the ground of this foresight how that can be other then necessary which is certaine because the knowledg of God that foreteis it cannot be uncertaine yet would it be no lesse evident that the foresight of God which supposeth the future being of that which it evidenceth causeth no necessity in that which it supposeth though I could give no account how the future being of that which is contingent can be certaine And as it is not requisite to the maintenance of Christianity to be able to answer all questions that the enemies of it may make So were it very impertinent not to allege that which is evident in behalfe thereof because there hangs an other question at the end of it which I cannot so evidently resolve And upon these terms I set aside that necessity which Gods foresight of future contingencies infers as impertinent to the question in hand being meerely the necessity of that which must needs be because you suppose that it is all foresight necessarily supposing the future being of that which is foreseen as all sight supposeth the present being of that which is seen Further when I say That the freedom which the Covenant of Grace supposeth in man to whom it is tendred requireth that his will be not determined by God before it determine it selfe to wit in order of nature I do not therefore require that it be alwaies indifferent that is no more inclined to doe then not to do this or that I have learned out of Aristotles Moralls that a drunkard may chuse whether he will be drunk or not though it is not possible that he should in an instant change that inclination to which he is habituated and that as the world is it cannot in discretion seeme possible to come to passe that some opportunity of bringing that inclination to effect shall not come to passe before the inclination of his habit be changed into the contrary by frequence of practice But this I say That in this latitude and variety of mans inclination he is not determined by any of them presently to satisfie and execute it having so many to please besides And that God without determinnig immediately by his omnipotence the will which remaines not determined by its owne inclination is able to bring to passe whatsoever his providence shal order by wils of men left at large to their own choise though not in a state of actuall indifference without biasse inclining them to do rather then not to do this rather then that yet in a capacity of becoming actually indifferent by change of judgement and by consequence of inclinations which frequent acting according to another judgement shall produce In the meane time not determined by God otherwise then as they determine themselves It is not therefore my meaning to say that the will proceeds immediately from a state of indifference to determine it selfe by chusing that whereon the mans happinesse depends For it is manifest that all choice is determined by the appearance of good in the object to reason that sees it nor can proceed without it It is manifest that all vertues and vices are meere determinations of indifference in the Will to some thing chosen for a cheife good It is manifest by experience that the proposing of an object determines many times the Will to chuse it It is received in Philosophy that from that which is indifferent as indifferent no action can proceed That the same remaining the same can never do but the same That nothing can come to be anew of it selfe without some cause And how shall the will from meere indifference proceed immediately to do this rather then that How shall indifference prefer doing this before doing that or not doing this My meaning is this That without appearance of reason sufficient to convict the mind what is good to be don there is no freedome in the Will that can determine to chuse it That when there is no appearance of reason to the contrary as in the generall nature of good there is no freedome to refuse That all habit of vertue or vice tends to determine indifference to the object and act of it and effecteth so much in this life that morally and speaking of that with experience and discretion will allow it is as impossible that some man should do any thing that is good as some other revolt from all goodnesse And therefore do allow a kinde of freedome in the blessed as well as in the damned who are arrived at the full determination of the will for the better or for the worse are past deliberating any more to which side they shall adhere for everlasting But their estate I account impertinent to the question in hand concerning that freedome in this life the use whereof is every mans title to the world to come and his owne share in it As also the estate of the blessed Angels Devils whom all allow to be as effectually derermined to evill or to good upon their fall or settlement as men are upon the performing their race here But as I have granted that no man can desire that in which he sees no reason why it is good for him So seeing sufficient reason he is not thereby immediately determined to act but onely inabled to act according to it The coherence of true good with the utmost happinesse of mankind is so darke the coherence of counterfeit good with his utmost misery so remote that as the apperance of counterfeit good may interpose to defeate the prosecution of that which sufficient reason convinceth to be true so may the appearance of true good interpose to deseate the prosecution of that which is counterfeite So that the race of this life is a continuall deliberation about the necessity of the meanes even in them that have made choise of their end It may be disputed indeed that when after resolution and choise we have experience of great debate within us what to do it is not the will the subject of freedome that is the seate of this debate but it is the sensuall appetite that makes opposition to the resolution of reason and that this opposition is meere violence to the naturall exercise of freedome not pretending to introduce a contrary resolution standing the first but hindring execution by degrees upon contrary information to reverse the sentence But the determination which we suppose sufficient reason had produced remaines alwaies ineffectuall and therefore the question must needs have recourse what determines the Will till answer be made that it proceeds effectually inwardly to chuse and outwardly to act by that choice determining all capacity of indifference in it selfe which redounding to every mans account at the generall judgement must needs be the act of the will that is of the person that doth it By that which hath been said I conceive I give account why having hitherto established the necessity of Grace upon the account of Originall sin I now advance a proposition tending to
the later end of the world that God meant first to show the world that all other meanes which he thought fit to use to reclaime man by the fathers and by and under the Law were not to purpose that the necessity of his coming might appeare But that this is not to be understood as if God meant to render them inexcusable by using insufficient meanes that could not take effect But that dispensing to those times such meanes of grace as he found the reasons upon which his secret counâ—ailes proceed to require proportionable to the obedience and service which he required then at their hands He reserves the full measure of them to the coming of his Son proportionable to the difficulty of beraing his Crosse which he purposed for the condition of those promises which he brought And the same is to be said of the Fathers under the law of nature Which if we understand it to be so cailed as if the light of nature then taught and inabled them to please God we contradict not onely the faith hitherto maintained against Pelagius but also the appearances in Scripture of those revelations of that cpmmerce and inâ—rcourse with God whereby they advanced to the state of his friends The book of Iob to the time whereof we see this state lusted presenting most evident instances both of Gods correspondence with the Godly of the Gentiles and of Christians piety in their conversations Now to that state of inocence wherein Adam was created it must needs be a grace oâ— God to make knowne his will because it cannot be supposed that God should imploy his creature in his service and not reward him for doing it with advantage But not as if suck knowledg could give him ability but onely determine the matteâ— of his obedience who had nothing to hinder the doing of that which commanded by God must needs be for his advantage to do Since the fall if reasons provided by God to convince the understanding to incline the will to that which he purposeth for our happinesse may and would prove ineffectuall were they not acted and managed by the holy Ghost Let us not therefore so far miâ—â—ken the counsaile of God in providing them as to imâ—gine the worke is not done by them because it is his speciall grace that makes them effectuall to purpose The indowments of Adam how great soever thâ—y were the event sheweth that they might faile and hâ—d they not failed it must have been ascribed to God for a greater grace then those indowments in as much as these made him accountable to God that would have inâ—itled him to a reward So that by this account it will be no marvaâ—le that the grace of Christ which saveth us in and through this weakenesse of iâ—bred concupâ—scence should be counted greater then that which Adam had in his inâ—â—â—ncy And the same is to be said of the Angels that fell and those that stood How great soever their indowments were had not the motive whatsoever it was that prevailed with the one part to depart from God been prevenâ—ed of taking effect with the rest it might have come to passe as well in all as in some That it did not what can it be ascribed to all being turâ—â—shed with abilities fully corespondent to that which God required at theâ— hands but some dispensation of Gods secret counsail being by no reason of his declared Justice obliged otherwise Not that the Will of Adam or of Angels was not able to doe what God required and hâ—d done it of â—â— selfe without any help added by God But because so gâ—eat is the influence of the makers providence that the events thereof how justly soevâ—â— imputable to the choice of the creature must of necessity have their springs in and from the secret dispensation thereof not concerning his justice Seeing then that as I said before the opinion of Jansenius though it gives account wherein the grace of Christ formally consisteth yet gives no account from whence effectively it proceedeth but the immâ—diate wâ—ll of God â—he question demanding upon what ground it redounds to mans accâ—uâ—t Let them either look about them for a better reason or accept of thâ—s not a destrâ—ying that which it saith but to the introducing of that which it saâ—eth not For it is agâ—eed upon both waies that it is delight in true goodness for the love of God that makes the grace of Christs Gospell effâ—ctual in mens lives and conversations How by the act of that wil which in others rejects it â—â—ndevour to say what the scriptures and faith of the Church will allow But Jansenius his opinion goes no further then that so it is to wit because love is free therefore man is freâ—ly saved howsoever love be brought to passe But the necessity of those actions to which grace determineth which is antecedent in Jansenius his opinion the cause which is Gods will being undeâ—easible iâ— in mine onely consequent upon suposition of efficacy which implyes the being of that which comes to effect grounded upon the foreknowledg of God which supposes the free motion of the reasonable creature If the advantage be such in reconciling the efficacy of grace with the free will of the creature in reconciling the same with Gods foreknowledge and effectuall providence extending to all good and bad it will appeare much more For had Jansenius done his businesse in the mater of supernaturall grace he had not obliged us much unlesse his resolution were an overture to abate the generall difficulty thâ—t remaines But if he sends us for that to the predetermination of God which is said to be requisite upon the geneâ—all account of the creature and the indifference of mans will he leaves us to seeke for a reason how God is not the author of that sin which he determineth the will to do before it determine it selfe If we avoid that as Doctor Strang whom I spoke of before hath done by maintayning against Doctor Twisse that the will is not determined by God to the actions of sin Besides that he is to give account why the same providence of God which is generall to all things should be thought to teach this sort not that all actions as appendâ—nces of Gods creatures having the same dependence upon God which the prerogative of the first cause requi eth we are leâ—t to seeke how that foreknowledge of God which directeth his providence comes informed of the truth of future contingencies For if wee maintaine that the wisdome of God comprehending the inclinations of his creatures and all those considerations which outward occurrences or inward appearances shall present or not present them with to determine their choice cannot thereby cetainely discerne what will come to passe as Doctor Strang maintaines that so there cannot be in God any certtine knowledge of future conditionalls I leave to them that shall peruse this writing what satisfaction it is possible for him to give in the possibility of foreknowing
figure in saying That God would have that done which he will not do because he knowes sufficient reason to the contrary whether he declare it or not but setting that reason aside would have done Or that he would have that done which he provideth sufficient meanes to bring to passe But that all should signify some and the world the elect because God will not do all he can to save those whom he would have to be saved is a figure in Rhetorick called Mendacium when a man denies the Scripture to be true The same is the difficulty when our Lord Christ who saith to the Father John XVII 9. I ask for them I ask not for the world but for them whom thou hast given me for they are thine prayes upon the Crosse Father forgive them for they know not what they do For though he ask not that for the world which he askes for his disciples yet he would not have prayed for that which he knew not that God would have done His prayer being the reason moving God to grant meanes effectuall to bring to passe that which it desireth But had there been in God a purpose to exclude the Jews from the benefit of Christs death considering them as not having yet refused the grace which Christ prayed for it could not have been said that he would have our Lord Christ dy or pray for them and therefore that he would have them to be saved This is then my argument that the will of man is neither by the originall constitution of God determinable by his immediate operation nor by mans originall sinne subject to a necessity of doing or not doing this or that Because God treats with the posterity of Adam concerning the Covenant of the Law first and since concerning the Covenant of grace no otherwise then originally he treated with Adam about not eating the forbidden fruit For in conscience were it for the credit of Christianity that infidels whom we would perswade to be Christians should say True if you could shew me that God by his immediate act determines me to do as you require me without which you tell me I cannot do it and with which I cannot but do it Or that by the sinne of Adam I am not become subject to the necessity of doing or not doing this or that But supposing either of these if you move me to do what you professe I cannot do you are either a mad man your self or take me for one Do they take their hearers for men and Christians or for beasts who having first taught that man can do nothing but what God determines him to do inferre thereupon that they must indeavour themselves to do what God commands and what their Christianity requires Or that they are obliged by their Christianity to do that which their corruption from Adam necessitates them not to do Is it for the honour of Gods justice that it should be said that he intends to damne the most part of men for that which by their originall corruption they were utterly unable to do without giving them sufficient help to do it no help being sufficient which the determination of the will by the immediate operation of God makes not effectuall as they think Do they not make the Gospel of Christ a mockery that make it to require a condition impossible to be performed by any whom God determines not to perform it having resolved not to determine the greatest part of them that know it to performe it Certainly this is not to make the secret will of God contradict the declared will of God but to make the declared will of God a meer falshood unlesse the declaring will make contradictions true For to will that this be done for an end which God that willeth will not have come to pass makes contradictions the object of that will and that for the same consideration at the same time God from everlasting determining meerly in consideration of his own will that the condition of that which he would have to come to passe conditionally will not come to passe What is it then to declare all this to the posterity of Adam already lapsed without tendring help sufficient to inable them to imbrace what he tendereth For it is manifest that Adam had sufficient grace to doe what God commanded and it is as manifest that God tenders both the Law to the Israelite and the Gospell to the World in the same form as he tendred Adam the prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit Nor can it be denied that this prohibition contained in the force of it all the perswasions all the exhortations all the promises all the threatnings which either the Law or the Gospell to their respective ends and purposes can be inforced with It must therefore be concluded not that they suppose in Adams posterity an ability to do what they require as did the origiginall prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit but that they bring with them sufficient help to perform it not supposing any thing that may barre the efficacy thereof till the will of him to whom it is tendered makes it void And truly speaking of that which the naturall indowment of freedom necessarily imports in the reasonable creature it is utterly impossible that any thing should determine the will of man to do or not to do this or that but his own action formally or in the nature of a formal cause which therefore in the will cannot be the action of God nor be attributed imputed or ascribed to him to whom it were blasphemy to impute that which his creature is honoured with That God should immediately act upon the soul of man or his will is no inconvenience Because that act must end in the will or soul and not attaine that effect which the imperfection of the creature bringeth to passe Ending therefore in the creature and not in that which the action of the creature produceth it leaveth the same of necessity in the state wherein God first made it And I may well suppose here and will suppose that Gods act of creation continues the same for all the time that he maintaines the creature in that perfection of being that is to say in that ability of acting which from the beginning he gave it This discourse I confesse extendeth to the voiding of the immediate concurrence of God to the actions of his creature which my purpose necessarily requires me not to maintaine For concurrence-supposeth the creature to act without help of God that concurreth and therefore cannot be requisite on behalf of the cause being supposed to act of it self but on behalf of the effect wherein it endeth Which having a being is supposed necessarily to require immediate dependance upon the first being which is God A strange subtlety acknowledging the creature able to act and supposing it to act of it self to imagine that this act can end in nothing as that which it effecteth without Gods concurrence Which immediately attaining the
is plaine that the objection is the same against S. Paul as against the resolution proposed For as this answer supposes the reason why the Gentiles were converted to be Christians the Jewes not to be resolved into the will of God so the resolution here proposed resolves the reason of the true Christianity and finall perseverance in it of those that shall be saved into that disposition of motives resolving free will which Gods free grace onely appointeth And the question is evidently the same if as one ingredient into the disposition of each mans salvation or damnation it be demanded why God suffered man to fall from the state of innocence but procureth that the preaching of the Gospell arrive at the knowledg of some people and not of others For if supposing sufficient helps of grace the reason where by they become effectuall is neverthelesse resolved into the immediate disposition of God Then though we consider man as not faâ—â—e from the state of innocence and resolve the reason why God should bring him into that estate in which he foresaw that he would fall intending to propagate his kind under the condition of this lapsed estate we have recourse to no other reason then that which S. Paul imployed before us Where we may see the fault which hath been committed by them who to attaine the end of his glory by the absolute salvation of some and damnation of others no otherwaies qualified then as such persons have made the object of Gods predestination to be mankind not made but to be made the purpose of making mankind being the next meanes subordinate to the attaining of that end which the first decree proposed to God For besides that this ingages God to procure the fall of man and the sins in which the reprobate finally persevere no otherwise then the grace in which the Elect depart it makes God to predestinate onely a number and to reprobate the same there being no other consideration possible to be had upon those that are supposed not to be as yet but onely that they may be so many as God shall appoint of either kind So that the glory of God according to this monstrous imagination shall consist onely in saving such a number and in damning such an other rather then one more or one lesse of either sort Neither is this inconvenience cured by the position of those that have been called Sublapsariaus by as monstrous name as the other of Supralapsaians That God seeing mankind Lapsed from the state of innocence resolving to save so many of them to damne so many provided to send our Lord Christ with effectual means to save these leaving those unprovided of sufficient means to find their owne ruine For solong as those that are appointed to be saved and to be damned are qualified no otherwise then as men found in the common case of mans fall the glory of God is made to consist in damning somany of them and saving so many rather then one more or one lesse For the originall corruption in which we are borne though it renders the first Adam unrecoverable without the second yet it leaves every man in every instance undetermined to evill till by his owne choice of evill before good and the habit whâ—ch accrews by custome his naturall inclination to it become so determined that his choice determines without deliberating any more But suppose so many absolutely appointed to life and so many to death in this estate you suppose them respectively determined though not in particular what good or what evill they shall doe yet in generall to sin and to dye in sin or oâ— the other side to attaine the state of grace and to dye in it Vnlesse we thinke that God being God the absolute appointment of his Providence can â—e defeated Whereas in making God determine to save and to damne those who are qualified for each according to the Gospell But to give effectuall meanes of being so qualified to the one which out of his freedome he refutes the others granting them what he deemes to be sufficient we make the glory of God visible here in the one point not disparaging it if in the other it be for the present acknowledged with Saint Paul to be invisible For if there were any other Religion in the World which could pretend maintaynig the differences between good and bad the providence of God in all things and the reward of good and bad in another world to give further reason of the coming in and continuance of evill in the world there might be some pretense of prejudice to the priviledg which Christianity claimeth in maintayning those principles from the inability of declareing the reasons by which God dispenseth the meanes of his effectuall grace But there never was any other religion in the world that could pretend any such thing The Greekish Philosophers who were the Divines of the Gentiles some of them openly professed necessity and fate as the Stoicke thereby destroying freedome and contingence by the consequence Religion and all difference between good and bad much more the truth of Christianity consisting in a treaty for imbracing good and rejecting bad Others supposing this either renounced Providence and by consequence the being of God As Epicurus and his predecessors and followers or at least doubted of it in which mire it is more then probable that our master Aristotle sticks If with Plato and Pythagoras we suppose them clearely to acknowledge all this yet is there a way left either by making the materiall cause coexistent which God from everlasting with Plato or by presupposing those contrarieties of good and evill which Pithagoras imagined to have beene from everlasting made by consequence the principles of all that comes to passe in the World to advance some other cause of good and evill in this world then mans will under Gods providence And it is very remarkable that Epiphanius observes all the Sects of the Gnostickes whereof he of all others hath given us the most particulars proceeded upon a pretence of giving a reason for the coming in of evill into the world To wit by setting up two principles or Gods one the fountaine of evill the other of good Which together with the expresse testimonies of divers others of the Fathers witnessing that they had theire principles from the Greekish Philosophers seems to argue that they took their rise from a pretense of rendring an account of the beginning of evill as well as of good intimating thereby that Christianity did not sufficiently performe it as not pretending all to be declared till the generall judgement And this is the case of Marcionists Manichees For as for Jewes and Mahumetans I suppose there is no man so little read in the difference between them and Christians as to conceive that they can give account of Gods providence in the evill which he maintaineth to be in the world together with the meanes by which some come to life others to
with virgines and once maried people And shall thy sacrifice freely ascend And among other affections of a good minde wilt thou desire chastity for thee and thy wife I dispute not here how lawfull it is to pray for the dead which Tertullian touches again de Monogamiâ X. de Animâ LVIII This Tertullian supposes that if a Christian have two wives hee must offer that the Eucharist may be celebrated and that at the celebrating of it the Priest may pray for those whom hee mentions as the occasion of celebrating it The birth-dayes of Martyrs that is the Anniversaries of their sufferings was another occasion of celebrating the Eucharist as in Tertullian so in S. Cyprian Epist XXXIV Sacrificium pro eis semper ut meminiâ—â—is offerimus quoties Martyrum passiones dies annuâ commemoratione celebâ—an us Wee alwaies offer sacrifice for them as you remember when wee celebrate the yearly commemoration of the Martyrs suffering dayes Therefore where the â—ame S. Cyprian forbids offering the names of those that had fallen away in persecution and offering for them Epist IX XI hee forbids the receiving of their offerings and by consequence praying for them at the Eucharist Epiphanius Haer. XXX speaking of the Patriarch of the Jewes baptized in private 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The said Patriarâ—â—â—aâ—inâ—â—â— his hand a very considerable summ of gold streâ—ched out his hand and gave it to â—â—e Bishop saying Offer for mee S. Cyril of Jerusalem Catech. Mystag V. Eâ—roe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then that spiritual sacrifice that unbloudy service being done consecrâ—tâ—â— over that propitiatory sacrifice wee beseech God for the common peace of the Churches for the State of the world for the Kings their armies and allies for the sick c. adding that praying for the departed wee offer to God Christ cruciâ—â—ed â—or our sins to render him propitious to them and to us Of which effect in due place the intent hereby appears For here as hee calls it a Sacrifice upon the Consecration so hee plainly sets down wherein the propitiation which it effecteth consists according to the Catholick Church For to say truth to the purpose in hand I can produce nothing like that which I have said already in my Book of the Service of God at the Assemblies of the Church to which I remit you for the rest pag. 370-382 that in all the Liturgies there is a place where mention is to be made of all States of the Church for whom the Oblations out of which the Eucharist is consecrated are offered And likewise a place where the Eucharist being consecrated prayer is made in behalf of all States in the Church that is to say the Sacrifice of Christ his Crosse there present is offered up to move God to grant them all that is desired by the regular and continual prayers of the Church And among them there is a special place for those that offer at present If any man be moved to imagine that any part hereof is prejudicial to that Reformation which the Church of England professeth for I professe from the beginning not to be sâ—rupulous of offending those that offend it I remit him to that learned Appendix of Dr Field to his third book of the Church the purpose whereof in answer to the question where the Reformed Church was before Luther is to show that in this point as in others there handled the sense of the whole Church of Christ even to the time of Luther and to the Council of Trent was no other than that which the Church of England embraceth and cherisheth Thereby to show that the Reformation thereof never pretended to found a new Church but to preserve that which was by taking away those corruptions which time and the enemies of Christianity had sown in the Lawes and customs of it Which hee doth so evidently perform in this point that I must needs challenge any man that hath a minde to blast any thing here said with the staâ—e calumny of Popery to consider first Whether hee can prove those things which the Authors past exception there quoted declare to be the sense of the Catholick Church at that time to contain any thing prejudicial to the Gospel of Christ and that purity thereof which the Reformation pretendeth And because I know hee cannot do it I rest secure of all blasphemies or slanders that can be forged upon this occasion Openly professing that those who will not acknowledg that condition of the Gospel and the promises thereof which I have demonstrated to be essential to Christianity it is for their interest to defame the sense of the Catholick Church with the slanderous aspersions of Popery that so they might seduce miserable creatures to believe that there is a faith which inâ—itles them to the promises of the Gospel not supposing them converted to the Christianity which it rendereth For seeing that propitiation which the Sacrifice of the Eucharist pretendeth is grounded upon this condition of the Covenant of Grace as I have showed it is no mervail if they who pretend to reconcile the promises of the Gospel to the lusts of the flesh by which this world is injoyed indeavor to slander the purity of Christianity with those aspersions which they have seduced wretched people to count odious In fine it is not that consideration of a Sacrifice in the Sacrament of the Eucharist which the sense and practice of the Catholick Church inforceth but the violent interpretations of it which are made on both sides to both extremities that can give the leass pretense for division in the Church For while on the one side the sacrificing of Christ a new is so construed as if to doubt of the virtue of it in behalf of all that assist in it whether they communicate in it or not whether their devotions concurr to it or not were to doubt of the virtue of Christs Crosse it is no mervail if this create so great offense that the receiving of the Eucharist nay the assisting of it with the devotions of Christian people comes to be a mater of indifference On the other side while the renewing of the Sacrifice of Christ upon the Crosse by that representation thereof which the Eucharist tendreth for the redressing of the Covenant of Grace between God and those which receive is construed as prejudicial to that one Sacrifice whereby our Lord for ever hath perfected those whom hee sanctifieth no mervail if the very celebrating of it come to be a mater of indifference the effect whereof by believing that a man is predestinate or justified is had before and without it The mater of the Sacrifice then being so great a subject for the diviâ—ion upon so litle cause it is time for good Christians to awake and look about them and see that the lesse cause there is the greater good will the parties have to continue at distance In the mean time it is the common interest of Christianity even the means of their salvation by the
God delivered to the Church by the Apostles commanding them so to live For that which was as difficult as impossible to have been introduced without conviction of the will of God as the rest of Christianity of necessity must go for a part of it But that in such variety of mens fannies reasons and inclinations the Church consisting from the beginning of all Nations and dispersed all over the world should of their own inclination not swayed by any information of Gods will received with Christianity agree in the same Lawes and Rulers submitting to the exercise of the same Power upon themselves is as impossible as that the world should consist of the casual concurse of atomes according to Democritus and Epicurus The name of the Church without peradventure was first used to signifie the whole body of Gods people in the Wildernesse when they might be and were called together and assembled upon their common occasions which the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies After which time the people continuing still one and the same by virtue of the same Lawes then received and the Powers placed in their Ruler Not onely the whole people but such parts of it as resorted to the same Government have still born and do bear the same name The Synagogue of Libertines Cyrenaeans Alexandrians Cilicians and Asians by example Acts VI. 9. which name first belongs to the respective Bodies of Jewes that subsisted at Rome Cyrene or Alexandria in Cilicia or Asia And consequently by Metonymy to the Places where such of those Bodies as chanced to be at Jerusalem might assemble themselves And to so many of those Bodies as being at Jerusalem did assemble at those Places Now no Christian can doubt that the Body of Christians succeeds in the stead of Gods ancient people And therefore the name of Gods Church when it stands without limitation signifies no lesse As when our Lord saith Mat. XVI 18. Vpon this rock will I found my Church Whatsoever the Disciples then conceived the Church should be our Lord that knew all by the name of it meant all that duly beares the name And therefore when hee saith once again Mat. XVIII 17. Tell it to the Church It is strange there should be Christians that should think hee means the Jewes and their Rulers And that the precept concernes Christians no longer now they have left the Jewes Though it is true a man cannot tell his cause to the whole Church but to that part of it to which hee can resort which is called by the name of the Whole as I said even now of the Synagogue S. Paul to the Colossians II. 24 25. calling the Church the Body of Christ saith That hee by the dispensation of God towards them which hee is trusted with is become the minister of the Church to wit as Angels are ministers of the Church because ministers of God towards it And therefore minister of the whole Church which is the Body of Christ not of any particular Church as if an Apostle could be bound to execute his office according to the discretion of any Church which for Gods cause hee attends As all Ministers are bound to execute their Office according to the will of them whose Ministers they are It is therefore the whole Church in which God hath set Apostles Evangelists Prophets and the use of the Graces rehearsed 1 Cor. XII 28. Eph. IV. 11. Because the Office of these Graces can by no means be confined either to any particular Church or to any part of the whole Church The name of the Church signifies the same thing again Eph. I. 22. III. 21. V. 23-32 While all Christendome was contained in the Church at Jerusalem the name of the Church is so used Acts II. 47. V. 11. VIII 1 3. that it is no mater whether wee understand by it the whole Church or the Church of Jerusalem The reason Because all right and power that can at any time be found vested in the whole Church was then as fully in the Church at Jerusalem as it can be at any time in the whole Church though in respect of a Body never so much greater than it As a childe is as much a man the day of his birth as the day of his death and a tree as much as a tree when it growes one as when it is come to the height But Christianity being propagated among Jewes and Gentiles as wee reade of the Churches of Judaea Samaria and Galilee Acts IX 31. and must needs understand the Epistles to the Ebrewes to have been written to Churches consisting onely of Ebrewes as those of S. Peter and that of S. James which mentions the Elders of the Church James V. 14. So the Churches of the Gentiles in S. Paul Rom. XVI 4. wee easily understand to be the Churches of Asia 1 Cor. XVI 9. Apoc. I. 11. the Churches of Galâ—â—ia 1 Cor. XVI 1. the Churches of Macedonia 2 Cor. VIII 1. and the rest that were visible in S. Paâ—ls time Now suppose for the present that these Churches mentioned by the Apostles were no more than so many Congregations as our Independents would have it Seeing they deny not so many Churches to be so many Bodies what reason can they give why the name of the Church when it stands for the whole Church should not signifie the like There is a prerogative attributed to the whole Church by S. Paul 1 Tim. III. 25. when hee calls it the base and pillar of Truth For that this should be said of any particular Church it were too ridiculous to imagine Can the Church bear this attribute if it be not capable of doing any act that may verifie it And if it be not a Body what act can it do In fine the correspondence between Gods ancient people and his new Israel according to his Spirit seems to require That as the Religion of the Jewes and not any Civil Power of the Nation makes them all one Body at this day in point of fact by sufferance of Soveraignes because they were once so in point of right So the Religion of Christians should make them one Body in point of right how many Bodies soever they are burst into in point of fact by their own wantonnesse For the Independents exception which I spoke of can be of no force unlesse they will make it appear that all those Churches that are mentioned in the writings of the Apostles did assemble in one place Not that if this could be made to appear they had done their businesse But because if it do not appear their plea is peremptorily barred Wee reade then of M M M soules added in one day to CXX of the Church at Jerusalem Acts I. 15. II. 41. To these were added or with these they became VM Acts IV. 4. To whom were added multitudes of men and women Acts II. 47. V. 14. These assembled daily in private to serve God as Christians as well as in
show were it worth the while as also from whence they took their rise to do it And if he please to step over the water again into France I can show him a more lively picture of an Empire erected within an Empire when the Reformed Churches their had there Civil Assemblies to order the businesse which should arise upon the privileges which they had purchased by their arms for the maintaining of their Religion by force Whether by right or by wrong I say not here But this is the thing which hee calleth Imperium in Imperio the Popes temporal Power making him rather Soveraign above than within other Soveraignties But I have showed you already that this opinion never was the Faith of the Catholick Church but the position of the Papal Faction disclaimed at this day by the farre greater part of that communion though the contrary being countenanced the more make the greater appearance For my own opinion I have delivered it so clear in my book of the Right of the Church in a Christian State that these Authors might if they pleased to oversee all other Divines that deliver the same by that alone have seen what they had to refute And truly I do not believe that any of them can allege a more convicting reason against those that build a Soveraignty within a Soveraignty upon the Title of the Church than that which there is alleged from the Unity of the Church prophesied of in all the promises of the calling of the Gentiles which the constitution of one visible Church of all Christians fulfilleth For if the Church of several Soveraignties is to be one and the same Body by communicating in the Service of God upon supposition of the same Faith then cannot the foundation of it create any title of temporal right to the prejudice and disturbance of those Soveraignties from whence all force within their respective territories is derived If it be said that the supposition is impossible to wit that the Church should have power to Ordain Excommunicate decree and yet be indowed with no force to constrain those that are obliged to stand to the acts thereof The reason now alleged to the contrary is evident For if the obligation of the inward man be of force to resolve a Christian to part with his life to maintain the profession of it If it be part of that obligation which Christianity createth to hold communion with Gods Church is not this obligation enough to inforce the acts of the Church and that excommunication which inforces the same And for experience from the effect it is but alleging the subsistence of the Church till the time that Gregory II and III Popes withdrew their obedience and the obedience of those parts of Italy that followed them from the Emperor Leo Isaunus upon pretense of his erring in the Faith in putting down Images For that is the first example which Christendom hath brought forth of temporal freedom from allegiance due to the Soveraigne founded upon the Title of Christianity If yet it be evident that this was the case in which I see there is some difficulty made But before this time it can neither be said that the Church was not the same after Constantine as before nor that the power of it ever produced any rebellion against the Soveraign upon this Title more than when the Martyrs suffered for their Christianity without defending themselves by force And therefore when this Doctor for the ground of his opinion as visible to his imagination as the common notions in Euclide alleges that all Power all Jurisdiction all Lawes all Punishment all Government all Appeales all Councils are derived first and do lastly resort to the Secular Power no lesse in Ecclesiastical than in Secular Causes and concerning Ecclesiastical as well as Secular Persons because all force which constrains obedience is vested in it his imagination is meerly imbroyled with equivocation of words For all Power is nothing else but a moral quality consisting in the right of obliging other mens wills those in respect of whom the Power holds by the act of his or their wills that have it And what shall hinder God to create such an obligation upon the consciences of Christians by virtue of their Christianity not allowing them any force to inact it but the denial of the communion of the Church Whether the Rules of the Church be called Laws or Canons hee that is tied to hold communion with the Church is tyed to observe those Rules by which it subsists and if hee do not deserves to be set aside rather than the Unity thereof perish Whether yee call them Magistrates or Elders that are appointed to govern the Church it maters not if by virtue of Gods Law the obligation of obeying them be evident in the Scriptures Whether it be properly called Jurisdiction or not when a Christian is censured to be put out of the Church it shall have the same effect with that Jurisdiction whereby a malefactor is put out of the world according as the correspondence between the Church and the State will bear it How this may be counted punishment how not I will not say again having said it already In all causes and concerning all persons I acknowledge there lies an appeal to the Soveraign the Church having to do onely in Ecclesiastical causes concerning men as they are members of the Church and so accidentally when the Church is as large as the State all acknowledging the same Church the Jurisdiction thereof whether properly so called or not extending to as many as that of the State For the last appeal is one of those Jura Majestatis or Prerogatives wherein Soveraignty consisteth neither is it alienable though it is limitable by those termes which Christianity when it is acknowledged to come from God establisheth On the other side the Power of the Church though never so evidently settled by Christianity may be abused not only when it is extended to some temporal effect but also when it is extended beyond the ground and reason of that Christianity which it presupposeth Instances you have of both in the claimes of temporal Power and Infallibility in behalf of the Church And as there lies an appeal to a Heathen Soveraign professing not to persecute his Subjects for their Christianity but to protect them in it upon pretense that it is extended to a temporal effect so may there by an appeal to a Christian Soveraign upon pretense that it is extended beyond the bounds which Christianity alloweth So the Council of Aâ—tiochia appealed Aurelian because Paulus Samosatenus protected himself in his House belonging to the the Church by power derived from him But hee alloweth them that trial which Christianity settleth So Constantine received the appeal of the Donatists but referred the trial to the Church in a Council at Rome and again another at Arles representing all the West But of the bounds of Secular and Ecclesiastical power I must speak again That the
be baptized who cannot make or are tied to any such promise To these I say no more but this that it is one thing to answer arguments and to give grounds of a contrary truth another thing to object difficulties which even the truth is not clear of especially that which comes by revelation from without as Christianity doth Because to the verifying of revealed truth it is not necessary that all things should be alike clearly revealed that are necessary to the clearing of objections The obligation of sticking to that which is revealed taking place no lesse though something belonging to the clearing of it be not so clearly expressed And generally that which is evident is never the lesse evident because there is something else evident the evidence whereof I cannot reconcile with it But this I say not as though I meant to dismiss these difficulties without that which I conceive ought to satisfie But because I have learned of Aristotle that it is the fashion of the unlearned to demand at once both the grounds of the truth and the clearing of difficulties A thing which might be done here but so that another place would require it to be done againe and not without balking the order which I intend My designe will bring me in due time to speak with the Pelagians first and afterwards with the Anabaptists To those points I will remit the answer to these objections Onely for the present to the former of these doubts I would say this That all that hath been said hitherto concerns onely that disposition which he that will come to salvation by Christianity must be firmly qualified with as the condition which the Covenant of Grace requireth All which being supposed it may and doth still remaine questionable how and by what meanes in the nature of an effective cause a man becomes qualified with the disposition so required To wit whether by the meer force of free will or by the help of Gods Grace And that being resolved upon what consideration in the nature of a meritorious cause those helps of Gods grace are furnished To wit whether by the free Grace of God or in consideration of the merits and satisfaction of Christ provided by Gods free Grace as the reason for which and the measure by which the helps of his Grace are dispensed To the latter of them I would onely say here That I conceive I have here maintained that reason for the necessity of Baptisme to the salvation of all Christians upon which the necessity of the Baptisme of Infants is to be tied Which is to say in plain English That I have by the premises re-established that ground for the necessity of Baptisme in generall the unsetling whereof was the onely occasion to make the necessity of Baptizing Infants become questionable CHAP. VI. Justifying Faith sometimes consists in believing the truth Sometimes in trust in God grounded upon the truth Somtimes in Christianity that is in imbracing and professing it And that in the Fathers as well as in the Scriptures Of the informed and formed Faith of the Schools NOW for those Scriptures wherein the nature of justifying faith is described by those effects which the promises of the Gospel tender I must here observe that which all observe that faith is many times made by the Scriptures to consist in believing the truth of Christs Message which he came to preach Otherwhiles neverthelesse in a grounded trust and confidence in the goodnesse of God declared through Christ For what is more manifest then that of S. Paul Rom. X. 9. If thou shalt confesse with thy mouth the Lord Jesus and believe with thy heart that God raised him from the deád thou shalt be saved Where first that which the heart believeth is the rising of Christ from the dead signifying by one Article the rest of the Faith then that which the mouth professeth is nothing but the same truth Therefore neither the inward nor the outward act of faith reacheth any further then the acknowledgment of the said truth So the Apostle 1 John V. 15. 10. Every one that believeth that Jesus is the Messi as is begotten of God Who is he that overcomes the World but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God He that believeth in the Son of God hath the witnesse in himself He that believeth not God hath made him a liar because he believeth not the witnesse which God beareth of his Son Where it is plain that no difference is made between believing God and believing in the Son of God and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is no more then to believe Gods witnesse Mat. IX 28. Jesus faith to the blind Believe you that I am able to do this They say unto him yea Lord. Then touched he their eyes saying according to your faith be it unto you That faith which consisted in believing that he was able to do it So of John the Baptist our Lord Mat. XXI 32. John came to you in the way of righteousnesse and ye believed him not but the publicans and harlots believed him Which you seeing repeated not afterwards that ye might believe him And sure they obtained the grace of Christ that believed John the Baptish Our Lord to the father of the Lunatick Mat. IX 23. 24. If thou caust believe all things are possible to him that believeth And straight the father of the childe crying out said Lord I believe help my unbeliefe If thou canst believe that I am able to do this as afore Mat. XI 23. 24. He that shall say to this mountaine be thou removed and cast into the sea and doubt not in his heart but believe that what he sayeth cometh to passe is shall come to passe to him as he sayeth Therefore I say unto you all things that ye ask by prayer believe that ye shall receive and they shall come to passe to you John V. 24. He that heareth me and believeth him that sent me hath eternal life and cometh not into condemnation but is passed from death to life XX. 31. These things are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ the Son of God and that believeing ye may have life through his Name Acts VIII 37. Philip said to the Eunuch If thou believest with all thy heart thou mayest be baptized He answered and said I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God Upon which faith he is baptized Rom. IV. 3. Abraham believed God saying to him Thy seed shall be as the stars of heaven Gen. XV. 5. and it was impâ—â—â—ed to him for righteousnesse On the other side it is no rare thing to finde faith described by trust and confidence in God and the effects of saving faith ascribed to it as in the description of the Apostle Heb. XI 2. Now faith is the substance of thing hoped for the evidence of things not seen That which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is that which the Hebrew expresseth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
Christ not the Son of God who made the world they could not rightly say that they held God the Father So that his argument being proper against them demonstrates who they are And this is the reason of that which went afore And ye have an unction from the holy one and know all things I have not written unto you because ye know not the truth but because ye know it and that no ly is of the truth And of that which immediately followes Let that therefore which ye have learned from the beginning remaine in you If that remaine in you which ye have heard from the beginning ye also shall remaine in the Sonne and in the Father For because they knew what Faith they had imbraced when they became Christians no man need tell them that they who would not have our Lord Jesus to be the Christ were liars and the holy Ghost which good Christians receive upon the hearty profession of Christianity he justly presumes will maintaine them in it This for the text of Saint Jude But I say further that the Name of the true God the great God the onely God which all of them attribute to God is attributed to him in equivalent terms not onely in those texts of the Old Testament when the proper name of God is given to the Angels that spake in the person of God which I spoke of afore But also in those where the name attributes an action of the onely true great God are given to the Messias which we agree is our Lord Jesus And therefore that there can be no cause to bring in unusual figures of speech to expound these texts for fear they should say that which is so many times said in the Scriptures S. Paul Rom. XIV 10 11. We shall all stand before the judgement seate of Christ saith he For it is written As I live saith the Lord unto me shall every knee â—ow and every tongue give praise to God Which any man may see is said of God by his Prophet Isa XLV 23. And therefore I marvaile it should seem strange that the same person should be called the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ Titus II. 20. when the appearance there mentioned is not the appearance of the Father but of Christ who shall appear judge at the last day though he have from the Father the glory wherein he shall appear Againe when he saith 1 Cor. II. 8. Had they known they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory It is manifest that he ascribes unto Christ the title of the onely true and great God in Psal XXIV 7 8 9 10. So the Apostle Heb. I. 10. affirming that to be said of Christ which we read Psal CII 25 26 27. Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth and the heavens are the work of thine hands They shall perish but thou shalt indure They all shall wax old as doth a garment And as a vesture shalt thou fold them up and they shall be changed but thou art the same and thy years shall never fail For whereas they grant that the end is of Christ where he speakes of ending the world at his coming to judgement But not the beginning where he speaks of making the world because there he is called by the proper name of God I call all the world to witnesse what there is in the words to argue that he speakes not still of the same person of whom he began to speak What will they not do to rack the Scriptures and force them to say what they never meant that are not ashamed to advance pretenses in which there is so little appearance rather then confesse what all the Church of Christ maintaineth So when the Prophet sayes Mal. III. 3. Behold I send my messenger and he shall sweepe the way before thee and suddenly shall the Lord whom ye seek come to his Temple It is so manifest that he ascribes the title of the onely true God to the Messias that Grotius who is so much carried away with the Socinians exposition of divers texts in this point could not forbear to say that the hypostaticall union is signified by this And therefore it is manifest what Lordship we are to understand where Zachary saith to the Baptist his Sonne Thou shalt go before the face of the Lord to prepare his wayes Luke I. 46. So when the Prophet David saith of the Messias Psal CX 1. The Lord said to my Lord sit thou on my right hand untill I make thine enemies thy footstool And the Apostle inferreth upon it Heb. I. 13. To which of the Angels said he ever Sit thou at my right hand untill I make thine enemies thy footstoole He remitts us for his meaning to that which he had premised there of Christ Heb. I. 3. that having merited by himself the cleansing of our sinnes he sate down on the Throne of Majesty in the highest heavens And againe Heb. VIII 1. We have such an high Priest as is set down on the right hand of the Throne of Majesty in the heavens For the Majesty of God being presented in the Scripture by that which is most glorious upon earth of a King upon his Throne as king of heaven and earth whose commands all the Angels stand about the Throne ready to execute To seat our Lord Christ upon the same Throne is to commit the highest degree of treason against the Majesty of God by challenging for him the honour due to God alone if he be not the same God on whose behalfe those words challenge it Ask any Jew that hath learned God from the Old Testament what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Thron of Glory is or rather what he is that sits on it and see if he do not refuse our Lord Christ that priviledge because he must allow him to be the onely true God if he do not But why should I be troubled to fit him with the title of the onely true God wo expressely challenges to be esteemed aequall to God John V. 21 22 23. For as the Father raiseth and quickneth the dead so also doth the Sonne quicken whom he please For neither doth the Father judge any man but hath given all judgement to the Sonne that all may honour the Sonne as they honour the Father He that honoureth not the Sonne honoureth not the Father that sent him Which is as much as if he had said he that honoureth not the Sonne as he honoureth the Father having said afore That all may honour the Sonne as they honour the Father As for that answer of his John X. 32-36 The Jewes answered him saying For a good work we stone thee not but for blasphemy and because thou being man makest thy self God Jesus answered them Is it not written in your Law I have said ye are Gods If he called them Gods to whom the Word of God came and the Scripture cannot be voided Tell you him whom the Father hath sanctified and
Whatsoever my Father giveth me shall come to me And No man can come to me unlesse my Father that sent me draw him And the Apostle 1 John VI. 19. We love him because he loved us first Heb. XII 2. Every good and perfect gift is from above and cometh down from the Father of lights with whom is no change or shadow of turning Gal. VI. 3. If any man think himself something being nothing he deceives himself Heb. XIII 22. God make you of one mind in every good work to do his will working in you that which is acceptable before him through Jesus Christ To wit by the meanes of his Spirit 2 Tim. â— 9 10. It is God that hath saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our works but his owâ— purpose and grace given us through Christ Jesus before eternall times but now manifested by the appearance of our Saviour Jesus Christ having abolished death but shined forth life and incorruption by the Gospel The abolishing of death and the declaration of eternall life wherein the calling of men to Christianity consists together with the saving of us which is effected by meanes of the Sonne how these things come by Christ we learn from his words John XII 24 31 32 33. Verily verily I say unto you If a graine of wheat fall not into the earth and dy it remaineth alone But if it dy it beareth much fruit And Now is the judgement of this world Now shall the prince of this world be cast forth And I when I am lifted uâ— from the earth will draw all men to me This he said signifying what death he should dy But signifying also what should be the force and effect of that death Then those Scriptures which make charity to be the gift of God and of the holy Ghost John IV. 7. Rom. V. 5. 1 Cor. XII 31. XIII 1. Gal. V. 22. which holy Ghost our Lord Christ by his death hath obtained for us as afore Unto all which I will adde in the last place those which speake of the predestination of God as it signifies no more then the preparation of that grace from everlasting whereby we are saved in time S. Paul indeed when he excludes the presumption which the Jews had of being saved by the Law as the Fathers they thought were distinguishing between the seed of Abraham according to the flesh and according to promise Rom. IX 6-13 which promise he supposes to be the forerunner of Christs Gospel Manifestly declares no more then the question which he is there engaged in requires him to declare To wit that they were not saved by virtue of the Law but by virtue of that Grace which now the Gospel openly tendereth So that Israel and Esau holding the figure of the Jews that expected to be saved by the works of the Law Isaac and Jacob consequently answer the Christians who expect salvation not by their birth but by Gods promise not by works but by him that calleth To wit to the said promise Whereby it appeareth that the words of the Prophet which he alledgeth Jacob have I loved and Esau have I hated signify no more according to the spirituall sense of the Old Testament which the New Testament yeildeth but the accepting of the Church in stead of the Synagogue of the Christians in stead of the Jews And that this is the purpose of God according to choice which S. Paul speakes of immediately afore In as much as God purposed from the beginning when first he took the seed of Abraham from among the Nations to place his name among them that his choice ones of Isaacs posterity as well as Abrahams should be those that bore the figure of the Christian Church promised afore and born upon the promise that they should be beloved All this being granted which I count most true and undeniable notwithstanding the purpose of God according to choice as it expresses a declaration of receiving the Church in stead of the Synagogue so it implies and presupposes a purpose of God to make and to build Christs mysticall body which is the Church upon which purpose of God all those prophesies are grounded whereby God foretelleth of his new people Israel according to the Spirit which Christians know to be those children which he raised up to Abraham out of the stones For we cannot think so slightly of Gods providence that by foretelling this secret he obliges himself onely to finde sufficient meanes to convert men to Christianity But also those which should take effect and bring to passe the conversion of the World to Christianity by the Gospel of Christ Seeing then that the Church is nothing but the souls whereof it consisteth and that the foreknowing and the foretelling of the Church which Christians believe to be fulfilled consisteth in foreknowing and foretelling the conversion of those persons who have constituted and shall constitute the number of believers from the preaching of Christianity til the worlds end It followeth that this purpose of God according to election can no way stand without an intent of God to bring the said election that is this multitude of Gods choice ones to Christianity whether by the preaching of the Gospel or by the helps which depend thereupon as it depends upon Christs death And this is most manifest by S. Pauls answer to an objection which followes upon his conclusion of this point That if God hath mercy upon whom he pleaseth and pardons whom he pleaseth he has no cause to complaine of any man to wit of the Jews who believe not because no man can resist his will That is to say because he is able to convert them if he please Which inference S. Paul not denying that God could convert the unbelieving Jews if he pleased thus avoideth Nay O man who art thou that disputest with God shall the pot say to the potter Why hast thou made me thus and afore What shall we say then Is there injustice with God God forbid For he saith to Moses I will have mercy on whom I have mercy and I will have compassion on whom I compassionate So it is not in the willing nor in the running but in God that shewes mercy Rom IX 18 19 20. 15 16. Where it is plaine that S. Paul no way denies the truth of the assumption That God may if he please imploy such meanes as shall make any man a Christian How he avoides the consequence is another matter and not belonging to this dispute inasmuch as it is manifest to all that understand learning that it is one thing to prove a truth another to clear the objections that ly against it That I shall indeavour to do before I leave the businesse In this I shall think thus much evidenced by the premises that God who knew from the beginning of the sending of Christ and inabling his Apostles and their successors of the Church to convict the world of it who should obey the Gospel and who
thence forth to recover man from the labor of sinne to which when he became mortall he was condemned to Paradise from whence he had been expulsed And therefore our Lord Christ according to S. Peter 1 Pet. IV. 18 19 20. going out of the world by that Spirit whereby he was made alive when he had been put to death in the flesh to wit speaking in his Apostles preached to the Spirits in prison that had been disobedient in the days of Noe Converting the Gentiles by the gift of his Spirit granted upon his sufferings who had refused the same in Noe the Preacher of righteousnesse 1 Pet. II. 5. When God said My Spirit shall no more strive with man Gen VI. 2. For the pilgrimage of the Patriarchs the Promise of the Land of Canaan the Law given by Moses was all but the further limitation and rule of that outward and civile conversation under which the traffique of Christianity was then driven by Prophets who spake by Gods Spirit This Reason Socinus being obliged to miskenne by making our Lord Christ a meer man cannot give that account of the grace of Christ before his coming which the Church doth Acquiting thereby my position That the Law covenanteth expresly onely for the Land of Promise of all suspicion of compliance with his intentions By this you see that Pelagius and Socinus both are carried out of the way of Christianity because they will not acknowledge the decay of mankind by the fall of Adam and the coming of Christ to repair it But those of Marseilles and the parts adjoyning in France that formalized themselves against S. Augustines doctrine of Predestination and effectuall Grace freely and heartily acknowledging Originall sin seem to have justified only upon the true interest of Christianity in that free will which the Covenant of Grace necessarily supposeth though mistaking their way out of humane frailty they failed of the truth though they parted with Pelagius They made faith or at least the beginning of faith and of will to beleive to repent and to turn unto God the work of free will in consideration whereof God though no way tied so to do grants the help of his Grace and Spirit to performe the race of faith Most truly maintaining according to that vvhich hath been professed in the beginning of this book that the act of true Faith is an act of mans free will which God rewardeth with his free Grace To wit with the habituall gift of his spirit inabling true believers to go through with that Faith which thereby they undertake as I have shewed you both these elsewhere Most expresly acknowledging the preaching of the Gospel going before in which whatsoever help the coming of our Lord Chirst hath furnished to move and winne the world to believe is involved But miskenning the grace of the Gospel granted by God in consideration of his obedience to make him a Church that might honour him for it If Pelagius acknowledged no more in the coming of Christ then to make his message appear to be true so that the imbracing of it might oblige God to grant his grace by preventing it with an act of free will complying with it The reason was not because this very tender being the purchase of our Lord Christs free obedience could be subject to any merit of man But because he was engaged to maintaine that we are borne in the same estate in which Adam was made needing nothing but Gods declaration of his will and pleasure towards the fulfilling of it But for them who acknowledge the decay of our nature by the fall of Adam and the coming of our Lord to repair the breaches of it to ascribe the grace which God furnisheth those that believe with for the performing of that which by believing they undertake to the act of freewill in believing which themselves acknowledge to be prevented by so many effects of Christs coming as the preaching of his Gospel necessarily involveth and which the Scriptures so openly acknowledge to be prevented by the Grace of his Spirit purchased by his sufferings must needs argue a great deal of difficulty in the question which the worse divines they appear must needs justifie them to be much the better Christians And indeed there is great cause to excuse them as farre as reason will give leave in a case wherein the Fathers that went afore Pelagius seem to be ingaged with them For it is ordinary enough to read them exhorting to lay out the indeavovrs of free will expecting the assistance of Gods Grace to the accomplishment of that which a man purposes And besides S. Augustine who acknowledges that before the contest with Pelagius he did think faith to be the act of free will which God blesseth with Grace to do as he professeth It cannot be denied that S. Jerome so great an enemy to the Pelagians with some others have expressed that which amounts to it But it is true on the other side that the same Fathers do frequently acknowledge the beginning as well as the accomplishment of our salvation to the grace of God Which is not onely an obligation so to expound their sayings when they set free will before grace as supposing the cure thereof begunne by Grace But also a presumption that those who expresse not the like caution are no otherwise to be understood Especially supposing expresly the motives of faith provided by the holy Ghost granted in consideration of our Lords sufferings in virtue whereof the resolution which is taken for the best must of necessity proceed though by the operation of the same Spirit whereby they are advanced and furnished It is therefore no doubt a commendable thing to excuse the writings of that excellent person John Casiane so farre as the common Faith will give leave as you may see the learned Vossius doth as speaking ambiguously in setting grace before free will sometimes as well as other whiles free will before Grace For Faustus his book De libero arbitrio I cannot say the same though I must needs have that respect for his Christian qualities which the commendations that I read of him in Sidoius Apollinaris deserve For besides that the stile of it is generally such as seems to make free will the umpire between the motions of grace and of sinne which ascribes the ability of well doing to God but the act to our selves that the Fathers under the Law of nature were saved by free will he delivers expresly with Pelagius An oversight grosse enough in any man that shall have considered upon what terms Christianity is to be justified against the Jews out of the Old Testament There is therefore appearance enough that the II Council of Orange which finally decreed against the heresie of Pelagius was held expresly to remove the offenses which that book had made And evidence enough that the articles of it are justified by the tradition of the whole Church For those prayers of the Church that way and subject of
from the whole Church For to require me to believe them to be in the torments prepared for the devil and his angels because I cannot say where they are were a reason too unreasonable for a Christian CHAP. XXI The opinion that makâ—s the Predetermination of mans will by God the sourse of his freedom And wherein Jansenius differs from it Of necessity upon supposition absolute The necessity of the Will following the last dictate of the understanding is onely upon supposition As also that which Gods foresight creates The difference between indifferent and undetermined These things thus premised as concerning that estate wherein the Gospell overtaketh the will of man to whom Christ is tendered being under original sin I say that it findes him not void of that freedome of choice in doing or not doing this or that which stands in opposition to necessity But that which stands in opposition to the bondage and servitude of sin This position is intended to contradict an opinion which seemeth to be very ordinary among Divines as well of the Reformation as the Church of Rome though more ingeniously professed and maintained by these Who pretending to derive the efficacy of Gods Predestination and the grace which it provideth from that decree of his Will whereby he determineth the will of his creature to do or not to doe watsoever is indeed don or not don in order of nature before it determine it selfe do consequently professe that notwithstanding this Predetermination of the will is no lesse effectuall then Gods omnipotence whereof it is the immediate and indefeasible consequence and effect yet there is no freedome in the creature no contingence in the effects of it but that which followeth upon this will of God determining understanding Creatures to do that which they do freely as it determining understanding Creatures to do that which they do necessarily This position though I intend not to admit yet I count it a point of ingenuity in them who think they free themselves of great dificulties by supposing it expressely to maintaine the truth of that supposition whereof they make so much advantage For they who not daring to incounter the difficulties wherewith it is chargeable do claime the consequences of it without premising the expresse supposition of it do as good as say nothing where they advise not the reader of those difficulties which the prime principle that they proceed upon is burthened with But he that sees how particular instances depend upon generall principles shall not stick to judge of their positions by the dependance they have upon this supposition so soon as they are informed of the credit which it deserves Now this predetermination Being the immediate effect of Gods omnipotency as for the cause of it as for the nature of it troubles very much those that maintaine it to say wherein it consists as indeed it may very well trouble any man to say of what colour a Chimaera is being in rerum natura just nothing For if they say it is a principle infused by the immediate worke of grace into the Will it is straightwaies evident that the having of it is not to make the Will able which all habituall indowments tend to but to make it actually to worke It must therefore consist in a certain motion or impulse immediately wrought by God in the Will which though it is not in the will to have depending meerely upon the Will of God yet that neither good nor ill can be don without it being necessary as they think to the effectuall determining of the will upon two accounts First as the will is a secondary cause that cannot worke unlesse moved by the first cause Secondly as the Will not being determined of it selfe cannot be determined to any act but by the same first cause But these two accompts seem to me both one For nothing can determine the will to act speaking of that which determines it formally or in the nature of a formall cause but the act of it For supposing the will to act and excluding whatsoever else might be considered the will remaines determined Not suposing that it may further be questioned what determines it The question then being onely what it is that determines the will in the nature of the effective cause the difficulty that causeth the question is but one because it is presumed that the second cause can not act if not acted that is determined to act by the first The nature then of this motion received lodged in the Will is imagined neverthelesse to be successive such as is the being of colours in the aire when they goe to the eye or that impulse which a handicraft-man moves his tooll with And the necessity of it standeth upon a generall account not of originall sine but of Gods creature such as the will in all estates is requisite to the acts of the will because nothing can be don by the creature but that which God shall determine it to do But there is of late an other opinion started in the Church of Rome by Jansenius in his Augustinus which maintaines that the Will in all actions that are goâ—d according to Christianity is determined by grace effectually inclining the will by the love of true good preventing not expecting the motion thereof and producing that influence of the will whereby formally it acteth The nature of it then consists in that very act of life whereby the reasonable creature exerciseth its choice no waies requisite to the actions of nature which man is able to do under originall sin but meerely upon that account as the cure of it restoring the due command over that concupiscence wherein originall sin consisteth and not extending to the state of innocence Which notwithstanding the will is no lesse naturally determined by it then by that principle which the other opinion advanceth For they say both that the will is not determined by the object howsoever proposed but morally as he that outwardly adviseth or perswadeth determines him that resolves upon that consideration which he advanceth to that which he proposeth And therefore this determination both agree satisfies not that efficacy of grace which the scriptures proposed in the premises require Therefore as the former opinion determineth the will naturally by a principle really lodged in the nature of the wil so this by the very vitall act of vvilling really subsistng in the nature of the Will though produced by God a cause above nature which when the delight in good which it importeth is so great as to swallow up all contradiction it determineth to the same preventing the determination of it selfe when otherwise acknowledging that though of the same nature with that which overcometh it is never the lesse defeasible From this ground there flowes an other difference between these two opinions we goe further from the fountaine head still more visible For the former admitting free will to be a faculty able to act or not to act supposing all
that is requisite to inable it in particular the helps of Gods grace assoiles all dificulties by distinguisting the compound sense of those sayings which expresse contradiction between predetermination and freedome from the divided sense of the same For example if it be said That to which the Will is predetermined must needs come to passe Therefore the will cannot be free to choose whether it shall be done or not the answer is That the will is able to do otherwise in sâ—nsu diviso non in sensu composito dividing it from the determination of it that is not being determined but not putting it and the determination of it together that is being determined So the will hath as they say simultatem potentiae not potentiam simultatis That is in their barbarous latine a power of doing this as well as that at one the same time not a povver of chusing or acting both this and that at one the same time For the ability of doing may well stand with the actuall choice of not doing but actually at the same time to choose to do and not to doe are terms inconsistent as it may be truely said that a white wall may be black though not supposing it continue white This distinction I cannot see how Jansenius can imploy though he think he may whether it serve or the other opinion to any purpose not For or that in difference wherein the first opinion maintaineth the very nature of freewill to consist at least in words whether they signifie any thing or not the second maintaineth to be so far from the nature of it that the freedome of the Will is not to be had and obtayned without either abating or extinguishing all indifference in it The will being free from sin and slave to righteousnesse which is an addition making the slavery of the will no slavery but the freedome thereof perfect freedome or else free from righteousnesse and slave to sin which slavery is perfect slavery but imaginary freedome according as it growes of in different determined to righteousnesse or to sin which he pretendeth to be the onely freedome whereof it is capable And how then should Jansenius imploy the distinction premised to salve that in difference of the will which he disavoweth And therefore in consequence hereunto they can neither admit that any help of grace is sufficient that is not effectuall and so that he who keeps not the covenant of grace was ever able to keep it Nor that our L. Christ shed his blood for any but them who are and shall be actually saved by it As for those of the Reformation amongst whom it is manifest that this great question of the agreement between Grace and freewill is as hotly disputed as in the Ch. of Rome upon the whether of these opinions they ground themselves who reject Arminius and the Lutherans it is not so easy to say as it may clerly be said that they must chuse the one or the other if they wil speake things consequent to their own principles It is manifest that Doctor Twisse hath imbraced the former which he that should say that any of the rest have forborne to imploy either because they could not make it popular to the capacity of vulgar understandings or because they found not themselves able to manage it perhaps should not conjecture much amisse But we have of laâ—e a work of one Doctor Strang late of Glascowe De voluntate actionibus Dei circa peccatum wherein he maintaines at large against Doctor Tuisse in particular that it makes God the author of all sin and by consequence plucks up all Christianity by the roots For the rest professing to imbrace the opinion of Jansenius as concerning the predetermination of mans will to all works of supernaturall Grace though not undertaking to maintaine it he hath added unto it that wherein it is certainely defective To wit an account how evill can be foreknowne by God not determining the will of the creature to act it For this being done the same account will serve to reconcile the freewil of the creature both to the activity of providence in generall and to the efficacy of predestination in matters concerning the world to come Which how securely soever Jansenius passe by he may think that he hath secured the point of faith concerning the grace of Christ but he cannot think that he hath satisfied any divine that the rest of the question can be resolved according to his opinion as the reason of Christianity requireth I am much in feare that our Puritan Preachers when they swagger over the Arminians in their pulpits do neither inform them how great a part of the reformation as all the Lutherans make is on their side neither the Church of England nor that of Rome having given sentence in the whole question nor what difficulties their own opinion is liable to which it would make theire hearts ake to overcome For my part finding the determination of the Synod of Dort against Arminius not to reach the whole question concerning the reconciling of mans freedome as well to Gods foreknowledg and providence as to his predestination and grace I have thought best to propose the opinion of predetermination which pretends to do it but does it not as I suppose together with that wherein Jansenius varies from it to make such a resolution as I am able to propose in so difficult a businesse the better to be understood Now for that which I propose that the will of man though under Originall sin is free from necessity though not free from bondage which is to say that neither as a second cause nor upon the account of Adams fall it is determined to do or not to doe that which indeed it doth I must distinguish that necessity upon supposition is not that necessity which the will of man is free from and which the contingence of the effects thereof is opposite to For if any thing be said to be necessary upon supposition not of the cause which necessarily produceth it but of it selfe which is supposed to be well may it be said necessarily to be because it is upon necessity as every thing that is must needs be because that you suppose that it is In like maner if you suppose any thing which implyeth the being of another thing as if a man see London-stone because no man sees that which isnot this supposition inferres not that necessity which destroyes freedom because it imports the being of that which you suppose that it is That necessity that destroieth freedom contingence is antecedent to the being of contingencies in the nature of an effective cause though not alwaies absolute For he which will speak properly and safely must not call any thing absolutely necessary but God alone and his perfections from whose freewill all the necessity that is found in his creatures proceedeth But in regard that we see the Sun rise and set alwaies in one constant order the
fire alwaies burn the earth alwaies keep the place truly we distinguish these things as necessary from those that come to passe either so or otherwise as having a presumption from so much experience of the wil of God which all things must obey already part upon the course of their nature bythe causes which being thereby produced cannot but by the same will be defeated But of this I do not see what question can remaine One kind of determination I shall grant upon the premises that the will of man is liable to that necessity which it inferreth not prejudicing the freedom of it I grant that the will necessarily followeth the last and ultimate dictate of the practick understanding setting this grant aside as impertinent to the question in dispute imports more then a judgement that it is best to doe or not to doe this or that For the last dictate of the understanding that advises about doing or not doing this or that or that it ought to be done or not don by him that will do as he ought For it is manifest that a man many times does not doe that which he is resolved that he ought to do And so it may fall out that such a dictate or sentence shall not be the last or ultimate dictate of the understanding because falling to advise anew after that sentence it may find some new consideration whereupon it may resolve to proceed otherwise then afore Therefore the last or ultimate dictate of the understanding cannot be understood to be any other then that which is effectuall that is to say when it is supposed that the effects followe upon it And upon these terms I grant that the will is necessarily determined by the last dictate of the understanding in as much as it is supposed to be necessary that the will be determined by some judgement of the understanding either expressely pronouncing or implicitly resolving that this or that is for the best to be done or not done So that he that saies that the will is necessarily determined by the last judgement of the understanding saies no more but this that the will is necessarily determined by that judgement which determines it For supposing it is the last you suppose that the will proceeds to action upon it So that the necessity which all this inferrs is no prejudice to freedome or contingence being only the necessity of that which must needs be because you suppose that it is The like is to be said of the foreknowledge or foresight which God hath of whatsoever shall at any time come to passe and the necessity which though it causeth not yet it inferreth For no man can know that which is not true nor see that which is not in being neither can that be foreseen which is not to have being at that time when it is foreseene to come to passe And therefore all foresight necessarily implies a supposition of the future being of that which is foreseen A thing necessarily true howsoever we suppose the will to be determined to do whatsoever it doth that is to say whatsoever we suppose to bee the ground of Gods foresight For supposing that God from everlasting foresaw that S. Paul should be converted at such a moment of time because he had a purpose from everlasting to determine his will freely to imbrace Christ at that moment of time yet was not S. Paul converted because God foresaw that he should be converted but because he was to be converted therefore God foresaw that he should be converted Indeed we are to distinguish three instances in the knowledg of God concerning future contingencies In the first he sees what may come to passe In the second what shall come to passe In the third what is come to passe The first by the perfection of his nature The second by the decree of his will giving stedy order to things of themselves moveable as Boethius says that is to contingencies For we suppose contingence to stand with providence and we inquire how that consistence may appeare The third by the act of freedome seene from everlasting before the will that doth it have being in those very decrees in the execution whereof providence consists There is in an architect or survayor of buildings a certain knowledg of that which he designeth before he goe to work consisting in a certaine Idea or form which his businesse is to copy out of his mind into the materialls But when his worke is done he sees that in being before his eyes which he saw in his own designe afore The wisdome of God is that soverain art which directed him in making heaven and earth and ordaining whatsoever comes to passe in both The decree of his will whether immediate or mediate distinguishes between that which may be and that which is at the present and therefore in the same sort between that which may be and that which shall be for the future But though his knowledge increase not when he sees that in being which formerly he saw was to be because he goes not beyond himselfe for the knowledge of it yet to see that it supposeth the act of the freedome which doth it past to see that it shall be to come In like maner therefore whilst the act of the creature appeareth to God as to come he seeth what shall be But if all future contingencies be present to God from everlasting then consequently he sees also from everlasting the act of that freedome which produceth them as don in the due time of it and in this sight consisteth the effect of the same presence of future contingencies in and to Gods eternity from everlasting There is therefore in God a certaine kind of knowledge of that which is to come which Divines call scientiam visionis whereby God sees from everlasting thegreatest contingencies to come to passe at that moment of time when we see them come to passe which whatsoever is the ground of it whether it be posible for us to say how it is possible or not yet this we must say of it that it presupposeth the future being of that which it foreseeth and therefore is no way the cause of it Though the future being thereof presupposeth also that knowledg in God which directeth that freedome which bringeth it to passe So that the Fathers of the Church had cause to insist against those Heretickes that derived the â—ourse and originall of sin in the world from some other cause then the freewill of the creature and the abuse of it that future contingencies come not to passe because God foretells that they will come to passe But that God foretells that they will come to passe because they are future contingencies that is things which though contingent yet shall come to passe therefore that Gods foresight infers no necessity in those things which he foresees shall come to passe by the free choice of the creature For though there remaineth yet a further question concerning
children as a henne gathers her chickens under her wings and ye would not Behold your house is left unto you desolate And S. Steven Acts VII 51. Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in hearts and ears you do alwaies crosse the holy Ghost as did your Fathers And the Scribes and Pharisees in the Gospel made void the counsel and purpose of God towards them Luke VII 30. But above all you have the purpose of God manifested by the Gospel of sending our Lord Christ for the salvation of the World as John the Baptist sayes John I. 29. Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sinne of the World And our Lord to Nicodemus John III. 16 17. God so loved the world that he gave his onely begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him may not perish but have life everlasting For God senâ— not his Son into the World to condemn the World but that the world by him might be saved And S. Paul commandeth Timothy that prayers be made by the Church for all men even for the Powers of the World then their enemies as a thing pleasing to God Who saith he would have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth For there is one God and one Mediator between God and man the man Christ Jesus who gave himself an expiation for all to be witnessed in his own time 1 Tim. II. 4 5 6. And if there be any other passages of the New Testament as others there are to witnesse that Christ is given by God for the reconciliation and salvation of all mankind One I will not omit because the mistake which is alledged to divert the sense of it is remarkable 2 Pet. III. 9. God slacketh not his promise as some men count slacknesse but is slow to wrath in our regard not willing that any should perish but all come to repentance Which they will have to signify that he would have none of us that is of the elect to perish because it is said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is patient towards us the elect They might have seen that this is not the meaning of the words by Luke XVIII 7. Shall not God avenge his elect that cry to him day and night though slow to wrath in regard of them I tell you he shall avenge them speedily 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 though slow to take vengeance in regard of them upon their oppressors Is here 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 slow to take vengeance upon our oppressors for us which he hath promised to take 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Syriack 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Greek of the New Testament signifying the delaying of vengeance due to them that oppresse Christians as you see by S. Luke the Apostle attributes to the desire of saving those whom he spares Nor will I stop here to shew you the insufficience of those expositions which in despite of the words are fastned upon these texts to avoid the difficulties which they create to prejudicate opinions For it is manifest that the consequence of them is no more but the very same that arises from any Scripture that testifies the meanes which God uses for the good of any man to become frustrate through his fault In consideration whereof that God shall call them to account at the last day who either being convict of the truth of his Gospel or having meanes offered to be informed of the same imbrace it not or having imbraced it notwithstanding persevere not in it by living as Christ requireth Or on the contraty that he shall reward them who imbrace it and persevere in it Which being so many that they are not to be avoided without setting a great part of the Scripture upon the rack I count it not worth the while to insist here that S. Pauls meaning is not that God would have some of all estates to be saved or that he would have many to be saved or those that are saved to be saved or upon any other of those lame expedients which have been applied to plaister the wound which these plain texts do make But I insist upon this that the meaning of them cannot be That God would have those onely to be saved that shall be saved Having such a swarm of Scriptures to evidence how many things there are which God would have done and are not done having all the importunities and complaints which God useth by his Prophets to assure us that he would have found that obedience at the handes of his ancient people which he found not all the preachâ—ng of his Gospel all the motives of believing all the exhortations to accept and perform the Covenant of Grace in the New Testament ready to witnesse what men are to give account for at the day of judgement All which must be satisfied before there can be cause to balk the plain meaning of S. Pauls words which cannot seem inconvenient in any other regard but because they make God to will that which comes to passe all the Scripture witnessing that all that shall be condemned shall be condemned for not doing that which God would have them do For wheresoever Gods justice punishes there is it of necessity that man had sufficient meanes to do otherwise Where it rewardes there was possibility of transgressing there was a capacity of indifference and a will actually undetermined to do or not to do this or that notwithstanding originall sinne But first to declare what I understand this antecedent will of God to be I must distinguish with some divines that God must not be said to will this because of that or for that but may be said to will that this be because of that or for that Deus non vult hoc propter hoc sed vult hoc esse propter hoc When I say because of that or for that I extend the observation to two kindes of causes To the finall cause for which a thing is said to be done and to the motive or impulsive cause because of which a thing is said to be done when we speak of the doings of understanding and free causes For these having something in consideration to move them to do what they do this motive which they consider holds on the side of the effective cause in as much as there had been no proceeding without the consideration of it Though it is also true that the motion which consideration produces being so called but out of that resemblance which it holdeth with the motions which naturall things are visibly transported with importeth no more then the appetite of some good thing the want whereof they apprehend which is nothing else but the effect of the finall cause So that the motive cause is no other then the finall cause in respect of that effect which it hath indeed moved the effective cause to produce So then when I say that God willeth not this for that or because of that I say that God can have no ends upon his creatures being
effect in which the action of the creature endeth will enforce that God is as properly said to give light as the sunne to burn as the fire to do that act which is essentially sinne as the man that sinnes And therefore at once not to sinne because we suppose his concourse tied by the originall Law of creation to the determination of his creature And to sinne as producing immediately whatsoever is in that action which is essentially sinne For unlesse the species or nature of the act importing generally no sinne were a thing subsisting by it self as by the understanding it is considered setting aside the sinne which the particular that is acted implyeth as Plato is supposed to have maintained his ideas it is impossible that he who doth the act which is essentially sinne should be said truly not to sinne The Law of concurring to the doing of sinne and producing the act which essentially importeth it necessarily drawing the imputation thereof upon him that freely tied himself by setling it Let it once be said therefore that God made the fire able to burn the sunne able to shine the will of man able to make a free choice as he is a reasonable creature and it will be very impertinent to require any action but that of the fire to the consuming of wood but that of the sunne to the dispelling of darknesse supposing God to maintaine or rather to issue every moment the ability of burning or shining once given his creature from his own spring head of being so long as his creature indureth And therefore if ever God made the will able to chuse the doing or not doing of this before that upon the direction not of right reason which directeth not to sinne but alwayes of reason for all choice supposes reason to direct it it is impertinent to suppose any thing requisite to the exercise of this freedome of choice but the maintenance of reason issuing from the fountaine of Gods Wisdome so long as the man continues a reasonable creature If the immediate concurrence of God to the action of his creature make the actions wherein the perfection of his creature consisteth much more the imperfections and faileurs of it a staine to his excellence much more shall the act of determining the choice of his creature free before it be determined impute to God whatsoever it importeth for the worse the imputation whereof or the better is a staine to his excellency And is it possible that God by making the creature capable of such imputations should depose himself from the Throne of his Godhead and set up his creature in his stead in making it able to act that either naturally without his immediate concurrence or morally also by determining that freedom by the use of his own reason and choice which he in no instance afore determineth Certainly they consider not what they grant themselves when they suppose that God made it able so to do when they make the abilities which he giveth unable to do their work till he determine them so to do so that being so determined before they determine themselves they cannot do otherwise And suppose it a contradiction that the will should choose that which no reason why it should chuse appeareth certainly when reason pronounceth the motive that appeareth to be sufficient the action that insueth cannot be said to proceed from a cause indifferent to act or not though the determination thereof be not peremptory till the act follow Now is there any necessity why God should interpose to determine the indifference of the cause otherwise then as inabling it to determine its own indifference Suppose then a sentence past in the Court of Reason importing not onely This is to be done But This shall be done Do we not see every moment protestations made by the sensuall appetite and acts entered of them by the judge Indeed if the matter of them do not bear a plea the sentence remaines But is it therefore necessary that execution follow Witnesse those that act against conscience Witnesse Aristotels dispute of incontinence placing the nature of it in doing the contrary of that which the judgement is resolved ought to be done as if the one could be absolutely the best the other the best at this time Witnesse Medea in Ovid when she saies Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor I see the better but I do the worse For the mouth of conscience is to be stopped with a pretense of repentance to come and so present satisfaction is clear gaine by the bargaine If at length it come to execution of the sentence I demand what it is that makes the resolution from thenceforth peremptory but the same reason that determined the choice afore unlesse we suppose new matter advanced in plea first and afterwards voided If that which was sufficient afore prove not effectuall till now it is not because any thing was wanting without which the will was not able to proceed but because reason to the contrary appeared considerable before I grant there be those that have so farre determined the indifference of their own inclinations that no reason to the contrary appeares considerable to delay execution of the sentence past long since But this appears by experience to take place as well in those who have degenerated to devils incarnate as those who have improved to saints upon earth And therefore cannot be attributed to the force of true good acting beyond the appearance which it createth in the mind because Gods immediate act directs it But partly to the habituall grace of the holy Ghost with the resolution of Christianity presenting true good as lovely and beautifull as indeed it is Partly to the custome of doing even those acts which without the assistance of God Spirit our nature cannot do Upon which as the habituall indowment of the holy Ghost followes by Gods gracious promise So there followes naturally a facility of doing even supernaturall actions which men habituate themselves to by the meer force of custome excluding the consideration of all that reason to the contrary that hath proved abortive and addle long since Which notwithstanding the choice remaines free by virtue of that originall freedome which determined the indifference of every man to those actions the frequenting whereof hath created an habit And this is the ground of that account which we owe that God showing sufficient reason why we ought to be Christians and the world to the contrary our choice hath followed for the better or for the worse For the efficacy of the said reasons on either side implies beside the sufficiency of them onely a supposition of that which comes to passe which the same reasons determine a man to do that remaine uneffectuall till the execution of sentence But if the will of God interpose to determine the will before it determines there can be no more ground for any account why it acteth or acteth not then the earth is to give why it
standeth still or the heavens why they move For it is not the nature of heaven and earth that makes them stand still or move but the will of God that made it their nature and creates all the necessity that followes upon it as I said afore If therefore a man can do nothing till God determine him to do it and cannot but do that which he determines him to do then is there the same necessity for that which he doth as for the heavens moving or the earth standing still Here a difficulty is made in regard of the merits of Jesus Christ who for the joy set before him underwent the crosse despising the shame and sate down at the right hand of God Heb. XII 2. And Humbled himself becoming obedient to death even the death of the Crosse Wherefore God also hath over-exalted him Phil. II. 8 9. As if because the merits of Christ are the acts of a will by the hypostaticall union utterly determined to the will of God it were not requisite that the promises of the Gospel should be obtained by performing the Covenant of Grace when a man might not have performed it The answer is not to be cleared more then the mystery of the holy Trinity is to be comprehended For of a truth how should it be understood how the will of God the Father freely tendered how the same in the Sonne undertook to assume our nature to perform the work of our redemption in it But upon this freedom depends the consideration which makes the Grace of Christ due by Gods promise For though the will of man in Christ were utterly determined to that which the will of God should choose yet because it became so determined by the divine will in Christ freely assuming our nature the influence of that freedome into all that he freely did in virtue of that choice makes the acts thereof meritorious of the rewards of his Crosse Nor is there any use to be made of the distinction between the compound and divided sence of any propositions but those that speak of that necessity which followes upon a supposition of the being of those things which are said to be necessary That necessity and onely that it reconcileth with contingence Necesse est praedestinatum salvari Non necesse est praedestinatum salvari In English for we must suppose the property of each language it must needs be or it is necessary that he who is predestinate should be saved It is not necessary not of necessity it must not needs be that he who is predestinate should be saved Compounding or twisting in your minde the quality of predestinate with salvation that is supposing a man to be predestinate the affirmative is true necessity is attributed to the salvation of a man so qualified dividing them that is not supposing the man to be praedestinate the negative Because Christianity supposeth praedestination to preserve freedome and contingence But if you say in Latine Praedestinatus necessario salvatur In English He that is praedestinate is saved necessarily or by necessity it must be utterly denied for the same cause The same distinction may be used when the necessity is not upon supposition of the being of that which is said to be necessary but to no purpose For it is necessary that the fire burne or the Sunne show us light if wood be put to it if it be above our hemisphere It is not necessary if otherwise But this makes not that which is necessary upon such a supposition ever a whit the more contingent Nay it were ridiculous to expresse it because a limitation so unnecessary may be understoode No lesse necessary will that act of the will be to which God determines though otherwise the being of it were not onely not necessary but impossible Nor will it be true to say that he who doth what God determines him immediately to do hath power to do the contrary at the same time though not to do it at the same time simultatem potentiae ad oppositum not potentiam simultatis For if the will cannot act still so determined it were a contradiction to say that it hath power to do that which you say it cannot doe Wherefore if God from the beginning ever gave the reasonable creature a will actually not determined to do or not to do this or that the same will by which God does this continuing for all that time that he maintaines it there is no more roome left for a will of determining the same in God untill by virtue of his first will it determine it selfe then there is roome in God not to will that which actually and presently he willeth It is therefore too late to say That God determining as well the maner by which all things come to passe as what shall come to passe can as well determine the acts of his reasonable creatures to be done freely as the acts of naturall things to be done necessarily Having supposed afore that he determines these acts by determining immediately the will to do them For though I count it necessary to grant that God by his providence determines all future contingences for the reason to be shewed in due time yet should he determine the will to doe them without supposing it to determine it selfe there could remaine neither contingence in the effect nor freedome in the cause And therefore I say that God determines those thinges that come to passe freely and contingently so to come to passe but he cannot determine this by destroying freedome and contingence Therefore not by determining immediately the will of man to doe or not to doe this or that For this determination produceth not that necessity which stands upon supposition of an act freely done and therefore contingent as that which neede not have beene done or of the foresight of it or of effectuall meanes to bring it to paâ—â—e which cannot be defeated because they are supposed to take effect but that which stands onely upon supposition of the cause which being the determination of God and therefore indefeasible the necessity which it produceth whatsoever it be for the kind will be stronger then any necessity that is antecedent to the being of any thing in the creature And though I said before absolutely that the action of the creature cannot be imputed to God yet upon an impossible supposition as this I can and must inferre that nothing can be imputed to the creature as good or evill to reward or punishment but all to God Which is a consequence that Christian ears must not indure For I suppose no Christian ears can indure to heare that God should infuse any inclination to malice into the heart of his creature because when it comes to effect the effect will be imputable to God and because before it comes to effect the work of God must be called evill as inclined to evill How then shall we indure to heare it said that God by his indefeasible omnipotence determines the creature
to doe all the evill that it does and that without this determination no evill can be done with it no evill can but be done For alas the covering will be too shortâ—â— to say that God produceth onely the positive action of sinne the malice incident to it consisting in the meere want of conformity to the rule which it ought to follow proceeding from the imperfection of the creature For the difference between the action of sinne and the sinne which it acteth consisteth meerely in the conceit of mans understanding not apprehending at once all the particulars wherein the action consisteth No action possibly being so badde that in some generall considerations common to those which are good it may not be counted good But those generall considerations expresse not the particular act which is supposed to be sinne So soone as the nature thereof is sufficiently expressed so soone it will appeare to be essentially sinne Therefore if God determine the creature to the act or sinne he determines it to sinne And though upon these termes there can neither be sinne nor vertue good nor evill Law nor Gospel providence nor judgment to come yet upon these termes the actions of the creature will be imputable to God alone though not as good or badde or as the actions of God yet as the actions of him that is supposed to be God in wordes but denied to be God in effect As for that which was said as if otherwise the efficacy of Gods praedestination and that grace which by it he appointeth for those that shall be saved could not subsist or as if otherwise God could not be maintained to be the first cause I will say no more now then what I said of the ground for Gods foreknowledge of future contingences That when I come to say how God determines future contingences I will doe the best I can to render such a reason as may maintaine him to be the first cause and so to foresee all future contingences by the same meanes by which he determines that they shall come to passe without giving just ground to inferre that there is neither contingence in the effect nor freedome in the cause no providence no judgment no Christianity appointed by God But if I faile of giving such a reason I disclaime it here before I give it and will rather allege that I have none to give and yet beleeve both Gods effectuall providence and the freedome and contingence of mens actions then beleive the determination of mans will by the immediate operation of Gods providence to be the sourse of freedome and contingence which I have shewed leaves no roome for contingence or providence And now I may freely grant that Jansenius hath avoided the charge of telling what it is that comes between the last instance of deliberation and the first of resolution by the immediate act of God to inable a man to do that which he that is able to deliberate and act both is not able to bring to passe Which is the same Chimaera with the imagination of infallibility in every sentence of the present Church when it comes to pronounce though the premises upon which it proceedeth do not appear even to them that pronounce infallible Nor will I envy him the advantage that he may make of the distinction between the sense of that which is said to be necessary including this praedetermination and not necessary setting it aside For having shewed that it is to no effect but to destroy contingence that is Christianity and to multiply contradiction to that common sense which all own I may well bid much good do it But I am not therefore bound to believe that it will serve his turn proceeding upon the account of indifference in the creature and the necessary effect of a secondary cause who standeth upon that necessity of Grace which Originall sinne introduceth For how shall he say that setting aside Gods praedetermination the Will may have Grace sufficient to do the work of Grace including the same it cannot but do it who makes the will utterly unable to do it till it be determined to do it And therefore takes away all difference between effectuall and sufficient Grace all intent of Christs dying for them that shall not be saved Indeed if he extend his opinion to the reconciling of mans free will with Gods Providence in matters not concerning the work of saving Grace he may make use of praedetermination in giving account how sinne is foreknown and the rest which hitherto he resolveth not But grounding himself upon the exigence of Originall sinne it were not wisdome for him to scandalize his own opinion by making sinne as necessary by Gods act as he makes the work of Grace There is extant a briefe resolution of the whole question by that learned Gentleman Thomas White where he concludeth Paragr X. That God determineth every man so to determine himself in whatsoever he does by the love of good infused and the causes which his Providence useth to represent it desirable that he cannot do otherwise How he would answer concerning evil is not so plain by his words He sayes indeed it is not the same thing to determine and cause to determine as for the Ammonites and David to kill Vrias But if the murther be duly imputed to David for procuring meanes towards it that might have failed would he have God procure meanes that cannot fail It cannot be allowed but thus that though of themselves they might fail yet supposing the foreknowledge of God that imployeth them that is supposing them to take effect which supposition all the experience in the world concludeth cannot be cleared till the effect follow they cannot fail And the nature of freedome the ground of the account to come consisteth in this that determining a man to act he might not have acted till the act was done For certainly it were a contradiction to say that which determines the will to act speaking not of the thing without but of the consideration thereof in the minde may not be extant when a man determines himself in virtue of it Nay were this consideration whereby God determineth indefeasible of its own nature for as imployed by Gods Providence that is supposing the effect to follow it is it were that very predetermination which I have infringed by the premised discourse coming from God in order of reason first and in the very next instant producing that choice wherein the determination of the will formally consisteth I will therefore conclude that wheresoever through the whole Bible God calls any man or his ancient people or by the Gospell all people to yeild him that inward obedience and worship in spirit and truth which Christianity requireth all this proceeding supposing the corruption of mans nature by the fall of Adam there he will take account of his disbursements by that which the creature shall have done not finally determined to do it by any thing preceding the choice Putting you
this then that which the supposition of free will necessarily requires Certainly Aristotles resolution that they are sure in the alternative but that neither part of it can be certaine That is to say that Peter being tempted shall either deny his master or not but that being contingent it can neither be certaine that he shall nor that he shall not is utterly inconsistent with that particular providence of God over all things which Châ—â—stianty supposeth renders that great mastâ—r as a man too cunning not to see â—he conâ—equence of his own position very sususpicious in a point so neerely concerning the belief of Gods providence Now future contingencies in the notion of contingencies that are not yet come to passe being in themselves nothing that is to say being onely understood to be posible cannot reduce themselves to the nature and state or future contingencies in the notion of contingencies that shall come to passe such as we believe all contingencies that have or shall come to passe to the worlds end were to God from everlasting It is therefore a meere contradiction to imagin that contingencies either by the possibilty of their nature or by the capacity of the cause that is of it selfe utterly undetermined to do rather then not to do to do this rather then that can be an object capable of being known by that knowledg upon which they may be said to be certaine future as things that shal be not as things that may be not as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to distinguish with Aristotle There are indeed those who undertake that when it is said Peter shall deny his Lord Peter shall not deny his Lord the one of which sayings must needs come to passe seeing this necessity must needs be in the object before it be in the saying because the saying is true or fals by reason that the matter of it is so or otherwise before therefore that part which appeares true in time was true from everlasting But that they suppose cannot be by virtue of any or all causes least the effects should no more be contingencies Therefore by virtue of the things themselves because of a contradiction the one part must needs be true the other false And this being of future contingencies they imagin it is which the knowledg of God attaining is therefore called sight because it reacheth that which is in being and therefore present to it But this imagination is a meere contradiction to common reason which is able to tell any man that possibilities differ onely in this from nothing that there are such things as can bring them to passe And therefore have no being at all but in the ability of their causes Whereas suppose them in being before their causes bring them to passe what remaines for their causes to doe which would have nothing to doe if that which they bring to passe were in being before they bring it so to passe And what contingency could then remaine seeing whatsoever is must needs be while it is For this position prevents any supposition that may be made concerning the being of that which is said to be before you can suppose or understand it to be And where is the difference between the being of God and that of future contingencies both being of themselves Surely supposing the necessity of this their being because God could not see them otherwise they would be not only objects denominating that knowledge of God to be sight which reacheth the present being of them but causes on which the sight of God must depend as our sight depends on the object that causeth it The future being therefore of contingencies necessarily supposeth the determination of their causes The contingence of them that thâ—s determination is from their causes themselves freely determining themselves The certainty of them from the infinite reach of Gods understanding comprehending the resolution of the Creature by the present inclination thereof meeting the considerations which it is presented with Wherefore as it is impossible that the will should act unlesse the understanding go before and the resolution of the will to do or not to do this or that necessarily depends upon some act of the understanding shewing by sufficient reason an end sufficient to move the wil to proceed and resolve So doth not the will effectually proceed untill the understanding shews that reason which effectually moves it to proceed Now these reasons proceeding from those appearances which the objects that every man meets with cause in his mind either at the present or by comparing that which outwardly appears at the present with that which is laid up in the storehouse of the mind And God having provided what objects every man in every moment shall meet with to resolve him what to do in every case that may come in debate It cannot be imagined that he provideth this and knoweth not by the means which he proviâ—eth what will be the issue supposing that he knoweth it not by his own resolution to determine a man by his own immediate act to do whatsoever he does And indeed God comprehending what considerations a man every moment is moved with and what be his own inclinations that is moved with the same it cannot seem strange that by this means seeing it appears impossible that by any other means he should comprehend what will so come to pass though knowing that he that acteth had or might have had sufficient reasons to have done otherwise Wherefore if any man ask me whether God know what will come to pass if any case should be put which he knoweth shall never be put which is now called in the Schools Gods middle knowledge because it hath on the one side that knowledge whereby he comprehendeth the natures of all things and the possibilities of all events on the other side the view which he hath from everlasting of all things that have been are or shall be for that tract of time which they endure because I seem to say that this is it which directs Gods providence in resolving what course to hold by which resolution it appears to him what shall come to pass I shall not answer nevertheless without distinguishing That God comprehends not the issues of those future possibilities which men can imagine to themselves and yet comprehends the issues of these future possibilities whereof we suppose him to determine all the circumstances For let a man infinitely endeavour to limit by his understanding all that he can consider in the case of any man left to his freedome he shall never be able to express that consideration which shall be effectuall certainly to determine him that is presented with it Because it is manifest that infinite considerations more may present themselves to move him to do nothing or otherwise But when the word of God speaks of these means which being provided by God determine effectually the resolution of him that is moved by them to wit by
it may be said that a thing comes to passe necessarily and that sense in which it may be said that it must necessarily come to passe For I suppose that the property of our English will help me here to distinguish these two senses to all that consider their mother tongue and may discerne a severall meanâ—ng when a man saies the fire burnes necessarily Peter must necessarily deny our Lord supposing that our Lord had fore told it For when the necessity is understood to be in the cause which the nature thereof though by Gods will determines it is proper to say thaâ— it comes to passe necessarily But when the necessity is understood to stand upâ—n a supposition of the effect either being or knowne to be which knowledg presupposeth it to be being supposâ—d to be true or the like it is proper to say this must needs come to passe or it must of necessity come to passe but not that it comes to passe necessarily because then the necessity must noâ— fall upon the coming of it upon passe but upon the manner by which it comes to pâ—sse I say then if any can inferr upon my saying that the necessity which it infers is antecedent to the being of it I grant I am faln into the inconvenience which I would a void and will disclaime the position upon which it followes But if it be onely consequent upon supposition either that it is or that it is taken to be it is no more then that necessity which is found in all coâ—tiâ—gencies according to all opinions that must allow all things necessarily to be â—hough not to be necessarily supposing that they are Now when I say that God determines the evenâ—s of future contingencies I say not that he doth it by determining their causes to do them speaking of free causes for the contingâ—â—cies which come to passe by the concurrence of naturall causes I grant â—o be meere necessities in regard it is necessary that when every cause actâ— to the uâ—most of his strength that must not onely needs come to passe but come to passe necessarily which the concurrence of severall forces produceth and must needâ— appear in the causes to any that comprehends the force of them all buâ— that this act of his ends in determining the motives which present themâ—elves to such causes Which act is consistent with an other act whereby he mâ—intaines the cause in an ability of doing or not doing that which it is movâ—d to do But that comprehending the inclinations thereof and the force oâ— the motives which it is presented with he comprehends thereby that it will proceed to act though comprehending that it might doe otherwiâ—e shâ—uld it regard those appearances which either habitually it hath or actuâ—lly â—t â—â—ght to have Now I confesse againe it is hard for me to show how it ought actually to have those appearances which habitually it hath But seeing thaâ— supposing this I show evidently how the providence of God iâ— unceâ—easibâ—â— the will remaining free and the effects thereof contingent I will rathâ—r conâ—esse that I cannot shew where their freedome might or ought to move when it does not then destroy the ground of all Christianity Thus much is evident supposing my saying that the certainty of the event includes the supposition of the will acting freely therefore infers no necessity antecedent to it the knowledge upon which providence decrees foreseeing that it will freely proceed being so moved CHAP. XXV The grounds of the difference between sufficient and effectuall How naturall occasions conduce to supernaturall actions The insufficience of Jansenius his doctrine Of sufficient grace under the Law of Moses and Nature ANd now I shall not use many words to declare what it is that makes those helps of grace which of themselves are sufficient effectuall For if all particulars are contayned in their generalls that which is said of all the works of providence must hold in those helps of supernaturall grace whereby it conducteth to the happinesse of the world to come And therefore the efficacy of Gods grace taking efficacy to imply the effect consists in the order which providence useth that the motives of Christianity whether to imbrace or performe the profession of it be presented in such circumstances as may render them accepted of the will to whose judgement for the preâ—ent they so appeare So that the same for nature and kind prove effectall to one which to an other prove void and frustrate For it is manifest that those helps are the grace of Christ even as they are sufficient and supposing them not to take effect And it ought to be manifest that the circumstances in which they are present to every particular person are brought to passe by the conduct of Gods spirit which filleth the world and attaineth from the beginning to the end of all things which come to passe And this spirit and the coming thereof being purchased by our Lord Christ and granted in consideration of his obedience it is easy to bee seen how it is the grace of Christ not onely as sufficient but also as effectuall This resolution then presupposeth two things as proved Chap. XVIII The first That the preaching of the Gospell is the grace of Christ That is to say A Grace granted by God in consideration of Christs merits and sufferings The second That the grace of Christ attaineth and reacheth the very effect of conversion and new obedience and resteth not in having inabled man to doe it of himselfe without the influence of it To make this part of faith better to be understood among believers better to be maintained against unbelievers that which this resolution advanceth is this That the Grace of the H. Ghost purchased by the humiliation of Christ and by his exaltation obtained as it is the meanes which God hath provided for the publishing of his Gospell to the conviction of all who understand it that they ought to submit to the faith and live according to it so it is the meanes to make it effectuall to the conversion of the Nations to Christianity that conversion effectuall in their lives and conversations by presenting the reasons and grounds thereof being of themselves sufficient for the worke to every mans consideration in those circumstances procured by the providence of God which it executeth in which his wisdome â—oresaw that they would takâ— effect and become to the purpose And truly when our Lord saith Iohn XVI 8 9 10. And when he cometh he will convict the world of sin of righteousnesse of judgement Of sin because they believe not in mee Of judgement because the prince of this world is condemned we must understand that the H. Ghost convinced the world of sin because those miracles which the Apostles did by the holy Ghost convincing the world that they spoke the word of God shewed the world that they were under sin and liable to Gods wrath if they became not Christians And that he convinced
meanes that makes the grace of Christ effectuall addresse it selfe especially to that estate o men in which our Lord Christ to whom they so become conformable appeared in the world And for that very reason to figure that estâ—te of mind which the Gospell requires the people of â—sraell were by Gods Law left unâ—uâ—nished of many helps of policy and force by which other nations maintain themselves free from servâ—tude that they might remaine obliged to depend upon Gâ—dâ— immediate assistance providence But it is to be said further That the greatest estates of the world being subject to the greatest crosses through want of successe and those great changes to which they are liable this way of preparation to the kingdome of heaven can no way seeme wanting to any estate when a begger is seen no lesse to doâ—e upon this world then an uncleane person is seen to doâ—e upon that whore by whom he is abused It is moreover to be said That the remembrance of death which must and the inconstancy of this world which may deprive us of all the benefits thereof being by Gods judgement the punishment of sin soures all the content of them that drench themselves deepest in the pleasures of this life and gives them just cause to forsake them all in case they stand not with the hope of the world to come And the very injoying of them being injoyed with that conscience which all Châ—â—stians have of Gods providence and the sense of his hand from whence they come is reasonably an advantage to those who injoy the best successe that can be expressâ—d in the course of this world both to become thankfull to God for it and also to prefer â—â—ernity before it Whereby it may appeare that the course of this world disposed by God upon the terms of the covenant of nature containes â—â— it those opportunities and advantages which the act of Gods providence by the grace of Christ knowes easily how to makâ— effectuall to the supernaturall purposes of it This is the place for the rest of that which I am to say of the opinion of Jansenius setling the efficacy of saving grace upon other grounds then those which I use The ground of it seems to stand upon the observation of S. Augustin de corrept gratia Chap. XI XII Distinguishing between the help of grace without which the worke of grace is not don that by which it is don auxilium sine quo non and auxilium quo and comparing the grace of Christ which cometh to effect notwithstanding originall concupiscence with the grace given Adam which might have come to effect had he pleased but came not notwithstanding his innocenâ—e as more powerfull in our weakenesse then that in his strength For hereupon he will have the grace of Christ to be onely that which takes effect confining that help without which the worke of grace cannot be don to the state of innocence as ouâ— of date now under oâ—iginall sin So that the freedome of the will is so far from being râ—quisite to â—he effects â—hereof that it hath no being but bâ— the meanes of it consisting in that free love of that which God commandeth because he commandeth it which it inspireth As on the other side the counâ—erfeit of it in them that sin without reluctation bâ—cause free from righteousnesse is nothing but the free lâ—ve of sin for the saâ—isfaction of concupiscence It is therefore in his opinion impertinent how necessarily the grace of Christ determineth the wil to imbrace the true good seeing it is the love of it the delight in it which grace worketh in the wâ—ll that determines it willingly and freely to imbrace it To tâ—ke the more distinct view of this plea let us put the case in him who running full speed in a course of sin is caâ—led by the preaching of the Gospell to become a Christian Or to the same purpose in him who being a Christian and runnâ—ng the same race is summoned by his profession and the grounds thereof to reâ—urne to it In this case can any man imagine that the reasons which move us all to be Christians shâ—uld raise no love of true good no dislike to sin no feare of vengeance no desire of everlasting hapâ—iâ—esse in him that considers them as they deserve Especially being managed by the spirit of God which knocketh at the dore of the heart by that meanes Or can any man question as it is â—he feare of vengeance that beginneth so it is the love of good for Gods sâ—ke that conâ—ummateth the resolution of becoming a true Christiâ—â— But the quâ—stâ—â—n being put about changing the chief end of a mans whole life and doings can it be supposed that any man is prevented with such a delight in true gooâ—nesse as iâ—stâ—ntly to abandon the lust which his bâ—sâ—nesse hath been hitherto to satisfie without demurre or regret I doubt not that God can immediatly crâ—aâ—e in any man that appearance of true good that shall without debate or looking back transport him to the prosecution of it That notwithstanding the Covenant of grace he may doe it Which though a rule to his ordâ—nâ—ry proceeding is no Law to his Soveraigne perogative But him that is thus sâ—ved though sâ—ved by grace yet we cannot count to be saved by the Covenant of grace Which proposeth a reward to them who are led by motives thereof notwithstanding the difficulties to the contrary though implying the worke of grace in him that overcometh And this no man more câ—earâ—ly acknowledgeth then Jansenius de gratia Christi VIII 2. where â—â— conâ—esseth that the predetermination of the will by the grace of Christ is not indefeasible but onely when it overcomâ—s as Gods predetermination according to the Dominicans is For by this difference whâ—ch in statiâ—g of this opinion I have not neglected afore the efficacy thereof cannot be attribuâ—ed to â—e â—aâ—ure of that help which overcometh aâ— of an other kind then that which pâ—oveth frustrate And therefore notwithstanding that large and elaborat work of his he hath left us to inquire further whence the efficacy of it proceedeth As having in effect onely resolved us wherein the efficacy of Grâ—ce consisteth in the nature of the formall cause Not from whence it proceedâ—th in the nature of the effective cause which the question indeed demandâ—th And truly the very consideration premised That as freedome from sin coâ—sists in the determination of the will to righteousnesse which the Grace of Chrâ—st effecteth so freedome from righteousnesse in the determination of it to sin which it acteth Inâ—orceth an other kind of freedome common to both estates not importing praise or dispraise but a capacity of either by doing that which no necessity determineth a man to doe And therefore that though the grace of Christs Crosse be the medecine yet till it be freely taken it worketh not the cure This is that freedome from necessity by the present condition of our nature the use whereof
manifest that the thing promised by it cannot be appointed by God as the meanes to his glory not supposing the condition which it requireth For whatsoever may be said of the consideration of our Lord Christ As it can have no place till we suppose his obedience to be in consideration when any mans reward is appointed by virtue of that Covenant which he came to treat So can it not be in consideration til we suppose him to whom the benefit of it is appointed to be qualified as it requires And this might have been seen by the opposite decree of Reprobation In which everlasting death appointed as the terme of it not being capable of bearing the notion of that which God aymes at of it selfe cannot be considered as the end Which might have been argument enough that as the death of the reprobate is not nor can be the meanes of Gods glory but as it is intended to punish mens forfeits So neither can the life of the elect be the meanes of Gods glory but as it is intended to reward their performance It is therefore answered that the reward of the Elect and punishment of Reprobate becomes the means of Gods glory not absolutely but in regard that God having proposed a Law by the obaying whereof they might attain happinesse though requiring supernaturall obedience the one have observed it the others not And God having proposed a law which the light of nature inableth all to observe none have observed it But otherwise that it could no more be the meanes of Gods glory to appoint life for the Elect then it could be the meanes for the same to appoint death for the Reprobate And therefore that it is necessary to the glory of God that the good gifts which he bestoweth upon his creatures should all be taken for meanes of their everlasting happynesse by his appointment To which purpose we have not a few passages of holy Scripture that are very expresse S. Paul tells the Athenians Acts XVII 16. That God made all mankind of one blood to dwell on the whole face of the earth determining appointed seasons and the bounds of their dwellings that they might seeke the Lord if by any means they might find him groping though not farr off from every one of us And so those of Lystra Acts XIV 16. That In the by past ages he suffered all nations to walke their own waies though â—e left not himselfe without witnesse dâ—ing good giving raine from heaven and fruitfull seasons filling our hearts with foode and gladnesse For what can this witnesse meane if it intend to destroy his owne resolution of damning them And therefore speaking to them that condemne the sins of others and doe the like Dost thou condemne the riches of his patience and long suffering saith he not knowing that the goodnesse of God leadeth to repentance But according to thy hardnesse impenitent heart heapest up wrath to thy selfe against the day of wrath and revelation of the just judgement of God Rom. XI 3 4. Which are the same termes that S. Peter useth of the impenitent within the knowledg of Christianity when he saith 1. Peter III. 9. The Lord is not slack of his promise as some men count slacknesse but is long-suffering towards us not willing that any should perish but come to the knowledg of his truth Which is in that place the effectuall acknowledgement of it As like wise saith the prophet to them that cast off the thoughts of repentance as dispairing of forgivenesse Ezek. XXIII 2. As he had done before Ezâ—k XVIII 22. These exhortations signifie nothing unlesse we suppose that it turnes to every mans account to neglect the meanes upon which they proceed Which is this That God on his part hath done what his goodnesse and justice requires though not immediately bringing to passe that which was immediately sufficient to the capacity of salvation and therefore requires this at their hands intending to judge them in case they faile on their part For there is none of those gifts but inables a man immediately to doe that which God immediately requires and therefore condemes him that â—eglects to doe that which he is immediately inabled to doe And thâ—ugh God cannot become obliged upon mans compliance wiâ—h the light of nature immediately to give sufficient helps of grace to bring every man to his kingdome because of the certaine faileur of mans compliance with them through the servitude of sin from which we cannot come free by nature yet is the sin for which he is condemned justly imputed to his not doâ—ng that which by the light of nature he might have done How much more is the refusall of sufficient helps to them who have neglected the improvement of those helps which they had or might have had to be imputed to them who have made themselves to be refused them From hence it necessarily followes that those helps which God followes his own preventing grace with are granted in consideration of the good use of his preventing graces Notwithstanding that nothing hinders the goodnesse of God both to oversee those failleures for which he might justly have given over those which he had prevented by his grace and not brought them finally to persevere or to redouble upon them those helps which the use that they formerly had made of his former graces might justly have moved him to refuse So though all Gods gifts to man are granted out of Gods desire of mans happinesse to wit as the mans end not as Gods so the gifts by which it is Purchased are granted in consideration of the right use of his former gifts That in the nature of the finall this of the meritorious cause though no way obliging God but by vertue of his owne will to be obliged And herewith agrees that of Solomon Prov. XVI 4. The Lord hath made all for himselfe And also the wicked for the day of wrath For whether we translate it with Grotius for it selfe or as it useth to be translated himselfe the consequence of it will be That as the world is and as things passe in it all that comes to passe is by Gods appointment or for his glory which is all one Leaving the account by which it may appeare so to be given from the rest of the Scripture But if we joine both causes together by repeating for himselfe in the second As to say That God for himselfe hath appointed the wicked for the day of his wrath then is the reason given how the being of evill is for Gods glory to wit by punishing them that doe it Herewith also agrees that of S. Paul far better then it is imagined to do Rom. VIII 28 29 30. Now we know that all things worke together for good to them that love God which are called according to purpose For whom he foreknew those he also predestinated to become conformable to the image of his Son that he may be the first borne amonge many brethren But
death If Christians by their profession cannot doe it Nor is it to be doubted that the dispute about free will and providence consequently predestination so far as the world to come is acknowledged hath been and in part remaines alive as well among Gentiles Jewes and Mahumetans as we see it is among Christians So that we may justly inferr that seeing no other religion either antecedent to Christianity or that hath come after it can pretend that satisfaction to this dispute which Christianity giveth by the coming in of sin upon the fall of Adam that it is no disparagement to it not to be able to declare the reason of Gods proceeding with particular persons in dispensing to them the meanes of effectuall grace when it remaines manifest both that Christianity goes further in declaring the same then any other Religion can doe and that there may justly be those reasons reserved to God which he notwithstanding the grace which he publishes by Christ findeth no cause to declare The answer then to the objection consists in this That as it is not necessary for the maintenance of Christianity to give account why God disposeth of his effectuall grace as he doth So is there no opinion able to reconcile it to the freedome of mans will without the bonds of Christianity but that which maketh predestination to Glory conditionall to Grace absolute It may be the readers lot as it hath been mine to heare an objection cast forth That if Gods predestination be unmoveable it is vaine for Christans to indeavour to live as Christians And the answer so insufficient as to leave more offense in his mind then before it it was made According to that which is some times said That unskilfull Conjurers some times raise a Devil whom they cannot lay againe For certainely it serves not the turn to say That God as he hath appointed the end so hath appointed the meanes For it is the secret will of God which is alwaies effectuall that appoints the end But his revealed will that appoints the meanes by commanding comes not alwaies to effect And therefore if God have absolutly appointed the end he that knowes not whether he hath appointed it or not can have no reason to goe about the means till he knew it as absolutely appointed as the end is Nor servs it the turn to adxe to say further That God as he apointeth the end so he appointeth also the meanes to be freely imployed by man for the attaining it Which the opinion of Predetermination may say For all the incouragement this can give a man to imploy his freedome to any purpose is That if God determine him he shall freely imploy it if not he shall freely not imploy it to that purpose Which is to say in English That his freedome being called freedom but is not can not be imployed by him that is incouraged to imploy it And therefore it is reasonable for him to say I shall freely doe so if God hath appointed it and freely not do so if he have not appointed it If it be said further and that according to my opinion that no event is determined by God but supposing mans freewill and foreseeing what choice it will make upon the considerations which a man is outwardly or inwardly moved with Neither wil this be enough to move a reasonable mans indevours supposing himselfe absolutely predestinated to life or to death before For that life and death being absolutely appointed becomes Gods end though subordinate to a further end of his glory and not onely the end of the meanes which he provideth for it A thing no lesse destructive to the supreme Majesty of God then to that which I said afore For that which God absolutely desireth that he ingageth his supreme Majesty to execute and bring to effect Vnlesse it can be thought that a Soveraigne can be soveraigne and not stand obliged make it his Interest that no designe of his be defeated Which if God do what availeth it the creature that the will thereof is free and the effects of that will are not determined but by the free choice thereof Whenas being the will of a creature and necessary proceeding upon consideration of those objects which providence inwardly or outwardly presenteth it with it is by a former act of that providence determined to that which may and must be the meanes of producing that end which God had designed afore And upon these termes providence will stand ingaged not to permit but to procure the sins upon which the sentence of eternall death as the good works upon which the sentence of eternall life proceedeth And he who knows that whatsoever he doth though never so freely shall certainely bring him at length to that estate which God had appointed for him before he considered what he would or would not doe wâ—at reason can he have to imploy the indevours of his will to doe what God commandeth for the obtaining or avoiding of that which he hath appointed before any consideration of his indeavours But absolute Predestination to the first helps that effectually bring a man to the state of Grace produceth not the like consequence For as supposing good and bad in the world and that the Gospell is refused by some and imbraced by others it is meerely the worke of providence that a man is borne under the obligation of it or not and cannot be imputed to any act of his owne So he that supposeth that God hath not appointed him to life or to death but in consideration of his own doings shall no lesse stand obliged to follow those sufficient reasons of well doing which Gods spirit by the preaching of the Gospell meetes him with then if it did not lye in the worke of providence to make them effectuall or not As for all the rest of every manâ— life that falls between the time that he is sufficiently convinced that he ought to live and dye a good Christian and that state of grace or of sin in which he deceaseth It is evident that the helps of Grace are dispensed all along upon that reason of reward or punishment which the covenant of grace establisheth For seeing the Holy Ghost is promised to assist all Christians in the performing of that which they undertake by their Baptisme it cannot be imagined that God should destitute any christian of helps requisite of the fulfilling of his Christianity whose profession was not counterfeit from the beginning that is not so reall as it should have been untill he faile of complying with the motions of it There is in deed some difference of opinion according to which a difference will arise in the termes by which we expresse our selves in this businesse There be those in the Church of Rome who hold that a Christian once setled in the state of Grace may by Gods ordinary grace here live without even veniall sin till death Supposing this done the helps of grace which God assisteth such a man
with are the effects of his justice which consisteth in keeping promise Though Originally the effects of meere Grace because it was meere Grace that moved him to make that promise Those that hold absolute predestination to life or to death and justifying faith to be nothing but the revelation of a mans predestination to life can no more allow that such a one may fall from the state of Grace then that Gods promise can faile or Christs death be to no purpose So that not onely the sins which they doe are to them occasion of good as S. Paul saith that all things cooperate for good to them that love God Rom. VIII 28. but the permission which in that opinion is the procuring of them is an effect of their predestination to life according to this opinion also the helps of Geace are the effects of that Justice which consisteth in keeping as well as of that grace which was seen in making Gods promise though the condition of that promise be cleared in this opinion at the first instant that a man believeth in the other not till the last instant that he liveth Though I have already laid aside both the suppositions upon which this opinion standeth yet I suppose it not refuted as yet because there must be a time on purpose to consider the arguments which it pretendeth But because one of the contradictions which it involveth is this that making justification to consist in remission of sins it alloweth the regenerate to become guilty of sin and yet maintaineth him justified at the same time an other contradiction that it involveth must needs be this That the helps of Grace requisite to the saving of him that is justified which as I said afore according to this opinion are due to the elect by the justice of Gods promise are granted of meere grace to the Justifying of him who being justifyed is notwithstanding acknowledged to need remission of sin For to tye God by promise to helpe any man out of sin as often as he shall please to fall back into sin who of Grace may allow waies freely to do it is to make the Gospel a passeport for sin And therefore notwithstanding this opinion I shall not let to presume here before I have spoken to it that the helps of grace requisite to the recovering of him that is falne from the state of grace come not by the vertue of the promise wherein the Covenant of Grace consisteth the right whereof is forfeited in that case but by vertue of that meere grace which first moved God to tender it though in consideration of the merits and suffering of our Lord Christ which purchased it Whereupon the truth is that the helps of grace that are requisite to maintaine them in the state of grace which have attained it are due by that justice of God which consisteth in keeping promise And though Gods cleare dealing with man requires that from the first heareing of the Covenant of grace that is from the first preaching of the Gospell or from the first calling of him that is fallne from the state of grace a man be inabled to imbrace that which is tendred yet that he shall effectually imbrace it will alwaies remaine the effect of meere grace So the gifts of nature and the death of Christ for mankind are provided by God for the salvation of all not as Gods end but as the end of the said meanes which he provideth But that by providing the death of Christ for the salvation of mankind he oblâ—geth himself to grant them who never heard of Christ inspirations and revelations convicting them that they are to be Christians as he obligeth the Church to cause them to heare of Christ I grant not though I find it not to be prejudiciall to the Faith Because then must all men be judged by the Gospell of Christ reason being showed that they to whom it is not preached shall be judged by the Law of Nature And upon these termes S. Paul may reject the demand Why God should complaine seeing no man can resist his will but he may make whomsoever he shall please a good Christian But God to have absolutely appointed all men to life or to death and so to be ingaged by the interest of his Soveraigne Majesty not to see his designe defeated but to provide the meanes by which he designeth to bring his appointment to passe S. Paul might allow the demand and his Gospell to have no answer for it And therefore the comparison of the potter that followes though it hold thus farre that God indeed makes the vessels that come to honour and shame in the world to come by the government of him that made them yet it holdeth not in this that Gods glory is interested to procure them to be saved that shall be saved and them damned that shall be damned as it concerneth the potters trade to be furnished aswel with vessels for dishonourable as for honourable uses Nor wil the instance of Pharaoh bear it according to S. Pauls words For had God spared Pharaohs life out of a designe to bring him to those torments which his obstinacy in refusing the plagues that succeeded should deserve he could not be said to beare with much long-suffering the vessells of wrath that are fit to be destroyed though intending at length to show wrath and make his power known The decree then of predestination proceeding partly upon the terms of the gospell but in those things to which the Gospell extendeth not and in those men that shall be judged by the law of Nature upon the Soverainty of God the reasons whereof either we cannot understand or God will not declare contayneth all the decrees whereby the motives upon which God foresees a man will imbrace and persevere in his Christianity to the end or not persevere to the end whether he imbrace it or not or finally not so much as hearing of it will resolve for the better or for the worse from the beginning of his life to the end of it which our understanding necessarily distinguisheth by the objects which they bring to passe The order of them is the same with the reasons which the Sripture inableth us to give for the effects which they produce either in the nature of the finall or meritorius cause speaking onely of that which comes from Gods declared will not from his secret pleasure Which as it alwaies verifieth his declared will so extends to that which the other compriseth not And it is as easy to comprise in the same decree which is the pure essence of God willing to glorifie it selfe by doing that which it might have glorified it selfe by doing otherwise the order of the reasons upon which all mankind comes to that estate in which they shal continue everlastingly in the world to come Seeing then all the effects of it fall not under Gods revealed will there can be no reason given for the whole decree whether respective to any man or
in the one in the other to be grounded upon a sentence of absolution that supposes it not And yet it will not be acknowledged that there is any decay of discipline any fault any defect in the Laws and Customes for what is Law but Custome what rule is there for mens actions that custome inforceth not of the Church that cause so much difference in the proceedings of it Howsoever the custome of redeeming Penance came into the Church and how prejudiciall soever the voyage of the H. Land or the like may have been to the discipline of it the application of temporall good to some spirituall end was a poor cloke for such a corruption in comparison of that zeal to Christianity which fighting for Christians against Infidels pretendeth This is the most material occasion that I find alledged for that change which the discipline of the Church hath suffered in granting absolution before Penance To wit the indulgences granted them that undertook to fight for Christians against infidels And this is enough to render the abuse and the decay of discipline by the means thereof visible But when Indulgences are proposed for a small summe of Money pre-supposing indeed such qualifications as need not the Indulgences if rightly understood and had but as not being rightly understood and had render the Indulgences dangerous delusions whither poor people will not rather be induced by our common corruption to imbrace that sense which makes the pardon of their sinnes void as so had then that which makes them to be deceived of their money to no effect by the Church I leave to the conscience of discreet Christians to judge And whither this be not horribly to abuse the Keyes of the Church I leave to God and man to judge In the mean time I onely remind you of that difficulty which the ancient Church made in believing and admitting that those were saved who being admitted to the communion of the Eucharist in danger of death died before they could accomplish that Penance upon undertaking whereof they were admitted to it For is not the case of him that steddily purposeth to perform that Penance which the Church imposeth according to Rule if he survive much more hopeful for salvation dying afore then his that thinks his sinne purged by the sentence of absolution without undertaking or performing any Penance at all in order to the pardon of it And here I summon the Consciences of the Doctors of the Church of Rome Suppose a man take revenge upon himselfe according to a good conscience that is proportionably to the weight of his sinne according to the Rules that were in force in more uncorrupt times of the Church another according to the doctrine that is current in the Church of Rome professing himselfe truly sorry for his sinne and receiving absolution presumes of pardon for it intending to satisfie for temporall punishment that remains as he is directed whether of these is upon the better ground whether of them pretends to pardon upon the better title supposing the premises concerning the Covenant of Grace He who satisfying his conscience upon the original word of the Gospel and the primitive practice of the Church that he hath appeased the wrath of God by taking revenge upon himselfe and is thereby returned to his first resolution for Christianity Or he who being touched with sorrow for his sinne and submitting the same to the Keys of the Church hath done what the current practice thereof requires him to do for redeeming the temporall punishment of iâ— For it is evident in the doctrine of the Apostles and the primitive practice of the Church that the satisfaction of Penance appeaseth the wrath of God upon this ground because it evidenceth that resolution for Christianity to be restored which a man otherwise ought not to presume of in himselfe when he knows in himselfe that it hath been interrupted much lesse ought the Church to presume of it in him when the interruption thereof hath been visible to the Church He then who having conceived sorrow for his â—â—nne submits himselfe to the Keyes of the Church to be restored to Gods grace by the ministery thereof and does as he is injoyned to do if the Church and the person whom the Church trusts for him do their duty that is supposing the Laws of the Church to be good and sufficient and well and sufficiently exercised hath a good and sufficient presumption that he is restored But he who proceedeth upon the common faith of the Gospel and the primitive practice of the Church whereby all that is doubtful in Christianity must be resolved attaineth that assurance of his restoring to the state of salvation which I have showed is attainable But not supposing the Laws of the Church to be either sufficient or sufficiently executed that presumption of pardon which can be built upon it is neither good nor sufficient but rather peremtory to salvation by palliating the crime which it ought to cure Now for the ground which the Church of Rome gives a reasonable man to presume hereof it is not to be denied or dissembled that the Council of Trent Sess XIV cap. VIII declareth that it is the duty of all Confessors to injoyn wholsome and competent Penance upon all Penitents and that by virtue of S. Pauls charge 1 Tim. V. 22. upon which the Power of the Church in imposing Penance is truly grounded seeing the blessing of the Church signifieth by imposition of hands is as much granted in Penance as in ordaining least they become partakers of other mens sinnes declaring withall the intent which they ought to aim at in imposing them But we know also and see thereby that there is no effectuall course taken to see that this be done whither it be possible to take a course that may be effectuall to be done or not And we know besides how great vogue that opinion hath which maketh attrition with the Keyes of the Church that is the shame of declaring a mans sinne to his Confessor a sufficient disposition to forgivenesse And therefore it is justly to be questioned whither the Law of secret confession with these abusive opinions and scandalous practises under which it is now exercised in the Church of Rome is for the best or not That is to say whether the greatest part of them who submit to it do not unduly perswade themselves that their sinnes are cured by it when indeed they are not For considering the ground of all superstition and counterfeit religion to be this that man sensible of the wrath of God due to his sinne on the other side yet favourable to that concupiscence which sinne pleaseth on the otherâ—side desireth a colour to perswade himself that he is reconciled to God by such means as indeed serves not the turn I know not whether perswasion is the more catching supposing the present division between the Reformation and the Church of Rome that a man is justified by believing that he is
divers suppositions of their own which I intend not hereby either to admit or to dispute because it is enough for my turne that we agree in this that the precept of avoiding the Excommunicate is limitable upon such considerations as the constitution and being of the Church presupposeth As the Apostle when he orders the Corinthians not so much as to eat with one that professeth Christianity and yet lives in the sinnes he nameth 1 Cor. V. 11. meaneth the same that he expresseth and signifieth by avoiding an Heretick Titus III. 10. S. John by not bidding him God speed and our Lord by holding him as a Heathen man or a Publicane But he that shall consider the vast difference between the State of Christianity under the Apostles and when the Empire and now severall Soveraignties professe it remembring that Christianity disolves not but maintaines civil Government and every mans estate in it must see this to be one of those Lawes which without limitation become uselesse to the maintenance of the Church and therefore must necessarily be limited that it may be serviceable The ordinary limitation of it by that verse of the Casuists is well enough known Vtile lex humile res ignorata necesse But he that will observe shall find that all these Exceptions to the generall rule of avoiding the Excommunicate are grounded upon that one title of the necessity of this world and the subsistence thereof which the being of the Church presupposeth A man converseth with the excommunicate for his profit to recover a debt This is the necessity of his estate of which he owes God an account in behalfe of his obligations A man or wife converses with wife or husband excommunicate for the bond of mariage This is that necessity which that law presupposed to the foundation of the Church createth Superiours and inferiours converse with one an other excommunicate This is the necessity of their estate which Christianity maintayneth Other necessities are warrantable under the generall title of necessity The necessity of violence or feare why should it not have a place here as well as that of ignorance onely that both are generall justifying all and not onely this kind of actions The necessity of giving and getting good counsaile or almes is all reducible to the same head Wherefore all these considerations resolve themselves into that generall ground which I tender that Christianity supposes the lawfull state of the world according to the reason of civill Government and altereth no mans condition in it of it selfe but maintaineth every man in that estate in which it findeth him as S. Paul argueth at large 1. Corin. VII 17-24 being such as Christianity alloweth By reason whereof the avoiding of the excomunicate easily to be visibly performed by Christians among themselves when their conversation was among many times more men that were not Christians becomes without limitation impossible to be observed of them that live onely with Christians How feasible that obligation is as the Casuists now make it I leave it to them to maintaine or how feasible it may be made This I say that all these reasons conccurre to oblige all Christian subjects not to forbeare the conversation of their Soveraignes The civill Laws of every state the advantage which the state of all subjects doth or may require from the soveraign the inâ—eriority wherein they are and the necessity which all these reasons produce For neither can Christianity pretend to disolve the Law of the land Nor can justice goe forwards without conversation of the subject with the soveraigne And Christianity obligeth superiours and inferiors to maintaine the relations in which it overtaketh them And finally the necessity of these reasons createth an exception even to the Law of the Church communion though setled by our Lord and his Apostles And this as much as to say that the greater Excommunication taketh no place against Soveraignes And this position is so far from being new in England that in my nonage it was disputed at Cambridge upon an eminent occasion at the reception of the Archbishop of Spalato by an expresse order of King James of excellent memory as I conceive I am well informed and thereby satisfied that I maintaine hereby no novelty in the Church of England But those that distinguish not this from the act of S. Ambrose in refusing the communion to the great Theodosius upon a horrible murther done by his expresse commandement may doe well to consider either with what conscience they censure such a Prelate in what they understand not or why they condemne the whole Church whereof all Christians are or ought to be members For how can the Church refuse any Christian the communion if it refuse not the same to all Christians even the soveraigne in that case wherein the condition of all is one and the same And hereby also wee may see what was the opinion of the learned Prince King James concerning this action of S. Ambrose whatsoever may have been said Who had he made question of the lesse excommunication consisting in excluding from the Eucharist would never have caused it to be disputed that the greater hath no place against Soveraigne As concerning the Jurisdiction of the Church in the causes of Christians if the question be made whether or no it now continue that common wealths professe Christianity the argument seemeth peremptory that it doth not continue because then of necessity all civill powers should resolve into the Power of the Church because all Jurisdiction by consequence to this priviledge must needs resolve into the jurisdiction of the Church all causes being the causes of Christians and resorting therefore to the jurisdiction of the Church and therefore no use of secular Courts but the power of the sword must become subordinate to execute the sentence of the Church And therefore seeing that on the otherside the reason why S. Paul forbids them to goe to sute before secular courts is this because they were the Courts of Infidels and that the scandals of Christians were by that meanes published before unbelievers which it is evident was the reason why this course was thought abominable even among the Jewes it is manifest that the jurisdiction of the Church in maters that arise not upon the constitution of the Church though inforced by S. Paul and our Lord ceaseth together with the title and cause of it when secular Powers professe Christianity Which notwithstanding it is a thing well known that the line of Charles the Great in the West revived those privileges which Constantine had granted the Church as his act also is repeaâ—ed in their Capitulares VI. 281. which Gratiane also hath recorded XI Quaest cap. Quicunque From which beginning many sorts of causes especialy such as charity seemed to have most interest in which the Clergy were thought fittest to manage have continued to be sentenced by the Ecclesiastical Court in all Christian dominions Notwithstanding that they rise not upon the constitution
of the Church nor doe originally be long to it to sentence And all this not distinguishing these severall titles hath been usually understood by the name of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction or the juâ—isdiction of the Church Neither is there any doubt to be made that not onely France in their appeales from the abuse of Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction which are there warranted of course but also all Christian states as England in their premunires and injunctions have alwaies provided to redresse the wrong that might be don by the abuse thereof Nor doe I doubt that Spaine it selfe hath made use of such courses as may appeare not onely â—y great volumes upon that subject by Salgado de Somoza and Jeronymo de Cevallos whom I have not seene but more lively by the letters of Cardinall de Ossat where there is so much menâ—ion of the differences between the See of Rome and the ministers of that Crowne in Italy about the jurisdiction of the Church But will all this serve for an argument that there is no such thing as a Church no such jurisdiction as that of the Church in the opinion of Christendome but that which stands by the act of Christian powers because they all pretend to limit the abuse of it When as the very name of Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction in the title of those books those actions is sufficient demonstration that they acknowledge and suppose a right to jurisdiction in the Church which they pretend so to limit as neither the Church nor the rest of their subjects to have cause to complaine of wrong by the abuse of it Whether they attaine their pretence or no remaining to be disputed upon the principles hitherto advanced by any man that shall have cause to enter into any treaty of the particulars Neither is the publishing of Erastus his booke against Excommunication at London to be drawne into the like consequence that those who allowed or procured it allowed the substance of that he maintaineth so long as a sufficient reason is to be rendred for it otherwise For at such time as the Presbyterian pretenses were so hot under Queen Elizabeth it is no marvaile if it was thought to show England how they prevailed at home First because he hath advanced such arguments as are really effectuall against them which are not yet nor ever will be answered by them though void of the positive truth which ought to take place in stead of their mistakes And besides because at such time as Popes did what them listed in England it would have been to the purpose to show the English how Macchiavell observes that they were hampred at home And for the like reason when the Geneva platforme was cried up with such zeale here it was not amisse to show the world how it was esteemed under their own noses in the Cantons and the Palatinat And here I cannot forbeare to take notice of the publishing of Grotius his book de Jure summarum potestatum in sacris after his death because that also is drawn into consequence For it is well enough knowne that at his being in Eâ—gland before the Synod at Dort he left it with two great learned prelates of the Church of England Lanctlot Lord Bishop of Winchester and Iohn Lord Bishop of Norwich to peruse And that both of them agreeing in an advice that it should not be published he constantly observed the same till he was dead So that though the writing of it was his act yet the publishing was not But the act of those that would have it appeare that his younger works doe not perfectly agree with the sense of his riper yeares He that in the preface to his Annotations on the Gospels shall reade him disclaiming whatsoever the consent of the Church shall be found to refuse will never believe that he admitted no Corporation of the Church without which no consent thereof could have been observed And therefore may well allow him to change his opinion without giving the world expresse account of it I will adde hereupon one consideration out of the letter of late learned Hales of Eton Colledge from the Synod at Dort to the English Embassador at the Hague For Grotius was then every man knowes one that adhered to the Holland Remonstrants He speaketh of denying them the copie of a decree of the states read them in the Synod December 11. This at the first seemed to me somewhat hard but when I considered that those were the men which heretofore in prejudice of the Church so extreamely flattered the civill magistrate I could not but think this usage a fit reward for such a service And that by a just judgement of God themselves bad the first experience of those inconveniencies which naturally arise out of their doctrine in this behalfe It remaines onelly as concerning this point that I give account of the article of the Church of England which acknowledgeth the King Supreme Governour in all causes and over all persons as well Ecclesiasticall as Civill to this effect as having all that Right in maters of Religion which the pious Kings of Gods ancient people Christian Emperors and Princes have alwaies exercised in the Church And the account that I am to give is what the meaning of this collective which hath been exercised by the Kings of Judah and Christian Princes must be For I have showed that it is not to be granted that Christian Princes may doe that in Christianity which the Kings of â—srael did under the Law Because the Law was given to one people for a condition of the Land of promise the Gospell to all Nations for the condition of everlasting happinesse It is therefore consequently to be said That in as much as the reason and ground upon which the right which those Kings are found to exercise under the Law holds the same under the Gospell so far that power which the Church of England ascribes to the King in Church maters is the same which those Kings are found to exercise in the scriptures But wherein the reason holds not the same insomuch it is necessary to distinguish and acknowledge a difference It seemes to me that when the Law refers the determination of all things questionable concerning the Law in the last resort to the Priests and Levits and to the Judge that shall be in those daies at Jerusalem or the place which God should choose Deut. XVIII 8-12 the reason why it speaks indefinitely of Priest and Judge is because it intended to include the soveraigne whether High Priest who from after the Captivity untill the coming of Herod was chiefe of the people or Chief Judge whether those that are so called who as I said afore were manifestly soveraignes or after them the Kings so that by this Law nothing could be determined without the King either by himselfe or by subordinate Judges And the reason is evident For the penalty of transgressing this law being death otherwise we must allow inferior Judges the power of