be unwilling to use the Means as thou art able to hear read or meditate on that which should affect thee and unwilling Privatively to hear and receive the inward motions of my Spirit which should convince and turn thee and wilt not either by previous Cogitation or immediate conatus and suscitation of thy Intellect to Think and of the will to its act actively concurr to receive my gracious motions and influx thy gracelesness absolutely and comparatively is imputable not to me but to thy self 3. Much more if when thou canst do otherwise thou run the contrary way and turn thy thoughts and affections eagerly after vanity and hate and oppose my help and grace because it is against thy lusts 2. Or if you will take it in the form of a half promise or encouragement from God thus 1. If thou wilt not by wilful progress in sin and custom so increse thy Privation and obdurateness as that the same measure of Gracieâ—s Means and Impress will not convert thee as would do one that hath not so abused common grace 2. And if also thou wilt at the present do what thou canst in stirring up thy own will to concurr and thy Intellect to consider and wilt but Consent that my Grace shall help thee and that thou wilt wait for it in the use of means 3. And if thou wilt not hate and resist my motions as enemies to thy lusts and turn wilfully after vanity in such a degree as thou art even Morally able to forbear Thou shalt find that I am gracious and merciful abundant in goodness and truth and forsaking none before they forsake me and have not appointed thee these means in vain To whom thus prepared did I ever deny the grace of faith Name him if thou canst So that Volo si velis hoc is one thing and Volo si velis aliud si ad hoc volendum quantum potes teipsum suscites Gratiam non oppugnes nec contraria prosequaris quando pravas Volitiones frâ—nare possis is another thing § 18. That God giveth his gracious operations sometimes in a Resistible limited degree besides what is said is most evidently proved 1. In that all Divines confess that in making the World he hath not done quantum potest but quantum voluit 2. In that there are innumerable Possibilia quae non sunt aut existentia aut futura God could have made the World sooner or made more Orbs Earths Trees Men Brutes in specie numero and done more acts and made more alterations than he doth 3. There is certainly some Divine operation with and by his instituted means which is limited to their instrumental aptitude § 19. And it is no dishonour to Gods Omnipotency to work thus limitedly and resistibly For 1. Else he should be the Author of his own dishonour who freely diversifieth Instruments Receptivities and effects throughout the World in wonderful variety 2. If the total Non-Volitions Non-operations or forbearing to do what he could as in all the innumerable Possibles aforesaid be no dishonour to him then to will only in tantum and to operate hoc hactenus limitedly and resistibly is no dishonour being more than not to Will and Work at all SECT VIII What that Operation of God on the soul is which is the subject of our many questions as Whether it be equal on all Whether it be resistible Whether it be moral or physical Whether it be sufficient when it is not effectual c. And what the various opinions about it are and how uncertain they are YOU may think this should have come first but for some reasons I have reserved it to this place § 1. I think the Ignorance of this in a great measure is common to all mankind But the Ignorance of mens Ignorance and presumptuous contending about what we understand not pretending even to triumphant scorn of dissenters that we do understand it is the very life of most of our contentions about these points § 2. My own judgement is that our own Intellection and Volition in the body are Acts that take in so much of the sense imagination and corporeal spirits into that of them which we perceive and denominate as that we cannot tell how far the Acts even of our own separated souls will differ from these which we here perceive and from perception call Intellection and Volition And much less do I know the difference between Gods Vital-activity Intellection and Volition and ours Some likeness there is or else ours were not his Image But all Schoolmen and Divines agree that the names are not Univocal and that it is not the same Thing in God as in man which these names signifie And that no man can have a formal conception of them I am satisfied that a glow-worm or the fire in a flint yea or in a stick or clod is incomparably liker the Sun than Man 's poor Life and Intellection and Volition is like to Gods And if so how unfit are we unnecessarily to dispute of these acts of God with curiosity or at all so as implyeth a nearer likeness The Lord knoweth that I would with reverence withdraw from this consuming fire and no further meddle with it than the Glorifying of God and the pacifying of the contentious and the healing of divisions and calling off the presumptuous doth require § 3. * * * The great difficulty is what it is which we must conceive to go between Gods essence and mans act or inclination given Dr. Twiss accuseth the Jesuits for denying Intellection and Volition to be instantaneous Acts sine motu And yet his friend Alvarez holdeth the Divine Act antecedent to be properly motio and would have his predetermination so described quâ praeviâ motionâ— actuali causis secundis praesertâ—m liber is inharente illas applicâ—t â—d operandum c. But it is either God or an effect of God which he calleth motio If an effect it is so called as it is in the receiver And what motio antecedent to mans Act can be imagined in man when motion is an Act though every Act be not motion Therefore they voluminously dispute de non ente or of they know noâ— what If we must have a distinct conception of it I think Viâ— impressâ— fitter By Divine Action or operation must be meant 1. Either something in God or something caused or Created by him 2. If caused or created it must be either something in the second Causes or something in the Recipient soul I think the distribution is sufficient § 4. I. In GOD there is nothing but GOD His Life Knowledge and Will are no accidents but his essence And therefore invariable and no subject for any of these questions To ask whether Gods Essential Knowledge Will and Activity
cessationem aâ— vaâ—ationem ab aâ—â—u boâ— necessitate naturaliter praecedentâ— cor p. 649. Omnia quâ— sunt fiunt aut eveniâ—â—t sunt â—â—â—â— eveniunt â—â— aliquâ— necessitate ipâ—â— naturalâ—tâ—r praecedentâ— This is just Hobbs Soâ— 5. â—â— 654 that No creature hath simple liberty of Contradiction or Contingency but only secundum quid in respect to second causes but only Gods acts of will ad extra are simply free and contingent As if God had given no creature Liberty to forbear sin or do good but doing it or not doing it were from Gods necessitation though not from the creatures The Dominicans the Masters of the Inquisition and Murderers of the Waldenses and Albigenses of old and therefore faulty as well as the Jesuits though there are very Learned men among them both do commonly hold that No Creature natural or free can act unless God by Immediate physical efficient premotion predetermine it to that act both in the act as such which they call the substance of it and all the modes circumstances and order of it 3. Augustine and Jansenius after him with their true followers hold not this necessity of predetermining premotion to all acts natural or sinful but only to spiritual good acts which is not from the Nature but the Corruptâ—â—n of â—â—an and therefore the predetermination is not made say they by Gods Common Natural Motion but by Medicinal Grace 4. Durandus and his followers as Lud. à Dola and Aureolus partly do hold that if God do but uphold â—ll creatures as compaginate in the Universe in the Nature he made them in and so natural Inclination and media and objects all supposed this sustentation and Influx maintaining their Active Natures and means is sufficient to cause an Act without another particular predetermining premotion of God As e. g. in Naturals they think that if a Rock were violently held up in the Air God continuing its Natural Gravity and all other circumstant Natures and Concauses this Rock if loosed can fall down of it self without another predetermining premotion of God And that a new Act of God supposing the said support of Nature is more necessary to the not-falling than to the falling of it As it was to the fires not burning the Three Confessors Dan. 3. And I am unable to see the error of this Opinion And so in Free agents they think that if God continue the Nature of a free-will with all circumstants and necessary natures it can freely determine it self without another act of predetermining premotion And doth so in each act of sin Though as Jansenius saith by accidental corruption for Conversion we need Medicinal Grace 5. The Jesuits and all others explode this Opinion of Durà ndus as singular but give so little and slender reason of their dissent as would draw one the more to suspect their cause Instead of it they scarce know what to assert But Bellarmine and the chiefest of them under a pretended opposition speak I think the same in other words Even an Universal Concurse like that of the Sun which operateth in specification according to the nature of Recipients which specifie the effect Which Universal Influx no doubt Aureolus and Durandus include in Gods sustentation of Nature For to sustain an Active Nature in all its Active disposition by a suitable active Influx is universally to cause its motion The difference they are unable to assign 6. After these come Hobbs Cartesius and Gassendus with a swarm of Epicureans a Sect commonly despised even in Cicero's time and yet called Wits in ours by men that have no more wit than themselves and some of these say that Motion needeth no continued cause at all any more than non-movere But when a thing is in motion it will so continue because it is its state without any other continued cause than the motion it self And so they may as well say and some do that when a thing is in Being it will so continue till it be positively annihilated without any continued causation of its being As if esse existere were nothing more than non esse and agere were no more noble a mode of Entity than non agere and so needed no more that is no Cause For non esse non agere need no Cause When this distraction is worn out and shamed the next Age will reproach us for attempting the confutation of it And yet the Wits of this delirant Age have not the wit to understand a Confutation Some of them say that Spirits cannot move bodies for want of Contact as Gassendus Some say that Matter and Motion are eternal and that of themselves As if there were no God but Matter and Motion Some say that there is a God who gave matter one push at first and so set it in that motion by which one body by a knock will move another to the end And some say There is no other Intellect but the wonders of wisdom and order in the World are done by such fortuitous motion But Hobbes meeteth the Predeterminants and saith that the Will is free in that its Act is Volition but that this Volition is necessitated by superiour or natural Causes as much as any motion in a Clock or Watch and that it is unconceivable that any Act or Mode of Act can be without a necessitating efficient cause But he differs from them in his consequents and in the Notion of a Spirit acknowledging no being but Corporeal § 2. The Predeterminants commonly build not their doctrine on Gods free-will but on the Necessity of the thing As if it were a contradiction which God cannot do for God to make a creature that can Determine it self ad ordinem actionis without his particular predetermining premotion or to make a Stone that can fall from the Air of it self unless he move it downwards besides his sustentation of its natural gravity and all other natures by his Influx or universal Concurse § 3. But till they can prove the Contradiction they must pass for the denyers of Gods Omnipotency which is to deny a God § 4. * * * Let the Reader note 1. That all the rest of their arguments save this one are of no value 2. And that Dr. Twisse affirmeth that God is not alwayes the effector of all Good either of Profit or Pleasure which yet he saith are Good Now if there be no such Entity in Bonum conducibile vel Bonum Jucundum as necessarily to require God to be the Cause of them tell us if you can Why there is so much entity in Malum morale as that man is not able to cause it unless God predetermine his will Yea as to Entity there is no more in Bonum honestum than in the rest fore-named His words are Nos tueri poterimus Malum fieri esse Bonum per se neâ—â—pe in genere Boni conducibilis ad certum aliquem fiâ—â—m sed arguit adversarius Ergo Deus esset non modo
permissor sed effector â—jus mali Prorsus invalida consequentia Apparet enim non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis N. B. Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non sit alicui conducibile Neque necessâ— est ut Deus sit author omnis boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati Nam certissimum est extra omnem controversiae alâ—am positum peccatum esse bonum in genere jucundi etiam in genere conducibilis potest enim peccatum nobis cedere in salutem Vind. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. p. 133. But whereas the Doctor upbraideth Arminius for confusion in not distinguishing the three sorts of Good in this controversie An â—â—li existentia bonum sit viz. the bonum honestum utile jucundum I must desire the Reader to avoid also the Doctors confusion and to be so much more accurate than he as to remember that this distinction is but de Bono Creaturae whose pleasure profit and honesty are distinguishable But that above these God Himself is the absolute and simple Good and that things are first Good as related to him the Prime and Ultimate Good And that the highest formal notion of Goodness in the â—creature is none of those three but the conformity of things to the Will of God the absolute Rule of Goodness And therefore when we ask An bonum sit ut sit malum we mean not an sit bonum hominis secundum quid but an sit bonum simpliciter viz. conforme Voluntati Divinae And if they can prove that Deus velit â—â—â—â— fieri we will confess it to be Good But 3. Yet I deny it to be bonum utile seeing it doth the sinner no good For Bonum jucundum in genere is not sin God would have men have more Pleasure than sin bringeth and not less But it is hoc minus jucundum sensibile preferred before hoc magis jucundum spirituale which is sin Now the prelation of a Less Pleasure to a Greater is no Pleasure So that sin is neither utile nor jucundum And the Doctor is quite out in calling â—ccasio a medium conducibile and confesseth that sin is no otherwise conducible to Gods Glory but as occasio Whereas occasio as such is no medium at all no more than possibilitas est ens unless you take Medium very largely Their chief argument is that the moral specification of an Action is an Entity and to say that any thing can cause any Entity without Gods first causing it is to deifie that creature making it a first cause Answ 1. The comparative Order of Actions as the terminating them on this object rather than that and at this time rather than that c. is but the modus modi entis and so is no proper entity 2. Or if the Name be the quarrell it is no other Entity than what God is Able to make a creature Able to cause without his predetermining Causality 3. This power is the excellency of the creature and the honour of its Creator § 5. As for their argument that there is no effect without a cause nor difference in effects without a difference in the causes and that an undetermined cause cannot produce a determinate effect I answer 1. God is the cause of all differences without any diversity in himself And he is the Free cause of all things necessary in the World 2. The soul is Gods Image 3. The Will when undetermined hath a self-determining power Therefore this is but petere principium 4. But there are many sub causes that are a reason of the determination As objects opportunity knowledge the removing of competitors c. § 6. Therefore Gibieufs Guil. Camerarius c. way of predetermination by the Causa finalis is nothing to our question that being no efficient but a Material objective or Moral Causation § 7. When they say that else God dependeth on the creature and is determined by it as to his Concurse I answer 1. How can Gods free upholding the power of a free agent be his dependence on it when it expresly speaketh its dependence on him without whom it cannot be nor act 2. No creature determineth Gods Immanent acts nor his transient as to the meer Impress and first effect and so not Gods Act at all unless Terminating be Determining It is only its own Act which the creature determineth which is a secondary effect of Gods act as proceeding from the second cause Gods Influx maketh all that Impress on the soul which God intendeth absolutely But whether by that Impress the sinner will consent the will determineth and is the chief determiner in Evil. § 8. Saith Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 2. Digres 9. The second cause non agit in primam c. Hoc faceret vel volendo vel aliâ—d agendo c. Answ It 's granted God is not passive nor doth any second cause act on him as passive Who is his Adversary in this § 9. He addeth Neither on the Influx of God do we act for an Act is not the subject of an act Answ 1. If by Gods Act and Influx he mean not the Effect on the soul it is a false supposition that Gods Influx or Act is any other than his Essence But if the said effect be meant I have shewed you that both Indisposition in the Recipient and a contrary Act may resist it § 10. Against our Passive determination of the effect he saith that God is denyed to act by physical action on mans will which if he did he would rather determine it than be determined by it because it cannot resist him c. Ans 1. The will doth not resist by reaction on and against God but by Indisposition and by its own not acting when it can c. 2. Who dare deny all Physical Action of God on mans will when it is quaedam natura 3. The will doth not Determine Gods will nor reject his Impress but only determine its own Act. 4. If God would act ad ultimum posse the will would never disobey or fail of the due effect § 11. He saith ib. Doth God move only to the Act in genere or also to this species of action The first cannot be said For Suarez Hurtado say that God determineth the Agent to this Individual act And the creature hath as much need of help to the species of motion which is perfecter than the genus as to the genus And Gods Influx is singular and not determined to Generical nature c. Answ Gods universal motion as the Suns doth necessarily make its Impress on the creature and giveth him sufficient help ex parte sui to Act yea necessarily continueth the soul in some Action And that Action is singular and not a non existent universal But it is only the General Nature of a singular Act which Gods Natural Influx necessarily causeth And the Moral species what need soever we
have of help to it is caused otherwise not by this common Influx of God as the root of Nature but by a special Gracious Influx with and by special supernatural means And this it doth only to Good and not to Evil and not alwayes with a causally necessitating influx as to our act § 12. He addeth If the will need not Gods motion to its Act in specie it is either in genere entis or in genere moris The first cannot be said For the special Nature includeth the General and more And the species in genere moris are no species of acts but only accidents of humane acts and that only by extrinsick denomination as to the Law c. Answ 1. The vanity of arbitrary Logical notions is a wood for you to hide the matter in You are not able certainly to define what physically specifieth an Action and what not To say that one is the species of an Act and the other is but an accident and no species is but to say that you will say what you list We use to say that Acts are specified by their objects And so when objects differ specie physica vel morali the acts do so But when the question is with Judas shall I betray my Master or not with another shall I be perjured or not with another shall I commit this Adultery or not with another shall I pray in season or out of season to another shall I love God or the creatures more shall I will or not will this shall I will it or nill it c. Here you are so much at liberty that you may please your self with saying that to betray and not betray to forswear and not to forswear to love more or less in degree c. are physical species of entity and so make physical species of Action But I will not say that non agere non ens is a species of Entity physical Nor do I believe that we need Gods Influx ad non agendum as such And as for your Accidents of Actions if you mean Relations it is their fundamentum that we are questioning The extrinsick denomination is founded in Relation or else it 's Causeless In a word Man by Common Influx can determine his own will to go this way rather than that and also not to go and this without a further physical predetermining premotion of God § 13. But here let the Reader note that when he maketh Moral Good and Evil no species of Actions but an extrinsick denomination which is true abstracting the relation from the fundamental difference of the Acts and maketh God the Naturally necessitating Cause of all that is physical in the acts he maketh God equally the necessitating prime Cause of Good and Evil which are but relations resulting from the specified acts § 14. He addeth If God move the will it is to that same act which it doth or to another If to another why should it be said that God moved it to that which is not done rather than that which is done when we speak not of moral but necessary physical motion Answ The Particle To doth cheat you by ambiguity 1. As to noteth the effect of God alone it is to the Impress which he maketh on the soul which effect he still obtaineth which urgeth it towards its own act 2. The same I say if to signifie an absolutely intended end 3. But if to signifie the natural tendency of Gods Impulse as to an effect possible and desirable yea and due by command from the subordinate cause mans will then it was to our act of repentance faith duty that God moved us That is he gave us that Power and necessary influx by which it might and ought to have been done by us § 15. It is but to make toil for the Reader to answer all these fallacies and quibbles founded in some false supposition or ambiguous word else I would answer the rest of that Digression and his Digres 5. li. 1. p. 2. contra Alvar. Only here I must take notice that in this Digr 9. he himself rejecteth Greg. Arim. and Hurtado's assertion of Gods Determining us to this or that Numerical Act as distinct from another ejusdem speciei ut merum figmentum ad curiositati hominum nimium infoelici satisfaciendum duntaxat introductum Whereas were it not for wearying the Reader I might shew that the same Reasons will hold for or against this numerical as are for or against his specifical predetermination And the species having no existence but in the individuals and himself saying that Gods motion is ad actus singulares if he say that it is not to that singular act that is done rather than that which is not done he giveth up his whole cause § 16. But to this he hath an answer that it is a fiction and unsound to say that Possibilia quae nondum existunt do differre numero cum differre numero est tantum existentium Answ 1. He may as well say that esse possibile is a fiction when possibile is terminus diminuens ad esse And is not possibile as much a fiction de specie as de numero That which is not neither is in specie nor in numero But there is a Possibilitas numeri as well as speciei Yet with this answer he oft insulteth over the Schoolmen when at another time he would have said that Possibile hath an esse cognitum in both respects § 17. And I think the good man forgat that by this he quite overthroweth his Book de Scientia Media and much of all his other Books which are animated with the supposition of Gods Will causing faturition from eternity For if only existentia differunt numero futura non sunt existentia And if the futurition of differentia numero be not decreed nor eternal as of this Sun this Earth Paul Peter and their singular acts c. then nothing is future from eternity And so we are brought to the Arminians election of species only and not of individuals in primo instanti which is rejected Sure God electeth Individuals or none And if so it is future individuals Individuation existeth not but in existentibus But if foreknowledge and Decree may be of futures and non-existents it may be of individuals that are such as well as of species § 18. Yea he proceedeth to say pag. 412. Deum scire plura esse possibilia quam sunt non est scire multitudinem rerum possibilium sed tantum scire se praestare posse ut detur major multitudo rerum existentium quam actu sit Quare multitudo rerum individuarum Deo notum est tantum existentium sive ea sit multitudo actualis sive potentialis c. And yet the soul of his Book de Scientia Media is Causa transitionis rerum è numero Possibilium in numerum futurorum And my foresaid opposition to his Eternal Causation of futurity is hereby confirmed 2. It 's
causeth no antecedent necessity but concomitant existentiae 3. This supposeth Gods Scientia futuri conditionalis Against this Dr. Twisse hath said much in a peculiar Digression And surely God ever operateth as God which is ut Causa prima But how far he determineth is the doubt i a capable object of knowledge And therefore he knoweth what conditional propositions of future contingents are true 2. Whether this should be called scientia media or not is a vain question 3. Gods acts ex parte sui being but his Essence and all one can no otherwise be distinguished nor ordered as to the denominations of priority or posteriority than as the objects are distinct and by their order of priority and posteriority allow us by Connâ—tation so to denominate the acts 4. The Intelligibility and the Amability of things are in themselves simultaneous though from the order of humane operations we say that things are first Intelligible before they are Amiable And so we may say of God after the manner of men but not otherwise 5. God doth not will the form or the act of sin as circumstantiated and as the form necessarily resulteth from it neither for it self nor propter aliud the essence or existence 6. Therefore God doth not foreknow sin as willed and decreed by him nor therefore foreknow it because he willeth it 7. God fore-knoweth or knoweth the formale peccati as well as the materiale yet almost all confess that he willeth not the formale Therefore he knoweth that which he willeth not Therefore his Volition of it is not necessary to his knowledge of it 8. There is no effect in God for all that is in God is God who is not effected Therefore there is no Cause in God of any thing in God Therefore Gods will or decree of Good is not the cause that he foreknoweth it noâ— his foreknowledge the cause that he willeth it But he both knoweth and willeth all that is Good at once 9. Gods inward operations on the soul are real efficiencies and yet moral and to us unsearchable They cause the will to determine it self to Good when it doth so but how we know not But we know that he ordinarily worketh by means and according to their aptitude 10. God useth such means with the free wills of his elect as he foreknoweth will prevail with them and setteth them in such circumstances as he foreknoweth they will freely act aright in But his inward grace is the principal or chief cause And he doth not will or decree to give them such means and circumstances because he foreknoweth they will prevail That is Gods will and decree as in him hath no cause 11. But the word because is in Scripture applyed sometimes to Gods Love or hatred and sometimes to his outward acts as John 16. 27. The Father loveth you because ye have loved me and believed And in the first case that which is meant is that the qualification of the object is the material constitutive cause of the act of God not as it is Himself but as relatively denominated ab extra from the object in specie vel individuo And in the second case It meaneth that the effects of God ad extra called his transient acts as in passo have their proper uses and we our commanded ends in using them And so God is said to send Ministers e. g. because he would save the hearers that is the Ministry is a cause of mens â—â—lvation 12. From all this it appeareth that they err who think that their scientia media is equally useful in the points of Election and of Reprobation and that they run pari passa For all Good is both willed and known and so Election supposeth not the foresight of our faith or obedience as causal or antecedent if we speak of that Act of Election which is to faith and obedience But Evil is foreknown and not willed at all And therefore there is no such Reprobation which is a will or decree that men shall sin And the non-impedition of sin being no act needeth no positive act of will or decree * * * Yet none of the stress of their differences lyeth on this And the Jesuits with the rest assert a Positive Volition de peccato permittendo without proof which I leave to â—uens various opinions But Reprobation which is the decree of damning ever supposeth the object to be a foreseen-sinner finally rejecting grace The rest about this is spoken to sufficiently before §. IV. II. Of Durandus 's way II. AS to the way of Aureolus Durandus Ludov. à Dola c. I conceive it is commonly rejected because not understood or because the wording of it soundeth disgracefully But it is a great matter that all confess how easily it would end all these controversies were it true And by Lud. à Dola's Explication and what Capreolus saith of Aureolus I conceive that they are commonly mistaken Durandus thinketh that to the motion of the Creature it is necessary 1. That God by his continued No doubt but God is quoad praesentiam Immediate in all his efficiency and as Near to the effect as if he used no second cause But yet he is not so immediate as to exclude second causes as media And while he useth them he operateth on us according to their kind of operations even as if they were between him and the effect And this is the sense of Durandus and à Doâ—a and easily reconcileth all Amyraldus de lib. Arbit c. 4. concurreth with Durandus It is consâ—derable that all confess that if Durandus's way did hold it easâ—ly ended all the controversie As Lud. le Blank noteth Thes 3. de Concurs Juxta hos doctores nulla est difficultas in conciliando divino concursu cum libertate c. And this way is as consistent with Gods certain disposal of events as predetermination it self influx continue the being and the nature and properties of the agent 2. And that he continue all the circumstant creatures concauses and objects and the media of action 3. And that no powerful impediment hinder the action Now say the Jesuits and Dominicans and the rest God doth moreover concurr as the first cause to the Act it self by an Immediate efficient Influx besides that by which he upholdeth the Power and second Causes But I think that Durandus meaneth as much as they that is that God doth not only uphold the creature in its meer esse but in its Nature which is its Mobility and its principium motus And this Nature is not only a Power to Action but also an Inclined Power So that for God by constant Influx to continue a Natural Power and Inclination to Action or motion with all necessary concurrents without impediments is truly by his Influx to concurr to the motion as the first Cause while his Influx is not only as to Being but as to the Motive force and inclination And no more than this doth seem to me
to be simply necessary to motion Here the Reader must know that the Controversie is equally of Natural and Free agents and action And first let us enquire of natural action I. Fire is an Active nature as much Inclined to Action as Earth to non-action or rest Yea it s Active Virtue and Inclination is its very Essential Form and this as to a threefold action viz. Motion Light and Heat If God then make Fire and continue its Nature or Essential Inclination For I have before shewed how many wayes this is certainly done The whole experience of the world sheweth that God doth operate by second causes according to their natures and wayes of operation Therefore it more concerneth us here to know what second causes do on the soul in good and evil actions than in these disputes is usually observed Adrian Quodl 3. fol 18. Sententia Durandi plurium aliorum certum tenet c. Quam opinionem ultimo tradit Magister 37. d. 2. judicium relinquens prudentis lectoris examini to these acts and continue fuel approximate with all necessary concauses and media without impediments to say that this Fire yet cannot burn or act without another kind of Divine premotion besides all this even an Immediate physical impulse besides the described Influx is a plain contradiction For Fire is essentially an Inclined Power to act And that which hath a true Power to act can act It 's a contradiction to say It hath power but it cannot And a Power naturally inclined to act will act caeteris paribus The question then is Whether it be an impossibility for fire to burn if God do but as the first Cause of Nature continue its burning power and inclination with all concauses or rather Was it not a Miracle for the three Confessors Dan. 3. not to be burnt in that fiery Furnace If you say that the Miracle was in Gods withholding his additional premotion you then imply that God as principium vel causa prima Naturae doth ordinarily give that additional premotion For that is no Miracle which is not dissonant from the common course of nature But nothing can belong to God as the Cause of Nature but to continue Nature as he made it and he actually premoveth and concurreth while by his Influx as the first cause he continueth all its Moving Nature both Power and Inclination In the motus projectorum so far as the moving vis impressa continueth and prevaileth the motion continueth accordingly And who can prove that though the vis impressa continue e. g. in a Bullet shot out of a Gun and all concauses yet there can be no motion unless God otherwise thrust it on or move it by some other impulse Suppose a Stone or Rock hang in the Air quasi per filum or by somewhat that hindereth its descent If God continue the Natural Gravity of that Rock which is not only a power but an inclination to descend and if he continue all concauses and media and if the thred be cut or the impediment removed that held up the stone yet saith the Dominican this Stone cannot fall unless God moreover by another action thrust it down or by an efficient physical premotion predetermine it or as the Jesuits say unless God concurr with a further moving Impulse A plain contradiction That a Power of motion strongly inclined to act so as a greater power is necessary in the impediment that will hinder it and this in genere Agentis continued by Divine Influx yet cannot act unless otherwise moved God worketh so constantly by Natural Inclinations of second causes as fully proveth to us that ut prima Causa Naturae he hath decreed so to work And how is that then but by his Influx into Nature as Nature If my house cannot fall when the foundations and pillars are gone unless God otherwise thrust it down If I cannot fall though I leap down from the house top unless God otherwise thrust me down If the Town cannot be fired unless God predetermine it or concurr besides his continuation of Nature why should we fear it when we know not that God decreeth any more than the continuation of natural causes and that action which is by them and by him as the upholder of them II. And the case of Free-agents is here confessed to be the same The Influx into their Natures and Virtues is it that continueth them in esse substantiali and in esse movente moto An Act is but the modus substantiae And it surpasseth my understanding to conceive what it is for God physice influere in actum immediate non in potentiam seu virtutem agentem nor how he can be said to move the faculties to act that doth cause the act and not meddle with and therefore not move the faculty Nor know I how an Act immediately and not the agent can be the terminus of a physical motion Though it 's easie to conceive how God should cause an act by moral and extrinsick objective means Therefore as God moveth things Natural by his Influx into their moving Virtues or into the moving Virtues of second Causes which being Active operate on passive matter so as the Soul and its Will is quadam natura inclined to Action in genere and to will good in special God as the cause of nature moveth it by his Influx into the faculty as he doth other natural agents But having made it a Free self-determining Agent his Influx upholdeth and moveth it as such And the same Influx is upholding and moving and moving as upholding seeing God as Motor also doth influere in naturam vitalem liberam Besides which supporting and moving Influx no other predetermining premotion is necessary to an Act as an Act that I know of But the very natures or dispositions of lapsed man being depraved the reparation of them is necessary to holy actions And here also God operateth on the faculties by right disposing them and by that grace which Augustine and Jansenius well call Gratia medicinalis his special Influx causing maintaining and actuating it he causeth the holy actions of believers I do verily believe that Durandus and his followers under the name of supporting the natural and free faculties did mean inclusively that which Bellarmine pleadeth for A General Concurse to the Act as an Act And that they differ in words and not in sense And if his doctrine hold not true I cannot see how God can be said to Permit mens sinful Actions or any action at all For if neither the Inclination of natural agents as of Fire to burn a Stone to descend c. nor the Inclination of the most wicked nature would cause any act unless God otherwise cause it by premotion then there is no place for Impedition for we cannot be said to Hinder a Stone from speaking or a Mountain from walking nor anything from any act which it could not as And permittere is non impedire And
therefore Gods moving a man to the Act of sin is not a permitting him to sin Motion being one thing and the not hindering of motion another thing or nothing §. V. III. Of the Scotists and Nominals way III. ANd as to the third way ascribed by Alvarez to the Scotists and Nominals I think that de nomine it is not a proper expression to call God causa partialis But if we agree of the sense we may bear Vasqu ubi sup taketh Alex. Al. 1. p. q. 26. n. 7. a. 2. ad 1. Ronavent 1. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. to be for him because they say Actus nostros esse liberos quia Divina voluntas non est Tota Causa sed cum libero arbitrio quod cum sit proxima causa modificatur concursum primâ— But if this be his opinion he joyneth with these Scotists and Nominals de causa non-totali So Pet. à S. Joseph Thos Univ. de Deo saith that God is Causa totius effectus sed non tota Causa sed partialis with improper expressions about God of whom we can say nothing without some impropriety Doubtless God and man are not to be accounted co-ordinate concauses of the act but whatever man doth he doth it in subordination to God But God operateth 1. As the prime cause of Nature in a stablished way by natural causes And so he giveth man his Natural vital power and the Liberty of using it and by this Power and Liberty a man can do more than he alwayes doth So that Gods natural causality and concurse doth not bring all the Power which he giveth men into proportionable adequate Action but men freely exercise the same power sometime more and sometime less 2. And in the like manner God causeth gracious or holy acts Rectifying our Powers and fortifying them by holy habits and preserving and actuating them by the Holy Ghost Yet the Spirit is to Grace as God the prime cause is to Nature He giveth us more Gracious Power than we use and than his own concurse alwayes reduceth into adequate act So that Gods operations in Nature and Grace are not ad ultimum posse Dei nor ad ultimum posse hominis but limited by his most wise and holy will And man as a free agent is not only Able but obliged to use his power further than by all Gods concurse or premotion it is used And in this sense I conceive it is that Scotus and others call God and man Causae partiales in that there is a certain proportion of premotion and help which God as the first Cause of Nature and Grace doth afford to man And there is moreover a certain use of Gods help and Grace beyond what God predetermineth man to as comparative to this object rather than that c. which man can do and is bound to do Not independently or in co-ordination with God but by the Power and Liberty which God only giveth and upholdeth and affordeth him sufficient help to actuate Now if man do this Part which is left to his liberty the effect alwayes followeth If he do not it may not follow though God gave him that necessary help or grace or premotion which is commonly called sufficient And when Scotus likeneth God and man to two drawing a Boat where the strength of both must concurr I believe he meant no more than I have said 1. All the Power is of God as the total first cause 2. All the Grace that rectifieth and disposeth our faculties is of God as the total first cause 3. All the Act as an Act in genere is of God as the total though not the sole cause 4. All the Holiness or Moral Goodness of the Act is of God as the total first cause though not the only cause 5. But all the sinfulness or moral evil of Acts and Habits is from Man 6. And that implyeth that mans free will is not so much freed from sin mutability and infirmity but that it can neglect to use well the power and helps of grace afforded But of total and partial Causality I have spoken more fully in the first Book And of their opinion that Gods Influx puts nothing into the will but only is ad actum seu effectum if it be true it easily endeth the controversie of the difference of sufficient and effectual grace as to that Act But it is to me unintelligible and the thing quite above all our understandings and very unfit for bold disputes or mutual censures §. VI. The true face or Scheme of the Dominican predeterminant way as to the sense and consequents I Do readily confess that as the summ of all the Controversie is Whether man have truly any Free-will that is not moved as necessarily as any natural motions are caused so the arguments of Hobbes and the Dominicans and Dr. Twisse are not easily answered And had we not better proof of all that Morality and Religion which is inconsistent with this opinion I should my self be inclined also to think that we must be contented with the naked name of Liberty there being nothing indeed but Volition necessitated and that man is an Engine moved by God and other causes no less necessarily and physically than a Clock or Watch but only by more invisible causes and to us unknown and therefore our Volitions are called Contingent and free when truly there is nothing contingent in the World We that converse in the body with things corporeal are so much strangers to our selves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits that we are very prone to such gross corporeal imaginations and to think that all action is like the motus projectorum violent and necessitated and that it belongeth to the perfection of the first mover that it should be so yea that he himself should be in all things the most necessary agent and consequently all things necessitated by him But as Alvarez confesseth Free-will is proved by Aquinas and many others by natural proofs and no Predeterminant or Hobbist can give the tenth part so full and certain proof of the necessitation of all Volitions as we can give of all the contrary principles in Morality which are overthrown thereby And therefore whatever some think of the fatum Stoieorum the Light of Nature taught almost all the Philosophers in the World the Freedom of mans will and the morality there founded of which Grotiâ—s hath collected so full a Volume of testimonies in his Book entituled De fato that it shall save me the labour of transcribing any Yet though I think Christianity inconsistent with their opinion I doubt not but many of the Predeterminants are good Christians and excellently learned and acute Divines as not apprehending the inconsistency of their own thoughts And I confess that there is a Religion consistent with their fundamental error which I shall therefore put into the Scheme lest any think that none but Hobbes hath made the right deductions from it And remember that I
circumstantially but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency as the first Cause besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances or can forbear to act when so predetermined is by consequence to say that such a creature is God the first cause For it is as impossible as to be God or to make a World III. Yea the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to must be stronger than God and overcome him or do contradictions IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion he could not have known any future acts No though with Scotus we say that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience it would not serve unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them V. Yet we will say that the Will is free but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth and his Willing is not a Nilling VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis rationis â—d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum ad agendum unum vel alterum sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur That is it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will by making it will yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive but also Active because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth God predetermineth the will to determine it self VII We will call this the wills Power but it is but hypothetically a Power viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it else not at all As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them or rather as the hand can move if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it VIII The will is said to be free partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God and then by it self ad utrumlibet and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction IX The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God is not constrained because it willeth not unwillingly that is so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant X. Yet the will that was one way enclined habituated and acted in the precedent instant is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant which it could not resist As he that in this instant wilâ—eth Chastiâ—y may in tâ—e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipâ—tency to will fornication or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment But we will not call this irresistible efficiency coaction because it is ad Volendum and so in ipso actâ— there is no reluctancy or resistance XI When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill or not will to will this or that and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such yet the moral specification of that Act to this proposed object rather than that as to hate God rather than to hate sin or to this Act rather than to that as to hate God rather than to Love him or to speak a lye rather than the truth hath so much Entity in it that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say that man can do it without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion XII God made the Law which forbiddeth sin and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law and God made and ordereth all the objects temptations and concauses and God by the said efficient physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances As when David was deliberating Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it or else he could not possibly have done it And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum fundamentum terminum nor can it possibly be but it must exist per nudam resultantiam hisce positis And yet though God make the man the Law the act the object and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a meer relation we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin XIII Yea though the Habits of sin are certain Entities and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature according to our principles who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity yet we are resolved to say that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin XIV Yet we will say that he is an enemy to Gods Providence that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness unless God thus predetermine both Will Tongue Hand and every active part to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale but not as to the formale And yet we must confess that the Relation is caused by causing the subject foundation and term all which God principally doth and can be caused no otherwise XVI But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation which is nothing Therefore man and not God is the cause of it For God cannot be a deficient cause nor have any privation And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience in curvity as in rectitude in disconformity as in conformity 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations such as death is though not a subject of them even such a cause as they can have 3. Nor that some of ours even Alvarez say that sins of commission and habits are positive in their formale 4. And sin is such a Nothing as is mans misery and he is damned for and by And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause man can no more be the cause of it than God 5. And that the Reason of non existences negations or privations is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the first necessary cause of the contrary as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency And if a man cannot
And who it is that erreth indeed the Light must discover and the studious impartial prepared Children of the Light must discern and the Father of Lights must finally judge Note that in the first part I speak as in the name of the Predeterminants till I come to the Questions and thence-forward I speak as in my own name which the Reader may easily perceive §. VII Of Jansenius his way of reconciling Grace and Free-will § 1. BUt after all these cometh Jansenius and justly blaming Philosophy as the great occasion of our heresies and errours which misled the Schoolmen Jesuites and others he goeth to Augustine alone as Lombard thought he had well done before him and disgraceth his cause by saying that Augustine first taught it to the Church as if Grace had been unknown by the former ages And because many will not be at the labour to know his mind by reading so big a volume I shall briefly select what concerneth the matter in hand and animadvert upon it 1. His first Tome describeth the Heresie of Pelagius wherein he proveth that Pelagius held all this that followeth concerning grace 1. The Remission of sins containing 1. Conversion to God 2. The abstersion of the blot and filth 3. Reconciliation or remission of Gods offence 4. And of the eternal punishment Jansenius Aug. To. 1. l. 5. c. 22. p. 126 127. 2. That Pelagius owned the Infusion of habitual grace And that God in Baptism did blot out all sins purge cleanse and expiate them save and renew the soul restore nature deliver from the body of this death and from the contracted custome of sinning He held that Grace doth Regenerate Illuminate cause Faith Justifie even Infants Sanctifie make us new Creatures incorporate us into Christ as his members give us the anointing of the Holy Ghost not only restoring us to the state that we were in in Adam but to a better and to be adopted sons of God and saved cap. 24. And 25. as to the Relative effects that Grace Reconcileth man to God maketh him an adopted Son of God and the Temple of the Holy Ghost an Heir of God and co-heir with Christ So that they acknowledge not only Habitual Infused Grace but more even in Baptism As also the Assisting motions of the spirit to good acts making them possible Also that after Pope Zozymus had condemned the Pelagians they went further and that their design was but to lay mens salvation or damnation on free-will lib. 6. c. 7. c. And when he cometh to characterize Pelagius he doth it as he doth elsewhere the Protestants and as Malignants do Religious persons by presumptions viz. that he was indeed as Augustine saith Temperate and of a good life but singular and very proud which he proveth by his opinion and because he was against Swearing and said that Gods servants mouths should vent no bitter thing but only that which is sweet and that Christians must be so patient as readily to let go what is taken from them and that gallantry and gay cloathing is contrary to God and that enemies must be loved as friends and yet not believed and that Riches must be forsaken c. as holding nothing mean and moderate that he affected novelty and yet his â—rrours were old coming from Origen â—uffinus Palladius Evagrius Jovinâ—an and the Philosophers that he affected fame admiration hypocrisie pretending to more holiness than others under the garb of poverty c. over-â—alued Reason Logick Syllogismes Philosophers c. All which I mention not to abate any mans dislike of any one errour of Pelagius but to shew that it is so usual for dissenters to make one another seem odious and to feign or aggravate faults and to vilifie or deny Gods grace in others that he that would not be tempted into malice uncharitableness and slander must take heed what he believeth even of men accounted most abominable hereticks Doubtless Pelagius his denying original sin and his laying too much on mans will and too little on grace are things to be detested II. Jansenius asserteth that the Angels and Adam had such Free-will as could obey or disobey and so could determine it self to good and persevere therein without any more grace than they had when they did it not And that by this Free-will some Angels stood and some fell and Adam fell when he might by it have stood and thereby fell from a nobler sort of Free-will which consisteth in a due subservience to God and fell to the Love of Himself not primarily of external things instead of God and to selfdependency and dominion De Grat. primi hom c. 6. p. 40 41 42. c. 7. Nos hic asserimus tanquam sine dubitatione verissimum juxta doctrinam sancti Augustini ecclesiae omnia hujusmodi opera adeoque ipsam fidem dilectionem Dei ab eo potuisse per arbitrii libertatem fieri sic ut ea non donaret ei gratia Dei vid. c. 7 8 c. The reason of this was sanitas Voluntatis Adami c. 9. III. Yet Grace was necessary to man and Angels both to perseverance and to every good act c. 10 11. And c. 12 13 c. this Grace necessary to all was not Habitual Grace for that they had nor general concurse which none denyed but it was Actual Adjuvant Roborating help But the Grace given to Angels and Adam was Adjutorium sine quo non giving the will power to determine it self but not Adjutorium quo which ever determineth it One giveth the Power and the other the Act. The same that is meant by the common distinction of Grace sufficient and effectual by the Dominicans Yet this Adjutorium sine quo non did with free will procure the Act in the standing Angels and Adam while he stood But that made it not Adjutorium quo because it is not so called efficax only ab eventu but because it so helpeth that illo praesente continuo fiat id propter quod datur illo absente nunquam fiat p. 63. c. 14 15. One is like Light and the visive faculty ad videndum the other ut ipsa visio such as all formal causes are and Gods simultaneous efficiency The difference is c. 15. that Adjutorium sine quo non doth but perfect the power and the chief honour belongeth to the will that useth it and could choose But contrarily the adjutorium quo is the principal cause of the Act and leaveth not the event to the will but useth it effectually to the act intended Therefore merit and perseverance in Innocency were no special gifts of God IV. That without or before faith no good work is done but lies and sins l. 3 4. c. 1. p. 223. no nor without true Godliness p. 261. passim To think that Infidels and ungodly have any true virtue is dotage c. 17. V. The first sin had no necessity being meer sin and no punishment and so easily avoidable and wholly voluntary Other sins
first giveth all creatures what they have and next faileth them and leaveth them in darkness as the Sun setteth and then Rising again revolveth all things into his original pure spirituality like the revolution of day and night Summer and Winter it is sure another thing than the Scripture describeth it which maketh it a noble part of that Sapiential frame of Moral Government which some despise § 37. IX But let it be noted that we hold that as the Almighty Father is the glorious Creator Motor and Life of Nature and the Eternal Wisdom Word and Son the Glorious Ordinator Rector and Redeemer so the Eternal Love and the Holy Ghost is the final Perfecter of believers even of Gods Elect and that this Sanctification and proficiency is by more than Moral Sapiential Regiment even by the Real shedding abroad Gods Love upon the soul or by a Quickning Illuminating felicitating Communication of Divine Life and Light and Love which yet maketh not the Sapiential Regiment vain § 38. And as to Free-will I further say that we are far from holding that it is a state of man in which he is Above God or Independent and as a God to himself or that God is any way a defective or idle as they call it Spectator of mans sins or free acts But that this rank and state of free agents is Gods own wisely-chosen work in which he is delighted And that he doth truly attain his ends in all § 39. Therefore as Mr. Sterry magnifieth the harmony which aâ—â—seth from Moral Good and Evil as designed and necessitated by God so we first admire the harmony which ariseth from Natural and free agents and their works which must not be dishonoured and left out § 40. And more than so we doubt not but all Gods works are perfect it being their perfection to be suited to his own will And the difference between us and Mr. Sterry Dr. Twisse c. is not Whether God be Glorious in all his works or they be perfect For we say that though mans sin be found upon Gods works and that sin be none of his works nor any means properly so called of Pleasing or Glorifying him nor at all willed or caused by him but hated and punished yet he loseth none of his complacency or glory by it but notwithstanding its malignity shineth gloriously in the perfection of all his works § 41. Yea more we say that men sin under his Disposing power and that he will make use of their evil unto Good and sin shall become an occasion of that Glory to God as sickness to the Physicion of which it is no Cause or proper Means nor of it self condâ—ceth thereunto Yea and that no Act as an Act how sinful soever is done but by Gods causation as he is the fountain of nature and prime Motor Yea more that all the Effects and Consequents of sin that are not sin it self are under the Causal Government and disposal of God who will attain his Ends in all § 42. Therefore we differ but in this Whether God get not all that glory which Mr. St. floridly describeth notwithstanding sin or on supposition of it as barely permitted negatively but with a Decree or Volition of all the good consequents occasioned by it rather than by sin it self as a willed designed effect of his own necessitating Negations and in the positive part of the acts as circumstantiated of his determining premotion Whether mans permitted sin be any of Gods works And whether Gods glory be not rather non obstante peccato and also by occasion of it supposed to be mans work only and by all the good consequents caused by God than by the sin it self as a Means conducible or a Cause § 43. For we deny not that God could have prevented all sin if he had so resolved and yet we believe not that such a permission is equivalent to a necessitating Motion or Privation as Mr. Sterry would perswade us To make a creature no better than such as can do good if he will and can be willing with a decree to make many willing is much different from making the creature bad and then condemning him to Hell for being so as an act of Justice Yet we doubt not but the Divine Light will shortly give us all a fuller discovery of that which shall vindicate the Wisdom Goodness and Justice of God in his Government of man than yet the wisest mortals have § 44. Either you suppose that God doth all that he can do or not If yea then you suppose that he cannot nor ever could make any one Creature Worm or Grass more or less greater or smaller sooner or later or otherwise than he doth which few will believe It being not for want of Power but through perfection of Wisdom and freedom of Will that he doth no more But if God can make one creature more or one Motion more and yet doth not I ask Whether you dare call that non-agency by the name of Idleness or deficiency If not why should the Non-causation of sinful Volitions in specie morali or the leaving free-will to its own determination be so called Not to make more creatures or more physical motion or not to give more Grace and Glory is as much a non-agency as not to determine a sinning Will. § 45. As to all Mr. Sterry's Reasons against Free-will they are so Rhetorically rather than Logically delivered that I think it not meet to trouble the Reader with any further answer of them or to suppose them to have any more strength than those that other men plainlier have delivered § 46. I conclude with this repeated profession that I am fully satisfied that all the rest of the Controversies about Grace and Nature and Predestination and Redemption as they stand between the Synod of Dort and the Arminians are of no greater moment than I have oft expressed in this Book nor worthy any of that stir and contention which men that sufficiently difference not Words Methods and Matter have made to the mischievous injury of the Church And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties is in this controversie between the defenders of Necessary Predetermination and of Free-will that is not What free-will sinners have left but Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man there was such a thing as a will that can and ever did determine it self to a Volition or Nolition in specie morali without the predetermining efficient necessitating premotion of God as the first Cause or as Hobbes speaketh Whether ever a created will did act without a necessitating premotion And whether to will and to will freely be all one And whether the will except as to the kind of action be not as much necessitated to will or not will as my Pen to write or not write are we call not its acts Contingent or free either because they are what they are Volitions or though Ignorance because we see not the moving Causes § 47. And if
Opinion hold it will allow no other Religion in the World but this much To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil which God doth cause aâ— a free Benefactor differencing his Gifts in various proportions as he seeth meet as he differenceth Stars from Stones and Men from Dogs and equally causeth the wisdom of Man and the poyson of the Toad or Serpent and so will make such differences in this World and the next if there be any as pleaseth him as he doth here between one Horse that 's pampered and another that is tired out with labour Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way It hath pleased God by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills necessitation unto its proper practice thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Authors sake than we could have expected if none but such excellent persons as Alvarez * And more plainly yet Bradwardine who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell that God will have it so and none can resist him and his Brethren Dr. Twisse and Rutherford had maintained it But as Davenant well saith It is an Opinion of the Dominicans which Protestants have no mind to own And there are two sorts that thus subject the Will to absolute caused necessity 1. Those aforesaid the Dominicans who assist the predetermining premotion of God as necessary to every act natural and free 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural second Causes which is Hobbs his way and alas the way of great and excellent healing Câ—mero For they hold That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect and the Intellect by the Object â— and God made both Will and Intellect and Object and Law And so Camero hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of Adams sin into but the Devil But who necessitated the Devil to sin This will be all one when it is discussed And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible it will be impossible in the Angels for they are not Gods Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess that God made Man's Will at first with a natural self-determining power and freedoâ— suited to this earthly state of government and that Adam's Will by that same measure of Grace which he had could have forborn his sin at the instant when he sinned II. The other extream which I reconcile not but confute * Yet I am not â—â—â—tating the old way of anaâ—â—â—â—a thing all the hard sayings or opinions of others that being it that I write this against of which course the Epistles of Joan. Antioch 5. 6 c. and of cyril Aâ—ix to Proâ—â—â—s against his so using Theoaâ—â— Mops in Proâ—â—â—â—â—â—â— are worth the reaâ—â—ing besides the fore named T is the Pelagians who deny Original Sin and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier And how far this also subverteth Christianity you may perceive A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions as you may see in the Domâ—nâ—oans on one side and Hobbes against Braâ—hall and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor his Treâ—â— of Repentance on the other and therefore are not to be so slighted B. I do not slight them but confute them I confess that the cases are not without difficulty yea not a little But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced than they can be of the truth of their Opinions And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of â—â— liâ—n Porphyrie or Celsus against Christ that they would not have spoken as plausibly and made the case seem as difficult at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do A. Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned what they are B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me 1. To distinguish Names and Words from Things and * Vasâ—u in 1. Tho. q. 2â— a. 3. d. 4â— c. 1. Bona pars hujuâ— controversiâ— an reprobationis detur causa ex partâ— reprobi dâ— vâ—ce est nominal Controversies from real and to that end to open the aâ—biguity of words as I go along And to â—â—ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion or an enâ— rationâ—â— only that men contend about instead of a reality 2. I may be allowed when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one to distinguish them that each may have its proper answer 3. I may be allowed to â—ast by as unfit for contention all those unâ—evealed and unsearchable Points which none of the Contenders know at all nor ever will do in this World 4. And I will take leave to lay by the rash words of particular Writers as not to be imputed to any others nor to the main Cause or as that which I am not obliged to defend reconcile nor at all to meâ—dle with 5. And when all this is done you shall see what Aâ—toâ—â— the remaining differences will prove A. Begin then with the first Article of Prâ—dâ—stination B. Remember my â—ndertaking that it is not to justifie every â—â—â—â— words that hath written on the Point and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors But produce you all your Accâ—sations as against the Cause of the sober moderate Calâ—â—â—ists and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do The first Crimination A. 1. My first Charge is That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men without respect See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort where this very Charge is denied with detestation And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves Episcop Justit Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur Deum cos secundum â—perasua judicare â—b rebellionem contumaci-am corum dolere irasci c. damâ—are c. cum tamen non modo absolute eos perirâ— peccare voluerit sed originario tali labe infectos nasci fecâ—rit unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat Quod quid aliud esse potest quam histrionica quaedam scâ—nica actio to any fore-seen Sin or cause in them but meerly because â—â—â—â— pleaseth him to do it This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation B. That words may not deceive us let us in the beginning onâ—â— for all know what you mean by the word Decree A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will de eventâ— thaâ— this shall be B. And I suppose we are agreed 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity
but God himself 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man nor of the same formal Conception And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man and not as in God and so this to us is the prius significatum 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sence formaliter but only eminenter 6. And lastly That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man All this you must grant me or be singular and ignorant A. All this is past denial but proceed to the Case B. Do you differ from us de eventu whether there be a Hell or yet of the number of those that are damned A. No or if we do about the Case of Heathens that belongeth not to this Point B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of mens Damnation We say that God damneth no man but for Sin yea for Sin impenitently continued in to the last against all the mercy which tended to their Cure A. So far we are agreed But it 's not the cause of damnation which I speak of but the cause of the Decree B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth he willeth to do A. Yes God doth nothing without a will to do it at least consequently B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day which he willed not yesterday and so from eternity A. No we do not with Vostius make God mutable B. Good still you grant then that God damneth men that he damneth them for sin that he doth it willingly that he willed it from eternity And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity A. Not in esse reali but there was in esse cognito B. So now the game begins Thus the World is cheaâ—ed and troubled by Logical Notions and meer words Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing If nothing it is no Cause If any thing is it God or a Creature It can be no Creature because it is eternal If God you do but say That God caused his own Will A. It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin which causeth his Decree or Will B. 1. Even fore-knowledge it self say the Schools is but the same with knowledge and spoken say they but to the respect and sense of man There being neither priâ—s vel postoriâ—s before or after in eternity But this I now insist not on 2. It is commonly taken for blasphâ—my to talk of a Cause of God or any thing in God If Gods Will be his Essence it hath no Cause He causeth not himself being no Effect 3. If this were so as you say yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge * Vasquer in 1. Thâ— d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree Divinâ— voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem motivam per modum objecti sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud sed solam suam bonitatem Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem causam alterius italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam quia â—na est causa altâ—rius Non ergâ—â—â—â—â— mus an aliud â—â—â—â— ratio â—â—tiva Deo per modum â—â—â—â— ut velit nos prâ—dâ—stinare praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest Id. ib. disp 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujâ—s gratia ratio nolendi aliquid sed propter quod câ—tera esse vult Deus For Siâ— fâ—re-seen is no Sin and nothing is no Cause so that you your self resolve all into God And indeed what can be a cause of the first Cause or any thing in him Use not tergiversation and vain words now and tell me what you have to say A. A thing not existent but fore-seen may be â— moral Cause though not a physical and so fore-seen Sin may be to God B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God There is nothing in God but God To be a cause of his Will is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence And shall so base a thing aâ— Sin cause God 2. We are still at the cheating Game of playing with â—rbitrary Notions What mean you by a moral Cause If a true cause of moral Being that 's one thing If any thing that is not physically or properly but by moral imputation only a cause of any event that 's another thing The first you dare not own as if any thing which is nothing Sin not existent were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica It is really no Cause but that for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that â—â—â—â— equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word Cause equivocally your rule is false Nothing is no moral Cause You will instance in good destrâ—d in fine nondum existente c. But I answer you Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes which are never found but in an existent entity or subject A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum That which is not is not good or amiable Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause But if we will let go the toy and come to the matter It is no other good but the desire of good or the apprehension of the â—â—â—â—rity of good which causeth so that all the Cause is in the Agent 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge that when any mâ—n saith That sin which is no sin and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will he must needs mean no real cause Because to be a cause is tertium Adjectum and presupposeth to be That which is not is not a cause much less of God or of his Will A. I can shew you that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick For if this hold true then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings c. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin and save Souls to â—hose under the Promise before the Incarnation B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter but advantageth you not at all Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this that nothing can do nothing nor cause nothing It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering not yet existent that caused Gods Will tâ— pardon Sinners Nor had Gods Will any proper cause But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another he willed that
Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fulness of time demonstrate his Justice and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency and to pardon Sin And therefore not Christ's Death it self but God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate was the cause of the Promise and of the New Covenant made with Adam and of the Salvation of Believers then Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word A. But at least Sin fore-seen is causa sine qua non B. Call it by what name you please as long as you confess it to be no Cause for causa sine qua non is called Causa fatua and is none But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non for it is no sin from eternity A. It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non B. Yet more notions what is futurity any thing or nothing nothing certainly For quoad ens it is terminus diminuens and nothing is no cause But it is Gods knowledge that Sin will be which is to be called the Cause of Gods Decree as sine qua non if any be But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is your self B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it But not by making other mens worse but by opening the reconciling truth 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said Predestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2. to have an extrinsick cause without change in God 1. Know therefore that Gods Essence is his Will but not as Essence To say that God is God and that God willeth this or that are not terms of the same signification 2. Gods Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will 3. As God willeth himself the Act being perfectly immanent his Will is called himself much more properly than his Will of things extrinsick which is ever either effectively or at least objectively transient Because it is God that willeth and that is willed or loved which made many Ancients say That this was the third Person in the Trinity 4. But as God willeth things ad extra though it is his Essence that so willeth them yet it is unfit to say simply that this Will is God e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God because the name Will here includeth the thing willed 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts it is less inconvenient to say simply that this Will is God than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra By this time you may see that though Gods Will as his Essence hath no cause yet his Will as denominated extrinsecally from the Object may have some kind of Cause that is * Alvarez himself saith that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act. Objective which is quasi materia actus and the terminus sine quo non that is Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent or in Peter regenerate * This is all that Ruiz his Reasons prove De Vol. Dei disp 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who saith that there is more than extrinsick denomination Et relatio rationis â—um realis formalitas But he doth but shew by his quodammodo that he knoweth not what to say or his understanding a seeing that the World was good before any of these things did exist So that by extrinsick denomination without any change in God he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent to be past to will things as existent with complacency or will them with displicency But not to will the futurity of mens damnation de novo but yet his Will of the futurity of mens damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause from whence it is denominated As in esse cognito the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man a subject and then a Sinner and a Despiser of Mercy and then a damnable Sinner And so these are indeed conditions in the Object or Causae sine quibus non or Objective material-constituent causes not in themselves but the fore-sight of them not of Gods Will as his Essence nor of his Will as a Will but of his Will as extrinsecally denominated a Decree to damn Judas e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsick denomination to Gods Will. II. Both you and I hold and must hold that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Conclusio quod Deus aliquos reproâ—at est de fide constat â—nim ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari Vid. Ruâ—z de prâ—de fin Tract 2. per totum But it is false that we hold that he doth it without any respect to fore-seen sin For 1. He fore-seeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation what he doth in time that is it which he decreed to do from eternity But in time he damneth no man but for Sin therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin For sin I say as the cause of damnation which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of Gods Volition or Decree yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object as fore-seen in the Mind of God and so as aforesaid is an Objective Cause as fore-seen III. The execution of Justice and glorification of it and Gods Holiness thereby is good and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree But in the word Reprobation is in most mens sense included much which we hold not which is to be opened further anon IV. And as to the absoluteness of Gods Decree to damn those that are dammed I think you will not deny it your self supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners God doth not only will that all the finally impenitent shall be damned nor only that e. g. Judas shall be damned if he be finally impenitent But also that Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent shall certainly be damned So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object it is no longer a meer conditional Decree but absolute supposing that condition In all this we are agreed The second Crimination A. II. But that 's not all But you hold That God eternally decreed mens sin yea all the sin of Men and Devils some say That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act and
less a cause in man least of all in man when he is no man 5. The word Condition either respecteth 1. The thing or event willed 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with respect to that event 3. Or that Will radically consider'd in it self I opened this before but think of it again for the reason of the distinction is very plain And 1. God damneth no man but for sin nor privatively denieth any necessary Grace but for sin Therefore the event no doubt is before-hand conditional that is dependeth on a condition God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently and not else 2. The Act of Gods Will as denominated from the said Effect or Object particularly may be called A conditional Act or Will But if any think otherwise it is but de nomine 3. The radical essential Will or Act of God as in himself can have no cause or condition * Though sin be acknowledged to be the cause of the Will of God in Reprobation quoad res volitas that is in respect of the punishment willed thereby this hindreth not the absoluteness of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis And unless we understand the Fathers thus we must charge them with an Opinion which Aquinas is bold to profess that never any man was so mad as to affirm c. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 49. But 1. The actus reprobantis as really distinct from the effect is nothing but Gods Essence And who saith that sin causeth Gods Essence 2. And the effect of Reprobation as it is said to be a Decree not to give Faith or Grace is nothing and therefore that nothing cannot aptly so much as extrinsically denominate Gods Will or Essence as an Act. Is not here then a fair agreement Ruiz de praedef d. 9. p. 150. Quantum ad negationem electionis quantum ad permissionem peccati finalis praedâ—finitus suit reproborum numerus Dr. Twisse denieth none of this 6. That God willeth or decreeth not sin formally all the Christian world almost confess And what loveliness is there in that only odious thing that should tempt good people to father it on God or attribute the being of it to his Will or to be zealous Reproachers of those that say otherwise 7. And if God will and decree the Act not only as an Act in general but with all its modes and circumstances he undeniably willeth or decreeth the form of sin or the immediate necessary cause of it which in the case of efficiency will more evidently appear C. God willeth not the Form that is sin as sin and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumstances B. I have told you before that a wicked man may will sin in matter and form and yet not will it as sin To will it as sin is to take the form of sin as such to be good and so to be the ratio volendi which few if any Sinners ever do But to will both matter and form in one not as the formal reason of Volition but making total sin the matter chosen as a means to some other desired end this is possible for a very wicked man to do But I think the ordinary case of Sinners is not at all to will the form of sin but cast that by and to will the matter of it for the carnal pleasure or inferior good which it seemeth to tend to Now this excuseth not their will from wickedness that they will not malum sub ratione mali or sin because it is sin but for another end And shall we charge God of willing sin as the wicked do C. God willeth it to a good end and they to an evil end B. As evil must not be done that good may come by it so neither must it be willed to that end Man may need such a * Sure Arminius granteth enough and that which â—theâ—us and many School-men deny and for my parâ— I cannot grant when he saith At per accidens bonum est ut malum siat propter Det saptentiam bonitatem potentiam secundum quam Deus expeccato materiam gloriae suaeillustrandae sumit Est ergo peccatum isto respectâ— non medium per se illustrandae Gloriae Divinae sed occasio tantum non data in hunc finem neque natura sua ad illum accommodata sed a Deo arrepta horsum mira arte landabili abusu usurpata Armin. exam Perkins pag. 508. An occasion it is indeed but I will not grant that ex peccato God setcheth matter for his Glory nor that by accident it is good ut fiat Caeterum peccata etiam secundum rationem malitiae moralis objecta sunt seu materia circa quam divina praedestinatio versatur â—o modo quo versatur poenitentia Vasqu in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. dâ—sp 93. c. 2. means to his ends but so cannot God Yea men have oft good ends for evil Acts Many lye to glorifie God and sin for his Cause and Church and for their own and other mens Salvation Much of the Blood and Cruelties and Superstitions in the World have had good ends which yet excused not the things from sinfulness C. God is under no Law and therefore cannot sin But man is B. 1. That proveth God no Sinner but not that he causeth or willeth not the sin of man 2. Gods natural essential Perfection is his Law and more than a Law to him And from that Perfection all Laws in the world that are just and good have their Original that is Gods own Laws are the expressions of his holy perfect Will and Nature and Mans Laws are authorized by and subservient to and derived from the Laws of God in Nature and Scripture So that when the Apostle would describe a man best and likest unto God he saith That the Law is not made for the Righteous 3. If Gods Holiness and Wisdom make man a Law forbidding sin on pain of Hell the same Wisdom and Holiness with his Justice and Mercy will not will the sin so forbidden nor cause it nor consist with so doing C. It is not the form or essence of sins that God willeth but the existence and futurity or event not sin but that sin be B. I many a year studied thinking to prove that true But I doubt it is but a game at words and groundless distinguishing for a false conclusion For 1. Sin is a Relation formally even a disconformity of an Act or disposition and so of the person to Gods Law It can no otherwise be caused but by making the Law and causing the Act in the circumstances disconform God maketh the Law and God maketh man and his faculties and God causeth the Object and God permitteth the tempter If God also cause the Act in the prohibited circumstances he doth all that can be done in the causation of sin And so of his Volitions or Decrees As for the essence of sin in notion without the existence more
may be said that God indeed is some cause of that without culpability yea by his Holiness and Power For as the Relations of Curvitude and Dissimilitude result from the Relate's fundamentum as compared to the Correlate or terminus so he that causeth any of them hath some hand in causing the Relation as a Relation And so God by forbidding Adultery Lying c. by his Law doth by Institution make those acts to be sin that is He layeth down the rule from which they are so denominated when committed That Adultery is committed is long of man that it is a sin when committed is long of God and man God by his Law and man by his Act. So that when you say God causeth not the essence but the existence or futurity you are so far out as that less of causality is to be ascribed to him as to the existence than the essence 2. But what is the existence but the essence existing or extra causas And what is it to cause sin but to cause it to exist And what is it to cause it to exist but to cause it or give it a being And what is it to will that sin shall exist but that the essence of it shall exist And what is it to will the event or futurity but to will that sin shall be And what more can man will or do about it to shew himself to be bad as Estius and others fully manifest C. I cannot but think that God may will that Act which is sin so he do not will it * Twiss Vind. li. 2. Digress 4. p. 201. Falsum est peccatum fieri ab hominâ— ut est peccatum Licet sit peccatum ut fit ab homine non tamen fit ab homine ut est peccatum hoc est sub ratione peccati Quanto minus in divinam voluntatem cadit cum hoc â—â— in humanam voluntatem competat as sin and so may cause it Quod peccatum but not Qua peccatum B. Here are three things before us 1. The common substratum or â—atter of the sin which is the Faculty and the Object and the Act only in genere act us or as not cloathed with the forbidden circumstances 2. The Act thus circumstantiated 3. The Relative form of sinfulness 1. No doubt but God doth cause all the first the Faculty Object and the Act as an Act e. g. In David's Adultery and Murder and Peter's denying Christ God gave them the Faculty by which they did it He â—pheld their natural power and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act But 2. The Act as thus circumstantiated he neither caused nor willed but permitted only that is that David should hic nunc lust after her that was another mans wife that he should vitiate her that he should choose out Uriah to the Sword that Peter should speak those particular words c. In the first sense God willeth the Act which is sin and the Faculty which is sinful but not in the second as sinfully circumstantiated And as for your Qua peccatum I tell you again few Sinners if any will it qua peccatum C. What say you to this undeniable Argument If God will not that Act which is sin he willeth almost nothing that men do For we sin in all someway or other And so God hath little to do in the world B. The last answer fully serveth to this If we sin in every Act yet all that is in every Act is not sin or prohibited All that is good in the Act is of God and willed by him But it is the prohibited circumstances of the Act which God doth not cause or Will which morally specifie it as sin As when I pray I sin in praying coldly unbelievingly with wandring thoughts God causeth not these though he cause the Prayer Or to come from compound Acts to simple Those wandring thoughts are not my sin as they are thoughts but as they are upon an undue Object A lye is not a sin as it is a word but as this word which is false And so in all others C. But some Acts are simply forbidden in themselves and not only in their circumstances Therefore if God there cause the Act he causeth the Sin B. No Act as an Act is forbidden but as circumstantiated by Object Time Mode Place c. Mr. Capell * Lib. of Tempt chooseth lying only as an instance of prohibitum per se But I answered before that all the Act in lying is Volition Intellection and Speech And these as such are not forbidden But only these particular words which are false The common instance is Odisse Deum But here hatred in it self is not the sin but â—s unduly terminated on God as the Object And this God willeth not C. By this you deifie man For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of And so man is made a first cause that is a God For the particularizing of the Object and the circumstantiating of the Act is aliquid something and must have some first cause B. The truth is this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants Which I have answered in due place and here briefly tell you 1. That when two Objects are before me a commanded and a forbidden one there is * I have noted after that Dr. Twisse saith Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile neque necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati And these have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale Armi. dic Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile jucundum in many instances And God maketh the Object e. g. Honey or Eves fruit and God maketh the Appetite so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity that is that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee But whether thou wilt eat it he hath left free so that if God also caused that determinate act he caused all And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law the Object and the man and thereby maketh that if thou wilt cause such an Act so disordered it shall be thy sin and misery so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin And they that ascribe the Act in suo modo to him ascribe all to him But as to Bonum utile he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile For it may be Conducibile ad malum interitum But it is not utile unless it be conducibile ad bonum yea ad finâ—m ultimum For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a mans ends or will And God is the Author
of all true profit to us no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one than in my choosing the commanded one To hate God and love sin hath no more natural entity than to love God and hate sin To speak an Oath or Lye than to speak Truth and Holily To will a forbidden Act than to Nill it and to will a good one So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause of that which hath no natural entity that is of an Act not as an Act but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised And Dr. Twisse hence saith That moral specification of Acts is no true specification of them And it 's true that it is not a Physical specification 2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety Even to will or not will do or not do And in this case to do or will when forbidden is more than not to do or will I answer 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power and it is as natural to it to be in act as to a stone to lie still And the Cartesians will tell you that Action needeth no more cause than Rest But I rather say that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul but only this or that Action upon this or that Object at an undue time So that no man ever sinned by meer Action as such whether Vital Intellectual or Volitive The Action which God commandeth he willeth The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object Adam had this liberty of contradiction to will or not to will this particular Act of eating the forbidden fruit but not to will or not will simply Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit instead both of nilling it and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it had no more natural entity in it than if he had not willed it but willed somewhat else at the same time 3. An Action it self is not properly Res but modus Rei and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature that supposing God the cause of its Power continued shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power he saith that which no mortal man can prove The Glory of Gods Works is their likeness to Himself And as Intellection and Free-will are parts of this likeness we know not just how far God can go in such Communications I see no contradiction in it to say that a faculty maintained by God in its natural force with necessary though not determining concurse can determine it self without any more causation And if it be not a Contradiction God can do it 4. But this is all prevented by considering that mans Soul is never out of Act. It s active force is never idle though it act not always the same way nor with the same extension or intension so that to reduce it into act is not to reduce it from a meer potentia in actum but from a power acting one way or slowly to act another way or more intensly 5. Yea this is all answered by considering that as I said while God continueth the Soul in its nature it continueth a naturally active force or power inclined essentially to activity So that though I say that Action needeth more cause than non-action that is here done in God still causeth the active disposition But supposing that upheld I say that there is oft more need of other causality or strength to keep it from Action than to cause it to act Whatever the world talketh against Durandus they are never well able to answer à Dola though in sense they that factiously oppose him mean the same as he And if a Rock hanged in the Air by something that might be cut off or removed as a threed supposing God to continue the nature of it and all things else there is more strength and causality needful to hold it from falling than to make it fall when the threed is cut It was a work of Gods Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confessors Dan. 3. and the Lions from devouring Daniel Dan. 6. and the Sea from flowing on the Israelites and the Sun from moving in Joshuah's fight 6. And yet consider that it is not so much as an Action which is but modus rei that is in question but only the comparative circumstantiating of that action so that it is but modus modi rei 7. And lastly The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have else-where proved overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion Now whether any man should deny all our Religion and certain necessary Truths for such a metaphysical uncertain notion as this that God is not able to make a Creature that can cause a modus modi in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that without Divine predetermination let sobriety be judge C. But thus you make man the specifier of his good acts without Gods determination as well as of the evil B. Jansenius is in the right in this we have more need of Divine help to the willing and doing of good than of evil We cannot do evil without his natural support and concurse But we cannot do good especially spiritual saving good unless we have moreover his medicinal special Grace To the specifying of good actions there must ever concur Gods natural help Gods gracious help and mans free-will or self-determination It is not two or three determinations of the Will which are made by these several Causes but one determination So that under God man is the specifying determiner of his Will to good or else he were not a Believer nor rewardable or punishable And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil proceedeth not from the Original nature of the Will for with that such a determination was consistent but from its Pravity or Corruption But how Grace and Free-will concur is after to be handled C. Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 190. Vol. minoris hath a full digression 4 to prove that God willeth that sin shall come to pass he permitting it and saith Nostri Theologi affirmanâ— Arminiani â—ontificii negant * This Digression of Dr. Twisse is answered in the first Book His Friend Alvarez de Aux li. 11. disp 110. p. 442 c. discusseth the Qu. An detur ex parte nostra causa reprobationis and concludeth that Reprobatio qua Deus statuit non dare aliquibus vitam aeternam et permittere peccatum eorum non est conditionata sed absoluta nec praesupponit in Deo praescientiam demeritorum ipsius reprobi 2. In Angelis qui ceciderunt nuâ—la datur causa reprobationis ex parte ipsorum quantum ad integrum effectum c. 3. Et ita de reprobatione parvulorum
yet hereby confesseth that he willeth or decreeth that permission You say then that he decreeth to permit mens unbelief and this is all that the Synod saith of non-Election or leaving men out of the number of the Elect. 2. If you yourselves believe all this with what face can you oppose the same in others If you do not either you believe that none are Infidels and damned or you believe that God doth not permit it to be so but it is done by conquering his Omnipotency or else you know not what you believe choose which you will 3. Do you really differ as Episcopius pretendeth about the cause of Reprobation As to the cause of Damnation all are agreed that sin is the true meritorious cause The question is only of Gods Will or Decree of it And it is not of his sententia prolata or Decree pronounced by Christ in Judgment for of that also it is agreed that sin is the meritorious cause Your oft recurring to your Objections when they have been fully answered puts me on the rediousness of repeating the same Answers Gods * The cause of Gods Will in reprobating Will is considered either ex parte volentis essentially or as extrinsically denominated from the connotation of the Object In the first sense you have not yet declared your selves to deny the common Doctrine of the Christian World that Gods Will is his undivided most simple Essence and that God hath no cause and so his Will in it self hath no cause that in God there is nothing but God Dare you say that a Creature made God yea that so base a thing as Sin made him How then doth it cause his Will which is himself Is Gods Will such a mutuable thing as mans And is it not the first cause of all things And shall men pretending to Learning reproach others for not assigning a cause of the first cause and that Sin which is baser than a Creature causeth the Creator But if you speak of Gods Will as denominated by connotation of the Object mark what we grant you viz. that as thus only Gods Will or Volitions are denominated diverse so are they denominated to be of this or that sort and numerically also distinguished And so they may be said to have a cause but not an efficient cause but only an * Arminius and Arnoldus Corvinus frequently affirm that Faith is not the cause of Gods Election to Glory but only a condition in the object objective cause And what Cause is an Object To let pass the Error of many Logicians it is only as an Object a material constitutive cause at least here And so sin is the objective material cause of that extrinsical denomination and relation of Gods Will called Reprobation to damnation It is that dispositio objecti which is essential to the Object And so as Gods Will may any way be said to have a cause we will say freely after the manner of men that sin is the objective cause of the Decree of damnation And speak now with shame can you say more or less Do you or any of us that are sober and understand our selves differ at all in this 4. And you cheat your selves and others more in saying Not from any ill desert of theirs more than others When if you would speak congruously you should only say that when all deserved to be utterly forsaken God effectually prevaileth with the Wills of his Elect not for any good desert of theirs above others You would infinuate that God must punish no man unless he deserve worse than every man whom he forgiveth which is false Do you not your selves believe that all have sinned and come short of the Glory of God and that God might justly have let them perish Do you not hold your selves that all men are guilty of resisting or sinning against Grace it self as well as against Nature and that God may justly with-hold his Grace from the Rejecters of it and if he did so by all he did not wrong them If God then leave not all as he might do but resolve to prevail with some infallibly do you represent this mercy as if it were cruelty to others What if it be apparent that you your selves charge God with as much of that which you call cruelty to all the World as the Synod doth to the Reprobate alone or as many of us do For they do but say that God leaveth the Reprobate to their own free Wills And you say that he doth so by all the World You say that God giveth all men that hear the Gospel so much Grace as that they may have Christ and Salvation if they will And they say so too as confidently as you do Tell me if you can then what Mercy or Grace you plead for as common more than they you cannot tell me And will you wrangle as if you differed when you do not Only they say and think that they give more to Gods Grace as to the Elect than you do which is to be examined anon And then you will quarrel about the Cause of the first Cause the Will of God and dream of it as if it were like the Will of Man which is an effect and that of many Causes Is it not enough for you that sin is the cause of all punishment but it must also be the efficient cause of Gods Will which is God Yet again I tell you that all sobeâ— men will agree with you that Gods Volitions of extrinfick Objects viz. Reprobations denominate not Gods Essence as such for we use not to say God is Reprobation or Election but only his Essence as terminated ad extra And to gratifie you to the utmost we distinguish an operating efficient Cause from a recipient Cause And we maintain that a Sinner is the recipient Cause of Gods damning Volition or Reprobation As shutting the Windows is the cause that my Room is dark and opening them is the cause that they are light not by causing the Sun to shine but by receiving or not receiving it so man is a receiving Cause of the Effects of Gods Will and Operation and of the Will and Operation it self as extrinsically denominated and diversified by the Effects But this recipient Cause is nothing but cause materialis objectiva which hath two parts the ipsa materia and the materiae dispositio Take not on you still to differ where you do not The third Crimination A. * Of that Deus vult omnes salves fieri saith Alliaco 1. q. 14. F. 1. Potest exponi de voluntate signi vult id est praecipit vel obligat c. 2. Si exponitur de voluntate beneplaciti potest intelligi de Vol. antecedente 3. Si de Vol. beneplaciti proprie dicta debet intelligi ut dicit Magister i. e. nulli salvantur nisi quos Deus vult salvari 4. Vel de generibus singulorum sed at singulis generum By denying Universal Redemption they deny that
but meer power For morality consisteth formally and primarily in the Will or Voluntary And to be able to do Good or Evil as such is not formally any moral Good or Evil but natural But Disposition is 4. Power is called Moral Analogically and Reputatively as causa finalis is said to cause when it is called a moral cause and the operation metaphorical or as he is called a moral cause who perswadeth to the End or Object And so we take the word Moral Power in our question And so the received Impress or Influx of Divine Agency as also the habits of Grace in the Soul are an Analogical Power because they are necessary to the natural powers performance of the Act And so the suscitation as received of a dormant active power may be called Analogically a Power And the right disposition of a power may be called a power And the deep fore described Action of the Soul may be called a power to other sensible Acts. XXVII Next to this moral power is potentia logica which is but the name of Power given extrinsically from some other thing without which the effect will never be though it be possible and the Causes have power sufficient And the name of Impossibility de effectu is oftner and more tollerably here used than of impotency as in the cause So we say that whatsoever God willeth or decreeth is possible and what he nilleth absolutely is impossible And thence some say That God can do it because be will and he cannot do what he will not And so we say that in sensâ— composito an undisposed or averse Will cannot love or will aright when perhaps no more than a Logical impotency is meant viz. That these two Propositions cannot possibly be both true Judas is undisposed to Love and Justice and Judas at the same time doth exercise Love and Justice speaking of a predominant disposition And this is but a denomination of the same sense as necessitas consequentiae vel logica is as distinct from necessitas consequentis vel effecti And so we say that he that is fore-decreed yea or fore-known to be good cannot be bad The meaning is not that he wanteth true power to be bad But that in ordine dicendi these two cannot possibly be true Peter is decreed by God or fore-known to be a Saint and Peter will not be a Saint And this logical impossibility is meant oft in Scripture as Joh. 12. 39. Therefore they could not believe because that Isaiah saith c. not that this hindered them but logically de consequentia both these could not be true that Esaia's Prophecy should be true and yet that the Person prophesied of should be Obedient And so the words the Scripture must be fulfilled and that the Scriptures might be fulfilled are oft used as to the inference XXVIII Thus by extrinsick denomination and connotation impotency is oft imputed to the Agent from the incapacity of the Recipient As it is said Mark 6. 5. That Christ could do no mighty work there because of their unbelief When as this was not from a disability in Christ to have done it if he would But here it is first supposed that God hath ordinately fore-decreed to do no such Works but where the persons were so qualified as to be capable of them And then that the persons there were unqualified And so the Effect was logically impossible in sensu composito Thus we say That God cannot save Unbelievers he cannot hear the prayers of the Wicked he cannot forsake the Faithful that is His Ordination and Decree supposed logically such a thing cannot consist with it in verity XXIX When something else and not impotency doth ascertain an event by omission or something besides Power ascertaineth the contrary efficiently yet the effect is oft denominated possible or impossible and ascribed to Power or Impotency by a conjunction of this moral and logical denomination So we say That God 's pure eyes cannot behold Iniquity that God cannot love the Workers of Iniquity as such Not for want of Power but by reason of his perfect Will and Nature So God cannot lye Tit. 1. 2. And it is impossible for God to lye God cannot deny himself 2 Tim. 2. 13. God cannot be tempted with evil Jam. 1. 13. So Joh. 10. 35. The Scripture cannot be broken Isa 1. 13. Your Assemblies I cannot away with No wonder also if this be said of men As 1. Joh. 3. 9. He cannot sin because he is born of God Not for want of power but partly he will not and partly logically these cannot consist So of the wicked Joh. 7. 7. The World cannot hate you XXX Oft times the word Cannot is taken politically I cannot that is I must not or I cannot lawfully Quod turpe impossibile Gen. 19. 22. I cannot do any thing till thou be come out Act. 10. 47. Can any man forbid water c. that is lawfully 2 Cor. 13. 8. We can do nothing against the Truth that is by Authority from God XXXI Oft times in Scripture the word Cannot is meant only of that which a man cannot do without suffering or loss or difficutly So Act. 4. 16. We cannot deny it that is without the shame of falshood Luk. 14. 20. I cannot come that is without such inconvenience as I am unwilling to bear Jer. 29. 17. They cannot be eaten that is without loathing 1 Sam. 25. 17. He is such a Son of Belial that a man cannot speak to him that is without inconvenience by it 2 Sam. 23. 6. They cannot be taken with hands that is without hurt Gen. 34. 14. We cannot do this thing that is without God XXXII Oft times this inconvenience procuring unwillingness this unwillingness is named like impotency and it is said Men cannot because they will not And so it is in divers of the last cited instances Joh. 3. 9. They cannot sin that is They will not Luk. 14. 20. I have married a wife and therefore I cannot come that is I will not because I cannot without this inconvenience Neh. 6. 3. I cannot come down that is I will not Gen. 44. 26. We cannot go down Josh 24. 19. Ye cannot serve the Lord for he is a holy God that is you are not disposed to do it holily and then he will destroy you Joh. 6. 60. This is a hard saying who can hear it that is willingly Isa 49. 15. Can a woman forget her sucking-Child that is will she forget it Jer. 2. 32. Can a Maid forget her Ornaments Mar. 2. 19. Can the Children of the Bridegroom fast c. Mar. 9. 39. Can ye drink of the Cup that I drink of and be baptized c. 39. They said unto him we can that is Have you Wills disposed for such sufferings and will you go through them And this unwillingness when it is habitual and prevalent is it that is commonly called mans moral impotency as to believe love obey c. XXXIII This impotency which is
thank himself too for all the good he does that Being as much of him as the other c. Answ It follows not For 1. Of all the good that man doth God is still the moral Cause egging on to it by all c. 2. And the same Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightning the Mind renewing the Will healing the spring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it and in a word making it every way more it self God must be more an Owner than man And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will because it flowed from Divine Goodness That which is good in man by way of Off-spring being so in God by way of Well-spring Ibid. p. 10. the same degree of impress or influx or force which causeth one man to believe or act is not sufficient to cause any other worse disposed man to believe or act nor the same man when he is more ill disposed and hindered 4. If we put the case of men equally disposed it is impossibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally disposed Nay it is most probable that they are not Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cause a difference than their countenances have of particles making the wonderful diversity which we see Nor is the same man long equally disposed 5. Men equally disposed if such there were may have unequal impediments without and in their bodies and temptations which may cause them to need unequal help of Grace 6. The same individual Impress which causeth no more than a Power causeth not the Act also For that is a contradiction to cause the Act and not to cause it 7. But a less degree of impulse or help may cause the act in one when a greater degree causeth it not in another 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in â—ll other diversities in the World by the diverse receptive dispositions of the Patient Which made Johan Sarisberiensis in Nugis Curial and many School-men to liken God with some acknowledged difference in his Operations to the Sun which by one invaried efflux of motive illuminative and calefactive power causeth innumerable varieties of effects as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Dispositions 9. But all good disposition or preparation is of God But by such ways of operation as we are searching after But all ill disposition is from our selves 10. To conclude God giveth men sometimes as much power to Will or Act when they do not as they have when they do But usually not an equal predisposition some having more indisposed themselves which is to be changed by contrary acts But whether de facto men equally enabled predisposed helped and hindered do yet without any cause but their own free-will it self act or will variously is a question that these Controversies need not come to That such were there such in the World could do it I take for granted what-ever they do The Controversie is well known which Hobbes hath raised in the World who saith That to be free and to be willing is all one and that every act of the Will is as truly necessitated by physical premotion as the motions of any Engine are And that we talk of liberty and contingency in the dark not that there is any such thing indeed but when we know not the train of Causes we use those names which signifie but our ignorance And that the first Cause and other superior Causes do by premotion as much necessitate each Volition as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow And the Dominicans predetermination and Camero's necessitation by a train of second Causes is the same I think But I think God hath made a very good use by his over-ruling ordination of the Doctrine of Hobbes learnedly and timerously or cautelously seconded by Gassendus and improved by Benedictus Spinosa an Apostate Jew in his Tractatus Politico-theologicus For the goodness and learning of such worthy men as were Alvarez Twisse Camero in all other points moderate and admirably judicious hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine which Hobbes and Spinosa having plainly and nakedly propounded is now detested by almost all good men For from thence they have plainly inferred the subversion of all morality as distinct from physical motion and consequently of all true Religion I deny not that I find my self the Controversie in it self exceeding difficult and that I have not been without temptations to their Opinion nor yet am And that indeed all pretended middle ways between Hobbes his Necessitation Physical and true Free-will are but fancies as far as I can perceive And if I leave true Free-will I must turn to their necessitation I confess their arguing is very plausible that there is no Effect without a Cause and that when ever the Will chooseth one thing and refuseth another there is some antecedent Cause in the power disposition or external things and that the same Cause in the same state and mode having no difference in it self doth always produce the same effect Otherwise the diversity should have no cause And that the Will being in the same disposition and having all the same objects helps impediments and other circumstances will have the same acts All this is plausible But 1. If I receive it I must let go almost all Religion as well as Christianity of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion And we must not reduce certainties to the obscurest unsearchable uncertainties 2. And in God himself their foundation is confuted For he that is the first Cause eodem modo se habens sine ulla diversitate unicus plurima immo omnia causat Therefore their Principle is false 3. And finding man made after the Image of God not only as holy but as man Gen. 6. I have great reason to think that Free-will is part of his natural Image and that as God is a causa unica plurimorum so may Free-will be And that as a God is causa prima entium so Free-will may be a kind of causa prima not actionis qua talis but of the comparative moral species of its own acts as choosing this thing rather than that which is no addition to real entity but a wonderful mode of it which man cannot tell whether he should call something or nothing 4. I say therefore that here is no Effect without a Cause Free-will may be the cause of various Effects without a various predisposition C. Doth not the Will act as it is disposed to act B. That it acteth not always according to Habits which are more than dispositions is certain by experience For objects oft prevail against habits and habits do not necessitate C. That is because the Will is otherwise disposed by some contrary stronger habits As either
And the sum of his opinion about the nature and cause of our holy actions is 1. That Gods universal influx or causation is necessary on our will to make them acts 2. That Free-Will is the cause that they are these particular acts about this object rather than another 3. That Gods particular or special influx of Grace is the cause that they are supernatural acts And that preventing Grace doth give men good thoughts and the first motion of the affections before deliberation and choice or liberty as Vasquez also saith which seemeth the same with the Doctrine of Ockam Buridane and the rest of the Nominals who call it Complacency as antecedent to Election yea and Intention To be pleased with the thing simply on the first apprehension they call a necessary natural act Though the Scotists say that quoad exercitium actus vel libertatem contradictionis even that is free And it seems the same which Augustine and Jansenius call primam aelectationem But converting Grace it self Molina takes to be a habit wrought by Gods special help in and with the word or means His words are of men that are hearing Gods Word or thinking on it Influit Deuâ— in â—easdem notitias inâ—luxâ— quodam particulari ac supernaturali quo cognitionem illam adjuvat tum ut res melius dilucidius expendatur peâ—etret â—umâ—etiam ut notitia illa jam limites notitia supernaturalis ad finem supernaturalom in suo ordine attingat Inde oritur in voluntate motus affectionis c. Yet no Jesuite is supposed to go further from the Calvinists than this man In truth I cannot perceive but that Jesuites Arminians Lutherans and all such are willing to ascribe as much to Gods Grace as they think consistent with mans Free-will and Gods not being the cause of sin which is the same thing that the Calvinists also endeavour thoughâ—hey seem not to hit on the same names and notions to do the thing desired save themselves and those that hear them 1. Tim. 4. 16. And that he that converts a sinner doth save a soul from death James 6. ult And that the word is the immortal incorruptible seed by which we are begotten again and which remaineth in us Are you now in doubt of this C. It is one thing for God to work with the Word and another thing to work by the Word The first we confess But if God work by the Word then he must operate first on the Word which is the Preachers act and so by that Word on the soul and not immediately Therefore I rather think that the word is a concomitant than an instrumental cause B. 1. You wrong your self and Christ in that you will not believe him John 3. that we mortals know not the way and manner of the Spirits accesses and operations on the soul any more than the cause of the wind whose sound we hear Do you not know that you do not know how Gods Spirit moveth our intellect and wills and how he maketh use of instruments except secundum quid in some particles revealed 2. An hundred Texts of Scripture which I omit lest I be tedious tell us that the Word is a means or subordinate cause to God of his informing and reforming operations on mens souls And it 's dangerous to dream of any second cause that is so concomitant as to be but co-ordinate with the first cause and not subordinate to it And the word is not only subordinate to God as Instituter by Legislation and Declaration but also to God as efficient operator 3. God can work two ways by the Word which are within our reach besides others 1. As it is the act of the speaker by exciting and illuminating him 2. As it is the species as they call it received by the senses and imagination which God can by his power set home to the attainment of the due effect 4. And yet I know not any or many of your Adversaries that deny that besides this Divine operation by the VVord God hath another immediately on the soul exciting it to operate upon the VVord as the vis plastica vitalis materna operatur in semen jam receptum But I will here forbear to trouble you with the physical difficulties whether the VVord heard be only objectum intellectus or also causa efficiens as light is both to the eye And whether it be operative on the intellect or only terminative with other such like C. Well I must grant you that all Infused Faith as to the act is Acquired But all Acquired Faith not Infused but infusion is added to our own endeavours like the creation of the humane soul B. I am glad that we are got so far on towards peace But Quest. 4. What mean you by Infusion Is it not a Metaphor C. Yes and we mean that immediate perswasion of God which you even confess to be besides his operation by the Word and by our Cogitations Even a Creation of an act or habit B. Quest. 5. Is it the name Infusion or the thing that you plead for C. The name though I confess Metaphors must not be used unnecessarily in Disputes is yet convenient but that I leave indifferent B. Quest 6. Do you not think that the act of Faith is the act of mans own Intellect and Will or Soul and that immediately C. Yes that cannot be denied B. If so then when you say that our act is Infused I hope you will confess the term to be none of the plainest and you only mean that Gods Grace doth so operate on the faculty as to excite it so to act and consequently that the thing first and properly infused is not the act of Faith it self but the vis impressa facultatem before described by which the act is caused And so in a secondary sense the act may be called Infused but not most immediately C. I confess it is the habit which we commonly take to be Infused and therefore we use to distinguish habitus infusos ab habitibus acquisitis rather than actus infusos ab actibus acquisitis B. Is that Habit before the Act or after it C. You know that it is a Controversie among our selves Mr. Pemble saith it is before and the common opinion is that it is after the first special Act. B. 1. I once received that from Mr. Pemble ignorantly But that cometh to us by not distinguishing the vis impressa or first received influx of the spirit from a Habit when as Amesius well saith it is fitter called semen fidei vel dispositio quaedam than a Habit of Faith For 1. no man can prove such an antecedent habit and therefore none should assert it 2. The true nature of a Habit consisteth in a promptitude to perform that special act with facility But that we should have such a promptitude and facility not only while we are Infant Christians but no Christians as having not yet believed in Christ is not probable according to our
equality with the wise Do we not see that as man is so is his strength and work operari sequitur esse The strong do as the strong and the weak judge and do as the weak Why else doth God give men strength of Grace sure they that think the habit of Grace must needs be before any act will not hold that all our lives after the Acts from immediate divine production go beyond the degree of the habits We know that God is the chief cause of our perseverance and all our works that are good But he causeth them by disposing and quickening strengthening illuminating and sanctifying our faculties to do them which is habitual Grace B. What is your own judgment in this point A. Our judgment is 1. That he that truly at the present preferreth the pleasing of God and his Salvation before all this World is sincere and justified 2. That of these some have well setled apprehensions and resolutions but others have such shallow Conceptions and weak Resolutions as that a very strong Temptation would change their minds and overcome them 3. But if they escape such Temptation and be not overcome they shall be saved For God will not damn men for possible Sin and Apostacy which they were never guilty of but only for that which they did commit 4. And that it is no certain sign of hypocrisie that they would have fallen away had their Temptations been great but only a proof that they were weak 5. Else to pray Lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil should be rather discover not our sincerity or hypocrisie by temptation 6. Therefore God useth to proportion mens trials to their strength And that young and weak Believers may persevere he exposeth them not antecedently to their provocation to great Temptations as he doth the strong Even as while a young Tree hath little rooting it hath also but a little top else had it the top of a great Tree and but the roots of a Plant the first great Wind would overturn it 7. Even strong Christians might possibly have some Temptations which would over-match their strength and turn them from Christ if God should not keep them from such Temptations 8. Therefore there are some Temptations so far above the very nature of man by such Grace as is not a meer Miracle to be overcome as that God doth not suffer Mankind to be tried with them As to be most exquisitely tormented many moneths or a longer time And in that unusual trial of the poor Christians in Japon though many endured those torments many weeks yet nature could not sustain them to the last but when they had suffered as much as many Smithfield burnings to death at last almost all denied Christ so that Christianity is now there extirpated Now if Rogers Bradford Hooper shewed sincerity by suffering death why should we not think that these did so that suffered far more than they though afterward the degree was greater than their strength 9. We hold that Gods Punishments and Mercies to men in this World are very much exercised in either permitting or not permitting great Temptations * The same Bradwardine l. 2. c. 16. holdeth that the cause of the damneds obstinacy in sin is not only themselves and Gods not-willing to cure and save them but also Gods positive Will by which their obstinate wills are for ever continued in the act But I see not why we should assert Gods positive Will of Sin in Hell or Earth when his not-effectual willing to cure it is enough And that for great sin he oft delivereth men up to Satan and giveth him the greater power over them Yea that the nature of sin it self is such as giveth greater advantage to the Tempter As he that will with Achan look on the wedge of Gold or that will please his tast with delicious Drinks and Meats or that will permit his eyes immodest Spectacles hath thereby let in the Devil into his Imagination and will not easily thence cast him out And on the other side he that pleaseth God and conquereth one Temptation obtaineth that Grace by which he is much saved from the next and the Tempter is the more disadvantaged and restrained 10. Lastly We therefore hold That seeing Temptations do not only try our sincerity or hypocrisie else we should desire them for self-examination but also tend to change mens minds and make them worse the way to persevere is to pray against and avoid Temptations and resist those that cannot be avoided This is our judgment In which you see that we hold that all weak Christians that are sincere may have assurance of their present Justification though they are not strong enough to stand the greatest trials And that they may well hope that God will save them from over strong Temptations while they sincerely do his Will B. But Christ saith That he that forsaketh not all that he hath and hateth not his own life cannot be his Disciple And what greater trial can there be than the loss of life it self A. Though some taking it to be hard that none are true Christians that would not be Martyrs were they tried have said that this Text speaketh de necessitate praecepti non medii You must grow up to this at last if you will be my Disciples yet I will not so force the Text but say as you do But 1. There are far stronger Temptations than the love of Life Though not from Interest yet from false reasonings which may deceive the judgment And one that would die for Christ while he believeth in him may possibly have so strong Temptations to unbelief as shall exceed in danger his fear of death 2. And all men that at the present would forsake Life and all for Christ yet have not the same fixedness of Resolution nor the same degree of Faith and Love No doubt but the Martyrs in the same flames had various degrees of Grace Now a less firm and fixed measure may be loosened by degrees or shaken by Seducers and mutable man may after be overcome by that same Temptation which once he could have overcome So that I accuse their Doctrine as utterly inconsistent with true Christian Comfort on both these account And such is the success of those men that will overdo and devise means of their own for extraordinary comforts which God never gave them B. The comfort of poor Christians it seems standeth but on slippery terms in the Opinion of both sides while each Party thinks that there is no true comfort in the others way * Whether we may be morally sure of our present Justification the Papists Doctors agree not among themselves Bellarmine and many others affirm it and others deny it as Aureolus cited by Brianson in 4. q. 4. fol. 36. and others that say no man can know whether his Habits are infused But doth not experience confute you Do you not see that many have true Christian comfort that are not of
Slothfulness in Students in seeking truth 3. Hastiness in Judging before digested conceptions and proof II. Nearly Want of 1. Humility and self-acquaintance Pride 2. Knowledge Ignorance and Error 3. Love to others Envy Malice and Bitterness III. Instruments or Engines 1. In General Corrupt departing from Christian Simplicity 2. Particularly 1. From Simplicity of Doctrine by DOGMATISTS Words Notions 2. From Simplicity of Practice by SUPERSTITIOUS additions 3. From Simplicity of Discipline by CHURCH-TYRANNY II. CONSTITUTIVE Causes viz. DISCORD 1. In JUDGMENT of things necessary ALIENATION 2. In WILL and AFFECTION viz. 1. Privative by denying due Communion 2. Positive 1. By Contention 2. Malice 3. Hurtfulness to each other DIVISION 3. In Necessary PRACTICE III. The EFFECTS viz. I. On THINGS viz. on Church 1. Doctrine Preaching and Writing turning it into vain and hurtful wrangling 2. Worship Prayer Sacraments corrupting them by faction partiality and wrath 3. Discipline corrupting it into Secular or factious Tyranny or a dead Image II. On PERSONS viz. I. Particular 1. Themselves 2. Their followers 1. The Guilt and Deceit of false-Religious zeal 2. The Death of true Holiness and Heavenly Conversation 3. The Death of Love and Life of Wrath and injuries 3. Rulers viz. 1. Corrupting them by factious clamours against their Subjects 2. Tempting them unto persecuting Laws and Executions 3. Engaging them in bloody Wars abroad 4. The Innocent viz. Injuries to 1. Private persons 1. By censures slanders backbitings making them hated 2. Denying them due Love Communion and help 3. Persecution silencing and other mischiefs 2. Princes 1. Weakning and grieving them by the Subjects discords 2. Dishonouring them by defaming Excommunications 3. Urging them to be the Clergies Lictors or Executioners 5. Enemies and Strangers scandalizing and hardning them in Infidelity sin II. Societies I. Churches 1. Corrupting them in Doctrine Worship and Order 2. Weakning them by discord and division 3. Shaming them before the World 4. Making them less fit for Gods Love and Communion II. Kingdoms Weakning them dishonouring them and drawing them into the Guilt of Feuds Wars and Persecutions IV. The REMEDIES I. Persons 1. Christ the Prince of Peace and the Churches Head and Center 2. Wise Princes who understand the Interest of 1. Christ 2. Their people 3. Themselves 3. Able Wise Holy and Peaceable Pastors 4. The Mature Experienced Mellow Peaceable sort of the people II. Qualities 1. Diligent Study under wise Teachers 2. Sincere Holiness A dying life 1. Humility 2. Knowledge 3. Love to others as our selves 3. Deliberate Judging upon tryal III. Means 1. Returning to Christian Simplicity 1. In Doctrine The antient Creed c. 2. In Worship 3. In Discipline 2. Magistrates forcing the Clergie to keep the peace and forbear strife 3. Subjects obedience in all lawful things required by Authority V. HEALTH or Cure 1. Rulers Pastors and people of one MIND 2. One HEART in Love 3. One MOUTH and practice in things Necessary in Communion and mutual help And mutual loving forbearance in Infirmities and things unnecessary edified in Love VI. The EFFECTS hereof I. GLORY to God 1. In the Hallowing of his Name and Honour of Religion 2. In the increase of his Kingdom and Conversion of the World 3. In the Doing of his Will on Earth as it is done in Heaven II. Peace on Earth 1. Increase of Holiness Heavenliness and Love 2. Mutual Delight herein The Joy of Health and Concord 3. The Churches Strength and Glory III. Gods WELLPLEASEDNESS in MEN His Church will be meet for his Love Delight and Communion and be liker to Heaven and enjoy its foretastes An Appendix to this Premonition SInce the Printing of this the World hath seen a specimen of such contention as I lament in a contest between a young insulting Assailant and a jocular contemptuous Defendant in my judgment both running into extreams whether verbal or real their own explications must further tell us The extreams of the former are reprehended by many By the later a person of great wit and piety I perceive that some men have such conceptions of the Covenants of God as will give occasion to some Readers to think that by mis-describing them I have erred and misled men through this and many other Writings And men that are not able to conquer the obscuring and tempting notions of their Authors are still calling for Answers to every inconsiderable objection or contradicting word that is suggested to them and little things puzzle and stop such Readers though otherwise pious and worthy persons who have not by long and accurate studies methodized and digested the matter that is disputed of Not therefore to offend any man by opposition or to defend other mens extreams but to prevent the frustration of some of these Writings and the scandal or trouble of my Reader I must take notice I. That some think that the Covenant of Grace must be considered 1. in its Constitution and 2. in its Execution The Constitution of the Covenant is God's firm and unchangeable purpose of saving his Elect to the praise of his glorious Grace For the word signifieth a disposition appointment or ordering of matters whether there be a restipulation or no the English word Covenant seduceth our understandings The fixed purpose and determinate counsel of God in Scripture is called a Covenant Jer. 33. 20. II. The execution of this fixed Constitution is God's wise and gracious managing of all things for the accomplishment of that glorious design which he had in the prospect of his eternal counsel which he steadily and regularly pursueth through all the vicissitudes that his mutable creatures are obnoxious to c. pag. 718 719. 1. On God's part whatever grace and mercy was in his eternal purpose that is given out to us by Christ c. III. 1. Christ cannot be the foundation of the Covenant because Christ himself is promised in the Covenant as the great comprehensive blessing Isa 49. 8 9. 2. Free Grace is given as the true reason of the Covenant Heb. 8. 8. IV. The Constitution of the Covenant in God's purpose and counsel hath no condition at all nor is that the Condition of the Covenant required of us on our part which God promiseth to work in us on his part nor that which God in Covenant bestoweth nor that which presupposeth other Covenant mercies antecedent c. V. A promise of pardon and life on condition of believing and obeying is no Covenant of Grace at all and neither better nor worse than a threatning of condemnation c. It 's no more a Covenant of Grace than a Covenant of Wrath. It 's no great matter where it is founded p. 584 586. VI. God hath not dispensed with one jot or title of the moral Law but Do this and live is as strictly exacted as ever so that unless a Surety be admitted and the righteousness of another owned the case of all the sons of Adam is deplorable and desperate To deny the righteousness wherein
God do intendere finem and what is his End The Order and Objects opened p. 57. Sect. 16. What Election and Reprobation are The order of the Decrees called Reprobation and of the Objects Of Negations of Decree p. 66. An Additional Explication of Divine Nolitions p. 76. Sect. 17. Whether God Will Decree or Cause Sin Five Acts of God in and about Sin What Sin is Many wayes God can cause the same thing that the sinner causeth and so fulfil his Decrees without Willing or Causing the Sin Objections answered God freely not idlely or impotently restraineth his own possible operations sometimes that he do not such or such an act at all and sometime that he do but so much towards it and no more Whether God be ever Causa partialis p. 84. Sect. 18. A Confutation of Dr. Twisses Digress 5. li. 2. sect 1. Vindic. Gratiae where he asserteth that God Willeth the existence of Sin and that sins are a medium sua natura summe unice conducibile to the Glorification of his Mercy and Justice p. 92. Sect. 19. The same Doctrine in Rutherford de Providentia confuted Whether things be good because God willeth them or willed by him because good resolved Whether there were eternal rationes boni mali Dr. Field vindicated p. 106. Sect. 20. The old Doctrine of Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius thought by some Jesuits too rigid but indeed Conciliatory for absolute Election to Faith and so to Salvation and for no reprobating Decree but only of Punishment for Sin foreseen but not decreed Prosper ad Cap. Gall. Sentent translated p. 115. Sect. 21. The summ of Prospers Answer to Vincent 16. Object p. 118. Sect. 22. Fulgentius words to the same sense p. 121. Sect. 23. The healing Doctrine and Concessions of many called Calvinists of the Synod of Dort Pet. Molinaeus c. p. 124. Sect. 24. And of Petr. á Sancto Joseph Suarez Ruiz c. on the other side especially Bellarmines at large and others p. 127. ERRATA PART 1. pag. 10. l. 38. in marg for Reason Being r. Relation being p. 24. l. 25. r. those Causes l. 26. r. first Case p. 27. l. 2. r. Of predetermination Reader Pain and Greater business forbad me to gather the Errata some are gathered by a Friend out of the first Book many more I must leave to your ingenuity I see in the Premonition p. 4. l. 22. for Mr. W. Mr. D. l. 47. for Armatus Annatus Also Dial. 11. p. 231. l. 30. r. refuse Dial. 13. p. 291. l. 13. for not r. done Catholick Theologie The First BOOK PACIFYING PRINCIPLES Collected from the common Notices of Nature the certain Oracles of GOD in the Holy Scriptures and the common Consent of Christians For the RECONCILING OF THE CHURCH-DIVIDING and DESTROYING CONTROVERSIES especially about PREDESTINATION PROVIDENCE GRACE and FREE-WILL REDEMPTION JUSTIFICATION FAITH MERIT WORKS CERTAINTY OF SALVATION PERSEVERANCE and many others In Three Parts I. Of Gods Nature Knowledge Decrees and Providence about Sin with Mans Free-will as the Objects of the former II. Of Gods GOVERNMENT and MORAL Works III. Of Gods Operations on Mans Soul By RICHARD BAXTER An earnest Desirer of the UNITY LOVE and PEACE of Christians For endeavouring of which he expecteth with resolved Patience still to undergo the Censures Slanders and Cruelties of IGNORANCE PRIDE and MALICE from all that are possessed by the Wisdom and Zeal which are from beneath Earthly Sensual and Devilish the Causes of Confusion and every evil work James 3. 14 15 16. LONDON Printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons at the Princes Arms in S t. Pauls Church-yard MDCLXXV The First Part OF THE NATURE KNOWLEDGE WILL AND DECREES of GOD As far as is needful to the intended CONCILIATION and CONCORD SECT I. Of our Knowledge of God as here attainable THough it be about the Knowledge Will and Decrees of God that our Controversies are agitated yet because the consequent Verities are scarce ever well understood without the understanding of the Antecedents out of which the Consequents arise and without the just order place and respect which the later have unto the former and unless things be understood in their true Method I will therefore expose my self to the obloquy of those who will call it Over-doing so far as to premise somewhat of the Deity it self But not what is necessary to the full explication of the Divine Attributes as we are capable as must be in a Method of Theologie which I have attempted elsewhere but only so much as lyeth under our Controverted Subject And when I have done that I shall leave the rest Thes 1. To Know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent is Life Eternal * * * John 17. 3. Bradward l. 1. c. 11. p. 198. The first necessary incomplex Principle is God and the first complex simply is of God Deus est c. But yet it is not to us the primum cognitum 2. To †††Exodus 20. know GOD is to know his Being Nature and Relations For though those Relations that are to Man be not essential to his Divine Nature yet are they essentially contained in the signification of the name GOD as he is the object of our Faith and Religion For to be OUR GOD doth speak his Relations to us as well as his Nature As the name KING and FATHER doth among men 3. We neither have nor can have here in flesh any one proper formal Conception of the Divine Nature that is formally suited to the truth in the object But only Metaphorical or Analogical Conceptions borrowed from things better known 4. Yet nothing beyond sense at least is so certainly known as GOD so far as we can reach though nothing be less perfectly or more defectively known or less comprehended Even as we know nothing Visible more certainly than the Sun and yet comprehend nothing Visible less 5. It is not true which many great Metaphysicians assert that the Quiddity of God is totally unknown to us For then it could not be life eternal to know him nor would a meer Negative knowledge cause in us a sufficient Positive Love or Joy or Trust c. But to know that we cannot know him would but inferr that we cannot Love him For we Love not an unknown Good 6. Nor is it true that Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza in fine Disput and some others say that the Notions of Life and Intellect are all that we have of the Quiddity of God and that the Divine Will is not a Quidditative notion 7. God is here seen in the Glass of his Works with the Revelation of his Word and Spirit And from these works we must borrow our conceptions * * * The doubt is How Imperfect works can notifie the perfect God And the Schoolmen manage it as an insuperable difficulty Whether God could have made the World or any thing better than it is If you will pardon me for making
Supereminence consisteth in 1. The Sub-propriety which we have in Inferiour Creatures 2. The Sub-government 3. That we are under God Their End and Benefactors SECT III. The several inadequate Conceptions which in order make up our Knowledge of God 21. BY the Knowledge of our own Acts we know our Powers and the Nature of our own souls though imperfectly And by the Knowledge of our souls we know the nature of other Intellectual Spirits And by the Knowledge of our selves and them and the Scripture expressions of his Attributes we know so much of God as we can here know And accordingly must speak of Him or be silent For we have no higher notions than such as are thus Analogical expressing that which is in God in an unconceivable eminency and transcendency by words which first signifie that which is formally in the soul as is said 22. And so we must conceive of God by all these following inadequate Conceptions confessing the impropriety but having no better I. The Essence of God who in Scripture is called in two words An Infinite Spirit is necessarily conceived of by these Three Conceptions 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. Vita 3. Perfectio The two first being the substantial Conceptus of a Spirit and the third that which answereth to all perfective degrees properties and accidents in Creatures and comprehendeth a multitude of Perfective Attributes which I express in the Abstract being loth much to use Concretes or Adjectives of God Of these as the first answereth to Matter in Materials and to the Genus and substantia abstractè sumpta in Spirits so doth the second to the Form and Difference when yet in God there is no Composition or Matter 23. II. And the Formal Conceptus VITA must it self be conceived of in this Threefold inadequate Conception 1. * * * It is a great dispute with the Schoolmen Whether Gods Power be any thing but his Intellect and Will that is a necessary distinct conceptus inadaequatus of God For he is one simple essence Durand 1. d. 38. q. 1. justly affirmeth it Vasqu in 1. Tho. q. 23. d. 102. c. 2. saith Haec sententia noâ—null is recentioribus mirum in modum probatur yet he is against it though Suarez be for it But it is partly by misconceiving of the Potentia Vital is in man as if it were only Executive ad extra or in the inferior faculties and partly on such frivolous reasons as tend also to a denyal of his Intellection and Volition Methinks they that acknowledge Gods Understanding and Will to be analogically so called mans being the first which the word signifieth though Gods infinitely more excellent should on the same reason grant that Vita Potentia activa are terms as applicable to God For which denomination many reasons and cogent may be given And I am sure the language of the Scripture and our Creed will warrant this conception Potentia-Actus 2. Intellectus 3. Voluntas I call the first Potentia-Actus to avoid Concretes and to signifie that as God hath no Potentia Passiva so his Potentia-Activa is not an idle cessant Power but in perpetual perfect Act and that Act is a most Powerful-Act so that neither Potentia alone nor Actus alone but both together are our best Conception of this first Principle in the Deity And I take it for granted that even in Mans soul the Potentia-Vitalis Activa the Intellect and Will are not as Thomas thought Accidents but the formal essence of the soul as the Scotists and Nominals better say And I have largely elsewhere proved and therefore stand not here upon it 24. III. And the Existence of this Divine Essence must be known by us in this Gradual Threefold Conception 1. As in Virtute vel Potentia 2. In Actu Immanente 3. In Actione Transeunte Of the first I shall say no more but what is said before By the second I mean Gods own most perfect Essence as Active in it self without extrinsick effect or object By the third I mean not the Creature or the Divine Action ut recipitur in passo or the effect But the Divine Essence it self in the state of Agency ad extra which the Schools conclude to be Eternal though the effect be but in Time Yet if any will call this a free and not a necessary state of the Divine Essence I contend not 25. IV. The Essential Immanent Acts of God are Three 1. SIBI VIVERE or to be Essential Active Life in Himself 2. SE INTELLIGERE to know Himself 3. SE AMARE or to be Amor sui 26. V. The Trinity of Divine Subsistences or Persons also must be here acknowledged 1. The FATHER 2. The WORD or SON 3. The HOLY SPIRIT Of which the School-men have said so much if not far too much as that I may turn the Reader to them 27. I have elsewhere shewed that many of them and other Divines do take the Three last named Immanent Acts in God to be the same with the Three Persons or Subsistences Even the Three Divine Principles Potentia-Actus Intellectus Volunt as as in Act thus Immanently But of these great Mysteries elsewhere All that I say here is that seeing the Trinity of Divine Principles or formal Essentialities and the Threefold Act are so certainly evident to Natural Reason it self that no understanding person can deny them we have no Reason to think the Trinity of Eternal Subsistences incredible and a thing that the Christian faith is to be suspected for but the quite contrary though they are mysteries above our reach as all of God is as to a full or formal apprehension 28. Though God have no Real Accidents we are fain to conceive of Him with some Analogie to Accidents where 1. The Universal Conception is PERFECTION which comprehendeth all 2. The Divine Principles considered in PERFECTION denominate God 1. Potentissimus 2. Sapientissimus 3. Optimus 29. The Attributes of the Divine Persons are 1. Distinguishing viz. 1. GENERANS Patris 2. GENITUS Filii 3. PROCEDENS Spiritus Sancti 2. Common to all such as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 30. The particular Attributes analogical as to Creatures Comparate Relative and Negative are very many But yet in Order to be conceived of and not confusedly which elsewhere I offer to the Readers view 31. VI. Gods Causal Relations to his Creatures are in General those named by S. Paul Rom. 11. 36. OF HIM and THROUGH HIM and TO HIM are all things And he is 1. The first EFFICIENT 2. The supream DIRIGENT 3. The Ultimate FINAL Cause of all things 32. Gods EFFICIENCY is terminated 1. On the Things in their Being 2. In their Action and Operation 1. And in the first respect he is the Cause 1. Of their Existing Essence 2. Of their Order 3. Of their Goodness or Perfection And so he is 1. The CREATOR and Conserver 2. The ORDINATOR 3. The BENEFACTOR of all the world And in the second respect as to Action
he is 1. The Actor or Motor of all things by his Active Power 2. The Governor of all according to their several Natures by his wisdom 3. The Perfecter of all things in their attingency or fruition of their proper End by his Goodness 33. VII As to MAN in special God is now Fundamentally Related to him as his CREATOR his REDEEMER and his REGENERATER or SANCTIFIER eminently ascribed distinctly to the FATHER SON and HOLYSPIRIT From whence floweth NATURA MEDELA SALUS or NATURE REDEEMING GRACE and RENEWING GRACE HOLINESS and GLORY that is LOVE begun here and perfected in Heaven 34. VIII From CREATION there resulteth a Threefold Moral Right and Relation of God to Man 1. He is our Absolute OWNER or LORD to dispose of us and Act us by his Power 2. He is our Supream RECTOR Morally to Rule us as Intellectual free-agents eminently by his Wisdom 3. He is our LOVER and Ultimate END as he is Goodness and Love it self To Love Him and be Loved by him perfectly for ever being Amantissimus Amabilissimus in his Goodness 35. He that leaveth out any one of these Relations of God to man to be Our Owner Ruler and Lover and End leaveth out that which is Essential to Our God as the word is Relatively used in the Precepts and Promises of the Holy Scripture SECT IV. Of Gods Relations to the Creature and denominations thereupon in his Power Knowledge and Will 36. THe Three Divine Essential Principles Related to the Creature ad extra are denominated 1. His Omnipotence 2. His Omniscience or Knowledge of them 3. His Volition and Love of them He who is Potentissimus perfectly Powerful in Act in Himself is denominated Omnipotent because he can do all things ad extra which belong to That Gods Power is Infinite quia est ipsa Infinita Essentia is past doubt But whether it may be called Infinite as respecting outward objects is disputed And some prove the affirmative by asserting Infinite Objects But Gregor Ar. n. 1. d. 43. q. 2. hath reasons too subtile to be here recited One of them Vasq useth in 1. Tho. q. 25. d. 103. c. 2. disp 104. Vid. opiniones Gabriel Scoti Thomae de ratione nominis Omnipotentia Divinae Power 2. And he who is Intellectus se Intelligens ad intra is denominated Omniscient or Knowing all Creatures from the exterior objects 3. And he who is Voluntas se Volens or Amor se Amans ad intra is also denominated willing of exterior things 37. But by the way how the Creature is called exterior to God who is Essentially every where and in all and how God is not a Part of Universal Being and how God and the Creature are no more than God alone is elsewhere somewhat explained but transcendeth mans Understanding to comprehend 38. Gods Transient Acts are of two sorts 1. Effectively Transient as Creation Regeneration c. which do cause somewhat without 2. Objectively only Transient which cause nothing but suppose the Object 39. It is a dreadful thing to be over-bold rash and presumptuous in speaking and asserting any thing without clear proof of Gods Knowledge and Will especially to reduce them to all the Modes and Methods of a man even as to the order of his Acts seeing we are forced to confess that even Intellection and Volition are spoken of God with exceeding great impropriety D'Orbâ—llis 1. d. 40. inquit â—icet in Deo non sit proprie Habitus est tamen ibl aliquid intellectum à nobis per modum habitus siquidem scientia in nobis est Habitus ad cognoscendum sicut Virtus est habitus ad operandum Cognitio Divina cum semper maneat congrue signatur per modum habitus and mans Acts which are the prius significatum are further below Gods than a Worm is below a Man Therefore were it not that the presumption of the Schools and Polemical writers hath made that Necessary as Defensive which else would not be so I should scarce dare to say this little following 40. I. The Power of God is denominated Relatively Omni-potency in three instants to Three several Objects 1. In the first instant as to All things which belong to Power And so God can do all things which are hence called Possible 2. In the second instant to All things meet or Congruous to the Divine Intellect to be willed and done And so we say that God can do All that is meet to be done and nothing that is unmeet 3. In the third instant of reason as to All things which he willeth to do And so we say that God can do whatsoever he will do And so Possibility hath various senses 41. II. Gods Intellect is Relatively denominated Omniscient in respect â—eid Rom. quodl 3. q. 3. saith That Gods speculative knowledge is before his Velle but his Practical determined ad oâ—â—s is after as we must conceive of it to three sorts of Objects also in three instants 1. In the first instant he knoweth all Possibles in his own Omnipotence For to know things to be Possible is but to know what He can do 2. In the second Instant he Knoweth all things as Congruous eligible and Volenda fit to be Willed And this out of the perfection of his own wisdom which is but to be perfectly Wise and to know what perfect Wisdom should offer as eligible to the Will 3. In the third instant he knoweth All things willed by him as such as Volita which is but to know his own Will and so that they will be 42. In all these instances we suppose the Things themselves not to have yet any Being But speak of God as related to Imaginary beings according to the common speech of men 43. These therefore are not properly Transient Acts of God because it is but Himself that is the object indeed viz. His own Power Wisdom and Will though it be de creaturis in that which is called his Idea's 44. It is usual with Divines to ascribe Idea's to the Divine Intellect after the manner of men against which I quarrel not but am my self afraid of presumption 45. From what is said you may see that the Common School distinction of all Gods Knowledge into scientia simplicis Intelligentiae purae Visionis is not accurate and the terms are too arbitrary and dark to notifie the thing intended and that the scientia media added doth not mend the matter And that a fitter distinction is plain and obvious 46. III. Also the Will of God as Related to things not yet existent hath in several instants a threesold object as we may conceive of God after the manner of men 1. The Possibility of things which God is said to Will in Willing his own Power as respecting them 2. The Congruity Goodness and Eligibility of things as in his own Knowledge which is but to Will the perfection of his own Understanding 3. The Future existence of things Good and
at words What is this Complexe object Deus est Is it any thing or nothing If nothing it is not before Gods knowledge and the Cause of it If any thing Is it God or a Creature A Creature is not before God nor a cause of his knowledge which is God himself If it be God is it his Essence as such or his Essential properties or the Persons None of these For Gods essence is the prime Incomplexe Being and not a Complexe proposition Dens est His Properties primary are Omnipotent-vital-power Intellect and Will But these also are the same Incomplexe essence and not propositions And his Intellect as an object of it self is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himself nor the cause of it All the sense he can make of it is that this proposition Deus est est Aeternus c. if it had had an eternal being would in order of nature have been conceivable to us before this Deus scit se esse or before his knowledge it self or that if man had been the Knower it had been first a true proposition that He is before he knoweth that he is But God knoweth not himself by propositions Words in mente vel ore are but artificial organs for blind creatures to know by And doth God need such to know himself Doth he know by Thinking and by Artificial means as we do Hath he Entia rationis in his Intellect as man as Propositions are And had he an Intellect and these Entia rationis or propositions in his Intellect Deus est c. before he knew them yea and his self-knowledge which in Act is his pure eternal necessary Essence caused by these All that you can say is that poor creatures know by Propositions and phantasms and diverse thoughts and that God knoweth man and therefore knoweth all our propositions and thoughts as ours but not that he had the like eternally in himself and knoweth them in himself and that Himself as a proposition is the Cause of himself or self-intellection as in Act. He can know that you see by Spectacles and yet not eternally use Spectacles himself as the Cause of his sight But Bradwardine saith that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt per solam suam essentiam sicut alia vera incomplexa Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota sed per suam voluntatem vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate c. More presumption still He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe And who knoweth what sense those words have What meaneth he by complexa but Notions that is names and propositions as distinct from the Things And what is it to know propositions complexe but to know them as they are And what is it to know them incomplexe unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is or to know that it is no proposition that is to err If God know a Complexum or a proposition that Proposition is in being And where was it in being before God knew it If in God or no where 1. God then is a proposition 2. And God is before he knoweth himself 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge it is to say that God knoweth that he is before he knoweth that he is and his knowing that he is causeth him to know that he is If it be said that by complexa he meaneth not organical notions words nor propositions but the Verity of Gods Being Eternity c. I answer To know things is said to be to know some Truth because by knowing the thing we can make this proposition This is or This truly is But Gods knowledge of Things is not as ours but by pure perfect intuition and so maketh not propositions in himself by knowing things But if it be the Truth of this proposition Deus est that you mean it supposeth that proposition to exist for quod non est non verum est and so to exist in God which is denyed And it is that proposition that Bradwardine speaketh of But if by Truth you mean nothing but Gods Essence that is not a Complex object which he speaketh of And he saith not that God knoweth suam essentiam creata vel futura but that he knoweth per suam essentiam quod Deus est est Omnipotens Aeternus c. per suam essentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus est So that it 's a proposition that he calleth complexum incomplexè cognitum by contradiction when he cannot prove that Gods Intellect made propositions in it self and that antecedently to themselves and the Causes of themselves And all this which men talk in the dark about God is non-sense to trouble themselves and the world with on false suppositions that Gods knowledge is such as ours or that we can have formal conceptions and descriptions of it when we should tremble to read men thus prophanely take Gods Name in vain and pry into unrevealed things I have purposely been the larger on this instance to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholastick Word-mongers who would obtrude on us humane entia rationis or Thoughts as real Divine entities and would perswade us that every nothing which they make a name for is therefore something yea some of them God himself What I have said of Divine Intellection I say of his Volitions of which cap. 20 21. Bradwardine saith that Voluta priora viz. Deum esse omnipotentem esse bonum cognoscentem c. sunt Causa But 1. It is too bold to say that Gods Will is an Effect 2. If it were so it must be his Essence Omnipotency and Intellect that is the Cause of his Will and not a Complex verity as Deus est omnipotens bonus est c. For Gods Will is not caused by Propositions 3. If you say that his Volition as terminated objectively on his Essence Goodness c. is his Will in act se Velle which some call the third Person yet here would be no Cause and Effect but our distinct partial conceptions of that incomprehensible simplicity which hath no real diversity or priority SECT VI. Of Gods Knowledge and the Co-existence of the Creature 88. AUgustine well and truly saith that fore-knowledge in God is the same with the Knowledge of things present Past present and future through his Infiniteness and Eternity being alike to him even all as present 89. But this dependeth upon the Indivisibility of Eternity in which all the things of time are included and co-exist 90. Thus saith Augustine li. 2. ad Simplic q. 2. Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum Quid autem futurum est Deo qui omnia supergreditur tempora Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet non sunt ei futurae sed praesentes ac
no Power used to produce it which is not given by God 160. An Act as such hath no Morality in it but is quid naturale And so it is from God as he is fons naturae But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it referred to Gods Governing Will or Law and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is mans End And Materially it is not the Act as such but the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one or to an undue End rather than a due End or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object which is the sin and the fundamentum of the sinfulness and so è contra 161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such In Omissions of Loving Trusting Fearing Serving God there is no Natural Act but a privation of it In committed sins to Love this Object rather than that hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such A modus Entis is not Ens But this Comparative choice is but the Modus Modi entis For an Action is but Modus Entis and this is but a modus actionis 162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans that Man should be a Causa prima and so be God if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such 163. If any will litigate de nomine entis let them call it Being or no-being as they please but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that under Divine Universal Influx without Divine pre-determining pre-motion on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it is bolder against God than I shall be And if God can do it we have no reason to doubt whether it be done 164. Men seem not in denying this to consider the signification of the word * * * It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twisse who oft saith that God denyed to Adam no grace ad posse but he denyed him grace necessary ad agere For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is necessary to the act Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art 1. pag. 457. POWER when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it without the said pre-motion If so It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it He that hath a proper Power to Choose is Able to Choose and Can Choose by that Power 165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-agents and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions by all that he doth by his Laws Providence and Grace to make them good But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil 166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis * * * Bellarmin's Universal Cause seemeth the same wiâ—â— what Durandus meaneth And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion saith l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia Multi enim Philosophi ut Plato Aristot â—gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium essâ— causam immediatam omnium esseâ—luum Causarum secâ—ndarum the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction A Cause is called Universal 1. In praedicando Logically And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis Statuarius est Causa particularis Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae 2. In causande as to the effect And so that is an Universal Cause whose causality extendeth to many effects And this is two-fold 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects but not of all that is proper to each unless its causality be otherwise as by the dispositio recipientis determined And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose and the stink of the Dunghill c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae by his common sustaining and moving Influx of all sinful actions 2. When it is the Cause of those actions not only as to that which is common to them all but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another and that of it self and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis or by any other cause And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is meerly physical in all beings and actions As in Generation c. which is properly to say that he is at once both Cause universalis particularis singularis And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause but only a meer Universal as aforesaid 167. They that denying our self-determining power do make Volition and free-Volition to signifie the same and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act do seem rather to jeast than seriously dispute And to define Free-will to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem is no other For Velle juxta rationem is no more than Velle the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one why do we blind the World with words and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will and not whether his Will be free And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition or not the Volition of another thing the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous If the will be not forced as long as it willeth or willeth juxta rationem then to question whether it can will by constraint is to question whether it can at once will and not will †††Of this see Ie Blanks excellent Theses de lib. arbitrio absolut The definition of Alvarâ—â— of Free-will is lib. arbitrium est facultas voluntatis
denominatione extrinseca so also as to their Eternity Gods Acts are all Eternal as they are his Essence ex parte agentis and yet some of them new and temporary some past some present some future ex parte effectus objecti inde denominatione extrinsecâ 277. Yet I confess that it passeth my understanding to conceive how it is that the same Act is Eternal ex parte agentis and yet but temporary ex parte patientis effecti that God should from eternity do all that ever he doth ex parte sui to create the world to redeem sanctifie justifie c. and yet that nothing should be done by it till lately Which drew Ludov. à Dola de modo conjunct Concurs par 1. c. 2. p. 20. to say Probatur Actionem Dei externam seu Concursum in actu secundo esse actum ab ipso Deo distinctum ex natura rei ante opus intellectus Quia Deus non solum poterat nihil agere ad extra sed de facto per aeternitatem nullum producebat effectum de novo incepit operari in principio temporis Igitur actio Dei est omnino distincta ab ipso Deo Neque dici potest actionem quidem Dei fuisse ab aeterno sed effectum non fuisse nisi in tempore Quia tametsi Virtus Potentia agendi Principium operationis esse possit antequam Causa actu agat tamen Actio esse non potest quin Causa verè agat producat Ac impossibile est Causam vere Agere producere quin effectus aliquis ab ea producatur agatur Nullus autem effectus producebatur à Deo ab aeterno ergo non habebat Actionem ab aeterno loquimur de productione ad extra transeunte Sane non potest Actio esse sine termino effectu suo Sed Actio essentialiter est sui termini productio aut conservatio ne conâ—ipi quidem potest sine illo Estque prorsus inintelligibile dari productionem aut conservationem alicujus rei non dari actualiter ipsam rem Estque Omnis actio intime conjuncta cum effectu qui per ipsam formaliter producitur aut conservatur nec sejungi ab illa potest And so Aureolus 278. In this also we we must confess that the matter quite transcendeth our capacity And as this is rash in à Dola to affirm so confidently a thing above him so we must not be rash to affirm on the contrary more than is certain But so far as we may venture the common way seemeth the far safer Because God is unchangeable not only Morally but Naturally And this Action as distinct from the Effect is made by him to be neither the Creator nor a Creature but a Creating or moving Act between both which is not convenient And as it is intelligible that God can Velle or Decree ab aeterno mundum fieri Petrum justificari c. in hoc tempore so we are not sure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity which shall effect only in Time by the concurrence of his will Though I confess that the case much differeth between an * * * Ego quidem fateor nostram libertatem cum Voluntate Dei facilius conciliari juxta eorum sententiam qui dicunt actum volendi intelligendi non esse operationem immanentem elicitam aut libere additam ipsi essentiae quam si dicamus esse actum quendam liberum elicitum Utroquâ— tamen modo conandum Vasqu in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 2. And if this will make it easie easie it must be For Gods free Volitions and knowledge of things extrinsick are commonly said to be no real additions to his essence but dum unus simplex immutabilis plura mutabilia scit vult facit his will and understanding are denominated by relation and connotation as various from the various objects Immanent Act such as nuda Volitio which doth nihil efficere and an Effecting Act. But many conceive that God causeth all things meerly by willing them Though I see not but that will must be a Powerful emanant operative will which is more than meer will And we are so unacquainted with God and all Active natures as that we cannot say that Action exparte agentis may not be sine termino objecto effectis And all Philosophical Divines agree that God hath no Power out of Act but an Active power alwayes equally in act exparte sui and so is a pure act Let us per possibile vel impossibile suppose the Sun to be what it is and no other Creature to be with it in being This Sun would in vacuo emitt its motive illuminative and calefactive radios by Action And yet nothing would be moved illuminated or heated by it There would be no Terminus and no effect And suppose afterward all other Creatures to be made then the divers Termini and Recipients would make a diversity of effects and the various disposition of the Recipients would make that one Action of the Sun to produce motion in one light in another heat in another sweetness from the Rose and stink from Weeds and so of other effects I do but tell you why we must not peremptorily deny much more of God 279. Prescience with Predefinition or Decree do not inferr causally That the Potentia executiâ—a ia Deo is principium absolutâ— pâ—oximum agendi ad exâ—â—a See â—ennot l. 3. c. 13. n. v. Aâ—uin 1. d. 45. a. 3. ad 2. that necessity of the event as predetermining premotion doth Because they do alone nihil ponere in objecto So that if it could be proved that God doth eternally Decree or will the event of sin and mens damnation absolutely it would not prove alone that he is therefore the cause of them It is not therefore the Predetermination of bare Decree which we lay those consequences on but efficient predetermination 280. Lombard d. 45. well concludeth That even that free-will of God by which he willeth decreeth and loveth the Creature is his essence Bradwardine l. 3. c. 5â— p. 8â—9 argueth that Gods will de creandis was antecedently free and yet concomitantly and consequently necessary and both immutably from Eternity But yet the Name Amor Petri odium peccati c. signifieth not his Essence as such but his Essential will as denominated from the created or humane object 281. Therefore it cannot be inferred hence that God is a Creature because he Willeth or Loveth the Creature Because his Loving it denominateth his Essence as terminated on or connoting the object and not as in it self simply 282. It is not fit or lawful to ask after any Cause of the Will of God Because it is the first cause of all things else and hath nothing Superiour or antecedent to Cause it And God is absolutely independent and is not to be called the Cause of himself Ruiz who saith that
Gods will hath a final cause meaneth but a final object as he confesseth A Tree is a passive recipient cause of the Termination of the Suns calefacient act and of the â—ffect as received but not of the act ex parte solâ—â— 283. Even the Acts of Gods free-will or Decrees have no Cause even in God himself no more than those called Necessary For we must not say that any thing in God is an effect 284. Yet as Gods Acts are oft denominated by Connotation from the object which in man is a constitutive Cause of the Act loco materiae so extrinsick objects may be called The Causes but rather the Objects of God Will Love or Knowledge not as his Essence but only as so denominated by that Connotation of the object 285. These distributions of Gods Volitions in Number and by specifying objects and individuating objects which are called material constitutive causes of the act are all according to humane weakness in us who know God but enigmatically and in a glass But yet if any man use such words in a broader manner than we think fit before we censure and condemn him we must hear his sence explained For all that ever we can say of God is improper analogical yea metaphorical And it is but in degrees of impropriety that all words about Gods attributes and actions differ For as is oft said no man hath formal proper conceptions of any thing in God If God should not speak to us in this improper language of our own he must not speak intelligibly to us unless he create another understanding in us And he himself in Scripture using such language of himself alloweth us to use it while we profess to disclaim ascribing to God any of the imperfection which it seemeth to import 286. On these terms not only Various Volitions are ascribed to God in Scripture and exteriour causes of them as John 16. 27. the Father Loveth you because ye have loved me and believed c. * * * So Gen. 22. 16. 26. 5. Prov. 1. 24. Luke 11. 8. 19. 17. Gal. 4. 6. Eph. 5. 6. 1 Sam. 28. 18. 1 King 9. 9. 11. 34. 20. 42. 2 King 10. 30. 2 Chron. 34. 27. Psal 91. 14. But also Fear Affliction Grief Hatred Repenting Rejoycing c. Deut. 32. 27. Isa 63. 9. Gen. 6. 6. Psal 5. 5. Gen. 6. 7. 1 Sam. 15. 11. Joel 2. 13. Jer. 15. 6. Hos 11. 8. Zeph. 3. 17. Jer. 32. 41 c. and exteriour causes of them 287. That which is to be understood by all these is 1. That man is so far the Cause of the Effects of Divine Volitions as the Dispositio receptiva may be called a Cause And I before shewed in the instance of the effects of the Suns Influx how great a hand the various Dispositiones materiae receptivae have in the diversifications of effects 2. And that Gods Volitions themselves are hence relatively denominated 288. Therefore we must say that Gods electing Peter and his rejecting Judas his Love to Peter and his hatred of Judas are not in specie the same act of his will nor his Loving Peter and his Loving Paul the same Numerically As his knowing of Peter to be a Saint and his knowing Judas to be a Saint is not the same numerical act of knowledge Though as they are Gods Essence all are but one And we must say that he Loveth one because he is good and hateth another because he is evil and he justifieth men because they believe and condemneth men because they believe not that he forgiveth a sinner because he repenteth c. Though Gods Will have no efficient Cause 289. Those Volitions of God which are but Immanent as to Efficiency but Transient Objectively are some of them to be denominated as before the thing willed and some as after The Will of effecting is before the thing willed The Will ut finis or Complacency and Displicency as also Intuitive Knowledge of the thing as Existent estimation approbation reprobation of it the Will of Continuing modifying altering perfecting destroying suppose the existence of the thing willed in esse objectivo And so many Volitions may be denominated as beginning in time as connoting the objects †††Pennottus li. 4. c. 24. p. 235. confidently argueth that because God can Love him that he hated or Loved not he can therefore Predestinate him whom he reprobated or change his decrees without any change in himself I answer 1. I grant that God can Love a Saint whom he hated as a sinner before and cease hating him without any change save relative and by extrinsecal denomination 2. But his inference seemeth to me false and dangerous unless he had meant it of executive Election and Reprobation which he doth not For 1. Proper Love and Hatred connote an Object as existent and by such connotation are named And his fourth supposition is false that Love is nothing but Gods Will to give a man life Eternal For the formal Act of Love is Complacency And the Velle Bonum is another thing as I think an effect of Love or at the most another act of Love And we deny that any absolute Velle bonum alicui is ever changed though displicence be changed Because it is the same with Decree 2. And the reason why the said Decree or Volition if absolute and proper may not be denominated changed is because it maketh its own object and so supposeth it not pre-existent and dependeth not on it denominatively And therefore it would inferr God to be mutable to change it But it is not so in the other which as to the Relation and Name followeth the Mutable creature as doth Gods Knowledge of present existents and preteritions as to denomination and connotation And it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability so to name them than to his simplicity to name them many and divers 290. And in this sense it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability to speak of Him as being before in Potentia only as to such Relative denominations As the Rock in the Sea hath not yet that proximity to the Wave which a twelvemonth hence will touch it and yet is not therefore mutable Or as you are yet but in potentia to the termination of his Relations who will pass about you before and behind on the right hand and on the left So God was but Potentially the Creator and Redeemer of the World from Eternity Though as to any real passion God hath no passive power 291. In this sense of relation to the objects and effects it is that we conceive of Gods acts of Knowledge and Volition in a certain order of nature as one being before and one after another Though not as they are Gods Essence 292. Yet because the use and truth of words or names is their signification of Things as indeed they are and we should put no name on any creature but what is adapted to notifie it aright
every Man his Right and Due is included 338. It is not Gods will without the sign as is said nor the sign without his will but the sign as notifying and his will as notified that is a Law and Jus the Effect Gods will is the principal Cause and quasi Anima Legis and the sign is the instrumental Cause and quasi Corpus 339. The Sign reâ—pecteth these things 1. The matter due 2. The dueness or right 3. The will of God concerning or constituting it 4. The mind and will of man to whom this is signified Or 1. Gods will as the Efficient of Right 2. The matter and form of Right as Constituted 3. The mind and will of man as the terminus 340. These signs of Gods will are 1. Natural called the Law of Nature which is the Natura ordo rerum especially ipsius hominis as before described 2. By extraordinary Revelation The latter have the great advantage of plainness significandi rem praeceptam The former hath the fuller evidence of its Author and Original that it is indeed of God Both are his Laws to man 341. Laâ— Judgement and execution the three parts of Government differ in that 1. Law maketh the Debitum or Jus 2. Judgement determineth It is of great use for a Divine who handleth Gods Laws to understand the nature of Laws in genere as Suarez in praes de Legib. sheweth which Book is one of the best on that Subject that is extant among us of it by decâ—sive application 3. Execution distributeth according to it 342. The Jus vel Debitum instituted by the Law is twofold 1. A Subditis What shall be Due from the Subjects the Debitum Officii 2. Subditis what shall be Due to the Subjects viz. 1. Antecedently to their merits which is 1. The act of our Governing Benefactor 2. Or a Divider such was the Law for dividing the Israelites inheritances 2. Consequently which is by the Retributive part of the Law commonly called the Sanction which is 1. By the Premiant part what Reward shall be due 2. By the Penal what Punishment 343. Accordingly Laws have several parts 1. Precept and Prohibition making Duty 2. Retributive 1. Premiant 2. Penal called Gods Promises and Threats 3. And subservient or accidental 1. Narratives Historical Chronological c. 2. Pure Donations 3. Prophesies 4. Doctrinal 5. Exhortatory 6. Reprehensive c. 344. Though Debitum vel Jus facere be the formal operation of a Law which is to be Fundamentum Relationis yet the Act of the chief parts preceptive or penal is commonly called Obligation And so many say that obligare aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is all the action of a Law But Obligare is a Metaphor and therefore in dispute to be laid by or to give place to the proper terms And the Premiant act is not properly called obligation nor the penal act save in a secondary notion as he is â—bligatus ad poenam ferendam if judged who is first Reus poenae or to whom it is made Due by the Law 345. The â—bligation aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is not of equality in the disjunctive As if God were indifferent which we chose But it is primarily ad obedientiam and but subserviently ad poenam as a means against future disobedience and a securing the ends of Government in case of sin 346. But the Preceptive and the Premiant parts are each chief or final in several respects God Commandeth us a Course of Duty or Right action to this end that we may be Happy in his Love And he promiseth us first and giveth us after in foretaste this Happiness to draw us to Duty 347. But here is a wonderful inseparable twist and in the main an Identity God Ruleth us as a Father or Regent Benefactor All his Benefits are Free-gifts as to the Thing and Value But given 1. In an Order 2. And the rest as means to the ultimate In which respects they are a Reward or means to it His very Law is a Gift and a great Benefit Duty is the means to keep his first Gifts and to receive more The very doing of the duty is a receiving of the Reward the object of duty being felicitating As if feasting or accepting offered wealth or honour were our work Holiness is happiness in a great part And in our End or state of perfection all will be one To Love God Rejoice in Him and praise him will be both our duty and felicity means and end as it were in one 348. Whereas some say that if there were no Law sin would deserve punishment it is an errour For it is due only by Law But it 's true Of all the following distinctions note these words of Bonavent in 1. d. 4â— a. 1. q. 1. Voluntâ—â—em Dâ—i Antecedentem sâ—â— Conditionalem possiblâ—e â—â—â—â— non impleri at consequentem absolutam nequâ—â—uam Sâ—â—unâ—um Daâ—â—sc Voluntas benâ—pâ—aciti â—t â—apl Antecedens seu Conditionales consequous qua vult quantum in sâ— est omnium salutem alsoluta sive consequens quâ— determinate vult aliquid qâ—â—d noâ—it certitudin 〈…〉 Intelligendum â—â—â— nâ—llam Dei Voluntatem pâ—sse superari aut cassari Aliquam tamen posse non impâ—eri â—t antecedentem Aliqâ—â—m ut consequentem impossibile â—sse noâ— impleri â—â—â— impediâ—i Non â—tiam possibilâ— est Voluntatem Dei cassari Nam cassam diâ—itur aliquid dum priâ—â—tur eâ—â—ectu pâ—â—â—â—io ad quem est Voluntas autâ—â— nullo privatur esseciu ad quâ—m est pâ—â—pâ—ie Nam quod dicitur quod Deus vult omnes homiâ—â—s salvos fieri quantâ—m in sâ— est haec Voluntas non connotat salutem nec proprie est ad effectum salutâ—s sed connotat ordinatioâ—â—m naturae sive naturâ—m ordinabilâ—n ad salutâ—n â—â—â—â— niâ—il plus est diâ—â—re Deus vult istum salâ—â—â— fieri quantum in se est qâ—â—m Deâ— placuit dare isti â—â—â—â—ram per quam posset pâ—â—â—â—â—ire ad saâ—uâ—em quod Deus paraâ—â—â— esset juâ—â—re ita quod salus non deficit propâ—er deseâ—tum à pâ—nte Dei Therefore it connoteth also all the helps which God affordeth men that it 's due by the meer Law of Nature without any superadded Positive Laws 349. Gods will called Legislative or Governing is ever fulfilled in strict sence that is So much as is Gods part and the Laws part to do is ever done e. g. God saith Perfect obedience c. shall be Adams duty and it is done It is his Duty whether he will or not He saith To steal shall be sin and it is sin He saith He that believeth shall have right to Justification and Glory and he that believeth not shall be Filius mortis that is Death and Hell shall be his Due and so it is Thus strictly all Gods Will is done 350. But in the secondary remote sence every sin violateth the Will of God by breaking his Law For when he saith Obedience shall
be thy duty we use to say It is Gods will that we should obey him And so when we do not obey him we are said to Violate his will But this is but metonymically For that which is Gods will indeed is but that we shall be bound to obey whether we do or not And the event whether we shall or not de facto is not at all determined by the Law 351. Therefore if it were proved that God did Decree one thing and command the contrary it would not prove two contrary wills in God nor is there any great shew of a contradiction in it For to say I forbid Judas to hang himself and I decree that he shall hang himself are no contradictions It is but to say It shall be his Duty to preserve his life and Eventually he shall not preserve it All that is a mans Duty doth not come to pass And to determine of Duty is not to say It shall come to pass Otherwise Gods word were false whenever man sinned Nay in reality Augustine truly judged that by Gods Law Hell was Due to Paul unconverted and yet then he was a chosen Vessel and God Decreed to save him He thought that Perseverance was the Duty of some that after fell away and that Heaven was their Due on condition of perseverance till they fell away though not presently to be possessed and yet that God decreed that ipso permittente eventually they should fall away and perish 352. If a King made a Law that no man shall murder another and yet knoweth that a certain Traytor that hath broken Prison is like to fall into the hands of some Thieves or Enemies that will kill him If he be secretly willing that he be killed by them it is no contradiction The Law maketh it their duty not to Kill But it saith not that they shall not de eventu by way of Prognostication 353. But yet indeed God never doth command an act or forbid an act â—nd yet Decree that the same Act immediately commanded shall not be â—one or that the act directly forbidden shall be done Because sin is a thing â—hat God cannot decree or will of which anon 354. But the effect of the commanded or forbidden act is sometimes said â—o be commanded or forbidden And this may be contrarily decreed of God And men that think not truly of the matter think that this is to Decree a thing forbidden and so they err by such confused thoughts E. G. Gods command is that I shall relieve a poor man and not let him faâ—ish and that I shall heal the sick c. and yet God may decree that this â—oor man shall be famished and this sick man dye And yet no contradiction For indeed Relieving in effect is but the End of the Act which is commanded me and not the act it self I am bound to offer him â—elief But if one cannot take it and another will not yet I have done my duty And so in the other instance So God commanded Abraham â—o sacrifice his Son and yet decreed that he should not be sacrificed And â—his without any contradiction For the act that under that name was commanded Abraham and made his duty was not actual eventual sacriâ—icing For then it had been a duty to resist the Angel and do a thing â—mpossible But to consent and endeavour on his part to sacrifice his Son which he did So the preservation of our own and others lives is commanded us by God and yet at the same time mens death decreed Because the thing indeed commanded is not Preservation as it signifieth the effect and success but only Preservation as it signifieth our true endeavour So the Jews were forbidden to kill Christ and yet God decreed that Christ should be killed For the thing forbidden them was their own Consent and wicked act But the thing that God willed and decreed was only the effect without any Will of their Act that caused it unless in genere actus but only a permission of it Men of gross brains that cannot distinguish and judge accurately may blaspheme God in their ignorance in a case that to a discerning judgement is very plain 355. * * * Of which see Amyraldus against Spanhem de Grat. Universali The next distinction of Gods Will is into Absolute and Conditional which some Divines use and others condemn and say that God hath no Conditional Will The common answer which most Schoolmen and other Papists agree with the Protestants in is that there are Conditions rei volitae of the event of the thing Willed but no Conditions of the act of Volition in God As Aquinas saith of Causes †††De Vol. Conditionali authoritatibus rationibus pro eadem Vide Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 20. But his assertion that Una creatura est Ratio movens tanquam objectum materiale secundario ut Deus velit aliam producere is a fiction though he lay his stress on it about the ordo decretorum For movere is causare and nothing doth cause or move God to act There are Rationes effectuum eorum ordinis but none of the efficient Acts of God in him If you say It is absurd to say that God had no Reason to will the creation of this world rather than another I answer That is an Act of efficient Wisdom above all Reason But to fetch Reasons from the object and thereby to be moved to Act is the part of the imperfect creature Reasoning properly is below God much more to be moved by extrinsick objective reasons Yet on this Ruiz disp 24. layeth a great fabrick and so men may draw twenty Schemes of Gods Reasonings as they variously fancy Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc 1. There are both Causes and Conditions of the event willed of God 2. Denominatione extrinseca ex connotatione objecti his Will is hence called Conditional meaning but a Volition of Conditionals 356. That God willeth Conditions and Conditional Propositions and Grants is past all controversies For he willeth his own word which is his work But his word hath conditional promises and threats And as his word also may be called his will he hath a Conditional will because a Conditional word 357. Gods eternal Omniscience proveth that at no instant he had a will properly Conditional quoad actum Because he that at the same instant fore-knoweth whether the Condition would be done or not must needs have his will to be thereby absolute But yet if it had pleased God to suspend the Act of his own Volition upon a humane Condition it would not have exposed him at all to the charge either of mutability or dependence which is very clear For 1. It is presupposed his Will as Voluntas Essentia is unalterable and is not that of which we speak 2. But only his Volition as terminated on this or that object and so as haec volitio
ab objecto denominata 3. And his efficient Volition and Power is terminated on objects in time without mutation in God 4. And N. B. that God doth suspend his own Possible Volitions in many cases As he doth Not will to make more Worlds more Men more Suns more Laws c. than de facto he will make 5. And it is no more defectiveness in God to suspend a Volition for a time than thus to do it for ever 6. And it is no more Dependence on the Creature to Terminate his Volition only on a qualified subject performing the Condition than to terminate his Efficient Power and will on such or such a qualified subject As e. g. He terminateth his Omnipotent Concurse for Generation only on the materia seminalis recte disposita He concurreth to burn by fire c. And if his Acts effectively Transient may be terminated only and temporarily on disposed objects If he did so in acts Objectively Transient and did freely not-will the damnation of man till he had actually sinned but suspended his will freely till then and then de novo terminated it on the said qualified object I see no shew of Dependence or Mutability For I oft cleared it before that the termination of Gods Knowledge Will or Power on any particular Object is in him no addition to its estence And doing it de novo is no change in him but in the Creature only no more than it would be a change in the Sun or its active Emanations if a thousand new creatures newly receive its Influx and are moved by it variously according to their several Conditions Yet I have before given reasons why incipere jam praedestinare is more incongruous language 358. I put in this only to deprecate the blind uncharitable censures of dissenters in this point who think that Gods Volitions are New and Conditional and suspended quoad actum hunc ad hoc objectum and cry out It is blasphemy and maketh God mutable and dependent I am against their opinion as well as you as to Conditional Acts But false charges prove you not to have more truth but less love and sobriety than others 359. XI The next distinction of Gods Will is into Effectual and Uneffectual And here he that would see a great deal said on the question Whether God have any uneffectual Will and whether mans will can frustrate it may see too much in a multitude of Schoolmen on 1 Sent. q. 45. 46. Some answer as D'Orbellis c. that the Voluntas Beneplaciti is Aq. a. 1. Scot. q. un Durand q. 1. Bonav art 1. Greg. Arim. q. un ar 3. Pennot l. 4. c. 22. Alvar. de Aux disp 32. Ruiz de Volunt disp 18. Gran. de Vol. Dei Tract 4. disp 3. Suar. l. 4. de Pradest c. 8. Gr. Val. disp 1. q. 19. p. 6. Cajct Nazar Ban. Zum Navar. Gonzal Molin Vasqu c. in 1. p. q. 19. ar 6. Ripa Arrub. Fasol ibid. Nic. D'Orbel 1. d. 46. and many other Scotists c. ever effectual but not the Vol. signi which yet seeing he well explaineth to be only the making of Duty he might well have said is still effectual to its proper primary effect Greg. Arimin and many others distinguish of the will of Complacency and Displicency and that Prosecutionis fugae and say the latter is effectual and not the former which others say of the Absolute Will as distinct from the Conditional The plain truth I have oft opened before Gods Will is the first Efficient the chief Dirigent and the Final Cause in which the three Principles Power Wisdom and Goodness are eminet 1. His efficient will is ever effectual and never frustrate Whatsoever pleased the Lord to do that he did in Heaven and in Earth in the Sea and in the depths Psal 135. 6. And who hath resisted this his will Rom. 9. 19. 2. His Directing will is ever effectual as to the making of the Law or Rule and of Due or Right thereby For so far it is efficient of that effect But it is too oft violated by our sin 3. His final will or Complacency is Gods being pleased with the Being or Action or relation of the Creature and supposing it is not efficient and therefore not effectual And I know no need of more upon this question 360. XII The last now to be named is The Antecedent and Consequent will This also is handled by many Schoolmen and much used by the Jesuits and Arminians To pass by others Pennottus handleth it propugn l. 4. c. 21. having first shewed c. 20. p. 225. that Chrysostom and Damascene first used it His explicatory Propositions are 1. Vol. Antec Chrys in Eph. Hom. 1. Damasâ— fid Orthod l. 2. c. 29. cont Manich. ad â—â—nem Cons non est in Deo respectu omnium Volitorum sed solum respectu â—orum quae aliquo modo pendent ex lib. arbitrio creaturae 2. Voluntas antecedens est illa qua Deus vult hominis salutem quantum in ipso est qua illum ad salutem ordinat media ad salutem necessaria praeparat quibus nisi per ipsum hominem steterit salutem assequatur 3. Non semper Voluntas antecedens Consequens circa objecta contraria versantur sed potest idem objectum esse Volitum à Deo Voluntate tum antecedente tum consequente 4. Voluntas antecedens in Deo est Voluntas beneplaciti non solum voluntas signi 5. Voluntas antecedens est formaliter Alliaco Camerac 1. q. 14. D. E. tells you the sense of Thom. Scotus Ockam Gregor of this distinction and that of Scotus and Ockam is to the same purpose with what I here say of it including that antecedent Grace which they call sufficient which God giveth to perswade men to consent The Schoolmen are disagreed of the sense of this distinction and not understanding it contend about it See Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 19. §. 2 3 4 5. p. 195 196 c. proprie in Deo existens non solum per metaphoram ad eum modum quo Voluntas signi 361. I tell you their sense that I may the better open the plain truth to you which is as followeth 1. This distinction of Vol. antec cons is not applyed to God as he is our Creator or End nor as he is meer Proprietor or Benefactor but only as he is Rector or Moral Ruler of man 2. As Government hath an Antecedent and Consequent part viz. Legislation and Judgement with Execution so Gods Antecedent will is nothing but his Legal will or his Will as Rector signified by his Laws And his Consequent will is his Judicial will or expressed in Judgement One Antecedent to Mans part obedience or disobedience and the other Consequent to it 3. It is most certain that God willeth Antecedently all that is in his Law that is that all that believe and repent shall be saved And that
a Means 2. Making one little parcel of that means to be the end 3. Inserting two acts or parts only of that which they themselves confess to be but Means For what should the names of Salvation and Damnation do in the description of the end Are they any part of the end Why is not Redemption Justification Sanctification Preservation Resurrection c. as well put in Is he not Glorified in them as well as in final salvation or damnation Yea and in Creation and the frâ—me of nature too Yea why is not the glory of Angels and all the world put in as part of the same means to his end 406. If it be said that it is only Gods Glory of Mercy and Justice in menâ— salvation and damnation which is the end of Redemption Conversion Preaching Ordinances Sanctification Adoption c. 1. I deny it His Power Wisdom and Goodness and his forementioned subordinate attributes are thereby Glorified also 2. It is an injury to God unworthy of a Divine to make God to have as many distinct ultimate ends as they think there are particular aptitudes or tendencies in the means 407. For undoubtedly we must feign in God no more ultimate ends than one And undoubtedly the means consisting of innumerable parts make up one perfect whole in which Gods Glory shineth so as it doth not in any part alone And he that will cut Gods frame into scraps and shreds and set up the parts as so many wholes will more dishonour him than he that would so mangle a Picture or a Watch or Clock or House or the pipes of an Organ or the strings of a Lute and tell you of their beauty and Harmony only distinctly Well therefore did Dr. Twisse reduce all the Decrees de mediis to one But they are one in their apt composition for one end And the Glory of Sun and Stars and Angels and the whole Creation is a part and the Glory of our salvation and damnation is but another part 408. The order therefore of Gods Decrees in respect of the Execution is onâ—y fit for our debate Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end and his Glory shining in the perfection of his intire works is the perfect means And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert And about this our Controversie is next to none at all Here we may well enquire what is prius vel posterius quid superius quid inferius c. and that to our edification 409. Seeing then that we are agreed as is said with Aquinas that * * * Ruiz de Voâ—â—n Dei disp 15. §. 4. p. 163. prettily argueth that Si non potest dari ratio ipsius â—olitionis divinae sed solius denominations extrinseâ—ae resultantâ—s ab eâ—â—â—â—lis creatâ—â— sequitur â—anas esse plurimaâ— Thâ—oâ—ogorum de ordine dependâ—â—tia vel ratione diviâ—â—â—um volitionum post quam inter illos constat quem ordinem dependentiam vâ—l rationâ—m habeant externa objecta inter se The conscquent is true They are vain indeed though he deny it And all his reasons p. 161 162 c. to prove that dantur iâ— creatâ—â—a rationes finales moventes divinam voluntatem are but triflings with the ambiguities of the word Ratio and abuses of the word Causa having before confessed that there is no Real Cause And are there Causes that are not Real 1. We grant the Creature is an Object of Gods will and the object is bâ— some called the material cause of the act in â—â—â—â—â—â—â—â— numero 2. It is the Terminus and Recipient of the divine influx 3. It may therefore â—e causa materialâ—s of the diversity of the effects of Gods influx as Received in patiente ex diâ—ersitate dispositions 4. Our acts may be the effects of Gods Volitions 5. And may be second Causes of other effects 6. Those other effects may be said to be Gods nearer ends speaking of him after the manner of imperfect man 7. Where our acts are not causes they may be conditions sine quibus non of many of Gods acts quoad effectus as sin is of punishment at least 8. In all these respects Gods Volition which is One in itself may and must be denominated divers from the diversity of these effects and objects which therefore are the Ratio nominâ—â— And he that would prove any other Ratio or Cause of the first Cause the will of God or any of his acts as in himself must first renounce all natural and Scholastical Theologie at least He citeth Durand Major Richardus c. But Durandus 1. d. 41. q. 1. doth but say that Gods Acts are thus to be reckoned secundum rationem as likening Gods reasoning or thoughts to ours ut n. 7. and not â—uxta rei veritatem Richard is full for what I say 1. d. 45. Voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur non est aliud Velle aliud Esse But yet his Velle hoc speaketh not his esse quà esse and therefore he addeth that when God is said scire aut velle it is his Essence but to say Hoc aut illud scit aut vult is but to say Hoc aut illud est subjectum scientiae vel voluntatis quae ipse Deus est Et Voluntas Dei est prima summa Causa omnium cujus Causa non est quaerenda non est diversa Voluntas sed diversa locutio de ea in Scripturis And Richardus in loc p. 141. saith but this that Ipsius divini Velle nulla est ratio motiva cum realiter idem sit quod Deus Tamen Ordinationis quae est inter divinum velle ipsum volitum bene est ratio aliqua respectu alicujus voliti Which is no more than I have said And as to Major Ruiz did ill to cite him who there professeth that Predestination and Volition is but Relatio rationis denominatio extrinseca as to God And his ordo signorum in mente divina is but the Scotists assimilating Gods acts to mans Deus non propter hoc vult hoc sed vult hoc esse propter hoc that which we have to do is but to enquire 1. De re how one thing is a Cause or other means of another 2. And so how God Decreed it to work and be 410. And 1. It is agreed that the Creation was Gods first work that we know of or have any thing to do with This had as to the first part no Antecedent Object but produceth its effect which some call its object But the latter dayes works had an antecedent object and also a produced effect And accordingly God Decreed from Eternity that this should be his first work From whence by connotation that may be called his first Decree 411. That sin or the Permission of sin or other meer Negatives are not to have place among the asserted Means and Decrees I am anon in due place to
damnationem How near is this to the other Joh. Scotus Duns See what Bishop Usher saith of this Scotus Erigena and Goteschalcus Petavius saith Idem à Caâ—olo Calvo unice dilectus erat See to this sense the Decrees Synodi Carisiacensis contra Gottâ—chaltum in 1 Tom. Concil Gallic p. 66. more Worlds more Creatures more Names c. when it is not possible that ever they should be unless he positively will and make them Yea if per impossible there were no God Nothing would be Nothing still To feign or call for a Divine Nolition to keep Nothing from becoming something is too presuming 480. 3. All those Schoolmen and Divines who tell us that every Will of God except his complacency and displicence is effective must needs be against a Positive Nolition of Nothings For that effecteth nothing If they say that they mean it only of Volitions and not of Nolitions I answer 1. Is not Gods Nolition a Velle non What is it but a Will that this or that shall not be 2. And in man as Volitions are for some Good so Nolitions are for the depulsion of some Evil But Indifferent-Nothings that are in esse imaginato neither Good nor Evil have no Volitions or Nolitions even in man 481. 4. Gods Will is his Essence variously denominated as variously terminated on the objects But Nothing is no object and so no termination of Gods Will and so no object to constitute an act in specie velindividuo by connotation or extrinsick denomination Therefore God is not to be said to Will it or Decree it If you say that it is something in the Idea of Gods Intellect I answer It is presumptuously asserted Who can prove or ought to feign that there is in God Idea's or Conceits of such nothings as never will be any thing in the forms of somethings For Nothing as nothing hath no form to be conceived of 482. Object Thus you deny Nothings as such to be known of God For if they cannot be the objects of his Nolitions then neither of his Knowledge Answ Properly Nothing as such is not an object of Knowledge at all But a Proposition de nihilo is But of this more anon 483. 5. Certainly God doth freely suspend or limit the Acts of his Power Therefore he may for ought we know that I say not It is certain that he doth suspend or limit the Acts of his Will God doth not make more Worlds nor more Men Birds Beasts Fishes Plants Stones Sands Atoms Names c. than are and will be He doth not sanctifie more than are and will be sanctified nor give more grace to the sanctified than ever they will have when he Could if he Would And when the Principles of the Divine Nature are Co-equal why should we say that he who undenyably suspendeth the possible acts of one freely suspendeth not the acts of the Free Principle the Will itself or is it like that one should be here active and not the other 484. 6. Positive Nolitions of Evil do seem in man to come from the Imperfection of his created nature As being Passive and Capable of or obnoxious to evil or in danger of it and so needeth defence against it and his Nolitions are the defensive and depulsive principle And though we must speak of God according to our mode we must say nothing needlesly which importeth weakness or passiveness or danger in him 485. * * * Again let the Reader note that my Cause lyeth not on this but because I have said so much of it I think meet to take notice of the most that is said against me Vasquez in 1. Tho. qu. 19. a. 3. disp 79. c. 3. doth purposely confute Scotus and affirmeth that Gods will is not to be conceived of as Negative quoad actum about any Negatives but that he hath a positive act of Nolition of every non-entity and non-futurum and so ut alibi hath infinite nolitions of infinite non-futures He himself confuteth their reason that say God is not in potentia ut velit and I need not answer it But he layeth all his cause on this as a demonstration and maketh it a very useful doctrine for the explication of reprobation that Quodcunque non esse creaturae cujuscunque referri potest ad divinam Voluntatem ut objectum appetibile quod ipsa velle possit Ponamus Deum velle rem aliquam non esse deinde ut dicatur negative se habere opus est variationem aliquam intrinsecam esse aut in Deo aut in rebus non futuris At non c. Voluntas autem Dei non necessario negative se debet habere quia illud non esse est appâ—tibile The summ is God can Positive Will non-entity ergo he doth And this is his All to which elsewhere he oft referreth us But let the sober Reader consider 1. He confesseth that Gods Will is his immutable and simple Essence and in it self is not at all diversified to or by objects but only extrinsecally denominated diversly so that all this is but de relatione nomint 2. And is it not presumption to frame a Logick of second notions and say This and not that is applicable to God as if it were to man when their Logical notions as to man himself are so arbitrary 3. He answereth none of the arguments to the contrary which I use Nil frustra must be feigned of creatures much less of God 4. We being agreed that whoever be in the right it inferreth no difference in God but in our denominations of his Will the seven cases here granted him may fully satisfie them that will so denominate Gods Will. 5. But in a Physical and proper sense I deny his supposition It is no Non-entity that is properly bonum appetibile though it may be Malum Bonum as well as Unum Verum are affectiones seu modi entis Et ubi non est Ens non est modus That which is not is not Good or appetibile Morally we say improperly It is good not to be sick not to have an enemy not to dye c. But we mean but 1. It is Good to live to be well to have all that good which an enemy would deprive us of and 2. That it is Evil to dye to be sick to have an enemy We say It s Good not to be erroneous wicked deprived of Heaven c. that is It is Good to know truly to be godly to be glorified and it is Evil to err to be wicked c. 6. Gods Will is considered either as 1. Efficient 2. Or as finally fulfilled and pleased As Efficient it cannot Will nothing for nothing is not made or caused And impeditâ—â— ut â—â—s fiat may be by effecting the hindering Cause And as final or as fulfilled and pleased Non-entity can properly be said to be but the not displeasing of it Nothing is no object of the Will though a Proposition or in men an oppositive thought be somewhat
properest sense of created Goodness because he cannot make it any other than what he willeth it to be But he might make it otherwise and might diversifie it and make particular creatures Better to themselves and one another which is a lower sense of Goodness But in all diversifications they would be still perfectly Agreeable to his Will and so be still equally Good or Best 10. The Goodness of the third rank of beings The Acts of Free-Agents is their Conformity to his Law or Governing Regulating Will. 11. God hath as Creator and Motor become the Voluntary Root or Spring of Nature and natural motion and accordingly stablished all second causes as natural agents under him and doth by them operate in a natural necessitating and constant way And this is antecedent to his Laws to free agents And this natural course of agency we must not expect that he should alter but rarely by miracles 12. Nothing is at enmity and Actively opponent to Gods natural agency or motion for else there should be something besides God and his works which he must overcome Though some natural motions may oppose each other yet all concurr to one end 13. Non-entity or Nothingness is not contrary to God as an opponent 14. Therefore seeing * * * * * * Saith Alliac Camerac 1. q. 12. a. 1. B. Reprobatio secundum aliquos est non-propositum dandi vitam aeternam Et ille dicitur Reprobatus secundum aliquos cui Deus non proposuit dare vitam aeternam Et postea Certum est de multis quod Deus non vult quod in bonis meritoriis perseverent Et non vult quod conditio impleatur Quia si vellet utique impleretur But he saith not Vult non impleri c. Gregorius non debuit inferre quod non misereri est effectus Reprobationis cum sit ipsa Reprobatio Id ibid. Nolle is not a meer Non velle but a Velle-non which is the war of the will against an opponent and the root of opposition ad extra it is an unmeet phrase to say that God doth Nil any Non-entity or any meer Natural opposition to him or that he Willeth any natural entity or motion which he effecteth not 15. But God being secondarily the Rector of free-agents and making them Laws to Rule their own Volitions and actions he doth by those Laws oblige their reason and will to restrain and resist some natural or sensitive appetites and inclinations and so to resist some natural motions of God in nature in which he is pleased to operate by second causes but in tantum and resistibly as a stronger natural motion may resist a weaker 16. And God doth by his grace and help internal and external assist them in that resisting agency which he obligeth them to 17. Therefore God may two wayes be said to resist his own natural motion by his Laws and by his assisting grace But his Laws contradict not one another 18. To God as meer Rector therefore two things may be said to be opponent 1. Such sensitive and natural inclinations and actions as are by Grace to be resisted 2. And all moral evil 19. And therefore as God may be said to Resist these so also first to Nill them And so to have Decrees against them 20. Gods Volitions and Nolitions here are his essential will denominated from the effects and objects And that effect of God from which he is said to Nill both these is as is said 1. His Laws 2. His grace or help And in this we are agreed 1. That he forbiddeth sin and commandeth us the restraint of appetites and senses c. 2. And that he helpeth us so to do Therefore the rest of the School-Controversies here that trouble the world are but logomachies about the Names of Nolitions and Nolitive Decrees 21. The thing properly willed by God in a Law is but the debitum the duty of the subject to do what is commanded and not to do what is forbidden 22. It is not a meer non-agency that is meant by a prohibition but a positive nolition of the subject restraining him from the forbidden act And all proper moral obedience or disobedience Good or Evil is primarily in the will and no further secondarily in the exteriour act or restraint than as they are Voluntary and in non-agency but in a third sense or instance as the consequent of nolition and the refraining act 23. If any therefore will say in this sense that God doth positively Nil the forbidden Act and so will a non-entity sub ratione mali moralis in this remote sence we will not contradict him but say as he 24. And accordingly we may say that God hath a positive Decree of non-entities or against moral evil where non-agency is loco materiae that is in tantum so far as to do all that he doth against it but not absolutè ne eveniat ubi evenit 25. But we may not therefore speak so unaptly as to say that he willeth positively all or any non-entity or non-futurity of meer naturals that are non-futura 26. Therefore we may much less say it of his own Natural Impeditions that he positively willeth non-impedire ubi non impedit For he is not to be thought of as a restrainer of himself by Law or self-opposition It is enough to say that non-vult impedire 27. Much less may we say that positively vult non velle-impedire lest we make another Velle necessary to that Velle and so in infinitum â—annes in 1. q. 23. a. 3. p. 2â—â— confeâ—â—eth that the sense of all this question is but which way God who is one pure act unvaried about all varieties is most conveniently to be mentioned by us and that Deus respectâ— culpae quae futura â—â—at in reprobiâ— non habuit aâ—â—um voluntatis affirmatiâ—um quo voluerit esse pecâ—ata aâ—â— illos pâ—ccaturos Whence it followeth that All futures or existents are not positively willed Even the formale pâ—â—cati is quid â—uturum But he thinks it most fit to say that God positively willeth the permission of sin 1. Because it is Good Ansâ—r Nothing is â—â—â—ther Good nor bad 2. Bâ—â— ause else the difference between the predestinate and reprobate would not fall under providence Answ As if giving that grace to onâ— which is not given to another made no diffeâ—â—â—â—e 3. Because else â—n would come by chaâ—â—â—e as to Gods foreknowledge Answ As if nothing would not be nothing without a positive dâ—â—râ—e that it shall be nothing or God could not know a nothing or a crime as such so far as it is quid intellectâ—i perfeâ—â—â—â—imâ— intelligibile without positive willing it How then knoweth he the foâ—male peccati 28. It is proper to say that Deus non vult permittere peccatum ubi id non permittit and that vult permittere aliquid indifferens quod per legem positive permissum est quia permissio ista est quid positivum 29. After the manner of men
blessing and felicity To predetermine the will physically is to end that Liberty to that particular act which consisted partly in being undertermined But that Liberty which consisteth in deliverance from all true evil is increased by such a Gracious predetermination And therefore Jansenius pleadeth only for the necessity of predetermination to Good by medicinal Grace and not to Evil or meer Natural actions Yet we say that even to Good God can procure the will to determine it self by moral means which infinite Wisdom can sufficiently improve But it is only 1. A natural power to act without predetermination from God or Others 2. And a Liberty of Condition from all predetermination ab extra to evil from God or Creatures which I here assert and plead for in this cause 564. 8. Much less do we take the Will from under the Power and Government of God For 1. It could have no self-determining Power but of God one moment 2. He giveth it this power to make us capable subjects of Moral Sapiential Government 3. He giveth us Governing Laws accordingly 4. And he attaineth all his Ends and fulfilleth all his Will as perfectly in consistency with our power and freedom as if we had none such at all so that God hath his proper Will whether men Will or not 565. But the turning point of difficulty here is Whether God is ever Causa partialis and if we so make him is it not injurious to his perfect operations All our Controversies turn upon the decision of this one question See the End For if we may conceive of God as Scotus speaketh like one that draweth at the same Ship with another and the act of both must concurr to the effect then all is easie and we may say when men Love not God repent not believe not c. that God did his part but the sinner did not his and so the effect failed As if a Father did resolve that he will help I remember one derideth John Goodwin for this similitude or the like Mr. Roborough his little Child to lift up a weight and will put to nine hundred ninety nine parts of the strength that is necessary but no more because the Child shall do something one part to shew his willingness and obedience Here if the thing be done it is the Father that deserves nine hundred ninety nine parts of the praise If it be undone the Child only doth deserve the blame But we have more to say 566. Note therefore 1. That here the Child hath in himself a Power independent on his Father and therefore the whole effect is not to be ascribed to the Father But man hath no Power but of God and what he holdeth yea and useth in dependence on him And therefore the praise of all his Power and his Acts as Acts are due to God 2. And all the good Inclinations of his will and all the Laws promises perswasions threatnings mercies afflictions examples convictions which tend morally to turn his will are from God so that in every good Volition or action man doth no more than God did both enable him command him perswade him and help him to do and so procure the actual determination of his will So that de re we see how much God doth alwayes besides that Grace may sometimes for ought I know otherwise predetermine And we see what man doth And all that you can desire more is that no man that doth any good act should be able at that instant not to do it or to do otherwise and then it must follow that no man that omitteth a good act or that sinneth could do otherwise which are false * * * Molina maketh God Causam partialem 1. p. q. 14. a. 3. disp 6. Sotus li. 2. Phys disput de causis denyeth it And Zumel disputeth against it in Disp in 1 2. Thom. p. 43. Concl. 2. And so do many others And great diversity here is among them while some affirm and some deny but none of us understand the mysterie of divine concurse So that here is only the lis de nomine left An Deus sit Causa partialis I think it fittest to say that he is Causa totalis of his own Act and of the effect as it is an Act and of all that is laudable in it too for the reasons aforesaid But yet he is not the Causa sola nor in that sense totalis of the Moral specification as if when he giveth his Creature a Power of choosing or refusing freely it could not be done without his further physical predetermination 567. And under favour I take the name Causa partialis to be improper and that it should properly be called Pars Causae For when divers concurr in efficiency all make but one proper efficient Cause †††So say Ockam and Gabriel Biel though Zumel call it a most improper mode of speaking because so no one Cause could be called Total And why should it if it be not except that God is above our order and so not a Part. Bonavent in 1. dis 38. q. 2. inquit Futurum triplex est Quoddam est cujus Deus est tota Causa ut Creata Quoddam cujus Creatura aut Voluntas est Tota Causa ut sunt defectus peccata Quoddam cujus Deus Creatura simul sunt Causa ut sunt opera naturalia moralia quia Deus cooperatur creaturae Respeâ—â—u primi futuri Divina praescientia est tota causa secundi non causa tertii est Causa sed non tota Gab. Biâ—l in 2. d. 37. bringeth in Scotus saying Licet Deus Volendo causat omnia quae causat non tamen ideo est Causa totalis quia vult etiam secum concurrere alias causas utrumque vult effectus esse secum concurrere Causas secundas non diversis sed una Volitione nec unum plus alio sed aeque utrumque simul Et nulla Creatura est Causa totalis Quia semper concurrit Deus ut Causa partialis Et ad dub 2. ex Greg. Arim. Nobiscum â—anquam Causa partialis producit actum malum Gregor Arim. his words are in 2. d. 34. a. 3. Actus mali quem efficit Peccator Deus est immediata Causa Partialis tamen co-efficiens actum eundem Of Greg. Arim. see more in the conclusion of this Chapter Now I suggest to the Learned Reader that is against me How he will decide the forementioned hard question Whether there be more Entity in God and the Creature than in God alone It is dangerous saying Yea or Nay and we know not well what to say But for my part as I said I will not say that God is Pars Entitatis nor yet that the Creature is not Ens nor yet that it is God But the solution must be either from the Equivocation of Entity or from the Creatures Inexistence in God or from somewhat rather which I know not And
soever that God is not the Cause of sin except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia whom the Synod of Dort rejected Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod Beza himself in Rom. 8. 28. passim abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin Yea more very much more than wicked men or Devils are which is not true 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved predetermined Cause of the Act of Volition and Execution whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin His saying Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin when they are committed which they would not be without the Law 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat and is the first predetermining Cause even the total Cause of all that is in the act and all its circumstances without which predetermination it could not be So that man doth but will what God first willeth and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act as the pen in my hand 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result and hath no other cause 579. And note here what Estius before cited after Aquinas saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat is all that the Sinner himself doth when he willeth sin And therefore it 's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin and willing the event futurity and existence of it ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction For he willeth sin who willeth the existence of it or that it be or come to pass 580. And note that it is both matter and form Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat For it is sin And forma dat nomen It is not sin but by the form of sin But if they had said otherwise it had been all one For he that willeth the fundamentum relate and correlate Saith Twisse Vindic. Graâ— li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. Posito quod velit perâ—ectiones istas manifestare necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati sed permittat 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws and Illuminating men to know them without execution by the occasion of sin 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical should not give so much to sin which were it a means as it is not but a Passive and opposite occasion is but a moral means And himself saith page 136. Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi â—inem à Deo praefixum At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae sive justitiae Media enim ejus sunt naturae ut ad ea facienda movâ—atur quis ex intentione finis Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium as stone and Timber to an House And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae it is not so to Christs Rather if a beggar Want a house is that Want the Materia domus no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propriâ— dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordiâ— sive iâ—stitiâ— potiâ—s quam medium Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this 2. Permission it self is nothing being but non-impedire And is nothing or non-agere a proper means But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed that it is the Permission of sin and not the sin that is the Divine medium only one saith Praedestinationis and the other providentia And yet they will differ while they agree And I that differ from both would agree with both willeth the Relation 581. There is nothing left to be said then but that God willeth that sin be done but not as sin or because it is sin But this is nothing For 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination or for seeming good 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God so doing is but one of their sins which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it and predetermined them to it so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice and so do not wicked men but for wicked ends or in enmity to God I answer That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente non faciente Answ The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law And why then do they put in the word permittente Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do but only permit when they mean no such thing For that is my second reason against them 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin which is false For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause he cannot be said to Permit To do a thing and
it 's clear 1. That in the first case the Motion will be if it be not hindered But that it is not caused by not-hindering it but by its proper moving causes In the second case the consequence of futurity is false And where the inclinations to good and evil that is to superiour and inferiour prohibited good are equal yea though antecedently somewhat unequal Yet bare permission ascertaineth not futurity 3. Much less in the third case where the soul must have positive help or provocation Sure he did not think that all or any ungodly men would infallibly Love God if God did but Permit them But Gods Permitting or not hindering sin may respect divers acts 1. Iâ— God continue not his natural support man will be no man but be aâ—â—â—â—lated and so will neither do good nor evil 2. If God uphold mans nâ—ture in its Integrity as it was in Adam and give him not Moral means and helps of Grace and his natural concurse Adams sin would have necessarily followed 3. If God give Adam both such support and means to stand and do no more Gods permission would not have inferred the certainty of Adams sin when he fell any more than before For God withdrew no grace from him which was necessary to his standing 4. Iâ— God give a lapsed sinful man Nature and common grace it followeth not necessarily because God doth no more that he will commit every sin that he is not further hindered from but it 's certain that he will not do the works to which special grace is necessary 5. If God give to the faithful the Holy Spirit and continue his influx necessary to the continuation of the Power and Habits of holy actions with necessary means and do no more this man will do some good and some evil and though he may be equally said to be Permitted to do this sin as another yet he may do one and not another 6. God totally permitteth no man to sin but hindereth them many wayes though he hinder not all alike 7. It 's possible for two men to have equal helps to duty and equal hinderances to sin or the same man at several times and yet for one to do the duty and forbear the sin and the other to commit the sin and omit the duty As many Schoolmen have copiously proved Yet in this case Permission would be the same thing to both But if you use the word Permission as connoting the Event then indeed you may say that the event from another cause will follow And Gods non-impedition will ab eventu actionis be extrinsecally denominated Permission in the one case and not in the other But this is but from your arbitrary use of the word 615. Next the Doctor assaulteth Durandus who thus argueth Gods will followeth only his approving Knowledge But he knoweth not sin approvingly being of purer eyes c. He answereth 1. God approveth that sin be though he approve not sin 2. God willeth the manifestation of his mercy and justice Ergo he willeth the existence of sin as that which is necessarily required to it To which I reply 1. The first answer is unproved and false God approveth not that sin be If he did few wicked men do more as Estiâ—s saith For it is not sin as sin or evil that they will but that it be for other ends which seem good 2. He phraseth it with his ad quâ—d necessario c. as if God first willed this manifestation of his Justice c. as the end and then sins existence as the means yea the necessary means But this is false as I have fully shewed 1. And his own opinion should confute it that maketh one Decree only de mediis And this particular Manifestation being some Acts of God and not God himself â—or the Complacency of his Will must needs be part of the media ad finem â—â—timum 2. And indeed sins existence is not a necessary means willed for â—ods glory but it is a presupposed mischief our Deliverance from which â—â— punishment for it is willed for his glory It is indeed necessary but â—â—ly necessitate existentiae in esse praecognito as a foreseen evil and so preâ—pposed to those acts of God which are the Means of his glory Therefore his assertion of a Notitia approbationis rei tanquam Bonae in â—nere Conducibilis etsi non honesti is detestable 616. Ibid. p. 196. He again saith that Though it be dishonest in the â—eature to sin because forbidden it is not dishonest in God to will that he â—â— it by his permission it being unice conducibile to his glory â—nsw 1. Fie upon this conducibile and unicè too 2. Fie upon this oft â—peated permittente non efficiente It is utterly lusory or immodest â—or a man that maintaineth that no sinner doth any thing in sinning but â—hat God as the first total cause predetermined his will to even as to all â—e entity in act and circumstances imaginable and that in all omissions â— was a natural Impossibility to have done one omitted act without this â—edetermining premotion And for the man that in the next saith that â—alum non est Objectum Volentis aut facientis but ipsa effectio rei I â—y for this man yet to say that the creature effecteth sin and God effecteth â— not is too too gross The common evasion is that sin is not any â—â—ing and therefore not effectible But why then do they say that the â—eature effecteth it when they have said and defended that the creaâ—re doth nothing but what God doth and what he unavoidably maketh â—â—m do 617. Durandus argueth that Sin cannot be judged convenient by a â—â—ght understanding Ergo not by God The Doctor answereth That â—es own sin cannot be judged convenient but anothers may He inâ—anceth 1. When a man willeth that an Usurer lend him money on usury â— When a Christian Prince willeth a Turk to swear to a League by Maâ—â—met 3. When God willed that Absalom should defile his Fathers Concuâ—nes And he addeth that for us to sin is contrary to our right reaâ—â—n because it is forbidden and hurtful to us But for God to will that â—e sin is not contrary to his right reason as not forbidden or hurtful â— him Repl. 1. No man should will unlawful usury He that willeth to Borâ—â—w though he cannot have it without usury doth not will the usury â—ut the money non-obstante usura As he that chooseth to travell with Blasphemer rather than to go alone in danger he doth not will his â—lasphemy but his company non obstante blasphemia 2. The same is to â—e said of swearing by Mahomet It is only the Oath as an Oath that is â—â— be willed and not as by Mahomet that is not willed but unwillingly â—â—dured 3. Absaloms instance is answered before God willed only â—avids punishment and the Passive Constupration as an effect of sin â—n a foresight of Absaloms active Volition and sin and not as
Holiness The Holiness of Christs Humane Nature and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators as is his Works of Mercy and Justice And Gods glory shineth as much in them And it is the glory of his Goodness if not of Mercy which preventeth sin and misery yea and of Mercy too For though mercy relate to misery it is as well to possible misery prevented as to existeâ—â— misery removed And if he speak not of Subjects but Proprietors the Boâ—um Creaturae is also Creatoris SECT XIX The same doctrine in Rutherford de providentia confuted 625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digression of Dr. Twisse which is contrary to the commonest doctrine of Protestants and The summ of their opinion I think soundeth not well in Christians ears The summ of which is this Neither God nor Devil do will sin as it is evil but God is the first willer of its existence because it is in its own nature summe unice conducibile to the manifestation of his Justice and mercy And willing and Loving being all one in God he thus singularly Loveth the existence of sin above its contrary holiness for this end And by Predetermining premotion which he much more largely writeth for elsewhere he causeth as the first total Cause all that man Causeth But it is sin in man because forbidden him but not in God because not forbidden him And therefore God is not to be said to cause sin though he cause all that is caused but to permit it because he causeth it not in himself nor is he to be called a Deficient cause of our omissions because he is not bound to Actuate us but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cause because he is under an obliging Law Though God made that Law And though he can no more than a stone act without physical predetermination nor forbear acting when so acted yet he is to be called free because he is actually willing or his will doth act and because he is predetermined by none but God This is the true sence of their opinion as opened by themselves I shall now briefly consider what Rutherford saith to the same sence 626. Cap. 15. pag. 186. To Annatus charging Twisse as denying Gods permission of sin because he maketh him the * * * Nec omnino negari potest Voluntatem Dei esse Causam rerum omnium quas fieri velit Twiss recitante etiam Rutherf de Prov. c. 15. p. 186. See all their Reasons for Gods causing sin or willing its existence answered by Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 26. p. 262 263 264 265. As also against Gods predetermining to the immediate materiale peccati disp 27. p. 270 c. disp 28 29 30 c. usque ad p. 580. As to the common saying that God willeth not sin as sin all men will confess Dr. Twiss often that neither doth a wicked man do so Peccans ut sic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod est formale in peccato seu carentiam conformitatis sed intendit actum ut est in genere moris inquit Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319. I will not conceal a more difficult argument than most of theirs which may occurr to others God caused e. g. in Nathanaâ—l Peter c. this act of saith before Christs coming the Messiah is to come hereafter When Christ was come this was false and so evil God still caused the faith which he gave them Therefore he caused an untrue belief and evil and that supernaturally But I answ 1. God caused the habit of their faith and the act The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations and in special A belief in the promised Messiah The termination of the act on the Messiah as future rather than as Incarnate required nothing positive in the Habit The same Habit served to both acts unless the latter being for the nobler act had some addition but the former needed none 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumstance no more was necessary but 1. Gods word Christus venturus est 2. And Gods influx on the habited faculty to cause it to act according to that habit So that when God had reversed that word Christus venturus est he was no longer the cause determining the mind to believe that word but only the cause that the habit of faith was still towards Christ But not at all sub ratione venturi For the determining word was called in and it was an imperfection not to know so much where it was not a sin Cause of the Act the Liberty and the Prohibition and to Cause is not to Permit he hath no better answer than to say that God doth not permit the Act nor the Evil of the Act but he permitteth the evil act and 2. To say that the Dominicans and Jesuits hold the same as he Which is to jest with holy things and not to argue As if he said God made neither the soul nor the body and yet he made the man What! is it as it 's said that non animased unio est vita so Doth God permit the Union of Actum and Malâ—m No that he pretendeth not 627. To prove that God willeth the existence of sin he bringeth the instance of Joseph's case Gen. 45. To which I say that the text saith not at all that God willed the Will or Act or Sin of Joseph's brethren but only the Venditio passiva or effect and the consequents Nay only the consequents are mentioned in the Texts His replyes to the answers prove no more than the five things which I before asserted about sin Nothing so much deceiveth them as not distinguishing between the sinful act and the effect or passion when they are called by the same name as Selling Killing c. 628. His next instance is of Christs death of which I said enough before But 1. He understandeth his adversaries as ascribing only the Consequents of Crucifixion to Gods will which is his mistake It is Crucifixion it self passivè sumpta which they ascribe to it some of them at least And let men too wise against God deride it as much as they will God can will and Love that Christ be Crucified and yet hate and not will the will and act of the Crucifiers but only foresee it as aforesaid And let them jeer God as Idle or asleep if he neither will nor effectually nill the sin we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty which they so deride 2. And whereas he addeth that Active Verbs are used as Gen. 45. Misit me Deus Isa 53. Deus voluit eum conterere Zech. 13. Ego percutiam Pastorem and God delivered Christ to death I answer It is too too gross to perswade us hence that any of these Texts say that God willeth the sinners will or Act. God sent me speaketh Gods act that is his disposal
Rutherfords charge of Camero and his followers in France Amyraldus c. with Semipelagianism and Arminianism and filthy opinions it is but the effect of the good mans overweening and conceitedness of his own apprehensions which must be allowed or endured in most of these contenders And the fruits of such disputes is like to be little better But the worthy praises of Blondel Dallaeus Placeus Capellus Amyraldus Testardus c. shall survive such reproach And a thousand pitties it is to read a good man Voluminously proving God to be a Willer of sins existence and a prime-predetermining Cause of all prohibited Volitions and acts and reproaching the Jesuits Lutherans Arminians and Socinians as the great enemies of Gods Providence for denying this As if he would tempt the World to think that Socinians were in the right and that Jesuites Lutherans and Arminians were the only defenders of the Holiness of God whilst Calvinists made him the Lover of all the sin in the World as the most appetible conducible Medium to his Glory 649. But to proceed his next Argument is cap. 23. Sin conferreth something to the splendor ornament and plenitude of the Universe Eâ—go See Bonavent well confuting this in 1. d. 46. q. 3. Malum fieri nullatenus bonum esse sed bene occasio boni God willeth its existence This is answered before The antecedent is utterly unproved Sin addeth nothing to the ornament or perfection of the World His word is no proof 650. Afterwards he heapeth up many frivolous arguments against that which he calleth reproachingly The Idle Permission of sin and saith that it frustrateth the prayers of the Saints and their patience their gratitude trust hope fear joy alloweth the arrogance of the persecuters fighteth with Gods Wisdom Clemency Justice Providence with the Ministry of the Word the Promises Threatnings with Ministers confirming â—â—â— against sufferings and it is blasphemously injurious to God and contrary to the order of things in the world that he should permit sin and not will the being of it Resp What is it that a man yea a pious man in a blind zeal of God and self-conceit may not pour out confident words for What a case is the poor Church in when the unlearned people must be on both sides charged by their Teachers with blasphemy what way ever they go This man will tell them that they are * * * Pag. 370. blasphemous and overthrow all reason and Religion if they say that God only Permitteth sin and doth not himself will the being of it and move unavoidably all wills and tongues and hands to all the blasphemies persecutions and murders that are done and damn men for it when he hath done And others will as confideâ—â—ly say that he is a Blasphemer for charging God to be much more the cause of all forbidden acts of wickedness than Devils and men are and theâ— damning them for it and for putting God into the shape of the Devil and painting him odious to humane nature that man may not love him What shall poor people think when they are thus torn and tormented by their holy Guides But all his arguments are before answered when I shewed him how many wayes God hath to secure the Effects and Events in the world and attain all his Ends and yet only Permit and neither Will nor Love nor Cause the sin 651. Cap. 26. he cometh to plead for Predetermination and saith p. 385. God predetermineth us to the Act of hating God in linea meâ—â— physica non morali Meer delusory words He maketh it by the Law of Nature a sin to hate him and then he maketh men hate him â—â— linea physica non morali as if the moral sinfulness resulted not from the Law and act that is here from Nature it self viz. of the Man and act both which God made 652. Pag. 386. he saith that Directa expressa efficax Dei Vâ—litio qua Vult ut sit seu fiat actus Dei odii non facit Deum Malitia qâ—â— I confess Gab. Biel in 2. d. 37. speaketh too like these several atheological assertions as do many others per accidens sequitur actum authorem Resp But that per accidens is no reason of the denyal if God cause that accident also as the first cause If he make a Law and make the forbidden act the relation of sinfulness is an Accident indeed but ariseth from the said fundamentum so necessarily that it cannot be otherwise But it should have made a holy Divine to tremble to have said that God directly expresly and effectually willeth mens Act of hating God viz. that it exist or be 653. And it is false that he saith that God is equally the Cause that men hate him if he will the Act hypothetically ineffectually and determiâ—ably by anothers will as if he willed it efficaciously And so when he maketh the Doctrine of Universal Concurse and Causation as guilty as â—is predetermining pre-motion As if God could not make man a free-â—iller and agent and as the spring of Nature enable him and concurr â—o his Act as an Act in genere without causing it to terminate on the forbidden object in specie As if it were impossible for the Sun to be â—n universal cause of the stinking of a Dunghill and Weed without being â—he special or as if God must be made the cause of every blasphemy unless â—e will make the blasphemer speechless and of every villany unless he will strike men dead to prevent it This is not reverent and holy judging of the most holy God the Judge of all 654. The summ of all his Vindication of God from being the chief Author of all sin pag. 387. passim is but this one reason God is under no Law But if this be all why do you not speak out what you mean but hold that which you dare not name viz. That God is the chief So Bannes in 1. q. 23. â— 3. p. 270 271. Voluntas hominis malâ— est quia exercet actum odii Dei sine regula rationis immo contra legem Dei Deus autem bona vol untate vult fieri illum actum permittens defectum Causâ— secundâ— in ipso ut inde aliquod majus bonum faciat which is true of the act in genere but not as it is Odium Dei. For so if he will it and cause it he doth more than permit and the defectus Causae secundae is that very odium as against God And doth God cause the greatest sin that he may do good by it He can do as much good without causing the evil â—nsuperable cause of all the sin of Devils and men for which he damneth â—hem and that both as to the matter and form but yet thus to do is no sin in God himself because he is under no Law This is your most â—lain undoubted sense or else your Book is non-sense What need we then any further enquiry what you hold It is
case 661. I intreat the Reader that is inclining to any extreams but to read â—over first those short answers of Prosper ad Capitulâ— Gallorum and ad Objectiones Vincent And most of the Sententiae de Capit. I shall think it worthy my labour to recite to force them on the Readers observation and let him see the highest old Doctrine of Gods Decrees Sent. 1. Whoever saith that by Gods Predestination as by fatal necessity men compelled into sins are constrained to death is not a Catholick For Gods Predestination doth by no means make men bad nor is the cause of any mans sin Sent. sup 2. He that saith that the Grace of Baptism received doth not take away Original sin from them that are not predestinated to life is not a Catholick For the Sacrament of Baptism by which all sins He meaneth that those that sincerely covenanted with God in Baptism were truly pardoned though he thought some of them fell away and perished are blotted out is true even in them who will not remain in the truth and for them that are not predestinated unto life Sent. sup 3. He that saith that they that are not predestinated to life though they were in Christ regenerated by Baptism and have lived piously and justly it profitteth them nothing but they are so long reserved till they fall to ruine and they are not taken out of this life till this happen to them as if the ruine of such men were to be referred to Gods constitution is not a Catholick For God doth not therefore prolong the time of any mans age that by long living he should fall to ruine and in his long living fall from the right â—aith seeing long life is to be numbered with the gifts of God by which a man should be better and not worse Sent. sup 4. He that saith that all are not called to Grace if he speak of such as Christ is not declared to is not to be reprehended Sent. sup 5. He that saith that they that are called are not equally called but some that they might believe and some that they might not believe as if to any man the Vocation were the cause of his not believing saith not right For though faith be not but by Gods Gift and Mans Will yet Infidelity is by mans will alone Sent. 6. He that saith that Pree-will in Man is Nothing but it 's Gods predestination which worketh in men whether it be to good or to evil is not a Catholick For Gods Grace doth not abolish mans choice or free-will but perfecteth it and revoketh and reduceth it into the way from error that that which was bad by its own liberty may by the operation of Gods Spirit be made right And Gods predestination is alwayes in Good which knoweth how either to pardon with the praise of mercy or punish with the praise of Justice the sin which is committed by mans will alone Sent. 7. He that saith that God for this cause giveth not Perseverance to some of his Children whom he regenerated in Christ to whom he gave faith hope and Love because by Gods fore-knowledge and predestination they were not differenced from the mass of perdition If he mean that God endowed these men in Goodness but would not have them remain in it and that he was the cause of their tâ—rning away he judgeth contrary to the Justice of God For though Gods Omnipotence could have given the grace of standing to them that will fall yet his grace doth not first forsake them before they have forsaken it And because he foresaw that they would do this by a Voluntary desertion therefore he had them not in the Election of Predestination Sent. 8. He that saith that God would not have all men saved but a certain number that are predestinate speaketh hardlier of the altitude of Gods unsearchable grace than he should speak Who would have all men to be saved and to come to the acknowledgement of the truth and fulfilleth the purpose of his will on them whom being foreknown he predestinated and being predestinate he called being called he justified and being justified he glorified Losing nothing of the fulness of the Gentiles and of all the seed of Israel for whom the eternal Kingdom was prepared in Christ before the foundation of the World For all the World is chosen out of all the World And out of all men all men are adopted So that they that are saved are therefore saved because God would have them saved and they that perish do perish because they deserve to perish Sent. 9. He that saith that our Saviour was not Crucified for the Redemption of the whole World looketh not to the Virtue of the Sacrament that is Sacrifice but to the part or participation of the unbelievers When as the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ is the Price of the whole World From which Price they are Aliens who being either delighted in their Captivity will not be redeemed or when they are redeemed return again to the same Captivity For the Word of the Lord falleth not nor is the redemption of the World evacuated For though the World in the vessels of wrath knew not God yet the World in the vessels of mercy knew him Which God without their preceding Merits took out of the power of darkness and translated into the Kingdom of the Son of his Love Sent. 10. He that saith that God substracteth from some the preaching of the Gospel lest perceiving the preaching of the Gospel they should be saved may decline the envy of the objection by the paâ—â—onage of our Saviour himself who would not work Miracles with some that he saith would have believed had they seen them And he forbad his Apostles to preach to some people and now suffereth some Nations to live without his Grace Sent. 11. He that saith that God by his Power compelleth men to sin is deservedly reprehended For God who is the Author of Justice and Goodness and all whose Statutes and Commands are against sin is not to be thought to compell any to sin and precipitate them from innocency into crimes But if there be any of so profound impiety as that they are reckoned to be beyond the remedy of correction they receive not an increase of their iniquity from God but are made â—â—â—â— by themselves because they deserved to be left of God and given up to themselves and to deceivers for their former sins that so their sin should be a punishment of their sin Sent. 12. He that saith that obedience is withdrawn from some that are called and live piously and righteously that they may cease to obey doth think ill of Gods Goodness and Justice as seeming to constrain the godly to ungodliness and to take away good mens innocency from them When as He is the Giver and Keeper of godliness and innocency He therefore that adhereth to God is acted by the Spirit of God but he that departeth from God doth fall from his obedience
at his left hand shall be damned because he executed not Gods will but his own Obj. 11. When incest is committed between Fathers and their Daughters Mothers and their Sons it is therefore done because so God fore-decreed that it should be done or come to pass Resp †††Let the Dominicans not◠this If it were objected to the Devil himself that he is the author and incenter of such villanies I think that with some reason he might discharge himself of the envy and overcome the committer of such wickedness by his own willing of them Because though he be delighted with the madness of sinners he can yet prove that he forced them not to sin With what folly and madness then is that ascribed to God which may not be wholly ascribed to the Devil who is but the adjutor of the baits of sin and not the Causer Generater of the Will God then fore-decreed not that any such businesses should be done nor prepared that soul to any such end who will live wickedly and filthily But he was not ignorant that it would be such and he fore-knew that he would justly judge of such So that to his fore-decree nothing else can be referred but either 1. That which belongeth to the due retribution of Justice 2. Or to the not due bestowing of grace Obj. 12. That by Gods fore-decree men are made of Children of God to be Children of the Devil and of Temples of the Holy Ghost the Temples of Devils and of members of Christ members of a Harlot Resp Gods Predestination though to us while we are in the perils of this life it be uncertain with him is unchangeable But those of whom it is said They went out from us because they were not of us did willingly go out and willingly fall away And because they were foreknown to be such as would fall away they were not predestinate But they had been Predestinated if they had been such as would have returned and remained in holiness and truth So that Gods fore-decree is to many a cause of standing and to none a cause of falling Obj. 13. That all those faithful and Saints who are fore-decreed to eternal death when they return to their vomit seem indeed to do it by their own vice but the cause of that vice is the fore-decree of God which secretly withdraweth from them good wills Resp Indeed to all that relapse from faith to infidelity from Holiness to filthiness and are not purged by emendation before the end of their lives nothing but eternal death is due But it is wickedness to ascribe the cause of such ruines to God who though he foreknow by his eternal knowledge what reward he will give to every mans deserts yet this his Impossibility of being deceived doth not bring into any man either a necessity or a will * * * Note this you that are for his first predetermining all forbidden Volitions and acts of sinning If therefore any man fall from Godliness he is carryed headlong by his own will he is drawn by his own concupiscence he is deceived by his own perswasion There the Father doth nothing the Son doth nothing the Holy Ghost doth nothing nor doth any thing of the will of God intervene in such a business by whose help we know many are kept from falling but none impelled to fall Obj. 14. That this great part of Christian faithful Catholicks and Saints who are fore-decreed to ruine and perdition if they beg of God perseverance in Holiness shall not obtain it Because Gods decree cannot be changed by which he fore-ordained prepared and fitted them to fall away Resp To the breach of the Law to the neglect of Religion to the corrupting of discipline to the forsaking of the faith to the perpetrating of any sin whatever there is no predestination or fore-decree of God at all Nor can it be that men should fall into such evils by him by whom men rise out of such If therefore men live in holiness if they profit in virtue if they remain in good studies it is the manifest gift of God without whom the fruit of no good work is acquired But if men fall away from these and pass over to vice and sin God there sendeth them no evil temptation nor doth he forsake him that will fall away before he be forsaken by him And for the most part he keepeth men from forsaking him or if they depart doth cause them to return But why he upholdeth one and not another it is neither possible to comprehend †††N. B. nor lawful to search seeing it may suffice to know both that it is of him that men stand and it is not of him that they fall away Obj. 15. That all the faithful and Saints who are predestinated to eternal death when they fall are so disposed of by God that they neither can nor will be delivered by repentance Resp Falsly said and foolishly For they that fall away from faith and holiness as they fell by their Wills so by their Wills they rise not But God taketh the way of amendment from none not depriveth any of the possibility of good For he that turneth himself from God taketh from himself both the will and the power of good It 's no good consequence as the Objecters think that God taketh away repentance from men because he giveth it them not and that he casteth down those that he taketh not up For it is one thing to act the innocent into a crime which God cannot do and another not to pardon the Criminal which is the desert of sin Obj. 16. That this great part of the faithful and holy which is fore-decreed to eternal death when they pray to God in the Lords prayer Let thy will be done do only pray against themselves viz. that they may fall and be ruined because it is the will of God that they perish by eternal death Resp The Truth saith not this that it is the will of God that the faithful and Saints do fall from faith and innocency and perish But Truth saith This is the will of the Father that sent me that of all that he hath given me I should lose none But if by the generality of Vocation and the abundance of Gods goodness even those that will not persevere are mixt with the persevering when these fall away from Godliness they fall not or are not forsaken of Gods help but of their own wills nor are impelled to fall nor cast off that they may forsake but yet are fore-known to fall away by Him that cannot be deceived And when they pray Thy will be done they pray not that they may fall Which God will not do or Cause any way by any means For this by their own naughtiness their own liberty will do But this they pray against themselves which doubtless is Gods will that when the Son of man shall come in his Majesty c. they that will not
power to keep rectitude so it is not equally in all For this Power is in God of Himself and in the Creatures received from God And it is more in the confirmed than the nonconfirmed and in the good than in the bad And seeing to be able to sin is a diminution of Liberty therefore according to Anselm to be able to sin is no Liberty nor part of liberty taking Free-will according to the Common Reason of it But to have power as to the Act which deformity is annext to may well be a part of Liberty not simply but of Created Liberty And so the deformity in the Act more agreeth with free-will as it is a Creature or as it is of Nothing than as it is Free. Dub. 3. Can free-will be compelled Answ God can destroy it but not force it for that is a Contradiction But he can well effectually incline it and make it move it self freely to which part God will * * * But to sin he will not so incline it I think this is as high as you can desire And yet there is nothing in all this but what both parties may well bear with and it hath indeed much soundness in it But here he treateth only about equality of Liberty but how much of it the unsanctified have he elsewhere sheweth and I have oft told you how much the most are agreed in it 708. To conclude The heart and summ of all our differences is how to make God the total first Cause of all Good and not to make him the Cause of sin and the damner of man for that which he himself insuperably causeth I hope both sides hold fast both the conclusions that our sin and destruction is chiefly of our selves but in God is our help and our good and happiness is all from Him And if they both hold this it is not the difficulty of joyning them together and opening Gods unsearchable methods that must disjoynt us and draw us to withdraw our Love or contemn each other or disturb the Churches peace and unity 709. Gregory Ariminensis and Gabr. Biel have come so near the rigid Dominicans that the Reader may think that they plainly say the same of Gods Causing all the Act of sin as Alvarez Twisse and Rutherford say But let the Learned Reader note these things 1. That over and over they affirm that though God Cause all the Act of sin yet he is but the Causa partialis I like not the phrase my self for the reasons before given but by this they do greatly differ from the aforesaid Authors see Greg. 2. d. 34 35. ar 3. frequently saying that God is Causa partialis And in answering Aureolus ad nonum he thus fully explaineth it Dicendum quod Causa dupliciter potest accipi Totalis Uno modo Totalis totalitate relata ad Causam id est sufficiens Causare effectum absque concursu alterius Causae praecise causando sicut Causat sic neganda est ista Consequentia Quoniam nec Deus nec Creatura est sic Totalis Causa actus mali Nunquam enim talis actus fieret si Deâ—s non Causaret â—um Neque etiam si Creatura non causaret Deus non aliter causaret quam nunc de facto causat concurrendo cum Creatura Alio modo Totalis totulitate relata ad effectum id est totum effectum causaus Et ejusdem possâ—nt esse plures totales Causae ejusdem enim Volitionis secundum totum est Causa Notitia etiam Voluntas Here note that 1. He taketh not Causa totalis for the same with Solitaria 2. That he asserteth only that God causeth the Totum of the Act but not by a total Causation of it And that Gods way or sort of Causation is not sufficient to cause it if man concurred not which they say he freely doth and could do otherwise 710. So that these mens way of freeing God from being the cause of sin is like Scotus his As if as I before made the similitude a Father to try his Childs obedience bids him lift up a Stone which he cannot do of himself and the Father holdeth his hand and joyneth his strength yet not ad ultimum posse but with a purposed restraint so far that if the Child will not put forth his degree of strength it shall not be done But who can comprehend the wayes of Divinè concurse 711. And it is to be noted that when Aureolus argueth that if God immediately concurr either he determineth mans act or man determineth Gods act or neither which are all absurd here Biel citeth Scotus as holding the third and answering Neither as no absurdity But Greg. Arim. that seemeth to go higher yet saith * * * Ubi suprae ad 8. Juxta modum loquendi arguentis dico quod Deus sequitur determinationem Voluntatis non quâ—â— determinatio Voluntatis fit aliqua Entitas distincta à Voluntate actâ— ejus quia primo fiat à voluntate nec intelligendo quod prius natura Viluntas agat actum quam Deus proprie loquendo de priori natura Quoniam tunc sequeretur quod posset illum agere Deo non coagente Sed ad hunc sensum dico Deum sequi Determinationem Voluntatis Quoniam ideo Deus agit illum actum quia †††I think it should be Eum. cum Voluntas agit Et non ideo quâ—â— Deus agit ideo Voluntas agit ideo magis proprie dicitur Deus coagerâ— Voluntati in talem actum causandi quam Voluntas dicatur coagere Deâ— You see that these Nominals do toto coelo differ from Alvarez Tâ—isse and Rutherford And yet Alvarez would fain be moderate in that one Disputation which Dr. Twisse in a peculiar Digression oppugneth 712. And note that the thing which moved Gregory to go so far as he doth is Lest God should be denyed to be the Cause of all Natural Entity But if you set before the will the Creator or Chief Good and the Creature or sensual pleasure the Act in genere as a Volition is an Entity or modus entis But who can prove that comparatively as it is terminated on the Creature rather than on the Creator it hath any Natural Entity more than the act in genere or any modality which God is not able to give a Creature power to cause or not cause withoâ—â— predetermination from God or any other 713. Yea Ariminensis seemeth to mean this himself when ibid. d. 34 35. a. 2. ad 5. he saith Deus â—potest solus actum illum causare actâ—â— odiendi id est qui est odium Dei mendacium etiam potest causare Non tamen potest causare actum odiendi Deum seu odium Dei neqâ—â— potest Causare Mendacium vel mentiri neque potest causare actum â—â—lum Quare quemcunque actum causaret solus licet ille nunc sit Odiâ—â— Dei vel mendacium vel aliquis actus malus
or after the performance a proper Cause of Gods Will which pardoned us For Gods Will in it self can have no cause But they were Causes 1. Of the Thing willed and 2. Also of the extrinsecal denomination of Gods Will from the object and effect of which anon 41. Christ did not take upon him strictly and properly the Natural or Civil person of any Sinner much less of all the Elect or all Sinners But the person of a Mediator between God and Sinners Of which more afterwards 42. Christ was not our Delegate Deputy Minister or Instrument to do what he did in our names by representing our persons as a man's Servant payeth his Masters debt by his command or doth some work which he was to do by himself or by another Nor did God or his own consent put him into any such Instrumental Relation in our Civil persons 43. Yet did he in the person of a Mediator not only merit and suffer â—ro nobis nostro bono but also voluntarily as part of his Mediatoâ—ial work suffer the penalty nostro loco in our stead Not by a full â—epresentation of our persons nor as if we could hence truly say that we â—id in sensu Legis vel Civili Suffer in Christ or satisfie Gods Justice our selves by Christ nor that God or the Redeemer do reckon it to us or ever will to be a thing done by us in our own Civil person though â—y Christs Natural person nor will ever give us all the fruits of it on that reason and account as supposing us so by Christ to have satisfyed for or Redeemed our selves But he suffered in the stead and place of Sinners to satisfie Gods Wisdom Truth and Justice and to procure pardon and life for Sinners to be given out by himself on his terms and in his way 44. Much less did Christ in our persons and we in and by him in a civil sence become habitually holy and perfectly fulfill all righteousness Nor doth God ever repute us to have our selves in our own civil persons thus fulfilled the Law and been holy in and by Christ or will justifie us on such a supposition 45. Christ is said to be made sin for us in that he was made a Sacrifice for sin But never was a Sinner indeed or in Gods esteem For God judgeth not falsly Nor did he ever take to himself the Guilt of fact or fault in it self but the punishment and the guilt only in relation to punishment the Reatum poenae non culpae qua talis But if any will call the Reatum poenae by the name of Reatum eulpae quoad poenam tantum because of the relation and connotation I strive not against the Name so we agree of the thing But safest words are best especially seeing that obligatio ad poenam is it that is most usually and eminently called guilt But Christ never undertook to be reputed of God one that was truly and formally wicked or a sinner but only one that was a sponsor who consented to suffer for Sinners that they might be delivered And they are ill words of them that say Christ was by imputation the most wicked man the greatest Thief Adulterer Murderer or Sinner in the world Though such men may mean well it were better speak in the Scripture phrase and not so far overgoe it Had God imputed our sins so to him as to have esteemed him a Sinner or guilty of our habitual and actual sin as sin even our hatred of God and all our wickedness God must necessarily from the perfection of his Nature have hated him as a wicked enemy yea more than he hated any other man as being guilty of a world of wickedness Whereas God was still well pleased with him and never hated him 46. The satisfaction which Christ made to the justice of God was full and perfect and so was his merit by his perfect Righteousness 47. The perfection of Christ's satisfaction consisteth not in its being in stead of All the sufferings due to all for whom be dyed so that none should therefore be ever due to the persons themselves For death afflictions and the want of Grace and withholding of the Spirits further help c. must be suffered even by the Elect But it consisteth in its full sufficiency to those Ends for which it was designed by the Father and the Son 48. The very Nature and Reason of the satisfactoriness of Christ's â—â—â—ferings was not in Being the very same either in Kind or in Degree which were due to all for whom he suffered For they were not such Of which more afterwards 49. They could not be the same which was due by the Law For the Law made it due to the Sinner himself And anothers suffering for him fulfilleth not the Law which never said Either thou or another for the shalt dye But only satisfied the Law-giver as he is above his own Law and could dispense with it his Justice being satisfied and saved Dâ—â—alius solvit aliud solvitur 2. And sin it self though not as sin as â—â— before opened was the greatest part of the Sinners punishment To â—â— alienated from God and not to love him and delight in him but to be corrupted and deluded and tormented by concupiscence 3. And the immediate unavoidable consequents resulting from sin it self weâ—â— punishments which Christ did never undergo As to be Hateful or â—â— pleasing to God as contrary to his Holy nature to be related as Criminal to lose all Right to Gods favour and Kingdom c. 4. And noâ—â— of the further punishments which supposed real faultiness could fall â—â— Christ as the torment of an accusing Conscience for rejecting and offending God for casting away our own felicity and running into hell c. the sense of Gods hatred of us as real Sinners 5. Much less the deâ—â—tions of the Spirit of Holiness to be left without goodness in a state of sin and to hate God for his justice and holiness which will be the damneds case The blind zeal of them that think they wrong the sufferings of Christ if they make them not thus of the sâ—me kiâ—â— with all that we deserved doth lead them to the intollerable Blasphâ—ming of our Saviour which if understood they would themselves abhor 50. Nor could Christ's sufferings be equal in Degree intensively and extensively to all that was deserved by the world As is easily disâ—â—â—nible by perusing what is now said seeing our deserved suffering lay iâ— things of such a Nature as to be left in sin it self destitute of Godâ— Image and Love and Communion under his hatred tormented in Câ—â—science besides the everlasting torments of hell which are more thâ—â— these upon all the millions of Sinners which were redeemed 51. Yet did Christ suffer more in Soul than in Body being at the present deprived of that kind of sense of Gods Love and Joy therein which was no part of his holiness or perfection but no other and having oâ—
but so far yield to as they can have a tendency to thâ—â—â— recovery All these twenty sorts of means and mercies Christ giveth to all or to more than the Elect. 96. It being certain de re that Christ so far died for all as to procure them all such Benefits as he giveth them the question remaining iâ— de nomine whether it be a fit phrase to say that Christ died for all And this is put out of question by the Scripture which frequently useth it as is proved by the fore-cited Texts We may well speak as God ordinarily there speaketh 97. There are certain fruits of Christ's death which are proper to the Elect or those that are in a state of Salvation As 1. Grace eventually Rom. 8. 30 31. Act. 26. 18. 1 Joh. 5. 11 12. Joh. 15. 1 2 6. Eph. 1. 22 23. Col. 1. 19. Eph. 3. 17. Act. 5. 31. 13. 38 39. Col. 1. 13 14. Rom. 5. 1 c. Tit. 3. 5 6 7. 1 Pet. 1. 3 4. Psal 50. 15. 46. 1. Rev. 22. 9. Heb. 1. 14. effectual working them to true Faith Repentance and Converâ—â—on 2. Union with Christ the Head as his true living members 3. The actual forgiveness of sin as to the grand spiritual and the eternal punishment Rom. 4. 1. 7. 8. 1. 33 34. 4. Our actual Reconciliation with God so as to be beloved as his peculiar people 5. Our Adoption and Right to the heavenly Inheritance Psal 4. 6. 8. 16 17 18. 6. The Spirit of Christ to dwell in us and sanctifie us by a habit of Divine Love Rom. 8. 9 13. Gal. 4. 6. Col. 3. 10. 1 Pet. 1. 16. 2 Pet. 1. 4. 1 Joh. 4. 15. Joh. 3. 5 6. 1 Cor. 6. 19. Gal. 5. 17 18 22. 2 Cor. 6. 1. 7. Imployment in sincere holy acceptable Service where they and their duties are pleasing to God Heb. 11. 5 6. 1 Pet. 2. 5 9. 8. Access in prayer with a promise of being heard in all that 's good for us in Gods measure time and way through Christ Joh. 14. 13 14. Heb. 10. 19 20 22. 9. Well-grounded hopes of Salvation and peace of Conscience thereupon Rom. 5. 1 2 3 4 c. 10. Spiritual communion with the Church-mystical in Heaven and Earth Heb. 12. 22 23 24. Eph. 2. 19 20 21 22. 1 Cor. 3. 22. 11. A special interest in Christ's Intercession with the Father Rom. 8. 32 33 c. 12. Resurâ—ection unto Life and Justification in Judgment Glorification of the Soul at Death and of the Body at the Resurrection Phil. 3. 20 21. â— Cor. 5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7. Rom. 8. 17 18 30 32 35 36 37 c. All these Benefits Christ hath made a conditional Deed of Gift to all the world But only the Elect accept them and possess them From whence we certainly infer that Christ never absolutely intended or decreed that his death should eventually put all men in possession of these Benefits And yet that he did intend and deâ—ree that by his death all men should have a conditional Gift of them As Dr. Twisse doth frequently assert 98. Christ therefore died for all but not for all equally or with the same intent design or purpose So that the case of difference in the matter of Redemption is resolved into that of Predestination and is but Gods different Decrees about the effects of Redemption 99. The particle For when we question whether Christ died For All is ambiguous 1. It may mean In the strict representation of the â—ersons of all as several so that they may be said to have died or satisfied â—n and by him as civilly in their own persons though not naturally And thus Christ died not for all or for any man which yet is in some mens conceits who thence say that Christ died not for all because he did not so personate all 2. It may signifie to die by the procurement of all â—ens sins as the assumed promeritorious cause And thus Parâ—â—â— himself in his Irenicon saith That the sins of all men lay on Christ and so he died for all that is for all mens sins as the cause of his death And you may tell any wiâ—ked man Thy sins killed Christ what-ever the deniers say to excuse them 3. Or it meaneth that Christ died finâ—lly for the good of all men And that is true as afore explained He died for the good of all but not equally that is not with the same absolute Will Decree or Intention of attaining their Salvation 100. But the conditional New Covenant without any difference in the tenor of it doth equally give Christ Pardon and Life to all Mankind antecedently to mens rejecting the offer on condition of acceptance And Christ equally satisfied Gods Justice for all the lapsed Race of Adam so far as to procure them this Gift or Covenant and the other foresaid common mercies But not equally as to his Decree of the success For there Election differenceth 101. It is a thing so contrary to the nature of Christianity and the Spirit of Christ in his Saints to extenuate Christ's Merits Purchase Interest or Honour or rob him of his due that doubtless so many sincere Christians would never be guilty of such injurious extenuations and narrowing of Christ's successes but that they cannot reconcile special Grace with universal and mistakingly judge them inconsistent Nor durst opprobriously reproach his universal Grace as they do by calling it vain lame imperfect a mockery c. if the conceit of their defending some truth by it did not quiet and deceive their Consciences Whereas indeed universal Grace and special do as perfectly and harmoniously consist as Nature and Grace do and as the foundation and the building and as any generical and specifick Natures And so doth a general Decree that All who will believe shall be saved and that this Promise shall be made to the world with a special Decree that Paul shall believe and be saved But on two accounts I pass by all the rest about the extent of Redemption 1. Because I must give you a special Disputation or Tractate on that subject 2. Because the most Judicious of English Divines so far as I can know them by their works Bishop Davenant hath said so much in his two Posthumous Dissertation de Redempt Praedestinat Published out of the hands of Bishop Usher as might suffice to reconcile contenders on these two points were not men slothful in studying them or partial or incapable in judging of these matters SECT VII The Antecedent and consequent Will of God c. 102. The distinction of Gods Antecedent and Consequent Will used by Damascene is by many applyed to this controversie but by none that I have read sufficiently explained which is the cause that so many good men reject it because they misunderstand it It 's truly said that by his Antecedent Will God would have all men to believe repent and be saved but by his Consequent Will
to God And so Faith is below Repentance as a means of it 204. By this the question whether Faith or Repentance be first may partly be resolved and partly cast out as founded in confusion As they are both one thing neither can be first any otherwise than the same Motus ut a termino a quo ut ad terminum ad quem But as they signifie divers things they have each of them divâ—râ— acts and in respect of each are before each other The Assenting act of Faith in general must needs be always before Repentance as it is an Act of the Will But the consenting Act of faith is also part of Repentance and must folow that part of Repentance which is a change of the understanding But whether the Repentance as towards God or Faith in Christ be first or Love to God and Faith in Christ I have discussed as accurately as I can in my Christian Directory Par 1. cap. 3. pag. 182. and therefore thither refer the Reader 205. And how Faith and Love differ I have there also opened and therefore shall now only say that Faith as it signifieth meet How Faith and Love differ Assent differeth from Love as the act of the Intellect from Volition And Love formally taken presupposeth the Assent and doth not contain it But Faith taken largely in the sence of the Baptismal Covenant containeth in it Consent which is the Wills Volition and therefore must needs have some initial Love in it as it acteth iâ— Desire This Faith in God hath some Desire and Volition of God and Faith in Christ which is the Souls Practical Affiance in him hath some Love to Christ in it But the denomination is not from the same ratio formalis in each It is eminently called Faith when giving up our Souls to Christ to be saved in practical Affiance is the great work of the Soul though it have something of Love essential to it And it is eminently called Love morally when the Complacency of the Soul in Christ thus trusted and in God our end is the great work or business of the Soul 206. This Holy Love as a fixed habit and employment of the Soul and our Relation to the Holy Ghost to work it in us is it that is promised and Given quoad jus in the Baptismal Covenant of which Faith though it have somewhat of actual Love or Volition in it is the antecedent condition which also I have so fully opened as afore cited that I refer the Reader to it for this also And somewhat was said of it before SECT XIII Of the degrees of Pardon or Justification 207. Some men lest they should yield that Justification is not one perfect finished act done but once do feign that it is only the first act of Faith by which a man is justified Indeed it is only the first act by which he â—s changed from an unrighteous to a righteous state But to think that therefore we are never after justified by Faith and so have no actually justifying Faith all our lives but for one instant only is fitter for a Dreamer than a theological Discourser 208. Our first constitutive Justification being in its nature a right to â—mpunity and to Life or Glory * * * â—â—â—â— tells us that 〈…〉 which 〈…〉 by Regeâ—â—ra â—â— and Just â—â—â—â— on â—uâ— what they mean by Râ—â—nission they cannot tell themselves as a â—oresaid Pardon of the guâ—â— they mean not or else they mean several things in one word is a Relation which must be continued to the end and therefore must have the true causes and condition continued and would cease if any of them ceased 209. As to the question therefore whether Justification be lossable and â—ardon reversible I answer that the grant of them in the Covenant is unalterable But mans will in it self is mutable and if he should cease believing by Apostacy and the condition fail he would lose his Right and be unjustified and unpardoned without any change in God But that a man doth not so de facto is to be ascribed to Election and special Grace of which afterward 210. Though all our past sins are pardoned at our first Faith or Conversion or as the Ancients speak in Baptism yet it is most certain that Pardon or Justification is not perfect at first no nor on this side death And the saying of many that Justification is perfect at first and Sanctification only by degrees is a palpable error as I have else-where oft shewed For that is not perfect 1. Which is not continued and brought on to its end but upon continued conditions and diligent use of means to the â—ast * * * Neque enim peccati sui veniam impetravit Adam ut a morte temporali immunis esset Twiss contr Corvin pag. 343. col 2. 2. Which leaveth many penalties unremoved which have further means to be used for their removal and further Right to it to be obtained To have more and more Grace and less and less Sin and to have â—earer communion with God are blessings as to the degrees which we must by degrees attain a further Right to and the privation of them are â—ore penalties to be removed 3. We have new sins to be pardoned every day 4. Our remaining Corruption is such as needeth a continued Pardon till it be perfectly done away 5. The Day of Judgment is not come for which the most perfect Justification is reserved SECT XIV Of Justification by Sentence of the Judge 211. The second sort of Justification which is by Sentence is done by Christ as Judge and so is an act of his Kingly Office 212. Therefore were it true as it is not that justifying Faith were only the receiving or believing in Christ as a Justifier of us it would not be a believing in him in his Priestly Office only but in act For he merited our Justification as a humbled Servant and a Sacrifice He giveth it us in Right by his Covenant or Law of Grace as King and Benefactor He promulgateth it as Prophet He passeth the Sentences as King and Judge He executively taketh off the penalty and glorifieth us as King and Benefactor There is no Justification by a partial Faith 213. Though the estimation of a man as just called the Sententiâ— judicis concepta as distinct from the sententia prolata be said to be â—â— immanet act of God and therefore from eternity yet it is a mistake For though it be not transient effectivè and do nihil efficere ad extra yeâ— it is transient objectivè and doth presuppose the existence of the qualified Object For though Gods Knowledge and Will in genere or as such are his eternal Essence yet Gods Knowledge and Love of John or Peter â—â— Believers are terms which signifie not his Essence as such but as transâ—â— and terminated on those existent persons relatively So that the extrinâ—â—cal denomination from the existent Object is temporary as it is 214.
is less than a good habit 10. That every man hath a moral proper power to do more good than he doth and forbear more evil 11. That every man is commanded to use some means in order to his salvation which he is morally able to use 12. That God useth to bear long with the abusers of their Power before he forsake them 13. That many have many perswasions and helps to use their power that abuse it 14. That it 's just with God to forsake such 1â— And great mercy to the elect not to be so forsaken All â—â—â—â— will be made cleareâ— in their due â—â—â—â— which I shall now here offer you § 2. AS for the five Articles I. The Article of Predestination II. And the Article of Redemption contain no difference between the parties but only as they relate to the Articles of Free-will and effectual Grace as is aforesaid For all must agree that God Decreed and Christ procured all that Grace or Mercy for men which he giveth them Of which the Conditional gift of the Love of the Father the Grace of the Son and the Communion of the Holy Spirit in the Covenant of Grace with a Commission to his Ministers freely to offer it to all Believing Consenters and to seal it and deliver it by Baptism is a great part And many mercies teachings perswasions and motions tending to draw them to Consent is another part God decreed not to deny men that which he giveth them and Christs Death procured them all that he giveth them To which add what elsewhere I have opened that there is no necessity of ascribing to God any Positive Decrees of Negations or nothings Else there must be a Decree against the existence of all the myriads of possible animals atomes names words c. And remember that to Permit is not-to hinder and so is a meer negation or a doing nothing and that not-to-give faith repentance grace the Gospel c. is a negation or a nothing and so need no Decree seeing a not-decreeing to give c. is sufficient so that the whole of the Controversie about these two Articles is clearly devolved to the Controversies of Grace and Free-will III. And concerning Free-will it cannot be denyed but that Natural Free-will is part of that excellency or Image of God by which man is differenced from bruits and that it is such a faculty by which man can in some instances determine his own will to this rather than that without Divine predetermination which is certain in the â—ase of sin yea and of some good For Adam's will could without any other grace than he had have forborn his sin Or else still all is but resolved into Gods meer will And it is agreed on as is said before that all men can do more good than they do and forbear more evil than they forbear and that without any more grace or help than they have when they use it not so that it is not abhorrent from the nature of Free-will for a man to make a good use or an ill of the same measure of grace at several times or for several men to make several uses of the same measure Therefore it is no unjust answer to the question Why did he forbear this sin to day and not yesterday or Why did this man forbear sin and not that supposing them to have the same measure of assisting grace to say Because this man at this time used that power which God had given him in stirring up his own will to concurt with grace and the other man or this at another time did not what he could Not that this answer is good in all cases where more grace is necessary to the effect but in this forementioned So that it is no Deifying of the will of a Rational free-Agent to say that it is essentially a self-determining faculty made by God in the Image of his Liberty and depending on him and not able to Act without him as the first Cause but yet on supposition of his Natural preservation and universal concurse and of his directions and Laws it is able to make choice hic nunc to will or not will to will this rather than that without Divine necessitating predetermination and without any more Grace or help than sometime it hath when it doth the contrary All which shewing the natural power of mans will and its liberty must be readily acknowledged by all sides that will not say that Adams first sin and every sin of all men else are all resolved into Gods causation in case of commissions and Gods non-causation in case of omissions and into Gods will in both and that man can no more do any thing but what he doth than he can be God or overcome God or live and act without God And as we must thus agree that natural Liberty consisteth in a self-determining power peculiar to Rational free agents so we are all agreed except the Pelagians that mans nature is vitiated by Original sin and therefore that the will which is naturally free from force and necessitation except from God who never necessitateth it to evil is yet in servitude to our own concupiscence and is not free either from the enticements of sense or the erroneous conduct of a blinded mind or from its own vicious habits averseness to God and holy things and proneness to things sensual and seeming good And therefore that this Holy or Moral Liberty of the will must have the Medicinal Grace of Christ to heal it of which next IV. And as to the Article of Effectual Grace it is agreed on and cannot I speak not of Grace as it is Gods favour but the effect â—e gratia data non de gratia dantâ— with sobriety be gainsayed without subverting the main doctrine of the Scriptures that whereas besides the Preparatory or Promeriting Grace of Christs own performance there is yet a three-fold Grace necessary for the application or conveyance of the Benefits purchased by Christ in the measure hereafter mentioned all this is common I. The first sort of Grace lyeth in the enacting of a new Law of Grace called also in several respects The new Testament the new Covenant and the Promise And as to this it is agreed 1. That God made this Law Covenant or promise in the first Edition with Adam and Eve after the fall Gen. 3. 15. the seed of the woman shall break the Serpents head and did by Actual Remission of their sin and not-punishing them as the first Law threatned yet more plainly manifest to them the pardoning Grace of this Covenant And that he made this new Law or Covenant to all mankind in and by them And that he again renewed the same Covenant of Grace with all mankind in Noah after the deluge Those few inconsiderate persons that deny this are not so valuable as to be an exception to our Concord It is an intolerable conceit of any to think that the tenour or sence of the
Creatures and their various species of being is after by PROVIDENCE to manage them as Active or Passive in their several Capacities And the ACTIVE Natures are threefold which he hath made to operate on the threefold Passives viz. INTELLECTUAL SENSITIVE and IGNEOUS or VEGETATIVE in its proper matter upon AIR WATER and EARTH § 12. GOD is so Active as not to be at all PASSIVE All the Active Creatures are first Passive as receiving the Influx of the first Cause and Inferiours from the Superiour second Causes But they are Naturally Active in that dependence and supposing that Influx § 13. The works of Providence about the Existent Creatures are MOTION causing Motion GUBERNATION causing ORDER and ATTRACTION or meet objective Termination satisfying their Appetites and giving them their Ends. * * * Cyprianus sie explicat Act. 17. In ipso sumus movemur vivimus In Patre sumus in Filio vivimus in Spiritu Sancto movemur Pater est sons omnis essentiae Filius est Vita Spiritus Sanctus est agitator seu motor unde apud Hebr. nomen habet Ruah quod significat endelechiam continuam perennem agitationem Vid. Strigel in Melanct. Loc. com pag. 294. § 14. MAN being endowed by his Creator with his Image in Vital-Active-Power Intellect and Free-will a Threefold Virtue in One as the formal Essence of his soul is peculiarly fitted for such acts of Providence as he must be under § 15. As the higher and Nobler Natures are under God the Immediate 1. Movers 2. Governours of the Inferiour so also are they 3. Their Immediate or nearest End having a Goodness in them fitted to attract terminate and satisfie the Appetites of the Inferiour God is not the only end of Appetites § 16. The Acts of Divine PROVIDENCE about MAN-existent are 1. Action or Motion 2. Special Government 3. Love From whence God is Related to Man the fundamental Relation of CREATOR supposed †††I hold with Bradwardine li. 1. c. 2. cor 3. Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque cansa creata Et c. 3. cor 3. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatius quolibet alio faciente Et c. 4. cor 3. â—adem de Deo Motore â—aking immediation for proximity and facere movere for the action as such and not for the meer moral specification and comparability 1. As ACTOR vel MOTOR 2. As RECTOR 3. As AMICUS vel FINIS Lover Benefactor and End 1. ACTION as such is from God in the first relation 2. Action as ORDERED is by him in the second 3. Action as TERMINATED FINALLY and in perfection is in him in the third § 17. Creation inferreth Propriety and making us Good and inter bâ—na and ad bonum inferreth that God is our Benefactor So that ab origine he standing in these three Relations to us from what is past he is to dispose of us by Providence accordingly § 18. Gods Omnipotence is most conspicuous in Creation propriety and Motion His Wisdom in Governing and Order and his Good will in our Benefits efficiently and our Perfection finally in mutual Love § 19. MOTION is caused by Moving â—â—â—ce impressed ORDER moral by LAW or signification of Gods Will de debito And PERFECTION by attingency and union with our END § 20. From the first resulteth NECESSITY properly so called From the second Moral RECTITUDE In the third is FELICITY as to single persons § 21. From the first viz. God as Actor upon Many or the Universe ariseth CO-OPERATION or Concurse All things work together as the Wheels in a Watch. From the second Divine ORDERING ariseth HARMONY and from the third UNIVERSAL PERFECTION and Melody of the whole Creation and to man perfect Love § 22. Motion is unresistible unless by a greater or unequal Contrary Motion or passive impedition and its effect as such not free but Necessary Government by Law is resistible and obedience free Final Goodness or Love do perfect and felicitate necessarily and freely not effecting for so they are not now considered but satisfying so far as they are enjoyed § 23. The Creation being past and Beings existent except what Generation and Composition make unfearchably and Gods fundamental RELATIONS setled we shall confound and be confounded if we distin-guish not Gods after-after-actions according to the Relations in which he worketh them and their foresaid differences in themselves SECT II. The Order of Divine Operations § 1. GOD is the Immediate Cause of all things and actions caused * * * Bradwardine ib. p. 172. seemeth to favour Averrois saying that God is Forma omnis formae forma maxime essentialis principalis cujuscunque formati and so acteth all things And indeed when we deny him to be the form of any creature we mean that he is More and not Less And that we have not a fitter Analogical conception of God than that he is eminently more than the soul of the world And c. 14. p. 210. he calleth Necessarium the most proper name of God But when he saith c. 17. that Gods Essence Omnipotence Intellect Naturally precede Gods Knowledge and cause it and so putteth Causes and Effects in God he is too bold by him as to the Proximity of God to the effect For he is every where present in Essence and as near to every Being and Action as it is to it self We must not conceive of Gods using means as we do of mans where the Pen the Saw the Knife c. is between the hand and the effect God is as near and as total a Cause of what he doth as if he used no second cause § 2. They that say God is thus Causa Immediata Immediatione Suppositi seu Essentiae Virtutis speak true but not aptly because it ill insinuateth as if Gods Virtus were not his Essence when as in God they are all one only as inadequate conceptions we may distinguish suppositum à virtute but not otherwise And it is not as quid creatum that we speak of Virtus § 3. Since the Creation in the Motions of Providence God who at first made the Universe to be One by conjunction and co-operation of parts as truly as a Clock or Man is one hath setled a course of second Causes that one thing may act upon and move another and though he work upon the Highest of these Causes immediately without any other subordinate Cause yet on all the rest he ordinarily worketh by superiour created Causes which are some of them Necessary and operate in one constant course and some of them Voluntary and Free and operate more mutably and contingently § 4. The course of Necessitating Causes is commonly called NATURE and the Influence of Angels and other Voluntary Causes distinguished from Natural But they all operate as second Causes under the Influx and Government of God upon us that are here on earth § 5.
There is no Place where any Corporeal being is where some Active created Nature is not with it so that considering the proximity and the natures we may well conclude that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun which God effecteth by himself alone without any second Cause § 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken Gods presence with the Creature in operation to the fire in a red hot Iron where you would think all were Fire and all Iron But the similitude is too low The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx God and the Sun do what the Sun doth and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth that 's corporeal without it § 7. But the Sun moveth nothing as the Cartesians dream by a single Motive Influx alone but by emission of its Threefold Influx as every Active Nature doth that is Motive Illuminative and Calefactive which are One-radically in Three-effectively § 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui But causeth wonderful diversity of effects without diversity in God the prime Cause or in it self The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet some things to live and some to dye some things to be soft and some hard c. In a word there are few changes or various actions below in bodies which the Sun is not the Cause of without difference in it self But not the specifying Cause § 9. The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures Recipitur ad modum recipientis So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock c. § 10. God operateth on second Causes as God Omnipotently but not ad ultimum potentiae but Freely as he pleaseth § 11. God worketh by second Causes according to the said Causes aptitude so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth § 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies And whether God work on all our souls by superiour Spirits as second Causes is unknown to us It is not improbable according to the order of his providence in other things But we know little of it certainly § 13. But certain we are that superiour Voluntary Agents Angels and Devils have very much to do with our souls and operate much upon them It is a wonderful power which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination or Thinking faculty of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee And it is not like that good Angels have less power skill or will § 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by which is JESUS CHRIST As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion Light and Heat to Inferiour creatures and God operateth by the Sun So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to mens souls and there is now no other conveyance to be expected § 15. Christs Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified is by the Office of Mediator Authorized and by Personal Union and the Fulness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind § 16. Object A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost who is God the Creator Sending is the Act of a Superiour But Christs humanity is not superiour to the Holy Ghost Answ 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God for that hath no Cause But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation as it signifieth the effect 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul and 3. Of the ordering of these effects why rather on this soul than on that and at this time measure c. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superiour sender of the Spirit but a Ministerial and a second cause As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth § 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls that is As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons measure time conditions of the Communication of the Spirit But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself as the Sun giveth us its Influx is all that is disputable That is Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ and pass from his person as his unto us as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members § 18. This question may be put either of all Natural Being and Motion or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause or whether this be true of this Lower World which was curst for sin or whether it be true at least of Humane nature or whether it be true only of Gracious operations § 19. 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe contained in the words Heaven and Earth the Scripture seemeth to assert 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature and of all other creatures that belong to man so far as they belong to him Angels Devils Sun Air Earth c. is past dispute 3. That the real â—hysical effects acts and habits of the Spirit on mens souls are caused by Christs Moral Causation by his Merit and his Political Mission is past dispute 4. That besides all this the Spirit it self by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ and that as they are such and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ is past dispute 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations is past dispute 6. But whether moreover any Action of Christs own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue which is every where be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass are questions not for me to determine § 20. Christs spiritual Influx on souls is not single but is ever Three in One as the Sun 's aforesaid which are according to
consider that though he be Almighty yet he doth not all that he can do nor do his works equally manifest his Omnipotency And there are these causes for Limiting his operations in the effects § 2. 1. * * * Gemina operatio Providentiae reperitur partim naturalis partim voluntaria Naturalis per occultam Dei administrationem quae etiam lignis herbis dat incrementum Voluntaria vero per Angelorum opera hominum Vid. catera August de Genesi ad lit l. 8. cap. 9. plura li. 9. cap. 15. The chief cause is his Wisdom and Free-will It is his Will to do what he doth and to do no more which hath no cause § 3. 2. Another cause is that God operateth by Jesus Christ whose Humanity is finite being a Creature and God worketh according to the Instrument or medium As he shineth by the Sun Moon or Stars according to their several natures and not according to his meer omnipotency so doth he communicate Grace by Jesus Christ § 4. †††Mark 6. 5. He Christ could there do no mighty work because of their unbelief and 7. 24. He could not be hid and 1. 45. Jesus could no more openly enter into the City with many such places all speak of an Ordinate power working not ad ultimum posse And Christ by Office being King and Prophet will operate upon certain terms which in his Sapiential Government he sets down And God will not violate those terms § 5. 3. Also under Christ there are many subordinate Causes There are his Word Preachers and all the forementioned means and helps and Christ will work according to these means Though he tye not himself from doing more or otherwise I have proved that this is his usual way And the effect will be limited according to these second causes § 6. As the Sun shineth on us first in and through the air which abateth somewhat of its force and then through the exhalations and then through the glass window and each maketh some alteration as to the effect on us so is it in this case § 7. 4. But the notable limitation is the foresaid Indisposition of the Receiver Every eye hath a tunicle which the Suns light must penetrate But he that hath a suffusion or he that winketh hath a greater impediment to limit the effect so is it with the various degrees of Indisposition or moral incapacity which yet be nothing if God did work ad ultimum posse and did not as aforesaid work according to his free will and second causes SECT VII Of the Resistibility of Grace § 1. TO Resist Grace signifieth 1. Either Not-to Receive it Passively * * * Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 1◠§. 6. p. 187. distinguisheth of Gods will 1. As to its ratio totalis including not only the viâ— aut causalitas effectiva but also the formal reason of Volitio effiâ—ax which includeth the prescience of future contingents And so he saith It is never resisted 2. Secundum partialem inadaequatam rationem praecise ut causa efficiens nostrorum actuum liberorum prout offert motiva confert causas secundas suum concursum abstrahendo à formalissima ratione Volitionis efficacis quae quidditativè supponit formalissimam rationem praescientiae c. Et ita etiam in sensu composito cum tota causalitate illius in actu primo ut praecisus ab actu secundo potest non sortiri effectum as a stone receiveth not the rain ad intus or as oyl resisteth water or hard things receive not impressions as the soft 2. Or Not-to-Receive-Actually which is Receptio Moralis as a man receiveth not a gift who consenteth not or as he resisteth the light who will not open his eyes The bare Not-Consenting with the Will or not using the senses or organs not opening the hand c. is such a Resisting 3. Or an Active opposition which is more As a man resisteth an Enemy with heart or hand or a man by Nolition and not only Non-volition resisteth a suiter § 2. Mans sinful soul resisteth Gods gracious operations all these wayes 1. It is Passively become undisposed to Reception And thus he is said to have a hard heart of stone and a seared conscience and to be dead and past feeling Eph. 4. 18 19. 2. 1 2. 2. It doth not do what it can do morally to receive grace that is it doth not Conari or suscitate it self to be willing of it 3. Yea it doth Positively resist by Action and is unwilling of Gods gracious operations And this is twofold 1. By willing the contrary and prosecuting carnal interest over-loving the pleasures of the flesh and so turning away from the motions of grace 2. And therefore by an enmity to that grace and work which would †††Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor 8. p. 5. proveth that Gods will is universaliter efficax nec impedibilis frustrabilis aut defectibilis which we grant as to his will as it is efficient and not meerly final and complacite But yet the Schoolmen that say he is not Omnivolens give reason for it convert him and take him off his chosen Idols § 3. No creature by resisting God doth abate or retund his essential Power or Activity nor make any thing properly difficult to him § 4. All the Elect resist Grace before it overcome and convert them And all our lives after we resist it too commonly when it exciteth us to duty and draweth us from sin § 5. He that repenteth not of his Resisting of Gods Spirit and Grace doth not understand and well repent of his sin § 6. All Resisting is not Overcoming All Resist grace but all overcome it not that is do not frustrate it as to the due effect § 7. There are several Degrees of yielding to Gods motions and operations and so several degrees of overcoming He is fully overcome by it who yieldeth to it wholly He overcometh it in some part who yieldeth to it but in part And because Gods grace moveth us to more than we ordinarily yield to therefore we do ordinarily overcome it in too great measure even when we are happily overcome by it § 8. God worketh not alike on all sometime as on Paul he so suddenly changeth the mind and will as that at once he both produceth the Act of mans consent and also taketh away even the moral though not the natural power to the contrary in the antecedent instant So that no man ever denyeth consent who is so moved And sometimes he procureth Actual Consent by such an operation as in the antecedent instant might have been resisted and overcome there being a Moral Power to the contrary So that there is Actually-Converting Grace which was superable in the antecedent instant as to Moral power and there is such a converting Grace as no man ever doth overcome § 9. Gods grace when it prevaileth doth not take away but determine
be equal or unequal physical or moral c. is to dote § 5. But yet this Knowledge and Will of God is transient or terminated Objectively when it is not so Effectively And so God is said to know things differently as they differ and to will things differently as they are different objects But this speaketh truly nothing New or various in God but only a Relative and so denominative connotation of his simple essence from these objects whose diversity giveth divers names to Immutable most simple Unity Of this all Schoolmen for substance are agreed however the Thomists Scotists and Occamists differ about the notions of Ratio ratiocinata formalitas denominatio extrinseca § 6. II. If it be the operation of the second Causes ex parte operantiâ—â—â—n and so of God by them that we dispute of the disputes would have the easier decision But this is denyed by the Dominicans and another Infusing Immediate operation is made the subject of these Controversies § 7. III. It remaineth therefore that it is only the effect as in the soul-receiving which we dispute of And if so this must be remembred that we dream not of any Controversie about Gods Action as ex parte agenâ—is in Him or between him and the soul § 8. In mans soul we know of nothing but 1. The substance in the first notion as answerable to Matter in bodies 2. The form which is a Threefold Virtue or faculty in One viz. The vital Power Intellect and Will which is at once Virtus Vis Inclinatio naturalis ad proprias actiones All these are but Inadequate conceptions of the same simple essence and not compounding parts None of this is the thing in question for the soul is presupposed to be a soul 3. The Accidental and mutable Disposition of the faculties to the Acts. 4. The Impressions of sâ—periour Causes God and means in moving to the Acts. 5. The Acts of the soul themselves 6. The Habits I know of no more § 9. I. Though All Habits are dispositions yet all Dispositions are not Habits And before Habits the soul may be many wayes predisposed to the Act As 1. By former acts of another sort which yet conduce to this 2. By other habits that are preparatory 3. By deliverance from many Internal and External Impediments 4. And lastly By the Divine Impress it self in the instant of Nature though not of time before the Act. For God so disposeth the soul to act § 10. This predisposition is sometime but a Moral Power that is in so low a degree as containeth only the Necessary power to the act with which alone it is sometime done And sometime besides this Moral Power it containeth some further degree of accidental Inclination or propensity to the Act. And these degrees are various in various instances and sâ—bjects § 11. II. When God moveth the soul to believe or repent we must conceive that in the instant antecedent to the Act the soul receiveth some Impress or Impulse from the divine essence by which it is disposed or moved to act * * * Aâ—xilium praevium non appellatur à nobis Forma Voluntatis impressa quoniam hoc nomen significare videtur qualitatem constituentem potentiam in actâ— primo sed proprio vocabulo dicitur motio Actualis qua Deus vere efficienter facit ut liberum arbitrium operetur actum liberum determinatum cum vera expedita facultate qua potest illum non operari si velit Alvarez de Auxil disp 23. p. 108. Mâ—tio is the proper notion he thinks between God and the Act or Habit of man as aforesaid but unaptly I think so conceived by him And though spirits especially God move not by such contact and impress as things corporeal yet in an unconceivable manner some spirit some spiritual Impress Influx or motion must be Received by which faith is caused And this Impress and the Disposition to the Act caused by it perhaps are really the same § 12. III. The Act it self by this and by the soul disposed and excited is next caused not given as pre-existent but given by causal efficacious suscitation of the pre-existent faculty or power § 13. IV. The Habit which is a Promptitude to facile acting is caused by all the forementioned causes conjunct and not by any one alone viz. by God and his Impress on a soul some way pre-disposed and by the soul it self further disposed and excited by that Impress But of Habits more anon And here because almost all our seeming difference dependeth on the question What it is that is between Gods essence and mans act which is the cause of our Act or may be called grace sufficient or effectual more or less c. I shall tell you how Alvarez handleth the question and thereby further shew you that it is a thing unsearchable and past mans knowledge and though I satisfie my self with calling it an Impulse or Impress or a Received energie or force or Influx yet these are but general notions and tell us not as to a distinct formal conception What it is And you shall see that the boldest disputers know no more Alvarez de Aux l. 3. disp 19. p. 77. tells you that there are these several opinions of it What is the previous motion by which God moveth and applyeth second causes to operate I. Some Thomists hold that It is a Quality not permanent but by way of transient disposition with operation Cabrera 3. p. q. 18. ar 4. dub 1. Conc. 4. n. 58. For it must be some Virtus and that must be a Quality Imperfect supernatural acts as attrition fear of hell c. are before habits and have only such transient virtues or qualities c. II. Others hold contrarily that Gods motion is nothing besides his own will or essence and mans act being simultaneous Their reasons I omit * * * So Bradwardine and many others And this would cut short most of our present Controversies if it would hold Dr. Twisse saith Vind. Grat. li. 2. p. 2. Crim. 3. c. 15. §. 9. p. 348. Probabile esse nullam motionem à Deo recipi in Voluntatem sed quia Deus velit Voluntatem creaturae Velle aliquid necesse est ut velit Ratio haec est cujus solutionem mihi expediat Arminianus aliquis Sola Dei Voluntate factum est ut Mundus crearetur Quis enim influxus Dei potest fingi praecedaneus qui occuparetur circa nihilum c. III. Others hold that Gods previous motion is somewhat received in second causes in order of nature before they operate and when they are asked What it is they say It is really the very operation of the second cause e. g. man it self as it proceedeth from God And so that Gods premotion and predetermination of our Will is not really distinct from the actual determination by which the will determineth it self but is the same The same act being of God and man So that they
make this motion to be somewhat received before we act and yet nothing but our act which is absurd IV. Other Thomists hold that It is somewhat really distinct from our operations and that is Quoddam complementum virtutis activae quo actualiter agat And he that knoweth what predicament this complementum belongeth to and what it is let him take this opinion for more than a meer complement And here they tell you that they speak not of Gods simultaneous concurse for that Alvarez confesseth is nothing besides Gods essence and mans act But of his previous motion which he saith is somewhat more So Amesius Antisynod de Grat. c. 2. pag. 255. Satis esset apud omnes pios dicere Dei Velle sine ulla Impressione intercedente certe posse efficere ut Voluntas consentiat ipsius Vocationi I now meddle not with the truth of this and Twisses argument is easily answered But I intreat the Reader to note into what all our controversies are by these excellent men reduced who yet most aggravate them What now is the Gratia efficax ad credendum Nothing besides Gods esse but ipsa fides Is faith effective of it self No. Is Gods essential will effective of it Who ever denyed it What place is there for Controversies of sufficiency and efficacy when it is but Gods essence and the known effect of which they speak and hold not as Alvarez doth any motion or Impress made by God upon mind or will at all Gods will then is effectual quia vult effectum and it is virtually sufficient for whatever he willeth not but could will But then no man can possibly do any more good or less evil than he doth because no more or less is willed of God which volition is the first necessary Cause of all things And is not all their Volumes de Auxiliis Gratiae and the several sorts previous simultaneous operating co-operating c. meerly vain when there is no such thing as any Grace besides Gods meer will and the Act of man And yet Dr. Twisse elsewhere saith that Gods Decrees do nihil ponere in objecto As if they differed in the nature of motion And he saith that this is true both of supernatural acts which are from Infused habits as faith hope Love and of Imperfect supernaturals as fear of hell and attrition by which man is remotely prepared for Justification ◠which proceed not from supernatural habits but from the spirits special impulse not yet inhabiting but moving And Alvarez thus concludeth I. That which God doth in second causes by which these act is Aliquid habens esse quoddam incompletum per modum quò colores sunt in aere virtus artis in instrumento artificis It is Aliquid incompletum transiens cum ipsa operatione Are you ever the wiser for all this II. Hoc ens incompletum praevium actioni causae secundae producitur in illa effective à solo Deo nullo modo dependet efficienter ex influx◠ipsius causae secundae And therefore herein the will is passive though not in its own Act as he falsly affirmeth Luther to assert for what can act and not be active III. When second causes natural or supernatural have by their inherent form sufficient Active virtue per modum actus primi proportioned with the effect then Gods premotion is not a Quality but proprio vocabulo dicitur Motio Virtuosa by which the universal cause maketh the second actually operate according to its proper mode Therefore it is not a Habit or disposition or natural power IV. Yea in Imperfect supernatural acts as fear of hell which go before habits and by preventing grace are elevated to the acts it is not a Quality but Motio Dei virtuosa by which they are done and is of the same sort with that which causeth acts from habits V. This previous Motion is Really distinct from the operation of the second cause and is not our act it self but is immediately from God Which he useth many arguments to prove And can all this give any man a formal conception what it is which he calleth aliquid incompletum and Motio Virtuosa We know not what the Vis projectis impressa is in corporeals And can we tell how spirits and how the God of spirits maketh his Impressions or what the word Impression or Motion here signifieth We know that we know it not if we know what we know and know-not And why is it called Motio Virtuosa Virtus he maketh a quality It is no quality and yet Virtuosa Omnis motio est Actio Is it Actio Increata Then it is God himself which he denyeth and speaketh of somewhat between God and mans Act. Is it Actio creata Then it is a Modus Agentis for so is every Action as such as distinct from its effect in patiente And if so it cannot be modus Dei for then it is Ipse Deus And if it be modus hominis it is either homini◠agentis vel patientis If the first then it is mans Action If the second it is formally no action For modus patientis is passio though many would confound action and passion with saying after their Masters that Actio est in patiente which is equivocation So that the plain truth is that mans understanding can reach no further than to conceive 1. That our souls are the termini of Gods Volition and Active power 2. That though God act not on us by corporeal contact yet we must call our selves Patients and think of the Attingency of his Active essence with its effects by some Analogie of Corporeal attingency contact and impressed moving force But truly to know how God toucheth moveth operateth on any Creature and by what Impressions or what there is indeed between Gods essence and mans Act we know not at all And if Christ had never said Joh. 3. so is every one that is born of the spirit our own experience might have told us that we know it not Boldly then tell our Church-distracting wranglers that contend about the nature sufficiency efficacy resistibility of this Act of Grace that they know not the very subject of their disputes And shall we still fire the Church by striving about words that profit not but subvert the hearers and tend to the increase of ungodliness Yea and shall bold blind zeal use the Reverend names of God and his precious Truth to colour and countenance these pernicious contentions I grant that the nature of Grace and the concord of it with Free-will may be soberly treated of But when men have followed the controversie beyond the ken of humane understanding and there will proceed to build great Fabricks upon unknown suppositions and perversly contend for them against Love and peace they do but serve Satan against God under the colour of his sacred truth and name And I think it not amiss here to tell you what Alvarez saith to this Question de Aux l. 12. disp 118. p.
to make a difference 3. The means much differ which several men have And God usually operateth according to the means upon the soul § 5. If the question be either of the Act or Habit it is no question For that were but to ask Whether all men have equal faith love and other graces which common experience denyeth § 6. Whereas some will stick at my mentioning a Divine Impress on the soul in nature antecedent to Act and Habit I would have them remember that either there is such a thing or not If there be I rightly mention it If not we are instantly at an end of all this sort of Controversies and Calvinists and Arminians cannot differ if they would For then the question must be only about that which is past question viz. 1. Either about Gods Act as in Himself which is his simple Essence 2. Or about the Act and Habit of Faith Love c. in Man which all the World knoweth is not equal For all men have not faith For as for pre-disposition the question will be revolved to the same point It is certain that all are not equally disposed and it is certain that Gods Acts as in him are his Essence SECT X. Whether the said Operation be Physical or Moral § 1. THis paltry question is worthy but a few words though â— make too much stir Of the sense of the words Physical and Moral having spoken before I will not repeat it here 1. If the question be de operatione ut est actus agentis before the effect it were but to ask Whether Gods Essence be Physical or Moral which is unworthy an answer § 2. 2. If the question be of the Action of second Causes as the Preacher c. if truly Acts they are both Physical as they are really actus naturalis and moral as they are the acts of free intellectual agentâ— But the Acts of Laws and other objects meerly as objects on man are called Moral Acts because they are but nominal but indeed are no Acts and therefore neither Physical nor Moral For they are but signa and significare is not agere but is only an objective aptitude by which an Intellectual agent can â—difie it self All the Books in my Library teach me without any Action by being signa objectively to my active Intellect § 3. 3. If the question be of the Divine Impress on the soul it is quid reale and therefore physicum And it is moral as it is the principium actus moralis The same is to be said of our own Acts and Habits They are physical and moral accidents And they cannot be moral unless they be physical § 4. But it must be known that to be quid naturale and quid morale formally differ as Actus qua talis and ordo qua ordo do differ ab ordine seâ— Relatione ad Legem ad finem morum and Moralitas est actus Physici vel privationis Relatio viz. ad Regulam finem morum § 5. But if the question be not of the Morality of the Act but the Morality of the Cause viz. Whether Grace or divine action do cause Physically or Morally I answer plainly that There is no true Cause which is not Physical A moral Cause not physical is but Causa reputata vel â—â—minalis Objects are usually said to Cause morally But if they be meerly objects they cause not efficiently at all but by termination only materially constitute the Act in specie But some things vulgarly called objects as Light Heat c. are Active and so effect And he that doth proponere objectum doth indeed effect by speaking or doing But he doth not effect any thing by the object on the mind as it is a meer object But the Vox loquentis doth more than present an object It doth by agency suscitate the Spirits and operate on the organs of sensation And many mercies afflictions and other means forementioned have their several wayes of active operation But it is readily confessed that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a soul but only Active Spirits like it self Remember therefore that I take the word Physical here as the Schools do largely as comprehending Spiritual or hyperphysical And I plainly say de nomine that Gods operations of Grace are to be called Hyperphysical in respect to God the Agent and Physical as they are Physical effects on man and Moral as the same are in instanti secundo also moral effects And that they are called Moral in two usual senses 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them 2. And in that objects being much of the Means the operation or efficiency of objects as objects is properly none at all They do but materially as it were constitute the Act and terminate it and occasion it as sine quibus non which many call a Moral Reputative Metaphorical Causation And yet diversification is much by objects § 6. If this stumble any who look not at the greater inconveniences on the other side and occasion them to think that it is little efficient operation which we own in the collation of faith and conversion I desire them to consider well 1. That it is no new substance at all that is to be produced but a pre existent substance and faculty to be actuated 2. That it is not an Act as such in genere that is to be caused by Grace but the due ordering of acts as to right objects c. 3. That the soul as such is an Active Spirit not indifferent between Action and cessation but as naturally prone to Act as the earth to rest and as a stone in the air to descend and as the Sun to move and shine so that it is never one minute out of Action even in this earthen tabernacle from its first being to the last breath day or night Though in different manner 4. That God as the God of Nature doth uphold the soul in this Active Nature affording it that Concurse or Influx necessary thereto which in Nature he made due to it As he doth to the Sun in its action and to the souls of Brutes So that Activity as such distinct from the due order of it is given by God in Nature 5. And God hath placed the soul in the Universe as a wheel in a Watch where it must needs have some effects of the co-operation of Concauses or superiour agents 6. And Angels and Devils who have very much to do with our souls do work as Voluntary Agents in Political Order though not without the regulation of Gods Law or Will 7. And God can do what he will on souls without any second cause though whether he do so or what we know not 8. All this being supposed for Efficiency objects duly qualified may do much for the Order of Acts though properly they do nothing so that though they be but ut Materia ad formam occasions sine quibus non yet the reasons
of the great alterations in the World being admirably fetcht from the various Passive or Receptive dispositions of matter no wonder Cum Thomistae dicunt Deum suo auxilio efficaci physice praedeterminare Voluntatem ad actum bonum non excludunt Motionem Moralem sed eam praesuâ—â—â—â—â—â— Alvarez de Aâ—xil disp 23. p. 108. â—â— if it be so with mans soul also A spark of fire which long was unseen if you put Straw Gunpowder or other fuel to it may burn a City or Kingdom when yet the fuel is not an efficient cause save the fire that is in it but an objective Matter What work doth a Student find all his life among Books What abundance of knowledge doth he learn by them which he had none of in his Infancy And so do Travellers by viewing the actions of the World And all these are but fuel to the fire The soul only is the Agent and all these are signs and objects that do nothing really on the soul at all You may lead a Beast up and down and govern them by objects which yet act nothing on them So Satan doth by the Drunkard Glutton Fornicator Gamester Covetous c. What Reputed work do objects make on them by doing nothing Thus Verâ—m Bonum are said to work And the case is this The Active Spirit is not only Naturally Active but Essentially Inclined to some certain objects Truth and Goodness And this Inclination being their very Nature when the object is duly presented to it and it self delivered from all false objects and erroneous Action on them and ill habits thence contracted it will Naturally work accordingly And therefore duly externally and internally to bring God and Holy objects to the prospect of the soul is the way of working them to God And sure the World would never make such a stir about Preaching to get fit men and to perswade them to diligence and to keep sound doctrine c. if these objective causes as fuel to the fire did not do much by occasioning the Active soul to do its proper work 9. Yet still remember again that Jesus Christ is the Political Head of Influx if not more who sendeth forth the Spirit as he please but ordinarily upon his setled Gospel terms to work on souls by his threefold fore-mentioned influx with and by these means according to them but in an unsearchable manner As God doth in Nature by the Sun and other Natural Causes SECT XI What Free-Will Man hath to Spiritual Good c. § 1. THe understanding of the Nature of the Power and Liberty of the Will is the very key to open all the rest of the controverted difficulties in these matters But having spoken of it so much before in the former part of this Book and more elsewhere I shall no further weary the Reader with repetitions than to note these few things following § 2. If any like not the name of Free-will Libera Voluntas let them but agree about these two the Power of the Will and Free-choice * * * Nolite esse adeo delicati ut abhorreatis ab usâ— vocabuli Lib. arbit Hypocritarum propriâ—m est rixari de vocabulis Nemo offendatur hoc titulo quia August in multae Volum singulis fere pagellis ad fastidium Lectoris hoc vocabulum inculcat Melancth Loc. Com. de lib. arb c. 1. Liberum arbitrium and they need not contend about Free-will § 3. 1. As to the first It is the very Essence of the Will to be a natural Power or faculty of Willing Good and Nilling evil apprehended by the Intellect and commanding the inferiour faculties either politically or despotically difficultly or easily perfectly or imperfectly according to its resolution and their Receptivity § 4. 2. The Liberty of choice is not only Libertas Voluntatis but Libertas Hominis when a man may have what he chooseth or willeth Here the Act of choosing is the Wills but the object is somewhat else either an Imperate act of some inferiour faculty or some extrinsick thing So we say truly that the unbeliever or unconverted sinner may believe may repent may have Christ and life if he will as Dr. Twisse frequently asserteth § 5. 3. But the Liberty of the Will it self is but the mode of its self-determination as without constraint it is a self-determining principle in its elicite Acts considered comparatively § 6. The Liberty of the Will is threefold 1. Liberty of Contradiction or exercitii 2. Of †††Note that the Papists confess that by Christs Case it is proved that Libertas specificationis inter bonum malum is not necessary to merit So Pet. â— S. Joseph Thes Univers pag. 90. Contrariety or specification in the Act 3. Of objective specification which is Liberty of Competition 1. The first Liberty is to will or not will to nill or not nill 2. The second is Liberty to will or nill this 3. The third is Liberty to will This object or That or to nill This or That * * * Of the real difference of these three see Rob. Baron Metaphys I take not that which many Schoolmen call Liberty of Complacence to be another sort of Liberty Though I distinguish Liberty of simple Complacence from Liberty of election as being a prior distribution And I deny not but that Liberty of Complacency specially may stand with necessity of immutable disposition yea and with some sort of necessitating operation of God as is in Christ and the Glorified And in this large essential sense Liberum and Voluntarium are all one supposing Voluntarium to be the act of a self-determining unconstrained will So that the word Free-will being so exceeding ambiguous as my foresaid Scheme sheweth we must be sure that we pretend not the Controversies de nomine to be de re But it is the Indifferency of a Viators will that we have now to do with and not that state of perfect determination or that Amplitude or advancement of the will which Gibieâ—f and such others talk of And note that by Posse agere vel non agere which we put into the definition of free-will we must not mean that Potentia moralis metaphorica which is nothing but the wills moral disposition or habit but the Potentia Naturalis And so it may be said of Christ and the glorified that their not sinning or not willing sin is not ex impotentia naturali but ex perfectione § 7. The Will hath not all these sorts of Liberty about every object For it cannot will known evil as such c. But it hath all these about several objects § 8. By this power and Liberty the Will is made of God to be a kind of Causa prima secundum quid of the Moral ORDER or specification of its own acts Not simply or strictly a Causa prima For 1. It was God the first Cause that gave man this self-determining Power 2. It is God that upholdeth it And so it
by the effect it must be described Efficacy is Aptitudinal which is the force and fitness of the Efficient Cause Or Actual which is Efficienty it self § 7. Aptitudinal efficacy is 1. In God 2. In the means And 1. In Gods Absolute Power 2. In his Ordinate Power § 8. 1. Gods Absolute Power is Omnipotency or Infinite and therefore was aptitudinally efficacious to make a world before it was made § 9. 2. Gods Ordinate Power is the same Essential Omnipotency denominated from the Connotation of those effects which he hath decreed to produce according to the limited aptitude of second Causes and means or the disposition of the recipient or at least as limited in the effects by his meer free will § 10. In these respects though still Gods power in it self be Omnipotency yet in the limited way of operation it is various 1. As Gods Will quoad terminos is various 2. And as the means are various 3. And as the Receivers capacities are various To one the same operation ex parte Dei mediorum though not from the same Decree is abundantly efficacious and to another not § 11. And thus God so limiteth the effect of his Power as that it shall be effectual sometime on a Condition to be freely performed by man receiving it even by a former help and not absolutely § 12. Therefore all that is Aptitudinally efficacious is not actually efficient of every effect to which it was thus apt § 13. The aptitudinal efficacy of the means being of God falleth in with his ordinate power herein and is not the thing in question § 14. The effects in respect to which Grace is called efficacious are 1. The Giving of the Means themselves 2. The first Impress on the soul 3. The altering of the souls Disposition 4. The production of the act 5. And of the Habit. And it must be some of these effects which are called efficacious or inefficacious to others So that by that time the state of the Question is truly opened this which Dr. Twisse saith Arminius durst never speak out his opinion of and which he and others make to be the very heart of all these Controversies perhaps will appear to be nothing § 15. For what is that Grace whose efficacy you enquire of â— Is it Gratia operans or operata The efficient cause or the effect If it be Gods Gratia operans it is either the Prime Cause or the second Causes If it be the Prime Cause it is Gods essence only Even his Essential Power Vasquez in 1 Tho. â—â—â—â— 19. disp 8c p. 5â—â—â—â—â— Voluntas libera Deâ— â—â—â—â— essentia Divina significata per modum actus vitalis affectus eliciti cum revera sit ipsamet substantia Dei includit tamen habitudinem etiam qúandam rationis ad res futuras quae liberâ— Deo convenit sient etiam res libere futurae sunt Cum enim haec relatio consurgat ex fundamentis non necessaries â—â—â—â— ex rebus ipsis objâ—â—â—â— futuriâ— ipsa etiam habitudâ—â—â—â—â—re Deo convenit non intrinsicè sed extrinsecâ— solum denominationâ— quam Deo convenire non conveâ—ire â—on est absurdum Ergo cum Velle liberam Dei non solum includat essentiam sed cum tali respectâ— â—ti-â—â—sâ— libera Volunt as possâ—â— Dâ—o adesse abesse niâ—il sequitur absurdi quod divina simplicitati immutabilitati repugâ—et This little is all that they can tell us what Gods free Volition of extrinsick effects is And can you tell us any more Bradwardine denying in God any executive power besides meer Volition though he call him oâ—â—nipotent antecedently to his self-knowledge and Volition doth make Grace â—x parts Dâ—â— to be nothing but his Will that we shall do the act and be such and â—â—ch Intellect and will And is that the Question Wherein consisteth the efficacy of Gods essence Why it consisteth in it self if you mean Aptitudinal efficacy It is Gods essential Virtue If you mean Actual efficiency that speaketh the effect of which more anon So that about Gods essential efficacy there is no Controversie § 16. But if you say that It is his Potentia quà ordinata and not quà essentialis vel absoluta that you enquire of the efficacy of Remember that the word Ordinata or Limited signifieth no alteration in Gods Power at all but only An effect which as Limited and ordinate from whence the Power causing it is extrinsecally so named Gods essential Power is never limited but Infinite and to be Ordinate is but to have ordinate effects So that still either the Controversie must be of Gods essence which is past Controversie or of some second cause or some meer effect § 17. And if you transferr the Question to the efficacy of second causes 1. You will deny your selves that means and second causes have any power but from God 2. And that the very nature of those causes is sufficient to the ascertaining of the effect because they cause mostly morallyâ— And it is one of the accuâ—ations against the Aâ—minians right or wrong that they lay all on moral suasion or causality 3. And second causes are so numerous and unknown to us that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy 4. But it is I think agreed between you that the force of Means or second causes in Conversion is not such as necessitateth the will Or if some of the Schoolmen and Jesuites which with their Scientia Media do joyn Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem do make this efficacy to be the chief cause of the effect yet they deny it to cause necessarily at least alwayes when the effect followeth And what if we add that objects effect not as such And therefore this question de efficacia causarum secundarum must extend to some second effective Agents and not only to objects as such nor to those that preach present and offer objects as such And what that Agent Cause must be under God by that time you are agreed you will find that they are new Controversies that will there rise up before you And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the efficaciousness of any cause foregoing the first effect it self on the soul it must be of the efficacy of some or all these second causes or we must question whether God be God For I can find nothing else to question § 18. It remaineth then that the question Wherein the efficacy of Grace consisteth must be meant of Gratia operata even of the effect it self And then either you mean that this effect is efficacious to it self or to something else The first is such a contradiction as is not to be imagined that you should think that an effect is its own cause and ask How doth faith e. g. cause it self Therefore there is nothing left but only to question How the first effect of God on the soul in its conversion is efficacious of the second § 19. And here 1.
is oft not Actually effectual for want of that Voluntary Reception and self-excitation § 27. As to the various effects of Grace fore-mentioned 1. As to the preparation of Means and Gracious medicine Christ the Covenant c. Grace is efficient of it self and doth it 2. As to the first Impulse or Impress on the soul God certainly effecteth it in some degree wherever his spirit worketh on the soul 3. Some Urgency and some degree of disposition to the act is constantly contained in this Impulse And usually it giveth a moral power to the Immediate Act-required 4. The Act of faith sometimes followeth this Impulse through its invincible force And sometime it followeth it through its sufficient force and the due Reception * * * Omne agens requirit de necessitate aliquam dispositionem in suo passo Maximè si illud pà ssum habeat dispositiones actionâ— illius agentis contrarias ut patet de igne c. Ergo cum Gratia non sit minus inmo magis quam naturalis forma Certum est quod Gratia requirit majorem dispositionem in passo Et voco illam dispositionem Libertatem arbitrii sui Deo submittere se ad alteram partem declinare scilicet ad volendum Gratiam recipere dolere de culpa commissa voluntarie libere per attritionem Brianson in 4. q. 8. cor 3. fol. 152. This is just the doctrine of our Protestant Preachers supposing that Common Grace must make this preparation which the Papists grant of the subject And sometimes it followeth it not at all through the Recipients indisposition 5. The Habit of faith ever followeth a special Act through the powerful operation of the Holy Ghost But usually it goeth not before the Act Man hath not a fixed Habit to promptitude and facility of believing before he believeth but after 6. The Habit ordinarily procureth following acts by the way of Inclination but not necessarily nor alwayes For by strong temptations Habits are oft born down § 28. If the question then be Whence Gods Grace is Aptitudinally and Potentially efficacious able and fit to effect It is because God is God that he is Able and his Impulse is such because he maketh it such And if the question be Whence Grace is Actually efficient of its first effect the Impulse It is because God will so do and his will hath no Cause being the first Cause And if the question be Whence Grace is Actually efficient of mans faith It is by its Impelling man to believe But if you ask Whence faith it self is or of what cause is it an effect I answer of God as the first cause and the Means as his Instrument and of the Believer as a free second Cause And if the question be Why sufficient Grace which is Effectual ad Posse is not effectual ad agere It is because being but sufficient mans Indisposition and wilful neglect or opposition maketh him an unfit Receiver § 29. There being nothing then but Gods essence and the means antecedent to the first effect on the soul and that effect ever following where God worketh and the second effect being the effect both of God by the first and of man as a free agent the questions unde efficatia Gratiae and unde effectus are thus healingly answered § 30. Obj. But the will of God is the first differencing and effectual Cause And that not as it is his essence but as it is terminated on the Creature and decreeth such an effect Answ 1. It is no will but his essence which is so terminated or decretive 2. That termination maketh no difference at all that 's real in the will of God but only in the effect or object 3. What is the difference then between Gods will simply in it self and as willing from eternity a thing not yet existent None really at all And that which is not yet being Nothing what Relative Connotative and Denominative difference such Nothings can make on the will of God besides the variety of imperfect notions in mans frail Intellect let the wise consider § 31. From whence it is that School-divines after Augustine say that with God there is no futurum velpraeteritum no fore-knowledge or fore-decrees properly because no difference of time but only knowledge and will of things as present § 32. Yet Gods Vital Activity Knowledge and Will as he himself is the object of them have a Greater distinction because to be self-living self-knowing and self-loving are his Essential Acts on himself the eternal object which made many Ancients account them the Trinity of persons And also to Will an existent Creature is an extrinsick denomination from existence But to will that which is not that man shall be that he shall believe hereafter c. as it is nothing really different from Gods essence so it is but an extrinsick denomination of his essence from nothing SECT XVI Of Infused Habits and the Holy Ghost Given us The Schoolmen that speak most for the necessity of Infused Habits cannot agree what use they are for Aureolus supposeth chiefly for the right circumstantiating of Acts rather than for promptitude to them and pleasure in them And when all is said they give men but small comfort from them saying as Aureolus Brianson c. that no man can be sure that he hath them seeing acquired Habits may do the same things that Infused do Utrum Beatitudo supernaturalis hujus vitae sit magis in Habitibus quam in operationibus vid. Suarez Metaph. disp 44. sect 8. n. 18. Molina 1. p. q. 12. ar 5. disp 2. ar 2. pro habitibus Sed contra inquit Aegid de Sancta Praesentatione Li. 4. de beatit q. 5. a. 3. pâ— 471. His non obstantibus oppositum affirmant omnes Theologi qui bac de re scripserunt nec videtur posse de hoc dubitari And yet Alens 2. p. q. 104. m. 3. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 51. a. 2. ad 3. q. 63. a. 2. ad 3. Valentiâ—â— To. disp 4. q. 3. punct 2. c. are for preferring Habits Idem Aegid de Praesentat li. 4. p. 443 444. tells us that by Grace God is Present in the soul as his Temple otherwise than by Immensity and sustentation But his praesentia Amicitia can mean nothing but the special effects of Gods Love Nostrâ tempestate non solum est temerarium periculosum sed ferè hareticum habitus insusos negare Nam Concil Vienens c. universi Theologi uno consensu affirmant dari habitus insusos Medina in 1. 2. q. 51. a. 4. 282. But Soto li. 2. de nat grat c. 17 18. saith that the Concil Trid. purposely forbore to define the case of infused habits Let the Reader note that Jansenius proveth that Pelagius himself asserted infused Habits given in baptism and that without merit Jans Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p. 126. § 1. EVery operation of the Holy Ghost is not the Giving
to Angels nor to Brutes For as God made one sort of creatures naturally determined to things sensible and another sort necessarily though freely determined to things spiritual so it pleased him to make a middle sort endued with Reason and free-will undetermined as to their choice and able freely to determine their own Volitions without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other That so they might be fit subjects to be governed in this Life by Laws and other moral means § 4. God as Creator maketh substances with their necessary Accidents and as the Natural Orderer of them placeth them in their natural order and as Motor or Actor he causeth Action as such But as Moral Rector he causeth only the Moral Order of Actions as far as belongeth to a Rector the rest being presupposed in Nature and leaveth it to man to cause the rest § 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making such a creature as man of a middle defectible undetermined Will left to his free choice with necessary helps it being part of the beauty of his works to be diversified He is not then to be blamed for any of the sins of such a creature because he supporteth his Being and his Active Nature and is his first cause of Action § 6. God could prevent all future sin if he absolutely willed so to do either by destroying the World or disabling the sinner or by withholding his Moving Influx or by such a change of his nature as should make him indefectible But he that made man in this Middle state will so continue him and not make a change in the frame of Nature to fulfil our wills § 7. No Act as an Act no Vital Act as Vital no Intellection no Volition as such is Virtue or Sin And therefore to cause it as such is not to cause either moral good or evil § 8. As God is Related to us as our Owner Ruler and our chief good efficiently as our Benefactor and finally as our End so to consent to these Relations and to the Duties of our correlations and to Practise them is the summ of all Moral Good even Dispositively and Actually to be Resigned and devoted to God as our Owner to obey and please him as our Ruler and to be Thankful to Him and totally Love Him as our Benefactor and our ultimate End All Moral Goodness lyeth in this § 9. By which it appeareth that Morality consisteth in the due or undue ORDER of our actions and dispositions as they are a Moral Agent 's related to God himself in these three Relations and to his Actions therein viz. his Disposals his Laws and his Attractive final Goodness with his Benefits § 10. In these the Morality consisteth as simpliciter talis in all three inseparably as Gods Relations are inseparable and our correlations But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them is Morality secundum quid § 11. And among them all our Action submission resignation patience to God meerly as our Owner is Moral but in the slenderest initial sense And our Actions as related to him as our Rector are Moral in the fuller formal sense And therefore by most accounted the only formal Morality as being a relation to a Law But yet our Actions as Related to God our Benefactor Lover and End are Moral in the highest most perfective notion § 12. It is not only sub rationâ— obedientia as it is a thing commanded by a Law that Love to God is Morally good but also in that superiour sense formally as it is the Love of God And therefore Love is called the Law of Laws and the fulfilling of the Law not only as commanded by a Law but as being the End of the Law and the state of perfection above it as Christ is to the Law of Moses and also as being a Law eminenter something greater though not formaliter § 13. But as there is an Order in these Relations so is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them So that the Last still includeth the rest foregoing All Love is Obedience and all Obedience is submission to our Owner But all Obedience is not Love nor all Submission or Resignation formal obedience to a Rector Though they must all concurr and not be divided when they are formally distinguished § 14. I have thought it necessary though I be guilty of some repetition to open here the Doctrine of formal Morality Virtue and Vice because we cannot understand how God is vindicated from being the Author of sin till we know what sin is which we cannot do till we know what Virtue is which we cannot do till we know what Morality is And also because the Schoolmens most subtile elaborate enquiries into this point especially de naturâ— peccati are generally too little subtile or accurate as comparing it with this little you may perceive § 15. From all this it is plain 1. That God as the meer Author and Motor of Nature doth not cause us to Obey or Love him And therefore that these must be caused by another superadded operation § 16. Yet when we Obey and Love him the Generical Nature of the Act is from God as the God of Nature viz. as it is Intellection Volition Action But that these Actions are so duly ordered as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded is otherwise caused For though the Generical nature of Action Intellection and Volition as such be seldom found but in some Moral species and that be never found but in singular acts yet can one causality procure the Generical nature and another the Specifical and another the singularity in the same action As the Sun is the Generical Cause and the Virtus Seminalis the specifying and the Individuatio seminis the Individâ—â—aâ—ing of Plants Animals c. § 17. As God is the God of Nature so he hath setled Nature in such a constant course of motion as that we have small reason to expect that he should there make any ordinary mutations And therefore as the Sun aforesaid he doth by his Generical Influx concurr with all Specifying and Individuating Causes according to their several natures or receptivities § 18. They therefore that suppose that God as the Cause of all Action must of natural necessity ad esse by physical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free to its object compared with other possible objects and that in all its modes and circumstances do confound Nature and Morality and leave nothing for God to do in causing Holiness but what he must needs do to cause all action that is caused allowing the difference of the second effects â— yea but what he doth in causing every sin For his Pracept is not with them the Causing predetermination § 19. Jesus Christ and his Gospel with all the fore described frame of moral means and the Spirit to co-operate are the proper second causes by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily
are wrought by common grace and that it is special acts and habits overcoming the flesh and world which are wrought by special grace So that those firemen that are resolved that yet differ they will and implacably differ and their adversaries shall be enemies of Gods Grace whether they will or not are yet defective in that acuteness and pregnancy of wit which is necessary to pretend a real disagreement and are forced to say that they disagree when they have not wit enough to seem to prove it to any but those that take their cholerick zeal and reproach for proof For in this there is no difference among us 6. Obj. At least we can prove that we differ in this about the effects that one side make Gods gracious habits given to believers to be such as may be lost and dye and the other do not Answ That is no difference You still want wit to make differences though you want not will For both sides are agreed that perseverance ariseth not from the meer nature of the Habit of grace but from Gods superadded sustentation For Adam and the faln Angels had as is commonly held such kind of habitual grace as we though objectively differing 7. Seeing there is no difference on Gods part as they all conclude Resistible grace and irresistible sufficient and effectual can have no difference but in the very effect or event and the connotation of mans Power or impotency to the contrary I know as I have said that not only the Dominicans and Calvinists but Suarez and other Jesuits say that Effectual Grace is such ex parte principii as is forcibler for faith as the effect But they contradict themselves who confidently say that besides that effect it is nothing but Gods essence which hath no degrees or real differences And mans power of Resistance and frustration is none as to Gods will and essence but only as to the effect When he could have done otherwise 8. The same Vanity they declare in the question Whether the same degree of Divine Grace help or operation would Convert one man as doth another or would Convert as doth not Convert When they are agreed that the effect is not the same and that the cause hath no degrees of difference 9. And though it 's past mans understanding to comprehend how all the various effects in the world should be produced without the least diversity in the Cause Will or Action ex parte agentis and that Velle salvare Petrum velle damnare Judam should be perfectly the same Volition ex parte Volentis yet it is the liker to be true because man cannot comprehend it as long as he hath no evidence to prove that it is not true For God is incomprehensible 10. Seeing then that we must concent 1. That God Decreed to do all that he doth and properly and absolutely no more 2. And that Christs death is the cause of all that it effecteth and properly of no more Of which the conditional gift of pardon and life is part And so that all the Controversie 1. Of Decree 2. Of Redemption is resolved into that of the effects 3. And seeing all the effects are such whose difference we little differ about if at all and ex parte Dei agentis they agree that there is no difference where then is the Difference among all the contenders §. II. Alvarez his Epitome in Twenty Propositions considered BUt that all this may more plainly appear I will recite the Twenty Conclusions which Alvarez in his Epilogus giveth us as the summ of all his Book one hundred twenty one Disputations And I shall tell you how far they are all to be consented to * Thus Bradwardine concludeth his Book with thirty six errors and as many verities which he would have the Church especially that of Rome determine But leaving out the most unsavoury parts or expressions of his own judgement Whether God be the chief necessitating Cause of all sin is none of them I. Free-will in lapsed nature cannot without the help of grace do a moral work which by co-operation of the supernatural End shall be truly good and a work of Virtue so as that by the doer it be referred to God beloved simply above all as to the ultimate natural End Answ It is granted and more that though all natural men have one sort of Grace given them yet I think this cannot be done without special saving grace II. Man by the sole strength of nature cannot assent to all supernatural mysteries propounded and explained to him as revealed of God or because revealed of God so as the formal reason of his belief is Divine revelation Answ It 's true He must have commoner grace to believe them dogmatically and uneffectually and special saving grace to believe them practically and savingly III. Not only faith it self but also the first beginning of faith proceedeth from the help of grace and not from the strength of Nature only Answ Very true IV. The free-will of man in lapsed Nature cannot without the help of Grace Love God above all simply even as he is the author of Nature Answ It 's true V. Man in lapsed Nature without the help of Grace cannot fulfill all the precepts even of the Law of Nature nor overcome any great difficulty and temptation even for any little time which it is necessary to overcome for the keeping of that Law Answ True Therefore they have some Grace that do it VI. There is no Law nor ever was made by God of his giving the actual helps of preventing grace to them that do all that is in them by the sole faculty of nature nor hath Christ merited or would have any such Law Answ True For he giveth some common grace to all men antecedently without any condition on their part And though he give to those that use their common grace to the utmost or near it sufficient encouragement to go on and hope that such endeavour shall not be in vain as to the obtaining of peculiar grace yet de nomine vel definitione Whether this encouragement shall be called a Law or a Promise or neither we contend not VII God by his helping grace floweth into free-will by premoving it that it may co-operate and also truly-efficiently together with the same free-will causeth its pious operation Answ It 's true But all adjuvant grace produceth not the second effect which floweth from both Causes of which before and after VIII When God by his exciting Grace striketh and toucheth the hearts of men he doth not expect that the will by its innate liberty begin its motion by Consenting But God by adjuvant grace effecteth that it freely and infallibly Consent Answ It 's true of all that do consent But God hath a degree of exciting and adjuvant grace which are Necessary and give the posse Velle which cause not the act through mans defect And though God expect not that effect as one that is deceived
yet he commandeth it and requireth it of us But exciting and adjuvant Grace are all one on Gods part And if you will difference the same things as connoting divers effects you must denominate it more fitly from the effects by words that notifie the difference IX Adjuvant Grace and Free-will are not Partial Causes of supernatural Consent as two drawing a Boat so as neither is premoved by the other or maketh it co-operate with it Answ True For God premoveth the will of man though through mans fault it be not ever effectual And though Gods will and mans be two Causes of the same effect the term Partial is scarce fit while man hath his whole power and activity from God X. Scientia media is not to be ascribed to God But all prescience of the future co operation of the will even from the foresaid Hypothesis presupposeth in signo rationis the free decree of Gods will by which absolutely or granting that Hypothests he will in us and with us effect that operation if Good and permit it if Evil. Answ Here come in your presumptions of things unknown or false 1. That God knoweth future contingents and conditionals is certain But I think this scientia media unfitly named and an unnecessary distribution and insufficient to the Jesuits ends 2. And your fiction of signa rationis and the necessary antecedence of a decree of Gods to his knowledge of every Volition of man is a more ungrounded and perillous figment which you have not proved It seemeth a denyal of Gods Omniscience or perfection that he cannot know an act future as future but only as decreed to be so 3. You deceitfully talk of permitting evil while you plead for the irresistible predetermining premotion of the will by God to every evil act with all its circumstances Is that but Permitting 4. To permit is Nothing no act of God but a non-agency not to hinder And how prove you that God must of necessity have a Positive Decree for every Nothing or non-agency Is not the not-willing or not-decreeing to hinder a lye e. g. supposing natural concurse or to make more worlds enough to the production of that lye by an ill inclined nature or to the not-being of more Worlds We are in the dark and God is infinitely above us and these tremendous mysteries are not to be so presumptuously handled by unproved assertions XI There is on our part no Cause Reason or Condition assignable for which Gods supernatural providence in comparison of this or that hath the formal reason of predestination or retaineth the common reason of providence but predestination is to be reduced into the sole free-will of God Answ Most of this is about meer words The word Predestination connoteth various effects and objects and so is called various Acts. There is no efficient Cause in the Creature of any act of God But there are objects without which Gods Acts have not their special denominations and these objects are the termini and called Material Constitutive Causes of those various acts as denominated various specially or numerically And so Gods Decree or Will to Justifie and Glorifie man hath something in the object as a necessary condition of it * * * That is of that object which is not â—â— the object of his decree of giving faith And that hath something in its object which is not in the object of the decree of giving a Redeemer to the World or making the World c. if you will at all distinguish Gods decrees by their objects or effects But if not there will be no matter for any Controversie And Predestination is an ambiguous word If it be taken for All Gods fore-decreeing or all about man or all of Good to us then our Being is the first effect of it in us and the making of the World a preparatory effect c. And so no doubt the first effect supposed us no men before and therefore no condition in us But if you take Predestination for Gods decree of Giving us Grace and Glory only then it is presupposed that we are lapsed sinners And the decree of damning men is exercised only on them as foreknown damnable sinners And the decree of penal denying Grace or faith to sinners for sin supposeth them such punishable sinners But the bare Negation of a Decree to give faith to one to whom the absence is no privation is unfitly called Reprobation though men may talk at their own rates And we grant that some such no-decrees have no condition in the objects for they have no objects e. g. If you will feign that God decreed from eternity to give me no faith before the Creation or before I was born or to give Innocent Adam no faith in a Saviour as dying for him this were no reprobating act But when God hath given men a Saviour with his common grace to believe in and accept here if he deny them necessary grace to believe it is a penal act And note that Christ and Common grace as absolutely given to mankind and offered to individuals ever goeth before mens accepting or refusing him And no man to whom he is offered refuseth him for want of necessary help till by sin against that grace he forfeit it XII God by an absolute and efficacious decree of his Will antecedently to the prescience of the future good use of free-will predetermined all good acts which are done in time specially those by which the predestinate come to eternal life Answ The substance of this seemeth true only 1. Whether you fitly denominate a decree efficacious from eternity which effecteth nothing till the Time I leave to them that dispute of words 2. You presumptuously determine Gods Decrees to be antecedent to his prescience herein when they are neither before nor after one another 3. If by predetermining you mean more than predecreeing or prevolition as if mans will was predetermined when it was not determined or determined before it had a being you speak contradictions But Gods own will was eternally determined if we may so say of that which was never undetermined to give all the grace that he giveth in time and to cause all the good acts that he causeth as he causeth them XIII The Co-operation of free-will with the gifts of grace is in the predestinate an effect of predestination and efficiently proceedeth from God making us by the help of grace freely to co-operate and consequently dependeth not on the sole and innate liberty of the will Answ I think so too XIV We must necessarily distinguish of a twofold help of Grace one sufficient by which man may be converted to God or work piously The other effectual by which God effecteth that he be actually converted and act piously Answ Hold to that and contradict not the terms in your description and all 's well XV. The effectual help of preventing or preoperating grace moveth mans free-will to act not only by perswading alluring inviting or other
morally attracting even inwardly but also efficaciously and truly effecting that the will moved and excited of God determine it self and act well Answ We know what mans perswading and moral operations are a little But the difference between these interiour acts of God named by you no man knoweth You cannot prove that his Interiour swasion is not truly efficient of the act nor know you how God proâ—ureth our determination as to the mode of his interiour operation Your arbitrary names have no signification of your true formal conceptions of the matter This Controversie therefore is vain XVI The efficacy of the help of preventing grace and the infallible connexion of it with the free co-operation of the will is totally founded and taken as from its first root from the Omnipotency of God and from the absolute and efficacious decree of his will willing that the man whom he moveth be converted and work piously nor doth this efficacy any way depend no not as on a condition sine qua non on the future co-operation of the created will though the free act by which man persevereth depend effectively on his will moved by God Answ 1. I grant that all the good that cometh to pass is fore-decreed by God 2. But Gods meer will effecteth it not without his Power 3. His power effecteth it not from eternity before it is effected 4. You leave out one of the causal Attributes The effect of Grace is as well from the Wisdom of God as from his Will and Power 5. Gods act dependeth not on mans will But mans co-operation which is his own act you must confess dependeth on his will as the effect on the nearest efficient 6. The non-efficiency of sufficient Grace dependeth on the sinners will It was not meerly nor principally from an absolute efficacious Decree or predetermination of God that Adams will omitted his duty first or committed sin first And if any run to the common shadow that sin hath no efficient cause and man only is deficient I answer 1. He is the first Reputative Deficient though not culpable because under no Law who must be the first efficient of the contrary and is not As if Adams body had never had a soul God was the first Non-efficient Cause that is into whose will and non-agency the whole ratio defectus is to be resolved 2. Forget not that Alvarez himself saith lib. 6. disp 45. p. 210. Licet peccatum originale non sit pro formali aliquid positivum sed privativum peccatum tamen actuale est pro formali aliquid positivum causat in anima habitum vitii XVII Supposing effectual Grace in free-will it infallibly followeth that free-will will consent and act piously so that these two are incompossible that effectual Grace be in a man and that he actually dissent Answ True because it is not called properly effectual unless either 1. Because it effecteth 2. Or as it cometh from an absolute decree of effecting 3. Or is of such a nature and degree that it cannot but effect And in all these cases it is true But such Grace may be eventually uneffectual which had a sufficiency ex parte sui to effect XVIII The gift of perseverance as such and the efficacy of it dependeth not no not as on a Condition sine qua non on the co-operation of our free-will but on the absolute decree of God effecting mans perseverance Answ This needeth no other explication or observation but as aforesaid Only that the Jus ad gratiam quâ ad finem perseveremus is given on condition in the Gospel from how absolute a decree soever it proceed XIX Effectual aid and a Power of dissenting are compossible in the same subject and consist in the same will Answ True And remember that a true Power is that quâ verè possumus and not that faculty which could do this or that if God will predetermine it and otherwise cannot no more than the Sun can shine without him When God withholdeth the Influx necessary to action such a faculty is no true power as to that action in that State XX. By preventing Grace efficacious as aforesaid the Liberty of the will is not destroyed nor the actual use of it hindered but is wonderfully perfected and roborated Answ There is a Liberty that is perfected by some even necessitating Free-will in name is owned by you all I say as August Enchir. c. 105. Sic oportebat prius hominem fierl ut bene velle posset male nec gratis si bene nec impune si male postea vero sic erit ut male velle non possit Quia ordo praetermittendus non suit in quo Deus voluit ostendere quam bonum sit animal rationale quod etiam peccare possit quamvis sit melius quod peccare non possit predetermination of God And there is an inferiour Liberty of Imperfect Viators which some efficient Divine predetermination feigned by you would destroy And if God did by that insuperable premoving influx which omnipotently moveth all things predetermine all men and Devils to all the wicked Volitions and actions that ever were done with all the circumstances and as respecting every object comparatively so that no creature ever did nor can resist such a predetermination any easier than make a World this were to destroy the true Liberty of that Creature with his innocency and felicity however you may at pleasure put the name of Liberty on and deny the name of Necessity to such an absolutely necessitated Volition and act and then may say that they are premoved and predetermined to do the Act of all sin freely or constrained to do it without constraint and so the liberty of the will is established For I see not but cogere ad Volendum is as apt a phrase as cogere nolentem ad agendum when a will formerly innocent is irresistibly predetermined by physical efficiency to all those comparate circumstantiate acts which are forbidden in Gods Law and that on pain of mans damnation But note how wisely Alvarez left out the great difference about predetermining to the acts of sin from this summary of his disputations §. III. Of the three other wayes and I. Of the Jesuits way Quest AS you have past your judgement on Alvarez and his Dominican way tell us how much you think well or ill of in the other three wayes mentioned by Alvarez and recited by you sect 8 Answ I. I have said enough before to answer this Briefly as to the Jesuits way de scientia media 1. It is certain that God knoweth all that Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 22. d. 99. c. 6 7. after the rejection of many opinions holds this the only way of Concord 1. Gods preventing operating grace is Vocatio Congrua with good cogitations and the primus motus voluntatis ante actum liberum 2. Gods co-operating Grace ad consensum liberum is neither before nor after our act but concomitant simul And so
think a good thought by any help that God can give him unless he physically predetermine him to it then the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously to be resolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it as the reason why he doth it into his predetermination and as it is night because the Sun shineth not XVII But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin because he is under no prohibiting Law Though it be true 1. That his nature or perfection the root of all Laws is more than a Law 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of man but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it which is none of the question XVIII And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning is not at all caused by God e. g. that we hate him not nor his truth and wayes and servants that we murder not commit not adultery steal not lye not covet not blaspheme not wrong none do no evil c. we need no help of God for this Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them it is impossible for us to do them at all XIX And though we say that God willeth sin to be by his permission only and not by his efficience yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause is the principal efficiency And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum and therefore permitteth not And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin and not because he meerly permitteth it For permission is not de impossibilibus XX. God willeth not sin because he willeth it not as sin in its formale which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not XXI And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future but as he willeth or decreeth them we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale was such as it is quid futurum if it was but futura privatio And therefore this would inferr that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also XXII Gods Will is his Love and what he Willeth he Loveth XXIII God willeth the futurity and existence of sin not only of the materiale but the formale even of all the sin that ever is done XXIV The existence of sin is Good and Amiable not only by accident but per se as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God XXV It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth and Loveth and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid the circumstantiated act and so the resultancy of the relative form And he willeth and Loveth the existence of all and the thing existing so far as he causeth it XXVI God Willeth Loveth and Causeth sin incomparably more than wicked men do For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable dependent will but God with a Divine primary immutable will Man causeth the forbidden act whence the relation resulteth with a Will that is irresistibly moved so to do by God as the pen writeth only sâ—o modo with Volition But God causeth it as the first omnipotent unresistible cause of all that the Creature doth in sinning XXVII The same must be said of God and the Devil who can no more commit one sinful act till God unavoidably predetermine his will to it by his premotion than sinful man can XXVIII God by his Law doth strictly forbid all those sinful acts which he principally and unavoidably causeth And he strictly commandeth all those good acts whose contraries he thus causeth us to do XXIX Though there is nothing in sin which can have a cause of which God is not the Principal cause and though he Willeth and Loveth all that he causeth yet the Scripture saith that God hateth sin and cannot behold it and hateth all the workers of iniquity and that it is abomination to him that he is as one laden with it and wearied provoked and offended by it And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holiness when he will not cause them but doth cause and will the contrary XXX Pardon and salvation is promised and earnestly offered by God to the Reprobate themselves on condition that they will believe and repent when God doth unavoidably as the first cause determine their wills to the contrary acts even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God and holiness XXXI The Law of God is that all the Reprobates shall be damned to hell fire if they will not believe and repent when his omnipotence doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impenitence and if they will not give over those acts of sin to which God doth thus unavoidably move and determine them XXXII Gods executions are answerable to these Laws and all save Christians and all professed Christians saving the sanctified are to be punished in hell fire for ever only for not doing the acts of Faith Love and obedience when God as the first cause predetermined them to the contrary and for doing the acts of sin when God unavoidably moved them to it and made them do it so that consequently all that are damned suffer in hell for not being Gods even the first sufficient causes of their own acts and for not being above God or stronger than he that is for not overcoming or avoiding his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts XXXIII The same must be said of the Devils who sin and suffer on the same terms XXXIV Q. What kind of torment then will there be in Hell Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to that is for not overcoming God when they know the case Or must we not more congruously say that the state of Hell torments lyeth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them and a justifying of themselves Or will every mouth be thus stopt in judgement XXXV Q. Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice and the exemplar of all humane Justice allowing for disparities And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course And how then would they be esteemed XXXVI Q Is not that best which is most agreeable to Gods Will and Love And therefore sin better than
have it not want it because they refused Preparatory grace which they were able to have better used oâ— submitted to So that the Reward is only such as a free gift which quoad ordinem conferendi rationes adjudicandi is given by God as a Father who at once useth Power Love and paternal Justice according to the tenour of his own Law of Grace which is founded in Christs perfect merits and is Christs own Law VIII and IX 1. That quoad eventum the good Angels grace was effectual and Adjutorium quo as well as sine quo non he granteth And Adams till he fell Let us find out the difference then To say that yet They could have sinned is a doubtful speech If could signifie Pâ—tâ—â—â—iam naturalem it is noâ— for want of Natural Power that Christ himself sinned not but because perfection caused the right use of that Power To be able to sin or not to believe or not to love God if it signifie any more than the Natural power which men abuse is an improper speech for sin is from moral impotency or indetermination and not an vaâ—t of other power But a Logical Possibility of any event but what â—ame to pass Gods very fore-knowledge will exclude and so his Decree And if the question be Whether Adam could not have stood when he fell it is agreed that he could It seemeth then that our Controversie lyeth plainly â—â— these two things 1. Whether any man now Holy or unholy have any help from God by Christ by which he is truly able to do any one good action more â—â—â—â— other than he doth or to forbear any more evil 2. Whether all Divine causation or operation â—e such as of it self alone will inferr the â—â—â—tainty of mans Volition as the Effect We gâ—ant that Divine prescieâ—â—â— doth inferr it eâ—â—â—oessitate infallibilitâ—â—â—â— Divine Volitions some think are ever efficient of all that is willed and that God hath no other operation but Volition as Bradwardine and others Others deny this 〈…〉 that God hath Power operative as much distinct from Volition aâ—â—â—tellection is and also that God willeth more than he operateth or totally causeth And of this opinion must Jansenius needs be because he held that the free-will of Adam before his fall and of the good Angels caused more obedience than God caused as to the totality of causation And yet â—ethinks he should be loth to say that it was more than God willed or decreed However the former is but a wordy strife For if God operate only Volendo yet his will as Immanent and a meer will as mans must be distinguished from his will as transient and efficient by operation So then the thing in question is Whether Gods power or will so far only as it is operative be so total a cause as that hac posita ex vi causandi necessario sequitur effectum viz. fidem charitatem humanam secuturum And we grant that as ex perfectione Intellectus it followeth Deus praescâ—t hoc futurum ergo futurum est so ex perfectione Voluntatis summo Imperio foelicitate Divina it followeth Deus vult hoc futurum esse ergo futurum est and that ex necessitate existentiae no doubt it is a good consequence Deus hoc fecit ergo factum est But Whether from his meer adjutorium or prime efficiency limited by his own will it be a good consequence God giveth as much help as is of necessity to mans volition ergo man will consent or will is the doubt He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed but he thinks that now it will We grant that God giveth not only the posse velle but the ipsum velle to those that have it His giving it being but a causing their faculties to Act And we grant that wherever God absolutely willeth that his Help shall be successful it is so And also that whereas all the effect cometh from our natural Power and Gods grace conjunct God is the cause of both And is ever the total cause quoad effectum that is totius effecti And we grant that Gods causing Impress on the will is such on some and perhaps on all in the act of special sanctification as ex vi causae will inferr the effect and is unresistible and doth not only determine the will but so determineth it as overcometh all moral power or disposition to the contrary But yet that there is a Grace or adjutorium of Christ which giveth a power either not necessitating the act or when the act followeth not such as he calleth sine quo non I think for these reasons 1. Because else no man can do any more good or less evil than he doth which I believe not 2. Because else All men that perish are damned only for original sin and its consequents which they had never power to avoid which is quite contrary to the tenour of the Scripture 3. And then God would judge them only by the Law of Innocency whereas he will judge them by Christ and by his Remedying Law for rejecting the remedying grace 4. And then the Conscience of the damned would have nothing to torment them with or accuse them for but original sin and its unavoidable consequents And it would give them this excuse and ease God never made it Possible for me to do otherwise 5. Because it teacheth men great ingratitude to say I never had any help of Christ 6. And so it teacheth them impenitently to extenuate their sin if they do but find themselves wicked and to say I never sinned against any Grace of Christ 7. And it feigneth God to give men all that reprival and mercy which the reprobate have from some other Cause and not by Christ And so to make a kind of grace common in the World which the Scripture knoweth not nor is according to the Covenant of Innocency or of Grace 8. Because God is Immutable and too gross mutations are not without proof to be imputed to his Laws and Government Therefore it seemeth to me an injurious fiction to say as Jansenius that God had such Laws as supposed mans self-determining will and governed so as to use sufficient Grace or adjutorium sine quo non to man and Angels at the first and thaâ— now he hath no such at all but only a moving efficiency I should sooner yield to the Dominicans and Hobbes that no other than necessitated Volitions are possible or ever were than to hold as he that there were other before the fall and none ever since For as to his great argument vitiated nature I answer it 1. Man is man still And therefore God ruleth him as man And that in via And if then man and Angels were supposed to have a self-determining free-will that could do this or not do it we have reason to think it is so still Why is not grace meerly sufficient as consistent with Lapsed as Innocent nature supposing that it is not the
What man can do further opened p. 114. Crim. 3. Holding free will to good p. 121. A manifold Liberty evinced by many Questions p. 122. Whether any that use it not have liberty to believe p. 124 125. Crim. 4. That men are not dead in sin p. 125. Crim. 5. That man is not meerly passive in his first conversion p. 126. Crim 6. None damned for Adam's sin only p. 128. The seventh days Conference Of Sufficient and Effectual Grace Crim. 1. Of the Armin. Denying sufficient Grace they damn men for meer Impossibilities p. 130. Had Adam sufficient Grace p. 132. Of the 13th Artic. of the Church of England p. 133. How God willeth mens Salvation p. 134. Crim. 2. Making Grace unresistible p. 136. How far they do so The eighth days Conference Crim. 1. Of the Calv. They assert universal sufficient Grace p. 139. Queries evincing Common Grace p. 139. The greatness of their error that deny it p. 141. Doth this satisfie while God that can save men will not p. 143. What Grace and what sufficient Grace is p. 145. Whether the same measure of Grace called meerly sufficient be ever effectual p. 148. What the Grace in that question is Whether a vis impressa Of determination by God and by the Intellect p. 151 152 153. Crim. 2. By Grace they mean Nature as Pelagius p. 156. What Nature is Grace how far supernatural p. 158. Crim. 3. Making Grace but a Moral swasion p. 160. Physical operation what p. 162. Crim. 4. They hold faith to be acquired and not infused p. 162. What acquired and infused means p. 163. Dr. Twisse about this noted p. 167 c. Crim. 5. They hold Grace given according to works or preparation p. 169. Crim. 6. They make the Will to have no sin or Grace p. 171. Crim. 7. They make Grace resistible p. 172. The case further opened p. 173 174 c. Is there any universal second cause of Grace under God as the Sun in Nature which worketh resistibly and God by it ad modum recipientis p. 177. Christ how far such ib. Crim. 8. They make mans Will to make himself to differ c. p. 180. What differing is what the causes as to believing ib. How far God worketh by universal Grace p. 185. Who made thee to differ opened p. 186. Crim. 9. Man's will maketh Gods Grace effectual and not Gods p. 186. Whence Grace is effectual p. 189. Differencing Grace what p. 192. It not all the question of the Divine Impress p. 193 194. The case summarily opened p. 196. The ninth days Conference Of Perseverance The Arm. Crim. 1. They make fear and care to be folly p. 198. Crim. 2. They cherish all sin p. 200. Crim. 3. Their Doctrine is uncomfortable on pretence of confuting p. 200 201. Both sides charge each other thus A middle way about Perseverance avoiding both p. 204. Crim. 4. They dishonour Gods Image making heinous sin consistent with it p. 204. Crim. 5. Immodesty and singularity contradicting all the ancient Church p. 206. Crim. 6. Contradicting express Scripture p. 207. The tenth days Conference The Calv. Criminations about Perseverance Crim. 1. They overthrow the comfort of believers that deny Perseverance p. 208. What comfort may be had by such p. 211. Crim. 2. and 3. They make God or his Covenant mutable p. 212. Crim. 4. They deny the Promise of Perseverance p. 213. Crim. 5. They infer a second Regeneration p. 214. Crim. 6. They go against the Doctrine of Augustine c. p. 215. The just extenuation of this last controversie p. 215. The eleventh days Conference with a Libertine called Antinomian vindicating sound Doctrine against divers accusations Chap. 1. Whether we must call men to come to Christ without Preparation p. 220. Chap. 2. Of denying our own Righteousness p. 223. Personal Righteousness necessary p. 224. Of Reward and worthiness or Merit p. 225. The truth largely opened about merit and reward p. 230. Reasons for it p. 232 c. Ch. 3. Whether our own Righteousness conduce to our Justification Or we are any way justified by it p. 238. Ch. 4. Whether the Gospel be a Law of Christ p. 243. Ch. 5. Whether Christ and not we be the only party in Covenant with God p. 245. Ch. 6. Whether the new Covenant have conditions p. 247. Ch. 7. Whether justifying faith be a believing in Christ as Teacher Ruler c. or only a receiving his Righteousness p. 251. Ch. 8. Of Faiths Justifying Instrumentally p. 251. Ch. 9. Whether Faith it self be Imputed for Righteousness p. 252. Ch. 10. Whether it be a change in God to justifie the before unjustified p. 256. Ch. 11. Whether a justified man should fear becoming unjustified ibid. Ch. 12. Of mans power to believe and our calling the unregenerate to Duty p. 258. Ch. 13. Of the witness of the Spirit and of Evidences of Justification p. 261. The Conclusion The twelfth days Conference with a learned Lutherane Whether the difference among Christians about Merit be as great as some think it p. 263. Some Protestants and the late Lecturers Reasons against Merit proposed p. 265. and the case opened Of the Doctrine of the Council of Trent p. 266 c. Of condignity p. 267. The Doctrine of Vega Scotus Waldensis Eckius Marsilius Bellarmine Greg. Armin. Durand Brugens Cusanus Stapleton Bradwardine Soto Bonaventure st Clara and all the Schoolmen as he judgeth Carthus Cassander p. 270. Holiness and Glory a greater gift than Glory without holiness p. 271. Aquinas judgment His confusion occasioned by his opinion that the new Law is that which is in the heart and not written viz. the Spirit as the Quakers hold ib. Vasquez denyeth Commutative Justice in God with all the School Doctors 17 of them cited He confuteth it even as to Christ He denyeth proper Distributive Justice also in God citing Bonavent Scotus Durand Palud Gabriel Alexand. Aquin. c. p. 272 c. Aquinas sense in Carbo's words p. 275. Many Schoolmen deny as much as Legal or Governing Justice in God Ruiz citeth for this Argent Bassol Suarez Pesant Suarez saith God's promises are but naked Assertions declaring his Will Durand that promises signifie not obligation Greg. Armin. That the Crown is no Debt but of free Ordination Marsil That God is no Debtor but free Giver Scotus Major Ricard deny God to be a Debtor by his promise but hold that Merits are such by Promise Ruiz saith against Suarez That Promises are more than Assertions but that God's obligation is to himself p. 276. Medina against Meriting Remission p. 277. Against Preparation p. 277. Contarenus judgment Fisher's of Rochester p. 278. The words of Tolet p. 280. The thirteenth days Conference with a Sectary Of the great errors sin and danger which many Ignorant Professors fall into on the pretence of abhorring and avoiding Popery p. 283. The sins of such as Calumniate sound Teachers as favouring Popery p. 285. Errors vended by some Protestants through an injudicious opposition to
the days of Arminius to this day especially between Prince Maurice and the States at the death of Barnevelt the imprisonment of Grotius c. The Synod at Dort and all the strife and discontent before and after it 3. Peruse but the Volumes written on one side by Suecâ—nus Arminius Grevinchovius Corvinus Tilenus Episcopius Curcellaeus Grotius c. with many Lutherans And on the other side by Gomarrus Lubbertus Macchovius c. Molinaeus Amesius Dr. Twisse Rutherford Spanhemius c. and think how sad such Combats are 4. Think what a lamentable distance to this day is kept up between the Lutherans and Calvinists in all Countries and much upon the account of these same Controversies And what bitter Books the Lutherans have written comparing the Calvinists to Papists Turks c. and how little Mr. Ducy by forty years Labour did to reconcile them and how small success all other Reconcilers have had though excellent learned judicious men such as Calixtus Johan Bergins Conrad Bergins Ludov. Crocius Mat. Martinius Isleburg Testaidus Amyraldus Placens Capellus Dallaeus Blondel Davenant Hall Carlton Abbot Morton Preston c. 5. Think of the great Conflicts in France and Flanders between the Jansenists and their Adversaries and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the Dominicans and the Jesuites And of how many Ages continuance those contests have been 6. Then rise up to the Time and Case of Faustus Rhegiensis Cassianus and the Massilienses and their Adversaries and the hard Characters left by those controversies on the names of worthy men 7. From thence ascend to Chrysostome and his Reproaches and Austin's Censures on the other side with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors Prosper and Fulgentius had with the Pelagians and Semipelagians of those times 8. And lastly read and pity almost all the Fathers especially of the Greek Church whose Names are now blotted with the censure of speaking too like our Arminians and Jesuites and after all this you will sure think this Contention was a very ill work if it be proved causless and you will think that it's time to end it if it be possible To which end an attempt is not discommendable if it should prove lost as to the greater part of men And some I doubt not God will bless it to at least to increase their love of peace A. I pray you tell me what is your Undertaking and in what measure it is that you think this Work may be accomplished B. My Undertaking is this To prove that in the points of Predestination and Redemption there is no difference between moderate men of each Party * Eadem enim difficultas fuit semper donationis in tempore praefinitionis aut praedestinationis in praescientia Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis prima gratia sine ulla causa ratione aut conditione sine qua non sic etiam praedestinatur Neque solum negari debet ratio cur unus praedestinetur alii verâ— non ut quidam dicebant sed etiam quare aliquis praedestinetur nulla facta comparatioâ—â— siquidem nulla ratio esse potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam nisi per modum sinis Vasquez in 1. Them Disp 91 c. 7. You see how much a Jesuite granteth but what is resolved into the points of Grace and Free-Will and in the points of Grace and Free-Will there is no real difference but what is resolved into the question of the degree of Gods co-operating influx compared with mans agency and with it self as on several Objects which will prove either no difference at all or else about a thing past mans Understanding And that only in the point of perseverance there is a real perceptible difference but such as is not worthy to be insisted on to the breach of Charity or the Churches peace but must consist with toleration and mutual love A. I know not whether this great Undertaking look more smilingly on the Times to come or frowningly on the Times past For if this be true what thoughts what names do we deserve for troubling the Christian World so perniciously and distractingly with a feigned difference But I pray you tell me in general how you will manifest all this B. 1. You must give me leave to tell you who they are that I undertake this Reconciliation of 2. And then how I shall perform it I. It is not every violent Contender that runneth into such palpable Errors as the common cause needeth not and will say any thing rather than agree that I am speaking of About these matters there are two Parties that stand on each extream who are not to be called Calvinists and Arminians but by other Names for their other Opinions These I intend to confute distinctly instead of reconciling them which iâ— impossible but by reforming them 1. On the one side I undertake not the Reconciliation of the Predeterminants who hold That Free-will is nothing but will a related to Reason Lubentia juxta rationem and that all its acts are as truly necessitated by the efficacions premotion of God as is the motion of a Clock or other Engine or of a Bruit though they will needs call them free because they are Volitions as if willing and free-willing were words of the same signification and that is deifying of mans Will or any Creature to say that it can move or determine it self to this Object rather than another without a Physical perdetermining efficient premotion by God at the first total Cause notwithstanding God should uphold its natural power and â—â— the cause of Nature afford his necessary universal Concourse and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act it to deifie it also They that think that God cannot make a Creature whose Will can determine it self without his predetermination to that act as circumstantiated though God uphold all its powers and all natural concurrentâ— else and that a self-determined not predetermined by premotion is a God or a Contradiction I am to confute and not to reconcile A. How will you confute them B. That is to be the work of a Disputation on that Point It shall now suffice to mind you that it seemeth to me very plainly to subvert Christianity if not all Religion For when Adam's sin and all the sin in the World of Men or Devils is resolved into the absolute unresistible Will and efficiency of God as the first total Cause and that it had been as impossible to have done otherwise as to be Gods or to Conquer God it 's easie to perceive whether God â—ate such sin and whether Christ died to signifie his hatred of it and whether he will damn men for not being Gods and whether he that is said unresistibly to predeterminâ— by immediate efficiency the thought will and tongue of every Lyar to every lye that ever was spoken can have any word delivered by man which we can be sure is true In a word if this
act of man 5. Though Dr. Twisse so frequently inculcate Quod prius est intentione posterius est executione he saith that it is but de fine medâ—is and not de mediiâ— inter se and that no medium is properly Gods End and then nothing but himself is his End and he glorieth as the discoverer of this Truth that all the means are one to God and therefore have but one Decree so that he reduceth all Gods Decrees to two 1. Of his Glory as his End 2. Of all the means thereto as one 6. And other learned mens Writings I have seen who come after him and seek to prove that the Decree de fine mediis are but one and consequently that there is no such order to be feigned among them 7. The plain truth is Gods Will is the beginning and end of all And all the World are the means of accomplishing and pleasing it And it is always fulfilled and pleased though not always by the same means And God loveth no Creature finally for it self but for Himself as his Perfection shineth in it and as it fulfilleth his Will And to feign any other Order of Intention and Election de fine mediiâ— in God is presumptuous much more to lay our frames of them and tye God hereto and trouble the Church with contending for such Models But the Order of Execution is intelligible in part to man And we are sure that God eternally intended to execute his Will in that Order in which in time he doth it And therefore this is the only necessary and the sufficient method of Gods Decrees which man can investigate 8. We deny therefore that God decreeth or willeth to damn any before he fore-seeth their Sin or that he decreeth to damn any but as impenitent Sinners or that the damnation of any man is his End or See this question handled by Vasqu 1. Tho. q. 19. d. 82. c. 4. 5. 6. that instantia secundum â—rdinem objectorum inter se assignanda sunt non ex sola Dei voluntate that he decreeth any mans sin or that he decreeth not to give them Grace or that Sin or not giving Grace or not believing c. need a Decree being nothing much more that these are decreed as means to Gods Glory But if you speak de fine 1. As that which man is bound to intend 2. Or as a meer effect so no doubt all things have their relation use and order to each other The sixth Crimination A. You deny all conditional Decrees in God and so make them all absolute and consequently arbitrary meerly because God will do it B. Do you think we differ in this You dare not profess your dissent Lâ—g Twiss Vind. Grat. li. 1. Digres 1. de Elect. p. 151. Et Episcopii Instit Theol. li. 4. Sect. 6. cap. 6. pag. 412 41â— from any of this following explication of our sense 1. Gods Will is the Cause and End of the whole Creation And what ever pleaseth him to do he doth whatsoever it pleaseth him shall come to pass it shall come to pass and what ever he is pleased to make our Duty by a Law is made our Duty All that God doth and commandeth is Arbitrary His Wisdom indeed and his Will concur but his Ends are within himself and his Will is the end of his Will so far as it may be said to have an end Arbitrariness and self-willedness is Gods Perfection which is mans Sin and Usurpation If you will stretch to that impropriety as to say that He willeth it because his Understanding seeth it fittest to be willed and so make Causes and Effects in God yet must you add that the fitness or goodness so understood is the Aptitudinal congruency to his Will 2. We affirm that God hath many Decrees which are conditional in respect of the thing decreed * Inquit Twissus Vind. Grat. li. 1. de elect Dig. 3. p. 163. Aquinas diserte asserit Deum velle hoc esse propter hoc sed non propter hoc velle hoc p. 1. q. 19. â— 1. c. ad primam voluntatem Dei rationabilem esse non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud Et q. 23. â— 5. c. Eodem modâ— produxiâ—uâ— Bonaventâ—ram Scotum Durandum conspirantibus animis â—adem per omnia quod ad hunc apicem attinâ—t pâ—ofitentes Vide quae addit ex suare sio ibid p. 164. So Dr. Twisse frequently tells you He maketh one thing a means and a condition of the event of another And we say that God hath conditional Promises and Threatnings If thou confess with thy mouth and believe in thy heart c. thou shalt be saved And we believe that Gods Will made these Promises and Threats and that they are the true signs of his Will And that he will fulfil them And so far he hath a conditional Will and conditional expressions of his Will 3. But as to the Act of Volition we believe that his Wills are eternal and have no proper condition of their existence or not existing because being existent they are Necessary necessitate existentiae e. g. God never had such a Will as this If thou repent I will purpose or will to pardon thee if thou repent or to make the pardoning conditional promise But If thou repent I will pardon thee and whether thou repent or not I will conditionally pardon thee or make that Covenant which saith I will pardon thee if thou repent our Acts are the Conditions of Gods Gifts and Acts but not of his Will as suspended on those Acts. 4. Sure this is your own sentiment For you deny not that God knoweth from eternity whether the condition of each Event will it self be or not And if so it must be only the condition of the Event and not of his Decree For he that e. g. willeth absolutely that all shall perish that repent not and knoweth certainly that Judas will not repent doth thenceforth absolutely Will that Judas shall perish though only that he perish conditionally For that Will is no longer suspended on a Condition but it is the Event only that is suspended At least you must say that it is passed into a certainty equal to an absolute Will 5. But we will come as near as truth will lead us If by a Condition you mean only that Condition of the event which is not a suspender of Gods Decree but only a constituent qualification of the Object so I grant to you that though Gods Will as it signifieth his Essence or his essential Principle of operation in it self have no cause or condition yet as it is extrinsically denominated the Volition or Nolition of this or that the Object hath its Conditions that is qualifications without which Gods Will is not so denominable And so Gods Will hath its Conditions of complacency or displicency in the Creature without which he cannot truly be said to be
comparativa ita de adultis 4. Non solum comparative sed etiam absolute loquendo nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus Where note that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects viz. punishment For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God And all his stress is laid on this that the permission of the first sin is the first effect of Reprobation and this permission hath no cause in man Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cause in man But the truth is 1. A man may put such a sence on the word Reprobation as to include what he please But it 's usually taken for Gods Decree to damn men and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation and so is 1. A positive Act as a Volition 2. And privative objectively and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative 4. And some most ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus no Act that is to nothing And so a man that will play with words may say that 1. Gods non-agere nonâ—igere is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect which is nothing and therefore no effect And Alvarez utterly faileth iâ— this proof either that non-eligere is an Act or permittere vel non impedire an eâ—â—ect or that it is fitly called Reprobation which hath â—â— privation but a negation for its Object e. g. that Judas shall not be an Angel nor iâ—â—eccabilâ— but have natural free-will is no act of his Reprobation And so of the permission of the first sin Arminius himself exam Perâ—ins pag. 568. saith Voleâ—et Deus Israelem punire Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere Propria â—mmediata adâ—quata causa cur permiserit ut Achaâ— iâ—â—â— cadem perpetraret est illa quam dixi mensâ—ra sâ—elerum implenâ—â— erat â—â—â—â— Dâ—â—â—â—â—tra peccatum hominis per aliam â—â—em Nabothum ad se evocare Which Dr. Twisse useth through all his Writings against him ad hominem in stead of argument â—â—-thinks this concession should seem enough which is too much And I conjecture that Arminius wrote it by over-sight and woâ—ld have said that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth because he would â—â—â—â— him to â—â—â—â— up the measure of his sin making permission the res Voâ—â—ta But all theiâ— assigning Causes of Gods â—â—â—â— are â—â—â—â—â—â—ld God being above all causeâ— B. I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act clothed with all its circumstances That which God causeth he must needs will But when he saith Nostri Theologi affirmant he must mean but some few such as Maccovius Spanhemius Rutherford and perhaps Piscator or Beza of his own mind But the generality of Protestants either are against him or meddle not with it He that will read Davenant and such others shall find the difference I remember but few English Divines at all that own it besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse and to his and Alvarez and other mens Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion I may pretermit that here C. But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation but of Gods Works 2. Take heed of such unreverent words of God Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain Dare you reproach God as Idle if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him C. The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine and not mine that do but denominate their consequents B. Let us try that Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do that he made the World as soon as he was able and could have done it no sooner or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast or Plant or Atome more than he hath made nor to do any one action more than he doth C. No I hold no such thing For God is Omnipotent and Free B. I pray you then study it and tell me if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles why should you call him Idle if by the same Wisdom and Free-will he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent able by Gods common generical concurse as the cause of nature to determine or suspend his own Volitions without any predetermining efficiency of God If God will delight himself in making such a Creature will you dare to say that he is Idle because he moveth him not in another manner you will not so reproach a Watch-maker for not moving the Watch all day with his finger C. I confess I cannot answer that But how then is God the Governor of the World if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation B. The Work of a Governor as such is only 1. By Legislation to make the Subjects Duty 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the case of each Subject whether he do that Duty 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgment But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions C. It is so with man because he can do no more but not with God B. Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits by physical motion as Engins are moved as a Clock or Watch by natural necessitation And so he doth the meer naturals of man As his Concoction Pulse circulation of Blood generation in the Womb c. But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent ruleth him as such agreeably to his nature even by moral Agency by Laws and Judgment And this is that Regency of which we speak If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind or King of the World you deny him to be God and overthrow all Religion and Morality C. But what say you to all the Texts that tell us that God willed and caused that which wicked men did as in the case of Pharaoh Sihon Rehoboam Absolom the death of Christ and many others B. One of the greatest over-sights of them that thus Object is that they distinguish not between the sin and the effect of the sin or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him and the reception of this Act in passo in the recipient God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination Especially
his own Will that this shall be the Order But as to Gods Acts or Volitions following mans 1. They no way follow mans but as Objects which Objects in their natures and qualifications relatively terminate or by connotation denominate Gods Volitions 2. And do you or any man deny that Doth not Gods Knowledge Praeteritorum Existentium suppose the preterition or existence of Objects Doth not Gods complacential Volition of the holiness and glory of his Creatures presuppose that holiness and glory Doth not Gods hatred of past or existent sin presuppose it C. But what can God fore see in man till he first decree to cause it or at least decree that it shall exist B. Sin He decreeth neither and yet fore-seeth it of which lib. 1. The seventh Crimination C. * Aliqui scholastici minus caute de gratia Dei loquuntur Patres negarent â—mne meritum causam occasionem ex nobis praedestinationis nostrae ut oftender ent gratiam in tempore omninâ— gratis sint aliquo horum nobis donari Vasq in 1. Tho. qu. 23 disp 91. c. 10. But some of them say that the Gospel it self yea and the first special Grace is given to men upon merit of congruity though not of condignity and so is decreed on that fore-seen B. 1. We mind not what some odd persons say but what the moderate and sober say whom we are reconciling 2. But I pray you wherein do you differ from these Is it in words or sense also C. In both I hold no such merit fore-sight or decree B. Do you hold that there is such a thing as common Grace distinct from special C. Yes so do all Protestants B. Is it not every mans Duty to make a good use of the common Grace or Mercies which he hath as in order to his Repentance and Salvation C. Yes He that had but one Talent should have improved it B. Is not a man that doth this as far as common Grace will go more disposed and prepared to receive special Grace than one that hath long abused it and derideth God and godliness C. Yes no doubt some such are not far from the Kingdom of God B. Have not * Doct. of Faith Mr. Jo. Rogers Mr. Tho Hooker Mr. Rob. Bolton †Instruct for Comfort Consc Read Vasq iâ— 1. Tho. qu. 23. a. 4. disp 9. throughout proving that Predestination to the first Grace is not upon foreseen Merit no nor upon any fore-seen Cause sine qua non no nor Condition sine qua non c. and against Cassianus and the Massilienses and the Greek Fathers that the initium primae gratiae praedestinationis is not from our free will Yea c. 10. opposing Scotus Grabriâ—l Cajet Richard Durand Pantus c. as coming too near the Massilienses Yea and all that hold that facienti quod in se est ex viribus naturae Deus non denegat gratiam and abundance of other Protestants written much of Preparation to Conversion And is it not our common Doctrine C. Yes but what 's that to Merit of Congruity B. What do you think they mean by it more than you by Preparation C. They mean such Merit as it is decent for God to reward B. The greater part I think by far of the School-men say That the first special Grace is not given upon any Merit at all And the learned and sober that thus talk of Merit of Congruity and Decency mean no more but this 1. That God who commandeth men such use of his common Grace as a means to special doth command no Duty and appoint no means in vain 2. That such prepared persons are fitter for special Grace than the unprepared and malignant Enemies of it 3. That it is Gods usual way to prepare men by common Grace before he give them special Grace 4. And many say that we cannot prove that God useth to deny special Grace where he giveth the highest degree of preparing common Grace And which of these are you against C. But doth not God give special Grace also without such preparation B. 1. Our foresaid practical Protestants seem to think not to men at age For they oft say that it cannot be conceived that a man can value Grace and come to Christ truly that hath no preparatory sense of sin and misery 2. But I find not that the Papists usually deny it but that God may give special Grace to the unprepared on a sudden 3. But Papist's and Protestants are agreed that this is not his ordinary way And where do we differ in all this C. But we say not that there is any Merit in all this B. Phy on that word Merit I thought it was but the name that we differed about 1. And many of themselves dislike the name and say It is unapt And I think so do the Lutherans and Arminians more commonly 2. And others say that by Morit they mean nothing but a moral aptitude for Reward And they say that they can find no one fitter name for that than this which all Christians without known opposition used for many hundred years after the Apostles And that the Scripture word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 worthy is the same in sence 3. And they usually say that special Grace is called a Reward to the prepared if not unaptly as many or most say yet but in a lower Analogical sense and not as Heaven is the reward of Holiness Because of the latter there is a flat Promise and premiant Law or Covenant made by God but of the former they can say no more than as aforesaid that God appointeth no Duty and means in vain The eighth Crimination C. They make many Elections or Decrees where God maketh but one * These are but contentions de nomine as Vasquez truly saith about Durandus Opinion who 1. d. 41. q 2. n. 11. concurring with other School-men that the question de causa praedestinationis is meant only ex parte effectus de toto effectu an scilicet totius effectus detur aliqua causa opposeth Ockam Gabr. therein on the supposition that glorification is no effect of Predestination but the means to it And that because Predestination is as prudence in a man which is only circa media which saith Vasqueâ— dis 91. c. 4. non tam rei quam vocis quaestio est So also Bonaventure and Jave differ from others and say that Praedestinationis quoad effectum datur meritum congruum ex auxiliâ— gratiae But it s a meer strife about a word while they take Predestination as reaching only to Justification Perseverance and Glorification and others take it as extending also to preparatory Grace as Vasqu also noteth disp 91. cap. 5. As an Election to Glory and another to Justification and another to Faith and Conversion and another to have the Gospel and another to be redeemed by a sufficient satisfaction of Christ and another to be made men And so vary the Objects B.
diversity of quantity quality distance c. But this diversity is nothing besides the said absolute quantity quality distance c. But I must not write a Logick for you I am by this much remembred that as David saith man walketh in a vain shew or Image when multitudes of nothings go for somethings and fill up so much of his thoughts and life and constitute so much of his Learning which he glorieth in C. But you have said nothing yet of the fifth which is Modus Entis And futurition may be reduced to that B. A true modus entis is quid absolutum reale and the same that we call an Accident And Gassendus chooseth to call Accidents Modes or Qualities And they are not really distinct from the ens cujus modi sunt if they be intrinsical Modes or Accidents as quantity quality action c. But they are small inadequate conceptions of the thing modified not conceptions of its constitutive chief denominating part but yet conceptions of quid entis so that an entire perfect conception of the thing would comprehend or include the conception of the Mode or Accident So that they that deride the name of Pars accidentalis as put for Accidens speak not always so good sense as they think they do But such Accidents or Modes as are extrinsical to the thing as Cloaths to the Body Servants Lands Riches Honours are not properly Modes and Accidents at all but Adjuncts C. Apply this to the point in question of Futurity B. If Futurity as is said be an eternal Being it is God If nothing it hath no cause If it be called Quid medium the very Quid is a contradiction to it To begin backward 1. If it be Modus Entis from eternity it must be Modus Dei For there was no ens ab aeterno but God If it be Modus Dei it is Dens For all in God is God 2. If it be Relatio it is absoluti alicujus relatio If so either of some real Being or of nothing If of a Being from eternity it must be a Relation of God to the thing future in that he either willed or fore-knew â— For nothing was eternal but God And if so that Relation of God to the thing future is something or nothing If something it is God himself and so hath no cause If nothing it is no effect and so hath no â—â—â—â— But if it be the Relation of nothing viz. of the thing future to an Intellect possible or real that could know it future than it is nothing it self For the Relation of nothing cannot be something a real accident without a real Subject 3. If futurity was from eternity ens Rationis it was Rationis Divinae for there was no created Reason ab aeterno And if so either Aptitudinal or Actual If Actual it was God For all his Idea's and entia rationis for I suppose you one of the bold men that affirm entia rationis to be in God must needs be God himself and so have no cause If Aptitudinal and not yet in mente divina but objecta possibilia either they were something or nothing If something then there was something eternal besides God which is not said by any of us If nothing to call them future signifieth no more but that Gods infinite knowledge extendeth to things that are not as if they were which is true But futurity it self being nothing hath no cause 4. If you say that they are extrinsical Denominations it is something or nothing that is denominated future I know you will say It 's nothing If so quatenus extrinsical to God it was from eternity nothing which you call a Denomination But if you mean the Act of God denominating it was quid reale that is God himself who hath no cause But yet this is the true foundation of the notion Because Gods Knowledge of all things and his Will of all good things extendeth to all intelligible and amiable Objects to all eternity therefore we first justly denominate God to be an Intellect that knoweth what will be and a Will which willeth all that he will do And thence we say that the thing was future from eternity And so from an extrinsick Denomination of Gods Mind and Will we run on to give names to numberless nothings and then talk and write and make Sciences and Disputes of them in our dreams as if they were somethings And this is the work of the fantastical World And then we confound poor Scholars with the names of Entia Intentionalia Species Entia rationis Universalia And with Aristotle Themistius c. say that the Intellect is all things that it knoweth c. O what work have vain notions and be-fooling Philosophy made not only in the World but in the Church and among those that call themselves Orthodox and cry up the sufficiency of the holy Scriptures The notion of Privations I need not here apply C. But things future are future whether any one think of them or not B. And some men will trouble and deceive themselves and others what-ever is said to them It is certain that possible and futurum are termini diminuentes negantes quoad existentiam That which only will be is not Therefore the name signifieth nothing but that the thing will be without any connotation of any cause of it but it implyeth that there is some fundamentum vel ratio which might warrant any perfect existent Intellect to say It will be And there needs no more to that but the eternal perfection of Gods own Intellect But I have said more of this lib. 1. and thefore here will add no more C. But how is it possible for God to fore-know that sin will be unless he first Will or Decree that it shall be by his permission B. I abhor the question and supposition That such worms as we who know not what Gods Intellect or Will is should presume to conclude that he cannot fore-know sin unless we can understand how he fore-knoweth it yea unless it be by a way that a man could fore-know it When it is a wiser way of arguing to say This is the way that man knoweth by and that man can comprehend Ergo it is not like to be the way of Gods fore-knowledge But remember one thing that here you plainly make God to will the form of Sin as well as the matter For is not the form future C. Yes B. And is not Gods Will his Love C. Yes B. And do you not make God then to love the very form of Sin which yet you say that no wicked man loveth C. No It is but the existence of the form that he willeth or loveth B. O excellent distinguishing He willeth not the form of Sin but only willeth that it be or exist The form is the Essence He willeth that the Essence exist but willeth not the Essence which is nothing but as existing But do wicked men will any more or so
Faith is become necessary when a man hath it necessitate existentiae But the asserting power to sin and to be an Unbeliever I will never charge on the Arminians when I would blame them for advancing man C. But it is a power to overcome Gods Grace which they assert B. Read but Dr. Twisse his judgment of Resistance and you will call it no more an overcoming any otherwise than a weight overcometh my strength which I can lift up and will not But I tell you I will not be cheated with ambiguous words 1. Either you mean an active or passive overcoming 2. And either you mean an overcoming of Gods utmost exerted Power by a greater Power or you mean an overcoming of Gods Will and his Power exerted with an absolute Will of efficiency or you mean the non-efficiency or non-prevalency of such an Act of God as cometh without any Decree or absolute Will of prevailing but with a Will of leaving the success to mans free Will as in Adam's case 1. Speaking improperly you may say that all men that are not softened convinced converted by the means which God thereto appointeth overcome God in that they overcome the means 2. Thus in not-repenting not-believing not-loving c. the less power any man hath the more he passively overcometh as a hard stone overcometh the Hammer that breaketh it not 3. No Arminian holdeth that man is stronger than God and overcometh his Power by a greater Power Out of Bedlam none have such thoughts that are awake 4. None of them think that any Act of Gods Power is overcome or is unsuccessful which is exercised with his absolute Will or Decree of prevailing or of the effect 5. But they think that in some cases yea ordinarily Gods Will is freely to exert no more of his power towards the causing of a commanded act than what shall give man a power to obey with some assisting motives and leave the success or effect to his free Will That God doth so sometimes is proved by the case of Adam Now whether you will call this overcoming or not and whether you will say Adam overcame Gods Grace or Gods Grace overcame not Adam's Will is but a Logomachy The thing in question is nothing but sinning against that degree of Grace which enabled man to have done better But all this belongeth to the controversie of Grace and not of mans power unless you think sin a powerful honourable act C. At least in this they over-value mans power in that they hold That mans Will hath power to determine the influx of God and so man shall rule his Maker when Gods influx or premotion shall but leave it to the Will of man what shall be the success B. This toucheth physical predetermination and needeth no other answer than is oft given 1. You wrong them They hold not all properly that mans Will determineth Gods Will either as to the essence of the Divine Will or as to the Act connoting the meer Object But only that it can determine of a common effect which Gods and mans Free-Will would produce if both concur 2. They do not think that mâ—â—â— Will hath any the â—least operation causally on Gods Will in it self but only that variations are made by variety of recipient dispositions where the influx of the Agent is universal and equal And so that mans receptive indisposition may be a cause that Gods Influx work not the same effect on him which it would do on a disposed subject 3. And they say not this of Gods absolute Will and Power but of his power operating restraiâ—edly by his own free Will when he will exert no more than what shall be successful only on a free concurring and disposed Subject and not on a resisting undisposed one It pleaseth God that the Sun shall operate but with a common Operation variable in the effects by the various disposition of Recipients The Flowers spring and are sweet and Weeds stink Trees grow and Stones grow not humanity is acted by it in men and not in Fruits God could have made the Influx of this Sun to have been causa specialis and to have turned a Weed into a Rose or a Stone into a Tree if he had pleased but he doth not Now will you say that we are erroneous and over magnifie the recipient if we say that its disposition is the cause of much of this diversity and that the stone is stronger than the Sun and overcometh it No the Sun did all that was properly intended Its beams came down on the Stone as well as on the Animals and Plants It warmed it though it did not quicken it So God doth his work on the Will of Sinners His Influx is terminated on their Will and had he sent it with a resolution to convert him it should have done it But seeing he sent it limitedly only to enable a man to Will and to concur so far as shall prevail if he do what his own Will is able to do by self-excitation it s no overcoming God if the man sin Once more I say that men that fear God should be very cautelous what they say in all Controversiès which are resolved into the nature of Divine Volitions and their way of efficiency Seeing 1. Will in God is not the same thing as in man an Appetite 2. It s own determination and the way of its determining us are confessed by the subtilest to be utterly unsearchable Saith Vasquez in Thom. q. 19. disp 80. p. 503. Quo autem pacto Deus seipsum determinet ad hoc potius quam ad illud ineffabile sane est nisi-quod nostro modo intelligendi intelligimus essentiam Dei quae est ejus voluntas habere circa futura peculiarem rationem voluntatis cum respectu illo rationis Et ideo dixi in hac controversia intelligi posse certa ratiocinatione Quid not sit Quid tamen sit quo pacto voluntas determinetur explicari non posse So that what Gods Act of willing or working is besides his essence and the effect they all confess that they are ignorant And yet shall the more ignorant contend The third Crimination C. They hold free-will to good that unregenate men have free-will Austin li. 1. de Gâ—n Contr. Manich. c. 3. professeth That all men may believe if they will and justifieth it in his Retractations But if the Will of man be corrupt and averse from believing we justly say such a man cannot believe yet this is an impotency moral only which is to be distinguished from impotency natural For notwiâ—hstanding this it may be truly said that all men may believe if they will And herein consists the natural Liberty of the Will The moral Liberty consisteth rather in a sanctified inclination unto that which is good whereby it is freed from the power of Sin and Satan c. But I never find that Arminians do distinguâ—sh these Twisse against Hoord li â— p. â—â— without Gods special Grace and
proportion of gracious means * Protestant Divines do commonly conjoyn the operation of the Spirit and Word as well as Papists and in some cases more Thom. docet q. 22. de Ver. a. 8. Deum inclinare Voluntatem ad aliquid appâ—tendum eam â—fficaciter physice praedeterminando non solum immediate sed etiam mediate aliqua entitate recepta in voluntate ex mente D. Tho. Deus movet omâ—â—s causas secundas eas applâ—â—a ' ad suas operatioâ—â— ita ut etiam quando â—â—â—â—â—t voluntatem aliquid â—â—â—imit in illam per moâ—â—â— transeuntis Alvaâ—ez de Aux disp 23. p. 114. and helps than to others but leaveth them under the common helps which convert the more prepared Souls Not that God always doth so For oft times to his Elect he doth as he did by Paul or the Eunuch vouchsafe them extraordinary means For as a Benefactor he is free and may do with his own as he list and may make Vessels of Mercy and Honour of them that deserved worst And the case of the Tyrians and Sidonians compared with theirs of Capernaum and Bethsaida doth prove that less means are proportionable to some as being less ill-disposed when greater to others may be uneffectual III. And then as to objective Grace it being the same God the same Heaven the same Christ and the same Promise which is set before all that have the Gospel this cannot be the Controversie Though the revealing means be divers with many so is not the Object nor the Means to all IV. All that remaineth then to be questioned is the Effect which is subjective Grace whether that Grace in one man which is but sufficient be efficient in another or in the same man at several times And here by this subjective Grace is meant either 1. The vis impressa 2. Or the Power 3. Or the Act produced 4. Or the Disposition or Habit. The two latter are shut out of the question which is not whether the Act or Habit be sufficient and effectual but whether the Grace be so that is to cause them Whether this vis impressa be always caused by means with Gods Power set home as the impress of a Signature by the Arm and Seal or be caused immediately by God without any proper means the word being but a Concomitant and not mediate Operator is made a Controversie by some But he that well considereth the Scripture here abouts and the experience of man will be likelier to think that it is God by means that ordinarily maketh the impress on the Soul and that the same impress is the effect of both though extraordinarily God can do without means For 1. It is most likely that God should work on man most agreeably to his nature and to his subject state under God his Governor 2. And Christ himself as our Teacher and Example and all his Gospel are appointed to this use 3. The Ministry and Ordinances are appointed to the same end And Ministers commanded to fit their teaching to that end 4. No man can prove that ever any came to actual Knowledge Faith or Love but by some means Experience telleth Gods Servants that he worketh by them 5. The most apt and powerful usually have best success and those prosper most in Grace that use means best and those speed worst that use them least 6. God strictly commandeth the use of the means as means for that end that his Grace may be wrought by them 7. God promiseth his blessing on the means Act. 26. 17 18. 1 send thee to open their eyes c. Rom. 1. 16. The Gospel is the Power of God to Salvation 2 Tim. 4. 16. Thou shalt save thy self and them that hear thee Jam. 6. last He that converteth a Sinner saveth a Soul from death c. 8. When God forsaketh a Nation by taking away the means he usually forsaketh them as to further Grace 9. The Devil seemeth to know this by his earnest opposition to a holy powerful Ministry and other means throughout the World so that we may say with Cypriam Epist. 69. ad Pupian Ut etiam qui non credebant Deo Episcopum Constitâ—enti vel Diabâ—lo credebant Episcopum proscribenti But whether it be by means or not it must be somewhat different from Gods own Essence which is imprinted or communicated And to get a formal conception of it what it is if it be not the Power Disposition Act or Habit is past mans reach Whatsoever it is this is certain 1. That God doth not give an Act as a thing pre-existent but giving Faith is but causing us to believe or do that act our selves which was none till we performed it 2. That quoad effectum disposed Power and Act also are more than Power and Disposition without the act 3. Undoubtedly Dr. Fairfax Of the Bulk c. of the World pag. 5. 6 7 c. Though God be the Maker of every Being that is physicaly so it follows not that he is so of every Being that is morally so It is enough that God is the Maker of the Power to do evil which being good may spring from him c. All that God doth towards sin is to leave us to our selves to bring it forth if we will and instead of driving on to it as a fellow-helper or procatarktick cause he draws from it and towards the good with unspeakable endearments of wooing and drives from it by forbidding the Evil with all that earnestness of threatning which may beget in man the utmostness of dread Nor is he any nearer the physical cause of it than to give that good power which is not the cause at all as it looks towards him for by giving this power he is at the same time the evil is done as much the cause of the good that is not done therefore he is not the cause at all Besides this power is not only good but also needful For though the the perfection of the Will in the next life will not be in a wavering alike towards Good and Evil but only in a selfwillingness to Good yet in this life I think it mainly does and must For this is a life of doing or believing as it looks on to reward in that to come and that is a life of rewarding as it looks back to doing or believing here c. Hence we may answer the old 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For â—s sin is a moral thing c. unbounded Wisdom and Goodness having â—aid out endless happiness as a reward for Obedience and endless wretchedness as punishment for sin without this Obedience there could be no Heaven without Sin no Hell And without a power not to do in both there could be neither So then that God may have leave to make man happy for holiness man must needs have power to make himself wretched for sin That evil should always flow from evil in a chain of Breeders is a great misunderstanding Object Then man may
and what do you hence infer B. 1. All degrees of the medela or recovery of Nature are so many degrees of Grace 2. Exparte Dei efficientis the operations of Grace and Nature really are all one and differ not That is God doth per essentiam operate in both and his operating Essence is the same But as the nature of a thing in its original or constitutive Principles are one thing and the recovery of it from its vitiated state another so relatively the same God and his Will and Operations are to be variously denominated even as he is the God and Fountain of Nature and as he is the God and Giver of Grace 3. I think it is past mans skill to prove that most Miracles themselves have no part of natural Operation in them It is sufficient of God interpose and over-rule the matter by any other immediate Operation of his own yea or that he put natural Operations themselves out of that course in which they would have gone if he had not so altered it 4. By this you may plainly see that though all natural Operations are not gracious All gracious Operations are also natural except the highest sort of Miracles that is they are the Actions of some natural Principles ordered by Gods gracious Will to a gracious end in a gracious manner I also except such Operations of God alone in which he useth no second Cause but himself immediately without any instrument produceth the effect But note 1. That this is only in the Reception of the Divine immediate influx it self on the Soul antecedent to our very first Acts For our first Act e. g. of Faith is from Gods Influx on our own natural faculties and so from those faculties themselves as suscitated by God 2. Note that this is no distinction between natural and gracious Operations to be so immediate For God doth as immediately operate in the natural As in the Creation he made all the World by such immediate efflux so he still operateth immediately on the first created Cause whatever that is and say almost all Divines even when he useth second Causes he himself is as near the Recipient and Effect immediatione suppositi virtutis as if he had used no second Cause at all The difference being not in his distance or proximity but in his using or not using a second Cause together with himself 5. Moreover it is utterly unknown to us how far God operateth without Vocatio ad communionum Christi beneficiorum ejus est gratiâ—sa â—ctio Dei qua homines peccatores reâ—s condemnationis sub dominâ—o peccati constitntos ex animalis vita conditione ex mundi hujus inquinamentis corruptelis â—â—â—â—t per verbum piritum suum ad vitam supernaturalem in Christâ— per poenitentiam fidem consequendam ut in illo tanquam capitâ— sâ—â— adâ—o destinato ordinato unirâ— beneficiorum ejus communionâ—â—rui queâ—nt ad gloriam Dei ipsorum salutem Armin. Dispur Privat Thes 42. Sect. 1. any second Cause even on the Soul it self As we know that Devils do much on the wicked so we know not how far he useth the Angels or superior Intelligences in operating on the Elect And yet we will not go so far as Aristotle did in ascribing to the primum mobile But as God is said to write with his own Finger the Law on the two Tables and yet that Law was delivered by Angels and as God is said to appear and speak to Adam and many others when yet it must needs be quid creatum which Humane senses could see and hear Even so we know not when God operateth on the Soul what spiritual Ministry he may use And now tell me again what it is that you accuse them of that you think turn Nature into Grace C. According to your explication I must mean nothing else but that the name of Grace is given by them to Nature alone with the natural operation is not gracious B. Wherein is it that they thus err Instance in particulars C. 1. When they make Gods common Providences to be Grace 2. When they make the preaching of the Gospel to be Grace 3. When they make Reason and Free-will to be Grace B. I. Do you not believe that all Gods merciful Providences are acts of Grace Are they not mercy contrary to merit which is the definition of Grace in the general And have they not an aptitude and tendency in medelam animarum to mans Recovery which is the specification of Evangelical Grace C. Yes I grant all this But we take Grace for the inward saving work of Gods sanctifying Spirit on the Soul B. 1. You do not only strive about words but perversly abuse words that you may have matter of strife Will you confine the general name of Grace not only to a Species but to one inferior Species and then accuse your Brethren for giving the name to other Species As if you would accuse them for calling any besides a Philosopher or a Souldier a man And 2. Do you know either Jesuite Lutherane or Arminian that holdeth that outward common Providences are inward Sanctification C. Let that pass and go to the second B. II. Do you doubt whether the preaching of the Gospel be Grace either as to the general or special definition C. I deny not that the definitions agree to it but I doubt whether it be a fit name when use hath appropriated it to the inward Sanctification B. 1. Here again you are convinced of striving about words 2. And till you are forced you confess it not but make it seem a material difference 3. You confess that your Adversaries name agreeth with the definition 4. When you have abused the name your selves by erroneous confinement of it to one species of Grace you then plead your own sinful use as a reason sufficient against Etymology Definition the custom of all the Christian Churches from the beginning to this day yea and against Scripture it self 5. For the Scripture so useth the word as you may see sometimes for merciful Providences sometimes for the Gospel sometimes for Church-Priviledges for Gifts sometimes for Favour and oft for recovering mercy in the general Ezra 9. 8. Zech. 4. 7. Joh. 1. 16 17. Act. 4. 33. 14. 3. 20. 24 32. Rom. 1. 5. 5. 2. 20. 6. 14. 15. 11. 5 7. 12. 3. 6. 15. 15. 1 Cor. 10. 30. 2 Cor. 8. 19. Gal. 1. 6. 15. 5. 4. Eph. 3. 8. 4. 8. 4. 7. Phil. 1. 7. Jud. 4. 1 Pet. 4. 10. 5. 12. Tit. 2. 11. Eph. 3. 2 7. Col. 1. 6. 2 Cor. 6. 1. C. Go on to the third instance B. 1. Who do you know that calleth Reason and natural Free-will in it self considered by the name of Grace I know not any such 2. But 1. Reason as reprieved in order to recovery and Reason as illuminated by common Grace and so Free-will are certainly a sort
commonest observation 3. All other Habits follow the Acts and therefore we have little reason to say it is otherwise here C. Doth the Soul believe before it is inclined or disposed to it B. Inclination is a hard word and belongeth both to Natural Inclination such as we have to Felicity and to Habits and to meer Dispositions And a pre-disposition we grant As when you spur your Horse you make him first the patient of your act and by suscitating his natural faculty you dispose him to a speedy motion though the similitude doth not quadrare per omnia because Gods influx is on the whole Soul it self But this Disposition to the present act is far less than a proper Habit or it 's another thing C. When I spur my Horse or whip my Dog I do but stir up a former faculty or slothful power But God giveth a new life and power to them that were dead in sin B. Yet I cannot take words for matter 1. It 's nothing but the natural faculty or power which you suscitate in the beast And hath not an unbeliever the Natural faculties or power Is he not a man Why do you not bury him if he be not alive 2. Death in sin is relative or real The Relative is Reatus mortis which denominateth men filios mortis and is done away by pardon The real is the Privation of a holy disposition to the act of Faith and Repentance c. or of the Act it self or of the Habit. You can name no other Now 1. the death which consisteth in the privation of the first disposition to act supposing all natural dispositions is taken away by the first influx or suscitation of the Holy Ghost 2. And by the same in secunda instanti is caused the Act and the death gone that lay in its privation 3. And in the third instant or afterward by degrees is taken away the death which lieth in the privation of the Habit. And this giving the Habit is called in Scripture and by Divines Sanctification as following Vocation and it is wrought in us by degrees and not all at once and that by the Spirits power with and by our exercised Acts. In my youth I was so prematurely confident of the contrary that the first Controversie that ever I wrote on was a Confutation of Bishop Downam Amesius Medall de Vocat Mr. Tho. Hooker c. in Defence of Pemble herein but riper thoughts made me burn that Script C. But the spur or rod putteth no new power at all into your Horse but Gods Spirit putteth a new Power into us B. I have talkt long enough to you about Power before and therefore would not turn back needlesly to say it over again Gods Spirit putteth no such thing into us as we call a faculty or natural power For that is the form or essence of the Soul and our Species is not chang'd by Grace But he giveth us that which is called a Moral Power which consisteth conjunctly in the concurrence of means and objects and the disposition of our faculties to the act Hear Dr. Twisse against Hord pag. 12. lib. 2. He secretly maintaineth that every man hath such a power by Grace by which he may repent if he will Concerning which Tenet of his we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power but we say it is nature rather Page 18. Truly I see no cause to deny this that even the wicked could do good if they would We may safely say with Austin Omnes possunt Deo credere ab amore rerum temporalium ad Divina praecepta servanda se convertere si velint Here is posse se convertere id est velte si velit But saith Twisse pag. 170. l. 1. But such is the shameful issue of them that confound impotency moral with impotence natural as if there were no difference which he oft sheweth is but the want of actual and dispositive willingness Now the rod or spur may cause both a present disposition and an act of will C. But is this all the new Life and Spirit and Divine Nature that is given us Sure it is much more B. No doubt but it is much more But that Spirit Life and Nature is promised and given to Believers and is promised on condition of our accepting Christ in whom is our life And therefore it is that habitual Grace which followeth the first act of Faith and is a nobler disposition to the following acts C. Will one act of ours cause a Habit B. Not as ours only But when the Spirit will work by it it will But even that Habit I told you is weak at first and increased by degrees But proceed and tell me Quest 7. Are you sure that in the Acquisition of Habits there is no immediate operation of God on the Soul that causeth them C. We all hold an immediate Influx necessary to the Being and Action of every Creature natural and free but not an immediate Infusion B. What 's the difference between Influx and Infusion C. The first is an universal operation the other a particular B. Do you mean that the difference of the acts or operations is at all ex parte agentis sen act us ut est agentis antecedent to the effect or only in the effect it self C. I dare not say that there is any difference in God for it is against his simplicity and his very will and act as in himself is his Essence though varioâ—sly related and denominated by cannotation Therefore I must needs confess that the diversity is only in the effect B. Do you not see then what a delusory and troublesome stir men make for and about meer words What 's the Crimination come to then about Acquired and Infused Habits when the difference is only in the effects You confess that all proper Habits Infused are by our cogitation and use of means and so are also acquired And you confes that all Acquired Aabits are wrought besides our cogitation and use of means by an immediate influx of God so that as to the Causes you can name no difference And yet the words Acquired and Infused signifie a difference in the Causes and their operation and not in the Effect by their notation Is not this deceit then C. Tell me what you take to be the difference your self B. 1. I suppose that ab uno omnia God without diversity causeth all diversity which is only in the Creatures and not in him 2. I suppose that God hath appointed natural means and second causes for common natural effects and his Will is that they shall operate according to their aptitude And that he hath appointed extraordinary means even Christ and supernatural Revelation for the production of saving Faith And it is his will that they shall work usually according to their aptitude 3. It is his command that we use these several means natural and supernatural accordingly 4. As these means are special extraordinary and for a special end
the production of Faith and Holiness So it is the will of God that they shall have answerable noble special effects which effects besides his operation on and by the means the said Volition of God it self produceth immediately operating on the Soul not as a meer volition alone but as conjunct with his Wisdom and Vital Power or Activity by which he operateth all in all I could here say that God doth concur with these supernatural means on his Elect with a stronger greater special energy force or influx But I am loth to deceive you with bare words for this force energy or efflux is either God or something created God operateth by that Wisdom Will and Power or Activity which are his Essence therefore there are here no degrees in any operation And in the effects the degrees are not denied The sum of all is then but this natural effects are natural effects and Faith is Faith the difference we partly perceive the means also are various but in God the operator there is no diversity And so you may see what the stir about Infusing and Acquiring is come to C. I dare not deny this because it is agreed on by all Philosophical Divines and I should be called a Blasphemer if I affirmed any real diversity in God at least besides the Trinity of Persons called by the School-men Real Relations and by some real modes of being But it surpasseth mans understanding to conceive that the same cause no way differing ex parte sui should produce variety of effects By which it seemeth that when there was nothing but God his love to Jacob and his hatred to Esau his decree to save and to damn his will to make the world and to destroy it his fore-knowledge of good and evil had no real difference at all And is it not somewhat of a lye then in us to call those acts different or by different names which really have not the least difference at all But of this before B. God were not God if mans shallow wit could comprehend him All this must be confest unless you will be a Vorstian But if our conceptions be not false our diversity of names here is no lye because we intend but to denominate Gods knowledge and decrees or will but by the relative connotation of the things known and willed And though those things were nothing before the Creation and so the difference between Gods Decrees c. was really none at all and the esse cognitum was nothing but Gods simple Essence Yet as Greg. Armin. hath disputed there be some kind of Relations which are nothing themselves and consequently denominations which may be terminated on nothing as praeteritu futura are But if your understanding rest not here do as I do rest in a necessary and willing ignorance and be but so wise as not to trouble the Church with that which you know not nor imitate them that can shew the valour of their raging zeal by Writing or Preaching against them as the enemies of the Grace of God which dote not as confidently as themselves C. But what say you to Dr. Twisse 's words against Hord l. 1. p. 156. Albeit it be not in the power of nature to believe fide infusa yet is it in the power of nature to believe the Gospel fide acquisita which depends partly on a mans Education and partly on Reasons considering the credibility of the Christian way by light of natural observations above all other ways in the world B. 1. * Pet. a S. Joseph Thes univers de Grat. habit p. 86. Datur aliquod donum Gratiae Divinitus infusum quod post operationem in anima nostra habitualiter permanet Dari gratiam habitualem jam videtur esse de fide post Concil Tridentiâ— antea tamen non erat habitus gratia sanctificantis realiter a charitate distinguitur which others deny Gratia habitualis constituit hominem in statu supernaturali c. The Reader that will peruse Casp Peucer's Hist Carcer pag. 692 693 c. may see that the Luthorans were more for Infusion and miraculous operations of Grace and may see a handsom explication of Conversion and the operation of the Word and Sacraments and pag. 698. De viribus humanis in renascentibus renatis dum fit conversio deinceps ad sinem Credo quod gratuiti beneficii ac meriti Christi salvatoris applicatio naturae mortuae vivifitatio in regeneratione non fit actione physica brâ—ta aut raptu Enthâ—stastico aut Stoica coactione aut Magico affâ—atu verbi Sacramentorum sp sancti Neâ— mutatione Physica aut Mâ—gica hyperphysica substantiâ— temperamenti viriuâ— seu facultatem hâ—minis sentientis quidem nec moventis se nec quiâ—quam agentis sed sustinentis tantum impressionem ut subjectum pations sicut ranâ— reviviscunt a tepore solis c. By this you may see what this excellent man Melanâ—â—hons Son-in-law suffered his ten years cruel imprisonment for by the instigation of Schmidelinus and other Lutherans to their perpetual shame and who was then as the Papists still are most for Physical infusions ex opâ—re operato in Word and Sacraments Not only he but all the School-men distinguish acquired and infused Faith But though the names sound otherwise the difference meant by them is in the effects only and the means and not in God He meaneth that a slight ineffectual belief may be performed by that disposition or moral power which is found before special Grace as excited by good Education and helps But an effectual saving Faith must be the product of a special impress of Gods Spirit on the Soul which is a special disposition and moral power to that act And this is true And no more can be truly meant or said 2. But I will tell you a mystery added oft by Dr. Twisse which may much moderate your judgment about the cause of mens condemnation if it be true He holdeth that no man is condemned for want of an infused Faith C. How why no man is condemned at least that hath the Gospel but for want of it For if it be only an infused Faith that justifieth then it is the want of an infused Faith by which men are unjustified And if as you say Infused and effectual or special Faith be all one sure men are condemned for want of special effectual Faith B. His words are these against Hord l. 1. p. 156. Neither have I ever read or heard it taught by any that men shall be damned for not believing fide infusa which is as much as to say because God hath not regenerated them but either because they refused to believe or else if they have embraced the Gospel for not living answerable thereunto which also is in their power quoad exteriorem vitae emendationem though it be not in their power to regenerate their wills and change their hearts any more than it is to illuminate their minds Yet I
before No man can deny but that God usually prepareth the Soul fer Conversion by a common sort of Grace And though he may do what he list with his own and extraordinarily may in an instant convert the most unprepared malignant obdurate person yet that is not his usual way And some that think otherwise are led into the mistake by thinking that a man is converted when he hath suddenly some terrifying humbling preparation which endeth in conversion Whether he convert all that are brought to the very highest and nearest degree of preparation I know not nor perhaps you neither But that usually he converteth all such we have very great reason to think probable And that he hath not commanded men to seek his special Grace in vain So that whether it be a proper promise on Gods part or only an encouragement short of proper promise I told you before is a hard question But we maintain that it is not that proper mutual Covenant which maketh a Christian and is celebrated in Baptism and giveth Salvation If one of old John Rogers's Thomas Hooker's or Robert Bolton's hearers when they were vehemently urging preparatory humiliation desire endeavour c. should have said to them Sir you play the Arminian and contradict St. Paul who saith that Grace is not given according to Ista â—â—â—dia nemini Deus destâ—â—â—â— propter vel secundum morita ipsius sed ex pura puta Gratia Nemini etiam denegat nisi juste propter gracedentia peecata Armin. Disp Privat Thes 41. Sect. 10. Adrian VI. Quodl 3. q. 1. fol. 21. expoundeth Habenti dabitur thus Qui habet verbi Dei amorem ut illuc mentis intuitum dirigat dabitur ei sensus intelligendi qui non habet verbi Dei amorem auferetur ab eo naturalis capacitas intelligend c Works Therefore God will give it me never the more for such preparations what would you have said to him The truth is practical Preachers in these practical cases are carried with full sail into that truth which Disputers would wrangle out of Doors But as for any workâ— meritorious in point of commutative Justice yâ—a or of any full and proper Covenant of God giving a proper Right to the Sinner upon which he may claim special Grace as his due I know of none such before true Conversion though Gods commands and general promises give men sufficient encouragement C. But what say you to Rom. 9. It is not in him that willeth or runneth c. B. I do not love to expound hard Texts unsatisfactorily by scraps I will give you God willing a Paraphrase of the Chapter together by it self I suppose you have read John Goodwin's and Dr. Hammonds Paraphrase At present it may suffice to say 1. That the meaning is not that he that would have Christ and Grace and Holiness is no fitter for it than he that would not have them nor that he that seeketh them is no fitter for them than he that rejecteth themâ—nor that he that believeth is no fitter for Justification than â—n Iâ—fidel nor he that is holy any fitter for Heaven than the unholy nor yet that he that heareth meditateth prayeth aâ— he can and attaineth the highest degree of common Grace is no fitter or likelier for Faith or special Grace than he that despiseth it and the means of it 2. But the meaning is that God of his free mercy câ—lled the Gentiles that were further from him than the Jews and may give both the Gospel and the Grace of the Gospel to one and take it from or not give it to another when both of them are equally unworthy of it by their sin So that the first and principal cause that differenceâ—ha Jacob from an Esau is not that Jacob before Gods Grace did will and râ—n deâ—ire and seek Grace but that Mercy begun with him and gave him though as unworthy as Esau both commonner and special Grace which caused him to will and run And yet for all that both are supposed to have forfeited mercy by sinning against it and it is in him that willeth not and runneth not that the cause of his misery and privation of mercy is to be found Yea in many an instance where mercy and helps are given by an equality a wicked man may make himself to differ by his sin and wilfully become worse than others C. At least you must here confess that de facto we do really differ from each other in this point B. All they that hold all that Doctrine of Preparation for Conversion which you find in the suffrages of the British Divines in the Synod of Dort do not that I know of differ from many of the Lutherans and Jesuites nor from many of the Arminians herein while by the name of merit of Congruity used by some and Preparation by the other no more is meant than they there assert And as to the question of a promise or no promise I shew'd you before how small the difference is yea with some it is but de nomine while one calleth that a Promise which another calleth but a half promise with Mr. Cotton or a precept to use means with sufficient encouragement when perhaps in the description of the thing they agree So that among the most and sober practical Preachers I yet see no real difference in sense at all about the necessity of preparatory Grace The sixth Crimination C. For ought I can understand some of them acknowledge no Corruption nor Grace in the Will as having no Habits but meer Indifferency or Liberty but think that the illuminating of the understanding is enough to change the will * The Remonstrants say Synod circ art 3. 4 p. 15. Voluntatem iâ—super Deus in obsequium suum fle ctit ad actuâ— fidei obedientiâ— ita inclinat per spiritum suum sanctum verbo utentem ut voluntas per illam operationem non solum possit obedire â—ed obediat quoties obedit non ex se anâ— per se aut a se B. 1. These are a few odd persons that differ from the generality of your Adversaries and I am not to justifie all that every man writeth 2. But even of these I suppose the meaning of the most is but this that sin began inthe Intellect and there Grace must begin and that God worketh on the will but mediante Intellectu And these Camero held as well as they and so do many more And these seem to differ not about the necessity of Grace but the manner of its conveyance to the will whether it be only by the intellect 3. And as the wind bloweth where it listeth and we hear its sound but know not whence it cometh or whither it goeth so is every one that is born of the Spirit We know that the will is vitiated as ill as the understanding and needeth Grace as much as it and that God is as near to the one in his operations as to the
other and giveth real Grace to both But because the intellect is in the natural order the first in acting and the will but second and because the act is commonly and reasonably supposed to go before the Habit though not before all Divine Influx ad actum therefore men are uncertain whether God who first acteth the Intellect do not by its act first operate on the will But this dependeth much on the Physical Controversie whether the Intellect determine the will ad speciem actus or at least really and efficiently move it or rather only present the object to it and so work but in subserviency to the material cause which is constitutive indeed of the act in specie but not efficient and the perception of it goeth to the conditio objectiva without which it is no object to the will This I incline to with Scotus and suppose that the Intellect moveth not the will per modum naturae by necessitation But while we know not the order and nature of the operations of our own souls how shall we know the unsearchable way of the operations of the Holy Ghost The seventh Crimination C. They make Gods Grace a resistible thing which man can frustrate and so God worketh at uncertainties * Mans ignorance of the way of Gods operation on second causes told us by Christ himself Job 3. should end such quarrels and teach us all with judicious Davenant to prosess uncertainty and with judicious Jos Placeus de lib. arb p. 174. speaking of the dependance of the second cause on the first and the Papists digladiations about concurse and predetermination to say Nos quidem qua reverentia erga infinitam Dei majestatem ducimur non audemus definire quanta sit dependentia causae secundae a prima Nobis sufficit modo ne Deo ullam peccatorum nostrorum vel minimam labem aspergat non posse nimiam statâ—i To which also the very judicious Lt Blank subscribeth Thes 51. de concursu c. The Remonstrants Syn. ar 3 4. p. 15. c. do profess that Gods operation of the Intellect Affection and Will do thus differ that the converting work on the will is more resistible than the other And to the question An conversâ—o contingens sit et in certa an vero necessitate causae aut eventus insallibiliter sequatur in â—o qui convertitur Respondent conversionem esse contingentem quia Libera est nec tameâ— Dâ—o incertam quia praecognita est nec sequi necessitate causae sive consequentis quia resistere poterat homo sed necessitate consequentiae c. Et pag. 17. Declarat Quare dicimus hominis voluntatem ad volendum bonum non necessitari sed hominem posse resistere hoc est non-velle et saepe actu non-velle et resistere gratiâ— sufficientis operationibus B. I have said so much of this before that I need not tire you with much more Quest 1. Do you know of no way for God to work with certainty of success if Grace be resistible C. I will not say so I know what you have said to this before B. Why then do you speak that which is not valid in your own judgment Quest. 2. Dare you undertake to justifie all the world against the accusation of having resisted the Grace of God C. No I dispute not on such hard terms B. Quest. 3. Did you never repent your self for resisting Grace C. Yes in some sense but not as I now mean it B. How is that C. To resist the Gospel and Ministry is a resisting of Grace and the Holy Ghost Acts 7. and so I have done But I speak of immediate resisting God B. 1. Remember that here you confess that the Gospel is Grace even to them that resist it 2. God himself cannot be resisted immediately where he worketh not immediately 3. But where he doth so he is said to be resisted 1. Not by any repelling of his strength 2. Much less by opposing a greater strength 3. Nor by acting by any strength but what he giveth 4. Not by causing any difficulty to him 5. Not by frustrating any absolute will of his But 1. Passively by being ill disposed to the reception of that Grace which he offereth and that operation which else might effect it 2. And actively by doing that which rendereth us yet more ill-disposed both naturally and morally by commerit 3. As also in that we do that which is contrary to Gods actions in their tendency to the effect When he moveth us to hear read meditate pray love trust c. and we do the contrary this may be called a resistance C. If God intend the effect it will be done but if he intend it not how is he resisted in that which he never intended to do B. You know the Scripture speaketh not at these rates but when men will set their silly wits against Gods Word thus they will seem subtiler than he But it 's but a dream 1. God may be resisted when he intendeth not the effect in that his Law is resisted and with it that necessary measure of Grace by which the effect might have been wrought Though his Decree be not resisted yet his Law and his Grace and help which had a tendency to the effect and a sufficiency on its part may be resisted 2. And he is ordinarily resisted in that which he doth both intend and do For he seldom doth us any good without resistance though he overcome But he that overcometh resistance is resisted C. But I mean by Resisting Overcoming B. Why then did you not speak as you meant None dreameth that Omnipotence is overcome by a greater strength much less by the derived power of us worms But the Case is weighty which you and others perilously overlook C. Let me hear your explication of it B. God doth not work like necessary agents to the utmost that he is able His Wisdome hath diversified Creatures and his Wisdome hath appointed even in the works of Grace a stablished order of second causes and means which he will use for the effect And his Wisdome and Free will hath fixed a certain degree or proportion of his concourse suitable 1. To the nature of man 2. And to the nature and use of all those means 3. And to the effect as it is to be ordinarily accomplished Even as in nature he concurreth with all causes agreeably to their stablished nature and use Now though Omnipotency cannot be overcome yet the same creature that hath a certain stated proportion of natural activity and Gods suitable concourse e. g. to a healthful body which hath strong appetites and also a congruous proportion of Gracious means and concurse and helps of Grace by which he can rule the foresaid appetite may yet by neglect of that help and by wilful indulging of that appetite make the appetite stronger than his ordinary degree of help and so overcome the Grace of God though he overcome not Gods Omnipotence or Decrees
I see more than ever I before observed that God indeed hath set up a Sun an universal medium a Christ who in our nature is a Creature to be the Donor and Convey or of all Recovering Grace to man and to give out the Spirit in that stated order and measure as is suitable to his design and Subjects And as on earth he gave out much light and help which was resisted and rejected I now less wonder that it is so now he is in heaven even as to his Spirit as well as his Word When I consider that though God be Infinite his Grace is given out to mankind finitely by a finite Creature Christ as man even as God shineth to us not immediately but by the Sun I will no more then account it an injury to God that he should be said to give limited and resistible degrees of Grace by Christ but repent that I have so much grieved and resisted the Spirit of Christ my self B. Proceed now to your other accusation The eighth Crimination C. They make mans Free-will and not Gods differencing Grace to be the cause that one man by Faith doth differ from another that hath Remonstr Synod ubi supra Si quaeratur quae sit causa cur hic convertitur non autem ille Respondemus hic convâ—rtitur quia Deus bunc non apponentem novam contumaciam convertit Ille non convertitur quia novam contumaciam opponit Quaeres cur hic opponit novam contumaciam alter nons Respondemus Hic opponit quia oppoâ—ere vult Ille non opponit quia a gratia movetur ne opponere velit Quaeres annon ille qui non opponit novam contumaciam per consequens convertitur majorem â—abebat gratiam quam qui opponit per consequens non convertitur Respondemus Antecedentem praevenientem gratiam aequalem esse posse sed coopelantem habâ—t prior non posterior no Faith Contrary to Paul's supposition who made thee to differ Tilenus could not answer Camero to this charge B. I doubt here again is a Controversie about words I will speak to you as to one that would know the truth 1. De re as to the Controversie 2. As to the meaning of the Text. I. Let us here consider 1. What it is to Differ 2. What are the causes of such difference I. To DIFFER is nothing but to be dissimile unlike Dissimilitude or Difference is a Relation This Relation as Ockam truly and largely sheweth is nothing extra intellectum besides its fundamentum subjectum terminus the Absoluta II. Difference then being a Relation is the dissimilitude of divers persons compared Here the natural numerical difference of persons and abundance of other differences are presupposed And it is the Difference between a Believer and an Unbeliever the Penitent and Impenitent as such that we have to consider of Now here are two Subjects differing and in each one if not two differences from the other So that here are two if not four several Relations of dissimilitude between them 1. Paul is a Believer by which he differeth 1. From Nero as a Privative Unbeliever 2. As a Positive Unbeliever On the other side Nero 1. as a privative Unbeliever 2. and a positive differeth from Paul Now every one of these Differences or dissimilitudes have a several cause 1. The fundamentum of both Paul's differences from Nero are hiâ— own Faith and the Termini are Nero's Privative and Positive unbelief 2. The fundamenta of Nero's difference from Paul are his Privative and Positive unbelief and the Termini are Paul's Faith to both Now if the question be what doth Constitutive make Paul differ from Nero it must be answered Paul's Faith and Nero's unbelief For dissimilitude resulteth from the one compared with the other And if both had been Believers there had been no difference And so were this the question there were no difficulty in it at all But the meaning of the question is not of the constitutive cause of the dissimilitude or the fundamentum but of the efficient cause of that fundamentum or else of the diversifying Dispositiv Receptiva Now supposing that Faith and Unbelief are the constitutive differencing causes the efficient causes of both must be sought as the Ratio discriminis and not of one only Quest 1. What is the cause efficient of Nero's unbelief Ans His own will or wicked heart Quest 2. What is the efficient cause of Paul's Faith Ans 1. The Principal efficient is God by his Spirit 2. The meritorious cause is Christ 3. The chief ministerial efficient is Christ as giving the Spirit to work it 4. The Instrumental efficient is the Gospel 5. The Immediate efficient is Paul For it is he that believeth and not God Is there any one that denieth any of this C. I doubt they think that mans will is more the cause than the Spirit because they suspend the Spirits success upon mans will B. Accuse not men by suspicions and doubts without proof yea contrary to their own professions Your crime of uncharitableness is not theirs nor doth it follow that they are faulty because you are suspicious * Alliac Camer â— â— q. 12. B. Dâ—us nullum praedestinavit ant praedestinat accipiendo predestinationem secundo modo propter aliquod bonum aut aliquâ—m causam praevisam in praedestinato quia non stat aliquem noviter aliquod bonum habere quin Deus prius voluerit aâ—â—terno c. You may read Corvinus to Tilenus expresly assigning the efficiency of all that Grace that maketh us to differ principally unto God Some of them only say man cannot effect or convert himself but he can resist and so require no more of man to his conversion but not to resist yea not to resist in an obstinacy and high degree Others of them require of man also an actual concurse of his will by his power received with the concurse of God But they make God here incomparably the chief efficient not only as to Priority of operation but as to his causation of the effect And they use to illustrate it some time as Scotus by the similitude of two drawing at a Ship sometime by a Father that should bid his Son lift at a heavy weight and resolveth to put to 900 degrees of the force himself if his Son will but endeavour and put forth one degree In this case if the Son will not put forth that one which he can do and so the event fail it is not by the Impotency nor absolute unwillingness of the Father And if the child do put forth that one degree will you say that he doth more to the effect than the Father that doth 900 parts and that only because that the Father would not do all himself But this carrieth us from the matter in hand and is after to be spoken to C. But if you make so many things go to make the difference the question who made thee to differ must have
a long answer B. Not as Paul meant it but as our troublesome Contenders use it in Even those that found the infallibility on scientia media make congrous Grace ex proposito convertendi to be the cause of the difference So Malderus 1 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 517. Quod hic credat prae alio indubie venit de misericordia Dei ipsum siâ— vocantis ut accomodet assensum misericordia inquam qua nos in Câ—risto elegit Totum est miserentis Dei ipse vocat ipse facit â—t vocatus veniat ipse â—t currat ipse nolentem praevenit ut velit volentem subsequitur nâ— frâ—fira velit vi sua Gratia it a sibi aptat liberum arbitrium ut a nâ—llo dâ—ro corde respâ—â—tâ—r quod diciâ—â—s provenire ex â—o quod meris inâ—â—â—abilibus occultis modis noverit Deus ita hominis â—over sensum ut accomodet assensum Fatemur Dei omnipotentiam Dominium quod habet in voluntates hominum manifestari in gratiae effâ—catia Et consensus homiâ—is est donâ—m Dei descendens a Patre luminum â—llumque consensum Deâ—â— vult â—acit quia facit â—ominem viribâ—â— gratiâ—â—acerâ— Yeâ— he yieldeth to â—radwardines Doctrine supposing him only to intend necessitatem quandam consequentiae necessarium esse hominem libere velle illâ—d ipsum quod Deuâ— cujuâ— omnipotentia quaecunque voluit facit praevoluit ipsum ville libere Item gratiam efficacem derâ— intuitâ— meritorum Christi non tantum quatenuâ— est sufficiensâ—sed etiam quatenus est eâ—â—iâ—ax dum seeundum propositum â—â—â—â— â—â—â—m cura Dâ—â— non est aqualis do omnibus another sense the answer must be suited to the question And here note that really it is the state of both parties compared and not of one of them that constituteth the dissimilitude as is said And the efficient causes of both states are the causes of the difference And so truly the cause of Nero's unbelief and the causes of Paul's Faith which are many as aforesaid all set together are the causes of the differences or rather all make up one cause of it This no Logician can deny But yet in vulgar speech we use to say that that person or thing is the cause of the difference 1. Which is the cause of the singularity 2. Or which causeth the state of the second person compared supposing the state of the first person to be already existent And so you will find yet several senses of the question C. Explain it by some instances B. 1. As to the cause of singularity If one man be born an Ideot or a Monster when we ask what made him differ from other men though really the causes of the dissimilitude be to be assigned on both parts yet we mean only on his part why is he not like others So if one Child be unlike to all his brethren or one Scholar in the School be much better or much worse than all the rest or if one in a Family be sick he that asketh what maketh him differ doth mean what made him sick c. 2. And so as to Posteriority of State if you suppose one of the dissimiliar parts pre-existent and ask what maketh the other to differ from it as if you ask why the Scholar writeth not like his Copy why the Son is so unlike to the Father why this age is so unlike the last c. We mean only what causeth the difference ex parte subsequente C. Apply it to the case in hand B. If you ask what made the difference between the Devils and the persevering Angels In the full and proper answer you must assign the reason on both parts But according to the usual sense of the question you must say The wilful sin of the Devils made the difference For the equal state of uprightness went before the difference So if you ask what made the difference between the world after the fall and before it vulgarly we must say sin because that came last So if you ask what made the difference between Noah and the world between Lot and Sodom Ans Indeed that which made one part sinful and the other righteous But according to the vulgar sense of the question it was the Righteousness of Noah and Lot and the causes of that righteousness So what made the difference between Judas and the eleven Apostles Ans Judas his wilful sin and Wickedness though indeed the cause is on both sides So what maketh the difference between Believers and the Unbelieving world Really the unbelief of the world and the Faith of Christians with their causes But it 's like the speaker meaneth only ex parte credentium And then the cause of their Believing is the cause of their differing But now if it hold true that God giveth a sufficiency of Grace ut causa universalis ex parte donantis antecedently to mens accepting or rejecting equally then if one ask what maketh the difference you would understand him why have not unbelievers Faith as well as others And then the answer would be wilful resisting or refusing Grace or the moral special indisposition of the Recipients makes the difference or else all would be alike believers But note that we ask not What maketh the difference between Believers and unbelievers but do particularize the subject and ask what maketh the Believer differ from the Unbeliever or what maketh the unbeliever differ from the believer It is then supposed that we mean only ex parte nominata And thus in the vulgar sense the questions what maketh the believer differ from the Infidel and what maketh the Infidel differ from the believer must have various answers C. I understand you thus in brief 1. You say that constitutively it is Faith that is the difference on Paul 's part and unbelief on Nero ' s. 2. The causes of the said Faith and unbelief are the causes of the difference As the causes of the whiteness of one wall and of the blackness of the other cause their difference 3. That to ask why the Believer differeth from the Unbeliever is but to ask why he is a Believer when the other is not 4. Here you say the two Relations of dissimilitude in two ubbjects make the questions two in one viz. 1. Why or whence is Paul a Believer 2. Whence is it that Nero is an Unbeliever 5. You say that Nero is an Unbeliever through his own wilfulness and illdisposition resisting Grace Satans temptations concurring And that Paul is a Believer from many conjunct causes 1. Gods Grace by his Spirit 2. Christs Merits 3. Christs donation of that Spirit 4. The means by which he worketh 5. The concurse of Pauls will To which efficients you add in most a competent Receptive disposition in genere causâ— materialis both passive and active 6. You say that in all this Gods Grace is incomparably the greater cause than man's will 7. But yet not the sole cause and that some free-not-necessitated concurse of mans
Whether God Actually in his mind thus Compare men and prefer one before another and say I will cause this man to believe rather than that I answer 1. There is no Act in God but his Essence which is invariable and indivisible 2. But because his operations as terminated and productive ad extra are various and have objective material causes of their diversity in the recipients therefore we usually thence denominate Gods volitions as various And so when we see that one man hath Grace given him to believe when another hath not we hence say that God mentally and by Decree preferreth one before the other when the difference is not at all in God not his Act ex parte agentis but only of and by God in the Recipients C. But come yet nearer the heart of the case and tell me plainly 1. Whether the difference of Effects be more from the will and action of God or from mens different Receptive dispositions And 2. Whether all these different Receptivities be not of God B. Order bids me begin with the latter 1. The different Dispositions are of two sorts Good and Bad. God is not the cause of the Indisposition or illdisposition of any And as to the good disposition or Preparation of Souls no doubt but he is the principal Cause of it all but not the sole Cause nor always at least the necessitating Cause but oft giveth men that necessary help by which they might have been prepared for more when yet they are not through their wilful resistance or neglect For few men will deny that men have sufficient uneffectual Grace for some preparatory acts though not for faith Ad. Q. 2. I told you that the difference in the effects resulteth from the Causes in both Subjects and not in one only That which maketh one a believer and the other an unbeliever maketh them differ And I have told you what these Causes are But further I suppose as aforesaid a certain established order and degree of universal help external and internal by Christ to the Soul as the Sun affordeth to inferior Bodies This stablished order of Grace universally affordeth such a degree of Divine Influx and help as will cause faith in a prepared Soul and will not cause it in some much unprepared Souls For if as little help would serve the unprepared as the prepared to what use is preparation quomodo recipitur ad modum recipientis In this case now the efficient of Grace is God and not Man but * That even Jesuits confess in their way of scientia media that the Ratio discriminis why one person rather than another hath Grace is from God initially and principally and not from any beginning in man See Ruiz proving it at large in all his Tract 3. Disp 18. 19. De Praedest exordio So that this is no difference between us Yea more he maintaineth that ante fidem niâ—il est dispositionis meriti aut impetrationis Sect. 3. Disp 19. 24. And one would think that this should satisfie even the Antinomians But he meaneth only that this disposition is not always necessary He that will in brief see what the Schoolmen say of preparative Grace may find abundance of them cited by Ruiz ibid. d. 21. per totam and what nature can do in preparation Greg. Armin in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 1. speaketh most like the Reformed Aug. de bono persever c. 8. Sed cur Gratia Dei non secundum merita hominum datur Resp Quia deus miserecors est Cur ergo non omnibus Et hic respondeo Quoniam Deuâ— justus Judex est the Ratio proxima of the difference in the event and effects is the Diverse disposition of the Recipients But here mark well that it is not the good disposition or preparation of one party that is the only and I think not the chief reason of the difference but the Privative and Positive indisposition of the other party is as much if not the chiefest reason If one man shut his eyes against the light when another doth not the Ratio discriminis why one man differeth from another in seeing and not seeing is on both parts but principally on his part that shutteth his eyes because the other doth but what he was made to do and all living creatures should do But the other absurdly crosseth nature So that under an universal Influx and help the said Influx is the efficient of the action or effect but the disposition of the Recipients are the Occasions and Reasons to be assigned of the various effects but especially the incapacity of the defective party As the reason why the Sun doth make a Tree bear fruit and not a dead stock is because the Tree is an apt recipient of its influx but the stock or stone is not 2. But Note that in case that God operate not by such an universal Influx only but also by superadded special or extraordinary degrees of particular Grace which by a difference from the universal Influx or degree is peculiarly apt to procure the effects here the ratio discriminis is principally to be ascribed to that special Grace and not to the preparations on the Soul C. Tell me then what you think whether God works by such an universal Grace or by such a special Grace 1. How far doth he work by universal Grace 2. Is that universal Grace ever effectual of it self on prepared Souls 3. How far doth he also use the special particular Grace which you mentioned B. I. To your first Qu. I answer 1. God in the beginning made mankind upright in Adam and Eve and made no difference as to the present case 2. Eve having first sinned did make a difference between her self and Adam which God made not nor altered first his universal Grace 3. Adam next without Gods alteration by Sin did difference himself from himself as he was before 4. God then set up a new universal Grace even Christ with the new Covenant and Recovering means to give out universal help suited to his Covenant and means to be the Giver of the Spirit and the Light of the world we cannot have time now to open the difference between Christ's administrations before and after his Incarnation There was at first an universal sufficiency in this Recovering help of Grace 5. Cain that could have done otherwise wilfully sinned against this universal Grace and Covenant and so made a difference between him and the rest of mankind when God made none 6. Whether Abel did offer his acceptable Sacrifice by this same universal Help alone or by any special extraordinary Grace ex parte mediorum vel Influxus primi recepti is a thing unknown to us because unrevealed 7. The Posterity of Cain as of Adam at first because Seminally in him and personally from his very guilty essence were justly deprived of some of that Grace both Subjective and Objective which Cain had deprived himself of Their natures were more vitiated and so
finem Now either there is such a middle Impulse or not If not then besides Gods essence there is no effect on us antecedent to our consent but the said cogitation and passion And 1. These are commonly said not to necessitate the will 2. And if they do it must be but Morally which is commonly held to be no way of necessitating though it may be of ascertaining the event And so consent or our Volition it self would be but of co-operating Grace And if there be such a middle Impulse as Gregory holdeth it is confessed by him and the Dominican praedeterminants to determine the will only to act freely and therefore not to necessitate it to consent but only to ascertain it and so the Volition will be as free as but by co-operating Grace though the Impulse would be necessary which tendeth to it of a special Grace for every preparatory Act. But of the rest I doubt B. And then 2. Sure you cannot deny it as to well prepared Souls 1. Because you granted that the same degree of help may be effectual to a disposed Soul 2. And so the Help though universal will to a prepared Soul be proportionable to the desired effect and is nevertheless Grace or powerful to such for being universal or uneffectual to others 3. And it seems that such a kind of degree of Grace was effectual on Adam before his fall and uneffectual in his fall 4. And it seemeth congruous to Gods other works that he give Grace suitable to his Law and Promise which shall not be always uneffectual So that it is most probable that to prepared Souls that ordinary established degree of the Spirits Influx from Christ which is universal but uneffectual to the unprepared is not only sometimes but ordinarily effectual I think none can prove the contrary And the same Grace you confess to be effectual to preparation But to unprepared Souls whom God will suddenly convert out of the ordinary way a special extraordinary operation seemeth necessary But wherein the extraordinariness of it consisteth antecedent to faith the second effect besides the extraordinary means I think it past mans reach to know C. Well now tell us Unde Gratia fit Efficax B. Any ordinary Logician will tell you that the effect is from all the causes and not from any one alone It is effectual in that it produceth the effect To which each cause doth its proper part and one is not all The effect in question now is Faith Faith is caused as is said 1. By Gods will as the Original 2. By Christ as sending the Spirit and meriting Grace first 3. By the Spirit as the Operator 4. By the Gospel as the Instrument 5. By the Preacher as a Sub-Instrument 6. But all this effecteth ordinarily in materia disposita and no other Having before wrought that preparation 7. But extraordinarily in materia indisposita working disposition and all at once Now here 1. Gods Will doth its part without any cause Velle ex parte Dei sicuâ— agere is his essence and the termination of it in rem Volitatam hath no efficient but only an Objective Cause 2. This prime Cause is the prime reason of all the efficacy of Inferior Causes Not qua voluntas simply moving them but qua voluntas cum potentia executiva moving them and qua volitio inferreth the necessitatem consequentiae of the effect So that plainly I think that no Good cometh to pass in the world but what God forewilled and nothing which he absolutely willeth cometh not to pass what he fore-knoweth is necessary necessitate Infallibilitatis and what he absolutely willeth necessitate Imutabilitatis and what he worketh from such a will is necessary necessitate invincibilitatis 3. Though all the other Causes are the reason of the effect and not only the first yet none of them operate on the first Cause and put any force into it for the act So that its force is from it self but theirs from it And having said this much preparatorily I thus resolve your great question Here are three things before us whose cause may be enquired of 1. The necessitas Logica consequentiae ex quo in ordine probandi necessario sequitur eventum futurum esse And this is the Decree or Will of God yea and his fore knowledge This is presupposed 2. The prime effect of Gods Will and Active power operating And this prime effect is not our Faith or Act but the Impression or Received Influx of God on the Soul For the Soul receiveth its like some Impression by the Divine Influx by which it believeth or acteth it self It doth not Receive its own Act as if that act had been first pre-existent in the Donor but it performeth that Act because it is premoved to it Now if the question be of this first effect Unde operatio Gratiosa sit efficax I answer 1. The whole efficient reason is in the operator and operation it self It is effectual ad impressionem ex natura rei because it is an Act If it did nothing it were no Act transient 2. And the specification and individuation is from the terminating object It is denominatively and Relatively one Act which is on a Stone and another on a Soul de specie And it is numerically one which is on Peter and another on John If the Sun did shine in vacuo there being no other creature to be objective or passive it would still agere but it would nihil efficere quia nihil afficere So God is one Infinite act and ex parte sui never begineth to act nor ever ceaseth nor is divided But transiently he doth nihil afficere vel efficere but first by making objects and then acting on them So that were there no mobile Gods act would not movere This first effect then of Impress hath an Effective and an Objective Cause The Effective Cause is Gods Essence that is his Active Power Intellect and Will and nothing else Supposing now that it be not Gods operation on the Instrument or medium that we speak of but immediately on the Soul it self But Man's Soul is the Objective Recipient Cause of this first effect which is the Impress or Influx received 3. The Secondary effect is Mans Act Faith and Repentance it self If the question Unde Gratia sit efficax mean this as with most it doth then it is all one as to ask Unde hic Effectus For that Gods Influx on the Soul immediately is the sole Cause is false Therefore the answer is that this effect is from all the Causes conjunct From Gods Will or Law and Power and Wisdom from Christs mission of the Spirit before merited from the Spirits Impress or Influx from the Gospel from the Ministry usually and from the Agent Believer all these as the efficient Causes And it is from or on the prepared Soul ordinarily as the Materia disposita vel Causa Receptiva Objectiva of the Divine operation And from or on God Christ the promise
Glory as the materia objectiva actus humani where I conclude the Causa finalis as the chief object Thus I have shewed you truly and plainly unde fit fides as that is all one as unde hic effectus and that is all one as unde Gratia fit efficax as to this secondary effect C. But I conceive that the sense of the question rather iâ— which of all these is the chief cause or reason of the existence of the effect B. Pardon my impatience of Confusion The chief cause and the chief reason are not always the same There is no question but God is the only and total Causa prima from whom all the rest have all their power and force But by the Reason of the existence is often meant that which in discourse must be assigned proportionately in answer to the question Why is one converted rather than another supposing Gods Influx on them both And this is oft the Receptive disposition as is said for Reciptur ad modum recipientes C. Well But the question recurreth what is the chief Cause and Reason that one not another hath that preparatory Receptivity B. The chief Cause is God why one hath it The chief Cause why another hath it not is himself that is the Moral deficient cause The Ratio differendi I opened to you before The most notable if we suppose Gods Influx to be of it self universal and equal is the Indisposition of the Sinner whence he doth difference himself from those that God causeth to receive even preparing Grace But the true Ratio effectus is from all the Causes conjunct C. But you must come at last to some prime difference And if you will say that the reason of our Preparatory effect or degree of Grace is because I used a former well or did not refuse it or was prepared for it what will you say of the first degree B. I say that the first preparatory Grace or help was given to Adam and all in him as the first natural goodness was C. But where came in the first difference B. By Cain's wilful Sin against God and his Grace C. But though you do with Augustine hold a communicated guilt of the sins of other Parents than our first and so a difference between persons yea and Kingdoms thence arising yet some Children as Esau and Jacob born of the same Parents must have in them some other cause of difference even as to preparatory Grace B. Suppose Gods fixed equal Influx universal there are two Causes of difference herein 1. One is the meer sinful wilfulness of one party that doth not do what that Grace enabled him to do by which a difference is made C. You mean that Jacob better used his help than Esau B. Not so but that Esau more abused it than Jacob. Suppose Jacob had slept out his youth or done no good and Esau had rebelled against God also and done much mischief Esau had hereby made a difference which is assignable without commending Jacob. C. Well what is the other Cause B. 2. Gods own free differencing Will and Grace who is a free Benefactor and may do with his own as he list and therefore freely loveth Jacob with the electing special love and decree which he hath not to Esau For though I have all this while discoursed with you of the Ratio Efficaciae of an Universal Grace I say not that there is no other C. O Now you come to the matter indeed B. II. The Question Unde fit Gratia efficax * Blank de Dist Grat. Thes 79. Naturam Gratiae efficacis Thomistae ponunt in motione quadam virtuosa quae est in voluntate per modum quo impetus in re quae impellitur Jansenius in â—ffectibus Amoris desiderii boni coelestis spiritualis quibus suaviter sursum rapitur animus humanus Discipâ—li Cameronis in potâ—nâ—â—ssima mentis illuminatione persuasione quae voluntatem â—ffectus secum rapit Alii in omnipotenti efficacissima Dei operatione qua novum principium spiritualis vitae Cordi hominis vocati inditur homo simâ—l excitatur ad actus eliciendos quae hic plerique vâ—i docti proferunt componenda potius quam opponenda videntur Even they that are for Physical praedetermination are not agreed what it is some make it a transient quality passing with the act Some say it is only mans Act it self as from God the first cause Some with Alvarez say It is Aliquid quod habet esse incompletum as colours in the air that is They know not what and yet venture on hot contentions about it And Jansenius who maketh it to be Delectatio or Complacentia saith it is Actus vitalis indeliberatus animo quidem amoris desiderii praecedentis consensum ac delectationem illam quae quies animi gaudium dicitur De Grat. Christi l. 4. c. 11. Much like to Vasquez save that Vasq calls it but an indeliberate prime motion of the affection and Jansenius calls it Indeliberate Delectation or Complacency which certainly is an Act of man and the Scotists say that all the Wills Acts are free though not all its inclinations But thus we strive about that which none of us understand viz. How God moveth his Creatures and our Wills in special being put of Gods special Grace by which he arbitrarily maketh a difference and is more than his Universal Grace must be thus resolved That though other Causes concur to the effect the Great over-ruling differencing and ascertaining Cause is the very quality and aptitude of Gods operation it self as proceeding from an absolute volition of the effect and in the Means and Influx fitted to ascertain the effect C. Wherein consisteth this differencing special Grace B. Deceive not your self No mortal man can know in what it ordinarily constantly or chiefly consisteth We know 1. That though God as Rector per Leges keeps one even and constant course yet as Proprietor and Benefactor he may vary as he please And that a Benefactor may give unequally to men of equal merits And that God really doth so de facto And that his Will hath no Cause 2. We know that God hath innumerable ways to fulfil his Will and make a difference between man and man which are beyond the search of Mortals 3. And though we can name divers which he can take we know not de facto which he doth take hic nunc C. What differencing free acts of Grace do you observe B. None which violate Gods established order or diminish his universal Grace But such as are superadded specially to some As 1. To Children of the same Parents he giveth to divers a temperament of Body as in one much more conduceth to thoughtfulness tenderness meekness sobriety chastity zeal honesty c. than in the other He is a stranger to man that knoweth not this 2. He sometime giveth them various Education One is piously educated Another is snatch'd away and
whom I recite to shew that he is not singular Alex. Alens 1. p. q. 39. m. 1. Scot. in 1. d. 46. q. 1. in solut arg Richard art 1. qu. 1. Durand q. 1. Palud q. 1. art 1. Capreol in 1. d. 45. q. 1. art 1. Concl. 14. art 3. ad arg S. Thom. 1. contra g. c. 39. ibid. Ferrariens Hosius in Confess Polon c. 73. Ruard art 11. Sot 3. de nat grat c. 7. 3. de Justit q. 5. art ult ad 1. Cajet in hunc art Joh. Bunder in Compend Concert tit 6. art 7. Gabr. Biel supplem in 4. d. 49. q. 4. art 4. dub 3. Bonavent in 4. d. 46. art 2. q. 1. ad 2. S. Thom. 1. 2. q. 114. art 1. Conrad ibid. Durand iterum in 2. d. 27. q. 2. Perrar cont Gent. 3. c. 179. Then because some words of Medina and Cajet and Romaus seem for Commutative Justice he sheweth that it was not their meaning Next he vindicateth Scotus and Gabriel as having no such meaning in some words of theirs Then he cometh to the case of Christs own Merits and saith that some say Christ satisfied for us in rigour of Justice But that Aquin. Bonavent and such ancients use not that form of speech but only teach that Christs satisfaction was perfect that is needed no Acceptilation but to this it is not necessary that it be according to Justice properly but that it was of equal condignity by way of Merit And other Schoolmen that speak as aforesaid mean not that in Christ there was proper Justice towards God but that the equality which he kept by the way and similitude of Justice in his satisfaction was according to rigour that is needed not Gods liberal acceptation but was altogether of equal condignity which is true I except but some late ones who contend that in that satisfaction there was proper justice whom he opposeth But they speak only of Imperfect Justice such as is found in Creatures which is not in God In Cap. 3. he layeth down several foundations against Commutative Justice and confuteth Cajetan and Medina who said that indeed between God and man there was no Commutative Justice but inter res that is inter meritum praemium there is which he sheweth is a contradiction of the former In Cap. 4. he disputeth against commutative Justice in God to man and that 1. Because there is not aequalitas dati accepti and to be short he brings against it the very same arguments as Protestants urge against Merit which sheweth that both sides mean and oppose the very same thing And he is so much against any Merit of ours from God in Commutative Justice that he labours to prove that Christs satisfaction was not such nor can any Creature so merit of God much less is mans penance or satisfaction such yea indeed he goeth too far in his reasons as I think For he argueth that where there is no Damnum damage in the sin against God there is no proper injustice but a common sort of it and therefore there can no merit in proper justice by satisfaction by Christ or us and that our sin bringeth no damage to God ergo c. But I deny his Major There may be injury where there is no Damage and consequently injustice Suppose a King or Father so far above his subject or son as that all his disobedience would no way hurt or damnifie him yet it would injure him because the father hath Right to the sons obedience and love and Juriâ— denegatio est injuria So that I confess that God cannot possibly give us anything by Commutative Justice in a strict and proper â—ence because we can so give him nothing in commutation But I see not but that by sin man sinneth against proper Justice in not giving God his Own or Due to his Injury though not to his damage But I confess the term Commutative nothing mutual Right is improper and their distinction of Commutative and distributive Justice is narrow ambiguous inepâ— and therefore â—eedeth and not endeth Controversies The true distribution of Justice is from the three Grand Moral Relations Dominii Imperii Beneficii vel Amicitiae 1. God hath the true proper Right of Propriety in us and to our service 2. He hath a proper Right of Imperium Rule and so to our obedience 3. By his Goodness Love and Benefits he hath a proper Right to our greatest Love and Gratitude And he that sinneth denyeth God all these and so doth violate proper Justice denying him that to which he hath Right But to return to Vasquez having said That our Merit and Satisfaction can be no benefit to God nor our sin his damage nec ulla inaequalitas inter ipsum nos constituta est quae sit objectum injustitiae proprâ—ae he addeth that his punishments are no parts of commutative justice in resarciendis vindicandis injuriis because here is no reparation of damage as Thom. 2. 2. q. 108. art 2. And Cap. 5. he proceedeth to prove his doctrine from the Condition of God and the Creature we being as Children and slaves absolutely his own therefore there can be no proper justice between us And he cometh to the great objection that As free our Actions are our own and so may merit of Justice and answereth No because the Value of our works to which the Reward is given dependeth on Gods grace which he freely giveth and conserveth to us though as free the actions are of us as Causes And because that Liberty is only a fundamentum of merit but giveth not the work its Value or worth therefore we cannot make God our Debtor by any meritorious work of which he himself is the author and Cause And hence he is so much against this merit of Justice as to inferr that Christ himself could not satisfie God according to strict Justice properly by the works of his Humane nature because the whole Value came from the Godhead it self sanctifying the humanity and making his works worthy Cap. 6. he proceedeth to shew that though it be not true that some say that full equal satisfaction may be refused it being not the ipsum debitum and that he proveth that a full equal satisfaction to proper justice cannot in justice be refused and if it be refuseable it is unequal though it may be equal condignitate meriti quae ad justitiam propriè non pertinet Yet even from Gods promise it self it is no obligation of proper justice that is on God to us Confuting Sotus that saith that Gods Fidelity is not to be referred to the virtue of verity but properly belongeth to commutative Justice If this be not enough Disput 86. he cometh to the other branch Whether God have distributive Justice to us and denyeth this also in proper sence And proveth it by the authority of Bonavent in 4. d. 46. art 2. q. 1. ad 1. Scotus qu. 1. Durand ib. q. 1. in
after him and find him though he be not far from every one of us For in him we live and move and have our being For we are also his off-spring Act. 17. 25 26 27 28 29. For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek For the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him For whoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved But have they not heard Yes verily their sound went into all the earth and their words unto the ends of the world Rom. 10. 12 13 18. Despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long suffering not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to Repentance Who will render to every man according to his deeds To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for Glory and Honour and Immortality Eternal life Glory honour and peace and to every man that worketh Good to the Jew first and also to the Greek For there is no respect of persons with God For not the hearers of the Law are just before God but the doers of the Law shall be justified For when the Gentiles which have not the Law do by Nature the things contained in the Law these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves which shew the work of the Law written in their hearts their Consciences also bearing witness and their thoughts in the mean while accusing or else excusing one another In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel If the uncircumcision keeps the righteousness of the Law shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision He is a Jew which is one inwardly and circumcision is that of the heart in the spirit and not in the letter whose praise is not of men but of God Rom. 2. SECT III. Of Christ's Incarnation and our Redemption 36. In the fulness of time God sent his Son made of a Woman made under the Law to redeem them that were under the Law Rom. 4. 4. But not them only for God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son that whoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life Joh. 3. 16. He was made sin for us who knew no sin that we might be made the righteousness of God in him He redeemed us from the Curse of the Law being made a Curse for us For he is the Saviour of the world and the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world He is the Propitiation for our sins and not for ours only but for the sins of the whole world 1 Joh. 2. 2. For he tasted Death for every man Heb. 2. being the Saviour of all men but especially of those that believe 1 Tim. 4. 10. For if one dyed for all then were all dead And he dyed for all that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves but unto him that dyed for them and rose again 2 Cor. 5. 14 15. 37. As the eternal Word and Wisdom of the Father in his Divine nature only was the interposing Redeemer by undertaking before his Incarnation and governed the faln world by the fore-described Law of Grace so upon his Incarnation initially and upon his performance plenarily all things are delivered into his hands even all the world so far as it was defiled and cursed by Man's sin Man as the Redeemed the Creatures as his utensils and goods and Devils as his and our Enemies All Power in Heaven and Earth was given him Matth. 26. 19. Joh. 13. 1 3. and 17. 2 3. All judgment was committed to him and the Father judgeth no man but by him But hath given him to have life in himself and to raise the dead Joh. 5. 22 23 24 25. For he hath made him Head over all things to his Church Eph. 1. 22 23. And for this end he dyed rose and revived that he might be the Lord of the dead and the living Rom. 14. 9 10. For God hath exalted him and given him a name above every name that in the name of Jesus every knee should â—ow Phil. 2. 7 8. And as in Adam all die even so in Christ shall all be made alive 1 Cor. 15. 22. 38. Christ upon his Incarnation performed but what God had Decreed before the foundations of the world and had obscurely and generally promised after the fall at the first making of the Covenant of Grace Which Decree of God is after the manner of men called by some a Covenant between the Father and the Son especially because the Prophets have sometimes as Isa 53. described it by way of prediction as a Covenant between the Father and Christ incarnate If we conceive of it properly under the notion of a Decree first and a Promise after unto the world so the Will and Mercy of God the Father and Son with the Holy Spirit are the cause of mans Redemption Pardon and Salvation even the fundamental Principal total Cause And the Promise was man's security and Christ as promised was the primary great meanâ— which was to procure us the rest by doing that upon the fore-sight and fore-decree whereof God did before-hand pardon and save Sinners But if you had rather mention it as in the form of a Covenant which before the Incarnation must be improperly taken being only of God to himself or a promise of and to Christ as to be incarnate then the undertaking of the Father and the Son herein must be carefully distinguished and described The Father giveth up to Christ as Redeemer the whole lapsed cursed reparable world the several parts to several uses and especially his chosen to be eventually and infallibly saved and promiseth to accept his Sacrifice and performance and to make him Head over all things to his Church and by him to establish the Law of Grace in its perfect Edition and to give him the Government respectively of the Church and world and to Glorifie him for this work with himself for ever And the second person undertaketh to assume man's Nature to do and suffer all that he did in perfect obedience to his Fathers Will and Law of Redemption to fulfill all Righteousness conquer Satan and the world to suffer in the flesh and be a Sacrifice for sin and to conquer Death and teach and rule and purifie and raise and justifie and glorifie all true believers 39. Before the Incarnation Christ's future death and obedience being * * * Eadem suit sides in antiquis patribus modernis qui alio modo credebant in specialia alia credibilia quam nos Immo aliquid eredebant quod nunc est salsum Alliaco in 3. q. 1. not existent were no real existent Causes in themselves of men's Justification But that Wisdom which foresaw them and that Will of God which Decreed them as such and not they without that fore-sight and Decree as existent were the cause 40. Nor were they either before
still dependeth wholly on his supporting will 3. God concurreth by his universal Influx to its acts 4. God is still the Lord of it and can turn it as he please and over-rule it to his Ends and hath put no act of ours from under his power But he willingly so forbeareth his own further operation as that he hath made the Will able on supposition of his foresaid support and universal influx and rule to Determine it self to the said ORDER of its Acts without Gods particular predetermining premotion § 9. As in the Vital and Intellectual faculties it is Gods Image to be Able to Act Vitally and to understand so in the Will this self-determining Power and Liberty and Imperium over other faculties is part of the same Image And it is Gods wrong and dishonour â—o have his Image denyed and dishonoured And therefore to deny this Power of the Will is as much a disgracing of Gods Image as to deny man to be Rational § 10. God made man such an Intellectual Free Agent that he might be a fit subject for Sapiential Moral Government and accordingly he setled a Kingdom in the World And as he governeth meer Natural Agents by Natural motion so he governeth Man as a Moral agent by Laws and Moral means and motion For he ruleth all things according to their Natures § 11. Yet as man even his will is quid Naturalâ— as the subject of his morality and as Aquinas oft saith Ipsa Voluntas est quaedam natura so God doth by Natural agency and Causation continue and actuate man as Natural that so he may govern him morally in the rest even in the moral ordering of his Acts. § 12. When men say that the will is free from co-action they mean not all the same thing By co-action some mean nothing but that willing is not nilling or that God doth not make it to be unwilling and willing of the same thing in the same respect at the same instant that is God causeth not contradictions it being Impossible And so with the Predeâ—erminants usually to will and to will freely signifie the very same And if this be all the Liberty of the Will then to move it as Naturally as a Stone is moved to hate God to will all sin and nill all duty so as that it can no more do otherwise than make a World were no abatement of its Liberty because it is Volition and Nolition which are the acts that it is moved to whether by God or Satan § 13. But I yet see not why it may not as properly be called Coaction to move the will by physical necessitation to will oâ— nill as to move the Intellect to understand or to move any natural agent § 14. If you say that the word Coaction importeth reluctancy oâ— unwillingness or opposition I confess with Scotus that Potentia passâ—vâ— is well distinguished into naturalem neutram violentam and that the word Coaction may be so strictly taken as to signifie no motion but of a violaâ—ed Patient and so it is but lis de nomine But a Necessitating motion oâ—â— natural and neutral patient is the same thing what name soever you call it by And they that acknowledge the pravity of the will and its corrâ—pt aversness to God and spiritual good must needs by this rule make Gods gracious change by predetermination to be a coaction as being the motion of a contrarily disposed patient contrarily I say iâ— instanti priore for the motus is supposed to change its disposition and act at once But if still they say that it is not contrary in eodem instanti and that 's its liberty I say then if the Devil had power as easily to effect by physical premotion a hatred of God and will to sin in all men as I can move my pen it were no loss of Natural Liberty And so mans liberty differeth not from a beasts or from a plants indeed but only in the Nature of the Act one willeth when the other doth but appeâ—erâ— but all by the like physical unresistible efficiency from other cauâ—es This is but to play with the name of Liberty § 15. We take not this Liberty to be inconsistent with all kind of Necessity as is opened before in the Table of Liberty § 16. Nor do we confound the several sorts of Liberty as the said Table sheweth 1. A Political Liberty from Restraint of Laws is one thing not questioned in these disputes 2. And a Moral or Holy Liberty from vice or sinful dispositions and acts is another 3. But it is the Natural Liberty of mans will on earth that we speak of § 17. So far as any man is vicious he wanteth the Moral Liberty of his will and so far as he is virtuous and sanctified he hath it that is His will is so far freed from sin § 18. We take not Liberty of Will to consist in Neutrality †††See Fr. Macâ—do against White of disposition or meer Indifferency For the will acteth freely when it acteth according to its Inclination and habits with the greatest propensity yea constancy of self-determination § 19. We take not the Indetermination of the will to be its perfection but its Natural Imperfection But such as God hath made it in in this World where all his creatures have not the same perfection * * * Therefore we do with judicious Strangius distinguish the essential Liberty which is self-determination according to Reason from that liberty of Indiffâ—â—enâ—y which is inconsistent with predetermination and necessitation § 20. Therefore though God hath thought this Indeterminate self-determining Will to be fittest for a Viator in his tryal and preparation for felicity yet perfection consisteth in the most Determinate state of Love with the greatest necessity which proceedeth from the perfected nature of man and the full communication of Love from God which we hope to have in Heaven for ever And he is best on Earth who is nearest to this state SECT XII Somewhat more of Predetermination with an answer to Dr. Twisse § 1. THough I remit the Controversie of * * * I remit the Reader to Strangius against the necessity of predetermination Percipere non possum quomodo statui possit Deum causas liberas etiam ad actus intrinsice malos physice praedeterminare quin inde sequatur Deum esse peccati authorem c. Le Blank Thes 56. de Concursu c. Predetermination to a peculiar full Disputation on that subject yet this touch in transitu I shall give here 1. It is not Gods meer Volition or Decree of the Event that we speak of but his Physical Motion 2. †††It 's strange the Dominicans are for burning and tormenting men for that which they hold God doth do in them and by them and necessâ—tate them to See Braâ—wardine li. 3. c. 1 2. â—â—â—od Deus quodammodo necessitat quamlibet Voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet liberum actum suum
God knoweth all Names Notions Propositions and Syllogisms with their modes as they are the measures organs or actings of Humane Understandings 8. †I refer the Reader to Blank de Concord lib. cum â—ecretis 1. Thes 25. c. where by citing their own words at large he proveth that the most famous and resolute Antiarminians were for this scientia media conditionata viz. Fr. Gomarrus Arminius's chief Antagonist in Mat. 11. 21. Antonius Walaeus loc com de sctent Dei pag. 160. Paulus Ferrius Scholast Orth. vindic p. 203 209 210. Besides Rob. Baronius Metaph. sect 12. disp 2. num 55 56. who in his last days was nearest to the Arminians as appeareth in those Metaphysicks And Jo. Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p 675. nameth also Lud. Crocius Dyodecad dis 7. It is therefore undeniable to all Christians that the thing which they call * Could Alvarez and his fellows well prove that the permission of the first sin is an effect of Reprobation as the word is used in a fit and ordinary sense they would do more to overthrow the Doctrine de scientia media circa malum than is yet done But they fail in their attempts of proving this Of which after scientia media is as certainly in God as is the scientia simplicis Intelligenâ—iae Purae visionis that is that God knoweth the truth of all true conditional Propositions and knoweth what would be done by such and such causes or upon such and such alterations if they were put Doth any Christian doubt of this 9. Whether this should be called scientia media is a question de nomine and that of no great importance and not at all de re 10. Whether it be of any necessity or use in this Controversie is a question only about the order of argumentation as long as the thing it self is confessed to be true 11. Some that cashier it as an useless Engine in this matter do go as far from you as the Jesuites and Arminians who use it As you may see at large in Ludov. à Dola and Durandus himself 12. I am one that fear Presumption both in their and your distributions of the Knowledge and Decrees of God and dread the taking of his Name in vain And one that think that we need not the notion of scientia media for our satisfactory explication of these matters But as the truth of the thing is confessed so if it be applied only to the Doctrine of Reprobation as it is commonly called and not at least always to the Doctrine of Election I see no untruth that it inferreth nor no real difference that it will prove between us The fifth Crimination C. They deny absolute Reprobation at least and say that God reprobateth no men but upon fore-sight of sin And so that he hath no Decree that men shall sin nor that he will permit them to sin nor that they shall do the act in particular which is sin As if God had not decreed the hardening of Pharaohs heart the sin of Sihon of Rehoboam of the Jews in killing Christ c. B. 1. I told you before Reprobation is a word that signifieth several acts You dare not but grant them that God decreeth or willeth to damn no man but for sin and as a Sinner And this is the same thing that they mean 2. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Decree to give them no Faith or Repentance 1. You must prove that God hath such a Decree or Will for a meer negation where not-decreeing or not-willing to give them Grace will do as much 2. All Christians must needs confess that God made a Covenant of Grace with fallen Mankind in Adam and Noah And that no man is now under the meer Obligations of the Law and Covenant of Innocency which saith Be perfect and live sin and die for ever And that there is some common mercy extended to all the World which obligeth them to repent in order to Salvation He subverteth Scripture and all experience that denieth this Therefore all must grant that God denieth no special Grace to any but the abusers of this common Grace And he decreeth to do but what he doth * Thus our Brittish Diviâ—es at Dâ—rt in their suffrage on Ar. 3. at large Therefore the persons whom he decreeth to deny special Grace to are none but the abusers of common Grace or the rejecters of that special Grace when offered 3. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Will or Decree to permit them to sin and perish willfully 1. You can prove no such Decree or Will Because permission being a negation or nothing needs it not but will be as certainly without it upon a bare not decreeing to hinder them from sin 2. And you mistake in saying that Arminius denieth it For he * Arminius himself expresly professeth that in case God permits a man velle pâ—ccatum necâ—sse est ut nullo argumentorum geneâ—e persuadeatur ad volendum Exam. Perk. pag. 153. Dr. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 70. saith with you That God decreeth his own permission 3. You must take the pains to distinguish between negative and privative Unbelief and between negative and privative not-hindring Sin or not-giving Faith Negative Unbelief is meer not-believing And so none of us did believe from eternity or before we were born He that is not believeth not nor yet in the first instant that the Promise and Law of Faith was given us Our unbelief is not sin or privative but on supposition that we are men and have reason and have a Law and Object of Faith And Gods permitting us in this negative Non-belief is not to be called a privative but only a negative permission For God did from eternity so permit me to be no man and no Believer and yet this was not Reprobation So God did negatively not hinder Adams first sin but not privatively because not penally for any evil done nor yet by denying him any thing that was naturally or morally his due Therefore this was not an Act of Reprobation But when the New Covenant of Grace and the common Grace of the Covenant are once given men and they are obliged to believe then sometimes God penally denieth them Grace and that is all which the Arâ—inians put against absolute denial because this denial is only for mens fore-going sin But he also still negatively only and not privatively or penally denieth some Grace to some yea to all And that is only such Grace as is neither morally their due nor naturally due or necessary to them And the denial of such is no Act of Reprobation 4. If by Reprobation you mean meerly Gods Preterition that is his â—â—t-willing or not-decreeing to give men Grace 1. Not to Will or Decree is nothing And how can you call nothing absolute or conditional These are the modes of Acts and not of not-acting or of nothing All grant that Gods non-agency non-volition not-decreeing hath no cause much
will in the use of such Power as he hath is a condition sine qua non ut dispositio Gratiae receptiva ordinarily 8. But that God is not tied to this but may extraordinarily do otherwise 9. But that this * Ruiz de praedif tr 3. d. 18. p. 222. Resp dispositiones proximas proâ—ertionatas ad gratiam nâ—â—il ob esse quidditati gratiae quoniam ex prima radice nascuntur ex prima gratia quae absque ulla dispositione quasi creata est a Deo sine materia At pugnabit cum quidditate gratiae quaelibet dispositio etiam remota si ab illa sumit initium gratia ita ut prima gratia detur intuitu talis dispositionis Iâ— not this enough pre-requisite disposition and the concurse of mans will is only the use of a power freely before given of God with all necessary helps to use it 10. And therefore that God is from first to last the first cause of all that 's good in man though not the only cause and that of himself man can do nothing Have I not taken your meaning right B. Yes so far as you have recited it C. But methinks yet you answer not the great question which Camero baffled Tilenus with It is not why Paul believeth Nor why Nero believeth not as singly considered But comparatively why Paul believeth rather than Nero Speak to that B. Camero and Tilenus were great and excellent wits But if you can forgive the Truth I must add that which they said nothing to which will prove that a few degrees more of acuteness might have shortned or better ended their dispute It is the Comparatio personarum that is now the subject of that Controversie why this man rather than that as compared Here then we are to consider 1. The Comparabilitas 2. The Ipsa Comparatio 1. The question as to the first is either 1. Whether there was antecedently any such ratio comparandi in them as might be a reason or motive to God himself quoad actum ex parte agentis why he should decree to give or actually give Faith to one man rather than to another 2. Or else whether there were any such difference antecedent as might be Ratio discriminis ineffectis the reason why one received or had Faith and the other not II. And then quoad actum comparandi the question is whether God in his Decree or mind did truly compare the persons antecedently and say not only I will cause this man to believe and say I will not cause that man to believe or not say I will But also said I will cause this man to believe rather than that To these several questions then I answer 1. Negatively to the first For Gods acts ex parte agentis are his essence and as he hath no cause but is the cause of all things so thus far nothing in the world is a causal reason or motive to God He willeth because he willeth or rather without cause II. To the second There are in the Creatures different capacities for terminating Godâ— will and action objectively and accordingly denominating his Volitions and Actions variously And so this question must be divided into three 1. Whether always 2. Whether ordinarily 3. Whether sometimes there be an objective ratio comparabilitatis and of preferring one before another as to the effect of believing or why Gods operation should effect Faith rather in this man than in that To which I answer Ad primum 1. There are nearest Reasons in the immediate aptitude of the receiver Such as is the highest degree of preparing Grace in one which another hath not And there are remote reasons or aptitudes As e. g. A man of great learning wit and zeal or some other remote aptitude will be a fitter person for Gods work than another when he believeth 2. It is not known to any mortal man what different aptitudes in both these kinds God the only heart-searcher seeth which no man can see And therefore this question cannot certainly be answered as to both sorts 3. But as far as our blind eyes can reach it seemeth most probable to us that God doth not always effect Faith according to the degrees of receptive aptitude of either sort Because we see that sometimes he suddenly calleth very great sinners and also some that are silly and little serviceable in the world But yet what special aptitudes God may see in them we know not Ad secundum Qu. I answer That it is Gods ordinary way to give Faith according to the first sort of predisposition alone were there no difference in the last that is To those that have the highest degrees of moral preparation or Common Grace I take to be a certain truth 1. Because in all Gods Works we see that he operateth by degrees in order and on predisposed matter and that efficit juxta dispositionem recipientis 2. But specially because he hath himself appointed a course of means for the obtaining of his special Grace to be used by all men And he cannot be thought to do all this in vain nor to set men on doing their part in vain And all practical Divines who preach so much for the souls preparation are of this mind that such preparation is the ordinary predisposition Ad Qu. 3. I answer That at least sometimes it is so is past question with any sober man For it is a contradiction to call it preparing Grace or Disposition and yet to say that by it no man is made ever the more receptive or nearlier capable of Faith or special Grace So much to the two questions de Comparabilitate * Mark what Bannes himself saith of Common Grace in q. 23. pag. 274. Pie credi potest quod omnibus venientibus ad usum rationis Deus opem aliquam ferat supernaturali quodam auxilio secreto instigante ad operandum bonum 2. Si vera est opinio Thomae c. necesse est dicâ—re quod omnis qui justificatur receperit gratiam praeparantem saltem prius natura quam praeceptum naturale adimpleverit 3. Quotiescunque aliquis pecâ—at speciale peccatum contra supernaturale praeceptum vel fidei vel pâ—nitâ—ntiae c. necesse est ut ille de facto receperit aliquam divinam inspirationem illuminantis Dei dut vocantis aut incitantis ad fidem c. Immo necesse est hominem tangi aliqua supernaturali inspiratione ut nullam â—abtat excusationem Possibile est seâ—undam legem ordinariam quemlibet dum est in hac vita salvari Dâ—us paratus est dare omnibus quamdiu sunt in hâ—c vita auxilium quo fiant potentes converti immo auxilium specialius quo convertaâ—tur si velint I cite this because for his Doctrine of Predetermiâ—ation Protestants much value Banâ—es a boasting Author who thanketh God that their King burneth Protestants Indeed the Dominioâ—â—s commonly confess sufficient Grace which is not effectual III. But as to the third question