all things must be governed by absolute Fatality and be in every respect Physically necessary there can then be no such thing as Contingency or any Voluntary Actions and if we were sure of this 't is indeed the greatest Ignorance and Folly in the World to pretend to talk any thing about it But on the other hand if there be a Deity who is an Infinitely perfect Being distinct from Nature who Created all things by the Word of his Power and for whose sole Pleasure they are and were Created then none of those Consequences will follow but it will appear very reasonable to believe that God hath still a Care and Providence over that World which he made at first and that he delights to exercise loving Kindness Judgment and Righteousness in the Earth as the Prophet here speaks That he hath made some Creatures capable of Knowing and Vnderstanding this and who consequently have a free Power as in other things so of giving Praise and Glory to so Great and Wonderful a Being nay and of Glorying themselves in being capacitated to attain so Excellent a Knowledge And that Man hath such a Power or Freedom of Will in his Nature is what I shall now proceed in the last place plainly to prove 1. And the first Argument I shall make use of to demonstrate this shall be the Experience of all Mankind And this one would think should be of great Weight and turn the Scale against all the Atheistical Metaphysicks in the World and so no doubt it would were it not wicked Mens Interest to advance the contrary Notion Now that we have a free Power of deliberating in many Cases which way 't is best for us to proceed that we can act this way or that way according as we like best and that we can often forbear whether we will Act at all or not is a Truth so clear and manifest that we are I think almost as certain of it as we are of our own being and Existence and 't is an unimaginable thing how any Man can be perswaded that he hath no such Power Indeed one may by Sophistical words Metaphysical Terms and abstruse Unintelligible Banter be perhaps a little amused and confounded for the present But that any one should by such a Jargon be persuaded out of his Senses his Reason and his Experience and continue in that Opinion is what I do believe never yet befel any Rational and Thinking Man When Zeno brought his silly Sophisticals Argument to prove there was no such thing as Motion his Antagonist thought it to no purpose to return an Answer to what plainly was contradictory to the common Sense of Mankind and therefore convinc'd him only by getting up and Walking And the very same Return will baffle and expose all the Pretended Arguments for Necessity For 't is plain He had a Power first whether he would have walked or not he could have walked Five Turns or Fifty he could have gone across the Room or length-wise round it or from Angle to Angle And I dare say no Sophistry or Metaphysicks whatever would have convinced him that none of these were in his Power when he plainly found them all to be so any more than he was convinced a Body could not move out of its place when he had seen and tried a Thousand times that it would 'T is the same thing in reference to the Thoughts of our Minds as it is in the Motions of our Bodies We plainly find we have a Power in abundance of Cases to preferr one thought before another and to remove our Contemplation from one Notion or Idea to another We can in our Minds compare and revolve over the several Objects of our Choice and we can oftentimes choose whether we will do this or not and this Internal Freedom in Reference to our Thoughts and Idea's we do as plainly perceive and are as sure of as we are that we can voluntarily move our Body or any part of it from place to place And as I have plainly shewed you above our Adversaries do grant and allow this when it is for their Turn But they will say tho' we seem to be free and do think and perceive our selves to be so yet in reality we are not and it is only our Ignorance of Things and Causes which induces us to be of this mistaken Opinion and the Idea of Liberty which Men have is this that they know no Cause of their Actions for to say they depend on the Will is to talk about what they do not understand and to use words of which they have no Idea's at all To which I say that I cannot but be of the Opinion that it is a good Rational way enough of Proceeding to pronounce of things according as we do experience them to be and to declare them to be that which we have all the Reason in the World to think and believe that they really are And I think we may well enough own and be contented with the Charge of Ignorance here laid upon us For the Case is thus We think our selves free because we plainly find and experiment our selves to be so in a Thousand Instances and this also these Penetrating Gentlemen sometimes as I have shewed do kindly allow and we are indeed wholly Ignorant of any Causes that do absolutely determine us to Action or which do necessitate us in what we do previous to that free Power which we find in our selves so that plainly perceiving our selves to have this free Power and being Ignorant of any true Reason why we should believe we are mistaken in what we perceive and know we do indeed such is our Ignorance and Weakness embrace the Opinion that there is a Liberty of Action in Human Nature And this free Power or Liberty which we find in us we not being deep Metaphysicians call the Will by which we understand as I have shewed before not any Particular Act of Volition but the Power or Faculty of Willing And since we plainly perceive that in many cases we are not determined to Action by any thing without us but do choose or refuse act or not act according as we please and being withal grosly Ignorant of any Cause these Actions have but what we find and perceive them to have we call our free Will the Cause of these Actions and say they depend on it and yet after all do we not find out that we talk about what we do not understand and use words that we have no Idea of But our Adversaries it seems have a quite different rellish of things they soar in a higher and more subtle Region they will not condescend to speak common sense in this Matter Tho' they plainly understand as they tell us that they are really free as to many Actions and can deliberate whether they will do them or not purely because they have a free Power so to do tho' they are satisfied that they can act if they will
God neither from Fear nor Policy The Atheist's Objections against the Immaterial Nature of God and Incorporeal Substances Refuted A Refutation of the Objections against the Attributes of God in General In Six Sermons Preach'd at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul 1698. being the first Six of the Lecture for that Year Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq By John Harris M. A. and Fellow of the Royal Society Dr. Payne's Discourses on several Practical Subjects In Octavo Dr. Abbadie's Vindication of the Christian Religion in Two Parts In Octavo A Serious Proposal to the Ladies in Two Parts In Twelves Letters concerning the Love of God between the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies and Mr. Norris A Treatise of the Asthma divided into Four Parts In the First is given a History of the Fits and the Symptoms preceeding them In the Second The Cacochymia that disposes to the Fit and the Rarefaction of the Spirits which produces it are Described In the Third The Accidental Causes of the Fit and the Symptomatic Asthmas are Observ'd In the Fourth The Cure of the Asthma Fit and the Method of Preventing it is Proposed To which is annex'd a Digression about the several Species of Acids distinguish'd by their Tastes And 't is observ'd how far they were thought Convenient or Injurious in general Practice by the Old Writers and most particularly in relation to the Cure of the Asthma By Sir John Floyer In Octavo A Refutation of the Atheistical Notion OF Fate or Absolute Necessity IN A SERMON Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul November the Seventh 1698. BEING The Eighth of the LECTURE for that Year Founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq By JOHN HARRIS M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY LONDON Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard 1698. JEREM. ix 24 Let him that glorieth glory in this that he understandeth and knoweth me that I am the Lord who exercise loving kindness judgment and righteousness in the earth for in these things do I delight saith the Lord. I Did in my last Discourse begin to Speak to the Second Particular considerable in these Words viz. An Account of some of those Attributes which God is here said to Exercise in the Earth and in which he Delights On which I did not think it necessary to Discourse particularly but from thence took an Occasion to Remove two Great Bars to the true Knowledge of God and of his Attributes which Sceptical and Unbelieving Men had raised in the Way Which were These I. That there is in reality no such Things as Moral Good or Evil But that all Actions are in their own Nature indifferent II. That all things are determined by absolute Fatality And that God himself and all Creatures whatsoever are Necessary Agents without having any Power of Choice or any real Liberty in their Natures at all The former of These I did then dispatch plainly proving the Existence of Moral Good and Evil and answering the Objections against it I proceed now to speak to the latter which is an Objection that our Adversaries are very fond of and do all of them upon Occasion have recourse to And it is indeed a great Point gain'd if they could make it out and will effectually destroy all manner of Religious Obligation and all dread of Punishment for doing amiss For as one observes on these Three things all Religion is founded 1. That there is a God who made presides over and governeth all things 2. That there are some things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in their own Natures good and just 3. That there is also something 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 something in our own Power to do whereby we are Accountable for our Actions and become guilty when we do amiss But there can certainly be neither Good nor Evil in any Man's Actions and no Rewards or Punishments can be the Consequents of them if nothing at all be in our own Power if whatever we act or commit it is absolutely impossible for us to avoid acting or committing Which yet must be the case if as they assert Things are determined by absolute Fatality and that God himself and all Creatures whatsoever are necessary Agents without having any Power of Choice or any real Liberty in their Natures at all I shall therefore at this Time 1. Shew you that this is plainly their Assertion from their own words 2. I shall endeavour to shew the Groundlesness of of those Reasons on which they build their Hypothesis And 3. from some Arguments Establish the contrary Position of the Freedom and Liberty of Human Nature 1. And that this is the Assertion of the Two great Atheistical Writers is very plain Mr. Hobbs declares himself to be of the Opinion That no Man can be free from Necessitation That Nothing taketh beginning from it self but from the Action of some other Immediate Agent without it self And that therefore when first a Man hath an Appetite or Will to something to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will the Cause of his Will is not the Will it self but something else not in his own disposing So that whereas it is out of Controversie that of Voluntary Actions the Will is the Necessary Cause and by this which is said the Will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not it followeth that Voluntary Actions have all of them Necessary Causes and therefore are necessitated This saith he also is a certain Truth that there are Certain and Necessary Causes which make every Man to will what he willeth Ib. p. 306. And then as to the Deity I have already more than once taken notice That Hobbs denies Him any Understanding Sense or Knowledge and asserts him to be without any Ends or Designs in his Actions and Operations Which plainly makes Him an Agent absolutely and physically Necessary as indeed follows also from the Notion of his Being Corporeal which the same Writer every where maintains Spinoza also is very Express in this Matter as I have already shewn in some Measure In mente saith he nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas sed Mens ad Hoc vel illud Volendum determinatur à Causâ quae etiam ab aliâ haec iterùm ab aliâ sic in Infinitum And in another place Voluntas non potest vocari Causa libera sed Tantum necessaria And yet on another Occasion and in another Book he hath these words Clarè distinctè Intelligimus si ad Nostram naturam attendamus nos in nostris actionibus esse liberos de multis deliberare propter id solum quod volumus Which is as plain and palpable a Contradiction to what he with the same air of Assurance delivers in other places as can possibly be Mr. Hobbs also cannot be acquitted from expresly contradicting himself as to this Point of Liberty and Necessity for he tells us
in his Reasons for his Opinion That he that reflecteth on himself cannot but be satisfied That a Free Agent is he that can do if he will and forbear if he will And such an Agent he allows Man to be and saith he hath proved it too But how he will reconcile this with his Assertion that no Man can be free from Necessitation and that all our Actions have necessary Causes and therefore are necessitated I cannot imagine As to Spinoza's Account of the Deity in Reference to this Point I have given a hint or two of it already He makes God to be the same with Nature or the Universe to be Corporeal and an absolutely necessary Agent one who cannot possibly help doing as he doth one who hath no Power of Creation nor doth act according to free Will But is Limited and Restrained to one constant Method of Acting by the Absolute Necessity of his Nature or by his Infinite Power And lest any one should misunderstand him so far as to imagine that he means by this that God is by the Excellency and Perfection of his Nature in all his Operations exactly conformable to the Rules of Justice Goodness and Right Reason He plainly excludes that Notion in these words Qui dicunt Deum omnia sub Ratione Boni agere Hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere quod à Deo non dependet ad quod Deus tanquam ad Exemplar in Operando attendit vel ad quod tanquam ad certum scopum collimat Quod profectò nihil aliud est quam Deum Fato subjicere Now I think nothing can more shew the wicked Perversness of this Writer's Mind than this Passage For he could not but know very well that when Divines assert the Deity to be Essentially and necessarily Good they do not mean that Goodness is any thing Extrinsical to the Divine Nature much less that it is something which hath no dependance upon it but only that the Excellency and Perfection of his Nature is such as that it is in every thing exactly conformable to Right Reason and therefore this was certainly a wilful Perversion of their Sense set up on purpose to overthrow the Notion of Moral Goodness in the Deity But how vain is it for him to tell us that for the Deity to Act sub Ratione Boni is for Him to be Subject to Fate when at the same time he Himself Asserts that God is in every respect a Necessary Agent without any free Will nay without any Knowledge or Vnderstanding in his Nature at all This is so plain a Demonstration that it was his chief and Primary Design to banish out of Mens Minds the Notion of Moral Goodness that nothing can be more and therefore tho' he was resolved to Introduce absolute Necessity into all Actions both Divine and Human yet it should be such an one as should leave no Umbrage for any distinction between Good and Evil or any Foundation for Rewards and Punishments And in this Notion of Necessity these Writers follow Democritus Heraclitus Leucippus and that Atheistical Sect who maintain'd that there was Nothing in all Nature but Matter and Motion And therefore when these Modern Writers assert that there is nothing in the Universe but Body as they do they run Fate farther than most of the Old Heathen Patrons of Necessity did For there was none but the Democritick Sect that supposed Fate to have a Power over the Will of Man and in this particular even they were deserted by Epicurus as I observe below The Pythagoreans Platonists and Stoicks agreed that the Mind of Man was free And 't is well known that the Stoicks did in this Free Power of the Will of Man found that arrogant Assertion of theirs That a Wise Man was in one respect more excellent than the Gods for they were Good by the Necessity of their Nature and could not help it whereas Man had a Power of being otherwise and therefore was the more commendable for being so There was indeed some of the Poets and some few of the Philosophers too who did subject the Gods themselves to Fate or Necessity Thus Seneca in one place saith Necessitas Deos alligat Irrevocabilis Divina pariter ac Humana Cursus vehit Ille ipse omnium Conditor ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata sed sequitur semper paret semel jussit Which Opinion is effectually refuted and exposed by Lucian in that Dialogue of his called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 As also by Lactantius in his First Book De falsâ Religione Chap. 11. But this as I doubt not but Seneca and some others understood in a softer sense than at first sight it appears to have so was it the Doctrine of but a few for generally the Heathens did fully believe that Prayers and Sacrifices would alter a Man's Fortune and Circumstances for the better that they would appease the Anger and gain the Favour and Blessing of the Gods and that Their Nature was not so absolutely Fatal and Necessary but that they could freely deal with their Creatures according as they deserved at their hands For we find Balbus the Stoick mentioned by Cicero telling us That the Nature of God would not be most Powerful and Excellent if it were Subject to the same Necessity or Nature Quâ Coelum maria terraeque reguntur Nihil Enim est praestantius Deo Nulli igitur est Naturae Obediens Subjectus So that these Writers tread in the Steps of the worst and most Atheistical of the Heathen Philosophers and maintain a more rigid Fate and a more irresistible Necessity than most of them did But 2 I come next to shew the Groundlesness of those Reasons and Arguments on which these Men build their Hypothesis of Absolute Necessity And first as to the Reasons of Mr. Hobbs The Chief that he brings against the freedom of Human Actions are these saith Mr. Hobbs In all Deliberations and alternate Successions of Contrary Appetites 't is the last only which we call Will this is immediately before the doing of any Action or next before the doing of it become Impossible Also Nothing saith he can take beginning from it self but must do it from the Action of some other immediate Agent without it if therefore a Man hath a Will to something which he had not before the Cause of his Willing is not the Will it self but something else not in his own disposing So that whereas 't is out of Controversie that of Voluntary Actions the Will is the Necessary Cause and by this which is now said the Will is also Caused by Other things whereof it disposeth not it follows that Voluntary Actions have all of them Necessary Causes and therefore are necessitated Agen also Every sufficient Cause saith he is a Necessary one for if it did not produce its Effect necessarily 't was because something was wanting to its Production and then it was not sufficient Now from hence it follows that
whatsoever is produced is produced Necessarily and consequently all Voluntary Actions are Necessitated And to define a Free Agent to be that which when all things are present which are necessary to produce the Effect can nevertheless not produce it is Contradiction and Nonsense for 't is all one as to say the Cause may be sufficient i. e. Necessary and yet the Effect shall not follow This is the Substance of all Mr. Hobbs his Proof against Free Will in which there are almost as many Mistakes as there are Sentences and from hence it plainly will appear that either he had no clear Idea's of what he wrote about or else did designedly endeavour to perplex darken and confound the Cause For in the first place He confounds the Power or Faculty of Willing in Man with the last act of Willing or Determination after Deliberating And consequently doth not distinguish between what the Schools would call Hypothetical and Absolute Necessity which yet ought to be carefully done in the Point between us for an Agent may be free and no doubt every Man is free to deliberate on and to compare the Objects offered to his Choice and yet not be so after he hath chosen Then indeed Necessity comes in 't is impossible for any one to choose and not to choose or to determine and not to determine and after the Election is made no one ever supposed that a Man is free not to make it And therefore if by the Will Mr. Hobbs means that last Act of Willing or Electing which immediately precedes Acting or which is next before the doing of a thing become impossible as he expresseth himself he fights with his own shadow and opposes that which no body ever denied for no Man ever supposed Freedom and Determination to be the same thing but only that Man before he determined was free whether he would determine so and so or not And accordingly he himself defines a voluntary Agent to be him that hath not made an end of Deliberating Agen 2. 'T is hard to know what he means here by Nothing taking its beginning from it self he is talking about Voluntary Actions and about the freedom of Human Nature and therefore should referr this to the Will of Man but the Instances he afterwards produces are of Contingent Things which are nothing at all to his purpose But if this be spoken of the Will what will it signifie I grant Nothing can take its beginning from itself the Will of Man took its beginning from God and Voluntary Actions we say take their beginning from the Faculty or Power of Willing placed in our Souls But what then doth it follow from thence that those Actions we call Voluntary are Necessitated because that they take their Original from that free Power of Election God hath placed in our Natures and not from themselves I dare say no one can see the consequence of this part of the Argument And it will not in the least follow from hence that the Cause of a Man's Willing is not the Will it self but something else not in his own disposing Which yet he boldly asserts It is the Power of Willing or that Faculty which we find in our selves of being free in many Cases to Act or not Act or to Act after such a particular manner which is generally called the Will and this is commonly said to be free Tho' I think as one hath observed it is not so proper a way of Speaking as to say the Man is free For besides that 't is not usual nor indeed proper to predicate one Faculty of another 't is hardly good sense to say the Will is free in the manner now explain'd for that would be the same thing as to say that a free Power is free whereas it is not the Power but the Man that hath the Power that is free But however the Other way of Expression hath prevailed and doth do so and I don't think any one is misled by it into Error for that which every body understands and means by saying the Will of Man is free is that Man hath in his Nature such a free Power as is called his Will Now from hence it will not follow that a Man is free whether he will Will or not for he must Will someway either to Act or not to Act or to Act after such a particular manner But it will follow that when a Man hath made any particular Volition or hath determined the Point whether he shall Act or forbear to Act he is then no longer at Liberty as to this particular Case and Instant for the Determination is then actually made and the Man no longer free not to make it But this proves nothing at all against the Liberty or Freedom of the Mind of Man Again what doth Mr. Hobbs mean by the Will 's being the Necessary Cause of Voluntary Actions Doth he mean that the Will of Man must of Necessity act freely and produce Actions voluntarily if he doth we are agreed but if he means that the Will is previously necessitated in every Act of Volition to Will just as it doth and could not possibly have willed otherwise this is to beg the Question and to take for granted the great thing in Dispute 't is to call that out of Controversie which is the only thing in Controversie which indeed when a Man contradicts the Common Sense and Reason of Mankind without Proof is the best way of Proceeding But that which looks most like an Argument for the Necessity of all Humane Actions is this which he brings in the last place That Cause saith he is a sufficient Cause which wanteth nothing requisite to produce its Effect but such a Cause must also be a Necessary one for had it not necessarily produced its Effect it must have been because something was wanting in it for that Purpose and then it could not have been sufficient So that whatever is produced is produced necessarily for it could not have been at all without a sufficient or necessary Cause and therefore also all Voluntary Actions are necessitated Now all this proves to his Purpose I think just nothing at all He proceeds on in his former Error of confounding the Act of Willing with the Power of Willing and of making Hypothetical the same with absolute Necessity for not now to dispute what he saith of every sufficient Cause's being a Necessary one allowing that when ever any Volition or Determination is made or when ever any Voluntary Action is done that the Will of Man was a sufficient Cause to produce that Effect nay that it did at last necessarily produce it he can inferr nothing from hence more than this That when the Will hath determined or willed 't is no longer free to Will or Nill that particular thing at that particular Instant which I don't believe any Body will ever or ever did deny But this will not prove at all that the Will was necessitated to make that
Principle as Fear no doubt they may do so for Interest and Advantage for that is certainly as good a ground as Cowardliness and Baseness and then what becomes of this boasted Honour that is so much talk'd of this greatness of Mind that will keep a Man from doing an ill thing In reality 't will at last amount to no more than this that he will forbear doing an Ill Thing when he thinks it will prove ill to him he will be Just Honest and Sincere when he don't dare be otherwise for fear of the Law Shame and Ignominy For all Men of Atheistical Principles would be Knaves and Villains if they durst if they could do it safely and securely such a Man 't is like shall return you a Bag of Money or a rich Jewel you happen to depose in his Hands but why is it 't is because he dares not keep it and deny it 't is great odds but he is discovered and exposed by this means and besides 't is Unfashionable and Ungenteel to be a Cheat in such Cases But to impoverish a Family by Extravagance and Debauchery to defraud Creditors of their just Debts or Servants of their Wages to Cheat at Play to violate one's Neighbour's Bed to gratifie one's own Lust are things which though to the full as Wicked and Unreasonable in themselves are yet swallowed down as allowable enough because common and usual and which are not the more is the pity attended with that Scandal and Infamy that other Vices are Thus 't is very plain that this pretended Principle of Honour in an Atheist or a Wicked Man and this Obedience and Deference that he pretends to pay to the Laws of his Country is a most Partial and Changeable thing and vastly different from that true Honour and Bravery that is founded on the Eternal Basis of Conscience and Religion 't is an Airy Name that serves only to amuse unthinking and short-sighted Persons into a Belief that he hath some kind of Principles that he will stick to that so he may be thought fit to be trusted dealt and conversed withall in the World And thus I think it is very clear and apparent that Wickedness naturally leads to Infidelity and Atheism and Infidelity and Atheism to the Support and Maintenance of That And that it is the Wicked that will not seek after God and whose thoughts are that there is no God Which was my First Particular I come next to Consider II. That Peculiar Kind of Wickedness which the Psalmist here takes notice of as the chief Ground from whence Infidelity and Atheism proceed And that is Pride The Wicked through the Pride of his Countenance will not seek after God neither is God in all his Thoughts And I question not but this Vice of Pride is generally the Concomitant of Infidelity and the chief Ground from whence the Spirit of Speculative Atheism proceeds When Men of proud and haughty Spirits lead ill Lives as they very often do they always endeavour to justifie themselves in their Proceeding be it never so Irregular and Absurd and never so contrary to the considerate Sentiments of all the rest of the World A Proud Man hates to acknowledge himself in an Errour and to own that he hath committed a Fault He would have the World believe that there is a kind of Indefectibility in his Understanding and Judgment which secures him from being deceived and mistaken like other Mortals Whatever Actions therefore such a Person commits he would fain have appear reasonable and justifiable But he sees plainly that he cannot make Wickedness and Immorality do so as long as Religion stands its Ground in the World The Sacred Scriptures are so plain and express against such a course of Life that there is no avoiding being convicted and condemned while their Authority remains good 'T is impossible any way to reconcile a vicious Life to the Doctrine there delivered And therefore he sees plainly That one that Professes to believe the great Truths of Religion and the Divine Authority of those Sacred Books and yet by his Practices gives the Lye to his Profession and while he acknowledges Jesus Christ in his Words doth in his Works deny him he sees I say that such an one stands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-condemned and can never acquit himself either to his own Conscience or to the Reason of Mankind Now this is perfectly disagreeable to the Genious and Humour of a Proud Man he cannot bear to be thought in any respect Incoherent or Inconsistent with himself And therefore having vainly tried to justifie himself in his Wickedness by alledging the Examples of some good Men in Sacred Scripture that have been guilty of great Sins but whose Repentance he can by no means digest And having also fruitlessly endeavoured to rely on the perverted Sense of some particular Texts of Scripture which he knows are sufficiently refuted by the Analogy of the whole he finds at last that 't is the best way to deny the Divine Authority of the Bible and the Truth of all Revelation and so boldly shake off at once all Obligation to the Rules of Piety and Virtue and since Religion can't be wrested so as to give an allowance to his way of living he will take it quite away Banish that and God Almighty out of the World and set up Iniquity by a Law And nothing can be more pleasing and agreeable to the Arrogance of such Men than this way of Proceeding It gratifies an insolent and haughty Spirit prodigiously to do things out of the common Road to pretend to be Adept in a Philosophy that is as much above the rest of Mankind's Notions as 't is Contradictory to it to assume to himself a Power of seeing much farther into things than other Folk and to penetrate into the deepest recesses of Nature He would pass for one of Nature's Cabinet Councellors a Bosome Favourite that knows all the secret Springs of Action and the first remote Causes of all Things He pleases himself mightily to have discovered with what Ridiculous Bugbears the Generality of Mankind are awed and frighted he can now look down with a Scornful Pity on the poor groveling Vulgar the Unthinking Mobb below that are poorly enslaved and terrified by the Fear of a God and of Ills to come they know not when nor where He despises such dull Biggots as will be imposed upon by Priests and that will superstitiously abstain from the Enjoyment of present Pleasure on account of such idle Tales as the Comminations of Religion And as he despises those that are not Wicked so he upbraids those that are so with inconsistency with their Principles and Profession and for doing the same things that he doth when they have nothing to bear them out And thus he doubly gratifies his Pride by justifying himself and condemning and triumphing over others Nay the very Mistakes and Errours of such a Man we are told appear laudable and great to him and he
of Success give them thanks making the Creatures of their own fancy Gods This is the Natural Seed of Religion which Men taking notice of have formed into Laws c. And he tells us in another place That Fear of Power invisible feigned by the Mind or imagined from Tales publickly allowed is Religion not allowed is Superstition So that according to Mr. Hobbs Religion and Superstition differ only in this that the latter is a Lye and a Cheat standing only on the Authority of Private Men whereas the former is supported by the Power of the Government In these Four Things saith he elsewhere consists the Natural Seed of Religion viz. Ignorance of Second Causes Opinion of Ghosts Devotion toward what Men Fear and taking things casual for Prognosticks These are the Accounts which our Modern Atheistical Writers give of the Origin of Religion and the Notion of a God among Men. And this they with great assurance put off as their own new Invention without being so just as to mention any of the Ancients from whom they have borrowed every Article of it That trite Passage every Body knows Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor and Lucretius mentions Fear and the Ignorance of Second Causes as that which gave the first rise to the Notion of a God For saith he When Men with fearful Minds behold the things in the Earth and Heavens they become abject and depressed under the fear of the Gods whose Empire Ignorance of Causes sets up in the World for when Men cannot see any natural Reason for any Effect they strait fansie 't is the Product of some Divine Power The very same thing he saith also in another place where he attributes likewise the Notion of Ghosts and consequently of the Gods interfering with the Affairs of the World to Mens not being able to distinguish Dreams from Real Appearances Tully tells us That there were some in his time and no doubt long before who attributed the Opinion and Belief of the Gods to have been feigned by Wise Men for the good of the Commonwealth And Plato acquaints us That the ancient Atheists did affirm that the Gods were not by Nature but by Art and Laws only and so were different in different places according as the different humour of the Law givers chanced to determine the Matter Sextus Empiricus saith That there were at first some Intelligent and Prudent Men who consider'd what would be beneficial to Humane Life and these first feigned the fabulous Notion of Gods and caused that Suspicion that there is in Mens Minds about them Afterwards he saith That heretofore Men lived wild and savage and preyed upon one another like wild Beasts till some Men being willing to prevent and repress Injuries and Rapine invented Laws to punish those that did amiss And then they feigned that there were Gods also who took cognizance of all Mens Actions whether good or bad that so no one might dare to commit any secret Wickedness when he was by this means persuaded 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Gods tho' unseen by Men did yet inspect into all Humane Actions and take notice who did well and who the contrary Sextus also attributes the Rise of Mens Belief of a God to their ignorance of Second Causes as I shewed you before that Lucretius doth for he makes Democritus speak thus When Men of old saw strange and frightful things in the Air or Heavens such as Thunder Lightning Thunderbolts Eclipses of the Sun and Moon c. not knowing the Natural Causes of them but being terrified by them they strait imagined the Gods to be the Authors of them This therefore being proved to be the true sence of the Ancient Atheistical Writers and from them copied by the Moderns viz. That Fear Ignorance and Cunning were the first Originals or Causes of the Notion and Belief of a God Let us now fairly examine the Case and see what ground there is for such an Assertion and whether this can account for that Universal Notion of a Divine and Omnipotent Being which we find every where in the World And 1. I say That the Notion of a GOD could not come from Fear for if it did either this Fear must be universally inherent in all Mankind or else peculiar only to some Dastardly and Low-spirited Mortals If the former be asserted 't is a very convincing Argument that there is a just ground for such a Fear and that it hath something that is Real for its Object that can thus affect all Men after the same manner And if it be so that all Men are naturally subject to this Fear of a Deity how could any one ever discover that there was no real ground for this in the nature of the thing how came he himself exempted from this poorness of Spirit And if he were not exempted from this terrible Passion how came he to discover that the Object of this Fear is all a Cheat and nothing but a meer Mormo and Bugbear 'T was very lucky for him that the rambling Atoms of his Constitution jumpt by chance into such a couragious and noble Frame and Temper But pray who was this mighty Man when and where did he live what Ancient History gives us any Account of this happy Person that laughed at that which all the World besides were afraid of Let the Atheists give us but any Relation of him that is Authentick and it shall be allowed as the greatest thing they have ever yet advanced But I suppose they will not say that this Fear is Universal but that it only possesseth mean and abject Spirits and never invades the Great and Brave Soul Let us see whether this will do them any service Now by Brave and Great Souls who do they mean Do they intend by them such as have Power Command and Empire over others Nothing is more certain than that Kings and Princes have been equally subject to these Fears of a God and of Divine Punishment with the meanest and most contemptible of their Subjects And this Lucretius himself owns as also that this Fear of a Deity is Universal and we have Examples of it in the Histories of all Ages and Parts of the World But they will say 't is like that by Brave and Great Souls they don't mean Kings and Princes but the Wise Knowing and Learned part of Mankind These were they that first discovered this Cheat and who finding its Advantage to Mankind have ever since continued it and carried it on for the Publick Good These Cunning Men finding the Vulgar generally subject to dismal Apprehensions and Fears of they knew not what kind of Invisible Powers took advantage from thence to tell them of a God and to form the product of their Fears into the Notion of a Deity Now to this I say That if these cunning Politicians found that there was a Fear Dread and Apprehension of some
Plutarch describing the Deity hath these remarkable words God is Mind a separated Form perfectly unmixed with Matter and without any thing that is passible 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And in another place he asserts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That 't is impossible Matter alone can be the sole Principle of all things Plato every where distinguisheth between corporeal and incorporeal Substances calling the former by the Names of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sensible and the latter always either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 immaterial or intelligible and he saith That certain intelligible and incorporeal Forms are the true and first Substance and that incorporeal Things which are the greatest and most excellent of all others are discoverable by reason only and nothing else And in another place he saith That they were instructed by their forefathers that Mind and a certain wonderful Wisdom did at first frame and doth now govern all things His words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In Phileb p. 28. Which sufficiently shews the Antiquity of the Notion of an Incorporeal Deity and the way also how they came by it Of the same Opinion also was Socrates as we are told by Plutarch and others Lib. de Placit Philos. 1. c. 3. Zeno and the Stoicks defined the Deity to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Intellectual and Rational Nature or as Plutarch recites their Opinion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Intelligent Spirit devoid of all Bodily shape Ibid. And Sextus Empericus tells us of Aristotle that he constantly asserted God to be Incorporeal and the Utmost Bounds of the Universe And Aristotle concludes his Book of Physicks with affirming that 't is impossible the first Mover or God can have any Magnitude but he must needs be devoid of Parts and Indivisible And Plutarch gives us this as the received and common Opinion of the Stoicks that God was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Spirit that was extended or did penetrate throughout the whole World De Placitis Philosoph lib. 1. c. 3. p. 882. Now by these Passages and many others that might easily be produced it appears very plain that the most Ancient Writers had a good clear Notion of God and that they speak of him as of a Mind perfectly distinct from Matter or as an immaterial or incorporeal Being Many of them also deliver themselves very expresly as to the Soul of Man which as Plutarch tells us they generally asserted to be Incorporeal and that it was naturally a Self-moving and Intelligible Substance But of this more in another place And that the Ancients did believe God to be a Spirit or a most Powerful Intelligent and Perfect Immaterial Substance will yet farther appear if we consider what Notion they had of and how they defined Matter or Body Plato describes it by the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which thrusts against other Bodies and resists their Touch or Impulse Others call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which so fills up a place as at that time to exclude from it any other Body Sometimes they called it the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in contradistinction to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is they distinguished it to be of a pure passive Nature and which was acted and determined only by Impulse from without it or distinct from it they knew very well that there was also besides it some Active Thing something that was the Cause of Motion and Action in the Universe For as Plutarch well observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 'T is impossible Matter alone can produce any thing unless there be besides it some Active Cause Sextus Empiricus also gives this Definition of Matter or Body That it is that which resists other things which are brought against it for Resistance saith he or Impenetrability is the true Property of Body By these Accounts that they have given us of Matter or Body 't is very easie to understand their Notion or Idea of it which indeed was the Just and True one They thought Matter or Body to be a purely Passive Thing incapable of moving or acting by it self but wholly determined either by some Internal and Self-moving Mind or by the Motions and Impulses of other Bodies without it That it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is as we now adays speak Impenetrably extended and did so fill up space or place as to exclude any other Body from being in the same Place with it at the same Time If to this you add what Aristotle and some others said of it that it was also capable of all Forms Figures and Modifications you have then the whole that ever they thought Matter could do or be Now from hence 't is exceeding clear that they could not as indeed we find actually they did not think Matter or Body the only Substance in the World and that the Deity was Material or Corporeal For they always described the Divine Nature by Attributes and Properties that were the very Reverses of what they appropriated to Matter or Body God they have told us is an Intelligent Mind pervading and encompassing all things an Active Energetical Principle the Cause of all Motion and Operation whatever Intangible indivisible invisible and no ways the Object of our Bodily Senses But yet whose Essence is plainly discoverable by our reasoning and Understanding Faculty This was as we have seen the Notion or Idea that many of the Ancient Philosophers had of the Deity and this plainly shews us that they look'd upon him to be what St. John here defines him an Incorporeal Being or a Spirit There were indeed some even then as I have before shewed who being wholly immersed in Matter themselves did assert that there was nothing else but Body in the World Such were Leucippus and Democritus and afterwards Epicurus and his Sect who perverted the Ancient Atomical and true Philosophy to an Atheistical Sense and made use of it for the banishing the Notion and Belief of a God out of their own and others Minds as indeed some others long before them had attempted to do But in this 't is very plain as an Excellent Person of our Nation hath observed that these Men did not understand the Philosophy they pretended to For it doth most clearly follow from the Principles of the True Atomical or Corpuscular Philosophy that there must be some other Substance distinct from and more Noble than Matter and which is of an Immaterial Incorporeal or Spiritual Nature And this I hope it will not be judged impertinent briefly to prove at this Time because some who seem not so throughly to understand it have of late reckoned the Mechanical Philosophy among the Causes of the growth of Atheism and Infidelity It is very much to the Purpose that the Ancient Atomists before Democritus and Leucippus did plainly assert and maintain the Doctrine of