because the one can be existent without the other In answer to this I say that these are not properly appetites to which namely appetites a knowledge doth necessarily concur but they are only improperly and analogically termed appetites because they agree with a proper appetite in having an inclination to a thing Wherefore a proper appetite being alwayes concomitated by a knowledge these fore-mentioned instances cannot be denominated appetites but natural inclinations and propensities for if a man is predicated to have an appetite for any thing it is equivalent as if he were predicated to have a will to a thing Wherefore there is only one proper appetite in man as he is man which is his will CHAP. IX Of Free-will by Reason 1. Wherein man doth most differ from Animals or Naturals 2. To what acts the freedom of man's will in reference to its acting doth extend What the freedom of will is quoad exercitium actus and what Libertas contradictionis is 3. What the second kind of freedom of will importeth 4. That the speculative understanding in the act of speculation is practick 5. That the will is not constrained to will a good thing although present but hath a power of rejecting it 6. That the will willeth evil for an evil end That some men are worse than Devils 7. What the will 's freedom is in specifying its acts 8. What free-will is in reference to its faculty 9. Velten rejected for asserting that the will is not indifferent to each contrary That the will is indifferent to each contradictory opposite 10. That the will is free to act or not to act 11. That the will is free to act upon particular objects whether good or evil The state of the controversie 12. That man as he is in a natural and corrupt state hath a free-will of doing a moral good or a moral evil act 13. That man hath not a free-will of doing a theologick good act immediately through himself without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him 14. Man hath a free-will of doing a theologick good act with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him That he hath a free-will of election 15. That man as he is in a natural state hath a free-will through himself and without Gods extraordinary concurrence to procure Gods extraordinary concurrence and assistance to him in his actions That our being and conservation in it and all our actions depend from the ordinary concurrence of God Reasons why God did not conferre upon him an absolute power of acting without his ordinary concourse The cause of man's fall That that which is only morally good will prove theologick evil at last 16. Arguments to prove a free-will in man A reconciliation of the Calvinists with the Arminians That man hath a remnant of theologick good surviving in him The state of the controversie The division of it I. THe chief respect through which a man doth differ from Animals or Naturals is his will which is a free principle through which he acteth freely that is without any irresistable impulse for there is no object whether good or evil pleasant or sorrowfull but it is left to the wils freedom whether it will imbrace it or reject it II. The freedom of man's will in reference to its act is either a determination or assent of man to act or not to act or else it is an assent to act upon a certain object or not to act upon that certain object oâ—to act upon a certain mode of an object or not to act upon that certain mode or to act upon the goodnesse of an object in common or particular or not to act upon the goodnesse of such objects or to act upon the evil of an object in common or particular or not to act upon the evil of rhat object or to act upon good or upon evil These are the particulars whereunto the freedome of man's will doth extend And first A man hath freedom of acting or of not acting through his will A man in willing to sleep he willeth to will no more before he hath refreshed himself by sleep So that herein a man hath a will of acting or not acting indeterminately which sort of willing freedome is termed Libertas quoad exercitium actus Such a freedom of will there is in man for a man in willing to sleep willeth not to will that is not to act through his will A man in willing not to sleep may will to will or to continue in action of willing or understanding This is a plain Libertas contradiction is ad actionem non actionem sive ad agendum non agendum for it is between an ens and a non ens III. The second kind of freedom in the will is to act upon an object I mean a whole essence or object as it doth consist of all its modes united as for instance a man may covet a whole Tree or only a branch of it a whole house or only a room Now in coveting a whole Tree or a whole house he coveteth an entire essence with all its modes or else a man may also reject a whole Tree or house and so rejecteth a whole essence IV. Thirdly The will may choose to act upon a particular mode as the truth or quantity of an essence c. For it makes choice to act that is to apprehend or contemplate upon these modes particularly Neither let it seem strange to you that the understanding or will in contemplation should be termed willing or practick for in that very contemplation the understanding is practick for it doth both act and will that action V. Fourthly The will may act upon the goodnesse of an object in particular or it may refuse it Herein I do thwart some Authours who strive to prove the contrary to wit that the will when it doth act upon a good object it cannot refuse it but doth alwayes covet it Others do with more caution assert That the will of man cannot reject or refuse the most universal good for which purpose they quote Austin 10. B. 20. Chap. of Confes. Were it possible saith he to ask all men at once whether they would be happy they would answer without any further paâ—sing upon it they would But suppose this were granted as really it is disputable there being many in the world so wicked that if they were invited to imbrace the true Summum Bonum either for to bid adieu to their own spurious happinesse or to wave their obstinate opinions they would rather excuse themselves as I once heard a Jesuite cry out in a dispute That he would sooner choose to be damned with St. Austin then go to Heaven with a Protestant Yet they need arguments to prove that a particular good may not be waved although perceived by the understanding How many are there who neglect and revile many good things such as are convenient for their souls and bodies Besides this granted infers a necessity upon man's will whereby
moral or voluntary actions We need not augment the number of internal principles by adding Habits to them these being supposed to alter the forestated principles accidentally only and not essentially How Habits ' are acquired and how intended remitted and corrupted we have set down elswhere Neither are God or Angels properly said to be external principles since all principles strictly are required to be internal But God may be justly termed the coefficient of the actions of man since God worketh in us to will and to do Angels whether good or evil Wizards and Witches cannot concur efficiently to the effecting of humane actions to which an infinite power is onely sufficient whereas they consisting of a limited power are therefore render'd uncapable They may concurre to the specification of an act as persuasive causes in bending man's will to this or that act by changing the phansie in stirring up the humours and spirits of the brain whereby it may represent objects otherwise than they are or by presenting objects through a false image or representation or by changing the external sensories Whence we may observe that it is not in the Devils power to make or force us to doe a thing against our wils but that we may discover resist and refuse his deceitfull motions or otherwise we might be justly thought excusable wherefore if we do at any time commit evil through the perswasion of an evil spirit we must not onely accuse the wicked spirit but our selves also After our discourse upon the will there remains alone to appose a word or two touching humane actions II. Humane actions otherwise called moral and voluntary are such as are effected by man as farre as he is a man or are produced by his will or practick understanding Wherefore whatever man acteth with the fore-knowledge and fore-command of his practick understanding is humane and voluntary A voluntary action may be purely voluntary and free or mixt out of a Voluntas and Noluntas that is willed with a reluctancy The first acception of Voluntary Aristotle terms voluntary strictly so called the latter he denominates involuntary but improperly III. It is absurd to assert man to do a thing ignorantly since it is impossible for a man to do any thing which he doth not fore-know Wherefore it must be an errour in the Peripateticks to affirm that man can act an involuntarium quiddam ex ignorantia because he acteth nothing but what is consented unto partially or totally by his will which cannot will any thing as the Peripatetick definition holds forth without the foreknowledge of the understanding Hence I conclude that nothing is to be termed involuntary or mixtly voluntary unlesse a man is forced to it violently or by a cause acting from without IV. Here may be demanded Whether evils of omission of duties required by a Law committed by man when he is ignorant of the said Law are to be termed involuntary No certainly for they are voluntary in that the omission of an act is as much an act of the will as the effection of it But whether such omissions or commissions which a man doth will are to be termed evil in regard he willed them through ignorance which had he not been ignorant of he would not have willed is to be decided from the circumstances of such actions and not from the imputing such actions not to be the actions of man or not to be voluntary Moreover I answer That no kind of ignorance doth make an action neutral that is neither good or evil and excusable but an invincible ignorance What invincible ignorance and other kinds of ignorances are I do wittingly omit the inserting since they are vulgarly enough known As for such circumstances which are required to render humane actions good or evil I have set down in the latter end of this Book V. The action of the will is accidentally divided in fruition and intention Fruition is the continuated coveting and willing of an object already before coveted and now enjoyed Intention is a mediate coveting of means whereby to covet an object immediately or to arrive to the fruition of it Intention contains in it three inferiour actions 1. Election whereby the practick understanding doth by a preceding deliberation covet one or more objects for a means out of many 2. Consent which is a further coveting of that or them objects which it hath elected so as to be confirmed and pleased in that election 3. Usus or Usance otherwise called execution which is the application of the means now elected and consented unto to a further action CHAP. XIII Of Natural Faith 1. That Faith is the sole means through which we are to attain to our greatest good What Faith is The Definition confirmed by Arguments deduced from reason 2. The two-fold object of Faith A proof from reason that God is the Creator of man That God and Nature are one 3. An enquiry into the end of man's creation 4. That man doth know the summe of God's Law through the light of Nature A summary enumeration of the Law of God as it is imprinted upon every man's heart 5. Moral virtues compared with the moral Law A comprehension of all moral virtues I Have just now finisht my Discourse upon the subject of this Tract that which fals next under our consideration is the means through which we are to attain to our greatest Good and happinesse The sole means is Faith Faith is a certain knowledge of God and the Law and an assurance in and of God's mercy and goodnesse The genus proximum and differentia proxima are signals that their Definitum or thing defined is not an historical or temporary faith or saith of miracles onely but a justifying and glorifying faith necessarily comprehending in it self the three other kinds as degrees by which the soul doth gradually ascend to an exalting faith Among other School-Divines it goeth under the name of an explicite Faith Fides the same with the Definitum deriveth its denomination from fidere a word not in use among the later Latinists whose signification the verb confidere hath since supplied which is to rest contented and fully satisfied Wherefore assurance implying a certain practical knowledge freed from all doubts and causing this rest and satisfaction doth justly and properly deserve the place of the Genus in this Definition The certainty which Faith doth bring with it depends upon the certainty and necessity of its premises which being necessary and certain infers a certain and necessary conclusion If God is mercifull he will save them that beg mercy But God is mercifull and I do beg mercy Therefore God will save me This Conclusion as depending upon unchangeable and certain premises holds forth that Faith is an undoubted assurance of God's mercy and that he will save a zealous believer No wonder then if Faith doth create this quietnesse rest and satisfaction Austin de Civit. Dei lib. 19. cap. 18. tels us no lesse To the Acadamicks all things are
a Material one but none Real XIII Besides all this there is an Absolute Power conferred upon Gods Creatures in general and upon man in particular I do not mean Absolute Simpliciter for that were Repugnant as I have proved in my Theol. but secundam quid I will further explain it to you The Power which all Creatures have of being and acting at that present Moment wherein they enjoy their being and do act is absolute because they cannot but enjoy that same being and act at that Moment wherein they have a Being and do act Ergo it is Absolute but not simpliciter for were it so then they would obtain that absolute power of being from and out of their own Nature which we know is dependent from Gods Power and according to this sense none consisteth of an absolute power but God alone because his Nature is alone independent It is then absolute secundum quid because God hath ordained that which is to be and that which ever hath been to have been and that which shall be to come to pass In short Absolute secundum quid I take for that which is unchangeable as all beings and their Actions are in that sense as I have proposed They are unchangeable because Gods Ordination in Creating Giving Forbearing and in all other Particulars is unchangeable This Distinction is of that use that many Points in Divinity cannot be resolved but by its being applied to them I shall content my self with the having named it since I have Treated of it at large in another Part of my Philosophy XIV The Absolute secundum quid powers which God hath conferred upon his Creatures are by Physitians otherwise termed Faculties Facultates which are derived from a faciendo doing that is they are actual dispositions whereby Effects are done Hence Galen Lib. 1. de Natur. Facult Par. 3. Prima euim actionis ipsius potentia causa est The first cause of an Action saith he is the power And in another place of the same Book he renders himself thus Facultatum quatuor naturalium essentia in partium singularum nutriendarum temperie est that is The Essence of the four Natural Faculties consisteth in the temperament of the parts that are to be nourished which is nothing different then if he had said the Faculties Facultates sunt temperamenta facientia are temperaments actually doing effects Now it is evident that Galen held the Temperament of bodies to be their Forms which if so then questionless his Opinion tended to assert that Powers and their Subjects were really identificated and that all powers were actual Moreover we shall find throughout all his Tomes that his sense touching powers and Faculties doth e Diametro agree with what I have set down in this present Treatise As for Hippocrates I cannot read a word throughout all his works but what tends against Aristotle in every Particular forasmuch as it relate to our Subject In the Conclusion I must remember you to observe that many Terms as Formal Substance Accident and divers others I have somtimes made use of in the same sense as I have proposed them in the Foregoing Chapters other times I have intended them in the same Acception which Philosophers vulgarly receive them in But herein the Sense of the Matter will easily direct you FINIS RELIGIO PHILOSOPHI OR Natural Theology The FIRST PART The fourth Book By Gedeon Harvey Doctor of Physick and Philosophy LONDON Printed by A. M. for Samuel Thomson at the Sign of the Bishops-head in St Paul's Church-yard 1663. TO HIS Most Honoured Mother ELIZABETH HARVEY Dear Mother AMong those serious Admonitions which from your singular Affection and Care you have so oft repeated to me This I remember hath been one of the most earnest of them that above all I should mind things of Eternity such as alone can make me eternally Happy Herein I cannot but acknowledge your greatest Love tending to invest me with the greatest Happinesse returning you all thanks that so great a Benefit is worthy of Moreover to shew my entire Obedience to so important a Command I have here drawn up a few Heads touching the Greatest Happinesse and the Means whereby to procure it which I do with all humility present unto you as a Debt due to your self in regard I have extracted the principal Rules from the Rudiments which your constant Practice and wholesome Precepts had in my younger years infus'd in me The cause and object which alone can afford us this infinite Happinesse is the Summum Bonum whereunto we are to direct all our aim which that we may with successe attain unto are the continual Prayers of Your most affectionate and obedient Sonne Gedeon Harvey RELIGIO PHILOSOPHI OR Natural Theology The FIRST PART The fourth Book CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Natural Theology 1. What Theology is 2. That Theosophy is a fitter name to signifie the same which is here intended by Theology That in knowing God we become Philosophers 3. What a Habit is 4. What it is to live happily That there is a mean or middle way of living which is neither living in happiness or living in misery 5. How Theology is divided 6. What Natural Theology is What Supernatural Theology is The first Doubts of a natural man 7. The Dignity of Theology I. THEOLOGY is a habit of enjoying the greatest Good and living in the greatest Happiness This practick Science might from the eminence and transcendence of its end and object crave a more excellent name for Theology signifieth only a discourse of God and expresseth a Theoretick Science and therefore is too strict to adequate the whole and full concept of what is generally intended by Theology This name is fitter to be imposed upon the Doctrine of God as he is theoretically discoursed of in Pneamatology The parts of which Doctrine might be aptly denoted by Theology Angelology and Psychelogy whereas this noble Science is better expressed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or wisdome of God because wisdome comprehendeth an universal collection of all practick and theoretick Sciences all which we know by knowing God and we know them to be in and from God For do we not know that all natural Beings are in and from God they are in God because God comprehendeth and conserveth them in and by his Power Is not God the Pattern of our Actions And do we not know that our actions are good or evil from knowing them to have some likeness to his Actions or to be altogether different from them Do we not know our selves in knowing God wherefore without knowing God we know Nothing In knowing God to be the first Cause and Creator of all natural Beings we know Natural Philosophy and become Natural Philosophers In discerning good from evil in our actions by comparing them to the most perfect actions of God we attain to Moral Philosophy In knowing him to be the Being of Beings we reach to the knowledge of supernatural Philosophy or Metaphysicks
that which bendeth to it it argueth that it is good You may reject my definition of Good because according to it it follows that God is conserved by his creatures since he is known to bend to them In no wise for God doth not properly bend to his creatures because he is every where with them But Gods creatures may be properly said to bend to him because bending doth follow a need and want of conservation which need being in all his creatures but not in God they do bend to their Creator IV. To avoid falsities and errors in this nice point it will not be amisse for you to observe a distinction between these two predicates to be good and to do good These are oftentimes confounded by many Divines and so thereby they fall into gross errors To be good denotes a formality of good as it doth concur to the further constitution of a Being by its modality To do good is an action whereby effects are produced from a good Being Now these actions are called good because they proceed from a good Being and not because they are essentially good and constitute an essential difference from its Being So that good actions are signs of goodnesse in a Being and not the goodnesse it self To do good therefore is onely to act from a good principle and to give signs of the goodnesse of a Being This distinction proveth very usefull and expedient to the discussing of the doubts touching Free-will Annex to this observation that in a large sense Moral good is taken for good as it is defined above and extendeth to other creatures than unto man onely for this reason because Moral good as it is synonimous to a mean and inferiour good is become so to all in being changed from the highest good through the deffecting of man from his highest good to a mean or moral good In a strict sense it is taken for the goodnesse of man in his actions or manners onely V. How doth Moral Good turn to Moral Evil This Question may be variously understood First as good importeth a natural good in the second acception and as it denotes a goodnesse in the Being and not in its action in this sense moral good cannot change into moral evil because nothing doth corrupt it self I mean its own Being and Essence If moral good is taken for a moral good action then it is coincident with a true action which is such as God doth require from us and is conformable to that action in which God did create us I say in which for all beings are created to be in action and not through which because that specifieth Creation According to this acception then are morally good actions said to be such as are true or conformable to their Pattern If these actions are false and difformable from their Pattern then they become evil These actions do proceed from a free cause and not necessary for then man could never have committed any evil The freedome of this causality consisteth in an indifferency to Good and Evil. The state of man wheren he is at present is neutral that is natural which is a state neither supernatural or preternatural I prove it A supernatural state is wherein man is most good or consisteth of good in the highest degree A Preternatural state is wherein a man is at the worst or consisteth of evil in the lowest degree But a man in a natural state is neither most good nor worst in evil Therefore he must needs be in a neutral state VI. Man as he is in a natural state is in a middle state between super-natural and preter-natural I prove it is a property of a Middle or Medium to participate of both extreams But man in a natural state participates of both the others Ergo He is in a middle state I confirm the Minor The good which man doth act is not the best good neither is the evil which man acteth the worst evil for the Devils act worse Ergo It participateth somewhat of good in the highest degree and of evil in the worst Or the actions which a natural man performeth are neither the worst or the best Therefore it participates of each Another property of a natural or middle state is to have a disposition or capacity of becoming to be either of its extreams This I prove also to be in man as he is in this present state Many natural men are glorified and many are damned Ergo A natural man hath a disposition to either Moral Evil doth corrupt a man in that it partially destroyeth his perfection Moral Evil is either an Evil of the soul or body or of both CHAP. V. Of Theologick Good and Theologick Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Theologick Good 2. An Explication of the Definition of Theologick Evil. 3. What honest usefull and pleasant Good is 4. What Natural Sensible and Moral Good is 1. THeologick Good doth perfectionate a man in a supernatural state only For a natural man as long as he doth continue in a natural state cannot be theologically good or do a good act that is theologically good A supernatural state is wherein a man is above his natural state and is at his greatest perfection II. Theologick Evil is directly contrary to Theologick Good Neither is it possible that both these should be in one subject there being no greater contraries than Theologick Good and Theologick Evil. They are most remote from one another so that there is an infinite proportion of distance between them Theologick Evil doth make a man worst he cannot be worse than when he is theologically evil neither is there then any capacity or disposition remaining in him whereby he may be changed into Good So likewise a man who is Theologically Good hath no disposition to Theologick Evil. Theologick Good implieth a triple Good 1. It imports a Theological good cause or which doth make a man perfect in a supernatural state and so God is the only Theologick Good 2. It is taken for a Being which is theologically Good or for a Being which is at its greatest perfection and so may man in his entire state be termed Theologically Good 3. It may be understood for an action which is Theologically Good that is true and conformable to its pattern and of this Good is man also capable in a supernatural state The Theologick Good which is in God is called Good through it self or Bonum per se. This Bonum is otherwise called Summum Bonum objectivum or Beatitudo objectiva But the joy which we receive from that objective happinesse is called Beatitudo formalis The Theologick Good which was in all his creatures is a Derivative Good or Bonum per participationem The Peripateticks divide Good in that which is honest usefull and pleasant Honest Good Bonum bonestum is which is agreeable to Right Reason and therefore they say it is Desirable through it self 2. Useful Good is that which is desired for its
formally distinct from singulars p. 45. 3. Singulars are primum cognita p. 46. 4. Universals are notiora nobis ib. CHAP. XI Of the Extream Division of a Being 1. Another Division of a Being p. 48. 2. What the greatest or most universal is ib. 3. What the greater universal is ib. 4. What a less universal is ib. 5. What the least universal is ib. 6. How the fore-mentioned Members are otherwise called ib. CHAP. XII Of the Modes or Parts of a Being 1. What a Mode is Whence a Part is named a Part. Whence a Mode is termed a Mode The Scotch Proverb verified p. 49. 2. The Number and Kinds of Modes What an Essence or a whole being is p. 50. 3. That a Mode is the Summum Genus of all Beings and their Parts ib. 4. The vulgar Doctrine of Modes rejected ib. 5. That a Substance is a Mode of a Being p. 51. 6. That a Mode is an univocal Gender to a Substance and an Accident p. 52. 7. That a Substance is an Accident and all Accidents are Substances The difference between Subsistence and Substance ib. CHAP. XIII Of the Attributes of a Being 1. Why a property is so called p. 53. 2. The Difference which Authors hold between Passion and Attribute ib. 3. That Passion and Attribute as to their Names imply the same thing ib. 4. That Attributes are really the same with their Essence That all Attributes of a Being as they are united are the same with their Essence or Being p. 54. 5. That the Attributes are formally distinct from one another ib. 6. That that which we conceive beyond the Attributes of a Being is nothing ib. 7. What an Essence is ib. CHAP. XIV Of the Kinds and Number of the Attributes of a Being 1. Whence the Number of the Attributes of a Being is taken p. 55. 2. The Number of Attributes constituting a Being ib. 3. All Attributes are convertible one with the other and each of them and all of them in union with an Essence or Being ib. 4. That all the Attributes of a Being are equall in Dignity and Evidence ib. 5. That the Order of Doctrine concerning these Attributes is indifferent ib. CHAP. XV. Of Essence and Existence 1. That Essence and Existence are generally received for Principles p. 56. 2. That Essence is no Principle ib. 3. That Existence is no Principle ib. 4. That Existence is according to the opinion of the Author p 57. 5. That Existence is intentionally distinct from Essence ib. 6. That Essence is perfecter than Existence ib. 7. That Existence is formally distinct from Substance ib. CHAP. XVI Of Unity 1. That Unity superaddes nothing Positive to a Being p. 58. 2. What Unity is That Unity properly and per se implies a Positive accidently and improperly a Negative What is formally imported by Unity ib. 3. That Unity is illegally divided in unum per se and unum per accidens ib. CHAP. XVII Of Truth 1. Why Truth is called transcendent p. 59. 2. What Truth is ib. 3. An Objection against the definition of Truth That a Monster is a true being That God although he is the remote efficient Cause of a Monster neverthelesse cannot be said to be the Cause of evil p. 60. 4. Austin 's definition of Truth p. 61. 5. That Fashood is not definable How it may be described ib. CHAP. XVIII Of Goodness 1. What Goodness is The Improbation of several Definitions of Goodness p. 62. 2. The Difference between Goodness and perfection ib. 3. What evil is ib. 4. What the absolute active End of Goodness is ib. 5. That Goodness is improperly divided in Essential Accidental and Integral Goodness p. 63. 6. How Goodness is properly divided ib. 7. That the Division of Good in Honest Delectable c. doth belong to Ethicks ib. CHAP. XIX Of Distinction 1. The Authors description of Distinction That the privative sense of not being moved is a Note of Distinction whereby the understanding distinguishes a Non Ens from an Ens. That the Positive sense of being moved in another manner than another Ens moves the understanding is a Note of Distinction between one Being and another p. 63. 2. How Distinction is divided What a real Distinction is p. 64. 3. What a Modal difference is ib. 4. That the vulgar description of a real Distinction is erroneous ib. 5. That the terms of a Distinction between two or more real Beings are requisite both or more to exist p. 65. 6. That one term of Distinction although in Existence cannot be exally predicated of another not existent Oviedo and Hurtado reamined ib. 7. What a formal Distinction is à Parte actus and how otherwise called ib. 8. What a Distinctio Rationis is How otherwise called p. 67. CHAP. XX. Of Subsistence 1. What Subsistence is What it is to be through it self from it self and in it self p. 68. 2. That a Nature cannot be conservated by God without Subsistence That the Transubstantiation of Christs Body and Bloud into Bread and Wine according to the supposition of the Papists is impossible Oviedo 's Argument against this Position answered ib. 3. The kinds of Subsistences p. 69. 4. What Termination is ib. 5. What Perfection is ib. CHAP. XXI Of remaing modes of a Being 1. What Quantity is p. 70. 2. What the kinds of Quantity are ib. 3. What Quality is ib. 4. What Relation is ib. 5. What Action is ib. 6. What Paspon is ib. 7. What Situation is ib. 8. What Duration is ib. CHAP. XXII Of Causes 1. What a Cause is That the Doctrine of Causes belongeth to Metaphysicks p. 71. 2. Wherein a Cause and Principle differ ib. 3. What an internal Cause is What Matter is ib. 4. What a Form is and how it is divided p. 72. 5. What an external Cause is ib. CHAP. XXIII Of the Kinds of Causes 1. The Number of real Causes That a final Cause is no real Cause The Causality of Matter and Form p. 73. 2. The Division of an Efficient p. 74. 3. That an Efficient is erroneously divided in a procreating and conservating Cause ib. 4. That the Division of a Cause into Social and Solitary is illegal ib. 5. That the Division of an efficient Cause into Internal and External is absurd p. 75. 6. That all Forms are Material 77. 7. That there are no assistent Forms p. 78. CHAP. XXIV Of the Theorems of Causes 1. That a Cause and its Effects are co-existent p. 78. 2. That there are but three Causes of every Natural Being ib. 3. That there is but one Cause of every Being ib. 4. That all Beings are constituted by one or more Causes p. 79. 5. That all Causes are really univocal ib. 6. That all Natural Causes act necessarily ib. 7. That the Soul of a Beast acteth necessarily p. 80. 8. That all Matter hath a Form That Matter is capable of many Forms p. 81. The FIRST PART The Third Book CHAP. I. Of Powers according to the Peripateticks 1. THe Opinion of
freedom of will is quoad exercitium actus and what Libertas Contradictionis is ib. 3. What the second kind of freedom of will importeth p. 39. 4. That the speculative understanding in the act of speculation is practick ib. 5. That the will is not constrained to will a good thing although present but hath a power of rejecting it ib. 6. That the will willeth evil for an evil end That some men are worse than Devils p. 40. 7. What the will 's freedom is in specifying its acts ib. 8. What free-will is in refference to its faculty ib. 9. Velten rejected for asserting that the will is not indifferent to each contrary That the will is indifferent to each contradictory opposite p. 41. 10. That the will is free to act or not to act p. 42. 11. That the will is free to act upon particular objects whether good or evil The state of the controversie ib 12. That man as he is in a natural and corrupt state hath a free-will of doing a moral good or a moral evil act ib. 13. That man hath not a free-will of doing a theologick good act immediately through him self without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him p. 43. 14. Man hath a free-will of doing a theologick good act with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him That he hath a free-will of election ib. 15. That man as be is in a natural state hath a free-will through himself and without Gods extraordinary concurrence to procure Gods extraordinary concurrence and assistance to him in his actions That our being and conversation in it and all our actions depend from the ordinary concurrence of God Reasons why God did not conferre upon him an absolute power of acting without his ordinary concourse The cause of man's fall That that which is only morally good will prove theologick evil at last ib. 44. 16. Arguments to prove a free-will in man A reconciliation of the Calvinists with the Arminians That man hath a rement of theologick good surving in him The state of the controversie The division of it 45 c. CHAP. X. Of Free-will from Scripture 1. Objections from Scripture against man's free-will p. 48. 2. An Answer to the said Objections p. 49. 3. Objections proving that moral good is evil ib. 4. The first Objection answered p 50. 5. The second Objection removed ib. 6. Some other Texts produced against free-will in man p 51. 7. The first Text reconciled ib. 8. The second Objection removed 52. 9. Arguments deduced from faith An answer to the said Arguments ib. 10. The first Argument drawn from Scripture to prove man's free-will to good and evil p. 53. 11. A second Argument proving the same ib. 12. A third Argument ib. 13. Many other Texts inferring the same p. 54. 14. Texts proving a remnant of good in man ib. 15. Texts proving that a natural man cannot do a theologick good act through himself and being only assisted with the ordinary concurss of God ib. 16. Scriptures inferring that a supernatural man hath no free-will to direct contraries that is to do theologick good and evil An answer to some Texts produced by Bellarmin p. 55 56. 17. Scripture proofs concluding that the means whereby God's extraordinary concurrence is procured is in man and adheres to his free-will p. 57. 18. Whether man's actions performed with God's extraordinary assistance are to be taken for the actions of God or of man ib. 19. A reconciliation of the ninth to the Romans The unfolding of Predistination or of God's eternal Decree p. 58 c. CHAP. XI Of the Command of the Will 1. Whether the will can be forced 64. 2. What elicited and imperated acts are p. 65. 3. What command the will exreciseth over the inferiour faculties What a politick and despotick command is ib. 4. That the irascible and appetitive faculty are under a politick obedience to the will p. 66. 5. That the locomotive faculty is not alwayes under a servile obedience to the will ib. 6. That the will doth not command over the practick understanding ib. CHAP XII Of Voluntary and Involuntary 1. That the Understanding as it is speculative and practick is the internal principle of the ultimate and intermediate actions That God or Angels are improperly said to be external principles That God is the coefficient of man's actions How Angels whether good or evil Wizords and Witches concur to the specification of man's actions p 67. 2. What a humane action is p. 68. 3. That it is absurd to assert man to do a thing ignorantly ib. 4. Whether evils of omission through ignorance are to be termed involuntary ib. 5. How humane actions are divided p. 65 c. CHAP. XIII Of Natural Faith 1. That Faith is the sole means through which we are to attain to our greatest good What Faith is The Definition confirmed by Arguments deduced from reason p. 70. 2. The two-fold object of Faith A proof from reason that God is the Creator of man That God and Nature are one p. 71. 3. An enquiry into the end of man's creation p. 72. 4. That man doth know the summe of God's Law through the light of Nature A summary enumeration of the Law of God as it is imprinted upon every man's heart ib. 73. 5. Moral virtues compared with the moral Law A comprehension of all moral virtues p. 74 75. CHAP. XIV Of Man's Fall and of Atheism 1. A rational enquiry into man's primitive estate The manner of man's fall p. 76 2. Grounds whence a man may rationally collect hopes for his restoration p. 77. 3. That Atheism is the worst of sins and that an Atheist is unable of performing the least good act Wherein the goodness of an action doth consist ib. 78. 4. A character of an Atheist That confirmed Atheism is the onely sin against the holy Ghost A full discovery of an Atheist ib. 79. CHAP. XV. Of the Means and Manner of Man's Escape and Restauration 1. What is requisite for a man to consider in order to his escape and restitution p. 83. 2. How a man may naturally find out a means tending to his restitution ib. 3. The description of God's mercy 84. 4. The explanation of the precedent description p. 85. 5. The act through which God's mercy doth succour a natural soul in her contention ib. CHAP. XVI Of the Light and Darknesse of Man's practick Understanding 1. That Light and Darknesse are analogal to principles of Good and Evil. p. 86. 2. Queries concerning Light and Darknesse ib. 3. The two kinds of Light What the first Light is and how it produceth the second Light ib. 4. What the Habit of Light is That the first Man acted without Habits How a Habit is acquired ib. 5. That the first Man acted through a natural disposition and not through any Habits p 87. CHAP. XVII Containing rational discoveries of Man's primitive and second estate 1. That Man was created most perfect A proof from reason inferring God to be a
in the understanding to a real being Ergo its Essence is derived from thence for had there never been a real being there could not have been an Objective being A real being is the foundation of an objective being because it is referred to a real being Neither is this properly a foundation because an objective being can exist without a real being so that a real being is rather to be supposed as a conditio sine qua non or a Pattern of an objective Being if a Pattern then it is no foundation for a thing abstracted from that Pattern doth exist when the Pattern is abolisht We may see the Picture or Representation of Alexander although he hath long since quitted his real Being According to this we may Metaphorically define an objective Being to be a Picture of a Real Being painted in the Mind The said Smigl in the next Page recals his Notion and doth again affirm the contrary with as little Proof as the other was Ens Rationis formaliter non potest esse nisi cognoscatur Primo probatur in iis entibus Rationis quae sine ullo fundamento finguntur ab Intellectu ut Hirco-cervus Mark he allowes some Beings not to be inherent in a Basis whereas before he granted that all beings were fundamentally but he could not tell whether their foundation was the understanding or Realities from which they were abstracted If he took the Understanding to be the Foundation of an Ens Rationis then he confounds the foundation of a being and the Subject of it into one Notion for the understanding is properly the Subject of an Objective Being and not its Foundation which rather may be attributed to the real Impression upon which an Objective Likeness is founded Nevertheless supposing his mistakes to be true and allowing either of these Acceptions he contradicts himself For here he asserts That an Objective Being cannot be formally unless it is actually understood before he saith that it can be fundamentally that is inherent in the understanding or else in the first Impression of a Real Being take him either way in the understanding before it is known Can there be any thing in the understanding but what is understood If there may then the understanding is no understanding neither will this Excuse in saying that a Being is fundamentally one and formally one for to be fundamental includes a Formality in a Foundation 2. He affirms That the Fiction of a Hirco-cervus hath no foundation which is erroneous also for it is grounded or doth properly resemble a real Buck or a Stagge upon a real Buck and a real Stagge The like Contradictions are frequent throughout the whole Dispute Whether an Objective Being is only proper to the understanding If an Objective Being is a Being because it is intelligible it is necessarily only appropriated to the understanding As for a being in the will or rational Appetite it is as all desires or beings desired are appropriated to the understanding because the understanding and will are formally one as to the Rational Faculty neither can the Will will any thing unless it be first represented in the understanding Sensitive Powers cannot frame an ens rationis because their proper Object is a Real Being CHAP. VII The Manner of Forming an Objective Being 1. That all Formations of an Ens Rationis are single That the Second Operation of the Understanding is the same in Specie with the first A Division of an Objective Being into Single and Complexe 2. That a non Ens cannot be known Two Acceptions of a Non Ens. ALL Formations of an Ens Rationis are from a single and first Operation of the understanding Wherefore hereby I would infer that the Speculation of the understanding upon these two Impressions upon the Phansie is one formally and numerically but the acts of impressing of the understanding are many differing only materially 2. That the first Operation of the mind which here I take for an Act or Impression of an Idea by the understanding upon the Phansie is no wise formally different from another as the Second or Third may be succedent upon it Hence I infer the Division of an objective Being into a single objective and complexe Objective Being What they are may be collected from the Precedents A Non Ens cannot be known because it cannot be impressed for it hath no Figure We say It or That Quiddam is a Non Ens not because we know that Quiddam which we speak of to be a Non ens for a quiddam and a non ens are Contradictories but because we conceive that quiddam not to be like to another quiddam which we had expected it should have been like to and therefore we say it or that quiddam is a non ens so that a non ens in that signification is only a difference of one being from another and in this sense we say one thing is not another as a man is no Beast or no bestial thing that is is a nothing bestial non ens bestiale or not that which doth represent a Beast 2. A Non Ens is taken for that which hath no Resemblance to any thing real nor consequently to any thing we can know for we can know nothing but what hath a resemblance to a real being wherefore we call a non ens that which cannot or doth not move our sense or understanding A non ens reale is that which cannot or doth not move our cognoscible faculty from without A non ens objectivum is whatsoever cannot or doth not move our understanding from within So that a non esse implies little more then quies rest of the understanding from Action hapning through a not moving non-cognoscibility CHAP. VIII Of the Formality of a Real Being 1. What a Real Being is according to the Author The Derivation of res and aliquid That it is very improper to call it a real Being The Cause of that Denomination 2. That the Phansie is the immediate Subject of an Ens Reale 3. That the Understanding is only the Mediate Subject of Real Beings A Real Being is that which move the understanding from without Res and Synonima's of a real being For it is called Real from Res and aliquid from aliud quid Let us enquire why Res and Aliquid should more be Synonima's to a being from without then to an Objective being Certainly Res and Aliquid rather imply a being in general then any of its Species in particular And it is probable that Ens was framed out of Res by leaving out the R and placing N. between E and S. How absurd is it then to say Ens Reale which is the same as if you said Ens Ens. For Reale is nothing else but an Adjective changed out of the Substantive res Aliquid might rather be called unumquid and it is likely that it was first so called which others probably did change out of a wantonness of Speech coveting new words and rejecting old
may demand to what Science or Art it belongeth to treat of final Causes I answer That they are treated of in Logick and Moral Philosophy but in a different manner Logick discourseth of final Causes as Notions thereby to direct the understanding in enquiring into the truth of things and Ethicks treats of them as they are dirigible to Good and Happiness III. An Efficient Cause is erroneously divided in a procreating and conservating Cause A procreating cause is by whose force a being is produced A conservating cause is by whose vertue a being is conservated in its Essence I prove that this Division is not real but objective only The dividing Members of a real division must be really distinct from one another But these are not really distinct c. Ergo. The Major is undeniable I confirm the Minor All beings are conservated by the same Causes by which they were procreated Therefore really the same I prove the Antecedence Nutritive causes are conservant causes But Nutritive causes are the same with Procreative causes Ergo. The Minor is evidenced by a Maxim Iisdem nutrimur quibus constamus We are nourished by the same causes by which we do subsist or have our Essence Wherefore Nutritive or Conservant Causes are really for by Nutriture we are conservated or a parte rei the same differing only objectively a parte actus Here you may answer that these Instances are of material causes but not of Efficients To this I reply That no cause can be a conservative cause but a Material Cause As for an Efficient cause I prove it to be no conservating cause That which conservateth a being must conservate its essence namely Matter and Form but Matter and Form are conservated only internally by apposition of that which is like to what was dissipated or which is like to themselves Wherefore an Efficient can be no conservating cause because it acteth only externally or from without A being might be conservated externally if its impairment did befal it from without that is from an external Agent which is only accidental to it An efficient then may Logically be called a conservative cause per Accidens IV. An Efficient is likewise divided in solitary and social A solitary Efficient is which produceth an effect alone or without the assistance of another cause A social cause is which produceth an effect joyntly with another As two Watermen rowing in one Boat are social causes of the moving of the Boat through the water This Division is no less illegal then the other I prove it All beings act alone and in unity as far as they are Causes and although two or more concur to the effect of a being yet they two act formally but as one and their Ratio Agendi is one Ergo formally they are but one as far as they are Causes yet in the foresaid instance as they are men they are two which duplicity is accidental to a cause The same Argument may be urged against the division of a cause in a cause perse and a cause per Accidens in univocal and equivocal in universal and particular V. An Efficient is Internal or External An Internal Efficient is which produceth an effect in it self An external Efficient is which produceth an effect in another This division is stranger then any of the rest The strangeness consisteth in this that thereby a being is capable to act upon it self and consequently upon its like Which if so what can it effect but that which was before It cannot produce a distinct being because it doth not act distinctly but identificatively This granted infers That the Soul being the internal cause of its Faculties as they affirm cannot produce any thing but what is like to it self Consequently that the Faculties are identificated with the soul and thence that a Substance is an Accident and an Accident a Substance 2. A Substance acting upon it self that is upon its sibi simile like for what is more like to a Substance then it self produceth a distinct effect and not its like which is another absurdity following the forementioned Division Iâ— will also follow hence that a substance doth act immediately through it self which is against their own Dictates To remove this last Objection they answer that a Substance may or can and doth act immediately through it self by emanation but can or doth not act by transmutation They describe an emanative action to be whereby an effect is produced immediately without the intervent of an Accident This description doth not distinguish Transmutation from Emanation for transmutation is also whereby an effect is produced without the intervent of an Accident and so transmutation may be as immediate to its Agent as emanation If there is any difference it is this in that emanation is an action not terminating or influent upon any other being but in and upon it self Transmutation is the Termination of its Influence upon another being Pray tell me why emanation may not be as properly called transmutation as not for there is no effect but which is different from its cause and changed by its cause For if it is not changed it remaines the cause still Ergo Emanation is also a Transmutation The Faculties of the Soul are said to be emanative effects Ergo they must be its understanding Faculty only for this only doth not terminate in any other being but in it self As for the other Faculties to wit vital and sensitive they are effects of the soul terminated in other beings Ergo These are no emanative Actions as they affirm them to be That which hath the most probability of being an emanative action and distinct from transmutation is the understanding faculty of the Soul Neither is this action distinct from Transmutation That which doth change the soul is an Object but the soul of it self alone doth not act or cannot act upon it self unless it be changed by an Object for were there no Object the Souls Rational Faculty would be nothing and frustraneous wherefore it is generally held that Angels when created had also notions or species which are objects concreated with their understanding Ergo emanative actions are also transmutative All matter is transient Wherefore the division of matter in transient and immanent is erroneous Transient matter is out of which a being is constituted by transmutation so bloud is the transient matter of flesh Immanent matter is out of which a being is constituted without any transmutation as Wood is the immanent matter of a Ship Here one part of the division is referred to a Natural Production the other to artificial How is this then a regular distribution since its dividing Members ought to be of one Species or kind The same Improbation may be applied against the distribution of matter in sensible and intelligible which distinctions are accidental to matter and therefore may be justly omitted for we ought to insert nothing in a Science but what doth essentialy relate to its Subject Hence Aristotles Precept is in
1 B. of the Parts of Liv. Creat C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we ought to divide a being by them parts which are contained in its essence and not by its Accidents The division of Matter in Metaphysical and Physical may be rejected upon the same ground These divisions as they are objective appertain to Logick where only second notions are treated of and are very useful to the directing of Reason VI. Forms are divisible in material and immaterial If material is understood to be that which doth inhere in matter which is its most frequent and ordinary acception for most Philosophers take it in that sense then all worldly beings are material what being is there but which doth inhere in Matter You may say mans soul. The soul of man according to this acception is material But if you take immaterial for that which can or doth exist out of matter then there are immaterial forms Neither can this be naturally for a Natural Form is which giveth an actual specification and numerication to matter If so how can a form give an actual Specification and numerication to matter when it is not united to it I prove that the Form giveth an actual specification and numerication to matter Forma dat esse i. e. Specif Numer non posse esse materiae A Form giveth a being not a power of being to Matter For matter hath the power of being from it self and not from the Form This is true for most Peripateticks hold that Potentia is essential to matter The Soul of man when once freed from its tye to the body ceases to be a Form but therefore doth not cease to continue a being So that I conclude there are immaterial beings but no immaterial Forms It is ridiculous to doubt whether the Soul of man when separated hath an Appetite or Inclination to its Body or to that matter which it did once informate because the soul in its separated estate is a compleat and perfect being and doth not need a Body neither is the Soul a Form in that state Wherefore should it then have an Appetite to its Body Such an Appetite would be in vain You may answer that it wanteth a Subject to inhere or subsist in I grant it and therefore it subsisteth in God VII A Form is improperly divided in an assistent and informating Form because one being is satisfied with one Form for had it two forms it would be a double being 2. That which they intend by an assistent form is coincident with an Efficient Cause CHAP. XXIV Of the Theorems of Causes 1. That a Cause and its Effects are co-existent 2. That there are but three Causes of every Natural Being 3. That there is but one Cause of every Being 4. That all Beings are constituted by one or more Causes 5. That all Causes are really univocal 6. That all Natural Causes act necessarily 7. That the Soul of a Beast acteth necessarily 8. That all Matter hath a Form That Matter is capable of many Forms I. A Cause and its Effect are existent at one and the same time This Theorem is received among most Philosophers who render it thus Posita Causa ponitur Effectus The Cause being stated that is reduced into action its Effect is also stated or produced The Reason depends upon their relation one to the other to whose Relata it is proper to exist at one and the same time according to that trite Maxim Relata mutuo sese ponunt tollunt Relations do constitute and abolish one another II. There are three Causes of every Natural Being whereof one reduced to Action supposeth the others also to be reduced to action The Proof of this is demonstrated by the same Axiom by which the next forementioned was inferred III. There is but one Cause of all Beings A Cause here is taken in a strict sense for that which produceth an effect essentially and really distinct from it self In this Acception is an efficient the only cause of all Beings Matter and Form are no Causes according to this Interpretation but Principles because they do not constitute an effect essentially different from themselves A Cause sometime is taken in a strict sense for that which produceth an Effect different from it self modally and so there are two to wit Matter and Form Lastly A cause as it signifieth in a middle signification participating of each acception comprehends a triplicity of causes viz. An Efficient Matter and Form IV. All beings are constituted by one or more Causes God is of himself and not from any other as from an efficient cause and consisteth of one pure formal cause By formal Cause understand an immaterial being Angels are constituted by two Causes namely by an Efficient and a Form All other Beings are constituted by more V. All Causes are univocal This is to be understood of Efficients only Whatever Effect a Cause produceth it is like to its Form and is formal only For it cannot generate matter that being created Wherefore it cannot produce any thing else but what like to it self and consequently produceth alwaies the same effect whereas an equivocal cause should produce different effects You may demand why it hapneth that many effects are different as we observe in the Sun which by its heat doth produce Vegetables and Animals which are different I answer that the Difference doth result from the diversity of the Matter upon which it acteth and not from the causality that being ever one and the same The diversity of Effects is accidental to the Efficient and therefore not to be allowed of in Sciences VI. All Natural Causes act Necessarily Hence derives this Maxim Natura nunquam errat Nature doth never erre because she acts necessarily Against this Maxim may be objected that Nature erreth in generating a Monster This is no Errour of Nature It might rather be imputed an Errour if when it should produce a Monster it doth not That which acts after the same manner at all times doth not erre But Nature doth act in the same manner at all times Ergo she doth never erre I prove the Minor If she acts differently at any time it is in a Monster But she doth not act differently in a Monster as in the example forenamed of a Dog without Legs she doth through the Efficient cause educe a form out of the matter which she extendeth according to the extent of the subjected matter the matter therefore being deficient in quantity it is accidental to Nature if thereby a being is not brought to the likeness of its Species The Soul of man may be considered either 1. As a Natural Cause and so it acteth also necessarily in giving a Being and Life to the Body For as long as it abideth in the body it cannot but give Life to its Parts 2. As it is above a Natural Cause in that it hath a power of acting voluntarily without the Necessity or Impulse of Nature VII The Soul of a Beast doth act
adorned with that variety of Accidents it is probable that Nature hath bestowed them for Action say they and not for nought They do not only allow one power to a Substance which might suffice but a multitude yea as many as there are varieties of acts specifically differing from one another effected through a Substance This leaneth upon an Argument of theirs thus framed The Soul being indifferent to divers Acts there must be somthing superadded by which it is determined to produce certain Acts. Neither is this Opinion deficient in Authorities of Learned Philosophers Averrhoes Thomas Aq. Albertus magn Hervaeus Apollinaris and others consenting thereunto Dionysius also in his Book concerning divine Names teacheth that Celestial Spirits are divisible into their Essence Vertue or Power and Operation III. The said powers are not only affixt to the Souls Essence but are also formally and really distinct from it They are perswaded to a formal distinction because else we might justly be supposed to will when we understand and to understand when we will or to tall when we smell and so in all others They are moved to a real distinction by reason that all powers in a Substance are really distinct from its Matter and Form Weight and Lightness which are Powers inherent in the Elements whereby they encline to the Center or decline from it are not the Matter of Earth and Fire nor their forms and therefore they are really distinct from their Essence IV. These Powers are concreated with the soul and do immediately flow from her Essence An Argument whereby to prove this is set down by Thom. Aq. among his Quaest. Powers are accidentary forms or Accidents properly belonging to their Subject and concreated with it giving it also a kind of a being It is therefore necessary that they do arise as Concomitants of its Essence from that which giveth a substantial and first being to a Subject Zabarel de Facult an Lib. 1. Cap. 4. sheweth the dependance of the powers from the Soul to be as from their efficient cause from which they do immediately flow not by means of a transmutation or Physical Action which is alwaies produced by motion Others add that the Soul in respect to its faculties may be also counted a Material Cause because it containeth her faculties in her self and a final Cause the faculties being allotted to her as to their End V. Immaterial Powers are inherent in the Soul as in their agent or fountain Material Faculties as the Senses Nourishing Faculty and the like are inserted in the Matter yet so far only as it is animated Hence doth Aristotle call the latter Organical Powers from their inherence in the Organs VI. Powers are distinguisht through their Acts and Objects to which they tend and by which they are moved to act For example Any thing that is visible moveth the fight and is its proper Object which doth distinguish it from the other Senses and Powers which are moved by other Objects Thus far extends the Doctrine of Aristotle touching Powers which although consisting more in Subtilities and Appearances then Evidences and Realities notwithstanding I thought meet to expose to your view since most Modern Authors do persist in the same and thence to take occasion to examine the Contents thereof in these brief subsequent Positions By the way I must desire the Reader to remember that the distinction of Powers from their Subject is commonly treated of in the Doctrine of the Soul and solely applied to it there being not the least doubt made of it elsewhere Wherefore I have also proposed the same as appliable to the Soul but nevertheless shall make further enquiry into it so far as it doth concern all Matters in general CHAP. II. Of all the usual Acceptions of Power 1. The Etymology of Power The Synonima's of Power 2. The various Acceptions of Power 3. What a Passive Natural Power and a Supernatural Passive or Obediential Power is 4. Various Divisions of Power I. THe unfolding the name is an Introduction to the knowledge of the thing it self and therefore it will not be amiss to give you the Etymology of Power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I can or have in my power So Potentia from Possum signifying the same Power in English hath its original from Pouvoir in French noting the like viz. to can or be able Power Vertue Might Strength and Faculty are Synonima's or words of one Interpretation Thus of â—ntimes we make enquiry what Vertue Strength Power or Faculty hath such or such an Herb that is what can it effect II. The Acception of the word Power is very ambiguous 1. Sometime it is understood passively for a disposition whereby a Substance is apt to receive the strength of an Agent 2. Actively for that through which a being can act 3. It s signification doth vary much according to the Subject which it doth respect as when we say a being in power that is a being which is not actually but yet may or can be So likewise a Cause in power is which doth not actually produce an effect but which can produce one Zabarel remarketh a double Acception of Power 1. Improperly it is taken for a Power which is joyned to its Act Thus we say of a man who actually walketh that he can walk 2. Properly it is attributed only to a Power which doth precede its Act Thus we say a man is a Logician when he can be one III. A Passive Power as it is capable to receive a Natural Act is called a disposition As it may receive a Supernatural Act that is an Act from a Supernatural Cause it is then named an Obediential Power The Power which was inherent in Lots Wife of receiving the Form of a Pillar of Salt was an Obediential Power IV. Again those Powers are either Natural Violent or Neutral A Natural Power is such which is agreeable to its Nature as the power in Fire of ascending is Natural to it A violent power is which is disagreeing to the Nature of its Subject as in fire there is a violent Power of moving downward A Neutral power is which is neither the one or the other but participates of both Such is the power in fire of moving circularly A Power may be understood either for a Logical power which is nothing else but a non-repugnance or for a Physical power which is the same with a Natural disposition or for a Moral Power which is nothing else but the Will Lastly in Metaphysicks it is that which is presupposed to be in an actus entitativus There is also mention made in Philosophy of an Objective Power which is not much different from a Non-repugnance or a Logical Power but expresly it is a Possibility of existing in a being which the understanding doth give it before its Existence Many more Additions of Power might be proffered as that a Power is either Created or Increated Accidental or Substantial
Whether a man hath a free-will or a remnant of theologick good in him whereby he may procure God's extraordinary assistance through himself or whether God doth stirre up that spark of Good being moved through his own mercy and not by what can proceed from man for many hold that man hath no spark of Good remaining in him and consequently cannot be thence supposed to have a free-will to beg God's extraordinary assistance but it is God who doth out of his singular goodnesse free-will and pleasure towards singular men cast and infuse a measure of theologick good in them through which they are made capable of having accesse to God and of praying to him and this they say Scripture implies by a new creation regeneration conversion or the becoming of a new man No doubt but this latter tenent is erroneous and absurd First They affirm That man hath no spark of theologick good remaining in him This is false as hath been proved already and shall be demonstrated more at large elsewhere Secondly Hereby they imply that man doth alwayes act evil and consequently acteth evil necessarily without a free-will And wherein doth he then differ from a Beast Thirdly Should God cast his mercy or goodnesse upon that which is altogether evil it followeth that God should love that which is altogether evil but that is repugnant to God's nature that being most good doth necessarily reject that from it which is most evil Fourthly Should God stirre up that spark of Good in man it proveth that that Good is of no efficacy and for no purpose which is repugnant to common reason concluding that all things which are are for to operate and for an end and are not in vain Therefore this spark of Good doth and can operate for an end to save it self and glorifie God especially being accompanied with God's ordinary concurrence it is directly as by a guide led to God's extraordinary concurrence and assistance So then if there be a spark of theologick Good remaining in man as without doubt there is it is of the same Nature with that which was in the first man before his fall who having a free-will to good and evil infers that this spark must necessarily retain the same free-will to good and evil but in an improportionable manner since that man's will is much more habituated to evil which doth much dead that weak remnant of good in him It is certain God doth equally impart his mercy and goodnesse to natural men because they are of an equal state Then again I object If so then all men would become theologically Good which is erroneous Wherefore I say God is no more good or mercifull to one natural man than to another and consequently there must be somewhat in men whereby one doth move God to mercy before another and what is that but that spark of Good Notwithstanding this inference holds good only ordinarily and doth not infer but that God extraordinarily may be pleased out of his free-will and pleasure to conferre bounties and mercies upon those to whom he will be bountifull and mercifull XVI 5. It is a simple Question to demand Whether the will is free at that instant when it acteth which is as much as if you enquired Whether the act of the will were free Certainly there can be no freedom allotted to the act or effect of an efficient for that followeth necessarily Posita causa ponitur effectus The cause being stated the effect is also stated By the act of the will I mean the consent of the will or the last execution of it which is named Actus imperatus But if the Question be understood De actu eliciendo then no doubt but the will is free at the same instant when it acteth for when would it be free else were it not when it acteth This Query may be apprehended thus Whether the will is free that is Whether it doth not act necessarily è suppositione Necessitas è suppositione is through which the will cannot act otherwise than it acteth when it doth act According to this supposition it doth act necessarily Nam impossibile est idem simul esse non esse For it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at the same instant Neverthelesse this doth not clip any whit from the freedom of man's will for freedom of the will is properly in actum eliciendo and in actum imperando but not in actu elicito vel imperato that is before the act is consented unto for the will before she consenteth to any act can determinate it freely to either opposite In short the will is free in its faculty but its acts are necessary CHAP. X. Of Free-will from Scripture 1. Objections from Scripture against man's free-will 2. An Answer to the said Objections 3. Objections proving that moral good is evil 4. The first Objection answered 5. The second Objection removed 6. Some other Texts produced against free-will in man 7. The first Text reconciled 8. The second Objection removed 9. Arguments deduced from faith An answer to the said Arguments 10. The first Argument drawn from Scripture to prove man's free-will to good and evil 11. A second Argument proving the same 12. A third Argument 13. Many other Texts inferring the same 14. Texts proving a remnant of good in man 15. Texts proving that a natural man cannot do a theologick good act through himself and being only assisted with the ordinary concurss of God 16. Scriptures inferring that a supernatural man hath no free-will to direct contraries that is to do theologick good and evil An answer to some Texts produced by Bellarmin 17. Scripture proofs concluding that the means whereby God's extraordinary concurrence is procured is in man and adheres to his free-will 18. Whether man's actions performed with God's extraordinary assistance are to be taken for the actions of God or of man 19. A reconciliation of the ninth to the Romans The unfolding of Predestination or of God's eternal Decree I. THe precedent Dispute touching Free-will is not so much held among natural men as between them who conceive themselves to be gifted As for the first I have already endeavoured to satisfie them And as for these last they alledging sacred Texts for their opinions plead with more force than the former Wherefore it will not be amisse to examine their Arguments and afterwards to produce such others as most orthodox Divines do urge for the proof of their tenents The first Scripture which they seem to produce against us is that in the Prov. 16. 9. A mans heart deviseth his way but the Lord directeth his steps And in Chap. 21. 1. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord as the Rivers of water he turneth it whither soever he will And in the next fore-going Chapter vers 24. Mans goings are of the Lord how can a man then understand his own way Jer. 10. 23. O Lord I know that the way of man is not in himself it
free-will might be allowed and yet not be repugnant to Gods fore-knowledge for thought he doth God fore-know our actions then man must act necessarily and consequently infers the truth of Fate but since he could not grant a Fate over men because he saw they acted contingently therefore he did impiously rob God of his fore-knowledge Hence saith Austin de Civ D. Lib. 5. cap. 9. Atque it a dum vult facere liberos fecit sacrilegos and so since he endeavoureth to make men free-willers he makes them commit sacriledge As for this doubt it is little touched upon by Christians who certainly know that God fore-knoweth contingent things as contingent and to fall out contingently Necessary things as necessary and to fall out necessarily Psalm 33. 14. 1 Sam. 10. 9 26. Prov. 21. 1. Exod. 12. 13. Prov. 16. 33. Matth. 10. This subject is very well treated of by Anselmus in his Book of God's fore-knowledge and predestination This by the way And now I return to prove that God's Predestination is in no wise coactive upon the will of man for then the will of man would be a not willing Voluntas esset noluntas God is most just in predestinating man through Election and of his grace and mercy to salvation Eph 1. 5 6. and in predestinating others through reprobation and of his justice to damnation 2 Cor. 13. 5. Because his predestination is founded upon his fore-knowledge God therefore fore-knowing the evil wherein man is enhardened doth predestinate him to damnation This I prove God damneth man of his justice and God's justice hath a particular respect to man's evil actions Wherefore it is of God's justice and for man's sinne or evil actions that he is damned That God's justice hath a particular respect to judge and punish man with damnation for his sins the Scripture doth evidently testifie Luc. 12. 47 48. Aud that servant which knew his Lords will and prepared not himself neither did according to his will shall be beaten with many stripes Ergo Man is punished for not doing the Lord's will and not because he was predestinated without God's fore-knowledge of his evil and unbelief Matth. 11. 21. Mat. 25. 41 42. Here Christ pronounceth the sentence of everlasting damnation against the wicked because they had not done his will in feeding the hungry and cloathing the naked Gen. 2. 17. Deut. 7. 26. Exod. 32. 33. So then if God doth damn man onely for his trespasses and sinnes he doth also for the same reason predestinate him to damnation Again Were God's predestination the sole and first moving cause of mans reprobation then Adam could have had no free-will of remaining in the state of innocency or of deflecting to the state of sinne but must necessarily and coactively have deflected to the state of depravation because God had predestinate him to it This assertion is impious Ergo God's predestination is not the first moving cause of man's reprobation What should God predestinate man to damnation without fore-knowing his guilt or without being thereunto moved through the fore-knowledge of his sinne then these Texts would be written to no purpose Hos. 6. 6. Ephes. 4. 22 23 24 c. John 3. 16 17 18. John 3. 36. Rom. 9. 22 23. Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked turn from his way and live Turn ye turn ye from your evil wayes for why will ye die O house of Israel Wherefore it is not of God's purpose to damn any unlesse being moved to it of his justice through their unbelief Likewise the Scripture doth reveal that predestination to life eternal is of God's grace and justice being thereunto moved by the saith of the righteous Mat. 9. 22. Rom. 4. 20 21. Ephes. 3. 12. Mat. 9. 2. Gal. 2. 20. Ephes. 2. 8 9. First Summarily I say that God's Will Decree and Predestination is the efficient cause of Reprobation and Election his grace mercy and justice are the moving causes Man's unbelief and belief are the objects of this motion in which or upon which and by which the fore-mentioned moving causes are moved which objects God fore-knowing determinates mans salvation or damnation from all eternity Wherefore we may observe that in many places of Scripture where predestination is held forth that God's fore-knowledge of mans belief or unbelief doth precede Rom. 8. 29. For whom he did fore-know he also predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son What can be more evident Secondly Faith or good works for saith it self is the best of works and the fountain of all good works are the means whereby we are saved yet it is not faith or good works which dâ— meritoriously or efficiently save us but God is the efficient cause of our salvation Rom. 4. 6. So likewise unbelief which is the worst of works and the original of all evil works and sins or Atheismis the means through which we are damned yet it is not that which is the principal moving cause of our damnation but God's justice which doth reject and predestinate man to damnation Rom. â— 8. Thirdly God's will is either absolute whereby he can will all things and this is concomitant to Gods absolute power whereby he can do all things although they never are effected for if he can do them he hath also a power of willing them although he doth not will all them things which he can will or his ordained will whereby he willeth that which he doth will This ordained will is unchangeable hence God is said to have loved because he loved that is when God willeth to love he cannot but love because he willeth it and therefore his will is unchangeable God's ordained will is that man shall be saved through his belief and therefore cannot but save a believer because his will endureth for ever and is unchangeable Wherefore I said in the first Assertion That man's belief moved God's mercy because God hath willed it through his ordained will otherwise were it not for this what could man's belief avail in meriting salvation for at the best we are but unprofitable servants Luc. 17. 10. and so man's unbelief moveth God's justice to damne him because God willeth justice Wherfore I conceive that belief and unbelief are remote moving causes as from us by which we move God's mercy and justice And that God's mercy and justice are moving causes as from himself Fourthly Man hath then a power of disposing and preparing himself partially to and for the admission of God's extraordinary concurss and to a conversion from the state of sinne to the state of grace for to what effect or end would all the reachings of Ministers serve All their exhortations their labour and pains would be to no purpose 1. They strive to bend men into a care for their salvation by working that carnal security out of them according to that of Acts 2. 37. 16. 33. 2. They lay the Law
observe that nature is the Seal and Impression of Gods Will and Omnipotence upon every being through which they are that which they are Hence Nature is called the Hand of God Hence it is also called the Order and universal Government among all natural beings through which one being doth depend upon the other and is useful and necessary to the other This is evident in many moving living Creatures as most Cattel whose dependance and Preservation is from and through Vegetables as from Herbs their 's again is from the juyce of the earth and that from a mixture of all the Elements The same subordinate use and good is also observed among all other beings in the world Hence nature is called the strength and vertue of a being for their strength and vertue is nothing else but an actual disposition and propension in beings In this sense we say the nature of fire is to levitate of earth to gravitate IV. I did rather chuse to say a natural being then a natural body for to avoid an improperty of speech because a body is properly and ordinarily taken for matter and so we usually say that man consisteth of a Soul and body and that a natural being consisteth of a form and body or matter Neither is it a motive rather for to say a natural body then a natural being because a being is of too large an extent for a being is restricted from that Latitude of signification by adding natural V. After the exposition of this Definition of nature it will not be amiss to compare that of Aristotles to it Nature is the Principle of Motion and rest of a being wherein it is existent through it self and not by accident It was the Opinion of Aristotle that nature was a substance and nevertheless here he seemeth to make an Accident of it for that which acteth immediately through it self is not a substance but an Accident because according to his dictates a substance doth not act immediately through it self but through its accidents if then a natural being acteth through its nature that is its Matter and Form then nature must be an accident and consequently matter and form are also accidents which he did in no wise intend 2. Suppose that nature were a substance it would be absurd to assert that a natural being did act through a substance of rest and motion which doth inhere in it self for then there would be a penetration of bodies and an Identification of Subsistencies You may reply That nature is not a substance of motion and rest but a substantial Principle Pray what is a substantial Principle but a substance 3. It is plainly against the Principles of Aristotle to say that a Principle is no substance for Matter and Form are Principles but these he granteth to be substances 4. If again granted that these are substances and not vertues then it must necessarily follow that a Form being an active Principle doth act through it self and thence a Form is called active It must also follow that Matter which is another Principle of motion acteth efficiently withal because motion proceedeth from an Efficient or from a Form and wherefore is Matter then called a passive Principle Your Answer to this will be that Matter is not the Principle of Motion but of Rest. I take your Answer but what kind of rest do you mean Is it a rest from local Motion or a rest from Alteration or Augmentation It must be a rest from some of these three It cannot be a rest from local motion because all beings are not capable of a rest from local motion then it must be a rest from alteration or augmentation Neither can it be a rest from any of these For all beings are constantly and at all times in alteration and consequently are either augmented or diminished What rest can it then be It is no rest from Action for then matter could be no Principle or cause for all causes do act 5. How can Matter and Form which are Principles before their union be substances since that a substance is a perfect being which doth subsist in unity through it self and thereby is distinct from all other beings but matter or form can neither of them subsist through themselves or have any unity or distinction 6. A Form is not a Principle of rest in all natural bodies through it self but by accident for all bodies are through themselves continually in motion as will further appear in its proper place VI. Wherefore for to avoid all these Absurdities Contradictions and Improperties of Speech it is necessary to assert 1. That Nature is a Property of a natural being through which it acteth 2. That a Property is really Identificated with its subject and consequently that Natural is not really differing from a natural body This property denotes a propension or actual disposition through which the said body is rendred active By activeness I understand whereby all is constituted whatever is actually inherent in a being as Existence Subsistence and all its other Properties so that Nature or Natural in Physicks is a Property equivalent to the Modes or Attributes of Truth and Goodness in Metaphysicks VII Nature differeth from Art in that she acteth conformably to the Divine Idea or Intention but Art acteth conformably to the intellectual Idea Wherefore nature is infallibly immutable constant perpetual certain because it dependeth from an infallible immutable constant perpetual and certain Cause but Art is fallible changeable inconstant and uncertain because it dependeth from the humane Intellect which is fallible changeable inconstant and uncertain As man is uncapable of acting without God so is Art incapable of effecting any thing without Nature Nature is infinitely beyond Art What Art is there which can produce the great world or any thing comparable to the little world Whatever excellent piece a man doth practise through Art it is no further excellent then it is like unto Nature neither can he work any thing by Art but what hath nature for its Pattern What is it a Limner can draw worthy of a mans sight if natural beauties are set aside VIII Whatever nature acteth it is for an End and Use It is for an end in respect to God who created all things for an end it is for an use in respect to one another because all beings are useful to one another as I have formerly demonstrated but we cannot properly say that all things act for an end in respect to one another because that which doth act for an end is moved by that end and doth foreknow it but natural beings do not foreknow their ends neither are they moved by them IX Nature is either universal or singular An universal nature may be apprehended in a twofold sense 1. For the Universe or whole world containing all singular natures within it 2. For a nature which is in an universal being and so you are to take it here A Singular nature is which is inherent in every
necessarily be so for water strictly so named had it been heaved up it would have been against its first nature and been moved violently which is improbable since that nullum violentum est perpetuum no violent motion is lasting The nature of air certifieth us that it must be it which moved above the waters under it Lastly The waters above the waters strictly so termed are called the Firmament from its firmness because they are as a deep frame or a strong wall about the waters underneath for to keep them together in a counterpoise from falling to an insinitum but it is ai◠that is above the waters and is a Firmament to them ergo the ayr must be comprehended under the Notion of waters Or thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Hebrew is by the Rabbi's and Hebrews expounded an Expansion or thing expanded for its Root is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to attenuate if so then by the waters above must be implied ayr whose nature it is to be expanded as I shewed before So whether you take the word according to the interpretation of the Septuagints 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Firmament or of the Rabbi's Expansion there can be nothing else intended by it but ayr I say then as by waters a duplicity of Elements is implied so by the Heavens ayr and fire are implied I prove it Light is fire flaming but the light was drawn from the Chaos if from the Chaos ergo not from the earth for by earth there is only meant earth single but from the Heaven which imports a conjunction of Elements viz. of Ayr and Fire Secondly Is light being a flaming fire drawn from the Heaven ergo there was fire latent in it So let this serve to answer Van Helmont his Objection who denieth fire to be an Element because its name is not set down in the first Chap. of Gen. neither is ayr mentioned among the Elements in so many Letters yet it is comprehended among them 'T is true Fowl are called Fowl of the ayr but what of that this doth not infer that ayr is an Element because Fowl are named Fowl of the Ayr. Secondly Earth and Water are there expressed in so many letters ergo the Chaos was made up of all the four Elements III. The Elements in the Chaos underwent an exact mixture because each being a stem and perfection to the other they required it for had they been unequally mixt then that part which had not been sufficiently counterpoysed by its opposite Element would have fallen from the whole Hence it followeth that they must have been of an equal extent and degree in their first vertue or quality and not only so but also in their quantity that is they consisted all of an equal number of minima's that so each minimum of every Element might be fitted sustained and perfectionated by three single minimum's of each of the other Elements Now was there but one minimum of any of the Elements in excess above the other it would overbalance the whole Chaos and so make a discord which is not to be conceived But here may be objected That the earth in comparison with the heavens beares little more proportion to their circumference then a point I confess that the air and fire exceed the earth and water in many degrees but again as will be apparent below there is never a Star which you see yea and many more then you see but containes a great proportion of earth and water in its body the immense to our thinking Region of the air and fire are furnished with no small proportion of water and earth so that numeratis numerandis the earth and water are not wanting of a minimum less then are contained either in the fire or ayr IV. The efficient of this greatest and universal body is the greatest and universal cause the Almighty God I prove it The action through which this vast mole was produced is infinite for that action which takes its procession ab infinito ad terminum finitum sive a non ente ad ens from an infinite to a finite term or from nothing to somthing is to be counted infinite but an infinite action requireth an infinite agent therefore none but God who is in all respects infinite is to be acknowledged the sole cause and agent of this great and miracuious effect It was a Golden saying upon this matter of Chrysippus the Stoick If there is any thing that doth effect that which man although he is indued with a reason cannot that certainly is greater mightier and wiser then man but he cannot make the Heavens Wherefore that which doth make them excels man in Art Counsel and Prudence And what saith Hermes in his Pimand The Maker made the universal world through his Word and not with his Hands Anaxagoras concluded the divine mind to be the distinguisher of the universe It was the Saying of Orpheus That there was but one born through himself and that all other things were created by him And Sophocles There is but one true God who made Heaven and the large earth Aristotle Lib. 2. De Gen. Cor. c. 10. f. 59. asserts God to be the Creator of this Universe And Lib. 12. Metaph. c. 8. He attests God to be the First Cause of all other Causes This action is in the holy texts called Creation Gen. 1. 1. Mark 10. 6. Psal. 89. 12. Mal. 2. 10. Creation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not alwaies intended for one and the same signification sometimes it implying the Creation of the world as in the Scriptures next forementioned other whiles it is restricted to Mankind Mark 16. 15. Mat. 28. 19. Luke 24. 47. In other places it is applied to all created beings Mark 13. 19. Gen. 14. 22. Job 38. 8. Prov. 20. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To create is imported by divers other Expressions 1. By 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To Form Gen. 2. 7. Esay 43. 7. 2. By 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To make Gen. 1. 31. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He hath establisht Psal. 89. 12. Psal. 104. 5. Mat. 13. 35. Heb. 6. 1. 1 Pet. 1. 20. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To stretch or expand Psal. 10. 2. Es. 42. 5. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To prepare or dispose Prov. 8. 27. Psal. 74. 16. V. Creation is a production of a being out of and from nothing Tho. gives us this Definition in Sent. 2. Dist. 1. Quest. 1. Art 2. Creation is an emanation of an universal Being out of nothing By an universal being he intends a being as it comprehends all material and immaterial beings So that this is rather a definition of the creation of the material and immaterial world then a definition of the Formality of Creation 2. His Definition is defective and erroneous for he adds only out of nothing This is not enough it being possible for a thing to emanate out of nothing and yet not be created the immaterial operations of Angels and
lye towards the North Pole of the Heavens or of the Earth because it tends downwards withall Poles are vulgarly described to be the two extremities of an axis axeltree about which a Globe or Wheel moves round If so then properly a Loadstone cannot be said to have either Axis or Poles because according to the vulgar opinion it doth not move round Wherefore the former denomination is improperly attributed to it viz. the extreme central point of its tendency towards the Arctick Pole is termed the North Pole of the stone and the opposite extremity is called the South Pole of it Next remember out of the Ch. of Coct that all bodies in their decoction do run off their temperament through streams or small mixtures of the Elements gradually deserting the decocting bodies and taking their egress or fuming through their pores These pores tend most from the transcurrent Axis towards the North. That its pores tend most towards the North is evident by its intrinsick parts within as you may see when it is cut through running variously intorted towards the North in streaks these streaks are distinguisht from one another through interjacent porosities otherwise they would be continuously one That the Loadstone emits fumes is testified from its looseness and inequality of mixture For all parts as I have shewed before that are unequally mixt suffer a discontinuation of their mixture because one Element being predominant and having its force united through the said unequal mixture must needs make way for its effumation and afterwards break through by egressing fumes but such is the Loadstone Ergo. 2. That these fumes or effluvia do effumate through their Northerly pores the experiment it self doth confirm to us For we see that they attract Steel most at the North side besides they usually rub the cross wires of Sea-Compasses at the North side as being most effumous there Thus much for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and part of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now for the manner of its attraction and here it is disputed whether the Loadstone attracts Iron or Iron the Loadstone Hereunto I answer That neither the Loadstone doth properly attract Iron or Iron it However since Iron is moved toward the Loadstone but accidentally by means of his effluvia or steames therefore the Loadstone is said to draw Iron to it 2. Iron doth improperly move it self to the Loadstone being incited to the same motion through the steames of the Loadstone entring through its pores into its substance The streams of the Loadstone are through their particular form and external shape or figure fitted to enter into the pores of Iron which are in like manner fitted to receive the streams of the Loadstone they being admitted do reserate the substance of Iron or through their specifick penetrability do free the volatil parts of that Iron from the fixt ones whence they do immediately through their fiery principle dilate and diffuse themselves towards that part of the Circumference where they feel the continual effumations of the Loadstone yet more to unite them which reeking out and being further diducted by a continuation of succeeding parts do draw the course parts along with it as being still continuatly united to them Or plainer the said fumes of the Loadstone having entered the pores of Iron do immediately loosen the spirits of the Iron which being dilated and united to the fumes of the Loadstone must needs covet a greater place the want of which causeth them both to spout out at those holes which are most patent which must necessarily be those through which the Magnetical fumes entered This sudden spouting out must cause an attraction of the Iron because the extrinsick air doth suddenly enter its pores on the opposite side for to recover a place within the Iron which it had lost without by being driven back out of its place by the prorupting fumes This sudden irruption of the air on the opposite side drives the Iron forwards to that place whence it was first repelled This you will the better understand if you compare it with our discourse set down in the Chapter of Local motion and of a Vacuum These steams of the Iron do effumate through all the pores where the vertue of the Loadstone hath touched it especially at the Center of opposition to the stone whence they breaking out in great quantity do draw the body of Iron directly towards the Loadstone But if the objected Iron be defended by being besmeared with Oil or any other greasie substance or by being dipt into water it puts by and obtuses the Fumes of Loadstone That the Loadstone doth effuse Fumes from it is further made known to us 1. Through its inequality of mixture and looseness of Substance as I hinted before 2. Either it must act that is attract at a distance or else operate through steams it cannot at a distance that being only proper to supernatural Agents and denied to all natural ones ergo the last 3. If you burn it it will cast a visible blew sulphurecus smoaky Flame 4. It is not the Iron doth primarily effuse steams towards the Loadstone because it is more compact and less exhalable Hence Scaliger might now have resolved his Doubt whether the Loadstone drew Iron or Iron it Why these Fumes do exhale most towards the North we have told you already Do not let it seem strange to you that the emanations of this stone should reserate the mixture and Temperament of Iron it being common to many other bodies although Authors are not pleased to take notice of it The fumes of Mercury do open the body of Gold The heat of the Sun opens the body of water and attracts Vapours thence Amber through its Emissives attracts Dust Paper c. But of these elsewhere Why the stone moves steel variously according to its diverse position happens through the variety and obliquity of its Pores variously and obliquely directing its steames and variously withal entring the Pores of the objected Steel V. The Reason of the second Property is because two Loadstones being alike in mixture of body and in Effumations cannot act upon one another for all actions are upon Contraries But in case the one be more concocted then the other and in some wise dissembling in their mixtures then doubtless the one will act upon the other and the more concocted will attract the less The cause of the third is that the Emanations of the Loadstone being appelled and harboured in an extraneous body as that of Steel do with more ease and in greater smoakes as I have said before exhale out of it and consequently attract Iron stronger and work with a greater Bent towards the Northern Pole Besides steel collects all the egressing steames of the stone which being concentrated in the body of the said steel and consequently received in greater quantity must prove more forcible The solution of the fourth is containned in the first The Reason of the fifth is