thè soul were forced to do what it doth one might justly lay the blame on God who permits such a force to be offered it neither could it be properly evil which the soul was constrained to but since it acted freely and out of choice the soul must alone be accounted the author and cause of evil Thus we see that God cannot with any shadow of reason be accounted the author of evil because he gave the soul of man a principle of internal freedom when the very freedom of acting which the soul had put it into a capacity of standing as well as falling And certainly he can never be said to be the cause of the breaking of a person who gave him a stock to set up with and supposed him able to manage it when he gave it him indeed had not man had this freedom of will he could not have fallen but then neither had he been a rational Agent which supposing no corruption doth speak freedom of action So that while we enquire after the Origine of evil we have no other cause to assign it to but mans abuse of that free power of acting which he had but if we will be so curious as to enquire further why God did create man with such a freedom of will and not rather fix his soul immutably on good if the order of beings be no satisfactory reason for it we can give no other then that why he made man or the world at all which was the good pleasure of his Will But secondly supposing Gods giving man this freedom of will doth not entitle him to be the author of evil doth not his leaving man to this liberty of his in the temptation make him the cause of sin I answer no and that on these accounts 1. Because man stood then upon such terms that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary act he had a power to stand in that there was no principle of corruption at all in his faculties but he had a pure and undefiled soul which could not be polluted without its own consent Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which man stood which were the tryal of his obedience to his Creator had he been irresistibly determined any way Simplicius puts this question after the former discourse Whether God may not be called the author of sin because he permits the soul to use her liberty but saith he he that says God should not have permitted this use of its freedom to the soul must say one of these two things â—ither that the soul being of such a nature as is indifferent to good or evil it should have been wholly kept from the choosing evil or else that it should have been made of such a nature that it should not have had a power of choosing evil The first is irrational and absurd for what freedom and liberty had that been where there was no choice and what choice could there have been where the mind was necessitated onely to one part For the second we are to consider saith he that no evil is in its self desirable or to be chosen but withall if this power of determining its self â—ither way must be taken away it must be either as something not good or as some great evil and whoâ—ver saith so doth not consider how many things in the world there are which are accounted good and desirable things yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will For it excells all sublunary Beings and there is none would rather desire to be a Brute or Plant then man if God then shewed his goodness in giving to inferior beings such perfectiâ—â—s which are far below this is it any ways incongruous to Gods nature and goodness to give man the freedom of his actions and a self determining power thâ—ugh he permiâ—ted him the free use of it Besides as that author reasonâ— had God to prevent mans sin taken away the Liberty of his will he had likewise destroyed the foundation of all vertue and the very nature of man for vertue would not have been such had there been no possibility of acting contrary and mans nature would have been divine because impeccable Therefore saith â—e though we attribute this self-determining power to God as the author of it which was so necessary in the order of the Universe we have no reason to attribute the Origine of that evil to God which comes by the abuse of that liberty For as he further adds God doth not at all cause that aversion from Good which is in the soul when it sins but only gave such a power to the soul whereby it might turn its self to evil out of which God might afterwards produce so much good which could not otherwise have been without it So consonantly to the Scripture doth that Philosopher speak on this subject 2. God cannot be said to be the author of sin though he did not prevent the fall of man because he did not withdraw before his fall any grace or assistance which was necessary for his standing Had there been indeed a necessity of supernatural grace to be communicated to man for every moment to continue him in his Innocency and had God before mans fall withdrawn such assistance from him without which it were impossible for him to â—ave stood it would be very difficult freeing God from being the cause of the Fall of man But we are not put to such difficulties for acquitting God from being the author of sin for there appears no necessity at all for asserting any distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace in man before his Fall that the one should belong only to a radical power of standing the other to every act of good which Adam did For if God made man upright he certainly gave him such a power as might be brought into act without the necessity of any supervenient act of grace to elicite that habitual power into particular actions If the other were sufficient it was sufficient for its end and how could it be sufficient for its end if notwithstanding that there were no possibility of standing unless efficacious help were superadded to it God would not certainly require any thing from the creature in his integrity but what he had a power to obey and if there were necessary further grace to bring the power into act then the substracting of this grace must be by way of punishment to man which it is hard to conceive for what it should be before man had sinned or eâ—se God must substract this grace on purpose that man might â—all which would necessarily follow on this supposition in which case Man would be necessitated to fall veluti cum subductis columnis dom us necessario corruit as one expresseth it as a house must needs fall when the pillars on which it stood are taken away from it But now if God withdrew not any effectual grace from man whereby he must necessarily fall then
the necessary obligation to punishment but therein God doth not bind up himself as he doth in absolute promises the reason is because comminations confer no right to any which absolute promises do and therefore God is not bound to necessary performance of what he threatens Indeed the guilt or obligation to punishment is necessary where the offence hâ—â— been committed to which the threatning was annexed but the execution of that punishment doth still depend upon Gods arbitrarious will and therefore he may suspend or remove it upon serious addresses made to himself in order to it For since God was pleased not to take the present forfeiture of the first grand transgression but made such a relaxation of that penall Law that conditions of pardon were admittable notwithstanding sentence passed upon the malefactors there is a strong ground of presumption in humane nature that Gods forbearance of mankind notwithstanding sin doth suppose his readiness to pardon offenders upon their repentance and therefore that all particular threatnings of judgements to come do suppose incorrigibleness in those they are pronounced against Upon which the foundation of hope is built that if timely repentance do intervene God will remove those judgements which are threatned against them And this was certainly the case of the Ninivites upon Ionas his preaching among them For when the threatning was so peremptory Yet forty dayes and Ninive shall be destroyed all the hope they could have of pardon must be from the general perswasions of mens souls of Gods readiness to remove judgements upon repentance For otherwise there had been no place for any thing but despair and not the least encouragement to supplicate the mercy of God which we see they did in a most solemn manner after they were convinced these comminations came from God himself by the mouth of his Prophet Some think that Ionas together with the threatning of judgement did intermix exhortations to repentance but we can finde no probability at all for that on these two accounts first Ionas then would not have been so unwilling to have undertaken this message for as far as we can see the harshness of it was the main reason he sought to have avoided it by flying to Tarshish Secondly Ionas would have had no pretence at all for his anger and displeasure at Gods pardoning Ninive which is most probably conceived to have been because the Ninivites might now suspect him to be no true Prophet because the event answered not his prediction Now there had been no reason at all for this if he had mixed promises together with his threatnings for then nothing would have falln out contrary to his own predictions And therefore it seems evident that the message Ionas was sent with was only the commination of their speedy ruine which God did on purpose to awaken them the sooner and with the greater earnestness to repentance when the judgement was denounced in so peremptory a manner although it seems Ionas had before such apprehensions of the merciful nature of God and his readiness to pardon that he might suppose Gods intention by this severe denunciation of judgement might be only to take occasion upon their repentance to shew his goodness and bounty to them But this was no part of his instructions which he durst not go beyond in his Preaching what ever his private opinion might be for the Prophets were to utter no more in their Preaching or particular messages then was in their commission and were not to mix their own words with the Word of the Lord. And by this we may further understand the denunciation of death to Hezekiah by the Prophet Isaiah Set thy house in order for thou shalt dye and not live I question not but the Prophet revealed to Hezekiah as much as God had revealed to him for to say as Molinaeus doth that the Prophet spake these words of his own head before he fully understood Gods mind is very harsh and incongruous but God might at first discover to Isaiah not his internal purpose but what the nature of the disease would bring him to unless his own immediate hand of providence interposed which message he would have Isaiah carry to Hezekiah for the tryal of his faith and exciting him to the more lively acts of grace and for a further demonstration of Gods goodness to him in prolonging his life beyond humane probability and the course of second causes Now what repugnancy is there to the truth and faithfulness of God that God should conceal from his Prophets in their messages the internal purposes of his will and in order to the doing good to men should only reveal what would certainly have come to pass unless himself had otherwise determind it And thus the repentance which is attributed to God in reference to these denunciations of judgements is far from importing any real mutation in the internal purposes of God a rock some have split themselves upon but it only signifies the outward changing of the Scene towards men and acting otherwise then the words of the Prophets did seem to import and all the alteration is in the outward discovery of his will which is certainly far from being any collusion in God Unless we must suppose God so bound up that he hath no liberty of using his own methods for bringing men to repentance or for tryal of his peoples graces but must in every instance of his Word declare nothing but his own internal purposes which is contrary to the general method of Gods dealing with the world which is to govern men by his own Laws and thereby to awaken them to duty and deterre from sin by his annexed threatnings without revealing any thing of his internal purposes concerning the state and condition of any particular persons at all which threatnings of his though pronounced with the greatest severity do not speak Gods inward resolutions as to any particular person but what all must expect if they continue impenitent and incorrigible For the only condition implyed in these threatnings being repentance it necessarily follows that where that is wanting these hypothetical comminations are absolute predictions of what shall certainly come to pass on all those who are destitute of the condition supposed in them So that where any comminations are pronounced by any in a prophetical way concerning any person or people and no alteration happen at all in them but they continue impenitent and incorrigible there the not coming of them to pass may be a token of a false Prophet For in this case the only tacite condition implyed in these threatening Prophecies is supposed to be wanting and so the comminations must be understood as absolute predictions Now in those comminations in Scripture which are absolutely expressed but conditionally understood we find something interposing which we may rationally suppose was the very condition understood As Abimelechs restoring of Sarah was the ground why the sentence of death after it was denounced was
the general defect for want of timely records among Heathen Nations the reason of it shewed from the first Plantations of the World The manner of them discovered The Original of Civil Government Of Hieroglyphicks The use of letters among the Greeks no elder then Cadmus his time enquired into no elder then Joshua the learning brought into Greece by him ENquiries after truth have that peculiar commendation above all other designs that they come on purpose to gratifie the most noble faculty of our souls and do most immediately tend to re-advance the highest perfection of our rational beings For all our most laudable endeavours after knowledge now are only the gathering up some scattered fragments of what was once an entire Fabrick and the recovery of some precious Iewels which were lost out of sight and sunk in the shipwrack of humane nature That saying of Plato that all knowledge is remembrance and all ignorance forgetfulness is a certain and undoubted truth if by forgetfulness be meant the loss and by remembrance the recovery of those notions and conceptions of things which the mind of man once had in its pure and primitive state wherein the understanding was the truest Microcosm in which all the beings of the inferiour world were faithfully represented according to their true native and genuine perfections God created the soul of man not only capable of finding out the truth of things but furnished him with a sufficient 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or touchstone to discover truth from falshood by a light set up in his understanding which if he had attended to he might have secured himself from all impostures and deceits As all other beings were created in the full possession of the agreeable perfections of their several natures so was man too else God would have never closed the work of Creation with those words And God saw all that he had made and behold it was very good that is endued with all those perfections which were suitable to their several beings Which man had been most defective in if his understanding had not been endowed with a large stock of intellectual knowledge which is the most natural and genuine perfection belonging to his rational being For reason being the most raised faculty of humane nature if that had been defective in its discoveries of truth which is its proper object it would have argued the greatest maim and imperfection in the being it self For if it belongs to the perfection of the sensitive faculties to discern what is pleasant from what is hurtful it must needs be the perfection of the rational to find out the difference of truth from falshood Not as though the soul could then have had any more then now an actual notion of all the beings in the world ocexisting at the same time but that it would have been free from all deceits in its conceptions of things which were not caused through inadvertency Which will appear from the several aspects mans knowledge ledge hath which are either upwards towards his Maker or abroad on his fellow-creatures If we consider that contemplation of the soul which fixes its self on that infinite being which was the cause of it and is properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it will be found necessary for the soul to be created in a clear and distinct knowledge of him because of mans immediate obligation to obedience unto him Which must necessarily suppose the knowledge of him whose will must be his rule for if man were not fully convinced in the first moment after his creation of the being of him whom he was to obey his first work and duty would not have been actual obedience but a search whether there was any supreme infinite and eternal being or no and whereon his duty to him was founded and what might be sufficient declaration of his Will and Laws according to which he must regulate his obedience The taking off all which doubts and scruples from the soul of man must suppose him fully satisfied upon the first free use of reason that there was an Infinite Power and Being which produced him and on that account had a right to command him in whatsoever he pleased and that those commands of his were declared to him in so certain a way that he could not be deceived in the judging of them The clear knowledge of God will further appear most necessary to man in his first creation if we consider that God created him for this end and purpose to enjoy converse and an humble familiarity with himself he had then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the language of Clemens Alexandrinus Converse with God was as natural to him as his being was For man as he came first out of Gods hands was the reflection of God himself on a dark Cloud the Iris of the Deity the Similitude was the same but the substance different Thence he is said to be created after the Image of God His knowledge then had been more intellectual then discursive not so much imploying his faculties in the operose deductions of reason the pleasant toyl of the rational faculties since the Fall but had immediately imployed them about the sublimest objects not about quiddities and formalities but about him who was the fountain of his being and the center of his happiness There was not then so vast a difference between the Angelical and humane life The Angels and men both fed on the same dainties all the difference was they were in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the upper room in heaven and man in the Summer Parlour in Paradise If we take a view of mans knowledge as it respects his fellow-creatures we shall find these were so fully known to him on his first creation that he needed not to go to School to the wide world to gather up his conceptions of them For the right exercise of that Dominion which he was instated in over the inferiour world doth imply a particular knowledge of the nature being and properties of those things which he was to make use of without which he could not have improved them for their peculiar ends And from this knowledge did proceed the giving the creatures those proper and peculiar names which were expressive of their several natures For as Plato tells us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The imposition of names on things belongs not to every one but only to him that hath a full prospect into their several natures For it is most agreeable to reason that names should carry in them a suitableness to the things they express for words being for no other end but to express our conceptions of things and our conceptions being but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the same Philosopher speaks the resemblances and representations of the things it must needs follow that where there was a true knowledge the conceptions must agree with the things and words being to express our conceptions none are so fit to do it as those which
God or our selves that God should when it pleases him single out some instrument to manifest his will to the world our enquiry then leads us to those things which may be proper notes and characters of such a person who is imployed on so high an Embassy And those are chiefly these two if his actions be such as could not flow from the power of meer natural causes and if the things he reveals be such as could not proceed from any created understanding First then for his actions these striking most upon our outward senses when they are any thing extraordinary do transmit along with the impressions of them to the understanding an high opinion of the person that does them Whereas the meer height of knowledge or profoundness of things discovered can have no such present power and influence upon any but such as are of more raised and inquisitive minds And the world is generally more apt to suspect its self deceived with words then it can be with actions and hence Miracles or the doing of things above the reach of nature hath been alwayes embraced as the greatest testimony of Divine authority and revelation For which there is this evident reason that the course of nature being setled by divine power and every thing acting there by the force of that power it received at first it seems impossible that any thing should really alter the series of things without the same power which at first produced them This then we take for granted that where ever such a power appears there is a certain evidence of a Divine presence going along with such a person who enjoyes it And this is that which is most evident in the actions of Moses both as to the Miracles he wrought both in Aegypt and the Wilderness and his miraculous deliverance of the Israelites out of Aegypt this latter being as much above the reach of any meerly civil power as the other above natural We therefore come to the rational evidence of that divine authority whereby Moses acted which may be gathered from that divine power which appeared in his actions which being a matter of so great weight and importance it being one of the main bases whereon the evidence of divine revelation as to us doth stand and withall of so great difficulty and obscurity caused through the preferring some parties in Religion above the common interest of it it will require more care and diligence to search what influence the power of miracles hath upon the proving the Divine Commission of those who do them Whether they are such undoubted credentials that where ever they are produced we are presently to receive the persons who bring them as extraordinary Embassadors from heaven imployed on some peculiar message to the sons of men For the full stating of this important question two things must be cleared First In what cases miracles may be expected as credentials to confirm an immediate commission from heaven Secondly What rational evidence do attend those miracles to assure us they are such as they pretend to be First For the cases wherein these miracles are to be expected as inducements to or confirmations of our faith concerning the Divine imployment of any persons in the world And here I lay down this as a certain foundation that a power of miracles is not constantly and perpetually necessary in all those who mannage the affairs of Heaven here on earth or that act in the name of God in the world When the doctrine of faith is once setled in sacred records and the divine revelation of that doctrine sufficiently attested by a power of miracles in the revealers of it What imaginable necessity or pretext can there be for a contrived power of miracles especially among such as already own the Divine revelation of the Scriptures To make then a power of working miracles to be constantly resident in the Church of God as one of the necessary notes and characters of it is to put God upon that necessity which common nature is freed from viz. of multiplying things without sufficient cause to be given for them and to leave mens faith at a stand when God hath given sufficient testimony for it to rely upon It is a thing too common and easie to be observed that some persons out of their eagerness to uphold the interest of their own party have been fain to establish it upon such grounds which when they are sufficiently searched to the bottom do apparently undermine the common and sure foundations whereon the belief of our common Christianity doth mainly stand It were easie to make a large discourse on this subject whereby we may rip open the wounds that Christianity hath received through the contentions of the several parties of it but this imputation cannot with so much reason be fastened on any party as that which is nailed to a pretended infallible chair for which we need no other instance then this before us For while the leaders of that party make a power of miracles to be a necessary note of the true Church they unavoidably run men upon this dangerous precipice not to believe any thing as a matter of faith where they find not sufficient miracles to convince them that is the true Church which propounds it to them Which necessarily follows from their acknowledged principles for it being impossible according to them to believe any thing with a divine faith but what is propounded by the Church as an infallible guide and it being impossible to know which is this infallible guide but by the notes and characters of it and one of those notes being a power of miracles I cannot find out my guide but by this power and this power must be present in the Church for nothing of former ages concerning faith as the Miracles of Christ his resurrection c. is to be believed but on the Churches account and therefore where men do not find sufficient conviction from present miracles to believe the Church to be an infallible guide they must throw off all faith concerning the Gospel for as good never a whit as never the better And therefore it is no wonder Atâ—eism should be so thriving a plant in Italy nay under if not within the walls of Rome it self where inquisitive persons do daily see the juglings and impostures of Priests in their pretended miracles and from thence are brought to look upon Religion its self as a meer imposture and to think no Pope so infallible as he that said Quantum nobis profuit haec de Christo fabula Such horrid consequences do men drive others if not bring themselves to when they imploy their parts and industry rather to uphold a corrupt interest then to promote the belief of the acknowledged principles of Christian faith But as long as we assert no necessity of such a power of miracles to be the note of any true Church nor any such necessity of an infallible guide but that the miracles wrought by
from the true God or from Idols and false Gods So that the meer pretence to Divine revelation was that which God would have punished with so great severity The Iews tell us of three sorts of Prophets who were to be punished with death by men and three other sorts who were reserved to divine punishment Of the first rank were these 1. He that prophecyed that which he had not heard and for this they instance in Zedekiah the son of Chenaanah who made him horns of iron and said Thus saith the Lord this was the lying Prophet 2. He that speaks that which was revealed not to him but to another and for this they instance in Hananiah the son of Azur but how truly I shall not determine this was the Plagiary Prophet 3. He that prophesied in the name of an Idol as the Prophets of Baal did this was the Idol Prophet These three when once fully convicted were to be put to death The other rank of those which were left to Gods hand consisted of these 1. He that stisles and smothers his own prophecy as Jonas did by which it may seem that when the Divine Spirit did overshadow the understanding of the Prophets yet it offered no violence to their faculties but left them to the free determination of their own wills in the execution of their office but this must be understood of a lower degree of prophecy for at sometimes their prophecyes were as fire in their bones that they were never at any rest till they had discharged their office But withall by the example of Ionas we see that though the Spirit of prophecy like the fire on the Altar could only be kindled from heaven yet it might be destroyed when it was not maintained with something to feed upon or when it met not with suitable entertainment from the spirits of those it fell upon it might retreat back again to heaven or at least lie hid in the embers till a new blast from the Spirit of God doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 retrieve it into its former heat and activity Thus it was with Ionas 2. The other was he that despised the words of a true Prophet of such God saith Deut. 18. 19. And it shall come to pass that whosoever shall not hearken to my words which he shall speak in my name I will require it of him Which Maimonides explains by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 death by the hands of God which he thus distinguisheth from the Cereth that he makes the death per manus coeli to be less then the Cereth because this latter continued in the soul after death but the other was expiated by death but generally they interpret it of a sudden death which falls upon the person 3. The last is he who hearkens not to the words of his own Prophecy of which we have a most remarkable instance in Scripture concerning the Prophet whom God sent to Bethel whom Tertullian calls Sameas the Iews Hedua whom God destroyed in an unusual manner for not observing the command which God had given him not to eat bread nor drink water at Bethel nor turn again by the way he came Neither was it any excuse to this Prophet that the old Prophet at Bethel told him that an Angel spake unto him by the word of the Lord that he should turn back For 1. Those whom God reveals his will unto he gives them full assurance of it in that they have a clear and distinct perception of God upon their own minds and so they have no doubt but it is the word of the Lord which comes unto them but this Prophet could have no such certainty of the Divine revelation which was made to another especially when it came immediately to contradict that which was so specially enjoyned him 2. Where God commands a Prophet to do any thing in the pursuit of his message there he can have no ground to question whether God should countermand it or no by another Prophet because that was in effect to thwart the whole design of his message So it was in this action of the Prophets for God intended his not eating and drinking in Bethel to testifie how much he loathed and abominated that place since its being polluted with Idolatry 3. He might have just cause to question the integrity of the old Prophet both because of his living in Bethel and not openly according to his office reproving their Idolatry and that God should send him out of Iudea upon that very errand which would not have seemed so probable if there had been true Prophets resident upon the place 4. The thing he desired him to do was not an act of that weight and importance on which God useth to send his Word to any Prophets much less by one Prophet to contradict what he had said by another and therefore Tertullian saith of him poenam deserti jejunii luit God punished him for breaking his fast at Bethel and therefore that message of this Prophet seemed to gratifie more mans carnal appetite then usually the actions of Prophets did which were most times matters of hardship and uneasiness to the flesh 5. However all these were yet he yeilded too soon especially having so much reason on his side as he had being well assured that God had commanded him he had reason to see some clear evidence of a countermand before he altered his mind if he had seen any thing upon tryal which might have staggerd his faith he ought to have made his immediate recourse to God by prayer for the settlement of his mind and removal of this great temptation But so easily to hearken to the words of a lying Prophet which contradicted his own message argued either great unbelief as to his own commission or too great easiness and inadvertency in being drawn aside by the old Prophet And therefore God made that old Prophet himself in the midst of his entertainment as with a hand writing against the wall to tell him he was weighed in the ballance and found too light and therefore his life should be taken from him Thus we see how dangerous a thing it was either to counterfeit a Spirit of Prophecy or to hearken to those who did It is the generally received opinion among the Iewish Doctors that the cognizance and tryal of false Prophets did peculiarly belong to the great Sanhedrin And that this was one end of its institution So Maimonides after he hath largely discoursed of the punishment of a seducer and speaking of that of a false Prophet he layes this down as a standing rule among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No false Prophet was to be judged but in the Court of seventy one which was the number of the great Sanhedrin And there is some thing looks very like this in the proceedings of the people of Israel against the Prophet Ieremiah for the people the Priests and the Prophets they laid hold on him and immediately
impossibile yet taking that impossibility as relating to second causes and the ground of faith to be some divine prediction we see what reason there may be for them For the more unlikely the thing is to be effected by second causes the greater evidence is it that the Prophets in foretelling it did not respect the meer order of things in the world but the unalterable counsels of the will of God which therefore would certainly have their timely accomplishments When therefore any Prophets did foretell things above the reach of natural causes and those things did not come to pass it was a certain evidence of a false Prophet as the contrary was of a true one for none could know so long before-hand such things as were above all humane power but such to whom God himself who alone was able to effect them did reveal and communicate the knowledge of them And hence we see in Scripture those predictions which have seemed to carry the greatest improbabilities with them have had the most punctual accomplishments as the Israelites returning out of Aegypt at the end of the 430 years their deliverance by Cyrus after the captivity in Babylon which seemed so improbable a thing that when God speaks of it he ushers it in with this preface that he frustrateth the tokens of the lyars and maketh the diviners mad but confirmeth the word of his servant and performeth the counsel of his messengers that saith to Ierusalem Thou shalt be inhabited c. The more unlikely then the thing was to come to pass the greater evidence there was in so clear a prophecie of it so long before above 100 years and so exact a fulfilling of it afterwards precisely at the expiring of the L X X years from the first Captivity Predictions concerning future events which are confirmed by an oath from God himself do express the immutable determinations of Gods will For which we have the greatest assurance we can desire from that remarkable expression of the Apostle to the Hebrews Heb. 6. 17 18. Wherein God willing more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel confirmed it by an oath that by two immutable things in which it was impossible for God to lye we might have a strong consolation c. Wherein the Apostle obviates and removes all doubts and misprisions lest God after the declaring of his will should alter the event foretold in it and that he doth both by shewing that God had made an absolute promise and withall to prevent all doubts lest some tacite condition might hinder performance he tels us that God had annexed his oath to it which two things were the most undoubted evidences of the immutability of Gods counsel The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here used doth in Scripture often note the frustrating of mens hopes and expectations so it is used Habak 3. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we render it the labour of the Olive shall fail So Osea 9. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the new wine shall fail in her Thus the meaning here is that by two immutable things in which it is impossible that God should frustrate the expectations of men or alter the events of things after he had declared them For Gods oath is an evident demonstration of the immutability of his will in all predictions to which this is annexed and doth fully exclude that which the Scripture calls repenting in God that is doing otherwise then the words did seem to express because of some tacite conditions understood in them So we find Psal. 89. 31 32 33 34 35 36. If they break my statutes and keep not my commandements then will I visit their transgression with the rod and their iniquity with stripes nevertheless my loving kindness will I not utterly take from him nor suffer my faithfulness to fail my Covenant will I not break nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips Once have I sworn by my holiness that I will not lye unto David His seed shall endure for ever and his throne as the Sun before me Wherein we see what way God takes to assure us of the immutability of his Covenant with his people by the oath which he adjoyns to his promises whereby God doth most fully express the unalterable determinations of his own will in that he swears by his own holiness that he would not lye unto David i. e. that he would faithfully perform what he had promised to him And therefore Tertullian well saith Beati sumus quorum causa Deus jurat sed miseri detestabiles si ne juranti quidem credimus It is happy for us unbelieving creatures that God stoops so low as to confirm his Covenant with an oath but it will be sad and miserable for such as dare not venture their faith upon it when God hath annexed his oath unto it It is thought by expositors that there is a peculiar emphasis in those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Once have I sworn thereby noteing the irrevocable nature of Gods oath that there is no need of repetition of it as among men because when once God swears by himself it is the highest demonstration that no conditions whatever shall alter his declared purpose And therefore the Council of Toledo well explains the different nature of Gods Oath and his repentance in Scriptures Iurare namque Dei est à se ordinata nullatenus convellere poenitere vero eadem ordinata cum voluerit immutare God is said to swear when he binds himself absolutely to performance and to repent when things fall out contrary to the declaration of Gods will concerning them for so it must be understood to be only mutatio sententiae and not consilii that the alteration may be only in the things and not in the eternal purpose of God But since it is evident in Scripture that many predictions do imply some tacite conditions and many declarations of Gods will do not express his internal purposes it seemed necessary in those things which God did declare to be the irrevocable purposes of his will there should be some peculiar mark and character set upon them for the confirmation of his peoples faith and this we find to be the annexing an oath to his promises Thus it is in that grand Instrument of Peace between God and his people the Covenant of Grace wherein God was pleased so far to strengthen the faith of his people in it that he ratifies the articles of peace therein contained but especially the Act of Grace on his own part with an oath thereby to assure them it was never his purpose to repeal it nor to fail of performance in it For we are not to think that an Oath layes any greater obligation upon God for performance then the meer declaration of his will it being a part of immutable justice and consequently necessarily implyed in the Divine nature to perform promises when once made but Gods
which it may be are uncapable of full and particular resolution and those are That the ruine and destruction of man is wholly from himself and that his salvation is from God alone If then mans ruine and misery be from himself which the Scripture doth so much inculcate on all occasions then without controversie that which is the cause of all the misery of humane nature is wholly from himself too which is sin So that if the main scope and design of the Scripture be true God cannot be the author of that by which without the intervention of the mercy of God mans misery unavoidably falls upon him For with what authority and Majesty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of sin with what earnestness and importunity doth he woo the sinner to forsake his sin with what loathing and detestation doth he mention sin with what justice and severity doth he punish sin with what wrath and indignation doth he threaten contumacious sinners And is it possible after all this and much more recorded in the Scriptures to express the holiness of Gods nature his hatred of sin and his appointing a day of judgement for the solemn punishment of sinners to imagine that the Scriptures do in the least ascribe the Origine of evil to God or make him the Author of Sin Shall not the judge of all the world do right will a God of Infinite Iustice Purity and Holiness punish the sinner for that which himself was the cause of Far be such unworthy thoughts from our apprehensions of a Deity much more of that God whom we believe to have declared his mind so much to the contrary that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together Taking it then for granted in the general that God cannot be the author of sin we come to enquire whether the account which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil doth any way charge it upon God There are only two wayes which according to the history of the fall of man recorded in Scripture whereby men may have any ground to question whether God were the cause of mans fall either first by the giving him that positive Law which was the occasion of his fall or secondly by leaving him to the liberty of his own will First The giving of that positive Law cannot be the least ground of laying mans fault on God because 1. It was most suitable to the nature of a rational creature to be governed by Laws or declarations of the Will of his Maker For considering man as a free agent there can be no way imagined so consonant to the nature of man as this was because thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice For where there is a capacity of reward and punishment and acting in the consideration of them there must be a declaration of the will of the Law-giver according to which man may expect either his reward or punishment If it were suitable to Gods nature to promise life to man upon obedience it was not unsuitable to it to expect obedience to every declaration of his will considering the absolute soveraignty and Dominion which God had over man as being his creature and the indispensable obligation which was in the nature of man to obey whatever his Mâ—ker did command him So that God had full and absolute right to require from man what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey and in the general we cannot conceive how there should be a testimony of mans obedience towards hâ—s Creator without some declaration of his Creators Will. Secondly God had full power and authority not only to govern man by Laws but to determine mans general obligation to obedience to that particular positive precept by the breach of which man fell If Gods power over man was universal and unlimited what reason can there be to imagine it should not extend to such a positive Law Was it because the matter of this Law seemed too low for God to command his creature but whatever the matter of the Law was obedience to God was the great end of it which man had testified as much in that Instance of it as in any other whatsoever and in the violation of it were implyed the highest aggravations of disobedience for Gods power and authority was as much contemned his goodness slighted his Truth and faithfulness questioned his Name dishonoured his Majâ—sty affronted in the breach of that as of any other Law whatsoever it had been If the Law were easie to be observed the greater was the sin of disobedience if the weight of the matter was not so great in its self yet Gods authority added the greatest weight to it and the ground of obedience is not to be fetched from the nature of the thing required but from the authority of the Legislator Or was it then because God concealed from man his counsel in giving of that positive precept Hath not then a Legislator power to require any thing but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it if so what becomes of obedience and subjection it will be impossible to make any probative precepts on this account and the Legislator must be charged with the disobedience of his subjects where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires which as it concerns humane Legislators who have not that absolute power and authority which God hath is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general sense of the world This Plutarch gives a good account of when he discourseth â—o rationally of the sobriety which men ought to use in their inquiries into the grounds and reasons of Gods actions for saith he Physitians will give prescriptions without giving the patient a particular reason of every circumstance in them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither have humane Laws alwayes apparent reason for them nay some of them are to appearance ridiculous for which he instanceth in that Law of the Lacedaemonian Ephori 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to which no other reason was annexed but this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they commanded every Magistrate at the entrance of his office to â—have himself and gave this reason for it that they might learn to obey Laws themselves He further instanceth in the Roman custom of manumission their Laws about testaments Solons Law against neutrality in seditions and concludes thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Any one would easily find many absurdities in Laws who doth not consider the intention of the Legislator or the ground of what he requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What wonder is it if we are so puzled to give an account of the actions of men that we should be to seek as to those of the Deity This cannot be then any ground on the account of meer reason to lay the charge of mans disobedience upon God because he required from