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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A73418	Roger Widdringtons last reioynder to Mr. Thomas Fitz-Herberts Reply concerning the oath of allegiance, and the Popes power to depose princes wherein all his arguments, taken from the lawes of God, in the Old and New Testament, of nature, of nations, from the canon and ciuill law, and from the Popes breues, condemning the oath, and the cardinalls decree, forbidding two of Widdringtons bookes are answered : also many replies and instances of Cardinall Bellarmine in his Schulckenius, and of Leonard Lessius in his Singleton are confuted, and diuers cunning shifts of Cardinall Peron are discouered.	Preston, Thomas, 1563-1640.	1619 (1619)	STC 25599; ESTC S5197	680,529	682

punishing power but also spirituall things by reason of some vnlawfull disturbance of the publike temporall peace annexed vnto them may sometimes take the nature of temporall things and therefore may be forbidden by the temporall power of the Ciuill common-wealth which hath for the obiect of her directiue power the procuring and maintaining of publike peace and the shunning of all vnlawfull disturbance of this temporall peace in what actions soeuer either temporall or spirituall they are to be found and consequently may be also punished if we abstract from the priueledges of Princes and Ecclesiasticall Canons with temporall punishments which only are the obiect of the temporall coerciue power For what sensible man can deny that temporall Princes haue authoritie if we regard the nature and obiects of temporall power to forbid all men whatsoeuer that are subiect to their directiue power as also according to the common doctrine of Diuines are Cleargie men not to disturbe wrongfully the publike temporall peace by any actions whatsoeuer and to punish all them that shall transgresse their iust command and are subiect to their coerciue power with temporall punishments and that when the temporall Prince forbiddeth all vnlawfull poysonings the vnlawfull poysoning of men by spirituall actions as by baptizing with poisoned water is not contained vnder this command 105 Secondly it is not true that granting once as I often doe that temporall things may take the nature of spirituall things by reason of sinne annexed it must follow thereon as Mr. Fitzherbert concludeth that the spirituall Superiour may punish in temporall things or which he taketh for all one may inflict temporall punishments and the perspicuous reason heereof I alledged before for although temporall punishments doe become spirituall things when the consideration of sinne entereth for which they may be subiect to the directiue power of the Church which hath for her obiect vertue or vice and consequently they may be commanded or forbidden by the spirituall power of the Church as it is directiue yet still they remaine temporall punishments which are only subiect to the coerciue or punishing power of temporall Princes and therefore cannot be vsed or inflicted by the coerciue or punishing power of the Church which hath for her obiect spirituall or Ecclesiasticall Censures and not temporall punishments Wherefore vnlesse the consideration of sinne can make which is impossible temporall punishments to be I doe not say spirituall things but spirituall punishments it can neuer make temporall punishments to be the obiect of the spirituall power as it is coerciue although it maketh them to be the obiect of the spirituall power as it is directiue But my Aduersarie by not distinguishing these two powers and their proper acts and obiects would blind the vnderstanding of his vnlearned Reader with a confused reduction of temporall things to spirituall which this distinction of the directiue and coerciue power and the proper acts and obiects of either of them doth make most plaine and manifest 106 Also if temporall things saith Mr. Fitzherbert l Pag. 1. 8. nu 23. 24. may be come spirituall by reason of sinne annexed why shall they not also haue a spirituall nature and qualitie by the connexion of some vertue and specially when they are applied as I haue said before to a spirituall end as to the seruice and glory of God which is the end of all things spirituall and temporall to which purpose it may be obserued Rom. 12. that S. Paul exhorted the Romaines to exhibite their bodies hostiam viuentem sanctam Deo placentem c. a liuing sacrifice holy and pleasing God giuing to vnderstand that our bodies goods and what temporall thing soeuer is subiect to our soule being dedicated and applyed to Gods seruice and the good of the soule is sanctified therby and becommeth spirituall Whereupon it followeth that whensoeuer a spirituall Superiour punisheth his temporall subiects in their bodies or goods for satisfaction of their sinnes and for the seruice of God and the Church and the good of soules their corporall and temporall punishments becommeth spirituall by reason of the end and the vertue annexed and consequently is most lawfull and iust euen according to my Aduersarie Widdringtons owne doctrine 107 Whereto I also adde that whereas Widdrington saith that euerie Superiour may punish his subiects with penalties proportionate to his authoritie he must needes grant the same in this case for albeit temporall goods haue no naturall proportion with spirituall things yet they haue a morall proportion therewith because they are not able instruments of good workes ● Pet. 2. in which respect S. Peter calleth Almes and other good workes spirituales Hostias spirituall Sacrifices albeit they consist in the vse and imployment of temporall things and therefore when temporall things are necessarie to a spirituall end they may be disposed of by the Church as proportionate to the end whereto they are necessarie 108 No man maketh any doubt but that temporall things may become spirituall not only by reason of sinne but also of vertue annexed especially when they are applyed to a spirituall end as to the seruice and glory of God who is the end of all things spirituall and temporall and therefore when one doth punish his body by fasting discipline hairecloath or such like for the satisfaction of his sinnes and for the seruice of God although they be corporall punishments yet they are vertuous actions and in that regard spirituall things and consequently subiect to the spirituall power of the Church as it is directiue But from hence it doth not follow that these temporall punishments by reason of vertue annexed doe become spirituall punishments but only vertuous actions and in that regard spirituall things for still they remaine temporall punishments and therefore not subiect to the spirituall power of the Church as it is coerciue which hath for her obiect only the vsing and inflicting of Ecclesiasticall or spirituall not temporall or Ciuill punishments Wherefore a spirituall Superiour hath no authoritie by the institution of Christ to punish in body or goods for any end whatsoeuer by way of constraint his spirituall subiects whether they be Clearkes or Lay-men whom Mr. Fitzherbert improperly calleth his temporall Subiects for although they be temporall men yet comparing them to spirituall Superiours they are spirituall not temporall Subiects for that the obiect of the spirituall coerciue power are not temporall or corporall but only spirituall Censures or punishments although he may as I said command such corporall punishments when they are necessarie for the good of the soule in which case they become spirituall things to wit vertuous actions which are the obiect of the spirituall directiue power But the cause of Mr. Fitzherberts errour is for that he doth not distinguish betwixt spirituall or temporall things and spirituall or temporall punishments and betwixt the acts and obiects of the spirituall directiue and of the spirituall coerciue power for although temporall punishments by reason of

from the Soueraigntie of absolute Princes for it little importeth to the substance of the matter whether the Pope may depose hereticall or wicked Princes by a power or dominion ouer temporals which must bee called temporall or by a power which must bee called spirituall so that he may depose them or whether the Pope bee superiour to absolute Princes in temporals directly or indirectly so that they must acknowledge themselues not to be absolute but subiect to the Pope in temporals But as I haue signified heeretofore all the difficultie and ambiguitie of these words directly and indirectly will presently appeare and the whole mist which the Diuines by this distinction doe cast ouer the eyes of the vnlearned wil foorthwith vanish away if we will but duly consider the difference betwixt the directiue and coerciue power and the proper acts and obiects of either of them 62 For as in all arts sciences faculties and powers whatsoeuer is directly contained vnder the formall obiect of that art science facultie or power is directly subiect to that art science facultie or power so what thing soeuer whether it be temporall or spirituall is directly contained vnder the formall obiect of the directiue or coerciue power is directly subiect to that power Seeing therefore that the proper acts and formall obiects by which all powers are distinguished of the spirituall directiue or commanding power are the commanding of vertue and the forbidding of vice from hence it followeth that all actions whatsoeuer whether they be spirituall or temporall as they are vertuous or vicious actions and necessary or hurtfull to the spirituall and eternall good of soules are directly subiect to the spirituall directiue power So that the reference or relation of temporall actions to the spirituall good of soules doth nothing hinder but rather is a cause that as they are vertuous or vicious actions they are directly subiect to the spirituall directiue power 63 But if these Diuines will further say that the spirituall directiue power dominion or iurisdiction ouer temporall things is therefore said to be indirect for that it doth not command or forbid temporall things as they are temporall but as in order to spirituall good they become spirituall that is vertuous or vicious actions no man maketh doubt of the matter or of the thing it selfe it being too too manifest to euery man of iudgement that temporall things are not subiect to the spirituall directiue power as they are temporall things but as in order to spirituall good they become spirituall that is vertuous or vicious actions but the speech is not so proper and giueth occasion to the vnlearned to be confounded and deluded with a superfluous ambiguitie and multiplicitie of words For what Diuine or Phylosopher can deny that all those things whatsoeuer which doe truly participate the definition or nature of the formall obiect of any art science facultie or power by what meanes or consideration soeuer they doe participate the same are directly subiect to that art science facultie or power And in the same proportionate manner as these men say that the Pope hath an indirect temporall directiue power or authoritie ouer temporall things it may bee said that temporall Princes haue an indirect spirituall directiue power ouer spirituall things for that as the Pope doth forbid temporall things not as they are temporall but as they are spirituall and hurtfull to the good of soules so temporall Princes may forbid spirituall things as Heresie Schisme periurie ministring of Sacraments with a poysoned matter whereby danger of death doth ensue not as they are spirituall but as they are temporall wrongs and hurtfull to the publike peace in the Common-wealth which is the formall obiect of the temporall directiue power So that this distinction of directly and indirectly cannot bee well applied to the spiritual directiue power but that in the like proportionate manner it may be also applied to the temporall directiue power dominion and Iurisdiction 64 And as concerning the Ecclesiasticall coerciue power we must discourse in the same manner and likewise consider what are the proper acts and formall obiects of this power as it is coerciue or punishing for whatsoeuer doth participate the nature and definition of the acts and obiects of this power is directly subiect thereunto Now concerning this point there are two principall opinions among Catholikes The first opinion and which now adaies is the more common for the causes by mee heeretofore l Apol. nu 449 alledged is that the inflicting of all punishments whatsoeuer being referred to spirituall good are the acts and obiects of the Ecclesiasticall power as it is coerciue or punishing But the Authours of this opinion albeit they all agree in this that whatsoeuer authoritie the Church hath by the institution of Christ call it spirituall or temporall is in order to spirituall good and is giuen her by Christ for the eternall saluation of soules for which end Christ also himselfe descended from heauen and tooke our flesh vpon him yet in this they differ that the Canonists that commonly follow this opinion measuring the nature of the powers by their acts and obiects and graunting as they doe that Christ hath giuen to his Church authoritie to inflict both temporall and spirituall punishments doe also affirme that the Church hath by the institution of Christ truely properly directly and formally both temporall and spirituall power But the Diuines commonly perceiuing the absurdity of this doctrine and that it confoundeth the acts and obiects of the temporall and spirituall power and subiecteth the temporall Soueraigntie of absolute Princes who by the common doctrine of the ancient Fathers are accounted to bee supreme in temporalls and therein subiect to none but to God alone to the Popes temporall authoritie to giue the more probable colour as they thinke to this pretended authoritie of the Church to dispose of all temporals and to inflict temporall punishments in order to spirituall good and to make it seeme lesse odious to Christian Princes and subiects doe differ from the Canonists at lest wise in words and therefore they affirme that the Church by the institution of Christ hath no true proper direct and formall temporall authoritie but onely vertuall or in effect which they call but verie improperly in my opinion indirect as I haue shewed before as the power of God and of the Angels to worke corporall effects although it be truely and formally spirituall as God and the Angels are truely and formally spirituall substances yet eminently vertually and in effect is corporall for that by their spirituall power they can worke corporall effects So that the Canonists and these Diuines doe not differ in effect and these Diuines doe in effect no lesse derogate from the temporall Soueraigntie of absolute Princes subiecting them in temporals who are supreme then the Canonists doe 65 The second principall opinion is of other m Apol. nu 4 seq and aboue in the first part of this Treatise learned

and spirituall power might command the Christians to doe and by spirituall Censures compell them so to doe when otherwise they should scandalize the Christian faith and religion And this very answere did I giue in my Apologie to this text of holy Scripture which was vrged by Card. Bellarmine to prooue that the Pope had power to depose and put downe Secular Princes as the Apostle had power to appoint and set vp new Iudges in Secular causes for I denyed his consequence because the appointing and setting vp of those Iudges did nothing derogate from the subiection due to Secular Princes for that they were onely Arbiters or peaceable composers of secular causes with the consent of the parties who were at strife but the putting downe of Princes or depriuing them of their Royall authoritie doth greatly derogate or rather quite ouerthrow and abolish their temporall soueraigntie 22 To which answere of mine D. Schulckenius onely replieth l In Apolog. pag. 444. That although these Iudges whom the Apostle commanded the Corinthians to appoint had not indeede vim coactiuam in foro externo a coactiue power in the externall Court and that if either partie would not obey the Apostle and goe to the Iudges appointed by the Church but would bring his cause to the publike tribunals of the heathen Magistrates the other partie was bound there to appeare and there to debate his cause yet they were not meere Arbiters or voluntary Iudges For Arbiters are chosen by the parties but these were chosen by the common consent of the Church and were appointed by publike authoritie by the command of the Apostle who was a spirituall Prince Besides none are bound to admit Arbiters vnlesse they will but Christians were bound to admit these Iudges and were forbidden to goe to the tribunals of Infidell Princes Moreouer the Saints are not to iudge the world and Angels as Arbiters chosen by them but as true Iudges and as sitting with Christ the supreame Iudge 23 But all this is easily satisfied by that which I said before For although the faithfull Corinthians were by the publike spirituall authoritie of the Apostle commaunded to choose those Iudges or Arbiters yet it doth not from thence follow either that those arbitrarie Iudges were to bee chosen by the whole Church and not onely by the parties that were at strife or that the Apostle for that he was a spirituall Prince had either himselfe publike authoritie to decide secular causes or could giue the same to any other But because the Christians were bound by the Law of God to compound their controuersies among themselues by way of arbitriment and not to bring their causes to the hearing of Heathen Iudges in case they should thereby scandalize the Christian Religion therefore the Apostle might by his publike spirituall and Pastorall power command them and also with spirituall Censures compell them so to doe 24 And although these arbitrarie Iudges were to be chosen by the whole Church and by the common consent of all the faithfull Corinthians which neuerthelesse can not bee sufficiently gathered from the Apostles wordes yet it doth not therefore follow that they were not meere Arbiters or voluntarie Iudges in power or which is all one that they had more then arbitrarie priuate or compromissorie power For it is not materiall by whom a publike or legall Iudge or else an Arbitratour or compromissorie Iudge bee chosen but from whom they receiue their authoritie to iudge as a true proper and publike Iudge may sometimes bee chosen by the people as is the Recorder of London by the Citie and the Chancellours of Oxford and Cambridge by the Vniuersities but it is the Kings Maiesty that giueth them publike authoritie to iudge And Achiters or voluntary Iudges may be chosen by the common consent of the people to decide by way of arbitrement or voluntarie submission all ciuill controuersies which shall arise among them yet seeing that they are onely Arbiters or haue onely arbitrarie voluntarie priuate or compromissorie power the parties onely who are at strife doe giue power to iudge and to make a finall end of their controuersies And although abstracting from scandall none are bound to admit Arbiters vnlesse they will yet if by not admitting them they should scandalize the Christian Religion as the Corinthians did they are bound to admit them or which is all one to giue them arbitrarie voluntrary or compromissorie power to decide and determine their controuersies 25 True also it is that the Saints are not to iudge the world or the bad Angels as Arbiters yet in what manner they are to iudge whether by onely assisting our Sauiour and approouing or applauding his sentence or by being Assessores supremi Iudicis Christi by sitting in seates of honour with Christ the supreme Iudge as Noble men and Iustices of peace do sit vpon the bench with the chiefe Iudge of Assises or in any other more peculiar manner it is a controuersie among Catholike Diuines although it be certaine that the Saints shall not be true and proper Iudges as Iudges are properly taken howsoeuer D. Schulckenius doth seeme heere to affirme the same for that to iudge and to giue iudgement doth properly signifie an act of Iurisdiction and superiority of power to giue the definitiue sentence pro or contra which Iurisdiction in respect of the last iudgement of soules is onely communicated to Christ. m Se● Suarez tom 2. disp 57. sect 4. But howsoeuer it be the argument of Saint Paul whereby he intended to prooue that Christians were not vnworthy to iudge Secular causes which he calleth the least things is of force as I declared before for if they be not vnworthy to iudge the world and Angels much lesse are they to be accompted vnworthy to decide by way of arbitrement Secular causes or the least things 26 And whereas D. Schulckenius affirmeth that those Iudges had no coactiue power in the externall Court and that if one of the parties should call the other to the tribunall of the Infidell Magistrate he were bound to appeare and debate his cause before the Heathen Iudge this doth make nothing against that which I haue said but is rather a confirmation that these Iudges were onely Arbitratours and voluntary Iudges in power to decide Secular causes For if they had beene true and proper Iudges and had not onely priuate and arbitrary power but also publike authority to iudge why should they not haue as all other true and proper Iudges haue both a commanding and also a coactiue power either temporall or spirituall according as D. Schulckenius will haue them to be temporall or spiritual Iudges And if they were true Iudges and not onely Arbitratours how could the faithfull Corinthians bee bound in conscience to leaue their tribunalls and goe to a Heathen Iudge to haue their cause decided by him if they should be called thither although against then willes seeing that they should thereby offend not only by reason of

he affirmeth that the Church in no case can iudge an vndoubted Pope so long as he is Pope Neuerthelesse I neuer affirmed that when the Emperour doth abandon and forsake his Empire and people and refuseth to be their Emperour any longer but leaueth them to themselues it is not in their power to choose them an other Emperour or to change the Imperiall Monarchie into Aristocratie or Democratie for that then the supreme temporall power and authoritie is immediately in the people and this also I prooued in that place out of Card. Bellarmines owne principles 45 Wherefore when D. Schulckenius a little aboue affirmed that I doe oftentimes graunt that the people cannot in any case deny ciuill obedience to that Prince whom once they haue had if his meaning be that I doe graunt that he who is once a Prince can not of his owne accord leaue to be a Prince and can not resigne his kingdome to the next heire and that the people are bound to yeeld ciuill obedience to him who was once their Prince but now of his owne accord hath resigned his kingdome to the next heire he doth greatly wrong me and abuse his Reader for to affirme this were foolish and ridiculous and contrarie to all reason and practise but that which I affirmed was that it is very probable and defended by many graue and learned Catholikes that the people who are subiect can in no case nor for any cause iudge or depose their Soueraigne Prince against his will and my reason was the same which Card. Bellarmine oftentimes vseth to prooue that the Church or a Generall Councell can not iudge or depose the Pope for that it is contrarie to all reason for an inferiour or subiect to iudge his Superiour and therefore those Catholikes that holde a Generall Councell may in some cases iudge the Pope doe also holde that it is superiour and aboue the Pope 46 That the Grecian Emperours had the Romane Empire as forsaken and abandoned by them I affirmed in these words Seeing therefore that as Lupoldus or Ludolphus writeth and diuers other Authors as Nauclerus Aeneas Siluius and Michael Coccinius doe insinuate the Emperours of Greece in the time of Charles the great and also before his time to wit in the time of his father Pipine and of his grandfather Charles Martellus did reigne in the West Empire only in name neither could the Church of Rome nor other Churches of Christ or also any others being by the Longobards vniustly oppressed in the same Empire haue iustice by them or by their authoritie and so the aforesaid Emperours had the West-Empire in a manner forsaken by gouerning therein only in name as it appeareth by diuers Chronicles the Pope Senate and people of Rome at leastwise by the tacite consent of all other Westerne men who were subiect to the Empire had euen according to the doctrine of Cardinall Bellarmine but now related full right and power which they could loose by no custome or translation of the Imperiall Seate as being to them connaturall and due by the law of nature to choose themselues a new Emprour and consequently to transfer the Empire which the Grecians kept in the Westerne parts only in name to Charles the great and his Successours the Imperiall Seate being in those parts at that time as it were vacant or without an Emperour Thus I wrote in my Apologie e Nu. 438. 47 And moreouer that the Greeke Emperours had the Westerne Empire and people for forsaken and abandoned and gaue at leastwise their tacite consent according to that rule of the law qui tacet consentire videtur that they might choose to themselues another Empeperour at leastwise in power and authoritie it is apparant for that they did neuer repugne contradict or gainesay that Charles the great should rule ouer them although perchance it displeased them that hee should haue the name of Emperour Yea and as Cardinall Bellarmine himselfe writeth when the Empresse Irene heard that Charles was called and crowed Emperour by Pope Leo shee did not onely gainesay but also she would haue married Charles and had done if certaine perfidious Eunuches had not hindered her as Zonaras and Cedrenus doe write in the life of the said Irene Afterwards Irene being dead Nicephorus the Emperour who did succeede her sent Ambassadours to Charles as to an Emperour as writeth Ado in this Chronicle of the yeere 803. And a little after Nicephorus being dead Michael suceeding him sent Ambassadours to Charles who likewise did publikely honour him as an Emperour as writeth Ado in his Chronicle of the yeere 810. All which doe sufficiently confirme that the Greeke Emperours did not gainesay this translation nor conceiue it to be a wrong done to them and in preiudice of their Imperiall right and Soueraigntie 48 By all which it is manifest first that I doe not any wrong at all to the Latin Emperours who haue beene and shall be from the time of that translation as though their Empire were not grounded vpon any sound title or foundation for that all writers and Cardinall Bellarmine himselfe doe agree in this that the Pope together with the rest of the people haue power to choose them another Emperour in case the Emperour will no longer reigne ouer them because in that case the supreame temporall power and authoritie is onely in the people or whole multitude but rather Card. Bellarmine as also I obserued in that place f Nu. 462. doth call in question and make doubtfull the right and title which the Latin Emperours haue to the Empire in that hee affirmeth that they haue all their right and title from the Pope alone seeing that there be many learned and graue Authours who make a great doubt whether the Pope alone hath by the institution of Christ any such power and authoritie to transfer Empires but no Authour not so much as Card. Bellarmine himselfe according to his doctrine which I related in that place doeth deny that the whole multitude hath full power and authoritie to transfer the Empire in the aforesaide case to wit when the Emperour doth abandon the Empire and will no longer reigne ouer the people 49 Secondly it is also manifest that I haue not any way contradicted my selfe in my answere and that I haue cleerely prooued by Card. Bellarmines owne grounds and by his owne Authours that the aforesaide translation was done by the authoritie decree ordinance and suffrages both of the Pope and of the people and consequently that the people did more then onely request applaude and assent to that translation to which D. Schulckenius maketh no answere at all and therefore his silence herein is both an euident signe that hee was not able to impugne my answere and that although hee doeth so highly commend his owne booke of the translation of the Empire as exactly soundly and diligently written yet his owne conscience for as much as concerneth this question seeth now the contrarie for that hee being so

descend from him and in the new Testament his Apostles and who by lawfull ordination shall descend from them and what spirituall authority these Ministers haue they doe not receiue from the ciuill Common-wealth but from God himselfe 12 Whereupon it is euident that we cannot gather what authority and priuiledges the Priests either of the olde Testament had or of the new Testament haue from the law of nature for that all the authoritie and priuiledges which the Priests in the law of nature had did wholly depend vpon the ciuill Common-wealth by whose authority those Priests and Ministers of religious rites and ceremonies were made but what authority either to cōmand or to punish either Lay-men or Clergie-men the Priests of the olde Testament had and of the new Testament haue we can onely gather from the positiue institution and graunt of God who hath giuen and determined their authority and not from the law of nature wherein the Priests were subiect to the ciuill Common-wealth and had all their authority from the Common-wealth it selfe And by this which I haue now said here and more at large declared in the sixt Chapter is fully satisfied all that Mr. Fitzherbert hath said aboue and repeateth heere out of his Supplement concerning the law of nature in these words 13 First then saith hee c Pag. 130. nu 5. it is to be considered that humane law is commonly diuided into Ius Gentium Ius Ciuile and Ius Ecclesiasticum vel Canonicum the law of Nations the Ciuill law and the Canon or Ecclesiasticall law And as for the law of Nations which is a humane law so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of Nature that all Nations doe receiue and admit it it is manifest c. But before wee goe any farther it will not be amisse to obserue the difference which the learnedst Diuines of this age doe make betwixt the law of Nations and Nature for vnlesse wee know and agree what the law of Nations is we shall dispute thereof to little purpose First therefore Mr. Fitzherbert by those words which is a humane law so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of Nature that all Nations doe receiue and admit it doth seeme to signifie that onely the knowne morall principles or generall maximes of Nature or naturall reason doe belong to the law of Nature and the conclusions which are easily and directly deduced from them doe belong to the law of Nations which doctrine neuerthelesse all the Diuines of this age euen of his owne Societie doe commonly reiect Vasq 1 a. 2 ae disp 154. cap. 3 Salas Disp 5. de Leg. sec 5. Suarez l. 2. de Leg. c. 7. as you may see in Vasquez Salas Suarez who doe therefore affirme that the law of Nature doth comprehend not onely all morall principles but also all conclusions which are easily and directly or by an euident and necessary consequence deduced from those principles of Nature 14 For all morall things which are knowne by naturall reason are either the first generall principles of manners as virtue is to be embraced vice to be shunned Doe not that to another which thou wilt not haue done to thy selfe and these without all doubt doe belong to the law of Nature or else they are principles not so generall but yet euidently knowne of themselues as Iustice is to be kept God is to be worshipped Parents are to be honoured and such like and these also without all question doe appertaine to the law of Nature or thirdly they are conclusions which are euidently deduced from the morall principles of nature and cannot be knowne but by discourse among which some are knowne more easily as adultery murther periury and such like to bee euill some are not so easily knowne but to know them there is required a greater discourse as simple fornication to be of it owne nature euill vsury to bee vniust an officious lye not to be lawfull for any cause whatsoeuer and such like And all these and other morall conclusions of what degree soeuer so that they bee deduced as conclusions from the morall principles of nature by a certaine and euident consequence doe also according to the common doctrine of Diuines belong to the law of Nature I said by a certaine and euident consequence for as well obserueth Salas Salas tract 14. disp 5. sec 5. as conclusions which are euidently deduced from morall principles and doe binde without any positiue law doe euidently containe the law of nature so those conclusions which are probably deduced doe containe it porbably and are lawes of nature not certaine but probable in which if in very deede falshood bee affirmed they are not the lawes of nature truely and in very deed but apparantly for that an erroneous conscience is not truely a law 15 The reason why not onely morall principles but also the conclusions which are deduced from them doe belong to the law of nature and not of nations as the law of nations is a positiue and humane law is both for that all actions which by the light of naturall reason abstracting from all positiue precepts of God or man are knowne to be euill and for that cause are forbidden by the law of God or man because they are euill of themselues although they had neuer beene forbidden by any such positiue law doe belong to the law of nature and also for that otherwise the morall precepts of the Decalogue and others contained in them as the precept forbidding simple fornication vsurie and to be reuenged of ones enemy by his owne priuate authority and such like should not belong to the law of nature because none of those precepts are generall principles but conclusions deduced by discourse from them nay nor to honour and woorship God should belong to the law of nature for that it is not knowne but by discourse that there is a God 16 And by this the Reader may easily perceiue that Mr. Fitzherbert in defining the law of nations to be a humane law which is so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of Nature that all Natitions doe receiue and admit it doth not onely dissent from all the learned Diuines euen of his owne Societie but hee must also vnlesse hee will maintaine strange paradoxes plainly contradict himselfe For first if the law of nations bee so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of nature that all nations doe receiue and admit it it cannot be a humane law which hath it force and obligation to binde onely from the constitution of men but it must haue it force and obligation to binde from the very principles of nature and consequently it must be reduced to the law of nature and not of nations Besides euery humane law is therefore a positiue and humane law not onely for that it is receiued and admitted by men but also for that it is made by men and hath it force to binde onely by the positiue