passages of Scripture which agree with this Idea we correct the sence of some other places which ascribe unto God members or passions like unto ours So when we wou'd speak exactly of the manner of Gods acting in the order of Nature or grace we ought to explain the passages which make him act as a man or a particular cause by that Idea which we have of his wisdom and his goodness and by other places of Scripture which are agreable to this Idea For in conclusion if the Idea which we have of God permits nay obliges to say that he does not cause every drop of rain to fall by particular wills tho this sentiment is authorized by the natural sence of some places of Scripture there is the like necessity to think that notwithstanding certain authorities of the same Scripture God does not give to some sinners by particular wills all those good motions which are of no effect to them and yet to several others wou'd be effectual because otherwise it seems impossible to me to make the Holy Scripture agree either with reason or with its self as I think I have proved LIX If I thought that what I have already said was not sufficient to convince considering persons that God acts not by particular wills as particular causes or limited understandings do I should proceed to shew that there are few truths whereof more proofs may be given supposing it granted that God governs the World and that the Nature of HEATHEN PHILOSOPHERS is but a Chimaera For in truth nothing is done in the World which doth not prove this sentiment Miracles only excepted which nevertheless wou'd not be Miracles different from the effects which are called natural if it was true that God ordinarily acts by particular wills since Miracles are not such but because they happen not according to general Laws Thus do Miracles suppose these Laws and prove the sentiment which I have laid down but as for ordinary effects they clearly and directly demonstrate general Laws or Wills For example if a stone be let fall upon the head of one that passes by the stone will always fall with equal swiftness without distinguishing either the piety or the quality the good or evil dispositions of the passenger If any other effect be examined we shall see the same constancy in the action of the cause which produces it But no effect proves that God acts by particular wills tho men often imagine that God works Miracles every moment for their sakes Since the way by which they wou'd have God to act is agreable to ours since it flatters self-love which refers all things to its self since it comports well with the ignorance we are in of the combination of occasional causes which produce extraordinary effects it naturally enters into the mind when we do not sufficiently study Nature and consult with attention enough the abstracted Idea of an infinite Wisdom of an Universal Cause of a Being infinitely perfect Additions Let me be permitted to desire of the Reader that he do meditate some time upon this first Discourse before he reads that which follows The Second Discourse Of the Laws of Grace in particular and of the Occasional Causes which Govern and Determin their Efficacy First Part. Of the Grace of Jesus Christ Additions Before this 2d Dis read 3d. C. of 2d P. of Search after Truth and the Expli of the same C. where the Author opposes the Efficacy of pretended second causes I Have proved in the First Discourse the necessity of Occasional Causes in the Order of Grace as well as in that of Nature and I don't think that which I have written can be distinctly understood but it must be granted But now I am about to prove by those arguments which Faith supplies that Jesus Christ is this cause Since this is of the greatest consequence clearly to understand the principles of Religion and to make us draw near with confidence to the true Propitiatory or the occasional cause which never fails to determine the efficacy of the general Law of Grace I think I may require the Reader to Meditate upon this Second Discourse with all diligence and without prejudice I. Since there is none but God who acts immediately and by himself upon Spirits who produces in them all the different Modifications whereof they are capable it is he alone who enlightens our minds and inspires us with certain sentiments which determine our divers wills Thus there is none but God who can as the * By the true cause I understand the Cause which Acts by its own strength true cause produce grace in our Souls For the principle of all the regular motions of our love is necessarily either knowledge which teaches us or a sentiment which convinces us that God is our happiness since we never begin to love any object if we do not either clearly see by the light of Reason or confusedly feel by the taste of pleasure that the object is good I mean capable of rendring us more happy than we are II. But seeing all men are engaged in Original sin and all even by their nature infinitely below God it is only J. Christ who by the dignity of his Person and the holiness of his Sacrifice could have access to his Father reconcile us to him and merit his favours for us Thus it is J. C. only who cou'd be the Meritorous cause of Grace These truths are agreed on But we do not seek after the cause which Produces Grace by its proper efficacy nor that which merits it by his sacrifice and good works we seek after that which regulates and determines the efficacy of the general cause that which may be called the second particular and occasional III. For that the general cause may act by general Laws or Wills and that his action may be regular constant and uniform it is absolutely necessary that there be an occasional cause which determines the efficacy of these Laws and serves to establish them If the percussion of bodies or some such thing did not determine the EFFICACY of general LAWS of the Communication of motions it would be necessary that God should move bodies by particular wills The Laws of the union of the Soul and Body are made efficacious only by the changes which happen in each of these substances For if God should make the Soul feel a pungent pain tho the body was not pricked or if the brain shou'd not be moved as if the body was pricked he wou'd not act by the general Laws of the union between Soul and body but by a particular will If it shou'd rain upon the Earth any other ways but by the necessary consequence of the general Laws of the communication of motions the rain and the fall of each drop that composes it would be the effect of a particular will Insomuch that if order did not require that it should rain this will would be altogether unworthy of God It is therefore
be a general Law that bodies should be moved according to the different wills of Angels or any other such like it is plain that this body might be moved tho it was not struck since the particular will of any Angel according to this supposition might determine the will of the general cause to move it Thus we may be often assured that God acts by general wills but we can never be assur'd that he acts by particular wills even in the best attested miracles VI. Since we don't sufficiently know the divers combinations of occasionalc auses to discover whether such and such effects happen in consequence of their actions since we are not for example knowing enough to discern whether such a shower of rain be produc'd by the necessary consequence of the communication of motions or by a particular will we ought to judge that an effect is produced by a general will when it is plain that the cause is not designed for a particular end For the wills of intelligent beings have necessarily some end general wills one general end and particular a particular end Nothing is more evident For example tho I can't discover whether the rain which falls in a meadow falls there in consequence of general laws or by the particular will of God I have reason to think that it falls there in by a general will if I see that it falls as well upon the neighbouring Lands or into the River which runs by this Meadow as upon the Meadow its self For if GOD caused it to rain upon this Meadow by a particular good will which he has for the owner thereof this rain would not fall into the River where it is useless since it could not fall therein without a cause or a will in God which necessarily has some end VII But it is still much more reasonable to think that an effect is produced by a general will when the effect is contrary or else useless to the design which faith or reason teaches us the cause proposes to himself For Example the end which God proposes in the divers sensations which he gives to the soul when we taste different fruits is that we should eat those which are proper to nourish the body and reject others I suppose this to be so Therefore when God gives us a grateful sentiment at the time when we eat poison or fruits that are poisoned he does not act in us by particular wills We ought to judge thus for this grateful sentiment is the cause of our death and God does give us our sentiments that he may preserve our life by a suitable Nourishment I say again I suppose it thus for I onely speak in relation to Grace which God gives us doubtless for our Conversion so that it is plain that God does not dispence it to men by particular wills since it often renders us more culpable and more criminal and God cannot have such a fatal Design God therefore does not give us a grateful sentiment by particular wills when we eat poison'd fruit But since poison'd fruits excite in our brain motions like unto those which good fruits produce there God gives us the same sentiments by the general Laws which unite the soul to the body to the end that she may take care of its preservation In like manner God does not give to those who have lost an arm sentiments of grief relating to this arm but by a general will for it is useless to the body of this man for his soul to suffer grief in relation to an arm which he has not The same may be said of the motions which are produced in the body of a Man which commits any crime In short supposing we are obliged to think that God sends rain upon the Earth to make it Fruitful we cannot think that he distributes it by particular wills since it rains upon the Sands and the Sea as well as upon Cultivated ground and it often rains so much upon sound Land that the Corn thereby is spoiled and Mens labours made useless Thus it is certain that the rain which is useless and hurtful to the Fruits of the Earth are the necessary consequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions which God hath established to produce in the World the best effects supposing that which I here repeat that God intended not that the rain should make the Earth to become barren VIII In short when any thing happens which is very singular there 's reason to think that it is not produced by a general will nevertheless it is impossible to be assur'd thereof For Example * Supposing there was any Reason for the Author 's high Esteem of that Ceremony the Example serves his Purpose well enough In a Procession of the H. Sacrament it rains upon the Company but not upon the Altar-Cloath or those that carry it there is reason to think that this happens by a particular will of the universal cause Nevertheless we cannot be certain thereof since an occasional intelligent cause may have this particular design and thus determine the efficacy of the general Law to execute it IX When the marks which preceed are not sufficient ground for judging whether any effect be or be not produced by a general will yet we ought to think that it is produced by a general will if it be evident that an occasional cause is established for such like effects For example it rains to very good purpose in a Field we don't inquire whether it rains upon the High-ways We know not whether it be hurtful to the neighbouring grounds or no we also suppose that it does nothing but good and that the circumstances which accompany it are altogether agreeable to the design for which God would have it rain Nevertheless I say that we ought to suppose this rain produced by a general will if we know that God has established an occasional cause for such like effects For we ought not without necessity to have recourse unto Miracles We should suppose that God acts by the most simple ways and tho the owner of the Field ought to give thanks to God for this favour yet it ought not to be imagined that God has vouchsafed it to him after a Miraculous manner by a particular will The Master of the Field is bound to give thanks to God for the good which he has received since God foresaw and intended the good effect of this rain when he established the general Laws whereof it is a necessary consequence On the contrary if rain be sometimes hurtful to our Lands since God did not establish the Laws which make it rain to render them unfruitful a great drought being enough to make them barren it is plain that we ought to thank God and adore the wisdom of his providence even then when we do not feel the effects of the Laws which he hath appointed for our benefit X. In short tho we should not be assured by the circumstances
distributes to his Members those Graces which by his sacrifice he hath merited for his Church For my part I cannot comprehend how any one can doubt of these Reasons nor upon what foundation a Truth so very edifying and as ancient as the Religion of J. C. can be treated as a dangerous Novelty I grant my Expressions may be new but this is because they appear'd to me very proper distinctly to explain a truth which I could only have confusedly demonstrated by too general terms The words Occasional Causes and General Laws appear to me necessary to make those Philosophers for whom I wrote the Treatise of Nature and Grace distinctly comprehend that which the generality of Men are content to know only confusedly Since new Expressions are not dangerous but when they cover something which is equivocal or may occasion some thought contrary to Religion to arise in the mind I do not think that any candid persons and who are skill'd in St. Paul's Divinity will be offended because I explain my self after a particular manner since it tends only to make us adore the Wisdom of God and to unite us strictly unto J. C. Objection I. XIII It is objected against what I have said That neither Angels nor Saints of the Old Testament received Grace in consequence of the desires of the Soul of Jesus since this Holy Soul was not as yet and thus tho J. C. be the meritorious cause of all Graces he is not the occasional which distributes them to Men. Answer In respect of Angels I answer That there is some probability that Grace was given to them once only So that if we consider things in this respect I confess that nothing oblig'd the Wisdom of God to establish an occasional cause for the sanctification of Angels But if these blessed Spirits be considered as Members of the Body whereof J. C. is Head or if it be supposed that they were unequally assisted I believe there is reason to think that the diversity of their Graces came from him who-is Head of Angels as well as Men and that in this capacity he by his sacrifice not only merited all Graces which God gave to his Creatures but also diversly applied these same Graces to them by his different desires Since it cannot be denied that J. C. along time before he was born or could merit was the meritorious cause of Graces which were given to the Angels and Saints of the Old Testament it must in my opinion be granted that by his Prayers he might have been the occasional cause of the same Graces a long time before they were ask'd For there is no necessary relation between occasional causes and the time of their producing their effects and tho ordinarily these sorts of causes do produce their effects at the very time of their action nevertheless since their action is not efficacious in its self seeing its efficacy depends upon the will of the universal cause it is not necessary that it should actually exist that they may produce their effects Suppose for example That J. C. to day asks of his Father that such an one may receive such an assistance at certain times of his life the Prayer of J. C. will infallibly determine the efficacy of the general Will of God which is to save all Men in his Son This person shall receive these assistances tho the Soul of J. C. actually thinks of quite another thing and tho it should never more think of that which it desired for him Now the Prayer of J. C. which is already pass'd is not more present to his Father than the future for whatsoever happens in all times is equally present to God Thus since God loves his Son and knows that his Son will have such desires in respect of his Ancestors and the People of his own Nation and also in respect of Angels who were to enter into the Spiritual Edifice of his Church and compose the Body of which he is the Head he seems to have been obliged to accomplish the desires of his Son before they were made to the end that the Elect who were before his birth and whom he purchased by the merit of his sacrifice should as particularly belong to him as others and he should be their Head as truly as he is ours I confess it is convenient that meritorious and occasional causes should go before their effects rather than follow them and even order its self requires that these causes and their effects do exist at the same time For 't is clear that all merit should be presently rewarded and that every occasional cause should actually produce its effect provided that nothing hinder but that this may and ought to be so But since Grace was absolutely necessary to the Angels and to the Patriarchs it could not be differ'd As for the Glory and Reward of the Saints of the Old Testament seeing it might be delay'd it was expedient that God should suspend its accomplishment till J. C. was ascended into Heaven and made an High-Priest over the House of God and began to use the soveraign power of an occasional cause of all Graces which he had merited by his Labours upon Earth Thus we believe that the Patriarchs did not enter into Heaven till J. C. himself their Head their Mediator and their Fore-runner was therein entred Nevertheless tho it should be granted that God should not have appointed an occasional cause for all Graces given to the Angels and the Patriarchs I do not see how it can be concluded that at present J. C. does not dispense to the Body of the Church that Spirit which gives it increase and nourishment that he prays not for it or that his Desires or Prayers do not infallibly obtain their effect or in a word that he is not the occasional cause which applies those Graces to to Men which he has merited for them Before J. C. God gave Grace by particular Wills This I grant if it be desired the necessity of Order requires it the occasional Cause could not regularly be so soon establish'd the Elect were but very few But at present when the rain of Grace is generally sent upon all the World when it falls not as heretofore upon a very few Men of one chosen Nation when J. C. may or ought to be establish'd the occasional cause of the goods which he has merited for his Church what reason is there to believe that God should still work Miracles as often as he gives good Sentiments For certainly all that God does by particular Wills is a Miracle since it happens not by the general Laws which he has established and whose efficacy is determin'd by occasional causes But how can we think that to save Men he should work all those Miracles which are useless to their salvation I mean that he should give all those Graces which they resist because they are not proportioned to the actual strength of their concupiscence St. John teaches us that Christians receive
infinite Wisdom of its Author Additions I use the example of the irregularity of ordinary rain to prepare the mind for another rain which is not given to the merits of men no more than the common rain which falls equally upon Lands that are Sown as well as those that lie Fallow I suppose it to be easily comprehended that it is because the rain falls in consequence of natural Laws that it is so ill distributed in relation to the necessities of the Earth But I think I ought to advise that they who don 't distinctly remember the proofs which I have given in the Search after Truth that it is God who does all that he does not communicate his power unto Creatures but by making them the occasional causes of determining the efficacity of the general Laws by which he executes his designs in a way worthy of him I think I say I ought to advise these persons to read and meditate upon at least the first explication which is at the end of the third discourse for to do it well recourse ought to be had to those places wherein I demonstrate my Principles XV. In truth I am perswaded that the Laws of motion necessary to the production and conservation of the EARTH and of all the STARS in the HEAVENS are reduced to these two The first that Bodies in motion endeavour to continue their motion in a right Line The second that when two Bodies meet one another their motion is distributed from one to another proportionably to their bulk so that afterwards they may be mov'd with an equal celerity These two Laws are the cause of all the motions which make that variety of form which we admire in nature XVI I confess nevertheless Search after Truth in the last C. of Method that the second does not always seem to be observ'd in the experiments which may be made upon this subject but this is because we see only that which happens to Bodies that are visible and that we think not at all upon the Invisible that surround them which by the efficacy of the same Law make the spring of visible Bodies thereby obliging them to recoil and not observe this same Law I must not in this place explain this any further XVII Now these two Laws are so simple so natural and at the same time so fruitful that tho there were no other reasons to judge that nature observes them yet we should have cause to believe that they are appointed by him who always acts by the most simple wayes in whose Action there is nothing irregular and who proportions it so wisely with his Work that he does infinite marvels by a very few Practical Resolutions Additions It would require a whole Book to prove that which I say here concerning the fruitfulness of these two general laws of the communication of motion It will be easily seen that I speak not at all adventures by those who are exactly well acquainted with the Physical principles of Mon. des Cartes But this is not essential to my subject It is sufficient that the Laws of Nature are general These three Articles may be looked upon as a kind of parenthesis XVIII We must not judge of the general cause as of particulars of the Infinite Wisdom as of limited understandings God foreseeing all that should follow the natural Laws even before their establishment could not have established them to overturn them The Laws of Nature are constant and Immutable they are general for all times and all places Two Bodies of such a magnitude and such a swiftness striking upon one another will be reflected after the same manner now as heretofore If the rain falls upon certain grounds and the Sun burns up others if a season favourable to the Fruits of the Earth be succeeded by a Prost which destroys them if a Child comes into the world with a monstrous and useless head which grows out of his breast and makes him miserable it is not because God intended to produce these effects by particular wills but because he has established the Laws of the communication of motions of which these effects are necessary consequences Laws otherwise so simple and withal so fruitful that they produce all that we see beautiful in the world and in a little time repair the greatest Mortality and Dearth XIX He that having built an house and then undermines the Foundation discovers his ignorance he that plants a Vineyard and immediately pulls up that which had taken root shews his folly Because he that wills and wills not wants either understanding or constancy of mind But it can't be said that God acts either by caprice or thro' Ignorance when an Infant comes into the world with superfluous members which hinder him from living or when an Hail-Storm destroys the Fruit almost ripe Thus if God makes the Fruit to fall by a Storm before it is ripe it is not because he wills and wills not For God acts not by particular wills as particular causes do He has not established the Laws of communication of motions with a design to produce Monsters or to make the Fruits Fall before they be ripe he appointed these Laws by reason of their Foecundity and not their Barrenness Thus that which once he willed he wills still and in general the world for which he made these Laws shall subsist eternally Additions I have not here proved a Posteriori or by the effects that the general cause acts by general Wills or Laws whose efficacy is determined by the action of occasional or particular causes tho' these sorts of proofs are very many and undeniable 1. Because I supposed in the Advertisement to the Reader that he had read what I have written against the pretended efficacy of second causes 2. Because none can want these sort of proofs for every one knows that a body is never mov'd before it be struck and that it is never stricken without being mov'd Every one knows it is day when the Sun is risen and that it is night when it is set and that thus God produces the motion and the light in consequence of the general laws of nature 3. To conclude because the proofs a priorit taken from the nature of the cause tho more abstracted appear to me clearer stronger and more proper to the subject I Treat of For if I had not proved only by the effects that God does all that we see in nature by simple general uniform and constant ways it might be answered 'T is true but in grace he does quite otherwise he there does all by particular wills Whereas having proved by the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect that he does all that we see by simple ways since God does not bely himself this proves that he does by the like wayes all that we do not see Thus men begin to reflect that God must act after such a manner as comports with his Divine Attributes Nevertheless at the end of this first Discourse
God hath made the occasional causes of the efficacy of the general Laws of Grace For Faith teaches us that God hath given to his Son an absolute power over Men by making him the Head of his Church and this cannot be conceived if the different wills of J. C. be not followed by their effects For it is visible I should have no power over mine arm if it should move it self whether I would or no and if when I desire to move it it should remain as if it was dead and without motion XI J. C. has merited his Sovereign power over men and this quality of Head of the Church by the Sacrifice he offered upon Earth and after his Resurrection he took full possession of this right Ioh. VII 39. 'T is upon this account that he is now Sovereign Priest of future good things and that by his many intercessions he continually prays unto the Father in the behalf of men Heb. 7.25 Rom. 8.34 1 Joh. II. 1. Joh. XI 42. And seeing his desires are occasional causes his prayers are always heard his Father denies him nothing as the Scripture teaches us Nevertheless he must pray and desire that he may obtain For the occasional physical natural causes for all these words signifie the same thing have no power of themselves to do any thing and all creatures even J. C. himself considered as man are in themselves nothing but weakness and impotence Additions I don't think that hitherto there is any difficulty if it be not in this last Article where I say that J. C. prayeth unto his Father for there are some Persons whom this very much offends For I speak as St. Paul to the Romans and to the Hebrews and as Jesus Christ himself I will pray the Father and he shall give you another Comforter which is to be understood of J. C. after his resurrection according to these words of St. John The spirit was not yet given because Jesus was not yet glorified For the Spirit fell not upon the Apostles till Ten days after J. C. was entered into the Holy of Holies a Sovereign Priest of true good things In all these Articles I speak only of J. C. as to his humanity according to which he received all power in Heaven and Earth because all his prayers or his desires which certainly are in his power or otherwise he has no power are executed in consequence of his qualities as Sovereign Priest of the House of God King of Israel Architect of the Eternal Temple Mediator betwixt God and men Head of the Church or to speak like the Philosophers for whom I chiefly write this Treatise the occasional natural or distributive cause of Grace The cause which Determines the Efficacy of the general Law by which God wou'd save all men in his Son XII J. C. having then successively divers thoughts in relation to the divers dispositions whereof Souls in general are capable these divers thoughts are accompanyed with certain desires in relation to the Sanctification of these Souls Now these desires being the occasional causes of Grace they must pour it down upon those persons in particular whose dispositions resemble that upon which the Soul of J. C. actually thinks And this Grace must be so much the stronger and more abundant as these desires of J. C. are greater and more lasting XIII When a person considers any part of his body which is not form'd as it ought to be he has naturally certain desires in relation to this part and the use he desires to make of it in common life and these desires are followed by certain insensible motions of the animal Spirits which tend to give that proportion or disposition to this part which we desire it shou'd have When the Body is altogether form'd and the flesh firm the motions change nothing in the construction of the parts they can only give them certain dispositions which are called Corporeal habits But when the body is not altogether form'd and the flesh is very soft and tender these motions which accompany the desires of the Soul do not only give the body certain particular dispositions but may also change the construction thereof This sufficiently appears by Children in the Womb for they are not only moved with the same passions as there Mothers but they also receive the marks of these passions in their bodies from which yet the Mothers are always free XIV The Mystical body of J. C. is not yet a perfect man Eph. IV. 13. it will not be so till the end of the world J. C. forms it continually for it is from the Head the whole body joyned together receives nourishment by the efficacy of his influence according to the measure which is proper to every one to the end it may be form'd and edified in love These are the truths which St Paul teaches us Now since the soul of J. C. has no other action but the divers motions of its heart 't is necessary that these desires be succeeded by the influence of grace which only can form J. C. in his Members and give them that beauty and proportion which must be the eternal object of the divine Love XV. The divers motions of the soul of J. C. being the occasional causes of Grace we ought not to be surprised if it be sometimes given to great sinners or those who make no use of it For the soul of J. C. designing to raise a Temple of vast extent and infinite beauty may desire that Grace may be given to the greatest sinners and if in this moment J. C. thinks actually for example upon Covetous persons the Covetous shall receive Grace Or else J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain merit for the construction of his Church which is not ordinarily acquired but by those who suffer certain persecutions of which the passions of men are the natural principle In a word J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain character for bringing to pass certain effects in his Church may in general apply himself to them by this application bestow upon them the Grace which sanctifies In like manner as the mind of an Architect thinks in general upon square stones for example when these sort of stones are actually necessary for his building XVI But as the soul of J. C. is not a general cause there is reason to think that it often has particular desires in respect of certain particular persons When we pretend to speak exactly of God we ought not to consult our selves and make him act as we do we ought to consult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect and make him act according to this Idea but when we speak of the action of the soul of Jesus we may consult our selves we may suppose it to act as particular causes would act which yet are joyned to eternal wisdom We have reason for example to believe that the calling of St. Paul was the effect of the efficacy of a particular
wherein he finds the Work he is to build according to the designs he continually forms according to the beauty wherewith he intends to Adorn his Church Now this way after which I suppose J.C. might act wou'd be sufficient to justifie Gods Conduct and make it in general comprehended whence it is that the rain of Grace is sent down without effect upon hardned hearts at such unseasonable times after such an unequal manner and almost always so little answerable unto the concupiscence of those who receive it For this reason I ought not to enter particularly upon the fall of the Just under an Head who has so much love for sinners Nevertheless I shall at present endeavour to explain it to satisfie the most difficult Whilst J.C. acts as Architect he only regulates his desires according to his designs It is indifferent to him to have in his Temple Paul or John if both the one and the other resemble the Idea which determines his desires As it is indifferent to an Architect who needs only a square stone or a pillar to have that which is on the right hand or on the left if they be altogether alike Thus the desire of J. C. bestowing Grace which moves men to come unto him and cast themselves in his hands those who come first and are most watchful are they whom he employs in his building But men having once followed the motion of Grace I think it is certain that J. C. is advertised of their dispositions and that when he has plac'c them in his Temple or made them parts of his Body no need no temptation happens to them which he has not notice of and which he doth not provide for When Bread is once become part of our flesh it cannot be touched without hurting us When a stone is wrought and laid in the building it cannot be broken without offending the Architect J. C. considered as Head of the Church is therefore advertised of all our necessities even before he particularly desires to know them Herein his Father prevents his Charity It seems to me that order requires this Perhaps he may even actually know the effect which the assistance he gives us will have even before it be given and this is that which makes all the difficulty For J. C. loves the just he tenderly cherishes those who are united unto him by Charity Now he has notice of a Temptation which solicits one of his Members and he may give him Victorious Graces If therefore he foresaw that with such assistance the Just tho he might have overcome would nevertheless be vanquished Why did he not augment this assistance He desires the just should be Victorious Why therefore doth he not proportion the means to the end if he actually knew the relation of the means to the end For my part I had rather believe that J. C. as man or the occasional cause of Grace doth not actually know the future determination of the will of the just to whom he gives assistance than think that he in any sense wants Goodness and Charity for his Members I grant that J.C. as man may know all the future determination of our wills as I know that two and two are four But I doubt whether he actually thinks thereon and I do not believe that he always thinks thereon that he may regulate the distribution of Graces according to this knowledge These are my Reasons J. C. does not see in the Word precisely as the Word whether the just will follow or will not follow the motion of his Grace He cannot know it unless God discover it to him by a sort of revelation as I have already said Now it seems to me that he ought not always to demand what effect his Grace will have because it seems clear to me that Order which is his Rule and his Law doth not require that he shou'd proportion his gifts to mens future negligence but only to their necessities for his own proper designs J.C. must act as man or as the occasional cause that God may build up his Church by the most simple ways Now none but God can dive in mens hearts and see the free determinations of their wills J. C. therefore before he acts ought not to desire of his Father to reveal to him whether the just being tempted will or will not be vanquished by such or such a degree of Grace For thus his action would not bear the Character of an occasional cause If God should by himself give unto the just Grace to vanquish Temptations being by nature Searcher of Hearts his Conduct ought to comport with this Character and if the just should be vanquished it might be believed that God designed to forsake him But Order requiring that J. C. as Man should act as Man his action is not to bear the Character of Searcher of Hearts For God intending to make his wisdom his fore-sight the infinite extension of his knowledge to appear in the construction of his great work he was obliged to form it by the most simple ways For in conclusion what marvel would it be if J. C. should make a beautiful work and save even all men if on the one side he acted by particular wills and on the other his action did not carry in it the character of an Occasional cause but of an infinite Wisdom certainly GOD ought not to appoint an Occasional Cause if this Occasional cause must act as God and not as man He ought to do all immediately by himself But how shou'd we have justified his wisdom and goodness seeing so many Monsters among Bodies so many irregularrities among Spirits so much disproportion in his action in relation to his Attributes so much rain upon the Sand and in the Sea so many Graces given to hardned Hearts Graces which serve only to make them more culpable and more criminal Ezek. 33.2 Eccles. 15.12 which yet cou'd not have been given with a design so unworthy of Gods goodness who desires the Conversion of sinners and to whom the wicked were never necessary If that which I have said of the fall of the just and the manner after which Jesus Christ forms his Church be clearly understood perhaps it would be found to be probable enough But I think I ought to say that this is no ways necessary in order to defend my principles and the manner by which I have justified the wisdom and goodness of God For it may be that God has given to J. C. as man a particular kind of knowledge and power in relation to his design by establishing him the occasional cause of the general Law of Grace To make my thought understood by a comparison let us imagine that as soon as Adam was formed God acquainted the Angels that he had united a Spirit to a Body to the end that it might take care thereof without informing them any thing of the Laws of this union According to this supposition the Angels reasoning according to their
Ideas would doubtless have imagined that the first man had no sentiment of Objects and that to eat and nourish himself he studied to know the consiguration of the parts of the fruits of Paradise the relation they might have with those of his Body thereby to judge whether they would have been proper for his nourishment In all probality they would have believed that to walk Adam had thought on the Nerves which answered to his Legs and that he had continually conveyed to them such a quantity of Animal spirits to remove them and thus they would have judged of other Functions by which Mans life is preserved We very near do the same thing as to the manner in which J. C. forms his Church We will needs judge thereof according to our Ideas and yet perhaps we understand nothing thereof God united the Soul to the Body of the first Man after a much more wise and real manner than the Angels themselves could imagine For God advertised him by sentiments after a short and undoubted manner of what he ought to do and this without dividing as little as might be the capacity which he had of thinking upon his Sovereign good For then his Senses kept silence whensoever he desired it Man may still walk and meditate both together but the first man upon all occasions might and also ought without withdrawing himself from the presence of God to give unto his Body all that which was necessary for it Why may not God at present therefore give unto J. C. certain kinds of compendious knowledge whereof we have no Idea that he may thereby better facilitate the construction of his Church so that the relation which he has to us may not divide the capacity which he has of seeing God and enjoying his happiness God appointed certain general Laws of the union of Soul and Body that the first Man might preserve his Life without applying himself over-much to particular Objects Why may not God by making his Son the Head of the Church have established such like general Laws It may be this ought to have been so that God might act in such a manner as agrees best with the divine attributes and perhaps that apparent irregularity with which Grace is given unto men is in part a consequence of this marvelous invention of eternal wisdom Assuredly it may be the first Adam was even in this a figure of the second and that J.C. besides his knowledge and desires which we cannot deny to him without impiety hath still compendious ways worthy of an infinite wisdom by which as we by our sentiments and passions he acts in his mystical body without being diverted from his Sovereign good which he loves too much to lose the sight of or remove himself from its presence There are several passages in Scripture may countenance this opinion but I might well be accounted rash should I pretend to establish it as a point which ought to be believed That which I say may be true but I ought not to assert it as true before I am well convinced of it my self If this be not it may be or some such like thing as for my part I have not justified the Wisdom and Goodness of God but by leaving to J. C. as Architect of the Eternal Temple that we cannot take from him without offering violence to Reason and good Sense But I am glad to know that there are several ways of answering those who oppose the Quality which I give to J. C. of an occasional cause which determines the efficacy of the good will of God in respect to men and that all the Objections which can be made against me in this can upon no other account be hard to be resolved but because we are ignorant of a great many things which it would be necessary to know for the clearing them up XVII The divers desires of the Soul of J. C. giving Grace hence we clearly apprehend whence it is that it is not equally given to all men and that it falls upon certain persons at one time more than at another Since the Soul of J. C. does not think at the same time of sanctifying all men it has not at the same time all the desires of which it is capable Thus J. C. does not act upon his Members after a particular manner but by successive influences like as our Soul does not at the same time remove all the Muscles of our Bodies For the Animal Spirits go equally and successively into our Members according to the different impressions of Objects the divers motions of our passions and different Desires which we freely form in our selves XVIII It is true that all the just continually receive the influence of the Head that gives them life and that when they act by the Spirit of J. C. they merit and receive new graces tho it be not necessary that the Soul of J. C. has any particular desires which may be the occasional causes of them for the order which requires that all Merit be rewarded is not in God an Arbitrary Law it is a Necessary Law which depends not upon any occasional cause But tho he that has done a Meritorious Action may be rewarded for it and yet the soul of J. C. have actually no desires in respect of him nevertheless it is certain that he has not merited Grace but by the dignity and holiness which the Spirit of J. C. communicated to him For men are not acceptable to God and do nothing that is good John 15.4 but so far as they are united to his Son by Charity Additions Altho I say order requires that the Just Merit Grace it must not be understood of all Graces but only of those which are absolutely necessary for the vanquishing unavoidable temptations But God is faithful who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able says St. Paul Now Order requires that God should be faithful Quis autem dicat eum qui jam coepit credere ab illo in quem credit non mereri says St. Augustine de Praedest Sanct. Ch. 2. The just therefore may merit Grace by the assistance of Grace but he cannot in strictness merit those Graces which are not absolutely necessary for him This depends upon the good will of J. C. as he is the occasional cause of the order of Grace And in strictness good works perhaps merit only the reward of happiness But it is not necessary that I should stand to explain the different ways of understanding merit XIX Moreover it must be confest that they who observe the councels of J. C. by the esteem which they have for them and by the fear they have of future Punishments do solicite as I may say by their obedience the love of J. C. to think of them tho as yet they should act only by self-love But all their actions are not occasional causes neither of Grace since they are not infallibly attended therewith nor even of the
by his Body as the occasional or natural cause receiving a great number of divers sentiments he might sacrifice himself as an Holocaust in Honour of the true good by suffering afflictions and the privation of sensible Pleasures XXXIV That I may not leave in some Persons an imperfect Idea of the Grace of J. C. I think I ought further to say that it doth not consist in delectation alone for all Grace of sentiment is the Grace of J. C. Now of this sort of Grace there are several kinds and of each kind infinite degrees God sometimes gives disgust and bitterness to the objects of our passions he weakens their sensible perswasives or causes us to have an horror of them and this kind of grace of sentiment has the same effect as delectation It re-establishes and fortifies our Liberty it puts us almost in Equilibrio so that by this means we are in a condition of following our Knowledge in the motion of our love For to put a Ballance in a perfect Equilibrio or to change the inclination it is not necessary to increase the Weights which are too weak it is sufficient to take something from those which weigh too much Thus there are Graces of Sentiment of several kinds and each kind is capable of infinite degrees for there are Pleasures Horrors and Disgusts greater and lesser to infinity That which I have hitherto said of delectation may be easily applyed to other kinds of Graces of Sentiment I only took pleasure or delectation as a particular example that I might explain my self more clearly and without equivocation If there be any other principle of our determinations to good besides the Grace of Sentiment and that of Knowledge I confess to me they are altogether unknown and it is upon this account that I have explained the effects which are necessary to the conversion of the heart only by these two Principles lest I should have been accused of having spoken in general terms and such as only excite confused Ideas which I have avoided with all possible care But tho I have explained my self only in such terms as all Men understand since there is no person who knows not that Knowledge and Sentiment of good are the principles of our determinations nevertheless I don't pretend to oppose those who not making use of these clear Ideas say in general that God works in the souls of Men their Conversion by a particular action different perhaps from all that I have said here * First Explicat of the Search after Truth and elsewhere that God doth in us Since I experience nothing in my self but Motion towards good in general and Knowledge or Sentiment which determines this Motion I ought to suppose nothing else if by this alone I can give a reason of all that which the Scripture and the Councils have defined concerning the subjects of which I treat In a word I am sure that Knowledge and Sentiment are the Principles of our determinations but I declare that I know not whether there may be something else of which I have no knowledge XXXV Beside Grace efficacious in it self and the Grace the effect of which depends intirely upon the good dispositions of the Mind besides the Grace of Sentiment and the Grace of Knowledge the Just also have Habitual Grace which makes them agreeable to God and puts them in a condition of doing actions Meritorious of Salvation This Grace is Charity the Love of God the Love of Order Love which is not properly Charity if it be not stronger and greater than all other Loves As it is Pleasure which ordinarily produces the love of the object which cause it or seems to cause it so it is the delectation of Grace which produces the love of God It is the enjoyment of sensible pleasures which encreases Concupiscence It is also the Grace of Sentiment which augments Charity Concupiscence diminishes by the privation of sensible Pleasures and then Charity is easily preserved and encreased Charity also diminishes by the privation of the actual Grace of J. C. and Concupiscence is easily encreased and fortified For these two loves of Charity and Concupiscence continually engage one another and strengthen themselves by the weakness of their Enemy XXXVI All that proceeds from Charity is agreeable to God but Charity does not always act in the just themselves To the end it may act it ought at least to be enlightned for Knowledge is necessary to determine the motion of Love Thus the Grace necessary for every good work relating to Salvation is the Grace of Sentiment in those who begin their Conversion it is the Grace of Knowledge it is some motion of Faith and Hope in those who are animated by Charity For the Just may do good works without the Grace of delectation yet they have always need of some actual succours to determine the motion of their Charity But tho Charity without Delectation is sufficient to vanquish many temptations nevertheless the Grace of Sentiment is necessary in many occasions For Men cannot without the continual assistance of the second Adam resist the continual action of the first They cannot persevere in righteousness if they be not often assisted by the particular Grace of J. C. which produces augments and sustains Charity against the continual efforts of Concupiscence XXXVII The effects of Pleasure and all the sentiments of the Soul depend a thousand ways upon the actual dispositions of the Mind The same weight has not always the same effects Its action depends upon the machine by which it is applyed with respect to the contrary weights If a ballance be unequally hung the force of the weights being unequally apply'd the weaker may turn the stronger It is the same of the weights of pleasure they act one upon another and determine the motion of the Soul as they are differently applyed Pleasure must have more effect in one who has already a love to the Object which causes the pleasure than in him who has an aversion to it or who loves the opposite goods Pleasure forcibly determines him who clearly sees or lively imagines the advantages of the good which seems to produce it and it acts weakly upon the mind of him who knows this good only confusedly or contemns it In conclusion pleasure acts with all its force in him who blindly follows that which flatters Concupiscence and may perhaps have no effect in him who has attain'd to some habit of suspending the Judgment of his love XXXVIII Now the different degrees of Knowledge Charity Concupiscence and the degrees of Liberty being every moment combin'd after infinite ways with the different degrees of actual pleasures and these pleasures not having their effect but according to the relation which they have to the dispositions of the mind and heart It is plain that no finite mind can judge with any assurance what effect any particular Grace will produce in us For besides the Combination of all that which concurs to make it efficacious
or to produce its effect contains something infinite This Combination is not like the springs and machines whose effects are always infallible and necessary Thus no spirit can discover what passes in the heart of man but God being infinitely wise it is plain that he clearly knows all the effects which may result from the mixture and combination of all things and that diving into the heart of man he insallibly discovers even the effects which depends upon the free act or rather consent of our wills Nevertheless I confess that I cannot conceive how God can discover the Consequences of those Actions which have not their infallibility from his absolute degrees But I cannot prevail with my self to engage in Metaphysicks at the expence of morality and to maintain Opinions contrary to my inward sentiment as undeniable Truths or to speak to the ear a certain Language which in my Opinion says nothing clearly to the mind I know very well that Objections may be made which I may not be able clearly and evidently to Answer but this perhaps may be because even these Objections themselves may be full of obscurity and darkness Because they are grounded upon our ignorance of the properties of the Soul because as I have * Expli of the 7. Ch. lib. 2 part 3. elsewhere proved we have not a clear Idaea of what we are and because that which is in us which suffers its self to be overcome by those determinations which are not invincible is altogether unknown to us To Conclude if I cannot clearly Answer these Objections * First Explicat I can Answer them by other which yet seem more difficult to resolve I can from the principles opposite to mine draw more hard and invidious Consequences than those which are pretended to follow from that Liberty which I suppose to be in us But I will not enter particularly upon this because I take no pleasure in walking in the dark and leading others into precipices The First Explication OF THE TREATISE OF Nature and Grace What it is to Act by General Wills and what by Particular I. I Say that God acts by General Wills when he acts in consequence of the General Laws he has established For Example I say that God acts in me by General Wills when he makes me feel pain by the prick of a pin because in consequence of the general and efficacious Laws of the Union of Soul and Body which he hath established he makes me feel grief or pain when my body is indisposed In like manner when one bowl strikes upon a second I say God moves this last by a General Will because he moves it in consequence of the general and efficacious Laws of the communication of motions God having in general appointed that whensoever two bodies strike upon one another the motion should be divided betwixt them in certain proportions and 't is by the efficacy of this General Will that bodies should move one another II. On the contrary I say that God acts by particular wills when the efficacy of his will is not determined by any general law to produce the effect Thus supposing that God makes me feel the pain of the pricking of a pin tho there happens not in my body or in any other Creature any change which determines him to act in me according to general Laws I say that then God acts by particular wills Likewise supposing that a body begins to move without being struck upon by another or without any change happening in the will of any Spirits or any other Creature which determines the efficacy of any general Laws I say then that God moves this body by a particular will III. According to these definitions it appears that I am so far from denying providence that on the contrary I suppose that it is God who acts all in all that the nature of the Pagan Philosophers is a Chimaera and that properly speaking that which is called Nature is nothing else but the general Laws which God has establish'd for the making or preserving his Work after the most simple ways by an action always uniform constant perfectly worthy of infinite wisdom and the universal cause That which I here suppose tho certain for reasons which I have elsewhere given is not absolutely necessary to prove what I intend For if it be suppos'd that God has communicated his power to Creatures and that bodies which are about us have a real and true force by which they may act upon our soul and render it happy or miserable by pleasure or grief and that bodies in motion have in themselves a certain entity which is called a Quality imprinted which they give to those they meet and give it with that readiness and uniformity which they suppose it will be equally easie for me to prove that which I design for then the efficacy of the action of the Concourse of the general cause will be necessarily determined by the action of the particular cause God for example will be oblig'd according to these principles to afford his concourse to a body at the moment wherein it strikes upon others But this body may communicate motion to them and this is certainly to act by vertue of a general Law Nevertheless I don't reason according to this supposition because I believe it altogether false as I have shewed in the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book of The Search after Truth in the Explication of the same Chapter and elsewhere These Truths supposed I here subjoyn the Marks by which it may be known whether an effect be produc'd by a general will or by a particular Marks by which it may be judged whether an effect is produced by a General or by a Particular Will IV. When we see an effect immediately follow the action of an occasional cause we ought to judge that this effect is produced by the efficacy of a general will A Body is immediately moved after it is struck the striking of bodies upon one another is the occasional cause therefore this body is mov'd by a general will A Stone falls upon the head of a Man and kills him and this stone falls as others do I mean that its motion is continued almost according to Arithmetical Proportion 1 3 5 7 9 c. This supposed I say that it is moved by the efficacy of a general will or according to the Laws of the communication of motion as it is easie to demonstrate V. When we see an effect produc'd and yet the occasional cause which is known to us is not concern'd therein we have reason to think that this effect is produc'd by a paticular will supposing that this effect be not visibly unworthy of its cause as I shall shew hereafter For example when a body is mov'd without being struck upon by another it is very probable that this body is moved by a particular will nevertheless we are not altogether assur'd thereof For supposing there should
conformable to Order It is therefore necessary that he continually change desires infinite wisdom is only able to prescribe general Laws for executing his designs Now seeing the suture world must subsist eternally and be infinitely more perfect than the present World it was expedient that God should establish an intelligent occasional cause and enlightned with divine wisdom to the end that it might correct the defects which necessarily happen in works formed by general Laws The striking of Bodies upon one another which determines the efficacy of the general Laws of Nature is an occasional cause without Understanding and without Liberty Thus it cannot be but there must be Defects and Monsters in the World which Defects it would be unworthy of the Wisdom of God to correct by particular wills But J. C. being an intelligent occasional cause enlightned by Divine Wisdom and capable of particular wills as the particular necessities of his work require it is plain that the future World will be infinitely more Perfect than the present that the Church shall be without deformity as Scripture teaches us and that this work will be altogether worthy of the esteem of GOD himself After this manner it is that the Eternal Wisdom renders as I may say to the Father that which it had taken from him for not permitting him to act by particular wills it seems as if it rendred him impotent But being incarnate it left God to act as became him by the more simple and general ways Ut innotescat principalibus potestatibus in coelestibus per Ecclesiam multisormis Sapientia Dei 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet produced a work in which the most enlightned understanding shall never be able to observe the least defect XV. After having proved by the Authority of Scripture that the divers motions of the Soul of J. C. are the occasional causes which determine the general efficacy of the Law of Grace by which God would save all Men in his Son 't is necessary further in general to prove by reason that we ought not to believe that God in the Order of Grace acts by particular wills For tho by Reason without Faith it cannot be demonstrated that God has established the wills of a God man as the occasional cause of his gifts it may nevertheless be known that he does not distribute them to Men by particular wills and that by two ways a Priori and a Posteriori that is to say by the Idea which we have of God and by the effects of Grace for there is nothing but proves this Truth See the proof a Priori A wise Being must act wisely God cannot falsifie himself His actions must bear the Character of his Attributes Now God knows every thing and foresees every thing his understanding has no bounds Therefore his manner of acting must bear the character of an infinite understanding Now to chuse occasional causes and establish general Laws for executing any work denotes a knowledge infinitely more extended than to change wills every moment or to act by particular wills God therefore executes his designs by general Laws the efficacy of which is determined by the occasional causes Certainly it requires a more comprehensive understanding to make a Watch which according to the Laws of Mechanism shall go always and regularly whether a Man carries it about with him or hangs it up or gives it what shake he will than to make one which cannot go truly if he who made it does not every moment change something in it according to the different postures in which he puts it For surely when there are a great many relations to compare and combine with one another there needs a greater understanding To see all the consequences which may happen from a general Law an insinite understanding is requisite but nothing of all this is to be foreseen when one changes his wills every moment Therefore to establish general Laws and chuse the most simple and at the same time the most fruitful is a way of acting worthy of him whose Wisdom has no bounds On the contrary to act by particular wills shews a limited understanding and which cannot compare the consequences or effects of causes less fruitful The same truth may further be demonstrated a Priori by some Attributes of God as his immutibility by which Mr. de Cartes proves that every thing in motion describes a right line and that there is always an equal quantity of motion in the World and other Truths But these proofs a Priori are too abstract to convince the generality of Men of the truth which I propose It is expedient to prove it by the signs which I have heretofore given for discerning the effects which are produced by particular wills from those which are the consequences of some general Law XVI God being infinitely wise neither wills nor does any thing without end Now Grace often falls upon hearts so disposed that it is unfruitsul Therefore it does not fall upon hearts by a particular will but only by a necessary consequence of general Laws for the same reason that rain falls upon the Sand and on the Sea as well as on Sown ground Tho God may punish sinners or make them more miserable than they are he cannot design to make them more culpable or more criminal Now Grace sometimes renders Persons more culpable and more criminal and God certainly knows that according to their actual dispositions the Grace which he gives them will have this sad effect Therefore these Graces do not fall upon corrupted hearts by the particular will of God but by a necessary consequence of general Laws which he has established to produce better effects for the same reason that too much rain sometimes spoils and putrifies the Fruits of the earth tho God by his general will causes it to rain to make them grow and encrease XVII If God intended that certain Lands should be barren he need only to cease to will that the rain should water them In like manner if God would that the hearts of some sinners should be hardned it would suffice that the rain of grace did not water them he needed only to leave them to themselves they would soon be corrupted Why should we attribute to God a particular will to make so severe a use thereof and so irreconcileable with the price of the Blood of his Son But some may say God never had this design when he gave his Grace to sinners This doubtless will appear more reasonable but if God gives his Grace by a particular will he has a particular design Now seeing his Grace has this sad effect God is frustrated in his intention since he gave it with a particular design to do good to this sinner For I speak not here of the Graces or rather of the Gifts which St. Paul explains in 1 Cor. Chap. 12. Ver. 9. I speak of the Grace which God gives for the Conversion of him to whom it is given and not
an invincible manner by particular and practical wills to the end that he may leave to him more of the glory of his work and make the infinite Wisdom of his Father shine more brightly as he is the Searcher of Hearts that glorious attribute which no spirit can comprehend Now if God acts by general Laws it is visible that we ought to ascribe unto occasional causes to the limitation the dispositions and sometimes the malice of Creatures all those mischievous effects which Piety and the Idea we have of a good wise and just God oblige us to say that he rather permits than has any design to effect For example if a Woman brings forth a Monster or a dead Child or if she lets her Child fall and kills it carrying it to the Church to make it a Christian it is because God observes the general Laws which he hath prescribed We ought to ascribe this dismal effect to natural or occasional causes Super defectum causarum secundarum says St. Thomas God hath permitted this evil since there is none but he can be the true cause of it it may be said in some sence that he hath not done it because it is not for such like effects but for better that he hath established natural Laws and if he follow these Laws it is because he owes this to himself that his Conduct may be uniform and carry the character of his Attributes This is not in the least to blaspheme against the Divine Power as some ignorantly object but it is rather to blaspheme against the Divine Wisdom and Goodness of God to maintain that he wills directly and positively these dismal effects A Man whose Arm is cut off feels grief in his Arm We all of us sleeping have a thousand thoughts in relation to objects which are not at all before us This is because God always acts in consequence of his Laws and gives to the Soul the same thoughts and the same sentiments when there are the same motions in the brain whether we have an Arm or no whether objects are present or absent The DEVIL tempts just Men the wicked solicite good Men to evil Thieves and Soldiers Pillage and Massacre the innocent as well as the guilty God permits this this therefore ought to be attributed to the malignity of occasional causes For tho God doth often from thence draw great advantages by the Grace of J.C. since injustice it self enters into the order of his providence Ordinat peccata says St. Augustine yet these sad effects considered in themselves are unworthy of his goodness There is nothing but good which he wills positively and directly And if he makes use of the injustice of Men to speak as Scripture doth it is because it becomes him to obey his own Laws which were not at first established for such effects In short the greatest number of Men are damned and yet God would save all for he would and can hinder them from offending him God wills the conversion of sinners and certainly he can give them such grace that they shall infallibly be converted Whence is it then that sinners dye in their sin Infants without Baptism whole nations in the ignorance of truths necessary to their Salvation should we rather maintain that God would not save all meerly because of these things Or rather should we not in general seek out the reason in that which he owes to himself to his wisdom and his other attributes Is it not visible or at least is it not a sentiment agreeable with Piety that those ruful effects ought to be attributed to the simplicity in a word to the divinity of his ways and limitation of occasional causes For seeing that God acts by general Laws since he makes use of his Creatures in bringing about his purposes and that he doth not communicate to them his Power but by the establishment of his Laws it is clear that all this proceeds from the nature and action of occasional causes But why has not God established other general Laws or given to the finite action of J.C. an infinite Virtue The Reason is he ought not because his Wisdom exacts from him that he do great works by the most simple ways and that he proportion the action of causes to the beauty of the works And I fear not to say that the Eternal Temple which is the great design of God and the end of all his works is the most beautiful that can be produced by ways so simple and so wise as those are which God makes use of to effect it For I am certain that God loves Men that he would save all and therefore if he doth not so it is because he loves all things in proportion to their amiableness it is because he loves his Wisdom more than his Work 'T is because he does more honour to his attributes by the divinity of his ways than the Perfection of his Creatures In a word 't is because he has the Reason of his Conduct in himself for there is nothing out of God which can hinder him from executing his will And if he should have a will absolutely to save all Men without having respect to the simplicity of his ways 't is certain that he would save all because it is certain that there is an infinite number of means to execute all his designs and that likewise he can execute them by the absolute efficacy of his will without the help of his Creatures I thought my self obliged to represent in few words the Idea which I have of the Divine Providence to the end that it may be easily judged whether it is not more worthy of the Wisdom of God more agreeable to all that experience teaches more useful to answer the Objections of the Libertines better fitted to make us love God and unite us to J.C. our Head and Lastly more according to the Scripture taking it in its full meaning than that humane providence which supposes that God acts always by particular wills and would only save the lesser part of mankind and this simply and precisely because his will is so Objections against the foregoing Discourse With the Author's Answers Objection I. THat cannot evidently be seen in the Idea of GOD which has no necessary relation to him Now there is onely an Arbitrary and not any necessary relation betwixt God and the observation of the general Rules of nature This is one of the Author's Principles Therefore it is not evident that the general cause ought not to produce its effect by particular Wills Now according to this Author we ought not to believe any thing that he says if evidence doth not oblige us thereunto Therefore we may stop here This overturns his new System Answer 'T is true I have said that the general Laws by which God executes his designs are Arbitrary and this is true in two senses First Because God might have produc't nothing For the World is not a necessary Emanation of the Divinity Secondly
bears to himself All the ways of executing his designs are equally easie to him but they are not equally wise equally simple equally divine A wise Man will never undertake a design which dishonours him how easily soever it may be executed And of two designs the execution of which will unequally honour him he will always chuse that which will honour him the most because his self-love is always inlightened by his Wisdom Thus tho God be Almighty he neither doth nor can act but by the love which he bears to himself and his own attributes he always chuses both the work and the ways which all together do most honour him But 't is said the ways of God are his wills It is enough for him to will that what he wills may be done I confess it The ways of God are nothing but his practical wills 'T is sufficient for him to will the doing of any thing to the end it may be done But God cannot have two practical wills when one is enough God cannot will when 't is not wise to will And upon this account it is that the practical wills of God are not ordinarily any other than general wills whose efficacy is determined by the action of occasional causes God loves Men. He would save them all He desires that all should know and love him For order requires this and order is his law This will is agreeable to his attributes But God will not do all that is necessary to the end that all may infallibly be brought to know and love him because order permits him not to have such practical wills as are proper to this end It is because he ought not to disturb the simplicity of his ways 't is because he must fit his ways to the work and chuse the work and the ways which honour him the most Altho God need only to will that the Church should be formed to the end it might be so tho he needed only to will that Men should receive grace to the end they might receive it yet nothing is more certain than that 't is by J. C. he sanctifies Men and forms his Church as it is also that he governs the Nations by Angels and produces Animals and Plants by other second Causes At present God acts no more as he did at the Creation immediately by himself This is undeniable He acts by Creatures in consequence of that power which he has communicated unto them by the establishment of his general Laws Thus his Laws or his general practical Wills are his Ways and his Ways are simple uniform and constant they are perfectly worthy of him because they are perfectly agreeable with his Attributes as I have often repeated When God created the World Men Animals Plants organized Bodies which contain in their Seeds wherewithal to furnish all Ages with their kind he did this by particular wills This was convenient for several reasons and indeed this could not be otherwise For particular wills were necessary to begin the determination of motions But seeing this way of acting was as I may say mean and servile because in one sense it resembled that of a limited understanding God quitted it as soon as he could dispense with himself from following it as soon as he could pitch upon another more simple and Divine way for the goverment of the World At present he rests not that he ceases to act but because he doth no more act after a servile manner something like unto that of his Ministers Because he acts most agreeably to his Divine attributes Thus tho God be Almighty and all his wills efficacious it doth not follow that he ought not to compare the simplicity of the ways with the perfection of the works for 't is not to Honour his Power but to Honour his Wisdom and his other Attributes that he doth all things immediately by himself In truth what wisdom wou'd it be even to save all Men and to make a World infinitely more Beautiful than that which we inhabit if he had made and govern'd it by particular wills What should we think of his Goodness and other Attributes there being in it so many Miserable Persons so many Sinners so many Monsters so many Disorders so many Damned In a word things being as we see they are he saith that he has no need of the Wicked and yet the World is full of them He hath not made Death and yet all Men are subject thereunto 'T is the sin it may be said of the first Man by which it entred into the World Very well But why did not he hinder his Fall Why did he not prevent it Why did he establish those natural relations betwixt Eve and her Children which communicate sin unto them Why did he make all descend from corrupted Parents In a word why did he not form our bodies by particular wills or by such wills did not suspend the general Laws by which the brain of the Mother acts upon that of her Child and thereby * See the Explicat of Original Sin in the Search after Truth corrupts its mind and makes its heart irregular Why I say did he not do this if it be indifferent to God to act or not to act by particular wills This is that which the Libertines demand and this is what Christian Philosophers should explain to them to stop their Mouths Reason as much as may be should be reconciled with Religion Hence it is that I Maintain it to be more worthy not of the Power but of the Wisdom and other Divine Attributes that the World should be governed and the future Church formed by the general Laws which God hath established for this end than by an infinite number of particular wills Hence it is that I assert that God has not made the World absolutely as perfect as it might have been but as perfect as he could with relation to the ways most worthy of his Attributes but has chosen the work and the ways which do most Honour him For God cannot and ought not to act but to Honour his Perfections both by the simplicity of his ways and the excellency of his work Object III. Whence is it then that a thing so evident was never perceived by any of the Fathers or the most subtil Divines Whence is it that St. Augustine who has written so much against the Manichees made no use of this Reason that God acts not by particular wills that thereby he might have proved that there is no necessity of attributing the destruction of his works one by another the generation of Monsters or other effects which are thought to disfigure his Work to an evil principle On the contrary it is certain that never any person did more than this Father own that nothing was done in all this but by Gods particular orders c. Answer 'T is not just to urge the Fathers and the Divines against me when neither the one nor the other are against me If St. Augustine
be blasted and will it for very good reasons We must know the designs of Men to understand whether they forsake them and want constancy and firmness of mind or not For they may have a design to do at different times things quite opposite to one another But who knoweth the designs of God This would be a very fit Principle to justifie the Reproach which Pagans cast out against Christians That their God shews himself to be inconstant by abolishing the ancient Sacrifices which he himself had appointed This appears by Marcellinus's Letter to St. Augustin where he acquaints this Father That the Change of the first Sacrifices was one of the things which stuck most with Volusianus Maxime says he quia ista varietas inconstantiae Deum possit arguere This Objection would have been a convincing Reason against the Christian Religion if it be true that it is always a mark of inconstancy to unmake at one time what is made at another Answer I do not say that to unmake at one time what is made at another is not always a mark of inconstancy Nay in respect of God this I say is never a mark thereof The reason is because God doth not ordinarily act by particular wills For I maintain that God doth not by such wills make a Straw for example turn a 1000 times about but only by the Wind in consequence of the natural Laws which are his general Wills I endeavour by the uniformity of God's Conduct and the simplicity of his Ways to reconcile infinite Contradictions which we meet with in his Work and thereby I silence the Manichees and Philosophers who judge of God by themselves those attributing to a blind Nature and these to a malevolent God those natural Effects which contradict one another The Lions eat the Wolves and the Wolves the Sheep and the Sheep the Grass which God makes to grow and all this because the Laws of Nature tho simple and always exactly observed are fruitful enough to cover the Earth with Flowers and Fruits and furnish to the Sheep and an infinite number of other Animals their food to the end that they themselves may be nourishment to those which are their Superiours either by strength or cunning I omit other Reasons not proper to my Subject All this I say again is done in consequence of general Laws insomuch that all these Effects which contradict one another do not imply any contradiction in the Cause which produces them because this Cause doth not act and ought not to act by particular wills Nevertheless I have said and do say it again that to make and unmake and make again the same things a thousand times in a day is a sufficient sign of inconstancy and if otherwise we did not know that there is no defect in God we should naturally be inclined to think there is If my Principle should be rejected That God acts not by particular Wills but in consequence of general Laws I maintain that the ways of God ought to bear the Character of his Attributes and that his practical Wills should be the same till the work for which they were appointed be atchieved the same I say with respect to his immutability if the justice which he owes to his other Attributes doth not oblige him to change But I never said that God could not undo that to morrow which he doth to day without giving Men occasion to accuse him of inconstancy because the same general Laws do produce an infinite number of different Effects in the World The Night the Day the Seasons of the Year every thing says St. Augustine is subject to change but the Laws which God observes in the course of his Providence change not Haec omnia mutantur nec mutatur Divinae Providentiae ratio qua fit ut ist a mutentur The ways of God that is his practical wills are always the same there has been no essential change in the general Laws since their first establishment the Bodies which strike upon one another are reflected now as they were four thousand Years ago the Laws of union of the Soul and Body and those of the union of the Mind with universal Reason are still the same now they were in Adam's time the sin of the first Man has only deprived us of the power which he had of suspending the action of these first Laws by that strict union which he then had with universal Reason in consequence of other Laws which still subsist and make our wills the occasional causes of the Ideas which are presented to our minds Lastly The Laws by which God has given unto good and bad Angels the power to act upon bodies and by them upon our minds are still the same in the main tho the bad ones cannot make use of this power as they would by reason of the resistance of our tutelary Angels and for other reasons little understood Thus I am of the opinion that the ways of God always carry in them the character of his immutability and that he never changes any thing in them till his work shall be finished if the Law of Order requires not that they should have the Character of some other of his Attributes Once more I never said that what God makes unmakes and makes again implies any change in his Conduct since according to my opinion all these effects are the consequences of the simplicity and fruitfulness of his ways I only maintain that if God should act by particular wills what he doth would signifie inconstancy in his designs since there are things which he makes unmakes and makes again an hundred times in a day without any apparent profit or necessity for surely it is a mark of inconstancy to undo that which one has done to make it again what it was before And 't is in my thoughts to speak of God very much after the manner of Men and very unworthily of his Attributes to ascribe unto him as many particular Designs or practical Wills as there are little Straws which are whirl'd about with the Wind or Leafs and Fruits which the Rain nourishes and the Frost destroys for experience teaches us that these Effects are only the Consequences of the Natural Laws which God hath established to make the World as perfect as it can be acting as becomes himself The Objection which the Pagans made by asking Whether the God of the Christians was not the same with him of the Old Testament and if so why he had abolished his ancient Sacrifices This Objection I say touches me the least of any one so far is it according to my Principle from being a convincing Reason of the falseness of Religion for tho the ways of God be always the same the effects thereof may and ought to be different according to different times God gave to Angels the power of governing the Nations especially the Jews in consequence of general Laws which are his ways So that it is rather the Laws of Angels which
abstracted truths do not affect them it may be said that this delectation of Grace doth instruct them for making these truths sensible they learn them more easily by the attention which they bring to them 1 Joh. 11.72 'T is upon this account that St. John says the unction we receive from J. C. teaches us all things and that they who have this unction have no need to be instructed It is true that concupiscence such as we feel is not necessary in order to merit Jesus Christ whose sufferings were infinite was not at all subject to it But altho he was absolute Master of his Body he willingly suffered the most troublesome motions and sentiments to be excited therein that he might thus merit all thereby which was prepared for him Of all the sentiments that of Grief is the most contrary to a soul which desires and deserves to be happy and yet he willingly suffered the most tormenting Pleasure makes him actually happy who actually enjoys it and yet he willingly depriv'd himself thereof Thus as we ought he has offered an infinite number of Sacrifices by a Body which he took like unto ours but these his Sacrifices differed from those of the greatest Saints because he willingly excited in himself all those painful sentiments which in the rest of Men are the necessary consequences of sin and that thus these Sacrifices being altogether voluntary in him were more Pure and more Meritorious XXXI Nevertheless it must be observed that this Unction doth not of its self produce knowledge it only excites our attention which is the natural or occasional cause of our knowledge Thus we see that they who have the most Charity have not always the most Knowledge All men not being equally capable of attention the same unction doth not equally instruct all those who receive it Thus tho knowledge may be communicated to the Soul by a supernatural infusion and it may often be produced by Charity nevertheless this Grace ought often to be accounted as a natural effect because Charity does not ordinarily produce knowledge in the minds of Men but proportionally as it causes the soul to desire the knowledge of that which she loves For to conclude the various desires of the soul are the natural or occasional causes of the discoveries we make in any subject whatsoever But these truths I must explain more at length in the Second Part of this Discourse THE SECOND PART Of the Grace of the Creator XXXII I Know but two Principles which determine directly and by themselves the motions of our Love Knowledge and Pleasure Knowledge by which we discern different goods Pleasure by which we taste them But there is great difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure Knowledge leaves us altogether to our selves it makes no attempt upon our liberty it does not force us to love any thing it does not produce in us a natural or necessary love it only puts us in a condition of determining our selves and loving the objects which it discovers to us with a love of choice or which is the same thing of fixing the general impression of Love which God continually gives us upon particular goods But Pleasure efficaciously determines the will it transports it as I may say towards the object which causes it or seems to cause it it produces in us a natural and necessary love it diminishes our liberty distracts our reason and does not leave us wholly to our selves A small attention to our inward sentiments may convince of these differences XXXIII Thus Man before sin having a perfect freedom and no Concupiscence which might hinder him from following his Knowledge in the motions of his Love and since he clearly saw that God was infinitely amiable it was not expedient he should have been determined by a preventing Delectation as I have already said nor by other Graces of Sentiment which might have diminished his merit and have engaged him to have loved by instinct that good which ought to be loved only by Reason But since sin besides Knowledge the Grace of sentiment has been necessary that he might thereby resist the motions of Concupiscence For Man invincibly desiring to be happy it is impossible he should continually sacrifice his Pleasure to his Knowledge his Pleasure which renders him actually happy which subsists in himself notwithstanding he never so much resists it to his knowledge which subsists not but by a troublesome application of mind which the least actual pleasure distracts which lastly doth not promise actual happiness till after death which to the imagination seems to be a real Annihilation XXXIV Knowledge therefore is necessary to Man for guiding him in the search after that which is good It is the Effect of natural order It supposes neither the Corruption nor the Restoration of Nature But Pleasure which draws us to true happiness is pure Grace for naturally what is truly good ought only to be loved by reason Hence the occasional causes of the Graces of sentiment must be found in J. C. because he is the Author of Grace But the occasional causes of Knowledge must ordinarily be found in the order of Nature because it is the Grace of the Creator Let us endeavour to find out these causes XXXV In the order established by Nature I only see two occasional causes which distribute knowledge to Spirits and thus determine the general Laws of the Grace of the Creator The one in us which in some sort depends upon us the other which is to be found in the relation we have to the things about us The first is nothing else but the different motions of our wills The second is the concourse of sensible objects which act upon our mind in consequence of the Laws of union of the Soul with the Body XXXVI The inward sentiment which we have of our selves teaches us that our desires produce or excite knowledge in us and that attention of mind is the natural prayer by which we prevail with God to enlighten us for all who apply themselves to truth discover it proportionably to their attention And if our prayer was not interrupted if our attention was not disturbed if we had any Idea of what we ask and if we asked it with necessary perseverance we should never fail to obtain as far as we are capable to receive But our prayers are continually interrupted if they be not preingaged by pleasure Our senses and our imagination trouble and confound all our Ideas and tho the truth we consult answers our request yet the confused noise of our passions hinders from understanding its answers or causes us presently to forget them XXXVII If it be considered that Man before sin was animated with Charity that he had in himself all that was necessary for his perseverance in Righteousness and that he ought by his perseverance and application to have merited his reward it may easily be apprehended that the various desires of his Heart were to be made the occasional causes
of the knowledge communicated to his mind Otherwise his distraction would not have been Voluntary nor his attention Meritorious Now Nature although corrupted is not destroyed God has not ceased to will that which he once willed the same Laws still remain Thus our different wills are still at this day the occasional or natural causes of the presence of Ideas to our minds Search after Truth 1. explic That God is not the Author of our concupiscence But because the union of the Soul with the Body is changed into a dependance by the natural consequence of sin and the immutability of the will of God as I have * elsewhere explained our Bodies at present disturb our Ideas and speaking so loudly in behalf of the goods which respect them that the mind rarely asks and distractedly hears the inward TRUTH XXXVIII Experience further teaches us every moment that our conversation with knowing Persons is capable of instructing by exciting our attention that Sermons reading converse and many such like occasions may raise in us good sentiments The death of a friend doubtless is able to make us think of Death if some great passion does not wholly imploy us And when an able Preacher undertakes to demonstrate a very plain truth and convince others of it it must be granted that he may perswade his Auditors thereof and even move their Conscience excite their hope and fear and such like passions in them which disposes them less to resist the efficacy of the Grace of J. C. Men being made to live in society one with another it was necessary that they might mutually communicate their thoughts and motions It was needful that they should be united by the Mind as well as the Body and that speaking by the Voice to the Ears and by writeing to the Eyes they should communicate knowledge and understanding to attentive minds XXXIX Now Knowledge what way soever it is produced in us whether by our particular desires or whether some accidents be the occasion thereof it may be called Grace especially when it very much concerns our salvation tho it should only be a consequence of the order of Nature because since sin God owes us nothing and all the good we have is only what J. C. has merited for us For even our very Being subsists not but by J. C. But this kind of Grace tho merited by J. C. is not the Grace of J. C. 'T is the Grace of the Creator because J. C. not being ordinarily the occasional cause thereof the cause of it must be sought for in the order of Nature XL. There are a great many natural effects which may reasonably be accounted Graces For example two Persons at the same time have very different desires of Curiosity The one would go to an Opera the other hear a fam'd Preacher If they satisfie their curiosity he who shall go to the Opera will find such objects as considering the present disposition of his mind will excite in him passions which will ruine him The other on the contrary may find in the Preacher so much clearness and strength that the Grace of Conversion being given at this moment may be very efficacious in him This being supposed a shower of rain or some other accident interveens which keeps them at home this rain doubtless is a natural effect since it depends upon the natural Laws of the communication of motions Nevertheless it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Ruine it prevents and a Punishment to him whose Conversion it hinders XLI Grace being joyned with Nature all the motions of our Souls and of our Bodies have some relation to our Salvation Such a man is saved for having whilst he was in the state of Grace made a step which happily caused him to break his neck And is damn'd for having at some time unluckily escaped the ruines of an house ready to fall We know not what is beneficial for us but we very well know nothing is so indifferent in its self but that it has some relation to our salvation by reason of the mixture combination of the effects which depend on the general Laws of Nature with those of Grace XLII Since then Knowledge discovers the true good the means of obtaining it our duty towards God in a word the ways which we ought to follow since it is sufficient also for those who are animated with charity to make them act well merit new Graces vanquish certain temptations as I shall elsewhere Explain I think it may very deservedly be called by the name of Grace tho J. C. be only the meritorious cause of it And since the outward Graces which act not immediately upon the mind nevertheless enter into the order of predestination of Saints I also look upon them as true Graces In a word I think the name of Grace may be given to all natural effects when they relate to salvation when they are subservient to the Grace of J. C. and remove some impediments of its efficacy Nevertheless if any deny this I have no design to dispute upon words XLIII All these sorts of Graces if we will allow unto them this name being Graces of the Creator the general Laws of these Graces are the general Laws of Nature For it must be observed that sin hath not destroyed nature tho it has corrupted it the general Laws of the communication of motions are always the same and those of the union of soul and body are not changed excepting in this only that what was but a union in respect of the mind is changed into a dependance for reasons I have mentioned elsewhere For at present we depend upon Bodies to which by the institution of Nature we were only united XLIV Now the Laws of Nature are always very simple and very general For God acts not by particular wills except when order requires a Miracle I have sufficiently proved this truth in the first discourse Thus when a stone falls upon the Head of a good man and kills him it falls in consequence of the Laws of motions this happens not because God is just and would by a particular will reward him When a like accident knocks out the brains of a sinner this is not because God would actually punish him For God on the contrary would save all men but it becomes him not to change the simplicity of his Laws to suspend the punishment of a Criminal In like manner when knowledge is conveyed to the mind it is because we have desires which are the occasional causes thereof 't is because we hear some knowing Person and because our brain is supposed to receive the impressions of him that speaks 'T is not because God has any particular will in respect of us but because he follows the general Laws of Nature which he has prescribed to himself I see nothing mysterious in the distribution of these kinds of Graces and I shall not stand to draw the consequences which