and afterwards as shall be explain'd in the third Book he may by the Union which he has with the Universal Being or that which includes every Good think of other things and consequently love other Goods In fine we may compare all other Goods love 'em according to the Order and Degree in which they are lovely and refer 'em to him which includes them all and which is only worthy to limit our Love as being only able to fill all our Capacity of Loving Almost the same thing may be said of the Knowledge of Truth as of the Love of Good We love the Knowledge of Truth as the Enjoyment of Good by a Natural Impression and this Impression as well as that which carries us towards Good is not invincible its only so by the evidence or by the perfect and absolute knowledge of the Object And we are as free in our false Judgments as in our irregular Affections as shall be shown in the following Chapter CHAP. II. I. Of Judgments and Reasonings II. That they depend upon the Will III. What use must be made of its Liberty in respect of them IV. Two General Rules to avoid Error and Sin V. Necessary Reflections upon these Rules IT might well be concluded Of Judgments and Reasonings from what has been said in the preceeding Chapter that the Understanding never judges since it only perceives or since Judgments and Reasonings even in respect of the Understanding are only pure Perceptions 'T is the Will alone which properly Judges in acquiescing in that which the Understanding represents to it and in voluntarily resting there 't is this also which deceives us but these things must be explain'd more at large I say then there is no Difference in respect of the Understanding between a simple Perception and a Judging and Reasoning save that the Understanding perceives a simple thing by a simple Perception without any relation to any thing whatever that it perceives the relation betwixt two or more things in Judging that in fine it perceives the relations that are betwixt the relations of things in reasoning So that all the operations of the Understanding are pure Perceptions When we perceive for Example twice 2 or 4 this is only a Simple Perception When we Judge that 2 times 2 are 4 or that 2 times 2 are not 5 the Understanding does only yet receive the relation of Equality which is between 2 times 2 and 4 or the relation of Inequality that is between 2 times 2 and 5. Thus the Judgment in respect of the Understanding is only the Perception of the Relation between two or more things but Reasoning is the Perception of the Relation that is found not between two or more things for this would be Judgment but between two or more Relations of two or more things Thus when I conclude that 4 is less than 6 and that 2 times 2 making 4 is also consequently less than 6 I perceive not only the Relation of Inequality between 2 times 2 and 6 for then this would be only Judging but the Relation of Inequality which is betwixt the Relation of 2 times 2 and 4 and the Relation between 4 and 6 which is Reasoning The Understanding then only perceives and the Will only judges and reasons by resting it self voluntarily in what the Understanding represents to it as we said before Nevertheless II. That Judgments and Reasoning depend upon the Will when those things that we consider are self evident it appears to us that it is not then voluntarily that we assent to them so that we are inclin'd to believe that 't is not our Will but Understanding which judges of them But to be convinc'd of our Error we must know that things which we consider are only then entirely evident when the Understanding hath examin'd them on all sides and all their necessary relations in order to judge of them whence it happens that as the Will can will nothing without knowing so it cannot act on the Understanding I mean it can't desire that it should represent any new thing in its Object because it has already consider'd it in every respect by which it has any Relation to the proposed Question the Will is then oblig'd to acquiesce in that which the Understanding has already represented and to trouble or agitate it no farther and this acquiescing is that which is properly call'd Judgment and Reasoning And thus this Acquiescence or Judgment not being free when things are in their utmost evidence appears to us to be involuntary But so long as there is any thing obscure in the Subject that we consider or that we are not entirely assur'd that we have discover'd all that is necessary to resolve the Question as it frequently happens in such as are very difficult and include many Relations we are at our Liberty not to consent and the Will can yet command the Understanding to apply it self to a new Enquiry hence we are not so far from believing that the Judgments we form upon these Subjects are voluntary Nevertheless the greatest part of Philosophers pretend that even these Judgments which we form upon obscure things are involuntary and will generally have it that a consent to Truth is an action of the Understanding which they call Assensus to distinguish it from a Consent to Good which they attribute to the Will and which they call Corsensus But the Cause of their Distinction and Error is this That in this present State of Life we often see evident Truths without any reason of Doubt and so the Will is not indifferent in the Consent that it gives to them as we have explain'd above But 't is not the same thing as to Good we know nothing of it without having some reason of doubting whether we ought to love it our Passions and the Inclinations which we Naturally have for sensible Pleasures are confus'd Reasons yet very strong because of the Corruption of our Nature and they make us cold and indifferent even in the Love of God And thus we evidently perceive our Indifference and are inwardly convinc'd that we make use of our Liberty when we love God But we do not in like manner perceive that we use our Liberty when we consent to Truth especially when it appears Self-evident and this makes us believe that our Consent to Truth is involuntary as if it were necessary that our actions were indifferent to be voluntary and as if the Blessed did not love God voluntarily without being interrupted by something else just as we consent to this evident Proposition Geometricians love not Truth but the knowledge of Truth altho' the contrary is commonly asserted twice 2 is 4 without being hindred from believing it by some appearance of a contrary Reason But that we may distinctly perceive the Difference that there is betwixt the Wills consent to a Truth and its consent to Goodness we must know the Difference that is betwixt Truth and Goodness taken in the common
Familiar Letters to express and abridge their Idea's Thus the mind not being embarrassed nor imploy'd upon any Representation which it would be oblig'd to make upon many Figures and Lines it may perceive at one view all that it is capable of seeing otherwise And thus the Mind can penetrate deeper and extend it self much farther when its Capacity is well manag'd The Art of rendring the Mind more penetrating and Extensive consists as we have elsewhere explain'd in a good Management of its Powers and Capacity not in imploying it to no purpose upon things which are not necessary to discover the Truth it seeks after which ought to be well observ'd Book VI. The Second Part of Method For this only shows that common Logicks are fitter to lessen the Capacity of the Mind than to inlarge it because it is evident That if in a Search after any Truth we use the Rules they prescribe us the Capacity of the Mind is divided so that it will be unfit to be attentive and to apprehend all the Extension of the Subject it examines It is therefore sufficiently evident from what I have said That the greatest part of Men make but little Reflection upon the Nature of the Mind whilst they apply themselves to a Search after Truth for indeed they have never been well convinc'd of its little Extension and the necessity there is of well managing and enlarging it And this is one of the most considerable Causes of their Errors and from hence it is that they have so unhappily perfected their Studies But we do not pretend that there were ever any Men which were not conscious of their own Limitation and their little Capacity and Extension of Mind all the World confesses it but the Generality of them only know it confusedly and confess it only with their Mouths The Method they take in their Study gives the Lye to their Confession since they act as if they truly thought their Mind bad no Limits and they would penetrate into things that depend upon a great many Causes whereof generally they do not know one There is also another Defect which is very common in these Studious Men V. Another Defect in Studious Men. which is the applying themselves to too many Sciences at once and if they Study but six Hours in a day they will sometimes study six different things 'T is plain this Defect proceeds from the same Cause as the rest that I have before mention'd For 't is very probable that if those that study after this manner know certainly that it was not agreeable to the Capacity of their Minds and that it was more likely to fill them with Errors and Confusion than with true Science they would not suffer themselves to be hurried away by the irregular Motions of their Passions and Vanity for indeed that is not the way to satisfie the Mind since 't is not the proper Means to know any thing CHAP. IV. I. The Mind cannot long apply it self to any Object which neither relates to it self nor to Infinity II. The Inconstancy and consequently the Error of the Will proceeds from this Defect of Application III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind IV. What is the Original Cause of the Corruption of Manners V. And the Ignorance of the Generality of Mankind THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error because it is Finite or more limited than the Objects they consider as has been explained in the two precedent Chapters but also because it is Inconstant and has no Firmness in whatsoever it does and cannot keep it self fix'd long enough upon any Subject to examine it entirely To conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of our Minds it is necessary to know that its Action is directed by the Will which applies it to such Objects as it loves and is of it self continually Inconstant and unsettled of which this is the Cause We cannot doubt but God is the Author of all things that he hath made them for himself and has inclined the Heart of Man towards him by a Natural and Invincible Impression that he continually imprints upon him God cannot Will the Existence of any Mind which cannot love him or which should love him less than any other Good if any other besides himself could be found because he cannot Will that any Mind should not love that which is most Amiable or love it more than that which is less Amiable Thus it is requisite that a Natural Love should carry us to God since it comes from him and that there is nothing that can stop the Motions of it only God himself who imprinted them Every bodies Will therefore necessarily follows the Motions of this Love The Righteous and Wicked the Happy and the Damned Love God with this Love for the Natural Love which we have for God being the same thing as the Natural Inclination that carries us to Good in General to the Infinite and Soveraign Good it is evident that all Minds Love God with this Love since he only is the Universal Infinite and Soveraign Good For indeed all Spirits and even the Devils have an Ardent Desire to be Happy and to possess the Chief Good And they desire it without Choice without Deliberation without Liberty and by a Necessity of their Nature Being therefore made for God for an Infinite Good for a Good which comprehends all others in it our Hearts can never be satisfied but by the Possession of this Good Thus our Will always labouring under an eager Thirst always agitated with Desires Anxieties II. The Inconstancy of the Will Causes the Defect of our Application and consequently causes our Error and full of Inquietudes for the Good that it does not possess cannot without much Pain suffer the Mind for any time to stop at abstracted Truths which affect it not and which it judges uncapable of making it Happy Thus she Incessantly pushes it forward to search after other Objects and when in this Agitation which the Will communicates to it it meets with any Object that has the Appearance of a Good I mean such as makes the Soul Sensible of any Pleasure or inward Satisfaction at its approach then this Thirst is excited anew these Desires these wishes and these Ardours take new Life and the Mind being oblig'd to obey them engages it self only to that Object which causes or seems to cause them to draw it nearer to the Soul which tasts it and feeds on it for some time But the Emptiness of Creatures cannot fill the Infinite Capacity of Man's Mind these little Pleasures irritate its Thirst rather than allay it and give the Soul a vain sort of a Hope of being satisfied in the Multiplicity of the Pleasures of this Life which also produces an Inconstancy and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind which was to discover to it all these Goods It 's true that when the Mind accidentally meets with any Object which is
MALEBRANCH's SEARCH AFTER TRUTH OR A Treatise of the Nature OF THE Humane Mind AND Of its Management for avoiding Error in the Sciences VOL. I. Done out of French from the last Edition LONDON Printed for I. Dunton at the Raven in the Poultrey and S. Manship at the Ship in Cornhil 1694. TO THE Marquess of NORMANBY My LORD THis Learned Treatise of the Famous Malebranch begs the Favour of your Lordships Patronage and if any thing could do so would almost deserve it All great Genius's are nearly related to one another at least there is a sort of Sympathy between them and the Wits of France have never fail'd of a kind Reception from those in England which the most Cruel Wars cannot hinder nor does Love to our Country forbid us from doing Justice to theirs The Translation of good French Books into our Tongue is a Reprisal on their Nation who have taken the same way by such Writings as are Famous in Antiquity doing all that was in their Power for an Universal Language perhaps to make way for Universal Empire So that Translation from them again is only a Countermining them and Fencing with them at their own Weapons And this perhaps might succeed as well in our Language as any in Europe since 't is much fuller and stronger and consequently capable of mending an Original and indeed nothing can hinder it but want of Encouragement from Men in Power or Weakness in the Performance For the First there is no one that can justly complain of it who has the Ambition of placing the Name of Normanby before his Writings it gives him a new Soul and he ought neither to think or write meanly when he considers at whose Altars his Labours are offer'd For the Second I have as little to say for it as I could wish our Criticks may have to say against it The Errors that have escap'd the Press in the Original the Difficulty of the Subject the Confinement of Language for fear of spoiling the Philosopher to gratifie the Gentleman my own necessary Avocations and the very little time I did it in cannot promise so correct a Translation as perhaps it otherwise might have been yet I am willing to believe it may in some measure be useful to such as can read it without Prejudice and it being design'd by the Author only for such as are willing to know the Errors of their Senses and Imagination and the Weakness of the Humane Mind in order to discover Truth and Happiness I cannot be very uneasie about anticipating its Fate amongst others especially under your Lordships Protection Indeed I may very well be Ambitious and Proud of such a Protection when the Government begins to be so very Sensible of the Happy Influences of your great Abilities and Interest 'T is a rare Happiness to have Prudence in Council joyn'd with Bravery in Action Nay the same Man may be a Politick-General and Master of much Personal Valour yet be far enough from an Accomplish'd Statesman But to think coolly yet act warmly to seize and improve every Advantage and yet pierce into the Depths of Futurity and disintangle intricate and distant Causes and Effects are only Accomplishments for such a King as ours and such a Minister of State as your Lordship Nor are your great Abilities to serve the Publick Good without particular Instances of your Personal Hazards and Signal Zeal for its Preservation in the late Dutch Wars when your Lordship was pleased to Command the Royal Catherine a Post that was the greatest Evidence of your Lordships Loyalty and Bravery The highest Military and Civil Honours which require great Application hinder not your Lordship from excelling in the less Severe Studies a great Genius will do best upon whatever Employment it fixes it self witness your Lordships Essay on Poetry and that admirable Product of your Youth the Temple of Death with several other Miscellany Pieces of your Lordships which like our great Roscommon's Works have a particular noble Air that is not only the Effect of a great Genius but also of a Genteel and Happy Education and therefore unimitable by our best Wits who can only plead the former Qualification Nor is it any Wonder that so great a Master should Patronize others who have excell'd in the same Divine Art which requires that force of Spirit and fineness of Thought that are necessary to all that even in Prose shall do any thing extraordinary or worthy the Perusal of such Judges as your Lordship this Malebranch is allow'd by all to have in his Native Language and therefore if he gives your Lordship no Entertainment the Defect must be in the Translation not the Original the very Faults of this great Man have something in them extreamly Beautiful and the Jewel is so dazling that the flaws are scarce discern'd The inscribing these Papers to your Lordships most honorable Patronage is the occasion of this Address wherein I have the Honor to testifie both to your Lordship and the World with how profound a Deference and Respect I am My LORD Your Lordships most Humble and most Obedient Servant Richard Sault THE PREFACE THE Mind of Man is by its Nature as it were situated between its Creator and Corporeal Creatures since according to * Nihil est potentius illâ Creaturâ quae mens dicitur rationalis nihil est sublimius Quidquid supra illam est jam Creator est Tr. 23. upon St. John St. Austin there is nothing above it but God alone and nothing below it but Bodies But as the great Elevation it has above all Material things does not hinder it from being united to them and from depending in some measure upon a Portion of Matter so the infinite distance that is between the Sovereign Being and the Mind of Man does not hinder it from being immediately and in a very strict manner united to him This last Vnion raises it above all things it gives it Life Light and all its Felicity and * Quod rationali animâ melius est omnibus consentientibus Deus est Aug. St. Austin speaks of this Vnion in many Passages of his Works as of that which is the most Natural and the most Essential to the Mind On the contrary the Vnion of the Mind with the Body debases Man exceedingly and is the Principal Cause of all our Errors and Miseries I do not wonder that the common sort of Men or that the Heathen Philosophers should only consider in the Soul its Retation and Vnion with the Body without distinguishing its Relation and Vnion with God But I am surprised that Christian Philosophers who should prefer the Mind of God to the Mind of Man Moses to Aristotle St. Austin to some wretched Commentator upon a Heathen Philosopher should look upon the Soul rather as the Form of the Body than as being made after the Image and for the Image of God that is according to * Ad ipsam similitudinem non omnia facta sunt sed
Sensation p. 64 Chap. 11. I. Of the Error we are subject to in respect of the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Senses II. The Cause of that Error III. An Objection and Answer p. 71 Chap. 12. I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses II. That either we perceive not these Motions or else confound them with our Sensations III. Experience which proves it IV. Torâ—e sorts of Sensations V. The Errors which accompany them p. 73 Chap. 13. I. Of the Nature of Sensations II. That we know them better than we believe we do III. An Objection and Answer IV. Why we imagine we know nothing of our Sensations V. That we deceive our selves in believing that all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects VI. Objection and Answer p. 80 Chap. 14. I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them II. Reasons of these false Judgments III. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments p. 90 Chap. 15. An Explanation of the particular Errors of Sight which may serve us as an Example of the General Errors of our Senses p. 95 Chap. 16. I. That the Errors of our Senses are the most general and fruitful Principles whence we draw all the false Conclusions which in their turns also serve us for Principles II. The Origine of Essential Differences III. Of substantial Forms IV. Of some other Errors in the Philosophy of the Schools p 97 Chap. 17. I. Another Example drawn from Morals which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods II. That 't is God only who is our true Good III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stolcks p. 102 Chap. 18. I. Our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of Men. III. We must not confide in Sensible Habits p. 105 Chap. 19. Two other Examples I. The first of our Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies II. The second of these that relate to the Qualities of these Bodies p. 109 Chap. 20. The Conclusion of this first Book I. That our Senses are only given us for our Bodies II. That we must doubt of their Testimony III. That it is not an inconsiderable thing to doubt as we ought to do p. 113 BOOK II. Of the Imagination The First Part. Chap. 1. I. A General Idea of the Imagination II. That it includes two Faculties the one Active and the other Passive III. The general Cause of the Changes which happen to the Imagination of Man and the design of this second Book p. 117 Chap. 2. I. Of the Animal Spirits and the Changes to which they are subject in general II. That the Chyle goes to the Heart and thereby produces some change in the Spirits III. That Wine has the same effect p. 122 Chap. 3. That the Air one breaths causes likewise some change in the Spirits p. 126 Chap. 4. I. Of the Change wrought in the Animal Spirits by the Nerves that go to the Lungs and Heart II. Of that which is caused by the Nerves that pass from the Liver to the Spleen and so into the Bowels III. That all this is done without the assistance of out Will but cannot be effected with out a Providence p. 128 Chap. 5. I. Of the Memory II. Of Habits p. 134 Chap. 6. I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to such quick Changes as the Spirits are II. Three different Changes in the three different Ages p. 139 Chap. 7. I. Of the Communication which is between the Brain of a Mother and that of her Child II. Of the Communication that is between our Brain and the other parts of our Body which carries us to Imitation and Compassion III. An Explanation of the Generation of Monstrous Children and of the Propagation of the Species IV. Some Irregularities of the Mind and some Inclinations of the will explained V. Of Concupiscence and Original Sin VI. Objections and Answers p. 141 Chap. 8. I. The Changes that happen to the Imagination of a Child after it is Born by the Conversation it has with its Nurse its Mother and other Persons II. Advice how to Educate it well p. 160 The Second Part. Of the Imagination Chap. 1. I. OF the Imagination of Women II. Of that of Men. III. Of that of Old People p. 161 Chap. 2. That the Animal Spirits usually observe the Traces of Idea's which are most Familiar to us which is the Reason that we never make a sound Judgment of things p. 168 Chap. 3. Of the Mutual Connexion between the Idea's of the Mind and the Traces of the Brain and of the Mutual Connexion between Traces and Traces and between Idea's and Idea's p. 172 Chap. 4. I. That Studious Men are the most subject to Error II. The Reason why they rather choose to follow Authority than make use of their Judgment p. 182 Chap. 5. Of the Ill Effects that Reading has upon the Imagination p. 187 Chap. 6. That Studious Persons are usually prejudic'd in favour of some Author so that their Principal Alm is to know whathe believ'd without minding what he ought to believe p. 190 Chap. 7. Of the Prejudices of Commentators p. 196 Chap. 8. I. Of the Inventers of New Systems II. The last Error of Studious Persons p. 204 Chap. 9. I. Of Esseminate Wits II. Of Superficial wits III. Of Persons of Authority IV. Of those that make Experiments p. 209 The Third Part. Of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations Chap. 1. I. OF our Inclination to imitate others in all things which is the Original of the Communication of Errors that depend upon the Power of Imagination II Two Principal Causes that increase this Inclination III. What a Strong Imagination is IV. That there are several sorts of it Of Mad Men and of such who have a Strong Imagination according to the Sense which is here meant V. Two considerable Defects of those that have a Strong Imagination VI. Of the Power they have to Perswaâ—e and Impose p. 219 Chap. 2 General Examples of the Force of the Imagination p. 232 Chap. 3. I. Of the Force of the Imagination of certain Authors II. Of Tertullian p. 241 Chap. 4. Of Seneca's Imagination p. 244 Chap. 5. Of Montagne's Book p. 253 Chap. 6. I. Of Imaginary Wizards and Lycanthropi or Wolf-Men II. A Conclusion of the Two First Books p. 263 BOOK III. Of the Vnderstanding or Pure Mind Chap. 1. I. THought only is Essential to the Mind Sensation and Imagination are only its Modifications II. We know not all the Modifications our Souls are capable of III. They are different from our Knowledge and Love and are not always the Effects of them p. 1 Chap. 2. I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing that relates to Infinity II. Its limitation is the Original of many Errors III. And chiefly of Heresies IV. We must submit our Minds to Faith p.
in almost all parts of the World and that on the Contrary we may boldly say of the other that he hath penetrated into that which appeared most obscure in the Eyes of Men and hath shew'd 'em a sure way to dâ—â—cover all Truths that a limited Understanding can comprehend But without relying on the Opinion that we may have of these two Philosophers and of all others let us still look upon 'em as Men and let not the Aristotelians be displeased if after having walk'd so many Ages in Darkness without being able to make any further Advancement we are willing to see with our own Eyes and if after having been led like blind Men we now remember that we have Eyes and essay to Conduct our selves Let us then be fully convinc'd of this Rule Never to give an entire assent but to things that are evident This is the most necessary of all Rules in a Search after Truth and let us not admit any thing into our Minds as Truth but what appears with the Evidence that this Rule demands We must be persuaded thereof to lay by our Prejudices and it 's absolutely necessary that we be deliver'd from our Prepossessions to enter into the Knowledge of Truth because the Mind must be Purified before it can be Enlighten'd Sapientia prima est Stulitia caruisse But before we finish this Chapter II. Remarks upon what has been said about the necessity of Evidence we must Remark Three Things The first is that I speak not here of Matters of Faith which admit not the same Evidence as Natural Sciences do because we cannot perceive things but by the Idea's which we have of them for God hath only given us those Idea's which are necessary to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things according to which we are created so that the Mysteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Order we must not be surpriz'd if we have not the same Idea's of them for our Souls are created by Virtue of a General Decree by which we have all the Notions that are necessary for us See the Explanations But the Mysteries of Faith have been establish'd only by the Order of Grace which according to our Ordinary way of Conception is a Decree consequent to that Order of Nature We ought then to distinguish the Mysteries of Faith from Natural Things We must equally submit to Faith and Evidence but in Matters of Faith we must not look for such Evidence as is in Natural Things we must not rely upon the Faith that is upon the Authority of Philosophers In a word to be Faithful we must believe things not comprehended by Reason but to be Philosophers we must take nothing upon Trust 'T is universally agreed upon that there are other Truths besides those of Faith in which it would be unjust to demand incontestible Demonstrations such for Instance as relate to History and other things depending upon Mans Will For there are two sorts of Truth Necessary and Contingent I call them Necessary Truths that are Immutable in their Nature and have been Decreed by the unchangeable Will of God all others are Contingent Truths Mathematicks Physicks Metaphysicks and even a great part of Morality contain Necessary Truths History Grammar particular Laws or Customs and many other things which depend upon the uncertain Will of Man include only Contingent Truths 'T is requir'd then that the Rule which I have before establish'd be exactly observed in a Search after Necessary Truths whose Knowledge may be call'd Science and we must content our selves with the greatest probability of Truth in History which contains the Knowledge of Contingent Things for one may generally call by the name of History the Knowledge of Languages Customs and even that of the Different Opinions of Philosophers when they are only learn'd by Memory without having had any Evidence or Certainty of them The second Thing to be Remark'd is that in Morals Politicks Medicine and in all Practical Sciences we are oblig'd to content our selves with Probabilities not always but for a time not because it satisfies the Mind but because there is a necessity for it and because if we should defer acting till we were fully assur'd of success we should often loose the opportunity But though there 's a necessity of our Acting yet we should doubtfully rely upon the event of these things we execute and endeavour to make such a progress in these Sciences as that we may in our Affairs act with more certainty for this ought to be the ordinary end of the Study and Employ of all Thinking Men. In fine the third Observation is that we must not absolutely despise Probabilities because it ordinarily happens that many of 'em being join'd together can as strongly convince us as the most evident Demonstrations Of this there are infinite Examples in Physick and Morality So that oftentimes 't is of use to collect a sufficient number of them for Matters which can't be otherwise demonstrated I must confess here that the Rule which I have impos'd is very rigorous that many would rather desire not to Reason at all than to Reason upon these Conditions that they will not move very fast under such Incommodious Circumspections yet they must agree with me that they should proceed surely in following this Rule and that hitherto for having made too much haste they have been oblig'd to turn back again and even a great many Men will agree with me that since Monsteur Descartes hath discover'd more Truths in thirty years than all other Philosophers because he submitted to this Law therefore if many Men would Philosophize as he did they might in time know the greatest part of those things which are necessary for as happy a Life as can be had upon an Earth which God hath Cursed CHAP. IV. I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error and that of these there are Five Principal ones II. The General Design of the Whole Work and the Particular Design of the First Book WE have seen that Men are only deceiv'd because they make not that use of their Liberty which they ought to do and because they do not moderate the haste and eagerness of the Will for bare appearances of Truth that Error consists only in a Consent of the Will which is more capacious than the Perception of the Understanding since Men would not be deceiv'd if they only judg'd of what they understand But though properly speaking 't is only an ill Use of Liberty which is the Cause of Error yet it may be said that we have many Faculties which are also the Causes thereof not true Causes but such as may be call'd Occasional ones I. Of the Occasional Causes of these there are Five principal ones All our Modes of Perceiving are so many Occasions of Deceiving us for since our false Judgments include two things the Consent of the Will and the Perception of the Understanding it is very evident that all our Modes of Perception may
Extension of Bodies in Relation to the Testimony of our Eyes let us imagine that God had created a Heaven and an Earth of a Portion of Matter as little as a Hand Ball and Men upon this Earth in the same Proportions with those in our Great World These little Men would see one another and the parts of their own Bodies as also the little Animals which would be capable of incommoding them or else their Eyes would be useless as to their Preservation Upon this Supposition it is Evident that these little Men would have Idea's as to the bigness of Bodies very different from those that we have of them since they would have Relation to their Little World which tho' as a Ball in respect of ours they would look upon as surrounded with infinite Spaces such as we imagine about ours Or if it may more easily be conceiv'd let us suppose that God had made a World infinitely greater than ours so that this New World should be in respect of ours as ours was in comparison of that which we suppos'd before Let us also suppose that God had observ'd the same Proportion in all the Parts of this New World as he had done in ours It 's manifest that the Men of this last World would be greater than is the Space betwixt our Earth and the most distant Stars that we see this being suppos'd if they had the same Idea of the Extension of Bodies as we have they could not distinguish even some parts of their own Body and would see some others of prodigious greatness So that 't is ridiculous to think that they would see things of the same bigness as we see them 'T is evident from these two Suppositions that the Men of the Great or Little World would have very different Notions about the greatness of Bodies to what we have supposing only that their Eyes gave them Idea's of the Objects that were about them proportionably in bigness to their own Bodies Now if these Men were much assur'd upon the Testimony of their own Eyes that Bodies were as big as they saw them it 's evident they would be deceiv'd and no body can doubt of it yet it 's certain they would have full as much reason as we to defend their Opinion let us therefore at least by the Example of this Error apprehend our selves to be very uncertain of the greatness of those Bodies that we see and that all we can know by sight is the proportion that they have to our Bodies In a word that our Eyes are not given us to Judge of the Truth of things but only to discern those things that may either Profit or Injure us But Men do not only trust their Eyes in Judging of Visible but also of Invisible Objects they even conclude that nothing exists which they see not thus arrogating to their Sight a certain infinite perspicacity 'T is this which hinders them from knowing the true Causes of many Natural Effects If they attribute them to certain Faculties and imaginary Qualities the common Reason is because they do not see the real ones which consist in the different Configurations of these Bodies For Example They see not the Particles of Air and Flame much less those of Light or of other Matter yet more Subtile and this inclines them to believe they do not exist or at least to judge they have neither Power nor Action they have recourse to occult Qualities or imaginary Faculties to explain all the effects whereof these imperceptible Particles are the Natural Cause They choose rather to have recourse to the Horrour of a Vacuum for explaining the Elevation of the Water in Pumps than to the Weight of the Air to the Qualities of the Moon for the Flux and Reflux of the Sea than to the pressure of the Air which environs the Earth to attractive Faculties in the Sun for the Elevation of Vapours than to the Simple Motion or Impulsion caus'd by the parts of Subtile Matter which are continually dispers'd by the Sun They look upon that as an Impertinent Opinion which has recourse to Flesh and Blood to solve the Motions of Animals their Habits or the Corporeal Memory of Man which is owning in part to this that they conceive the Brain to be very little and consequently insufficient to conserve the traces of an almost infinite number of things which are there they are willing to believe tho' they know not how to conceive it that Beasts have a certain Soul which is neither Body nor Mind as also that there are Qualities and Intentional Species to solve the Habits and Memory of Men and such other like things of which they have no particular Notion in their Minds It would take up too much time to enumerate the Errors which this prejudice begets in us almost all the Errors in Physicks are owing to it and whoever attentively considers it will be amaz'd thereat Altho' I 'm unwilling to insist much upon this head yet I can't but take notice of the Contempt which Men commonly have for Insects and other little Animals which are generated as they say out of Corrupted Matter this is an unjust Contempt which is founded only upon the Ignorance of the thing despis'd and the prejudices already mention'd There is nothing Contemptible in Nature all the Works of God are worthy our respect and admiration especially if we consider the admirable ways by which God makes and preserves them The least Flies are as perfect Animals as the biggest Creatures the proportion of their Members is as Just as those of the others and it even seems that God has given them more Ornaments to recompence the littleness of their Bodies they have Crowns Helmets and other Curiosities on their Heads which outdo the most Luxuriant Fancies of Men and I may confidently aver that they who have never seen any thing but with their naked Eye have never beheld any thing so fine so exact and even so magnificent in the Houses of the greatest Princes as what we discover with Microscopes upon the Head of a silly Fly It 's true these things are very small but yet the more surprizing because there are so many Beauties crouded in so small a Space and altho' they are very common yet they are not the less valuable nor less perfect in themselves on the contrary the Wisdom of God is more apparent who hath with so much Magnificence and Profusion perform'd almost an infinite number of Miracles in Creating them Nevertheless our Sight reaches not these Beauties but makes us despise the Works of God so worthy our admiration and because these Animals are little in comparison of our Bodies it makes us consider them as absolutely little and contemptible because of their smâ—llness as if Bodies could be little in themselves Let us then endeavour to distrust the Impressions of our Senses in Judging about the bigness of Bodies and when we say for Example that a Bird is little let us not absolutely
that they do not help us to the Knowledge of Things but in respect to the preservation of our Body and not according to what they are in themselves is exactly true in this case since we have a more exact Knowledge of the Motion or Rest of Bodies in proportion to their nearness and which we cou'd examine by the Senses than when they are so distant That the Relation they have to our Bodies ceases as when they are five or six hundred Paces from us if they are of an ordinary bigness and even nearer than that if they are less or in fine farther off if they are greater CHAP. X. Of Errors about Sensible Qualities I. A distinction of Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately Vnited IV. How Objects act upon Bodies V. How upon the Soul with Reasons why the Soul does not perceive the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are Confounded in every Sensation WE have seen in the preceding Chapters that the Judgments we form by these means of our Eyes about Extension Figure and Motion are never exactly true yet we must confess they are not absolutely false they include at least this Truth That Extension Figure and Motion whatever they are are without us It 's true we often see things which are not and which never were and we ought not to conclude that a thing is without us from hence only that we see it without us there is no necessary connexion between an Idea that is presented to the Mind of Man and the Existence of a thing which this Idea represents That which happens to those who sleep or are delirious sufficiently proves this however we can ordinarily be assur'd that Extension Figures and Motions which we see are without us These are not meer imaginary things they are real and we are not deceiv'd if we believe they have a real Existence and which is independant of our Mind though it 's very * See the Explanations difficult to prove it It is then evident that the Judgments we make about the Extension Figures and Motions of Bodies contain some Truth but the same cannot be said of those things that belong to Light Colours Sapors Odours and all other sensible Qualities for Truth is never to be found there as we have shown before We do not here distinguish Light from Colours because we believe they are not very different nor can be separately explain'd We shall be oblig'd to speak of other sensible Qualities in General at the same time that we treat of these two because they might be explain'd from the same Principles We ought to be very attentive to the things that follow for they are of the most important Consequence and much more useful than those things we have yet spoken of I suppose first Distinction of the Soul and Body that the Reader has made some Reflexion upon the two * I here cast Idea every thing that is the immediate Object of the Mind Idea's which are found in our Soul one which represents the Body to us and the other the Mind that he is able to distinguish them by the positive Attributes which they include in a word that he be well persuaded that Extention is different from Thought Or else I suppose him to have Read and Consider'd some Places of St. Augustin as the 10th Chapt. of the 10th Book of the Trinity the 4th and 14th Chap. of the Book of the Quantity of the Soul or the Meditations of Descartes especially that which respects the Distinction of the Soul and Body Or lastly the Sixth Discourse of M. de Cordemoy du discernement de l'ame du Corps I suppose also II. Explication of the Organs of the Senses that he knows the Anatomy of the Organs of the Senses and that they are compos'd of small Branches which have their Original in the middle of the Brain whence they disperse themselves through all the Members of Sensation and that at last without any interruption terminate at the Extreme parts of the Body That whilst we are Awake or in Health one of their Extremities cannot be mov'd but the other is also mov'd because of their perpetual Intension just as an extended Cord cannot be mov'd in one part without communicating motion to another The Reader must also know that these little Strings or Branches may be affected after two ways either at the end which is at the extremity of the Body or at that which is in the Brain If these little Strings are shaken by the Action of External Bodies upon them and this Motion is not communicated to the Brain as it often happens in sleep then the Mind receives no new Sensation by that Action but if these Strings are mov'd in the Brain by the Course of the Animal Spirits or by some other Cause the Soul perceives something although the parts of these Strings which are out of the Brain and which are dispers'd through all the parts of our Bodies be in perfect rest as it often happens in sleep It is not amiss to observe here by the by III. The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Strings of the Organs of the Senses meet how Experience teaches us that we do sometimes feel pain in such parts of our Bodies as have been cut off because the Strings of the Brain which belong to those respective parts being shaken after the same manner as if they were effectually hurt the Soul feels a very real Pain in these Imaginary Parts Now all these things shew visibly that the Soul immediately resides in that part of the Brain where all the Organs of Sense meet I mean it perceives all the Changes which pass there by means of Objects which Cause or have been accustom'd to Cause them and perceives nothing that passes out of this part but by the interposition of the Fibres which terminate there This Position being well conceiv'd it will not be very difficult to shew how Sensation is made which must be explain'd by some Example When I thrust the Point of a Needle into my Hand IV. An Example how Objects affect Bodies this Point removes and separates the Fibres of the Flesh the Fibres are continued from this place to the Brain and when one sleeps they are extended enough not to be shaken unless those of the Brain be also shaken it follows then that the Extremities of these Fibres which are in the Brain are also moved If the Motion of the Fibres in my Hand is moderate that of the Fibres of the Brain will be so also and if the Motion is violent to break something upon my Hand it will be much stronger and more violent in the Brain Thus also if I come near the Fire the small parts of Wood which it continually in great number and with much violence disperses as may be prov'd by
as to that which is in the Hand or in the Fire Now this Judgment is Natural or rather it is a Compounded Sensation But this Sensation or this Natural Judgment is almost always follow'd by another free Judgment which the Soul is so accustom'd to that it can scarce refrain from it These four things are very different as may be shewed however Men do not carefully distinguish them but are inclin'd to confound them by reason of the strict union betwixt the Soul and Body which hinders us from separating the Properties of Matter from those of the Mind Yet it is easie for any Man to know that of these four things which pass in us when we perceive some Object the two first are proper to the Body and the two last to the Soul provided he consider a little the Nature of the Soul and Body as he ought to do which I have suppos'd But these things must be explain'd in Particulars CHAP. XI I. Of the Error we are subject to in respect of the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Senses II. The Cause of that Error III. An Objection and Answer IN this and the three following Chapters we shall Treat of these Four Things which are confounded and taken for pure Sensation and shall only in general explain the Errors we are subject to because if we should enter into particulars it would be endless Yet I do not doubt but I may so assist the Mind of such as will seriously Meditate upon what shall be said as to make them capable of discovering with great facility all the Errors that are caused from our Senses but it will be requisite then that they shou'd think with fome application both upon the preceding and following Chapters The first of these things which we confound in all our Sensations I. Of the Erro we are juâ—ject to in respect to the Objects acting upon the Fibres of our Serses is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body It is most certain that there is hardly any distinction made between the Sensation of the Soul and this Action of the Objects of which there needs no proof for Example almost all Men imagine that the heat they feel is in the Fire which causes it that Light is in the Air and Colours upon Coloured Objects they have no thoughts upon the Motions of fome imperceptible Bodies which cause these Sensations It is true II. The Cause of the Error that they do not imagine that pain is in the Needle that pricks them as they judge heat to be in the Fire the reason is because the Needle and its Action are visible but the Particles of the Wood which go out from the Fire and their Motion against our Hands are not seen so that seeing nothing that strikes our Hands when we warm our selves and feeling heat we naturally judge this heat to be in the Fire because we see nothing else there So that 't is commonly true that we attribute our Sensations to Objects when the Causes of these Sensations are unknown to us and because Pain and Tititation are produced by sensible Bodies as with a Needle a Feather which we see and touch and therefre we do not judge that there is any thing like to these Sentiments in those Objects that cause them in us It is certain indeed III. Objection that we do not imagine that the burning is in the Fire but only in the Hand although it is caused by Particles of the Wood as well as the Heat which we always attribute to the Fire But the reason of it is the burning is a kind of Pain and having many times judged that Pain is not in the External Body which Causes it we are induced also to make the same Judgment of Burning What further persuades us to judge after this manner is that Pain or Burning does strongly apply our Soul to the affected parts of our Bodies and that diverts us from thinking on other things Thus the Mind unites the Sensation of burning to that Object that is nearest to it And because we soon after perceive that the burning hath left fome visible Marks in that part where we felt the Pain this confirms us in the Judgment we have made that the burning is in the Hand But this must not hinder us from receiving this general Rule that we use to attribute our Sensations to Objects every time they act upon us by the Motion of fome invisible Particle This is the reason that we generally believe that Colours Light Odours Taste Sound and fome other Sensations are in the Air or in the External Objects which cause them because all Sensations are produced in us by the Motion of fome Imperceptible Bodies CHAP. XII I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses II. That either we perceive not these Motions or else confound them with our Sensations III. Experience which proves it IV. Three sorts of Sensations V. The Errors which accompany them THE second thing that may be observed in each of our Sensations I. Errors concerning the motions or shaking of the Fibres of our Senses II. That we confound them with the Sensaâ—on of our Soul and sometime again do not perceive them is the shaking of the Fibres of our Nerves which is communicated unto the Brain and we deceive our selves in this that we confound this shaking with the Sensation of the Soul and judge there is none when we perceive it not by the Senses We confound for instance the Motion that the Fire excites in the Fibres of our Hands with the Sensation of Heat and we say that the Heat is in our Hand But because we feel not the shaking that visible Objects produce in the Optick Nerve which is in the bottom of the Eye we think that this Nerve is not shaken and that it is not cover'd with the Colours that appear to us on the contrary we judge that 't is only external Objects upon which these Colours are dispersed yet we may see by the following Experiment that Colours are almost as strong and lively in the bottom of the Optick Nerve as upon visible Objects Take the Eye of an Ox that is newly killed III. Experience which proves it and strip the Skins from it that are opposite to the Apple of of the Eye in the place where the Optick Nerve is and put in their room a little bit of Paper that is very thin and place this Eye in the hole of a Window so that the Apple be in the Air and the back part of the Eye be in the Chamber which must be shut close so that it may be very dark and then all the Colours of the Objects which are without the Chamber will appear upon the bottom of the Eye but represented upside down And if these Colours shou'd happen not to be very lively if the Objects which are painted at the bottom of the Eye are too near the
by Conversion to the Phantasmes or Traces of the Brain So soon as the Soul would have the Arm to move the Arm is moved tho' it does not so much as know what it ought to do to make it move and so soon as the Animal Spirits are agitated the Soul finds it self mov'd tho' it does not so much as know there are Animal Spirits in the Body When I come to treat of the Passions I shall speak of the Connexion between the Traces of the Brain and the Motions of the Spirits and of that between the Idea's and Emotions of the Soul for that all the Passions depend upon it My business here is only to treat of the affinity between Idea's and Traces and the Connexion of the Traces one with another There are three very considerable Causes of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces Three considerable Causes of the union between the Idea's and Traces the first and most general is the Identity of Time For frequently it suffices that we had certain Thoughts at such time as some new Traces came into our Brain so that those Traces cannot be produced again without renewing the same Thoughts If the Idea of God present it self to my Mind at the same time that my Brain was struck with the sight of these three Characters Iah or with the sound of the Word it self 't is enough if the Traces which those Characters have produc'd be excited to make me think of God And I cannot think of God but there will be produc'd in my Brain some confused Traces of the Characters or Sounds which accompany'd the Thought which I had of God for the Brain being never without Phantasmes there are always such as have some Relation to what we think tho' many times these Phantasmes are very imperfect and very confus'd The second Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces and which always supposes the first is the Will of Man This Will 〈◊〉 necessary that this connexion of the Idea's with the Traces may be regulated and proper for Use For if Men had not Naturally an Inclination to agree between themselves to affix their Idea's to Sensible Signs not only this Connexion of Idea's wou'd be absolutely unprofitable for Society but it would be also very Irregular and Imperfect First because Idea's are never strongly united with the Traces but when the Spirits being agitated they render those Traces deep and durable So that the Spirits being never agitated but by the Passions if Men had no such Union to communicate their Sentiments and participate of those of others 't is evident that the exact Union of their Idea's with certain Traces would be very weak because they do not subject themselves to those Exact and Regular Connexions but to render themselves Intelligible Secondly the Repetition of the Meeting of the same Idea's with the same Traces being necessary to form a Connexion that may be of long continuance since the meeting unless it be accompany'd with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits suffices not to make strong Connexions 't is clear that if Men should refuse to assent it would be the greatest Chance in the World if the same Traces and Idea's should meet together so that the Will of Man is necessary to regulate the Connexion of the same Idea's with the same Traces tho' this Will of Agreement be not so much an effect of their Choice and Reason as an Impression of the Author of Nature who has made us altogether one for another and with a strong Inclination to unite in Mind as well as in Body The third Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces is the Constant and Immutable Nature or Will of the Creator For example There is a Natural Connexion and which depends not upon our Will between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or Mountain which we behold and the Idea's of a Tree or Mountain between the Traces which the Cries of a Man or Beast that suffer Pain beget in our Brain the Air of one who threatens us or of whom we stand in fear and the Idea's of Grief of Strength or Weakness as also between the Sentiments of Compassion of Fear and Courage which are excitedin us These Natural Bands are the strongest of all they are generally alike in all Men and they are absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life For which reason it is that they depend not upon our Will for if the Band or Connexion of Idea's with certain Sounds and Characters be but feeble and very different in several Countries 't is because it depends upon the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the reason why it depends upon it is because this Connexion is not absolutely necessary for Life but only for living like Men that are to form among themselves a Rational Society Here we must observe that the Connexion of Idea's that represent to us Spiritual Things and such as are distinct from us with the Traces of our Brain is not nor can be Natural and by consequence it is or may be different in all Men for that it has no other Cause than their Will and the Identity of Time of which I have spoken before On the other side the Connexion of the Idea's of all Material Things with certain particular Traces is Natural and hence there are certain Traces that stir up the same Idea in all Men. For Example there is no question but that all Men have the Idea of a Square upon the sight of a Square because that Connexion is Natural but 't is to be doubted whither all Men have that Idea when they hear the Word Square pronounced because that Connexion is entirely voluntary The same thing may also be thought of all Traces that are tyed to the Idea's of Spiritual Things But because the Traces which have a Natural Connexion with Idea's do affect the Mind and consequently render it attentive the greatest part of Men do easily enough comprehend and retain Sensible Truths that is the mutual Relations that are between Bodies On the other side because the Traces that have no other Connexion with the Idea's then what is voluntary do never vigorously strike the Mind 't is not without a great deal of trouble that all Men Comprehend and with much more difficulty retain abstracted Truths that is the mutual Relations between things that fall not under the Imagination But when these Relations are never so little compounded they appear absolutely Incomprehensible especially to those that are not accustomed to them in regard they have not fortify'd the Connexion of those abstracted Idea's with their Traces by continual Meditation and tho' others have perfectly comprehended them they forget them in a short time because this Connexion is seldom or never so strong as the Natural one It is so true that all the trouble Men have to comprehend and retain Spiritual and Abstracted Things proceeds from the difficulty of fortifying the Connexion of their Idea's
nothing yet the difficulty is not solv'd by this Subterfuge For we ought to consider that it is not more difficult to produce something out of nothing than to produce one thing out of another which cannot at all contribute to its Production For example it is not more difficult to Create an Angel than to produce him from a Stone because a Stone being of another sort of Being wholly different it cannot in the least be useful to the Production of an Angel But it may contribute to the Production of Bread Gold c. for a Stone Gold and Bread are but the same thing differently configur'd and are all Material It is even more difficult to produce an Angel of a Stone than to pronuce him out of nothing because to make an Angel out of a Stone so far as it can be done the Stone must be annihilated and afterwards the Angel Created But simply to Create an Angel nothing is to be annihilated If therefore the Mind produces its Idea's from the material Impressions which the Brain receives from Objects it must always do the same thing or a thing as difficult or even more difficult than if it Created them since Idea's being Spiritual they cannot be produc'd of material Images which have no proportion with them But if it be said that an Idea is not a Substance I consent to it yet it is always something that is Spiritual and as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit although a Square be not a Substance so it is also impossible to Form a Material Substance from a Spiritual Idea although an Idea was no Substance But although we should grant to the Mind of Man a Soveraign Power to Annihilate and Create the Idea's of things yet it would never make use of that Power to produce them for even as a Painter how skilful soever he be could not represent an Animal which he had never seen and of which he never had any Idea So that the Picture which he should make should be like to this unknown Animal Thus a Man cannot form the Idea of an Object if he knew it not before that is if he has not already had some Idea of it which does not depend upon his Will and if he already had an Idea of it he certainly knows this Object and it would be unnecessary for him to Form it anew It is therefore in vain to attribute to the Mind of Man the Power of producing his Idea's It might be said perhaps that the Mind of Man hath general and confused Idea's which it does not produce and that those which it produces are particular more clear and distinct but it is always the same thing For even as a Painter cannot draw the Picture of a particular Person so as to be sure that he hath perfected it if he had had no distinct Idea of him and even if the Person had not been present Thus the Mind for example which could only have the Idea of a Being or an Animal in general could not represent to its self a Horse nor Form a distinct Idea of one and be assured that it is perfectly like a Horse if it had not already the first Idea with which it might compare this second Now if it had a first it is unuseful to Form a second and the Question respects this first Therefore c. It 's true that when we conceive a Square by pure Intellection we can also imagin it that is perceive it in our selves by tracing an Image of it in the Brain yet it must be first observ'd that we are not the true nor principal Cause of this Image But it will be too long to explain it here Secondly So far is the second Idea which accompanies this Image from being more distinct and more exact than the other that on the contrary it is not so Exact because it resembles the first which was only a pattern for the second For indeed we must not believe that the Imagination and Senses represent Objects more distinctly to us than the pure Understanding but only that they apply them more to the Mind for the Idea's of the Senses and Imagination are not distinct but only so far as they are conformable to the pure Intellection The Image of a Square for example which the Imagination Traces in the Brain is not exact and perfect but only so far as it resembles the Idea of the Square which we conceive by pure Intellection It is this Idea which regulates this Image 't is the Mind which Conducts the Imagination and which Obliges it if we may so say to behold from time to time whether the Image it Paints be a Figure of four right and equal Lines whose Angles are alike In a word whether what it Imagins is like to what it Conceives After what has been said Tanto meliora esse judico qua oculis cerno quanto pro sui natura viciniora sunt iisquae animointelligo Aug. 63. de Vera Religione I do not believe it can be doubted but those are deceived who affirm the Mind is able to Form the Idea's of Objects since they attribute the Power of Creation to the Mind and even of Creating with Wisdom and Order although it has no knowledge of what it does for that is not Conceivable But the cause of their Error is that Men always Judge that a thing is the Cause of some Effect when both are joined together supposing the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them That makes all the World conclude that a Bowl put in Motion and meeting another is the true and principal Cause of the Motion that it communicates to it as the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Cause of the Motion of the Arm and other the like prejudices because it always happens that a Bowl is shaken when it is met by another that runs against it As our Arms are moved almost always when we Will and we do not see any other apparent Cause of this Motion But when an Effect does not so often follow something which is not the Cause of it there is nevertheless a great many Men who believe this thing is the Cause of the Effect which happens yet every Body is not guilty of the same Error For instance if a Comet appears and after this Comet a Prince Dies Some Stones lie exposed to the Moon and they are eaten with Worms The Sun is joined with Mars at the Nativity of a Child and something extraordinary happens to this Child All this is enough to perswade a great many Men that the Comet the Moon and the Conjunction of the Sun with Mars are the Causes of these Effects and others like them and the reason why all the World does not believe it is that they do not always see these Effects follow these Causes But all Men having commonly the Idea's of Objects present to their Minds as soon as they wish it and it happening many
times in a day almost all conclude that the Will which accompanies the production or rather the presence of Idea's is truly the Cause of them Because they see nothing in the same time that they can attribute it to and they imagin the Idea's no longer Exist when the Mind sees them no longer and that they revive again anew when they are again represented to the Mind 'T is for these Reasons some Judge that External Objects emit Images which resemble them as we have mention'd in the precedent Chapter For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves but only by their Idea's they judge the Object produces the Idea because as soon as it is present they see it and as soon as absent they see it no longer and because the presence of the Object almost always accompanies the Idea which represents it to us Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments from this that the Idea's of things are present to their Mind as soon as they Will them they should only conclude that according to the Order of Nature their Will is commonly necessary for them to have those Idea's Not that the Will is the true and principal Cause which presents them to the Mind and much less that the Will produces them from nothing or after the manner they explain it Nor ought they to conclude that Objects emit Species resembling them because the Soul commonly perceives them only when they are present but only that the Object is for the most part necessary in order to the Idea's being present to the Mind And lastly that a Bowl put into Motion is the principal and true Cause of the shaking of another Bowl that it meets in the way since the first had not the power of Motion in its self They can only determin that the meeting of two Bowls is an occasion to the Author of the Motion of Matter to execute the Decree of his Will which is the Universal Cause of all things See Ch. 3. Of the Second Part of Method in communicating to the other Bowl a part of the Motion of the first that is to speak more clearly in willing that the last should acquire so much more Motion as the first lost for the moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the Will of him who preserves them as we shall shew elsewhere CHAP. IV. That we do not see Objects by the Means of Idea's which were created with us And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them THE Third Opinion is That of those who say all Idea's are created with us To discover the Improbability of this Opinion it will be necessary to consider that there is many different things in the World of which we have Idea's But to speak only of simple Figures it is certain that the Number of them is Infinite Nay even if we consider but one only as the Ellipsis we cannot doubt but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of different Kinds of them when it considers that one of the Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity and the other always continue the same So the heighth of a Triangle may be augmented or diminished infinitely the base being always the same we may conceive there is an infinite Number of different Kinds of them And also which I desire may be consider'd here The Mind in some manner perceives this infinite Number although we can imagine but very few of them and that we can at the same time have particular and distinct Idea's of many Triangles of different Kinds But what must chiefly be observed is That this general Idea that the Mind has of this Number of Triangles of different Kinds is sufficient to prove That if we do not conceive each of these different Triangles by particular Idea's And in short If we comprehend not their Infinity 't is not the Defect of the Idea's or that Infinity is not represented to us but only the Defect of the Capacity and Extension of the Mind If a Man should apply himself to consider the Properties of all the diverse Kinds of Triangles although he should eternally continue this sort of Study he would never want new and particular Idea's but his Mind would be unprofitably fatigued What I have said of Triangles may be applied to five six a hundred a thousand or ten thousand sided Figures and so on ad infinitum Now if the sides of a Triangle which have infinite relations one with the other make Triangles of infinite Kinds it is plain that four five or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences since they are capable of a greater Number of Relations and Combinations of their sides than simple Triangles are The Mind then sees all these things it hath Idea's of them and these Idea's would never fail it although it should employ infinite Ages in the Consideration of one Figure only And if it perceived not these infinite Figures all of a sudden or comprehended not their Infinity 't is only because its Extension is very much limited It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's Do I say an infinite Number It hath as many infinite Numbers of Idea's as there are different Figures to be consider'd So that since there is an infinite Number of different Figures it 's necessary that to know the Figures the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number of Idea's Now I ask If it 's probable that God should Create so many things with the Mind of Man For my part it does not appear so to me chiefly since that might be made in a more simple and easie manner as we shall soon see For as God always acts by the most simple ways it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know Objects by admitting the Creation of an infinite Number of Beings since we can resolve this Difficulty in a more Easie and Natural way But although the Mind should have a Magazine of all the Idea's which are necessary for it to see things it would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul should make choice of them to represent them For instance how it can represent the Sun to it self whilst it is present to the Eyes of its Body For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in the Brain resembles not the Idea we have thereof as has been elsewhere proved and since the Soul perceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the bottom of the Eyes and in the Brain it 's inconceivable how it should exactly guess amongst these infinite Number of Idea's that it has which it must represent to it self to imagine or to see the Sun We cannot therefore say That the Idea's of things were created with us it is sufficient that we see the Objects that are about us Nor can we say that God produces as many of them every Moment as we perceive different things this has been sufficiently refuted from what has been said in this
of my Imagination and the Illusion of my Senses The Inward Man which is in me will deride the Animal and Earthly one which I carry about me Lastly The New Man shall increase and the Old Man shall be destroy'd provided I always obey the Voice of him who speaks so clearly to me in the most Secret Recesses of my Reason and who having made himself Sensible to condescend to my Weakness and Infirmity and to give me Life by those very means by which he gave me Death speaks yet to me through my Senses after a very strong lively and familiar manner I mean by the preaching of his Gospel And if I interrogate him in all the Metaphysical Natural and pure Philosophical Questions as well as those which regard the Regulation of Manners I shall always have a Faithful Master which will never deceive me I shall not only be a Christian but a Philosopher I shall make a good Judgment of things and in a word I shall follow both by Grace and Nature the way which will guide me to all the Perfection I am capable of It must then be concluded from what I have said That to make the best use that we can of the Faculties of our Soul our Senses Imagination and Mind we must only apply them to those things for which they have been given us We ought carefully to distinguish our Sensations and Imaginations from our pure Idea's and judge according to our Sensations and Imaginations of the relation that External Bodies have to ours without making use of them to discover Truths which they always confound And we must make use of the pure Idea's of the Mind to discover Truths without ever attempting to judge by them of the relation that External Bodies have to ours because these Idea's never have Extension enough to represent them perfectly to us It is impossible that Men should have a sufficient Knowledge of all the Figures and Motions of the little Particles of their Body and Blood and of those of a certain Fruit in a certain time of their Sickness to be able to discover the relation of Agreement betwixt this Fruit and their Body and that if they should eat of it it would recover them Thus our Senses alone are more useful to the Preservation of our Health than the Rules of Experimental Physick and Experimental Physick than the Theoretick But Experimental Physick which allows much to Experience and still more to the Senses is the best because all these things ought to be joyn'd together We may then use our Reason in all things and 't is the Privilege which it has above the Senses and Imagination which are limited to Sensible Things but we ought to use it with Circumspection for though it is the chief part of our selves it often happens that we are deceiv'd when we permit it to go too far because it cannot act sufficiently without wearying it self I mean it cannot know sufficiently how to make a good Judgment and yet it will not forbear Judging A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH BOOK IV. Of the Inclinations and Natural Motions of the Mind CHAP. I. I. It 's necessary the Mind have Inclinations as well as the Body Motions II. God acts the Humane Mind only for himself III. Mens Minds are only inclin'd to Particular Good through the Motion they have to Good in General IV. The Origine of the Chief Natural Inclinations which will make up the Division of this Fourth Book IT would not be necessary to Treat of Natural Inclinations as we are going to do in this Fourth Book nor of the Passions as we shall do in the following in order to discover the Causes of the Errors of Mankind if the Understanding did not depend on the Will in the Perception of Objects But whereas it is the Will that directs it which makes it resolve and applies it to some Objects rather than others it is absolutely necessary to apprehend its Inclinations well to penetrate into the Causes of the Errors to which we are liable If God I. It 's necessary the Mind have Inclinations as well as the Body Notions when he Created this World had produced Matter infinitely extended without giving it any Motion there would have been no difference in Bodies All this visible World would still have been a meer Mass of Matter or of Extension which indeed might serve to discover the Grandeur and Power of its Author but there would not be that Succession of Forms and that Variety of Bodies which compose all the Beauty of the Universe and which incline Mens Minds to admire the Infinite Wisdom of the Governour thereof Therefore I am of Opinion That the Inclinations of the Mind are in the Spiritual World what Motion is in the Material World and that if the Mind were without Inclinations or if it never had any Desire we should not meet with that Variety in the Order of Spiritual Things which not only makes the World admire the Profoundness of the Wisdom of God approve the Variety of Material Objects but also his Mercy his Justice his Goodness and generally all his other Attributes Thus then the Difference of Inclinations produces in the Mind an Effect much like unto that which the Difference of Motions produces in the Body and the Inclinations of Mens Minds and the Motions of Bodies together constitute all the Beauty of Created Beings Thus all Spirits must have some Inclinations as well as Bodies have different Motions But let us endeavour to discover what Inclinations they ought to have Were not our Nature Corrupted it would not be necessary to seek out by Reason as we are going to do what the Natural Inclinations of Created Spirits ought to be It would be sufficient in order thereunto to consult our selves and we should discover by the Inward Sentiments we have of what passes within us all the Inclinations we ought Naturally to have But whereas we know by Faith that Sin has destroy'd the Order of Nature and that Reason informs us that our Inclinations are Irregular as it will appear in the Sequel we are obliged to go another way to work Since we cannot trust to what we feel we are obliged to explain things in a more Sublime Manner but which without doubt will seem to have but little Solidity in it to those who only esteem what relates to the Senses It is an undeniable Truth II. The Principal End of the Actions of God is himself and he only acts Mens Minds for himself that God can have no other Principal End for his Operations but himself and that he may have several Ends less Principal which tend all towards the Preservation of the Beings which he has created He can have no Principal End but himself because he cannot Err nor place his Final End in Beings which are not Perfect But he may propose as a less Principal End the Preservation of Created Beings because as they all participate of his Goodness they are necessarily Good and even
they do not pretend to Judge of them It is no defect in a limited Mind not to know certain things it is only a defect to pretend to Judge of them Ignorance is a necessary Evil but we may and ought to avoid Error Therefore I do not condemn Men for being Ignorant of many things but only for giving rash Judgments about those things When things have a great relation to us are sensible V That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things or such as have but little relation to us and fall easily within the Compass of our Imagination we may say that the Mind applies it self to them and may have some knowledge of them For when we know that things have a relation to us we think upon them with some Inclination and when we find that they concern us we apply our selves to them with pleasure So that we should be more Learned than we are in many things if the uneasiness and tossing of our Will did not Disturb and Fatigue our Attention continually But when things are abstract and not very sensible it is difficult to attain any certain knowledge of them Not that abstracted things are very intricate but because the Attention and Sight of the Mind begins and Ends commonly with the sensible Prospect of Objects for we seldom think on any thing but what we see and feel and only as long as we see and feel it It is most certain that if the Mind could easily apply it self to clear and distinct Idea's without being any-wise byass'd by Opinion and if the uneasiness of the Will did not continually disturb its Application we should meet no great difficulties in many Natural Questions which we look upon as not to be Explain'd and we might easily be deliver'd of our Ignorance and Errors in relation to them For Example It is an undeniable Truth to any Man of Sense that Creation and Annihilation are things which surpass the common force of Nature Therefore if Men did remain Attentive to that pure Notion of the Mind and Reason they would not so easily admit the Creation and Annihilation of an infinite Number of New Beings as of Substantial Forms real Qualities and Faculties They would look into the distinct Idea's we have of Extension Figure and Motion for the reason of Natural Effects which is not always so difficult as People imagin all things in Nature are so connected together and prove each other The Effects of Fire as those of Canon and of Mines are very Surprising and their cause not very well known Nevertheless if Men instead of relying on the Impressions of their Senses and on some false or deceitful Experiments did firmly fix on that bare Notion of the Mind alone That it is not possible for a Body that is very little agitated to produce a violent Motion since it can communicate no more moving Power than it has its self it would be easie from that alone to conclude that there is a Subtle and Invisible Matter that it is very much agitated and dispers'd int h all Bodies and several other like things which would teach us the Nature of Fire and also be of great use to us to discover other Truths yet more conceal'd For since Canons and Mines have such great Motions and all the Visible Bodies about them are not in a sufficient Agitation to produce them it is a certain proof that there are other Invisible and Insensible Bodies which have at least as much Agitation as the Canon Ball But with being very Subtle and Thin may alone freely pass and without breaking through the Pores of the Canon before it is Fir'd that is as Monsieur Descartes has explain'd it more at large before their having surrounded the hard and gross parts of the Salt-petre of which the Powder is Compos'd But when the Fire is put to it that is when those subtle and extreamly agitated Particles have surrounded the gross and solid Parts of the Salt-petre and have thus Communicated their very strong and violent Motion to them then all does Burst of necessity because the Pores of the Canon which left an open passage on all sides for the subtle Parts before mention'd while they were alone are not large enough to make way for the gross Parts of the Salt-petre and some others of which the Powder is Compos'd when they have receiv'd into themselves the Agitation of the Subtle Parts which surrounds them For as the Water of Rivers which flows under Bridges does not shake them by reason of the smallness of its Particles Thus the very subtle and very thin Matter I have mention'd passes continually through the Pores of all Bodies without making any sensible Alterations in them But then likewise as the said River is capable of breaking down a Bridge when carrying along with it some great Flakes of Ice or some other more solid Bodies by forcing them against it with its own Motion so subtle Matter is capable of producing the surprising Effects we see in Canons and in Mines when having communicated to the Parts of the Powder which Float in the midst of it its Motion which is infinitely more Violent and more Rapid than that of Rivers and Torrents the said Parts of the Powder cannot freely pass through the Pores of the Bodies which enclose them by reason they are too gross so that they violently break them to force them a free Passage But Men do not easily apprehend those subtle small Particles which they repute Chimera's because they do not see them Contemplatio ferè definit cum aspectu says Bacon The greater part even of Philosophers invent some New Entity rather than not to talk upon those matters which they are Ignorant of And if any Body objects against their false and incomprehensible Suppositions that Fire must needs be compos'd of Parts that are in very great Agitation since it produces such Violent Motions and that a thing cannot Communicate that which it has not which is undoubtedly a most clear and most solid Objection They confound all by some frivolous Imaginary distinction as that of Equivocal and Univocal Causes in order to seem to say something though in reality they say nothing For it is a general Notion among Men of Sense and Learning that there can be no real Equivocal Cause in Nature and that it has been invented meerly by the Ignorance of Men. Therefore Men must apply themselves more to the consideration of clear and distinct Notions if they have a mind to understand Nature They must check and stop the Inconstancy and Levity of their Will a little if they design to penetrate deeply into things for their Mind will ever be weak superficial and discursive while their Will remains Light Inconstant and Roving It is true it requires some Fatigue and Men must constrain themselves to become Attentive and to search into the bottom of things for there is nothing to be got without pains It is shameful for Men of Sense and
of Well-being Now the Love of Well-being is so Powerful that it sometimes proves Stronger than the Love of Being and Self-Love makes us sometimes desire not to be because we have not a Well-being This is the Case of all the Damned who according to the Word of Jesus Christ had better not to be than to be so Unhappy as they are because these Wretches being declar'd Enemies to him in whom all Goodness Centers and who is the Sole Cause of Pleasure and of Pain which we are capable of it is impossible they should enjoy any Satisfaction they are and will be Eternally Unhappy because their Will will ever remain in the same Disposition and in the same Irregularity So that Self-Love includes two Loves the Love of Greatness of Power of Independence and generality of all things which seem to be proper for the Preservation of our Being and the Love of Pleasure and of all things that are necessary for our Well-being that is To be Happy and Satisfied Those two Loves may be divided several ways Whether because we are composed of two different parts of Soul and Body according to which they may be divided or because they may be distinguish'd or specified by the different Objects that are useful for our Preservation However we will not inlarge upon that because as we do not design to make a Treatise of Morality it is not necessary to make an Inquiry into and an exact Division of all the things we look upon as our Felicities It was only necessary to make this Division to relate the cause of our Errors in some order Therefore we shall first speak of those Errors which are caused by our Inclination for Greatness and for all those things that makes our Being Independant of others And afterwards we shall treat of those which proceed from the Inclination we have for Pleasure and for all those things which render our Being the best it can be for us or that contents us most CHAP. VI. I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites IV. Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes WHatever raises us above others by making us more Perfect as Science and Virtue I. Of the Inclination we have for all that raises us above other Persons or that gives us an Authority over them by making us more Powerful as Dignities and Riches seem in some measure to make us Independent All those that are beneath us have a Respect for us and fear us they are always ready to do what pleases us for our Preservation and they dare neither Prejudice us nor oppose our Desires Therefore Men constantly endeavour to possess those Advantages which raise them above others For they never consider that both their Being and Well-being in Truth only depend on God above and not on Men and that the true Greatness which will make them Eternally Happy does not consist in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination of other Men as Weak and as Miserable as themselves but in an humble Submission to the Will of God who being Just will not fail to reward those who remain within the Order he hath prescribed But Men do not only desire Effectively to possess Learning and Vertue Dignities and Riches they also use their utmost Efforts in order to persuade others that they do really possess them And if it may be said that they endeavour less to appear Rich than to be really so it may also be said that they often take less care to be Virtuous than to appear so For as the Author of the Book Entituled Reflectiones Morales fays agreeably Virtue would not go far unless it were accompanied with Vanity The Reputation of being Rich Learned and Virtuous produces in the Imagination of those that are about us or that are more nearly related to us very convenient Dispositions for us It makes them fall at our Feet it makes them act in our Favour it Inspires them with all the Motions that tend to the Preservation of our Being and to the Increase of our Grandeur Thus Men preserve their Reputation as a Good which is necessary for them to Live with Ease in the World All Men then have an Inclination for Virtue Learning Dignities and Riches and for the Reputation of possessing those Advantages We will now endeavour to show by some Examples how those Inclinations may engage them into Error Let us begin by the Inclination that Men have for Virtue or for the Appearance of Virtue Those who apply themselves Seriously to become Virtuous commonly imploy their Mind and Time to understand Religion and to exercise themselves in good Works They only desire with St. Paul to be acquainted with Jesus Christ Crucified to find out a Remedy for the Distemper and Corruption of their Nature They desire no other Knowledge than that which is necessary for them to live Christianly and to know their Duty after which they apply themselves to fulfil them with Zeal and Exactness And therefore they seldom trouble themselves about Sciences which appear Vain and Barren in respect to their Salvation No Fault can be found with that Conduct it is Infinitely to be valued II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons Men would Esteem themselves Happy to observe it exactly and they often repent their not having followed it more But this is unapprovable that since it is certain that there are Sciences absolutely Humane very Certain and Useful which disingage the Mind from Sensible Things and use it by degrees to relish the Truths of the Gospel some Pious Persons without having examin'd them condemn them too freely either as being Useless or Uncertain It is true that most Sciences are very uncertain and very useless Men are partly in the right to believe that they only contain Truths which are of little use No body is oblig'd to study them and it is better to despise them than to suffer ones self to be deceiv'd or blinded by them Nevertheless we may affirm That it is very necessary to know some Metaphysical Truths The Universal Knowledge or the Existence of a God is absolutely necessary since even the Certainty of Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reason gives of the Existence of a God It is necessary to know that it is his Will which makes and which regulates Nature That the Force or Power of Natural Causes is only his Will In a word That all things whatever depend on God It is also necessary to know what Truth is the means to distinguish it from Error the Distinction between the Mind and Body the Consequences that may be drawn from it as the Immortality of the Soul and several other things of that kind which may be known with certainty The Knowledge of Man or of ones self is a Science that cannot be reasonably despis'd it contains a World of