therefore be our wisdome to follow Gods footsteps sobrietie to stay our selues where he hath left no impressioÌ„ else shall we loose the sweete inspiration that issueth out of the flowers of Gods wisedome neither must we breath vpon it any of our vnsauourie notions for then the sweet influence wil retire into the flower the smell that we haue breathed out of our selues will returne not to recreate the spirits of grace and goodnesse but to puffe vp in vs a spirit of pride and selfe-conceit which is nothing but like a blowne bladder euacuated with the least pricke of sound knowledge For as extreame windie stomacks do not onely hinder digestion by interposition with the wholesome meate and relaxation of the mouth of the stomacke which ought to shut it selfe so close about the meate that not so much as the least vacuitie may bee left but also either by ill digestion fils the bodies with crudities obstructions and consequently putrifactions or else because winde is so stirring makes eiaculation and a sudden regurgitation of all that is receiued so in like manner windie knowledge aboue wholesome sobrietie makes such an interposition and relaxation of the minde that it can digest no wholesome doctrine but fils it selfe with all manner of rawe humors and vnstable opinions which breed such obstructions in the minde that presently it falls into diuers sickenesses and can keep nothing that is good but presently beeing receiued by the pride and selfe-conceit it hath in it selfe casts it vp againe and so by a continuall casting breeds that weaknes that so much leauen of evill doctrine is soked into the verie filmes as I may say of the mind that it breeds that disease which is tearmed of Physitians corruptio ad aciditatem corcorruption into sowernesse which sets such an eager and sharpe appetite in the mind that it hungers continually to be fed with newe opinions and so at the length rottennesse and putrifaction is bredde therein and then consequently death and destruction therefore if we meane to preuent these sicknesses we must looke to God our patterne But alas you will say how can that be done seeing hee dwells in a light vnapproachable 1. Tim. 1.16 and therefore is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 incomprehensible by our Logicke or reason and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vnnamable by our graÌ„mar speech but here let vs wonder that God beeing one most simple beeing and therefore to be apprehended as one which he himselfe alone is able to doe hath made himselfe many in his attributes that so by many attributes wee might come to apprehend this one God Now these attributes are according to our measure and manner the measure of our reason and manner of our speech a vessel can hold no more then his measure neither is there any wayes how it may be filled but by the mouth so our soules hold the wisdome of God according to their measure and are to be filled with it according to their manner Now the Lord is said to speake mouth to mouth both in himselfe and by his ministers so then the wisedome of God teacheth vs that the words of euerie text are to be explaned for the manner of our apprehension and then the arguments and reasons for the measure of our knowledge Therefore in the feare of his maiesty and the loue of his wisedome let vs eie his worke before vs and write vpon it nil vltra here is my stay I wil range no further if this flower doe inspire wisedome then God giue me the taste of it and keepe my appetite and desire from that imbecillitie and strange weakenes that nothing will content it but newe inventions and vnaccustomed deuises of men my desire is to handle nothing but that which hath logicall ground in it But first let vs cleere the words for they are the ingrauen characters of the mind and therefore must we know them that we receiue no false reports by them the one serues for communication the other for information therefore the rules of speech and reason beeing obserued we doubt not but to communicate our text to the information of the weakest II. Part. Of the clearing of Gods euidence These things hast thou done These This word points out their speciall sinnes and is to limit a more generall to his specialls which are these theeuery adultery euill speaking deceit false witnesse slaunder profanation Things This is an ambiguous word first it signifies the beeing of any thing secondly it signifies any qualitie in that being thirdly any action proceeding either from the beeing or qualitie of any creature fourthly it signifies any sinne either in the qualities as vitious habits or actions as transgressions in thought word or deed fiftly miserie it is here taken in the fourth signification for sinnes because as actions proceed froÌ„ the being and qualities of euery creature so the being or quality beeing infected the action prooues bad and sinfull But here ariseth a great difficultie whether the action be the subiect of sinne or the effect It seemes to bee the subiect for a sinfull action is expounded sinne in the action so the subiect an action which is a thing should bee put for sinne his adiunct which properly is nothing But vnder the correction of the learned I iudge no action to be the subiect of sinne properly â—â—tions no subiect of sinne my reasons are these which I bring most willingly because in my apprehension it notably cleares God in working in sinfull actions Reason 1. from punishment in … d. That which is properly the subiect of sinne may bee punished but actions cannot bee punished for sinfull actions a man is punished therefore it is the man that is the subiect and his sinful action is the meritorious cause therefore when God is said to punish sinne with sinne it is to bee vnderstood sinfull action with sinfull action therfore to conclude that God is the author of sinne is a fallacian of composition and diuision for it is one thing to bee the cause of sinne and an other the cause of a sinnefull action for the sinne is not in the action but in the agent and therefore in man alone but the action is common to both as for example I cast a glasse against the stone wall the stone wall breakes the glasse so doth the hand that sast it but the one is a blameable cause the other vnblameable so man sinning casts himselfe by his owne free will against the law of God which beeing stronger then man breaks him in peices Here the lawe and will of God wrought in this sinfull action God and his law most iustly man by his own free will most vniustly the action therefore from both but the sin onely did sticke in the nature of man and so made him for his part in the action culpable and guilty of Gods wrath therfore the action hauing no sinne inherent in it properly may be handled of God without sinne Reason 2.
God another now all learned men knowe that the manner of any thing makes it not many as one cause may beget preserue be alone and with others worke by it selfe and by accident and therefore no neede to multiply the action Effectuum relationes omnes sunt ad causas suas separatas concurrentes concausas simul ac similiter agentes that is the relations and respect of all effects are to their causes whether they be separate concurring concausing or together and in like manner working if to separated causes then the effects obtain their names from the manner of the cause by which these effects exist if necessarily they come forth then of necessarie causes they are called necessarie effects And here by the way obserue that the decree of God and mans free will in his fal are rather separate then concurring causes and therefore if you please Gods decree may be called a necessarie cause of his owne effect but mans free will was another manner of cause and therfore being a contingent cause his fall was cōtingent obserue this against we come to the difficulties that arise out of Gods ordering of sin So then in separate causes if necessary then necessary effects if contingent then contingēt effects but if many causes concurre to produce one effect then this one effect can neuer be said to be contingent and necessarie for so one nature should be contradictorie to it selfe therefore if the principal cause of mans sinne be contingent as who dare denie it seeing it came from mans though free yet mutable will therefore that Gods decree should either necessitate the cause or the effect is impossible for so a contingent cause should become a necessarie cause and a necessarie effect should be the same with a contingent effect so then Gods decree though it make his owne effect necessarie yet concurring with mans fall works in sustaining ordering limiting whatsoeuer shall be done but without all violence or coaction of his nature For the third concauses which are absolute in their working and neither will nor can be frustrated alwaies produce a necessarie effect as the first cause and the second not only concurring but concausing each of them for their full power and freedome that which they work cannot but produce that which they intended therefore God the first cause concausing in mans fall his owne good pleasure and man for his freedome in the selfe same effect concausing his owne will could doe no other but produce vnto himselfe a miserable effect but vnto God who made this serue his own will a glorious consequent to manifest a greater good then otherwise the world should euer haue conceiued and therefore giue euerie effect his right in his cause but wrong no cause for the effect because that which you may charge one cause with all was proper to another Thou This word hath relation to 16. ver but to the wicked said God thou whose heart is full of hypocrisie worship vngodlinesse conuersation vnrighteous and euerie action an impudent lying before God and man Done Doing is to be limited for generally it signifies to doe well or euill but the second is meant done amisse whether in omitting true reformation or committing vile abhominations against the sacred lawes of God both are iudged of God in this place Gods law is cast at the backe and therfore all good duties omitted the contrarie performed in profanation adulterie the euerie deceit slander c. Held When it is taken for holding to worke Plowing Meditation Labouring it properly signifies plowing hence meditating and thirdly any kind of labouring the second signification is a metaphore hence Sampsons prouerbe they plowed with my heiffer the third is a Synecdoche A second head of significations is to hold from worke and then it signifies either to omit Omit Remit Cease wholly to passe it ouer or else to remit to hold backe some of the whole thirdly wholly to cease which all of them may be applyed First I omitted wholly from calling of thee to an account and therefore thou thoughtest that all reckonings were made vp betwixt thee and me Secondly I remitted thee many offences for which thou neuer was thankefull vnto me Thirdly a long time haue I ceased from my anger and therefore as in my mercies thou scantedst me as a nigardly and pinching giuer so now in thy sinnes thou hast beene exceeding liberall and large taken my hands and armes as bound vp in a cloth and cannot be pulled out to strike thee withall Tongue The word beeing giuen to reasonable creatures First signifies as dumme Thou thoughtest that I was tongue-tied alas didst thou neuer heare me in my word Secondly deafe thou thoughtest I could not here thy mouth giuen vnto euill thy tongue to forgerie deceit cursed speaking slaunder c. Thirdly blind that I had no eyes to see thy secret hypocrisie Qui tacet consentire videtur Fourthly silent as one consenting with thee Fiftly ouerseeing as one winking at thy sinnes Sixtly sparing as neuer meaning to call thee to account But there is one signification more and that is to thinke a secret and therefore O hypocrite it might be that God all this time was thinking a secret against thee To hold the tongue is put for silence which is a Metanomy of the cause for the effect now the Lord can properly be said neither to hold the tongue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or keepe silence therefore a third thing is meant by a metaphor drawne from men keeping silence to wit clemency gentlenes patience forbearing long suffering bountifulnesse and a large time to repent The iustice of God as it burnes more remissely against sinne is called anger as more sharpely wrath in sentencing iudgement 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What is mercie in executing reuenge now in all these God vseth mercie which is a compassion toward his creature offending and this is double either gentlenesse or bountifulnes gentlenesse gentlenesse whereby in his iustice hee remembreth mercy and this appeares in his patience patience and longanimitie patience whereby he most gently suffereth sinners deferreth his punishment longanimitie whereby he expecteth long time repentance longanimity his bountifulnesse bountifulnes whereby he is rich in goodnes powring forth his good gifts vpon his sinful creatures notwithstanding their sinnes and in all these appeares this which the Prophet hath said I held my tongue III. Part. The explication of wickedmens conceits Thoughtest 1. 1. Consent It signifies to consent vnto a thing and that is nothing els but the fitting of natures together either in their causes as like causes will haue like effects and so on the contrarie like effects like causes or of subiects with their adiuncts as this is a fit subiect for such a qualitie or this is a qualitie for such a subiect Let vs then applie thou thoughtest that is consentedst but alas how fitly doth Gods silence and their thoughts agree fire
members become sinnefull It is not simply a sinne to looke on a woman for so much as to see is done by the concurrence of a rule of Gods wisdome but in that it is to lust after a woman and so here the eye looking vpon this tree is made sinnefull because inwardly she lusts after it and that is expressed in the next words when shee saies a tree to be desired and the ende of that is to get knowledge This ende is good but will not iustifie the action because the very eating for this end was expressely forbidden The 3. act is taking of the fruit thereof neither can this simply be condemned for it might be they might haue gathered the fruit and I am thereunto perswaded because this tree as well as the rest was for man and some good vse might haue beene made thereof 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 conâ—â—â—ing the first sinne The 4. act And did eate neither here am I of Arminius minde that meant subtilly to crosse an argument in M. Perkins by affirming that the very act was forbidden The natural act was good but onely the morall act which was respectiue and in reference to Gods law that onely was sinnefull The 5. act And gaue also vnto her husband this was likewise a sinne seeing God had made her a helper vnto him to become his ruine this was the breach of charitie The last act and he did eate To this some might reply but how could this bee a sinne seeing he was ignorant of it to which I answer 〈◊〉 present 〈…〉 in 〈◊〉 First I doubt not but by that excellent knowledge he had he was able vpon the very sight thereof to know that it was the fruit of the forbidden tree God brought him the beasts of the field and he named them according to their natures he knewe his wife when shee was brought vnto him these were farre more difficult then to know euery seuerall fruit in the garden seeing they are so easily distinguished by many outward appearances therefore questionlesse he knew the fruit But then you will obiect man was more foolish then the woman for shee did it by strong perswasions and he without any more adoe vpon his very wiues giuing it did eate thereof alas neuer thinke so But how then was he tempted surely I thinke it was not a new disputation betwixt his wife and himselfe that as the deuil had dealt with her so she might deale with her husband for if Adam had been absent all the while of that communication and then the serpent and the deuill in the serpent had been departed that Adam would so soone haue yeelded vnto her motion Secondly it is said that as soone as shee desired it she tooke it and did eate if this was done in the place where shee stood then assuredly her eyes would haue been open to haue seene the offence before she could haue brought Adam vnto it Thirdly if she must first haue plucked the fruit and then haue carried it to Adam and lastly haue disputed with Adam for the eating of it it had been too long a time for a woman with child in sinning and longing for an apple or a figge or what else the fruit was to haue staied her appetite so long and therefore as I doubt not but she presently are it so presently her husband yeelded too and so both their eyes were opened together But you will say did Adam stand by all the time of their disputation I know no other meaning of the text but that it should be so and therefore Adam was exceedingly too blame to suffer his wife to haue such communication with the serpent hee should haue shut him out at the first entrance for God set him to keepe the garden that no beasts should come in it Now tell me I beseech you what concourse Gods law had in mans fall and the selfe-same is my iudgement that God had in it Now the lawe stood at hand to haue ioyned with man to haue brought forth his obedience vnto God and haue kept him from all sinnes of omission but man would not heare the voice of the lawe but of the deuill against the law therefore no maruell if he fell So then the Lord concurred by his law I will vse the word of Arminius quantum decuit yea and quantum oportuit as much as was seemely and as much as was expedient and this none of our Diuines denie if I may speake it bona venia with the good liking of all Arminians so that God withheld none of this grace from him but as I said before the deede of his will or that velle quod potuit which was not of such absolute necessitie neither wanted man any concourse if he had been as good as his meanes were But you say further Gods will no irresistable motion to mans â—ill the motion was irresistable and so man was no faultie cause seeing he could doe no better Alas had they all those free actions in sinne and yet did nothing proprijs voluntatibus I see nothing at all done by them but was done most freely But then you say the will of God might haue beene frustrated Alas senslesse creatures when the Apostle saies who hath resisted the will of God at any time is most certaine in very reason it selfe for the superiour cause can neuer suffer of the inferiour cause therefore if mans will should goe about to resist or frustrate the will of God it were euen against reason it selfe for then should Gods wil suffer of mans will And againe with Arminius God forbid it should be otherwise but that consilium Deistaret that Gods counsell should stand and therefore God hath an irresistable will and if that then the motion of his will is also irresistable if this then man cannot resist it and if he cannot resist then is hee mooued irresistably to sinne Fiue propositions to explaine how Gods will cannot be resisted stay there the consequence is false I know you will graunt me these fiue propositions and I know no more that our Diuines defend first that Gods will is the supreame cause secondly that Gods will cannot suffer thirdly that none can resist it fourthly that his motion is likewise irresistable fiftly that neither men nor angels can resist it But tell mee how you can prooue your consequence therefore man in sinning followes Gods irresistable motion I know no such consequence either in the Scriptures or our men for euery motion of Adam and the woman were most free and they followed most willingly their owne motion But you will say God decreed this motion true yet no cause thereof for he decreed man should be the cause of it himselfe But could this be done and yet God be no cause thereof yes assuredly for you are deceiued of Gods decree by putting it into the thing when it is in himselfe And here I will cleare vnto you another way that God takes in his decree then you imagine First Gods decree ariseth from
of my loue and Esau to the feeling of my hatred and therefore here by these acts we are to vnderstand Gods appointment Against this ariseth the argument of flesh and blood The argument of flesh and blood against Gods euerlasting decree being not able to distinguish betwixt Gods appointment and his actuall loue or hatred in the creature therefore vers 14. surely then there is vnrighteousnesse with God To this the Apostle answers First by a correction execration and holy indignation God forbid Secondly from a testimonie Exod. 33.19 God saith it vnto Moses and therefore it must needes be most true and that is prooued in the verie testimonie it selfe First from the true cause of all righteousnesse and that is Gods will secondly from the libertie of his will hee is bound to none and therefore he can iniustly depriue no man of any right hee can claime at his hands thirdly euery subiect is equall for the receiuing of it otherwise it could not bee on whome hee would fourthly because it is aboue the reach of man v. 16. it is neither in him that willeth nor in him that runneth but in God that sheweth merci◠But you may obiect this testimonie is imperfect for it onely prooues that which you haue said of election but this is nothing for reprobation but marke what followes v. 17. The example of reprobation to set forth Gods purpose power and name which he simply willeth and you shall see the second testimonie for reprobation exemplified in Pharaoh the supreame causes whereof are Gods purpose power and name his name is proclaimed Exod. 34.5 6 7. and it is nothing but his glorious attributes and they are his iustice and mercie and therfore the name of his iustice is proclaimed on Pharaoh this name God did purpose with himselfe and that he might purpose hee had power whereby he might shew it on Pharaoh ergo qua potuit fecit qua fecit potuit decreuit c. God did it on Pharaoh and therefore he might doe it as he did it and might doe it he purposed and decreed it as he did that so it was his counsell this his counsell had no scope but his owne name this his name was wel-pleasing vnto his wisedome this his wel-pleasing made his purpose good and this good God absolutely willed therefore that which he concluded onely of mercie v. 16. in this 19. hee concludes on both mercie and iustice hee hath mercy on whom he will and whome he will he hardeneth this conclusion plainely shewes that Gods will is the supreame and absolute cause otherwise no need why either that obiection should be made v. 14. is God vnrighteous or this which followeth how should men complaine seeing no man can resist his will to what purpose I say if it had beene for sinne but the former is cut off with this resolution it is Gods will and therefore he knowes how to iustifie it and this second is answered accordingly as I haue said from the nature of passion and resistance Gods will is the supreame therefore an irresistable will and void of all passion Shall the thing forming As man cannot resist God so God will not resist man vntill man haue offered the first resistance suffer or bee resisted of the thing formed or the potter of his lumpe of clay how much more should Gods will bee resisted of man But what is all this to Gods resisting of mans will the Lord offered no violence to the will of man in his fall neither did he himselfe make any resistance to the temptation but most willingly imbraced it and gaue as free a consent as possibly could be imagined and therfore God put vpon man no irresistable motion But you say he could not resist the decree of God c. True what then could be not resist his owne will it is therefore one thing for man to resist Gods will and another thing for God to resist mans will If God should haue resisted mans will he should not haue sinned Therfore the causes beeing separate so iudge of the effects the effect of Gods will is necessarie because it hath the best ende but mans effect was contingent and had the worst ende Therefore God by his decree imposeth no irresistable motion vpon the will of man To the necessarie copulation of Gods decree The copulation of Gods decree and sinne is not causall and mans fall it is to be answered that it is not causall For if you vnderstand it as a copulatiue axiome God decrees and man falls then the whole axiome is absolutely affirmed and the former part doth not pull in the consequent but both of them are considered as going cheeke by ioule but their meaning is of a connex axiome if God decree then it is necessarie that man should fall Here we distinguish betwixt the parts of an axiome and the connexion the parts may be contingent or false where the connexion is most necessarie As for example If he be a learned man then he respecteth wisdome the connexion is necessarie if Cicero be an Orator then he knowes how to speake well these be necessarie connexions but the parts are contingent Againe the connexion may be a necessarie truth yet the parts may be false as if a man be a dogge then he hath the facultie of barking a man to be a dogge is false or a man to haue this facultie is also false God decrees that was not absolutely necessarie nay as out of himselfe it was contingent so mans fall is likewise contingent Actio interna seu formalis externa seu materialis coniuncta seu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore our Diuines distinguish of actions First there is an internall action which they call formall and this is in God himselfe eternall immutable and neither hath beginning nor ending And in this sense say they the whole cause of reprobation or election is in God alone and this is a most necessarie truth The second is externall or materiall which is exercised vpon the creature and this is in time and limited according to the nature of the creature that receiueth it and this is contingent The third is a complete or perfect action of both which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Extremam admouere manum a perfect finishing of the thing and this beeing absolute and proceeding from absolute causes is in his conioyned nature necessarie yet no argument to prooue that one cause should make the other necessarie And therfore the will of God makes mans will no necessarie cause of his owne fall But to this connexion it is formerly replied that it is not onely so in the maior proposition but also in the minor and therefore the assumption beeing taken out of the maior and concluding necessarily must needes be causall as if God decree then man must fall but I assume God decrees and therfore man must fall so that Gods decree inferring the conclusion vpon mans will as following
necessarily must needes be a cause The answer is it is a necessarie conclusion by way of ratiocination or discourse but not from the argument it selfe the disposition makes it necessarie but the third reason is no necessarie cause seeing that the action of Gods decree as out of himselfe and in the creature is externally and materially to be considered and so is not necessarie but contingent temporarie and mutable and therefore if it had pleased God it might haue fallen out otherwise for euery necessarie truth is an eternall truth And therefore that which is in time and not eternall is contingent mutable and alterable That which is said to the interceding cause betwixt Gods decree and the fall Of the interceding cause to wit mans free will to exempt God from sinne is most true for God did not immediatly worke mans fall But you obiect that the remote cause is as well sinfull as the next because the deuill was the remote cause and yet guiltie of the same sinne Adam commited A speciall neuerprooues a generall The answer is when the causes are vniuocall homogeniall and of the same order of working but in causes heterogeniall and equiuocall which are of diuerse natures the remote cause is neuer tainted with the same fault that the next cause is As wine is a remote cause why a man is drunke yet no faultie-cause of his drunkennesse The Gospell and our Sauiour Christ came to send a sword into the world but yet were no true causes of sedition and quarrels among men The Sunne raiseth putrified creatures out of dead carkases it can harden as well the clay as melt the waxe A sonne desires the death of his father so doth God One thing effected of diuerse causes may bee faultie in one but not in another but the sonne breaks Gods commaundement God doth it according to the true rule of iustice a sonne would haue his father liue God would the contrarie yet a sinne in neither And therfore a remote cause is onely guilty of the same offence with the next when they worke all after one forme and manner otherwise the immediate cause is the onely author of the sinne al the rest by accident and by abuse The Gospel is the sauour of death vnto death as well as the free will of man but not eodem genere causandi after the same manner of working Pharaoh hardneth his owne heart so doth God but the one immediatly the other mediatly by the abuse of mans freewill Therfore the answer is from the distinction of remote causes in vniuocall causes the remote cause is as guiltie as the next and therefore the deuills will In causes vniuocall all are guiltie of the same crime but not in equivocall and mans will working vnivocally are both in the same offence but Gods will and mans worke equiuocally the one one way and the other another and therefore no neede of participation seeing they haue no next genus of a cause in which they should communicate Answer to Gods desertion To the third euasion betwixt infallibilitie and necessitie it is granted that man fell infallibly but not necessarily except we vnderstand it of Gods decree in himselfe and then the truth was an eternall truth And in this sense our Diuines hold it not of any necessitie in mans will therefore it was only necessarie in Gods wll but contingent in mans yet the truth it selfe in the thing is to God and man contingent to God most certen but to man vncertaine For desertion we hold that God did not forsake man in any necessarie requisite for his true obedience vnto the law onely he with-held his confirmation of man If a man were set in some office for triall of his gifts is it necessarie that he should be confirmed in it I trow not and therefore this desertion was of confirmation and not of necessarie helpes for execution And here our Orthodoxe writers when they answer to that argument that iustice and mercie presuppose misery Misâ—rie potentiall reall habituall make answer of a threefold miserie first actuall which is in sense and feeling secondly habitual which is in the bosome of a man but as yet puts not forth it selfe the third potentiall into which a man may fall and this they call a miserie in comparison Iob 4.18 Behold he found no steadfastnesse in his seruants and laid folly vpon his angels Iob 9.2 Howe should man compared vnto God be iustified Habituall and actuall miserie had no place in man by his creation but possible or potentiall miserie was laid in the freedome of his will which if God had inclined vnto good and man so determined then had he come into the estate of the blessed Angels and so miserie had been impossible and his estate should haue been confirmed vnto him with God for euer not from the freedom of his will but from his obedience and Gods promise thereunto Therefore that desertion and not collation of necessarie helpe to auoide sinne is to be vnderstood of this third grace which was not a grace of creation but a further liberallity which God might haue bestowed if it had pleased him But I dare not rest satisfied with this answer because I see this third grace was onely to be obtained by the obedience of the creature that is if he did the will of God then would God haue beene as good as his promise thou shalt liue therefore in my iudgement Confirmation of life by creation was to follow our obedience vnto the 〈◊〉 confirming grace was a subsequent grace to followe obedience and not an antecedent grace to goe before it and so the angels obtained it by their obedience and from their obedience are confirmed if then without their obedience they could not be confirmed then must confirming grace belong vnto the law of creation as well as any other for what grace should man haue receiued by creation but that which God would haue communicated vnto him by the rule of obedience doe this and thou shalt liue to confirme him in life was vpon his doing I answer therefore Desertion 1. in not rebuking Sathan 2. In diuiding of the lawe and his facultie 3. In that God suffered man to be distracted and did not hold him close vnto his law in despite of the deuill that desertion is no cause of mans sinne but that God was wel-pleased to suffer the deuill to worke more strongly in the temptation then mans will should be able to oppose not for power giuen but for present act and as in this temptation the law forsooke man so God may most iustly bee said to forsake him I haue before declared that two things are most necessary for euery good action rule and power which if both concurre not the action cannot bee produced Now the law concurred not and therefore man was forsaken of the lawe not actiuely but passiuely euen as a master should promise his seruant all aide and succour as long as hee would
third of such things as would bee if such and such things went before If Caine doe well he shall be accepted Gen. 4. if Dauid stay in Keilah the lords of the citie will deliuer him if I continue in beleeuing then I shall be saued if I continue in sinne I shall bee damned And on this knowledge for any thing that I can perceiue doe the Papists and Lutherans hang all predestination and so make Gods will the consequent in decreeing and mans will the antecedent in giuing God the occasion The deceit is this that from the connexion of things they iudge of Gods will about things which is most indirect and a knowledge that agrees not to God but at the second hand It is true that the first knowledge beeing iudged according to logicall inuention is of things possible for arguments or reasons afore they come to bee disposed are onely in potentia ad arguendum haue an affection to argue and so many things that might be haue this potentiall kind of reason and so we say they are knowne of God because we so conceiue of them The second knowledge which is more actuall is properly science the laying together of those things which before were onely in affection to argue The third is of these things which beeing laid together can no otherwise haue force of reason but vpon connexion and supposition and in this head would they tie Gods decree and knowledge when indeed God followes no such suppositions but absolutely knowes and wills what he pleaseth yet seeing his decree is as large as all reason it cannot otherwise be imagined but that in the manifestation of it all reason should appeare And so we grant a connexion supposition condition and occasion in all Gods works that is in the effects of his will but none of all these in the will it selfe Therefore they doe amisse to put that vpon his will which is the cause which ought to be in the effect of his will and thereupon no antecedent of Gods will but meere consequents That creation should go before the fall the fall before redemption redemption before saluation and sinne before damnation are all of them most necessarie suppositions connexions conditions and if you please occasions And thus much for that occasion which is to Arminius delphicus gladius but it cuts asunder such knots as God hath tied together whose will in all things drawes the first linke and cannot be drawne of any M. Per. 3. Principle in sense is this that God does all by counsell therefore he hath his scope which he knowes wills and disposeth vnto most prudently and therefore decrees euery thing therevnto I. Ar. The most wise God doth all things for some ende and purpose euen that which he doth not yet hee permits it for some ende and purpose therefore first it is a fault to say that God must either agere be doing or otiose spectare become an idle beholder which is no good distribution for agere and permittere to doe and permit are really distinguished and both these are for good purpose and therefore God must either be doing or an idle beholder are too scant for he may permit Secondly prudence is too short a word to inlarge it selfe to all Gods wisedome Thirdly adhibito certo fine the ende applied finis gratia and for the ende are not all one for no man workes for the ende applied but for the good therein implied Fourthly Deus non vult aut non decernit quod non potest God neither wills nor decrees that which he cannot here no sense except it be further added which he cannot do or permit and therefore the conclusion is most imperfect so God decreed to doe except this be added or permitted Collat. Agere prudenter to doe wisely will beare the sense of permission for permission comming from Gods wil is considered of vs as an effect this effect is produded by counsell therefore for a good ende and purpose so then that which God doth permittere he doth prudenter agere grant then that Gods permission comes from his counsell and aimes at his glorie and then it must bee more then a negatiue act But to speake the truth permission as it is expounded of Arminius maintaines nothing but absurdities First in regard of the cause for saies he permission is voluntatis remissae now such a will as this cannot be in God whose will is meere act and therefore cannot admit of degrees all remissiuenesse of Gods will is in regard of the subiect which is quantum and may be lesse and more but in regard of himselfe it is impossible Secondly a remisse will doth either will or not will or suspend to suspend is neither to hinder nor further the act and so the Lord should haue no stroke in sinne which is the deniall of his prouidence in the apostacie of man if his prouidence did not suspend nor his power then his wil was not to suspend in that action if he did more then suspend then it was either to will or not to will if not to will then sinne should not haue beene therefore God did will it per modum actionis That this may appeare Gods manner of working in sinne we are to consider what manner of efficient causes true reason laies downe vnto vs And the first manner of causes efficient are either to beget or preserue the second to worke alone or with others the third by himselfe or by accident and agere is giuen to euery one of these Let vs then see where Gods action in sinne comes in and because it is most apparent in the third I answer God is the cause of sin by accident And this will appeare if we consider how many causes wrought by an internal principle these were foure the deuill and Adam principally the serpent and the woman instrumentally and all these were blameable causes The externall cause was the lawe and will of God which in mans transgression did all they did by an externall facultie for the lawe is made the sauour of death vnto death not by his own facultie but by the deuills and mans free will and this work of the law was most holy and iust And this is a working cause iustified by the true rule of reason and not a bare permission If a man take a knife and thrust it into his bowels it is the cause of murder and no permission if man therfore was thrust thorow and wounded to the death by the law of God it was no bare permission but a working cause yet in all things vnblameable And therefore to denie Gods will all causation is impossible If a man would faine kill himselfe and could finde no instrument to effect it withall he would be kept from the fact for want thereof so if the Law had not bin man could not haue died Therefore it is most true when our Diuines speake of permission that they doe not in the generall latitude of action exclude it
yet bona venia with greater rashnesse seeing the Apostle intended no such thing as humane infirmitie to dispute with God but to musle vp the mouthes of the refractorie and peruerse Iewes and such like but yet he is to know that if the Apostle had brought his argument to that purpose onely then should he haue dealt with them as our Sauiour Christ did Ioh. 8. the Iewes they say we haue no neede to be made free Christ tels them Ye are the seruants of sinne therefore in vaine doe you boast of your freedom so here the Iewes might haue saide we are cast off and reprobates for so was the will of God and how should we haue helped it The Apostle might presently haue stopped their mouthes Yee are rebells against God and therefore he hath cast you off what could flesh and blood haue opposed to this But the Apostle makes no mention of this but resolues all into Gods will and that most iustly seeing to make and prepare his vessells is his own will alone When he shall come to the third to handle them as vessels of wrath the cause shall easily be found out to iustifie God and condemne man 6. Principle No mon can doe any thing but where God workes the will and the deed and it is done according to that measure lesse or more that God bestowes vpon vs. Of the concourse of Gods grace both of them agree onely that word absolute is disliked yet if in all effects the first cause bee absolutely required that the second may worke then God must absolutely concurre to the effecting of any good Seuenth principle No euill is avoided that God doth not keepe vs from in the working Of this it is agreed but the manner of working is doubted of whether it bee by omnipotencie causing a necessary impedition or of counsell causing an infallible impedition the first mooues the will naturally the second voluntarily To answer the distinction is not good for omnipotencie goes along with prouidence in the preseruation of the creature as well as it did in creation for the production of the same and therefore omnipotencie is seen in the creatures motions whether naturall or voluntarie Secondly that distinction of the wills naturall motion and voluntary is false for I demaund whether the will in both be an internall agent if internall then it suffers neither violence nor coaction but acts most freely and therefore by that modus efficiendi which is counsell Thirdly a necessarie impedition and infallible are not alwaies distinguished nay a necessarie impedition is alwaies infallible though infallible be not alwaies necessarie and therefore to make distribution of a whole into a part and a whole is against reason and opposeth those which are not opposed Fourthly the naturall or voluntarie motion of the will to an externall obiect is neuer necessarie but contingent Therefore if the Lord should mooue the will with a most certaine determination vpon some externall obiect it should not make the act necessarie Eigth Principle Gods will is iudged of by his word by reuelation and by euent Arminius excepts against the third because the euent may as wel belong to Gods permission of it as his action in it the former teacheth vs to resolue the euent affirmatiuely vpon the second cause but negatiuely vpon Gods will because he would not hinder it either by his power secundum modum naturae or perswasion secundum modum voluntatis liberae If wee graunt that God permitted sinne which before I haue shewed to bee false in regard that a manner of working in sinne is iustified of God without all blame yet doth it not follow but that the euent should be Gods Zach. 6.1 the foure charets of the world that is all euents East West North and South come from betweene mountaines of brasse Gods immutable decree which is as immooueable as a mountaine of brasse Againe that God must needes will the euent it is plaine from the order of his wisedome which runnes before and after all euents before to worke in them and dispose of them without which two causes they cannot bee he that is the first wisedome and the last will not suffer any euent that shall not be from him to him for in as much as any thing is to him in so much it is from him seeing it is equally good to both that is as good for God so good from God Now surely all euents fall between these two tearmes and therefore from God to God Againe as after the euent Gods wisdome doth either approoue or disprooue of the second causes working it and hence all euents are either ordered limited or punished of God 9. Principle No man can doe that good which he might doe by grace except God should worke in him both the will and the deede to effect the same To this Arminius replies that God neuer giues power but secondly all things that might concurre to bring that power into act This is most true for before we shewed that two things were required to produce any worke facultie and rule of working and God neuer put any facultie into his creature but he gaue him a sufficient rule to worke by But the strait tying together of these two makes the creature to stand firme and immooueable therefore religion which since the fall is properly so called a tying againe of man vnto God is this strait bond that ties the faithfull soule for euer vnto God I will put my feare into their hearts and they shall neuer depart from me This is eternall life to knowe thee c. So then beside the rule and the facultie a third thing is required not for sufficiencie of working but for certentie of working and that is when the Lord shall put into vs his spirit of grace which shall lead vs into all truth and keepe vs from falling away And this third thing Adam wanted and therefore Phil. 2.13 It is God which worketh in you both the will the deede euen at his good pleasure Obserue first it is said in you that is his faithfull ones secondly it is both will and deede thirdly it is his most free will and pleasure and therefore hee may doe it to whom he will and when he will therefore man had power and rule sufficient to haue stood but God did not so necessarily tie these together but that man might if hee pleased denie his concourse with the rule and so sinne against God 10. Principle The gouernement of the whole world and all execution of iustice is to be ascribed vnto God The exception to this is of small moment God doth all not onely in iustice but also in mercie and knowes where to bestow both this M. Perkins included in the gouernment of the world wherein both iustice and mercie are manifested The definition of Predestination reprehended in the genus or common nature in the subiect and in the ende The next examination is concerning the definition of Predestination wherein Arminius reprehends
children are in sorrow but when they consider how of his owne will he hath begotten them with the word of truth that they should be as the first fruits of his creatures then their hearts doe reioyce and their ioy no man shall take from them Now that compleat ioy may be drawne out of all these arguments it is necessary that the word of God be specially looked vnto for in afflictions it onely giueth vs the liuely sight of our sinne manifests the riches of the mercies of God in Christ Iesus to deliuer vs from sinne and therefore Dauid saies often but for thy lawe I had perished in mine afflictions therfore for further comfort he shewes what is required to make vs profit in Gods word first qualification secondly practise the first the soule the second the life of the soule the qualification v. 19. the reason of it v. 20. and the conclusion out of both ver 21. Wherefore laying apart all silthinesse and superfluity of malitiousnesse receiue with meekenes the word that is grafted into you which is able to saue your soules After this qualification followes the practise that the mercies of God might not be in vaine which he hath bestowed vpon them therefore v. 22. be ye doers of the word and not hearers onely deceiuing your selues now because this cousening of our selues in hearing of Gods word is a disease incident to the most hee playes the good Physitian first discouering the disease by a familiar similitude laying together these fowre tearms spots and a glasse sins and the law as spots may be seene in a glasse so sinnes may be seene in the law secondly in their qualitie wherein they are laid together and that is beholding considering and immediately forgetting as a man beholding falls to consider something amisse in himselfe yet going his way and other matters possessing his head immediately forgetteth what manner of face-he had So they come to the Church looke into Gods word consider that all is not well yet going their way home againe to their olde courses and now all is spoiled and they are neuer better Secondly hauing discouered the disease by the most familiar fymptomes applyes the remedie and tells them what must be their receit ver 15. the perfect law of libertie must be carefully looked into Thirdly he giues them the manner how it must be receiued first what must be abstained from as deadly poison to the nature of a Christian and secondly the onely hinderer of the worke of all good physicke First therefore v. 26. If any man seeme religious and refraineth not his tongue but deceiueth his owne heart that mans religion is in vaine Secondly thus must it bee taken according to pure religion and vndefiled before God in visiting the fatherles and widdowes in their necessity and to keep himselfe vnspotted of the world Seeing then that God hath so many comforts patience to possesse the soule when it is at a loffe wisedome to make i◠finde it selfe in the greatest night of trouble contentation to quiet it as well in aduersitie as prosperitie a crowne of glory to recompence it after all combats and such a word as may be a light to direct a sword to defend and teach the true watch word of a Christian when he is readie to be swallowed vp of his enemies it cannot bee but that we should alwaies rest in the hauen of happinesse A recaptulation of all the former heads in a briefe and perspicuous table for the further impression of Christian comfort in the memories of the faithfull Comfort in affliction donation of grace informing the action present patience working v. 4. perfecting v. 4. wifedom giuen freely and liberally receiued by praier faith future true contentation in all things v. 9 the ende of the action blessednes in the crowne of life v. 12. sanctifying causes principall the will of God v. 18. instrumentall the word of truth v. 18. effect first fruits a holy kind of offering taken out of the residue of men v. 18. true application in the qualification manifested v. 19. prooued in clearing the point v. 20. in concluding v. 21. in the practise honest and good hearing and doing v. 22. dishonest and vnprofitable illustrated 23. 24. by tearms spots a glasse sin and the law qualitie beholding forgetting applyed first in the prescript v. 25. in the vse vnlawfull v. 26. lawfull v. 27. Seeing then that this is the course that the Lord will take let no man think to be Diues all his life time in this world and Lazarus after death If God promise riches the way thereunto is pouertie before loue correction before exaltation deiection whom he saueth first he damneth he bringeth not to heauen but by hell if he promise life hee slaieth first Ioseph sawe the sunne moone and starres worshipping him neuertheles yet that could come to passe God laid him where he could see neither sunne nor moone nor any starre of the skie and all that many yeares and also vndeserued yet all this while to nurture him vp against the time of honour God promised Israel a land of milke and honie yet for the space of forty yeeres they went through a land not only where there were no riuers of milke and honey but not so much as a droppe of water to refresh them withall yet all this was done of God to doe them good at the latter end God promised Dauid a kingdom yet immediatly he stirred vp Saul against him to hunt him and ferret him out of euery hole and that many years Thus he that will weare the crowne of glory must weare the crowne of thornes he that will haue all teares wiped from his eyes must first shed them Reu. 15.3 the children of God before they can sing the song of Moses the seruant of God and the song of the lambe Christ Iesus must first swim through the glassie sea mingled with fire and brimstone It is not the way to heauen to liue in this world in perpetual ease rest quietnes in body soule goods and good name therefore as the end of all afflictions is full of ioy and comfort so is the way seeing it is appointed of the Lord most comfortable because euery steppe brings vs towards Gods kingdome and I may tearme afflictions markes in the way to tell vs we are to keepe on that way they lead vs. A man inquiring his way and is told he hath no plaine way but by desolate woods hills and mountaines very stony and troublsome to passe by when the trauailer seeeth these marks he saies vndoubtedly I am right but if he find all to be plaine presently stands still lookes about and saies I see neuer a one of my directiōs therfore I am assuredly wrong this way will neuer bring me to the end of my iourney So the Lord hath told vs that this is the way to heauen to passe by many crosses we run a long and find no such matter well may we suspect that we are out
strengthen all our actions The first is when wee goe about any good dutie to deale thus with our soules surely by the grace of God I purpose to set my selfe about this action 2. That my purposes be not vaine I enter couenant with the Lord and promise that that which I haue purposed I will performe vnto him 3. That I may be no couenant-breaker I vow vnto the Lord my obedience 4. That I may not be rash in my vowes I proceed further and say with Dauid I haue sworne that I will keepe thy righteous statutes Now when the Deuill my corrupt flesh the world or any worker of iniquitie shall set vpon mee thus will I answer Why would you haue me breake my purposes and be inconstant in my resolutions seeing the world despiseth all inconstancie againe though I might change my purpose yet my promise I will not alter for infidelitie is hated of all but if you will say you may put off the performance of your promise because you beare men in hand with dispensations of future obedience yet I haue a third thing that binds mee more straightly and that is a holy vow vnto the Lord which being lawfully made I must not breake for a world of wealth yet if you will be instant vpon mee and say I was too rash in my hasty vowing then I pray you consider that I haue sworn vnto the Lord and therefore to haue God to count mee for a periured person would sting mee at the heart and suffer my conscience neuer to be at peace with mee therefore putting all these together purpose promise vow and oath how should I doe this great thing you require and sinne against my God these things beeing practised I dare boldly say euery Christian shall find daily increase of grace and more readinesse to serue God V. 15 The second part required is prayer v. 15. which is discouered vnto vs First by his work to call shewing great necessitie and therefore the neglect of it must needs bring extraordinarie losse vnto the soule 2. By the proper obiect vpon mee the Lord the best succour in the time of need 3. By the adiunct of time in the day of trouble and therefore great occasion is giuen to euery Christian soule to call vpon his God 4. The promise is annexed as an excellent motiue to so excellent a dutie so will I deliuer thee and therefore happie is euery Christian that hee may know assuredly in euery day of trouble hee hath hope of the day of deliuerance And these are the parts of the true worship of God praise in prosperity prayer in aduersitie the end of both followes in the same ver And thou shalt glorifie mee therefore not vnto vs O Lord but vnto thy name for all thy mercies be ascribed all honour and glorie V. 16 The second part of Gods proceeding is with the profane hypocrites from the sixteenth verse to the ende the parts wherof are three conviction to the 21. v. sentence of iudgement in the 21. v. and application in the 22.23 v. The conuiction is of two sorts of crimes first against God the breach of the first table the second against his neighbour the breach of the second table the first which is against God is in the sixteenth and seuenteenth v. and that is a forme of Religion in the sixteenth v. but a deniall of the power in the 17. v. The shew of religion is set forth by his effects declaring and speaking 2. By the obiect ordinances and couenants 3. From the iniurie they offer vnto God what hast thou to doe 4. From a testimonie of God himselfe witnessing against him but vnto the wicked said God Therefore the religion of all hypocrites is formall in the fruit and in the obiect to the iniurie of God himselfe and the prouoking of a sharpe witnes against themselues V. 17 The power of Religion is wholly denied v. 17. First in affection they hate reformation 2. Of instruction in actions they will endure no reformation 3. By obstinacie in casting Gods words behind them They direct degrees of sinne first to enter the affections by batred of good and loue of euill 2. To proceed to action without all reformation 3. To continue in practise by obstinate rebellion and casting off Gods yoke V. 18 The second order of crimes is the breach of charitie vnto his neighbour 18 19 20. v. which are of two sorts of actions and speaches of Actions v. 18. First laid foorth in their kinds theeuerie and adulterie 2. By their formes running with theeues partaking with adulterers where the consent vnto these sinnes is taxed with the practise 3. From the motiue cause in these words when thou seest shewing how the desire of wicked men is inflamed with the beholding of the sinnes of others to make them runne with them in inward consent and be partakers in the verie heart V. 19 The second kind of crimes are of speaches first of things secondly of persons of things v. 19. wherein wee haue first the kinds euill and deceit euill in the forme deceit in the end 2. From the instruments the mouth and the tongue abused of wicked men to the hurt of others and the destruction of themselues 3. From their willing practise in these words thou giuest thy mouth as though they would sell themselues to commit iniquitie thou forgedst as though they were alwaies in the fire of mischiefe V. 20 Of persons first the preparing of themselues in that word thou sittest 2. The manifestation of their malice thou speakest and slaunderest 3. The aggrauation of their sinne in regard of a double obiect thy brother more generally thy mothers sonne more specially shewing how vnnaturall they are euen to their owne flesh and the very bowells of their mother V. 21 And thus much of the conviction the sentence of Iudgement followeth in the 21. vers Wherein wee haue the two parts of all Gods sentences truth and holinesse for it is requisite that euery sentence of God be true and holy the truth in these words these things hast thou done the holinesse in the rest The truth is most exact consisting of all requisits Truth first knowledge without all errour 2. integritie without all partialitie 3. equitie without all contradiction The first is cleare in that the Lord enters vpon the very particular sinnes of an hypocrite these things and therefore can no way be deceiued for hee that sees things in generall and these things in speciall leaues nothing vntouched The second is also most euident for the Lord respects neither the person nor the sinne of the person but saies plainely thou and these things And the third is apparant to euery eye for the Lord handles no matters either vpon suspicion or malice for he is most certain of the fact neither doth hee complaine of any thing but the fault hast thou done and therefore what shall an hypocrite plead for himselfe when hee shall see his doings plainely detected The holinesse of
from the obligation of the law That which is bound to the lawe is properly the subiect of the breach of the law now men and angels are only bound to Gods law therefore men and angels may only be tearmed the subiect their actions therefore onely as belonging vnto them are sinfull that is flowing from sinners and so are their workes so that mans nature worketh and sinne and God mans nature worketh and hath God working in it and so the action is good againe God beside his general influence concourse with his creature hath a speciall worke in the action which concernes himselfe and that is likewise good yea and verie good for it is the last end of the creature but the other cause which is sinne cleauing so fast vnto our nature qualifies our nature to doe sinfully The sunne-beames comming thorough a red glasse shines on the opposite wall with the tincture of the colour of the glasse now the question is whether the red colour be onely in the glasse or likewise in the shining surely it seemes that the whole colour remaines still in the glasse and rather dimmes the shining then infects it so the beames of Gods wisedome shining through our corrupt soules seemes to be an action tainted with sinne but surely the corruption stickes in our soules and onely hindred the bright beames of Gods glorie from appearing in our actions Reason 3. from the sole nature of an effect That which is onely an effect can neuer be a subiect nowe the motion is onely an effect and can no otherwise be considered and therefore is alwaies ioyned with his cause as a sinfull action is in sense and reason the action of a sinneful man that is whereof sinnefull man is the cause Hence beeing an effect it must needes exist or stand out by many causes and therefore according to euery cause hath his speciall affection so a sinfull action hath one reference vnto man an other vnto God and yet may stand out of both Christs death had many causes and all subordinate causes were according to Gods determinate counsell the action was sinfull yet the sinne did inhere in Pilate Herod and the accursed Iewes Reason 4. from the nature of goodnes That which is simply good cannot bee the subiect of sinne now actions are of this nature the reason is because causes giue beeing vnto things and therefore are absolute as causes now motion hauing no other being but that which it receiues from causes Causa cuius vi res est This vis must needs be Gods and causes producing that by a motiue force in themselues which force is from God cannot any wayes leaue in the effect an euill inherent but onely in themselues which wanted true force whereof the effect should haue existed hence we call sinne rather a deficient cause then an efficient cause Rom 6.12 Rom. 7.5 Indeede sinne in vs is said to raigne and haue force in our members and so sinne with his subiect is exceeding powerful but it is by turning Gods created force the wrong way euen as a wheele set a running wrong way is carried with as great force as when it runne the cleane contrarie so mans nature set a rebelling against God turnes Gods created forces against himselfe that the force is put into the action it is Gods but that it was put in by the hand of a rebell it became sinfull yet God will acknowledge his owne force in the action and turne the fault and crime to the proper owners That the Iewes and Pilate laid hands on Christ it was Gods created force in them but the abuse of it is their owne and takes vp a proper habitation in their miserable soules then causation beeing a created force and motion onely acknowledging the same well may the motion be Gods and yet no cause at all of sinne Reason 5. from priuation Sinnes are properly the priuation or want of action and therfore though they may bee both in one subiect yet neuer can the one be the subiect of the other for so should deadly enemies become louing freinds and the worst kind of opposites be reconciled for I am sure that priuation though he be no being yet he denies a beeing in the selfe same subiect which is capable of it Blindnes is a worse not being then not seeing for not seeing may be in a stone which is neuer the worse for it but blindnes can be no where but where sight may be and therefore the eye is much worse for it if then sinne bee the priuation of an action it can neuer bee in an action but alwaies against an action Reason 6. from action and passion which seeme to differ but in respect of the agent and patient and therefore the patient should sin more then the agent seeing the action wherein lies the sinne is most properly in the patient but frō the agent The action from the worker is a passion in the receiuer and therefore if sinne were in the action it should goe along with it to the patient yea rather should it be in the patient then the agent seeing the action rests most in the patient Hence murther should rather be the sinne of the patient then the agent seeing the action of murther as it is from the agent so most properly is in the party slaine and therefore the murtherer should be the murthered which is against reason It is plaine then that sinne abides in the murtherer the action is good let this therefore be obserued that God may be iustified euen in sinnefull actions yet no cause of sinne because sinne alone rests in the bosome of fooles and will not stirre one iotte out of that subiect it is therefore dangerous to defend that an action is the materiall cause of sinne for so should sinne not onely be said to be in the action but of the action and then I know not how God should worke the action and bee freed from sinne for causa causae est causa causati The words then are thus to be expounded Things are here put for actions by a metanomie of the cause for the effect for actions proceed frō things then actions for the sinnes which are committed by sinnefull things and so the action is an effect of the sinnefull man and is put for his cause which be sinnes in the things Neither is this any newe opinion Motus modus actionis for all agree that the motion is good onely the manner of doing is euill Now examine the point well and we shall alwaies find the manner in the doer and not in the thing done and therefore the euill is properly in the doer and not in the thing done onely it is said to be in it in that regard that an euill cause wrought it and so the motion is both Gods and mans yet not both of one manner of working Mans fall was an action therefore Gods and mans but man wrought it one manner of way and
eternity is now before the eyes of the hypocrite For the Lord saies not before me but before thee for the Lord neuer begins his work in himselfe therefore in himselfe he did this from all eternitie but now he will manifest his ordering of sinne which he alwaies doth by the booke of his law but because this was cast at his backe and set at his heeles which ought to haue lien at his heart the Lord will open the third booke which shall pricke him to the quicke and make him most fearefully to looke about him Obiect 2 The second obiection is drawne from his attributes Attributes simgle conditional some of them not following the nature of the creature as omnipotencie power goodnes immensitie eternitie and the like but others haue no worke in the creature vntill the creature haue had his worke as no mercie can be wrought vpon the creature vntill his miserie be presupposed and no iustice executed vpon the creature vntill he haue bin sinnefull For mercie cannot be where there is no miserie neither iustice where there is no sinne for that ius dominij is an abuse of Gods wisdome for there is no rule for it and for the Lord to doe any thing in punishing as dominus and not as iudex is to make him vniust Indeede by the law of creation as he made man of nothing so may he annihilate him and bring him againe to nothing but to let him liue and punish him standing in his innocencie is to doe against the law of his iustice Sol. The answer to this point it this in briefe The distinction is not good for Gods attributes in himselfe are equally absolute eternall infinite but beeing manifested in his creatures become conditionall and to haue respect vnto the creatures therfore creation makes manifestation of power goodnes wisdome eternitie and the like as wel as mans fall of mercie and iustice therefore mercie and iustice were equally first in God with the rest for God was in himselfe both iust and mercifull before man was either sinnefull or miserable for the execution of iustice or mercie I confesse to be in regard of sinne and miserie but there is one reason of the execution another of the decree the iust cause of the one is his will the iust cause of the other is mans sinne Gods decree must haue a subiect Obiect 3 The subiect of Gods decree therefore either beeing or no beeing no beeing can vndergoe no decree for it can haue no end and therefore it must be a beeing therefore either the first beeing or that beeing which is from the first beeing not the first beeing for he can haue no end nor beginning and therefore no decree can passe of him so that onely remaines the other beeing which is from God therefore created therefore man created is required for a subiect of Gods decree now the ende of creation can not be reprobation for the ende of creation is mans happines with his Creator therefore a second estate of man must be considered and that is the fall of man in which estate a iust ground is giuen of Reiection and Election The answer It is graunted that Man is the Subiect Sol. The subiect and his manner of consideration yet we distinguish of man and answer that in euery subiect two things are required res considerata modus considerandi the thing considered is alwaies one but the manner of considering maketh diuers speciall subiects in this one subiect As for example being frō God is the subiect of all Gods reuealed wisdome yet this one subiect hath diuers manner of considerations according to diuers acts and operations that lie in him As for example Reason is a particular act and therefore becommeth a particular subiect of Gods wisedome to wit the Art of Logicke so the will a particular worke in Gods creatures becomes the subiect of Diuinitie so speach a particular worke becomes the subiect of Rhetoricke and Grammar Now that generall Subiect is before all these particular subiects and the foundation of all the rest and in them the thing considered as common to them all but the manner of considering it is proper and speciall to euery one So man is the thing considered in Gods decree therefore the most generall going before all particular considerations of creation fall redemption saluation damnation for all these are but particular considerations of man therefore keepe their order appointed of the Lord for the obtaining of his owne ende which is the glorifying of himselfe in his Iustice and Mercie therefore as man is the Subiect of Gods decree so creation the fall redemption saluation and damnation are but the meanes for the accomplishment of his will Againe euery one of these particular actions haue their speciall ends not opposing but concurring to the generall ende of the whole subiect so that the ende of creation is happines with the Creator and no miserie at all but this is the speciall end and therefore no opposite of the generall Againe the speciall ende of mans fall is miserie of bodie and soule in the first and second death yet no opposite of glorifying God in the demonstration of his mercie Thirdly the speciall end of mans Redemption is saluation to all that are in Christ and damnation to all that are out of Christ therefore all these ends beeing speciall must needes ayme at the generall for so goes the Rule of all true reason that subordinata non opponuntur 2. that fines intermedij sunt pro subordinatione finium ad vltimum finem And this shall suffice for the opposition now I come to the confirmation Arguments proouing the decree of sinne first drawne from ends The first Argument That which hath any ende is decreed but sinne hath an ende therefore is decreed The first proposition is prooued from the true distinction of ends laid downe by the Philosopher in the first booke of his Ethicks and the first Chapter where the Philosopher disputes most excellently for the subordination of arts and so consequently of beeings by an argument drawne from the distinction of ends to wit that all ends are either the last ende or ends tending vnto the last now the last end giues goodnes and amabilitie to all other ends and doth virtually containe them all in himselfe therfore must they needes be appointed for him This ground is a most enident proofe that sinne is decreed for the end of sinne must either be the last ende or tending to the last ende now it cannot be the last end for that alone is chalenged of the first being therefore an end tending vnto this last end And who dare denie but that all endes vnto the last ende are decreed for they make for the manifestation of his glorie Obiect Sinne is euill and therfore hath no ende seeing ends goodnes are the same But it will be obiected sinne is euill and therefore hath no ende for finis and bonum conuertuntur Vnto this I answer
God seeing man this way to determine his will Mansâ— determination made the determination thereof a iust way for his owne glorie God decreed mans fall and he also decreed that he himselfe would not be the cause but that man himselfe should onely cause his own ruine Thus then God did absolutely decree but not absolutely determine mans wil for that was left vnto man himselfe Determination no impulsion yet the determination of that determination was absolute and that without impulsion or coaction of mans will for determination is alwaies of things vnto their ends therefore is called absolute in regard of the end but coaction is onely of an efficient which is not necessarie for an absolute ende All Gods ends are absolute and necessarie yet the meanes that God vseth are of all kinds contingent necessarie dependent independent Suppose God had decreed to haue giuen man actuall grace as alreadie the angels haue it in heauen had it therefore been necessarie that man could not haue fallen or that God should haue constrained his wil to haue imbraced this grace no assuredly therefore on the contratie God decreed not to giue man this actuall grace of standing is therefore his auersion necessarie and constrained no but God by this meanes gaue way vnto the sinne of auersion and permissiuely yet willingly did suffer it for to enter for otherwise it could not haue entred and by a positiue decree resolued that auerting himselfe from the fountaine of all goodnesse and the rule of all righteousnesse he should runne into innumerable dangerous euills and grieuous sinnes both of commission and omission Omission is alwaies the first sinne Omission a priuation for a man falleth first from the loue of God before he can loue or desire any other thing now this sin beeing a neglect hath no positiue cause it selfe being a priuatioÌ„ neither need we seek any higher spring of it Non 〈…〉 then the will of such a creature as is defectiue and therefore doth not alwaies necessarily attend to the rule it should conforme it selfe vnto and thus of the first sinne we can find no cause in God because hee is no wayes defectiue The second sinne is commission which is a positiue act and therefore hath a positiue cause now God that neuer ceaseth to doe his worke of moouing but alwaies carrieth forward all things with restlesse motions cannot but cause the verie substance of a sinne of commission 〈…〉 of the Schâ—olman neither here am I of the opinion of the School-men that defend the very deformitie of this sinne to be nothing but the act and very substance of it for an act is a generall tearme and hath speciall limitations added vnto it therefore it is said to be well done when it keeps his rule euill when it misseth his rule now the Lord in no action goeth against the rule of his wisdome therefore he can work no deformed act only man that is defectiue may goe against the rule and so causeth the deformitie A cunning artificer makes a clocke but he suffers his apprentice to helpe to ioyne it together the deformitie of the motion is none of the artificers but onely from the vnskilfull apprentice yet will the skilfull artificer haue his praise in correcting of that aberration and turne the motion to his owne ende The causes then why sinne entred as efficient are properly the deuill and man as determined to an ende properly Gods who might well so determine of man seeing he created him mutable But to come more neerly How Gods lawe works sinne we may expresse this most familiarly in a comparison taken from an earthen pitcher dashed by the hand of a man against a stone wall that the wall breaketh it that is no fault of the walls but rather the coÌ„mendation of it working according to his owne nature but the fault is in the partie that dashed it against the wall so man being dashed by the deuill and himselfe and the serpent and the woman vpon the law of God too hard to bee ouerwrastled of man was broken in peices yet the lawe was without all fault onely the fault was in the deuill Adam and the woman the law therefore a most iust and holy cause of mans fall as the law caused mans sinne so I dare boldly say that God cansed it yet most holily and iustly Hence it followeth most plainely that God was no bare permitting cause or a forsaking cause but a working cause euen in the fall of man now as God did it so he was able to doe it and so to decree it to his owne glorie according as it seemed best vnto his own wisdome and so might it be willed as absolutely good and iust and therefore no sinne God made them the beginners of their owne actions beeing indued with free will by well doing they might deserue both praise and prize and by ill doing might deserue both dispraise and punishment But you will obiect then God might both will it and not will it Very true as God willed it it had respect of good and was iust and therefore to be willed but as they willed it it was euill and so God hated it and his law forbad it The sonne may desire the death of his father and so may God too but in so doing the sonne sinnes against God yet God is free from sinne the Iudge desires that a malefactor should die so doth the hangman yet may be the hang-man is guilty of murther when the Iudge is a true executioner of iustice Obserue then for the entrance of sinne these positions Positions for sinnes entrance First that to sinne is directly beside the scope intent and purpose of the law and therefore if the law cause sinne it is by acccident as to the law so to Gods wil which can neither intend purpose or will any impietie and therefore sinne is accidental and externall in regard of God now an accidentall principle is either in regard of necessitie or fortune How a cause by accident may be giuen vnto God now for necessitie to sinne that cannot be giuen vnto God for he can suffer of no causing principle and fortune is too strange a tearme to stand with Gods prouidence where then is this externall principle I answer if wee soberly conceiue of the nature of a cause by fortune we shal not much swarue if we say sinne was chance in regard of Gods will for chance and fortune according to true reason is nothing but the accident or euent of any thing beside his end and scope now only good is the end and scope of Gods will and therfore sinne which is not good is beside Gods scope and ende therefore it is accidentall in Gods scope and end But you wil say then God was ignorant of mans sinne I answer no because sinne is not onely accidentall to a good ende but also an aberration from the true rule of wisdome and must stand to the iudgement and sentence thereof
creation fall or redemption that it is blasphemie to say that the ende of man as created was any thing but happinesse neither from thence ariseth any other demonstration Man qua creatus as created is in no intention but happines come to his fall and then againe I say homo qua lapsus est miser tantum man as fallen is onely to bee considered as miserable as redemptus or redimendus onely sub salute or saluandus where then is the ende of man As man generally considered electus or reprobus elect or reprobate these be the most generall and here onely reprobation and election is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 truely first and primarily iâ— all the rest gratia huius for this cause therefore happines of creation miserie of the fall saluation by Christ are subordinate and come vnder it Indeed I confesse that election and reprobation haue their manifestation to the creature onely in redemption and in that part which is the application of it vnto the church in generall here onely both angels and men knowe and feele their state of election and on the contrarie reprobation is there to be sought for of the wicked But Bellarmine saith A defence of Calvin that Calvin denieth Gods determination decreeing what shall be to depend on his prescience that in all things his prescience presupposeth his purpose and decree For answer whereunto wee must consider whether there goe any prescience in God before his will I meane according to our apprehension Whether the Lord vnderstand or will first and as things are reuealed to vs out of God in his workes my reason is this because if the Lord vnderstand it then it is a possible beeing now I presse my argument that euery beeing whether possible to be or alreadie existing is demonstrated from his will for his will makes things to be or possibly to be therefore if a thing must be before it can be vnderstood and to be howsoeuer conceiued yet is from Gods will that giues all beeings either in posse or esse I knowe not what can be that first comes not from his will But wisdome according to sobrietie is commendable and in high mysteries it is good to goe with the current of our best approoued diuines therefore according to the way troden before me Intelligentia diuina I answer There is a double prescience one simplicis intelligentiae and another diuinae visionis the first is of all those things that are possible and which vpon any supposed condition may be as was the prescience of God whereby he foreknew that if in Tyrus and Sidon those things should be done which afterwards were done among the Iewes they would repent this doth not presuppose the decree of God but extendeth to many things God doth not decree nor purpose to be as it appeareth in the example proposed The other is of those things onely which hereafter shall bee and this alwaies presupposeth some act of Gods will for seeing nothing can be vnlesse some act of Gods will do passe vpon it at least not to hinder the beeing of it and thus nothing can be foreseen as beeing hereafter for to be vnlesse some decree of God passe vpon it Of this kind of prescience Caluin speaketh and not of the other it was not considered what it was possible for the creature to doe or what he would doe beeing so created and left vnto it selfe this may well be said to presuppose no decree of God or determination what he would doe for if it had pleased God he might haue turned the possibilitie to another end and issue but the truth is that other to wit what hereafter shall be which though it be future and therefore contingent yet to God it is most certaine with whom all future things are present and therefore beeing to be done was most certainely decreed and whatsoeuer is done and come to passe wee may absolutely conclude it was Gods will euen long before it happened therefore Calvin rightly affirmeth that Gods foresight of the entrance of sin presupposed his decree that it should enter Fourthly Gods foreknowledge and purpose in sinne Sinne 〈…〉 decâ—â—â—â— that God might â—â—nisâ—â— vpon the bestowing of such benefits of his rich abundant goodnesse was not that man should fall that he might punish but that man should freely make his choise vpon which choise the Lord both knew and purposed that his iustice and mercy should be manifested yet for all this it will not followe that the Lord should purpose the entrance of sinne originally out of his owne liking that he might haue matter of punishment Belâ—armâ—â—â— false exposâ—â—â— of Calvin as Bellarmine most iniuriously chargeth Calvin to affirme but the ende of his purpose of bestowing such benefits onely and no other notwithstanding his foreknowledge what would fall out if so he did was that he might shew his mercie and iustice in sauing and condemning whome he would Therfore it is idle in Bellarmine to followe this argument of the seuerity of iustice as though Calvin should any where affirme that when God thought of creating man the first ende that God purposed was the seuerity of his iustice and the riches of his mercie and that this purpose was before and without respect vnto the prescience of any thing that afterward might or would bee in man and that because there was not any thing wherein he could shewe mercie and iustice vnlesse sinne did enter therefore secondly he purposed that sinne should enter so that first hee purposed to punish before he sawe any cause and then purposed the entrance of sinne that there might be cause which is no lesse excusable from iniustice cruelty and tyrannie then if he should purpose to punish and so doe without any cause at all therefore he concludes that the first originall and spring of sinne is from the will of God according to Caluins opinion Answer to Bellarmine for his false imputation vpon Calvin But he is easily answered out of that which hath beene spoken concerning Calvins iudgment in this point for he doth no where say that God did purpose the manifestation of his mercie and iustice before all prescience but onely that which is named prescientia visionis which alwaies hath Gods decree going before it The possibilitie of a thing is before God decree it to be and so God knowes it simplici intelligentia but that this thing possible shal be the Lord decrees it before that bare knowledge that it shall come to passe Secondly Calvin denies not all pâ—escience before his decree Caluine doth no where pronounce that simply and absolutly the ende wherfore God purposed to make man was the manifestation of the seueritie of his iustice and the riches of his mercie or that he might saue some and condemne others but that first he meant to bestow vpon man as much as was sufficient to make him perfect fecondly there was something he meant to denie him How God shâ—wâ—d
his iusâ—â—ce and mercy which beeing done God knew he would fall therefore in the third place beeing assured that he would fall into sinne and apostasie made his sinne and apostacy a way to a greater good then the world otherwise could euer know fourthly his purpose was not earatione to bring in this former good but for this former good God was content that man should fall yet without any imputation to God seeing he gaue him all that could be required by the estate of his creation And surely against this neither Bellarmine nor any other can except indeede he heapes vp infinite testimonies and reasons against him and other Diuines Therefore seeing the matter is so waighty and that reasons are brought both to dishonour God and bring a blasphemous report vpon his faithfull seruants I will according to mine owne apprehension obiect that which may be obiected either from appearance of reason or from testimonies of the writings of our best Diuines And the rather I will doe it because Bellarmine triumphs in nothing more then this That Gods does not onely permit the wicked to doe much mischiefe and the godly to suffer an hard measure at their hands but also doth praesidere ipsorum malis voluntatibus eosque regere gubernare torquere ac flectere in ijs inuisibiliter operando that is does not onely suffer them but also placeth his regiment in their euill wils rules them gouernes them nay doth wreath bend and bow by working in them inuisibly This is more then to impell which is the worst word that he can snatch out of our writers And therefore seeing all Diuines runne so much to Gods ordering of sinne and Bellarmine makes it as Delphâ—cus gladius Apollos sword to cut asunder all Gordian knots I will the more liberally insist vpon it beeing so direct with my text Reasons obiected to make God the author of sinne Obiect 1. Because whereof God is the cause thereof he is the author but he is the cause because euery positiue act or beeing is from God and sinne is of this nature which I shew in the first sinne 2. in originall sinne which springs from that 3. in sinnes of omission and commission the fruits of originall 4. First sinne obiected from the subiect 5. from the nature of habits From the first finne because no circumstance or manner of eating the forbidden fruit is the sinne but the very action it selfe because that is forbidden in substance and not in circumstance 2. Originall Originall sinne is not a meere priuation want or defect but also an inclination and pronnesse to all euill therefore it is saide to raigne in our members carrie vs headlong to all impietie and worke mightily in vs. 3. In sinnes of omission and commission Omission Commission first because God doth not onely know that he wil permit but also he is resolued that he will not co-worke with men and angels to the producing of a necessarie act and therefore by consequent omits and againe he knowes that he will not co-operate to free men and angels from an act that is forbidden and so by consequent doth commit 2. a greater difficultie is this seeing that sinnes of commission and omission are distinguished And therefore in commission there must be some thing beside omitting of that which is commanded and that can be nothing but doing and therefore the difference can be nothing but some positiue act neither is the substance of this act one thing and the deformitie an other but the act it selfe which should not be done is out of forme order and rule and is repugnant to the rule of righteousnesse therefore this kind of sinne beeing positiue hath a positiue cause neither is the will of man onely the cause of it but God also euen of the deformitie of it as well as the substance seeing the deformitie in a sinne of commission is nothing els but the very substance of the act which is done but ought not to be done Fourthly The subiect of sinne from the subiect euerie sinne is in that subiect out of which the goodnes is expelled and therfore though it haue not formam vel materiam constitutiuam tamen est in subiecto vnde recessit habitus that is though it haue no matter or forme for his beeing yet it comes into that subiect where goodnes was and possesseth his roome therfore is more then merum ens rationis a conceit of the braine and beeing something extra conceptum intellectus more then the worke of reason is beeing and therefore from God from whome all beeing is 5. Habits obiected Lastly it is an habit and they be qualities and euery qualitie is beeing therefore from God These and such like are arguments that the wittinesse of corrupt reason may make against God that is so pure and holy that he can no waies be a God that willeth any iniquitie Ans 1. The first argument is answered by this distinction to eate of the forbidden fruit is either a naturall act or a morall act A naturall act a morall act as a naturall act it is no sinne and this is the very beeing of that action and in this God worketh the second which is a morall act is not absolute but relatiue and respectiue to the diuine law of God and this was onely mans act which did refuse to giue his respect and due obedience to this law 2. Ans To the second I answer originall sinne is considered either materially or formally Materially according as all the faculties of man are set a running and this is positiue and from God that carries all things with restlesse motions The formalitie is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or exorbitation and wheeling awrong of all the faculties and this is done either by the free-will of man or the law of God that beeing opposed as an enemie punished man and by his abuse turned him out of the way of righteousnesse and therefore as a iust iudgement of God the sinne is called a punishment and so beeing againe working out of mans will as in concreto is likewise called beeing by reason of his subiect who giues him power to worke and is inclined by it but the meere formalitie and the sinne in abstracto considered without the subiect and in opposition to vertue and goodnes is meere nothing 3. Ans To the third this must be answered First First for omission that God gaue both men and angels sufficient for the estate of their creation to make them able to stand yet not so much that they should be confirmed to stand therefore if God had not co-operated in regard of the first he had sinned in omitting and committing but for the second it was not necessarie that God should co-operate and confirme them in their estate of goodnesse To the second difficultie Secondly commission the Doctors of the Church of Rome haue made it and affirme it a Respectu peccati commissionis duplex est
deformitas prima carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse voluntati elicienti actum quem non habet secunda est ipse actus elicitus quem deus prohibet Occam in sent lib. 3. quest 12. saies there is a double deformitie of the sinne of commission first the want or priuation of that rectitude which ought to be in the will making his owne choice of an action which he ought not secondly the very act that is drawne out of this will is a deformitie forbidden of God so then besides the wills deformitie the act it selfe is a deformitie Other Diuines vnderstand by the deformitie found in sinne the want of rectitude or omission of due circumstances and thereupon say there is no cause of it but priuatiue onely but Occam vnderstandeth as you haue heard by the deformitie of a sinne of commission the act it selfe done without due circumstances without which it should not be done and so seeketh a positiue cause of it If any of our Diuines should haue affirmed this how would Bellarmine haue handled them and imputed straunge and outragious blasphemies against them b Cameracensis in lib. sentent lib. 1. q. 13. art 1. q. 14. Of this opinion are many other of their Doctors as may well be seene in Cameracensis c Hugo de S. vict erud theol de sacram lib. 1. part 4. cap. 12. 13. c Scotus l. 1. dist 41. q. Vnica sola permissio aliculus actus certitudo de permissione non facit certitudinem de illo actu quia opportet habere aliquā causam effectiuā igitur ex hoc quod deus praescit se velle permittere Luciforum peccare ex hoc inquam solo non videtur quod sciat Luciferum peccaturum soluitur haec obiectio quia deus non solum scit se permissurum sed etiam scit se non cooperaturum ei ad actum necessarium per consequens onuttet scit se cooperaturum ad substan iam actus prohibiti sine debitis circumstantijs per consequens committet Scotus another great doctour saies Gods bare permission of some action and certitude of his permission makes not any certitude of that action because it ought to haue some effectuall cause therefore for as much as God did foreknow that he would permit Lucifer to sinne from this it could not be that the obiection of Lucifers fall should be answered seeing that God doth not only know it but also knowes that he will not co-oporate with him to the producing of a necessarie act and therefore withdrawing he omits as well as Lucifer for how should Lucifer but omit when the first cause withholds his influence and againe the Lord that he will co-operate to the substance of an act forbidden and therefore it followes that God commits it What blasphemies would these be in the mouthes of Calvin and others yet good diuinitie in the schooles of Rome But thus they expound themselues that God worketh decreeth and willeth the deformitie that is found in the sinnes of commission not by his antecedent will whereby he worketh things out of his owne liking but by his consequent and conditionall will whereby presupposing the purpose of suffering his creature to auert and turne from him he still intendeth to mooue impell and carrie them forward though beeing by their owne fault out of the way hee carrieth them thither whither they should not goe first say they by substraction of grace vpon the withdrawing whereof he sawe the creature would turne from him he purposed to suffer the sinne of auersion or omission to enter secondly this purpose beeing presupposed and foreseeing that which would follow vpon it in his consequent and conditionall will he positiuely decreed the other which is of commission Man by creation was made to seeke an infinite good and loue it infinitely which if he omit to seeke in God then must he needes commit the contrarie and seeke it in himselfe for so God decreed that man not continuing to adhere vnto him should fall into selfe loue pride and all euills of that kind All this might bee borne withall saue onely they make deformitie of the essence of an action which cannot be borne withall for indeed it is so farre from agreeing with an action that he will not suffer him to take vp any dwelling in him and therefore I prooued before in exposition of those words These things hast thou done that no action was the subiect of sinne and therefore well might the action be caused of God without all fault of his But to answer the doubt 1. They differ in that omission is a morall defect but commission is a morall act the one is not doing morally that which is commanded and the other is a morall doing of that which is forbidden 2. The one lookes at the law as commanding but denies his act the other at the law as forbidding and yet performes his act Now the will of God is positiuely carried vnto neither of both but permissiuely to the creature and accidentally to the effect Yet you will obiect then God permits that which he wills not and if he will it not how can it be done Here I dare not be so bold as our Diuines are though I thinke we haue all one meaning that Gods will is first carried vpon his permission secondly vpon the thing permitted As his will is carried vpon his owne permission he wills that absolutely and by an affirmatiue act but as vpon the thing permitted it is non impedire not to hinder it and that is actus negativus And this must be taken notice of because Gods will must haue some thing to intercede and come betwixt it selfe and sinne for a will immediatly carried vpon sinne is alwaies sinnefull therefore permission comming betwixt Gods wil and sinne frees God from the action of sinne To the fourth obiection I answer that priuations are either considered as opposites with their habits or as adiuncts with their subiects in the first consideration the habite is that which doth affirme it selfe to be existent or in nature may be existent the priuation cleane contrarie denies this to be in nature nay worse then that shewes that he is expelled from such a subiect which now makes him appeare as though he were the Lord of the house and beare the full dominion As life is a naturall thing death comes and saies there shall be no life in this subiect and when life is gone the subiect makes death appeare as though he were the commander of lifes habitation night comes and saies where now is light and because no man can see the light he is faine to giue darknesse a good word and say he hath possessed the circle of the world yet neither will the world confesse he hath receiued any beeing by darknesse or the subiect of life any further existence by the presence of death Therfore he is neither being in himselfe or giuing being to his subiect but taking away a
being yet because the subiect into which he is receiued by reason that he alwaies lookes vpon his adiunct giues him the denomination of beeing as long as he rests with him yet in his simple nature the neuer can be so considered but as a meere tyrant to beeing and essence which agree so ill that if the one come the other must be gone And this is the reason why originall sinne is said to raigne which could not be but for our members which giue him leaue to stay with vs. The Ivie hath no roote or existence from a proper principall of life but most louingly embraceth the Oke and for all his strength the Ivie will eate out his heart secretly and bring him to death so sinne hath no roote of his owne yet most familiarly be closeth with our nature and eateth out the heart of all goodnes within vs and speedily bringeth vs vnto miserie For the last obiection sinne is called an habit and qualitie therefore beeing The answer is as sinne is habitus in subiecto it hath that name yet properly sinne is no habit for it is alwaies his negation and opposite therefore can not properly haue the name of his opposite yet beeing crept into vertues closet desires to put on his habit that so he may haue the more loue and welcome as tyrants when they haue gotten the kingdome of lawfull Princes will be very glad to put on any title that might please them whome they desire to become their subiects and for this cause will be content to change their names so sinne a meere tyrant will maske it selfe in the habit of vertue that so we may esteeme the better of him and willingly subiect our selues to his vntolerable yoke Obiections from the testimonies of our Orthodoxall Diuines whereby they are said to haue made God the author of sinne Obiect 1. The obiection may be formed according to these foure heads 1. from Gods will 2. from the effect of his will his decree 3. from the subiect of his decree man 4. from the ende reprobation of man The argument in generall is thus framed They which make the will of God euill his decree causam energeticam an effectuall cause of sinne the will of man compelled to sinne and his ende euerlasting punishment without consideration of sinne make God the author of sinne but this is defended by our Diuines I will at large inforce euery obiection because it is one of the most damnable opinions that blasphemously the Papists vrge vs withall The obiections against our Diuines concerning Gods decree Obiect 1. That they make the will of God euill it may thus be pressed Voluntas mala dicitur a volitione mala volitio mala est quae fertur in obiectum non debitum obiectum non debitum est malum ergo volitio mala est qua quis vult malum qua vult malum fieri distinctly that will is euill whose act of willing is euill the act of willing is euil which is carried vpon an vnlawfull obiect Vellâ— ma … velle melur … 〈◊〉 sunt idem now an vnlawfull obiect is nothing but euill All this is laid vpon our Diuines to attribute it to God which seemes thus to be prooued He that wills sinne to bee or that it may fall out either whereby he may sport himselfe as Nero did when he had set Rome on fire or else that he may vse it for some good ende as he that bids a man take poyson that he may shew his art in curing him or another steale that he may couer the naked or feed the hungry is all one as to will the sinne it selfe The truth of this is thus cleared to will sinne to bee or exist or happen is all one with sinne it selfe For first what is the beeing of sinne but sinne it selfe what is the existence of sinne but that it exists from that beeing this existing or standing out of the causes of his beeing what is it but the euent so then as God wills sinne to bee exist or happen so he wills sinne it selfe God as he loues not sinne so he loues that sinne should not be exist or happen he wills againe that sinne should be exist and fall out for his glory with as good reason may he be said to will sinne for his glory so that no difference is or can be giuen betwixt the willing of sinne and sinne to be exist or fall out If it shall be resolued God wils non impedire peccatum sed permittere peccatum that is Distincta sunt 〈…〉 not to hinder and stop sinne but permit it to be this will not free the speech for these three things are distinct first to will sinne not to be that is to hinder it that it shall not bee secondly to will it to be or fall out thirdly to will to permit it or not to hinder it The two former are affirmatiue acts work for the willing or not willing of the thing the third is a negatiue act willing but not working this permission in willing is an act but in working a negation first not to hinder others in their libertie and power secondly not to helpe but yeeld the whole carriage of the sinne to themselues and their owne free wills yet hereby explorare to trie and prooue what they would doe and secondly vpon his euill doing to make way that for euill doing the Lord might doe well and become mans greater benefactor Againe to will sinne for a good end is no excuse of this euill non sunt facienda imo nec volenda mala vt eueniant bona we must not doe nay not so much as will euill Velle perpâ—â—rare that good might come thereof for the first sinne is to will the second to doe and he sinnes that wills euill though he does it not A third consideration to excuse the point is how sinne can be the obiect of Gods will Here it is said of our Diuines that sinne in his causes and circumstances 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wholly considered hath a double respect one to man as sinne another to God decreeing it as good but this seemes also with a dry finger to be defaced it needs no washing for it washeth away it selfe seeing all Gods considerations of sinne are of sinne as it is sinne he permits it not as good but euill yet his permission is good he punisheth sinne as sinne he forbids it as sinne he forgiues it as sinne he decrees his permission and this comming betwixt sinne and Gods decree giues him libertie to produce what good he can out of it not qua bonum as good but as sinne and euill the reason is good euerie thing hath his best consideration according to his definition And thus much from Gods will to the obiect A second thing that they impose vpon our men is Contradiction put vpon Gods will that they make God in his will contradict himselfe to will sinne to bee and to will sinne
decree can haue no other force of reason to presse the conclusion but a cause Secondly they answer that the antecedent beeing granted and from thence the consequent concluded is causall when there comes no middle cause betwixt them but God decrees that man should fall by his free-will comming betwixt the fall and Gods decree thereof But this is no answer for so mans free-will came betwixt the Deuils temptation and the yeilding thereunto and so the Deuill should be no cause of mans fall this then is but a shift Thirdly they answer that God may will that man should fall and yet man might fall by his owne free will The answer is ouerturned because a man might haue fallen infallibly and freely but necessarily and freely can neuer stand together Infallibilitie is in respect of Gods infinite diuine prescience but necessitie is of the thing done Infallibilitas est â—ognitionis imnustibilitas rei which is immutable and immutabilitie takes away all contingencie in the thing and consequently libertie so then necessitie contingencie and libertie can neuer stand together Fourthly they answer per desertionem nempe ipsius non collationem necessary ad cauendum peccata auxilij vnde sequitur hominem necessariò peccare that is by desertion of him and not collation of necessary helps to beware of sinne man fell necessarily But this will not salue vp the matter because God gaue the lawe therefore it was necessarie that he should affoard man all necessaries to obey him otherwise the transgression might be giuen vnto God but they will say that Gods desertion had mans free will to come betwixt it and the fall but to that it may be replyed then man deserued that desertion But the question is whether man could wil such a thing or no if it be said he could then hee sinned freely but againe how could he will this if it be answered he could not then surely God made him will it if he could then what was the cause of it surely they defend that God did forsake him before he willed to bee forsaken in that he forsooke to giue him that grace which should haue kept him from sinne Lastly there commeth nothing betwixt Gods desertion and mans willing of it if so then either God or man must be the cause not man because he suffers it therefore God and indeede they confesse that peccatum est merum consequens decreti a meere consequent of Gods decree nothing interceding must necessarily be a cause But they answer this cause is deficient for desertion is but the taking away not concurring but this deficient cause was a necessarie cause why Adam should fall because he could not otherwise escape it And thus much from the Decree now I come to mans will impelled to sinne Obiect 3. That man is compelled to sinne Neceâ—â—â—â—e of Gods decree it is first prooued from the decree graunt the decree and then man could not abstaine from the act of sinne if he could then might he haue frustrated Gods decree Deâ—◠〈◊〉 of 〈…〉 but that is impietie once to thinke consilium enim deistat Secondly that which makes the wil to loose his libertie must needes compel the will the libertie is gone because it is not free ad opposita but must needes incline it selfe to one thing and that necessarily Neither are we here to conceiue coaction or violence for the will hath two motions one of nature another of libertie libertie is taken away when the will is carried with his naturall motion this is spontaneus assensus a natural willing which is alwaies of one thing To be happie is willed of all but neither by violence or freedome but natural inclination for no man wills miscrie Therefore Gods decree takes away his libertie but not his assent to mooue naturally which way God would haue it And though it be not constrained yet can it not resist neither indeede would it resist for this determination Necessitie and libertie cannot stand together Thirdly and lastly necessitie takes away all libertie because all libertie is in contingent things What libertie hath a man ouer the fire or any immutable thing Againe libertie is alwaies with consultation now consultation is in things contingent What man will consult whether the fire burne and surely God and man vnderstands one truth how then should I conceiue that necessarie to God which must be contingent to me Contingencie and necessitie can neuer stand together And to say Adam fell contingently and yet necessarily is an impossibilitie The principle of necessitie is immutabilitie not infallibilitie Certitude makes infallibilitie that which is certen is infallible Time changeth not nature and so may a contingent thing be certen Neither must we measure the thing by time for time is not of the essence of any thing but a thing adioyned to all created beeings Now then time past present or to come change not the nature of any beeing but diuersly qualifie him Was the thing contingent before it fell out then why should it be of the nature of necessitie when it is come to passe hath the time present made it otherwise then it was in time past Define me Adams fall was it not an apostacie from God his Creator this is one thing and is neuer changed now necessitie followes the nature of things and not of time in things You graunt it contingent vntill it came was not this a truth and truth I am sure pronunciat vti res est pronounceth as the thing is will you then make truth pronounce one thing before the thing was and another thing when it is is the nature changed because the time is varied then farwell all truths and that common axiome which is no more common then true That definitions of things are not onely to be conceiued in the present time but also past and to come Let vs examine the definition of contingencie and necessitie â—â—e definition of contingency Contingencie is that which is so true that it may be false is this onely for future no but thus may be false or might haue bin false I am sure you will say that mans fall might haue bin false for God might haue decreed otherwise and therefore marke what you doe affirme to wit that God might change necessarie truths then may he make contradictions true He may make a man and not reasonable fire but not hote Let it then be what it will be if once it might haue bin changed it can neuer be made an vnchangeable nature by time Achilles might haue killed Hector Saul might haue fallen on his owne sword Adam might haue runne into the finne of auersion from God These before they were done you confesse were contingent but Achilles hath slaine Hector Saul is fallen on his owne sword Adam is become an Apostata from God now the case is altered and they are become necessarie But do you not vnderstand reason tell me I pray you Achilles to kill Hector Saul to fall
on his sword Adam to sinne what arguments are they in reason surely causes and effects Now to kil and may kill fall and may fall sinne and may sinne what new inuention haue they brought into reason are they not still cause aâ—d effect A man may laugh therfore if he bring his facultie into exercise it is become necessarie Surely betwixt a reason in potentia in power to argue and actu there is no substantiall change The Coryphaeus of Logitians defines an argument quod est ad arguendum affectum that is which is affected to argue All men know that the power of a thing is more neere the beeing then the act and therfore a thing can part with his act but neuer with his power or facultie A man doth not alwaies laugh nay he may alwaies be a mourning Heraclitus yet he cannot part with the facultie And if it was contingent for Adam to fall surely beeing fallen the cause is not altered onely that which might be is come to passe That which I feared saies Iob is come vpon me when he feared it it was contingent but now it is necessarie strange reason that for bringing a thing into act that was in power to the act or for a little change of time nature should be altered fire will be fire wheresoeuer it is and nature will be nature whensoeuer it is Let any answer me this one thing did God intend to create all things necessarie or some things necessarie and some things contingent If all things necessarie then let vs become Stoickes if some things contingent then I aske when those contingent things were made did they then become necessarie where is then any contingent thing made of God Euery thing you say is necessarie when it is therefore when God had made all things all things were necessarie This kinde of discourse will hold no water and for my part away with this necessitie But doe you desire to know what a necessarie thing is then in a word it is this The definition of necessitie That which is alwaies true and neither can nor could be otherwise To be alwaies true is common to contingencie and necessitie for God with whome all things are present knew them alwaies to be true yet not necessarie but here lies the difference that neither can nor could be otherwise Dare any affirme this of Adam surely then farwell all libertie and make God the true cause of sinne for beloued immutabilitie and necessitie are most principally in God and therefore from him and where you finde them acknowledge God the author If then Adams fall was of this kind it must needes be from God This argument shall be cleared when I come to the answers 4. Obiect Is drawne from the end or if you like not that because may be you will say reprobation is not mans end but Gods glorie in reprobation therefore thus I frame the argument Reprobation is a punishment now our Diuines hold that God reprobated man without consideration of his sinne therefore he punisheth man and yet not for sinne which must needs be iniustice That it is a punishment I prooue it thus Punishments according to the Schooles are either poena sensus or poena damni the punishment of sense lies in sensible torments the punishment of the damned by an Emphasis is a separation from God now reprobation is a separation from God because it is Gods desertion of man thus then if they make Gods will euill the decree of his will an effectuall cause of sinne mans will necessarily thereunto compelled and reprobation mans ende or if you please a meanes vnto the same then will it follow that they make God the author of sinne but all this you see prooued and therefore our diuines make God the author of sinne The accusation is heauie in loue therefore vnto Gods Saints and the defence of his faithfull ministers I will labour to resolue euerie one of these arguments The resolution of the former arguments To the first argument from Gods will that he wills the being existing and euent of sinne I answer by this distinction that there is a double being Gods willing of sinne to be is not the beeing of sinne existing or euent of sinne in regard of a double cause First that which man giues vnto it proceeding from his free-will and this is none of Gods the second is from God and that is an existing beeing and euent which God will draw out of sinne and this is not sinnes beeing existing or euent but Gods therefore when they say God wills that sinne should be that is he wills a beeing out of sinne first his owne glorie secondly a better good then otherwise man could haue knowne and this fiat sit eueniat existat which be the words of our Diuines is good and that this is their meaning it is cleare for say they God wills sinne to be for his glorie now sinne in his owne nature is against his glorie therefore he cannot will the being of sinne for then should he will against his glorie but he wills some euent beeing or existing which he knowes will make for his glorie Secondly God wills sinne to bee exist happen from man onely but that is the first beeing of sinne as the sinnefull action lookes at the sinnefull man whereof you heard before that a sinnefull action was onely in sense an action done by a sinnefull person But you will say how should this be done without sinne I answer here God is first said to permiâ—it to be done secondly to worke it by accident but you will say comes any thing to passe because God permits yes therefore it comes to passe because God will permit for that which God will not permit cannot come to passe and this hee doth most willingly Now when God permits in this sort he is said not to concurre with the worker of the thing but leaues him freely to himselfe this is that desertion which our Diuines speake of for if God should haue concurred to haue produced in man the act of not willing sinne and haue confirmed him in the contrarie then man should not haue fallen and this is that which Caluin affirmes that God gaue Adam posse quod voluit sed non velle quod potuit that is to be able to doe what he would but not to will that which he had power to will therefore that not impedition permission or desertion was a cause why he did not will but none why he did will that which he did will But you will obiect that not to will was a sinne and God was the cause of that I answer it is both a sinne and no sinne a sinne when it flowes from a will that is immediately bound vnto it therefore the very not willing was in Adam a sinne of omission but that not to will which Adam might haue willed did not bind God at all for God was not bound to make Adam to will God might with-drawe himselfe from that
willing which Adam doing sinned against God Adam was bound to doe it actually and God was only bound by the law of creation and his owne wisdome to giue him sufficient power that he might doe it Man was bound actually to obedience but that God should bring forth the act was not necessarie God was not bound vnto the act of willing Adam to stand now both the will and deed are from God and therfore where God denies the deed he is the cause why the deed is not as if I denie to helpe an idle man which hath power to goe I am the cause why he is not helped and for want of my helpe he will not goe that he would not goe it is a fault in himselfe and if he goe backeward it is also his fault If a friend should say vnto me I will not go vnto such a place except you will goe with me I answer him peremptorily I will not goe with you now that hee is not gone withall I am the cause but that he himselfe would not goe it is his fault and if he promised his iourney he alone hath broken his word God saies I will permit sinne and man saies Lord then I both can and it is my will to doe it wel go too man and trie the issue but Lord wilt thou not binder my being tempted by the deuill no man I will not doe it why then Lord I and the deuill will consent together to sinne against thee well trie your freewill so then Gods permission is a not impedition this not impedition is a desertion not of his power to the power of the creature for in him we liue moue and haue our beeing but of his will to the will of the creature and therefore the wil of the creature becomes his own wil by his own will he turnes from God so he turnes it vnto himselfe for he will be like God therefore I dare boldly say that the not willing of Adam was froÌ„ God because he would not giue the deed and that deed beeing denied man did the contrarie The answer to the distinction of non velle velle permittere But dare thou O man dispute with God I could not doe otherwise yes thou would not doe otherwise for thou hadst power inough and that I held my act from thee I did it according to my good pleasure to glorifie my selfe more in thy fall then in thy creation For that threefold act Non velle est impedire vel non approbare first to will sinne not to be secondly to will it to be thirdly to permit it are in simple signification distinct speaking of an absolute will or els they may fall together the first may haue a double meaning for to will sinne not to be is either to hinder it from beeing or els not to approoue it when it is So then God may be said not to will sin when he hinders man from it and this he did not for Adam therfore Iacob Arminius hath sinned grieuously against God by this distinctioÌ„ to make M. Perkins blaspheme against God it is witty I grant but only with the simple God will haue me speake I professe against all the crew of Arminius defenders that they do greatly derogate from the Maiestie of God and abuse their wits to ouerturne Gods wisdom Marke therefore I beseech you the distinction of this subtill Confuter whom the world beginnes to flocke after He beginnes his booke as though he bare a great loue to the truth and the worthy man M. PERKINS yet his poyson be spits out in coyning distinctions to ouerturne the truth and make him whome he called a brother to blaspheme against God And that I may giue you a tast of his wit I intreat you consider what a flourish he hath made in these two distinctions Looke the places the first is Pag. 118. l. 21. Detection of Armintus sophistrâ—e Sunt enim tria inter se distincta quorum nullum alterum includit velle vt peccatum non siat hoc est velle impedire ne fiat velle vt fiat seu eueniat velle permittere seu non impedire That this is a false distinction let the learned iudge for if this be true I can prooue directly that it was impossible for sinne to be and let the proudest Arminian answer it if he can I speak in the loue of the truth beare with me First I am sure out of his distinction that he cannot denie but God willed not sinne to be now they are his owne words That that which Gods wills not to be that he wills to hinder and therefore if God will sinne not to be he wills to hinder it and what God wills to hinder that cannot be and therefore sinne cannot be But he is to know that God wills sinne not to be two waies first non impediendo secondly non approbando therefore that which God wills not to be may be but yet hated of God because he neuer approoâ—ed of it and so God wills sinne not onely in hindring of it but also in that he approoues not of it the one will not suffer a thing to be the other distasteth the beeing of it For the second member Arminius rather blasphemeth that prooues him to blaspheme for whatsoeuer God wills not according to his minde is hindred of God therefore nothing can bee but that which God wills for say the thing is and God would it not and then you say plainely some thing is that God could not hinder and then where is his omnipotencie for his position is what God wils not he hinders For the second member that which God wills to bee is also twofold either effectuall or permissiue for proprietie of speech wil beare both these senses God wils a thing to be either effectualy or permissiuely for he deceiues himselfe not knowing from whence this distinction is taken The distinction of a permissiue will and effectuall is not in the cause but effect not from the cause but effects of one wil diuersly disposed to diuerse obiects as euill and goodnesse to goodnesse his wil is said effectuall to euill permissiue the efficacie of his wil is manifested in the production of a good thing his permission in the production of an euill and therefore the speech is proper and familiar to say that as God wils a good thing to bee by his effectiue will so he wils an euill thing to be by his permissiue wil and as by efficacie hee is carried towards good things so by his permissiue wil he is carried towards euil this distribution is warrantable seeing diuers effects are carried vpon diuers obiects and I vrge him with reason The act of his effectuall will is excercised vpon some obiect which all our men say is toward goodnesse and neuer bends to euill therfore in like manner I demand on what obiect is his permissiue will carried surely on euill and therfore God permissiuely
may wil euil for to be and so in the second member he puts the effectuall willing of sinne for both effectuall and permissiue which is a meere collusion of his reader Here can I vrge him againe with blasphemie A second appaâ—â—â—â— blasphemy if words must be pressed in stead of sense hee that defends whatsoeuer God wills for to be that he wills it effectually then God wills sinne for on whatsoeuer his will is carried that he wills but his will is carried on sinne for I aske him on what obiect is his permissiue will carried if he say on euill then he wills euill but he will answer that is done permissiuely wee grant it and so thinke charitably of him why then can he not in like manner conceiue of ours For the third to will to permit is to will not to hinder wee graunt it him but that may be in either of the former for first that which God wills not to approue he may will not to hinder and secondly that which he wils for to be he wills not to hinder yet we also here conceiue his meaning to wit that not to hinder is a middle betwixt an absolute hindering of a thing and an absolute willing of a thing but to will sinne absolutely was neuer imagined of our Diuines neither with all his Logicke and Grammar can he draw it out of them and therfore as you haue found his faithfulnesse in this so beleeue him in the rest A like place to this you haue Pag. 120. Efficaciter 〈◊〉 efficaciter impedere permitterâ— creaturae Quod Deus vult vt fiat hoc efficaciter efficit adde vel permittit quod vult vt non fiat hoc efficaciter impedit adde iterum vel non approbat quod neque vult vt fiat adde tertio simpliciter neque vult vt non fiat iterum simpliciter deinde conclude hoc permittit creaturae That which God would haue to be he effectually brings to passe or adde I pray you permits that which God would not haue to come to passe he effectually hinders stay a little and adde or approoues not for the third that which God neither wills to be you must meane simply nor wills not to be that also simply and then you may conclude he permits vnto the creature A second collusion is out of these words proinde sic facere decreuit that is God decreed so to doe Arminius comes in with a tayle as though he would sweepe all to the ground adde vel permittere or so to permit If you please to see a Sophister turne to the 145. Pag. de permissione in genere Permissionem ad genus actionis pertinere ex ipsa vocis flexione est notum c. Permission saies he belongs to the predicament of action and hath no neerer cause or immediate then the will not science power or abilitie though these be required in him that must permit No man permits any thing but he knowes what to whom againe he must haue power authoritie and will to doe it It is very strange if all these be true and yet God should doe nothing in his permission and therefore to doe and permit may well agree If he meane to doe iniquitie then the obiect hath limited the act and so we denie it God and that most iustly Againe to follow this Sophister a little and I would some would doe it throughly but saies Arminius to permit is nothing but not to hinder and therefore a negatiue act but where is the negation not in the will but in the deniall of the obiect and therefore we denie not but God hath such a hatred against sinne that he denies it his good pleasure yet wills it A good confession of Arminius that to permit is nothing but that God is welpleased to let man haue his freewill to try him and of his fall take occasion of doing the best good and likewise by his owne confession in the same place saies God is willingly content to put the matter of sinne to mans free will yet thereby to prooue him and vpon his euill doing to doe an infinite good hold thee there Arminius and that which thou called for at the hands of M. Perkins we will graunt thee all loue and respect for the acutenesse of thy learning But further the argument is vrged no euill is to be done nay not so much as willed that good might come thereof To will euill or to doe euill and bring the end as an excuse is impious therefore who speakes in this sort Our Sauiour Christ saith Doe good to them that curse you that you may be the children of your heauenly father If God doe good for euill must he therefore will euill that he may doe that good It is true God wils good out of euill that is not to turne euill into a better nature for heauen and earth will as soone meet but only make it the obiect of his permissiue will Now God can haue his will neither permissiue nor effectuall about any obiect but he will raise his glorie out of it and therefore out of the ruines of sinne and vngodlinesse is he able to build vp his glorie and this is to will euill the obiect of his permissiue will for his owne names sake I am sure euery slender Logitian knows there is great difference betwixt an obiect and an effect If Adam had made euill but his obiect and neuer haue effected it it would haue prooued but a temptation iniected of the deuill and no sinne of his Why then should it follow if God doe decernere de peccato exercise both iudgement and will about sinne iudgement to know it will to limit it discretion to direct it and iustice to punish it And therefore as the argument from the ende is nothing so from the obiect that sinne is alwaies considered as sinne Let it be graunted can therefore the excellent wisdome of God extract nothing out of it yes for euill will be in good and God will so separate it from the good that it can not otherwise be but some thing should be fined and refined by it yet so that sinne shall alwaies be nothing but drosse and dung stubble and straw for hell fire For the contradiction in Gods will it is none at all for in contradiction the affirmation and negation must be of one thing A man is blind and not blind are no contradiction because the one may be vnderstood of the eies of the bodie and the other of the eies of the soule Apius est caecus Apius non est caecus is no contradiction Therefore God to will sinne by his permissiue will and not by his effectuall will make no contradictions For the last branch of this argument God inclines impells constraines as they are naturall acts adde also hardnes commands wicked instruments and doth effectually procure them to execute his iust iudgements the motion is Gods act ordinarie the iudgement is Gods act morall and the sinne his
permissiue act He that strikes against God shall be so stricken againe that he shall suffer and therefore as the smiths hammar striking against his hands hardeneth them by opposition so God the hearts of men by his iust iudgements opposing them Solution of the second Argument drawne from Gods decree The first part of the Argument resting vpon that Sophisme of Arminius is alreadie cleared To the second Gods decree not the workes of sinne but conuersant in it in ordering and disposing concerning the necessary copulation of Gods decree and sinne First I answer they are not cause and effect because Gods decree is an act vpon sinne and therefore subiect and adiunct But you will inquire what necessitie is there of the connexion of these two parts I answer Gods decree and mans fall doe not make a necessarie sentence but contingent yet most infallible and true because it was the act of an infinite wisdome that could not be deceiued and hereupon his iudgement was most infallibly true of mans fall If an expert Physitian should foretell the death of his patient and were most certen of it must it therefore be necessarie when it comes to passe Determination no cause of necessitie because he foretold it no for the truth is the same that it was before onely it is now more euident to others that knew it not so God most certenly knew the fall of man and determined of it euen as the Physitian determines of the fit in an ague wherein his patient shall die and farre more certenly he will not misseit a minute of time Could the deuill tell Saul yea and determine of it To morrow shalt thou and thy sonnes be with me and yet shall not God be able to set downe the exact time of mans apostacie And if the Lord haue determined the day and houre wherein Adam should die shall he therefore be the necessarie cause of his death You will not accuse the Physitian as a murtherer because he foretold the time wherein his patient should depart nay you will scarse accuse the Deuill because he said to morrow but confesse that Saul himselfe fell on his own sword onely this makes vs say the Deuill did it because he hath bin a murtherer from the beginning And as God saies Is there any euill of punishment in the citie and I haue not done it so dare I say is there any euill of sinne in the world and Sathan hath not done it Therefore I must craue pardon to hold a certentie but no necessitie that man infallibly should fall yet most freely and contingently but not necessarily at all for necessitie is against Gods decree Things necessaâ—â— neede no decree for their consequents God neuer decrees the fire to burne because if it be fire it is good reason it should burne God neuer decrees man shall haue reason for if he will haue him a man then it is necessarie he should haue reason but to decree in all proprierie of speech both with God and man is of things contingent Man he decrees vpon deliberation and consultation and the subiect matter thereof is some contingent thing which hee would produce or hinder for if it be a necessarie thing he can neither produce it or hinder it man is not a stone he can neuer produce out of this the arffimatiue part man is a stone God is iust is a necessarie truth let him bring all the arguments he can inuent or deuise out of his wit and yet he shall neuer produce this that God is the author of sinne or vniust Suppose an armie of men were comming against England would not the King and his Councill assemble to deliberate and consult that they might preuent them and therefore though the thing be most certain yet it is not necessarie The towne is on fire if it were necessarie it should burne the town what then should men do crying for helpe yet it might bee some knewe for a certentie that the towne would be burnt is it therefore necessarie But you will say euery thing when it is is necessarie that it should be I answer that this beeing should become existent was neuer necessarie A thing to bee when it is is not necessarie for the cause but that it is a kind of beeing vnder some head of entity where it is necessarie yet that this beeing should be something is most necessarie And therfore I admire that though many meane wel yet they should neuer distinguish betwixt an an effect and a species of beeing The effect lookes onely at causes now the causes of mans fal were no wayes necessarie either when they were in power to act or when they did really produce and therefore as man was a contingent cause till he fell so when he was fallen he was stil the same cause onely his power was brought into act and all our dispute is on this head as mans fall was an effect But now you come and say this effect was necessarie how I pray you because you say quicquid est quando est necessarium est esse marke your predication which is of that word esse vpon quicquid est quando est now what is that esse to quicquid est quando est I tell you no effect but a species now the species of any genus is a necessarie axiome when it is disposed And therfore that which is existing in the world to be brought vnder some head of beeing is most necessarie for God is the God of order sinne therefore or rather the action of sinne for sinne cannot haue an est though it may haue a quando est as beeing referred to the predicament of action One thing as an action is an example of that order and another thing as produced into that order or the catagorie of effects is necessarie because this action or this effect is an example or species of that generall nature and with that generall nature he is necessarie hence Logitians call these arguments disposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second degree of necessarie affirmation but recall these actions to their agents these effects to their efficients and the argument is changed therefore dispose Adam and his sinne together as cause and effect Gods decree and mans fall as subiect and adiunct and both are but contingent axiomes the former contingent and vncertaine vnto Adam vntill he had committed his sinne the second contingent and most certaine because God that decreed it knewe all things and with whom all time was present Argument repeated Further it is vrged from commission and omission from commission because God did concurre to the doing of it seeing it could not be done without him and beeing the first in it is the principall actor man but his instrument and that so necessarily vrged that hee could not resist God the first moouer From omission because God did not giue him so much grace as was necessarie to keepe him from omitting his dutie for if God had concurred
giue all men satisfaction and that no man would euer be able to make any sound replie to it it is become as the winde in the bowels that will not be remooued except the hotest medicines be applied and that by the iudgement of the best Physitians These rumours may daunt a weake spirit and make him despaire to encounter with such a tempest that strikes all downe before it But seeing God is in the calme more then in the rushing wind and that the truth is freely to be bought of all that meane not to sell him for the plausible opinions of the world I am bold in the confidence of my God and the loue of his truth to rescue a faithfull seruant of God out of the hands of as subtill an aduersarie as euer set pen to such a worke And why should I be afraid seeing he that walks in the midst of the golden Candlesticks holds euery starre in his right hand to protect guide and defend them as long as they walke with him O therefore thou which art the truth teach me in thy truth that I erre not thou which art the way guide me in thy way that I wander not and thou which art the life quicken my soule with the life of grace that I may speake in the chiefe mysterie of my saluation from the true experience of thy loue shedde abroad in mine owne heart M. Perk. Predestination is first to be grounded out of Gods word secondly out of true principles of reason I. Ar. It is true that the word of God and innate principles are the true foundation of all this doctrine yet because the fal hath blotted out these principles we must alwaies haue recourse to examine them by Gods word which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in stead of all Collation This is Christianly spoken on both sides indeed the Philosopher saies contra negantem principia non est disputandum he that denies principles is vnworthie to be disputed withall yet mans principles be they neuer so common are not to be trusted without Gods word M. Perk. First principle God is alwaies iust though man be not able to comprehend it in his owne reason I. Ar. This notion is most true onely caution is to be taken that we iudge not the cause by the effect it is iust therefore God wills it but from this antecedent God wills it therefore it is iust Collat. This confession as yet makes no breach betwixt them yet this I would adde that seeing we onely vnderstand God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 à posteriore and not à priore his backe-parts and not his face that it is lawfull to conclude from the effects to the cause as this thing is done and except God had willed it it could not haue bin done and therefore there is a iust reason for it in Gods will though we can not perceiue it which is the minde of M. Perkins which he would haue corrected M. P. 2. Principle God is independent from all second causes yet all second causes are dependent vpon him euen when they doe vniustly I. A. Occasion taken from the creatures is not to make God depend on them for his will but absolutely to will that occasion yet if that occasion had not bin giuen from them God would neuer haue willed decreed or ordained it The subiection of the creature to vanitie is from him that subiected it yet if man his cause had not giuen this occasion God had neuer willed this subiection It was Gods will that Christ should be sent which neuer had bin willed of God but vpon the occasion of mans fall It is Gods will that sinne should be punished yet mans fall gaue the occasion without which God would neuer haue punished man Gen. 18. Exod. 32.1 Sam. 2. The Iudge of the whole world will doe iustly 2. He that sinnes shall be put out of my booke 3. God forbid but that they that honour me should be honoured of me and they that contemne me should be contemned of me Yet in all this irrogation or imposing of punishment the Lord is absolute and independent otherwise the creature would leaue nothing vnassaied to escape Gods hand Collat. M. Perkins meaning is to make God independent euery wayes and therefore by a Synechdoche he puts second causes for all kind of reason that can bee drawne from them Now causation is the first and most perfect reason that can be in things from God therefore God is not onely independent as his creatures worke with him but also for all other reason that can be drawne from them Therefore occasion giuen by the creature beeing a reason must either depend from God or God must depend from it if it depend from God then Gods will was before it but if God depend from it then was this occasion before Gods will and to make any thing before Gods will is to denie his will to be absolute For the three examples First it is true that the occasion of the creatures subiection vnto vanitie was mans sinne but no occasion of Gods will who absolutely willed as much as hee occasioned For the second mans fall was the occasion of Christs sending into the world but not of Gods will to send his Son which was before all occasions For the third mans sinne is the occasion why God will punish but no occasion why hee should ordaine to punish For his admonition to distinguish betweene to ordaine and decree is profitable but not according to his exposition For saith he to ordaine is to set an order in things done and not to ordaine facienda vt fiant things to be done that they may bee But he is to know that discerno is to see asunder and is as generall as all reason wherby all Gods works are seene asunder Of the same signification is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from whence comes dialectica the art of reason now reason is first to find out things secondly hauing found them out to iudge them which iudgement is either of truth or falshood as in propositions or of consequence inconsequence as in Syllogismes or of order and confusion as in method And in this last part to ordaine is properly manifested therefore is a speciall branch of discerning and by a Synecdoche of the speciall for the generall may be put for decreeing yet properly to decree is a worke of counsell wisely discerning of euerie speciall reason truth consequent or any other thing that may make for his scope prefixed then to ordaine is the wise laying together of all these things that all confusion and disorder may be escaped and euery thing most sweetly brought vnto his end appointed of the Lord. Here take notice of three kinds of knowledge disputed among the Schoolemen Knowledge possibile actuall conditional 1. possibilis intelligentia 2. actualis 3. conditionalis The first is of all possible things that neuer shall be the secōd of all things that are or shal be the
from comming vnder that Generall head which Arminius doth in euery place and so takes all manner of working from God in sinne For that which hee obiects of prudence it is true The siue intellectuall vertue that this vertue is a speciall one for first we define intelligence that vertue whereby God vnderstandeth euery particular concerning euery thing 2. his knowledge or science whereby he knoweth all truths in things as it is of things to come it is called his foreknowledge or prescience 3. his sapience whereby he knoweth whatsoeuer may follow or ensue of euery thing 4. his prudence whereby he knoweth his fittest opportunitie for all things 5. his skill whereby he knoweth to effect euery thing most skilfully The first of these vertues belongs to all kinds of reason which we call arguments simply considered in inuention the 2. is seene in axiomes where all truths are contained the 3. in syllogismes that teacheth how to conclude out of truths knowne the 4. is seene in method and order the 5. in practise Hence we obserue that these 5. vertues beeing distinguished yet one by a Synecdoche may be put for all And therefore when M. Perkins saies prudently he vnderstands not onely Gods orderly proceeding but intelligence of all things science of all truths wisdome in all diductions and the most skilfull handling of the matter that possibly can be imagined For the third it is but a meere Grammaticall enasion for M. Perkins meant no more but the ende it selfe though he further added the application of it For the fourth God neither wills nor decrees that which he cannot is no imperfect sense seeing that God fecit qua potuit quafecit potuit decrevit that is God did it as he could doe it and as he did it and could doe it he decreed it And therefore there was no neede of such addition seeing that Gods posse brings in his officere and that posse and efficere bring in his decree But I see if I should follow him steppe by steppe his acutenesse would make me heape vp an infinite writing therefore I content my selfe with a generall view of him because a iust confutation of him ought to be in an other style Therefore that I may onely free the point in hand I will generally labour to doe it in the maine points and leaue the other to some more speciall tractate hereafter 4. God decree man table graunted of both yet Arminius by permission and occasion taken opposeth M. Perkins Principle Gods decree is immutable euen in those things which are mutable This is confessed of Arminius both in Gods decree of effectuall working and permission the secret opposition lies in two things first in that he exactly distinguisheth betwixt to doe and permit and will graunt no efficiencie to permission which beeing defended ouerturnes the nature of a decree for if to permit be to doe nothing then God should decree to doe nothing If he answer to doe some thing in himselfe but nothing in mans sinne then God should decree some thing with himselfe which should neuer be effected in the creature by himselfe so God should not perfect his owne will But it may further be replied God decrees to permit Permissiion yeelds the creature his libertie ver denies not God his worke in sinne that is to giue the creature free libertie to fall into sinne this is true permission that God will not doe it himselfe but permit man to doe it yet still we are further to adde that the wisdom of God which is his will reuealed in his law did worke in the very sinne and therefore sinne is caused by the law not by any internall facultie or power in the law but externall which beeing accidentall is alwaies reduced to other causes and therefore the last resolution of sinne is into the free will of man For neither the abuse of the law by the deuiil or his temptation had prooued sinnes in man except he had conioyned with them Secondly though Gods decree in both these be immutable yet God follows the creature in taking occasion from him in his greatest mutations to set forth his glorie This cannot stand for immutabilitie makes a necessarie truth and all necessarie truths are eternall therefore taken from no occasion of such things as should be in time which are mutable and contingent and neuer to be the grounds of eternall truths which onely haue their originall from him that is immutable and eternall No eternall or immutable truth that followes things 〈◊〉 contingent and therefore an immutable decree cannot be vpon the contingent occasions of God creatures and therefore before all occasions are considered for it is impossible either that Gods will or the decree of his will or the immutabilitie of that decree or the necessarie truth from that immutabilitie should euer be vpon occasion taken from creatures mutable and changeable For whatsoeuer follows vpon contingent things is contingent and therefore if Gods decree should follow vpon contingent things it would become contingent Indeed there is a connexion or disiunction of contingent things which is necessarie not from the contingent things themselues but either from the connexion or disiunction it selfe As for example if thou beleeue thou shalt be saued the connexion is necessarie but that thou should beleeue or be saued are both contingent A man is either learned or vnlearned is a necessarie disiunction but that thou should be learned is contingent and so is the other If God decree then it must come to passe but if the decree should follow vpon the thing come to passe though but occasionally yet would it crosse the nature of immutabilitie And we graunt him that which he saies that the tearmes of the creatures mutation which make a most certen determination and by connexion a necessarie truth yet in simple consideration the Lord might haue done otherwise which neuer can be in a necessarie truth 5. Principle All Gods iudgments are to be honoured acknowledged Exception if they will agree with the word of God and his iustice and this cannot be except they be inflicted vpon man sinfull a iust exception but not against the principle for three things are to be considered in man first his workemanship and that is Gods secondly the appointment of it for vse vnto his maker thirdly what may follow vpon fault of the vessell Men are vessels and so they are Gods secondly they are prepared of God for his vse but the third that they are vessels of wrath that is of themselues Therefore Augustine would not man to dispute with God either for his making or for the ende of his making for this can be resolued into no higher a cause then his owne will But if he will dispute with God for his wrath and vengeance executed vpon him he shal find no other meritorious cause but his sinns That he saies Augustine was too bold with the place to the Romans Arminius reprehends Augustine of rashnesse
insight of the mercies of God in his Christ which are the onely ioy and confidence of our soules And thus much of Gods mercie CHAP. VI. Of Gods Iustice in generall THe second part of Gods holines Iustice is his Iustice contained in the consequent part of the sentence and is distributed into two adiuncts Power and Order Power in that God will be sure to iudge and Order in that he will take no hastie courses whereby all should be done in confusion Excellent is our God for first beeing a God almightie he is able to doe what he pleaseth with his creature but secondly obserue his order and euery one shall confesse that he is a God of excellent wisdome for things done in good method stoppe the mouthes of all Two men that put on armour and like bulls of Basan push the one at the other are not discommended for their power and strength but that beeing men they wanted wisdome to vse their strength aright and that is that they kept no good order and therefore such execution of iustice as this is condemned so that if our gratious King had no more arguments but this one in forbidding all Duells it were sufficient for graunt the exercise the power of iustice yet where is this order and good method that the Lord would haue obserued of all his seruants Aristotle hath vnfolded vnto vs in his Ethicks fiue intellectuall vertues which if they concurre not in all our actions they will prooue exceedingly defectiue First intelligence which giues information of the cause and the reasons of it secondly science which disposeth of euery necessarie truth in those reasons so that thereby he shall iudge his cause to be good or bad for vt intellectus habet se ad verum ad falsum sic voluntas ad bonum vel malum the vnderstanding goes before and iudges of truth and falshood and the will follows after and embraceth good or euill the third vertue is sapience seeing how he may diduct and draw out of the truths of science other necessarie truths which could not appeare but by the discourse of this third vertue the fourth prudence which is the fourth perfection of our actions when we doe all the former in good and comely order the fifth Art the highest degree of perfection when I doe all nimbly and very skilfully in knowing in iudging discoursing applying These men may haue the three first vertues but they are altogether destitute of the two last they may know that their cause is good and that both of them hath reason to complaine of iniurie for braue spirits can not rest without mutuall prouocations secondly they may know that disgrace of their persons is their shame and the losse of their good name which they esteem better then the most pretious oyntment that they inioy to be such an iniurie that it can deserue no lesse then some kind of trial and so in the third place discourse of it and conclude that therefore they will haue iustice executed that they may bee reuenged for their wrongs but alas when they come to apply all this their former knowledge they want prudence and so leap ouer the lists of iustice and breaking good order spoile the exercise of all artes For first they breake the rule of diuinitie in sinning against God by murther the rule of ethickes for fortitude and manhood is abused the rule of politickes for the common-wealth is iniured by losse of such persons as might haue been his pillars the rule of nature complaines that would haue himselfe preserued in all his subiects Indeed special nature for the good of generall nature will seeme to crosse himselfe the fire will descend and the water will ascend before they will suffer such a stranger as vacuitie to possesse any place among them So indeed nature would neuerbe offended if they would shed their blood for their countrie Nature will make the hand to offer it selfe to be cut off before the head receiue the blowe because nature is wise in order knowing that the head is to be preferred before any other member because it hath in it the greatest part of life The people can tell Dauid thou art better then ten thousand of vs and therefore no matter if we be all cut off to saue thy life Blessed is that kingdome that is not onely powerfull in iustice but that keeps good order in the execution Indeed many may say I will reprooue thee but alas how few say I will set thine offences in order before thee Many lie in prison for a sic volo sic iubeo stat pro ratione voluntas authoritie vrged by violence of passion spoyles all Magistrates Aristotle saies that the law ought to be like the primum sensorium which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so the law must sauour of no qualitie but his owne for then would it neuer iudge aright And as the lawe is so ought the Magistrate to be voide of all his owne passions let the law rule him as he meanes to rule the people and then should all be done in good order and we should not heare these lamentable complaints I am in prison but I knowe not for what cause and the Magistrate saies I shall lie there vntil my bones rotte For the mercies of God let vs be mooued betimes as well to set mens sinnes in order as vse our power in reproouing of them lest the Lord come and handle vs most roughly in the power of his iustice for this most hainous offence committed in diuiding iustice against it selfe So then the distribution lets vs see that the power of God is neuer without his wisedome but that the Lord workes in all things intelligenter scienter sapienter prudenter artificiosè plainly truely wisely prudently and skilfully The power of Gods iustice is laid downe in these words I will reprooue thee first the cause I the Lord which in the first verse styled my selfe the God of Gods euen the Lord from heauen in comparison aboue all and in dominion ouer all without comparison therefore a mightie iustice that hath so great a cause Secondly from the species or kind of it a reproofe therfore vindicatiue and reuenging iustice stronger then remuneratiue or rewarding iustice for here appeares ira furor excandescentia anger a displeasure of short continuance furie a short madnesse the third an inueterate hatred that alwaies smoakes against sinne that kindles hote coales hinc ira ex candore fierinesse full of brightnesse Thirdly the obiect thee the sinne and the person I am out of loue with both and therefore will I discouer thy sinne which I know thou aboue all men mayest not endure to heare of Secondly what thou thy selfe art both in deceiuing and beeing deceiued shal plainly be knowne therefore most powerfull iustice whose cause is Iehouah nature vengeance obiect the most secret sinne and most deceitfull person free from all the iudgement seats of men Sect. 1. Of the cause Observ 1. The great God
the world would censure me of flattery and if I knewe that selfe-loue were at home with your selfe then should I neuer feare want of intertainment in learning to dissemble but both the world and your selfe must pardon my boldnesse for I speake not to blaze abroad your praise but to intreat that kindnesse that men would admit of your example as a patterne for imitation Three things constraine mee to vtter my mind First that continuall care which you haue for resolution of many difficulties in diuinity the means which you haue vsed are but practised of few one is that you haue not bin content to take your resolution of diuine truth from translations but haue taken that paines that you are able to fetch it from the originall and drinke of the purest fountaine A second meanes is that of the Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make question of matters of religion whensoeuer you haue seene iust opportunitie and fit persons to resolue neither haue you been content to admit of superficiall answers but haue pressed argument vpon them to see the true tryall and often your own resolutions haue bin more agreeable with the truth and context of Sciptures then that which others haue said let this teach men of your place besides their continuall imploiments to set some time apart for this excellent knowledge of the originalls of the Bible and knowledge of that art A second good example is your continual care that the legges of iustice may not lie broken in the streets and no man to raise it vp A happie thing when men of place count their dignities to be conferred as a common good for Church and Commonwealth Thirdly for all manner of election this you onely haue not affirmed by word but performed by action that the place more then the person might haue cause to reioyce For my selfe I confesse I had no cause to be iâ—ticed from you as the Leuite was from Micah Iudg. 17. to become a Priest vnto a Tribe or familie in Israel but least through ignorance I should as soon serue in the ministery of Idols as the true God I desired to be a little longer trained vp in the schooles of the Prophets For my loue vnto your familie whereof once I was a member it is this that all of them might knowe the God of their fathers and serue him with a perfect heart a willing mind For your vertuous Lady whoÌ„ God hath made as a fruitful vine on the sides of your house that she might likewise grow into the true Vine Christ Iesus and be fruitfull vnto her owne saluation For all your children that they might be as the Oliue plants of God round about your table For your eldest son Beniamin I hope in name and nature the sonne of your right hand the Lord make him the strength and crowne of your age the excellencie of your dignitie and the excellencie of your power But I feare I haue alreadie offended your desire is breuitie therefore to conclude I commend and commit this small labour to your patronage the text I am sure is excellent for these dayes but for my manner of handling it I leaue it to the censure of Gods Church How-euer it be I do more then hope that you will kindly accept it from me and entertaine it as a testimonie of my loue and not onely so but vse it for your comfort Now the God of peace that brought againe from the dead our Lord Iesus the great Shepheard of the sheepe through the blood of the euerlasting couenant make you perfect in all good workes to doe his will working in you that which is pleasant in his sight to whom be praise for euer and euer Amen Yours in all good affection IOHN YATES To the Christian Reader IT is a common saying that an Exorcist may sooner coniure vp a logion of deuills then adiure one of them out of his habitation And as it is with bodily possession so is it with the obsession of the soule for although the deuill cannot penetrate the soules dimensions yet he will sit so neere it that whosoeuer admits him the least good fellowshippe he shall not be freed of his company when he is wearie and with all his heart would shake hands with him The Papists challenge all our Churches as false because we can cast out no deuills but the whole world knowes that they can doe it to the admiration of thousands but for my part I knowe not how they coniure the deuill from the bodie yet this I dare boldly affirme that where they haue gotten one deuill out of mens bodies they haue admitted a thousand into mens soules and surely the deuill were a foole if he would not change his roome for a better lodging I am sure that there was neuer any church that hath coniured vp more heresies then they haue done and as yet I know not one that they haue adiured and sent packing into hell No marueile that they haue need of strange exorcismes for otherwise how should men be confirmed in their strange doctrines these questionlesse haue bin strong delusions to make them beleeue lies But if they please to admit of the holy Scriptures we shall at the first resolue them of a double meanes Math. 17.20.21 the first is miraculous and for a time the second ordinarie and so remaines in the Church the one is in the 20. v. the other in the 21. and this second meanes we haue I am sure the Church of God may pray and fast to deliuer both bodie and soule from the deuil But perhaps they will say shew vs whom you haue dispossessed I answer Prayer fasting are of the same nature that preaching and administring the sacraments they being conscionably vsed worke where and whensoeuer God pleaseth I doubt not but by the preaching of the word thousands haue bin coÌ„uerted vnto the faith and where men get the deuil out of the soule he will haue small hope or comfort either to enter or stay in the body and so no maruell the deuill holds them so strongly and takes such good liking of them that he will be at their commaund to leaue the body and ascend into an higher roome for he is proud enough to intertain such a motion And though I deny not but we haue had some possessed among vs yet I dare boldly say the most haue bin of their owne making Let them take the credit of their art for questionles a blacke art best beseemes a religion of darknesse blindnesse and ignorance But to applie our Sauiours rule vnto our purpose Fasting and praier are admirable meanes in the Church of God not onely to cast out deuills and vncleane spirits but also to fill the soule with the spirit of grace and goodnes And here I tremble to speake and charge mine owne heart with exceeding great negligence as often as I call to remembrance the extraordinarie fasting and prayer of Arminius especially whensoeuer he entred this mysterie of mysteries Gods
Controversie concerning Gods decreeing of sinne 1. Obiections from the Text. 47. answered ibid. from attributes 48. answered ibid. from subiect 49. answered ibid. 2. Arguments proouing from the end 50. from method 52. from God first and last 54 3. Of sinnes entrance his causes principall instrumentall and accidentall 55. how God purposed this entrance 56. how the lawe workes sinne 58. positions of the manner 59 4. Of sinnes progresse and consequents 63. what is Gods work therein 64 5. Obiectiions that God is the author of sinne from Scripture 66 answered ibid. from Bellarmine 68. Caluins iudgement ibid. from reason 73. answered 74. from orthodoxe writers concerning Gods will decree mans will and his reprobation 78 6. Answered 88. how God wills sinne to be 89. Arminius sophystrie 91. determination no cause of necessitie 96. when a thing is how necessarie 97. of Gods concourse 98. of Gods irresistable will 106. the nature of Gods decree 107. freedome of mans will 121. reprobation no punishment 123 7. Collation of M. Perkins and Arminius 127. in 10. principles to 139. for the definition of predestination 139. how counsell 139. of the subiect and his degrees 140. to 152. lastly of the end and subordination of meanes 152. to 160. PSALM 50.21 These things hast thou done and I held my tongue therefore thou thoughtest that I was altogether like thee but I will reprooue thee and set them in order before thee CHAP. I. Of the generall Analysis IN the world we haue three sorts of people All men in thâ—â— world are either Atheists Hypocrites or Saintâ— First Atheists that care for no religion secondly Hypocrites that care for formall religion thirdly Saints that care for true religion Atheists discouer themselues and therfore the word of God is not large in ripping vp their sinnes Hypocrits make a faire shewe and therefore the word of God is verie copious in reuealing their sinne and threatning iudgement against them it tels them plainely they are all for the ceremonie nothing for the truth they lay hold on the shadowe but loose the substance these mens sacrifices are no better then abhomination vnto the Lord he hath no eare to heare them withall he hath no eyes to looke vpon their sacrifices no smell to sauour a sweet sauour of rest in them but his soule is displeased with them and his heart doth rise against them that hee must needs spewe them out of his mouth hee hath no tast to say that the sacrifices they haue prepared are any sauoury meat vnto his palate and yet the Lord is no daintie taster for hee would say it were well if there were but a willing mind Iacob and Esan a true type of Gods militant Church which is cumâ—â—aniâ— Indeede Izaac the father of Iacob and Esau might be deceiued in his sonnes and in their venison but surely hee was not deceiued in their garments for when he had kissed Iacob hee smelled the fauour of his garments and blessed him and said most truely behold the smell of my sonne is as the smell of a field God is not dim-sighted to iudge betwixt the taâ—es wheate which the Lord hath blessed but the Lord is not as man that he should any way be deceiued Iacob should neuer haue gotten the blessing from Esau by hauing his brothers hands in shewe except the Lord had brought that to passe which long before he had decreed Iacob haue I loued Esau haue I hated So stands the case betwixt all hypocrites and true professors they may haue the hands of 〈◊〉 but their voice will bee the voice of Iacob or morally their hands may be the hands of Iacob but their voice will be the voice of Esau the world might be deceiued by the workes of their hands but if they listen to their words they shall find them rellish of Esaus heart but the Lord knowes their workes that they are not onely couered with goates skins but that they themselues are goates indeede and so shall one day appeare when the Lord shall goe through the flocks and separate from all the sheepe the little spotted the great spotted and the blacke spotted not to be the wages of Iacob but the inheritance of the denil and therefore blessed are all they that shal be found in the garments of Christ Iesus that so not Izaac but the God of Abraham Izaac and Iacob may blesse them with the dew of heauen the fatnesse of the earth plenty of wheat and wine that all the world may be their seruants and all their mothers children honour them and therfore cursed be he that curseth them â—â—pocrites fiâ—al be rewarded and blessed be he that blesseth them let the hypocrites complaine we haue done thus and thus and yet thou regardest not we haue bin thy eldest sonnes in casting out deuills working miracles preaching fasting sacrificing giuing of almes and what haue we left vndone for thy names sake hast thou not therefore one blessing in store ò father to blesse vs withall Well it may be they will imitate Esau in his passion lift vp their voices and weepe and surely God will say of them as he did of Ahab Seest thou not how Ahab playes the hypocrite yet because he humbles himselfe in shewe I will bestow a blessing in shew vpon him I will spare him for a time so because yee haue wept with Esau for a blessing behold the fatnesse of the earth shall be your dwelling place by your swords and crueltie to my Saints shall you liue Cruelty of hypocrites I haue made you your brethrens seruants but it shall come to passe when you shall get the masterie that you shall breake their yokes from your neckes and assoone as the daies of your mourning are come and gone you will slay your brethren for that hath beene the thought of your mind God will surely blesse thâ—â—g â—ly and curse the wicked yet let me tell you my mind them haue I blessed and they shall be blessed but for you hypocrites which would seem to haue the little spots among my sheepe I tell you Ciuil hypocrits Grosse hypocrites Meere Atheiâ—â— Little spoâ— great spots blacke upon that I haue separated you for the day of slaughter and againe you hypocrites which are not of the number of these ciuill professors but grosse hypocrites with great spots in my congregation and yet defie my seruants which tell you of your damnation I tell you that you are in the selfe same predicament of my decree of reprobation And lastly all you Atheists which haue the blacke spots vpon you which will acknowledge no more then bruit beasts I tell you that you and all the rest are the goates that I must set on my left hand and pronounce this sentence against you Goe you cursed into hel fire prepared for the deuill and his angels there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth for euer This Psalme is as I may tearme it an Assize or session holden of the Lord vnto
denying graunt the one and graunt the other denie the one and denie the other Secondly because it is not onely the part of a wise man to produce his worke but also to direct it to his ende therfore most absurd to denie it of the wisest Thirdly because it is impossible that a thing should be produced by one wisdome and gouerned by another thus things would not serue the ende of their creation but another Observ 6. According to this wisdome euery nature worketh and to this he ought to obey Reason 1. Because they are Gods effects and therefore obeying the cause must needs obey the wisdome that ordered the causes sinne therefore beeing nothing obeies not God neither any sinner as he serues sinne Secondly this wisdome carries to the ende and euery thing obeies his ende and inclines bends and bowes vnto it Observ 7. This obsequie or obedience of the creature is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or true impression of this producing and gouerning wisdome This first wisdome is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The gouernement of the Creator the obedience of the creature or liuely seale that stamped that marke vpon the creature therefore the stampe is the liuely effigies or impression of that first wisdome and the obsequie or obedience of the creature is nothing but to imitate his gouernour A familiar example of this you may see in the seale and the impression vpon the waxe the seale leaues his marke and the marke is a plaine representation of the seale though the seale it selfe could be seene of none but him that stamped his marke vpon the waxe The waxe sets forth the creature the stampe the obedience and the seale Gods wisdome and this is that Idaea which is so much dreamed of whereof the creature is not capable yet the reflexion of it may be in the creature As for example sixe or seuen men may see their faces all in one glasse yet the glasse is farre lesse then any one of their faces for the naturall face of a man can not be put into the glasse but the image of his face reflected and that in most liuely proportion so Gods face no man can see yet his backe parts may be seene Exod. 33. now this face as I may say of Gods wisdome beeing stamped vpon his creatures carrie them in all their motions to their ends appointed of his Maiestie These things beeing well conceiued of wee finde two things most necessarie to concurre to the producing of any act 〈◊〉 and 〈…〉 First facultie or power which God giues the creature when he giues them beeing 2. a rule of Gods wisdome to bring that facultie into exercise and so carrie it along vnto his ende The rule is the principall cause the facultie the instrumentall or ministeriall cause to ioyne with the principall neither alone can doe any thing but both together can doe any worke that the Creator would haue to be done To come then to our purpose God created man a reasonable creature indued with two most excellent qualities will and vnderstanding so that man was made able to vnderstand his Creator and will him as his onely good Yet man could not actually will God except God had giueÌ„ a rule to haue taught him so to doe the Lord bad man loue him with all his heart soule minde and strength and then to loue his neighbour as himselfe And for the effecting of this he gaue him a perfect rule of righteousnes to ioyne with his will in the performance of any dutie neither did God withhold this rule from him at any time and therefore God gaue man by creation power to will and rule sufficient for to haue taught him how to will so that neither for power or act any thing was wanting Let vs see then how these two things concurred in mans first fall How rule and facultie meet together in the first fall The deuill comes in the serpent and he beginnes to withdraw man from his rule knowing if man and woman had sticked close thereunto sinne should haue had no entrance He beginnes first to propound a question that so he might bring the woman to dispute with him and the question is made about the rule of obedience Hath God indeed said Ye shall not eate of euerie tree of the garden To this the woman answers first by affirmation we eate of the trees of the garden secondly by negation from the sentence of the law of the fruit which is in the mids of the garden God hath said not onely I The dispuâ—â—â— on of the 〈◊〉 man and 〈◊〉 deuill but neither I nor my husband must eate of it neither shall ye touch it and to the prohibition she laies the curse least ye die So then the rule would haue made his part good against the Deuill and haue taught the woman to haue holden this conclusion against all the deuills arguments The deuill replies againe vpon the woman and first he begins to take away that which might feare her in breaking the law yee shall not die at all and then to her negation brings a testimonie first from God God doth knowe secondly from contradiction to the law when ye shall eate therof thirdly a threefold reason to perswade them to that act of eating first knowledge your eyes shall be opened secondly the measure of this knowledge it shal make you like God himselfe thirdly from the kinds of their knowledge knowing both good and euill As yet no hurt was done Let vs now see how the Law concurres in the next The conâ—â— of the 〈◊〉 and we shall easily see both Gods and the lawes confluxe with Adams fall The 1. act of the woman was approbation of the deuills reasons so the woman here 's consent against both God the law The 2. act was seeing here God concurred naturally and that by the rule of nature in optickes neither was this the breach of that rule but presently the will wheeles or turnes it selfe vpon the obiect and saies the tree was good and that approbation was also good for the tree was good by Gods creation but this goodnesse did so affect the will that Gods law must be forgotten and the tree beeing made good for that which the law forbad to wit that it was good for meat when before out of the sentence of the law she had saide the law and God himselfe hath saide ye shall not eate and to say it was good for meate was a direct affirmation against both God and his law and so could not haue their concourse and this was her internall iudgment The next is her externall iudgment in regard of the tree obiected to her eyes in these words and that it was pleasant to the eyes Now this was no where forbidden but that they might looke on it and it may be she said too much when she added we may not touch it yet this likewise is made a sinne for after the will is spoyled then all the other
before him in his creatures now Gods is first in himselfe and then in the things Secondly in man his plot is but a forme in his head distinct from his beeing but in God both the forme of his working and himselfe are all one Thirdly there is in man an Idaea or forme of working before he worke the thing in genesi that is before he compose any thing according to his first conceit which is not before but after himselfe but Gods is neither before nor after himselfe and therefore we must not looke first for Gods Idaeas in things and then in God but first in God and then in things And here I beseech you take notice of the absurditie of many Diuines and grosse ignorance concerning the point of Election and Reprobation expraevisa massa corrupta that it needs must be of man in the estate of his sinne and so make Gods Idaea or the plot of his counsell whereby he decreed to be first in the things and then in God which is cleane contrarie Indeede we vse to say you stand there therefore I see you and not I see you and therefore you are there but in God it is contrarie God saw Adam to fall and therefore be fell Againe prescience can not be properly in God seeing God directly sees all at once and together and therefore can not see one thing before an other yet as God lookes vpon the creature one thing is saide to goe before an other and this may be tearmed prescience but this is that second knowledge of God which we call indirect and here all things are seene of God as they are the images of his wisdome For if he see all things in himselfe then must he needes see all things out of himselfe indirectly the reason is because whatsoeuer God sees directly it is himselfe and therefore the creatures beeing not himselfe he sees them indirectly The Schoole-men speake much of this speculum trinitatis for say they Angels Saints see in God otherwise then by the creatures and therefore are able to know any thing It is true God can reueale yea and hath reuealed not onely vnto Saints in heauen but Apostles and Prophets many things that neuer came by the way of the creature yet we must conceiue that the Lord did irradiate and shine vpon their vnderstanding by an other image then his owne and therefore it was diuine reuelation by working vpon their vnderstandings an Idaea or plot of knowledge which is out of himselfe As God is said to view all principles that is the simple beeing of things he is called an intelligent wise and vnderstanding God 2. the truth of these things and this is Gods omniscience for the present God fore know ledge or prescience for future and neither of both are idle speculations Therefore Gods knowledge or foreknowledge beeing of truths and truths are to pronounce as things are and things are because God doth pronounce them to be therefore God vseth to say I know you not I doe not acknowledge you Againe the Lord knowes the way of the righteous that is works it approoues it And therefore it is not according to the Papists whome the Lord foreknew would doe good or the Lutherans whome he knew would beleeue or others whome he knew would not fall but his will and knowledge goe together I can as well say God had a will to doe all things that were possible as well as a prescience for his will was omnipotent as well as his knowledge and therefore hee could as well if it pleased him to will any possible thing to be as to foreknowe it to be yet this I am sure of that a thing possible and now come to passe was as well willed of God as foreknowne of God And though I would bring no strange opinions yet this seemes to be reasonable that whatsoeuer God knowes it is either something or nothing now something is immediately demonstrated from his will this thing is because God willed it for his will is the cause of all beings not his knowledge therefore to vs in any beeing we must first take notice of his will and then of his knowledge Man is fallen this is the will of God and not his meere foresight for things done can neuer be resolued into an higher cause then his will and for nothing that is alwaies vnderstood per oppositum ens by his contrarie which is some thing Now because further we find in the creatures No discourse in God yet in his creatures one reason puls in another prius posterius a first and a second so that here we conceiue of God as though he did discourse of one thing from another The truth is he sees them simul and semel yet because for our capacitie he hath said he hath antica postica a face and back parts and his back-parts are reuealed vnto vs by a prius and posterius a first a last we giue sapience vnto God which is of all coÌ„clusions and diductions from their true fountaines Againe because the Lord hath set an order and contriued euery thing most fitly and conueniently for time place and person we call him a prudent God And as he hath most substantially effected all things we call it great art and skill Now all this cannot be without the good will and pleasure of our God which respecting himselfe makes himselfe the chiefe good and therefore he made the world for no neede he had of it Secondly in respect of the creatures bearing his image they were all of them good yea and very good if all were done 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by his good pleasure or according thereunto then is God the most free agent because first most absolute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 propriè and therefore Arminius blasphemes against God in saying that God doth worke most necessarily because he hath no libertie of will as well to euill as to good for saies he that which is onely vnto good hath no freedome but necessitie thereunto He knows not that liberum arbitrium free-will belongs to counsel and that cause that can worke by counsell hath free will For arbitrium belongs to reason liberum to will and therefore free-will Free-will a wit and a will or a â—â—lling wittines is nothing but a willing wittinesse and that is counsell To doe willingly is the worke of the wil and to doe wittingly is of the wit or vnderstanding Thus then you haue heard the concourse of God with his creature the creature depending must be gouerned beeing gouerned must obey obeying must obserue his rule and yet beeing mutable may leaue off to giue due respect vnto it and this non attendentia makes him slippe out of Gods way into his owne as may plainly be seene by the first sinne where the Law offered his concourse but man denied his Againe you see how God doth decree in himselfe and therefore first we are to know that God in decreeing follows no creature directa
Sathan is a worker beside his owne peculiar manner of tempting which is possession or a more liberty and freedome to the tempted of sorrow and despaire and quicke dispatch of themselues For comfort of the godly I will instance a little in these lesser temptations and then I wil inlarge them to the wicked whose cause is desperate Of our owne natures spring the temptations which rise of the roote of originall sinne The spring and fountaine of all temptations without any forraine instigation from the world whatsoeuer is either a baite of pleasure or fright of terror which increase the actuall sinnes springing frō the originall roote and lay as it were compasse and powreth on water to that vngracious stock to make it grow the faster Now all these temptations are not of that dangerous nature that this is of here must we attend with patience the issue which not onely is certen but also shal come in the best time The corporall inhabiting of Sathan is the greatest fullest of terror and despaire that can befal the godly yet the historie of the deeds and sayings of Christ the writing of the Euangelists do testifie of whole legions dispossessed of that habitation by the power of Christ mercifully extended vpon such miserable captiues which examples serue against like times of affliction that we giue not ouer hope though millions of deuills should possesse vs within enuiron vs without but knowe his power to be aboue all force of the enemy and his mercie farre surmounting Sathans malice therefore Gods children haue no cause in this sort to feare nor haue any shadow of ground wheron they should resolue against themselues vpon the point of reprobation but that all these molestations and terrours which they now indure are temptations rather of their father for good and profit then grounded resolutions of such lamentable issue Againe The order of the deuill in drawing Gods elect into Atheisme and so on concerning his soule religion or faith for more praticular examination I find by daily experience that these are as well the operations of phansie from melancholie as of conscience for sinne that methode of which temptation I find for the most part to runne in this order First to call into question whether there be any God or no for melancholie is a disputing humor Secondly when reason hath mastered that then the second question is about the immortalitie of the soule When that again is conquered there enters a third question whether we professe the true religion or no. When that is expelled the fourth question that maketh the greatest tumult in the soule is whether wee haue any part or portion in that which it promiseth Here the deuill is exceeding busie for if this be resolued on he is wholly cast out and hath nothing further to trouble vs withall Any of the former doubts would haue sunke our soules for if no God then why should I abstaine from my sinfull pleasures If againe no refurrection then why should I vexe my selfe in this world If my religion be false then must I haue a new twenty to one but I change amisse and therfore I wil be of no religion but when I shall begin to thinke I haue no faith in Gods promises Whether melancholie be the affliction of conscience then alas what shall comfort me Therefore consider these questions first whether the conscience of sinne and the afflictions thereof be melancholy or not secondly what is the differēce thirdly the afflictions of mind to what persons they befall and by what meanes fourthly what may be the consolation And so from this setting before the eies of the conscience only in appearance I will proceed to the reall and that which the Lord will do to the hypocrite in this place For the first Difference betwixt them the affliction of conscience is quite another thing then melancholy as may appeare out of the second question by the differences First in the causes 1. Causes the one is a meere fancie without all true and iust ground and is onely raised vpon disorder or humour in the fancie and rashly deliuered to the heart which vpon naturall credulitie fareth in passion as if it were indeede whereof the fancie giueth a false alarum But the other is a sorrow and feare vpon cause and that the greatest cause that worketh miserie vnto man Secondly 2. Effects in the effects In that of conscience the bodie is ofttimes in firme state of health perfect in complexion and perfect in shape and all symmetrie of his parts the humours in quantity qualitie not exceeding nor wanting their naturall proportion but in the other the complexion is depraued obstructions spoile the course of humour and spirit whereby the blood becomes ouer-grosse thicke and impure and nature so disordered that diuerse melancholike persons haue iudged themselues strange creatures as historie will plainly record Thirdly 3. Subiect in the subiect The senses in the other both inward and outward are ofttimes perfect the imagination sound the heart wel compact and resolute and this excepted want no courage but in the other both inward sense and outward are too feebled the fancie ouertaken with ghastly fumes of melancholy and the whole force of the spirit closed vp in the dungeon of melancholy darkenesse imagineth all darke blacke and full of feare their hearts are either ouertender and reare and so easily admit the passion or ouer close of nature serue more easily to imprison the cheerefull spirit the causes of comfort to the rest of the body Hence they are faint hearted without occasion onely driuen with the tide of that humour to feare euen in the middest of securitie 4 From the originall Fourthly they differ in the fountaine and originall of them the one begins in the minds apprehension the other in the distempered humour which deluding the organicall actions abuseth the mind and draweth it into erroneous iudgement 5 Cure through false testimonie of the outward report Fiftly in the meanes of cure the one is helped by no medicine no purgation no cordiall or balme except the balme of Gilead are able to assure the afflicted soule trembling heart panting vnder the terrors of God hell death and damnation But in melancholy passions the vaine opened neesing powder or Bearefoot ministred to expell the fumes in the braine cordialls of pearle saphyres and rubies with such like recomfort the heart throwne downe and appaled with phantasticall feare 6. End Sixtly they differ in the ende in the one the perill is not of bodie and corporall actions but of foule and bodie to be cut off from the life of God from the sweet influence of his fauour the fountaine of all happinesse and eternall felicitie Here then the cause is the seueritie of Gods iudgement summoning the guiltie conscience the subiect is the sinfull soule apprehending the terror thereof which is for euer and euer the issue is eternall punishment satisfactorie to