instance who enter upon the Study of Algebra or Analyticks are incapable of taking Algebraick Demonstrations without a great deal of pains and when they have once master'd them they retain them but a short time because Squares for example Parallelograms Cubes Solids and the like being exprest by aa ab a 3 abc c. the Traces whereof have no Natural Connection with their Idea's the Mind finds no hold to fasten the Idea's to and to examine the Relations of them by But those who begin to Study Common Geography most clearly and readily conceive the little Demonstrations that are explain'd to them provided they distinctly understand the Terms made use of Because the Idea's of a Square a Circle or the like are Naturally Connected with the Traces of the figures they see describ'd before their Eyes And it often happens that the meer shewing of the figure used in the Demonstration makes them sooner comprehend it than the Discourses made to explain it Because words being Connected to Idea's by an arbitrary institution only excite not these Idea's readily and distinctly enough to make us easily understand their Relations For 't is chiefly upon that account there is so much difficulty found in learning the Sciences By the way it may be discover'd from what I have been saying that those Writers who coin abundance of new Words and Figures to explain their Notions by spend much pains to very little purpose They think to make themselves intelligible when indeed they take the way of becoming incomprehensible We define say they all our Terms and all our Characters and others ought to agree to them It is true others agree to them with their Will but their Nature is repugnant They cannot fasten their Idea's to these Novel Terms because to that is required custom and long practice The Authors perhaps have attain'd that custom but the Readers have not And when a Man endeavours to instruct the Mind 't is necessary he first know it since he ought to conform to Nature and offer her nothing provoking or offensive Yet we ought not to condemn the Industry and Care Mathematicians take in defining their Terms for Definition is evidently necessary to take away Equivocation But the ordinary and receiv'd Terms ought to be imploy'd as far as possibly they can or such whose common signification is not very remote from that which they pretend to introduce which is a thing not constantly observ'd among the Mathematicians Nor do we pretend by what has been said to condemn Algebra especially such as Mr. Des-Cartes has restor'd and left it to us For though the Novelty of some Expressions in that Science give the Mind some trouble at first yet there is so little variety and confusion in these Expressions and the Assistances the Mind receives from them so much out-weigh the Difficulty found in them that I am of Opinion 't is impossible for a Man to invent a way of Reasoning and Expressing his Reasonings more suited or better accomodated to the Nature of the Mind or that can carry it farther in the Discovery of unknown Truths The Expressions of that Science do not distract the Capacity of the Mind they burden not the Memory they contract and abridge in a wonderful manner all our Idea's and our Reasonings and even render them in some measure sensible by Practice In fine their usefulness is much greater than the Natural Expressions of the delineated Figures of Triangles Squares and others of like Nature which are inserviceable to the Disquisition and Unfolding of Truths any whit intricate and obscure But so much for the Connection of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain 'T is seasonable to say something of the Connection of Traces with one another and consequently of the Connection between the Idea's corresponding to these Traces This Connection consists in this that the Traces of the Brain are so firmly connected to one another as 't is impossible to excite them again without the whole retinue which were imprinted at the same time If a Man for instance happens to be in some publick Solemnity in case he observes all the Circumstances and all the Principle Persons that assisted at the time the place the day and all other Particularities the remembrance only of the Place or some other less observable Circumstance of the Ceremony will be sufficient to bring the Representation of all the other to his Mind 'T is upon this account that when we can't recollect the Principal Name of a thing we sufficiently specifie it by making use of a Name which signifies some Circumstance of that thing as not being able to call to Mind the proper Name of a Church we can make use of another Name signifying a thing that has some Relation to it We can say 'T is that Church where there was such a Throng where Mr. such a one Preach'd where we went on Sunday And thus not having the proper Name of a Person ready at hand or when it is more convenient to denote him in another manner we can do it by saying He whose Face was disfigured by the Small-pox the Portly and well-made Gentleman the little crooked Man according as we stand affected towards him though to express a Man in terms of contempt is neither a sign of good Nature nor good Manners Now the mutual Connection of these Traces and consequently of their Idea's one with another is not only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetorick but also of infinite other things of greatest concernment in Morality and Politicks and in all Sciences in general which are any ways related to Man and consequently of many things we shall treat of in the sequel of our Discourse The cause of the Connection of many Traces together is the Identity of time wherein they were imprinted on the Brain For 't is enough for many Traces to have been produc'd at the same time to cause that they should never afterwards be excited but in company of one another because the Animal Spirits finding the Channel of these Co-temporary Traces gaping and half open continue their courses in them by reason of their meeting with a more free passage through them than through the other parts of the Brain This is the cause of Memory and the Corporeal Habits which are common to us with Beasts The Connections of the Traces are not always conjoyn'd with the Emotions of the Spirits because all the things we see do not always appear either Good or Evil These Connections too may change or break because being not of perpetual necessity for the preservation of Life there is no need they should always be the same But there are certain Traces in our Brain which have a Natural Connection with one another as also with certain Commotions of the Spirits that being necessary to the Preservation of Life And this Connection can't be broken at least not easily because 't is convenient it should always be the same For instance the trace of a
six hours a day they sometimes study six different things 'T is visible that this fault proceeds from the same Cause as the others I have been speaking of For there is great probability that if those who studied in this manner knew evidently how disproportion'd it was to the Capacity of their Mind and that it was more apt to fill it with Error and Confusion than with true Science they would not let themselves be transported with the disorderly motives of their Passion and Vanity For indeed this is not the way to be satisfy'd in our pursuits but the most ready means to know nothing at all CHAP. IV. I. The Mind cannot dwell long upon Objects that have no Relation to it or that include not something of Infinity in them II. The Inconstancy of the Will is the Cause of that want of Application and consequently of Error III. Our Sensations take us up more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind IV. Which is the Source of the Corruption of our Morals V. And of the Ignorance of the Vulgar sort of Men. THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error for want of being Infinite or for being of less Extent than the Objects of its Consideration as has been explain'd in the two last Chapters But because it is Inconstant and nothing Resolute in its Action and unable to keep the View fixt and steady on the Object long enough to examine all the parts of it The better to conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of the Mind we must know that the Will is the Directress of its Action that the Will applies it to the Objects which it loves and that the same Will is it self in perpetual fluctuation and disquietude whereof I assign this to be the Cause 'T is not to be doubted but GOD is the Author of all things and has made them only for Himself and that he draws the Heart of Man towards him by a Natural and Invincible Impression which he perpetually influences him withal 'T is impossible for GOD to have will'd that there should be any Will that did not love Him or that lov'd Him less than any other Good if there could be any other besides Himself it being impossible for Him to ordain that a Will should not love that which was supreamly Amiable or should love that more which was less lovely And thus Natural Love must needs carry us to GOD as proceeding from GOD and nothing being able to stop the motions thereof unless GOD Himself that impresses them There is then no Will whatever but necessarily follows the motions of this Love The Righteous and the Wicked the Blessed and the Damned love GOD with this Love and 't is this Love in one sense that is the Cause of the Misery of the latter For this Natural Love we have for GOD being the same thing with the Natural Impression which carries us towards Good in general towards Infinite Soveraign Good 't is manifest that all Minds love GOD with this Love since there is no other that is the Universal the Infinite the Soveraign Good For lastly All Spirits and even the Divels passionately desire to be Happy and to possess the Soveraign Good and they desire it without Choice Deliberation and Liberty by the bent and necessity of their Nature Being therefore made for GOD for an Infinite Good for a Good that comprehends in Himself all Goods the Natural Motion of our Heart can never stop till we arrive to the possession of this Good The Will then labouring thus with a perpetual thirst being toss'd and agitated with Desires Eagerness and Restless longings for that Good it is not in Possession of cannot but with much Uneasiness suffer the Mind to dwell any time upon Abstract Truths which don't affect it and which it judges incapable of making it Happy It therefore pushes the Mind forward continually to the Research of other Objects and when in this hurry and agitation communicated to it by the Will it meets with any Object that carries the Mark of Good I mean that by approaching the Soul makes it sensible of some internal Delight or Satisfaction then this Thirst of the Heart rises anew these Desires Eagernesses and Fervencies are re-kindled and the Mind oblig'd to wait on them fixes it self only on the Object that either is or seems to be the cause of them to approximate it to the Soul that regales and feeds upon it for some time But the Emptiness of the Creatures being unable to fill the Infinite Capacity of the Heart of Man these little Pleasures instead of extinguishing its Thirst only provoke and inflame it and give the Soul a foolish and vain Hope of being satisfy'd in the multiplicity of Earthly Pleasures which produces a far greater Inconstancy and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind which ought to make the Discovery to the Soul of all these Goods It 's true when the Mind falls by chance upon an Object of an Infinite Nature or which includes something great and mighty in it its unsettledness and casting about ceases for some time For finding that this Object bears the badge and character of that which the Soul desires it dwells upon it and closes in with it for a considerable time But this closing and adhesion or rather obstinacy of the Mind to examine Subjects infinite or too vast and unweildy is as useless to it as that Levity wherewith it considers those that are proportion'd to its Capacity since 't is too weak to accomplish so difficult an Enterprise and in vain it endeavours to effect it That which must render the Soul happy is not as I may speak the Comprehension of an Infinite Object this she is not capable of but the Love and Fruition of an Infinite Good whereof the Will is capable through the Motion of Love continually impress'd on it by GOD Himself Which being thus we need not wonder at the Ignorance and Blindness of Mankind because their Mind being subjected to the Inconstancy and Levity of their Heart which incapacitate it from considering any thing with a serious Application is unable to penetrate into a subject any whit perplex'd and difficult For in short the Attention of the Mind is to intelligible Objects what a steady View of the Eyes is to those of Sight And as a Man that can't fix his Eyes on the Bodies that are about him can never see them well enough to distinguish the differences of their least parts and to discover all the Relations those little parts have to one another So a Man who cannot fix the Eye of his Mind upon the things desir'd to be known can never have a sufficient Knowledge to distinguish all the parts and to observe all the Relations that may possibly be between themselves or themselves and other subjects Yet it is certain that all our Knowledge consists in a clear View of the Relations things stand in to one another So that when it happens as
us The second is a New Determination of the Motion of the Will towards that Object provided it be or seem to be a Good Before that View the Natural Motion of the Soul was either undetermin'd that is to say she was carried towards Good in general or it otherwise determined by the knowledge of some particular Object But in the very instant of the mind 's perceiving that Relation of the new Object to it self that general Motion of the Will is forthwith determin'd conformably to the perception of the Mind The Soul advances near that Object by her Love that she may relish it and discover her good in it through a sensible delectation which the Author of Nature affords her as a Natural Reward of her Inclination to Good She judged that that Object was a Good by an abstracted and unpathetick Reason but she persists in the persuasion of it through the Efficacy of Sensation and the livelyer that Sensation is the stronger is her adhesion to the Good that seems to be the Cause of it But if that particular Object be considered as Evil or able to deprive us of some Good there happens no New Determination in the Motion of the Will but only the Motion towards the Good oppos'd to that seemingly evil Object is augmented which augmentation is greater or lesâ—er as the Evil seems to be more or less formidable to us For indeed we hate only because we love and the Evil that is without us is judg'd no farther Evil than with reference to the Good of which it deprives us So that Evil being consider'd as a privation of Good to fly from Evil is to fly the privation of Good which is the same thing as to tend towards Good and therefore there happens no new determination of the Natural Motion of the Will at the presence of an unwelcome Object but only a Sensation painful distasteful or imbitter'd which the Author of Nature inflicts on the Soul as a pain naturally consequent to her being depriv'd of Good Reason alone had not been sufficient to carry her to it wherefore this painful and vexing Sensation is superadded to quicken her Thence I conclude that in any Passion whatsoever all the Motions of the Soul towards Good are the Motions of Love But as we are affected with divers Sensations according to the various Circumstances that attend the View of Good and the Motion of the Soul towards it so we come to confound our Sensations with the Commotions of the Soul and to imagine as many different Motions in the Passions as there are different Sensations Upon this head it must be observed that Pain is a true and real Evil and no more the Privation of Pleasure than Pleasure the Privation of Pain for there is a great difference betwixt not feeling or being depriv'd of such a Sensation of Pleasure and the actual enduring of Pain So that every Evil is not precisely so because it deprives us of Good but only that Evil as I have explain'd that is without us or is not a Modification of our Soul Nevertheless as by Goods and Evils we commonly understand things good or evil and not the Sensations of Pleasure and Pain which are rather the natural Tokens by which the Soul distinguishes Good from Evil it may be said methinks without Equivocation that Evil is nothing but the privation of Good and that the natural motion of the Soul that removes us from Evil is the same with that which carries us to good for in brief all natural Motion being an Impression of the Author of Nature whose acting centers in himself and who can incline us only towards himself The true Motion of the Soul is always essentially the Love of Good and but accidentally an Aversion from Evil. I grant that Pain may be consider'd as an Evil and in that sense the Motion of the Passions which is stir'd up by it is not real since we never will Pain and though we positively will the absence of Pain yet 't is only because we positively will the Preservation or Perfection of our Being The third thing to be observ'd in every Passion is the Sensation that attends them the Sensation of Love Hatred Desire Joy Sorrow which are all different in the different Passions The fourth thing is a new Determination of the course of the Animal Spirits and Blood to the outward and inward parts of the Body Before the View of the Object of the Passion the vital Spirits were dispers'd throughout the whole Body for the preservation of all its parts in general but at the appearance of that new Object all this Order and Oeconomy is disturb'd and most part of the Spirits are thrown into the Muscles of the Arms Legs Face and other exteriour parts of the Body to put them in a disposition suitable to the ruling Passion and to give it such a gesture and motion as are necessary for the obtaining or avoiding the imminent Good or Evil But if its own Forces are insufficient for its occasions these same Spirits are distributed in such a manner as make it machinally utter certain words and cries and which diffuse over the Face and the rest of the Body such an air and comportment as is capable of actuating others with the same Passion it self is possess'd with For Men and Beasts having a mutual cohesion by the Eyes and Ears when any one of them is in a violent Commotion it necessarily affects the Spectators and Hearers and naturally makes upon their Imagination such an Impression as troubles them and moves them to preserve it As to the rest of the Animal Spirits they violently descend into the Heart Lungs Liver Spleen and other Viscera thence to draw contributions and to hasten those parts to send forth a sufficient and timely supply of Spirits necessary to preserve the Body in that extraordinary Contention The fifth thing is a sensible Commotion of the Soul who feels her self agitated by an unexpected overflow of Spirits This sensible Commotion of the Soul always attends that Motion of the Spirits that the Soul may participate of all that affects the Body even as the Motion of Spirits is raised in the Body when the Soul is carried toward any Object For the Body and Soul being mutually united their Motions are reciprocal The sixth thing are several Sensations of Love Hatred Joy Desire Sorrow that are produced not by the Intellectual view of Good or Evil as those that have been already mention'd but by the various concussions that are caused in the Brain by the Animal Spirits The seventh thing is a certain Sensation of Joy or rather internal Satisfaction which detains the Soul in her Passion and assures her that she is in the fittest State she can be in reference to the Object she considers This internal satisfaction attends all the Passions whatsoever whether they proceed from the sight of an Evil or from the sight of a Good Sorrow as well as Joy This satisfaction makes
a great Number but also differ by the different Perceptions and Judgments that cause or accompany them Those different Judgments of the Soul concerning Good or Evil produce different Motions in the Animal Spirits to dispose the Body in relation to the Object and consequently cause in the Soul Sensations that are not altogether like Whence it proceeds that some Passions are observ'd to differ from each other though their Commotions be not different In the mean while the Commotion of the Soul being the chief Thing observable in every Passion 't is better to refer them to the Three original Passions in which those Commotions are very different than to treat confusedly and disorderly of them in reference to the different Perceptions we may have of the Good and Evil that raises them For we may have so many different Perceptions of Objects in reference to Time to our selves to what belongs to us to the Persons or Things to which we are united either by Nature or Choice that it is wholly impossible to make an accurate Enumeration of them When the Soul perceives any Good which she cannot enjoy it may perhaps be said that she hopes for it though she desires it not However 't is plain that this her Hope is not a Passion but a simple Judgment And therefore 't is the Commotion that attends the Idea of any Good of which we take the Enjoyment to be possible that adopts Hope into a true Passion It is the same when Hope grows into Security For the latter is a Passion only because of the Commotion of Joy that mixes with that of Desire since the Judgment of the Soul that considers any Good as certain is a Passion but as much as it is a foregoing Taste of the Good that affects us Last of all When Hope diminishes and is succeeded by Despair 't is visible again that the latter is a Passion but because of the Commotion of Sorrow that mixes with that of Desire for the Judgment of the Soul that considers any Good as unattainable would not be a Passion should we not be actuated by that Judgment But because the Soul never looks upon Good or Evil without any Commotion and even without any Alteration in the Body we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgment that produces it confounding together whatever happens both to the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil For the Words Hope Fear Boldness Shame Impudence Anger Pity Derision Grief and the Names of all other Passions in common use are short Expressions made up of several Terms by which can be explain'd in particular whatever Passions contain We understand by the Word Passion the View of the Relation any thing has to us the Commotion and Sensation of the Soul the Concussion of the Brain and the Motion of the Spirits a new Commotion and Sensation of the Soul and lastly a Sensation of Pleasure that always attends the Passions and makes them grateful All these we commonly understand by the Name of Passions but sometimes it only signifies either the Judgment that raises it or only the Commotion of the Soul or the bare Motion of the Spirits and Blood or lastly something else that accompanies the Commotion of the Soul It is very useful for the Knowledge of Truth to abridge Ideas and Expressions but that often causes some considerable Errour especially when those Ideas are abridg'd by popular Use For we ought never to abridge them but when we have made them very clear and distinct by a great Application of Mind and not as 't is ordinarily done as to Passions and sensible Things when we have made them familiar to us by their Sensations and the mere Action of the Imagination which easily imposes on the Mind There is a great difference betwixt the pure Ideas of the Mind and the Sensations or Commotions of the Soul Pure Ideas are clear and distinct but 't is a hard Task to make them familiar whereas Sensations and Commotions are intimate with us but can never plainly and distinctly be known Numbers Extension and their Properties may be clearly known but unless we make them sensible by some expressive Characters 't is very difficult to represent them to our Mind because whatever is abstracted moves us not On the contrary the Commotions and Sensations of the Soul may easily be represented to the Mind though the Knowledge we have of them be but confused and imperfect for all the Words that raise them lively strike the Soul and make it attentive Thence it proceeds that we often imagine we rightly understand some Discourses that are altogether incomprehensible and that reading some Descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul we persuade our selves that we perfectly comprehend them because they strongly move us and that all the Words that reverberate upon our Eyes agitate our Soul The hearing of the very Names of Shame Despair Impudence c. straightway excite in our Mind a confused Idea and obscure Sensation that powerfully influences us and because this Sensation is very familiar to us and presents it self without any Trouble or Endeavour of the Mind we fancy it to be clear and distinct These Words however are the Names of compounded Passions and by consequence abridg'd Expressions which popular Use has made up of many confused and obscure Ideas Seeing we are oblig'd to employ such Terms as common Use has approv'd of the Reader should not be surpriz'd to meet with Obscurity and sometimes with a sort of Contradiction in our Words And if it were but consider'd that the Sensations and Commotions of the Soul that answer to the Terms us'd in such Discourses are not wholly the same in all Men because of their different Dispositions of Mind they would not so easily condemn us when they could not enter into our Opinions This I say not so much to prevent Objections against my self as that we may understand the Nature of the Passions and what we are to think of Books treating of such Matters After so many Cautions I shall not stick to say that all the Passions may be referr'd to the three Primitive namely Desire Joy and Sorrow and that it is specially by the different Judgments the Soul makes of Goods and Evils that such as relate to the same Primitive Passion differ from each other For Instance I may say that Hope Fear and Irresolution that is the Mean betwixt them both are Species of Desire That Boldness Courage and Emulation c. have a greater Relation to Hope than to all others and that Timidity Cowardise Jealousie c. are Species of Fear I may say that Alacrity and Glory Kindness and Gratefulness are Species of Joy caused by the Sight of the Good that we know to be in us or in those to whom we are united as Derision or Jeering is a sort of Joy commonly arising at the Sight of the Evil that befalls those from whom we are separated Lastly That Distaste
Tediousness Regret Pity Indignation are so many kinds of Sorrow caused by the Consideration of something displeasing But besides those Passions and several others I pass by which particularly relate to some of the Primitive Passions there are yet many others whose Commotion is almost equally compounded either of Desire and Joy as Impudence Anger and Revenge or of Desire and Sorrow as Shame Regret and Vexation or of all Three together when Motives of Joy and Sorrow meet And though these last Passions have no particular Names that I know of they are however the most common because in this Life we scarce ever enjoy any Good without a Mixture of Evil nor suffer any Evil without Hopes of being freed of it and enjoying Good And though Joy be altogether contrary to Sorrow yet it allows of its Company and even admits it an equal Sharer in the Capacity of the Soul as Volent when the Sight of Good and Evil divide its Capacity as Intelligent All the Passions therefore are Species of Desire Joy and Sorrow and the chief difference betwixt those of the same sort must be taken from the different Perceptions or Judgments that cause or accompany them So that to become learned in the Nature of Passions and to make of them the most accurate Enumeration possible it is requisite to enquire into the different Judgments that may be made of Good and Evil. But as we especially intend to find out the Cause of our Errours we need not so much to insist upon the Judgments that precede or cause the Passions as upon those that follow them and which the Soul makes of Things when she is agitated by some Passion because those last Judgments are the most liable to Errour Such Judgments as precede and cause the Passions are almost ever false in something because they are for the most part grounded upon such Perceptions of the Soul as consider Objects in relation to her and not as they are in themselves But the Judgments that follow the Passions are false all manner of ways because such Judgments being only made by the Passions are only grounded upon the Perceptions the Soul has of Objects as relating to her or rather to her own Commotion In the Judgments that precede the Passions Truth and Falshood are join'd together but when the Soul is agitated and judges by every Inspiration of the Passion Truth vanishes and Falshood remains to be the Principle of so many more false Conclusions as the Passion is greater All Passions justifie themselves continually offering to the Soul the moving Object in the fittest way for preserving and increasing her Commotion The Judgment or the Perception that causes it gets still new Forces from the Increase of the Passion and the Passion likewise augments proportionably as the Judgment that produces it in its turn is strengthen'd Thus false Judgments and Passions join in Confederacy for their mutual Preservation And should the Heart never cease sending up Spirits for keeping open the Tracks of the Brain and supplying the Expences which that violent Sensation or Commotion make of the same Spirits Passions would perpetually increase and never allow us to be sensible of our Errours But as all our Passions depend on the Fermentation and Circulation of the Blood and that the Heart can never furnish as many Spirits as are necessary for their Preservation they must needs expire when the Spirits diminish and the Blood grows cool again Though it be an easie matter to discover the ordinary Judgments of Passions yet 't is not a thing to be neglected there being few Subjects that deserve more the Application of an Enquirer after Truth who endeavours to free himself from the Dominion of the Body and will judge of every thing by true Ideas We may instruct our selves in this Matter two ways either by pure Reason or by our inward Consciousness when we are agitated by some Passion For Instance Experience teaches us That we are apt to judge of those we love not to their Disadvantage and to spit all the Venom of our Hatred at the Object of our Passion We also know by Reason that as we cannot hate but what is Evil so 't is necessary for the preservation of Hatred that the Mind should represent to it self the worst part of its Object For 't is sufficient to suppose that all Passions justifie themselves and give such a Disposition first to the Imagination then to the Mind as is fit to preserve their own Commotion directly to conclude what are the Judgments which all the Passions cause us to make Those that are endued with a strong and lively Imagination that are extremely sensible and much subject to the Motions of Passions may perfectly inform themselves of those things by their own inward sense and it often comes to pass that they speak of them in a more pleasing and instructing manner than others whose Reason over-tops their Imagination yet it follows not that those that discover best the Springs of Self-love that penetrate farthest into Man's Heart and more sensibly discover its Recesses are always the greatest Understandings This only proves that they are livelier quicker of Imagination and sometimes more malicious than others But those that without consulting their inward Sense make use only of their Reason to enquire into the Nature and Effects of Passions though they be not always so quick-sighted as others are always more rational and less obnoxious to Errour because they judge of things as they are in themselves They see very near what Men posseâ—t with Passions can doe as they suppose them more or less agitated but do not rashly judge of the Actions of others by what they would doe themselves in such Occasions for they well know that Men are not equally sensible to the same things nor alike susceptible of involuntary Commotions and therefore 't is not by consulting our Sensations which the Passions create in us but by listening to Reason that we must treat of the Judgments that accompany them lest we should draw our own Picture instead of discovering the Nature of Passions in general CHAP. XI That all the Passions justifie themselves What Judgments they cause us to make in their Vindication WE need no long deduction of Arguments to demonstrate That all Passions justifie themselves That Principle is sufficiently evident both by our internal Consciousness of our selves and the Behaviour of those we see agitated by them and therefore we need only barely propound it to consider it as we should do The Mind is such a Slave to the Imagination that it always obeys when the Imagination is over-heated and dares not answer when the same is incensed because it meets with Abuses when it resists and is always rewarded with some Pleasure when it humours that imperious Faculty Even those whose unruly Imagination persuades them they are transmuted into Beasts find out Reasons to prove they must live as Beasts do walk Four-footed eat Grass and imitate every Action that is purely
loose and indefinite Notions engage not into Errour at least they are wholly unserviceable to the Discovery of Truth For though we know that there is in Fire a substantial Form attended with a Million of Faculties like to that of heating dilating melting Gold Silver and other Metals lightening burning roasting the Idea of that substantial Form with all its Faculties of producing Heat Fluidity Rarefaction will not help me to resolve this Question Why Fire hardens Clay and softens Wax There being no Connection betwixt the Ideas of Hardness in Clay and Softness in Wax and those of a substantial Form in Fire and its Faculties of Rarefaction Fluidity c. The same may be said of all general Ideas which are utterly insufficient for resolving any Question But when I know that Fire is nothing else but divided Wood whose Parts are in a continual Agitation by which alone it raises in me the Sensation of Heat and that the Softness of Clay consists in a Mixture of Water and Earth those Ideas being not general and confused but particular and distinct it will not be difficult to perceive that the Heat of Fire must harden Clay nothing being easier to conceive than that one Body may move another if it meet with it being it self in Motion We likewise easily perceive that since the Heat we feel near the Fire is caused by the Motion of the invisible Particles of Wood striking against our Hands Face c. if we expose Clay to the Heat of Fire the Particles of Water that are mixed with those of Earth being more thin and disunited and consequently more agitated by the Action and Impulse of the fiety Corpuscles than the gross Particles of Earth must be separated and expelled and the other remain dry and hard We shall perceive with the same Evidence that Fire must produce a quite contrary Effect upon Wax if we know that it is composed of Particles that are branched and almost of the same Bulk Thus may particular Ideas be subservient to the Enquiry after Truth whilst loose and undeterminate Notions are not only altogether unserviceable but also insensibly engage us into Errour For these Philosophers are not content to make use of those general Terms and uncertain Ideas which answer to them they moreover pretend that those Words signifie some particular Beings they give out that there is a Substance distinguished from Matter which is the Form of it and withal an infinite Number of little Beings really distinguished from that Matter and Form of which they suppose as many as they have different Sensations of Bodies or as those Bodies are supposed to produce different Effects However 't is visible to any attentive Person that those little Beings for instance that are said to be distinguished from Fire and suppos'd to be contained in it for the producing Heat Light Hardness Fluidity c. are but the Contrivances of the Imagination that rebells against Reason since Reason has no particular Idea that represents those little Beings When the Philosophers are asked What is the illuminating Faculty in Fire They only answer That 't is a Being which is the Cause that Fire is capable of producing Light So that their Idea of that illuminating Faculty differs not from the general Idea of Cause and the confused Idea of the Effect they see and therefore they have no clear Idea of what they say when they admit those particular Beings and so say what they not only understand not but what 's impossible to be understood CHAP. III. Of the most dangerous Errour in the Philosophy of the Ancients PHilosophers not only speak without understanding themselves when they explain the Effects of Nature by some Beings of which they have no particular Idea but also establish a Principle whence very false and pernicious Consequences may directly be drawn For supposing with them that there are in Bodies certain Entities distinguished from Matter and having no distinct Idea of those Entities 't is easie to imagine that they are the real or principal Causes of the Effects we see And this is the very Opinion of the vulgar Philosophers The prime Reason of their supposing those substantial Forms real Qualities and other such like Entities is to explain the Effects of Nature But when we come attentively to consider the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of a Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a subordinate Power the Idea of an inferiour Divinity yet a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens supposing it to be the Idea of a true Power or Cause And therefore we admit something Divine in all the Bodies that surround us when we acknowledge Forms Faculties Qualities Virtues and real Beings that are capable of producing some Effects by the force of their Nature and thus insensibly approve of the Sentiments of the Heathens by too great a Deference for their Philosophy Faith indeed corrects us but it may perhaps be said that the Mind is a Pagan whilst the Heart is a Christian. Moreover it is a hard Matter to persuade our selves that we ought neither to fear nor love true Powers and Beings that can act upon us punish us with some Pain or reward us with some Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration it is hard again to imagine why they must not be ador'd For whatever can act upon us as a true and real Cause is necessarily above us according to Reason and St. Austin and by the same Reason and Authority 't is likewise an immutable Law That inferiour Beings should be subservient to superiour Whence that great Father concludes That the Body cannot operate upon the Soul and that nothing can be above her but God only The chief Reasons that God Almighty uses in the Holy Scriptures to prove to the Israelites that they ought to adore that is to love and fear him are drawn from his Power to reward or punish them representing to them the Benefits they have received from him the Punishments he has inflicted upon them and his Power that is always the same He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens as such as have no Power over them and can doe them neither harm nor good He commands them to honour him alone as the only true Cause of Good and Evil Reward and Punishment none of which can befal a City according to the Prophet but what comes from him by reason that natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Hurt they seem to doe us and as it is God alone that acts in them so 't is He alone that must be fear'd and lov'd in them Soli Deo Honor Gloria Lastly The Sense of fearing and Loving what may be the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is not possible to cast it off So that in that
incident to the Corporeal World which is an Opinion sufficiently now receiv'd among Men of Letters But let their Opinion about it be what it will that matters not much since it seems much easier to conceive that a Body drives another when it strikes it than to comprehend how Fire can produce Heat and Light and educe from the power of matter a substance that was not in it before And if it be necessary to acknowledge that God is the True Cause of the different Communications of Motion by a much stronger reason we should conclude that none but He can Create and Annihilate real Qualities and substantial Forms I say Create and Annihilate For it seems to me at least as difficult to educe from matter a substance that was not in it or to reduce it into it again whilst yet there nothing remains of it as to create it or Annihilate it But I stick not to the Terms And I make use of those because there are no other that I know of which express without Obscurity and Ambiguity the changes suppos'd by the Philosophers to arrive every moment by the force of second Causes I had some scruple to set down here the other Arguments which are commonly urg'd for the Force and Efficacy of natural Causes For they appear so weak and trifling to those who withstand Prejudices and prefer their Reason before their Senses that I can scarce believe methinks that Reasonable Men could be perswaded by them However I produce and answer them since there are many Philosophers who urge them ARGUMENT I. If second Causes did not Operate say Suarez Fonseca and some others Animate things could not be distinguish'd from Inanimate since neither one nor the other would have an inward principle of their Actions ANSWER I answer that Men would have the same sensible proofs that have convinc'd them of the distinction they make between things Animate and Inanimate They would still see Animals do the same Actions as eat grow cry run bound c. and would discern nothing like this in Stones And this one thing makes the vulgar Philosophers believe that Beasts live and that Stones do not For we are not to fancy that they know by a clear and distinct view of Mind what is the Life of a Dog 'T is their Senses which regulate their Decisions upon this Question If it were necessary I could prove here that the principle of the Life of a Dog differs not from the principle of the Motion of a Watch. For the Life of Bodies whatever they be can consist but in the Motion of their Parts And we may easily judge that the same subtil matter which causes the Fermentation of the Blood and Animal Spirits in a Dog and which is the principle of his Life is no perfecter than that which gives Motion to the Spring of a Watch or which causes the Gravitation in the Weights of a Clock which is the principle of their Life or to speak as others do of their Motion It behoves the Peripateticks to give those whom they stile Cartesians a clear Idea of what they call the Life of Beasts Corporeal Soul Body which Perceives and Desires Sees Feels Wills and then we shall clearly resolve their Difficulties if after that they shall persist in raising them ARGUMENT II. It were impossible to discover the Differences or Powers of the Elements So that Fire might refrigerate as Water and nothing would be of a settled and fix'd Nature ANSWER I answer That whilst Nature remains as it is that is to say whilst the Laws of the Communication of Motions remain constantly the same it is a Contradiction that Fire should not burn or separate the Parts of certain Bodies Fire cannot refrigerate like Water unless it becomes Water for Fire being only Fewel whose Parts have been violently agitated by an invisible surrounding Matter as is easie to demonstrate it is impossible its Parts should not Communicate some of their Motion to approaching Bodies Now as these Laws are constant the Nature of Fire its Virtues and Qualities are unchangeable But this Nature and these Vertues are only Consequences of the General and Efficacious Will of GOD who does all in all things Therefore the Study of Nature is in all respects false and vain when we look for other true Causes than the Wills of the ALMIGHTY I confess that we are not to have recourse to God or the Universal Cause when we require the Reason of particular Effects For we should be ridiculous to assert for Instance That GOD dries the Ways or Freezes the Water in the River We must say The Air dries the Earth because it moves and bears off the Water with it that dilutes it Or that the Air or the subtil Matter Freezes the River in Winter because at that time it communicates not sufficient Motion to the Parts that constitute the Water In a Word we must if we can assign the Natural and particular Cause of the Effects propos'd to Examination But because the Action of these Causes consists in the moving Force which actuates them which moving Force is the Will of GOD which create them we ought not to say they have in themselves a Force or Power to produce any Effects And when in Reasoning we are at last arriv'd to a general Effect of which we seek the Cause 't is no good Philosophy to imagine any other than the general And to feign a certain Nature a first Moveable and universal Soul or some such Chimera whereof we have no clear and distinct Idea would be to argue like an Heathen Philosopher For Example when we are ask'd whence it comes that some Bodies are in motion or that the agitated Air communicates its Motion to the Water or rather whence proceeds the mutual Protrusion of Bodies Motion and its Communication being a general Effect on which all others depend we cannot answer I do'nt say like Christians but Philosophers without ascending to God who is the Universal Cause Since 't is His Will that is the moving Force of Bodies and that regulates the Communication of their Motions Had he will'd there should be no new Production in the World he would not have put its Parts in motion And if hereafter He shall will the Incorruptibility of some of the Beings he had made he shall cease to will the Communication of Motions in point of those Beings ARGUMENT III. 'T is needless to Plow to Water and give several preparatory Dispositions to Bodies to fit them for what we desire from them For GOD has no need of preparing the Subjects on which he Works ANSWER I answer That GOD may do absolutely all he pleases without finding any Dispositions in the Subjects he works upon But he cannot do it without a Miracle or by Natural ways that is by the General Laws of the Communication of Motions which he has constituted and which he almost always follows in his Actings GOD never multiplies his Wills without Reason
special a regard as to give it all things necessary to its preservation and likewise a Seed for perpetuating it's kind This proves second causes no more than the Plurality of Causes of contrary Principles of Good and Evil which the Manichees imagin'd to account for these effects But 't is a certain Sign of the Grandeur Wisdom and Magnificence of God For God does no works unbecoming an infinite Wisdom and he does them with that profusion as is a manifest proof of his Power and Greatness Whatever is destroy'd is repair'd again by the same Law that destroy'd it So great is the Wisdom Power and Fecundity of that Law God prevents not the destruction of Beings by any new Will not only because the first suffices to restore them but especially because his Wills are of much greater value than the Reparation of these Beings They are far more valuable than all that they produce And God had never made this World since not worthy of the Action by which it was produc'd unless he had other prospects than are known by the Philosophers and knew how to honour himself in JESUS CHRIST with an honour which the Creatures are not capable of giving him When a House falls and crushes an Honest Man to death a greater Evil happens than when one Beast devours another or when a Body is forc'd to rebound by the shock it receives from the Encounter of another But God does not multiply his Wills to redress either the true or apparent Disorders which are the necessary Consequences of natural Laws God ought not to correct nor change these Laws though they sometimes produce Monsters He is not to confound the Order and simplicity of his Ways He must neglect mean and little things I would say he must not have particular Wills to produce effects which are not equivalent to or worthy of the Action of the Producer God works not Miracles save when Order which he constantly follows requires it which Order requires that he should act by the most simple ways and make no exceptions to his general Wills but when 't is absolutely necessary to his designs or on particular occasions which we are absolutely ignorant of Though we are all united to Order or the Wisdom of God yet we know not all the Rules of it We see in it what we ought to do but we cannot discover in it what God ought to Will nor is it our business to be very sollicitous to know it A great instance of what I have said we have in the Damnation of an infinite number of Persons whom God suffer'd to perish in times of Ignorance and Error God is infinitely Good He loves all his Works He wills that all Men should be sav'd and come to the Knowledge of the Truth for he has made them to injoy him And yet the greatest number are Damn'd They live and die in blindness and will remain in it to all Eternity Comes not this from his acting by the simplest means and his following Order We have shown that according to Order God ought not to prevent by Indeliberate Pleasures the will of the first Man whose Fall has disorder'd Nature It was requisite that all Men should descend from one not only because that is the most simple way but for several too Theological and abstract Reasons to be here explain'd In fine we ought to believe this conformable to the Order which God follows and to the Wisdom he always consults in the intention and execution of his designs The first Man's Sin has produc'd infinite Evils I confess but certainly Order requir'd that God should permit it and that he should instate Man in a peccable condition God minded to repair his laps'd Work seldom gives Victorious Graces that prevail over the malice of the greatest Sinners Sometimes he gives Graces useless to the conversion of the Receiver though he foresees their inutility and sometimes sheds them in great Plenty yet with little effect Commonly he acts as it were by degrees giving Men secret inspirations of Self-denial and Repentance as formerly he gave them Counsels in his Gospel Thus he prepares them for the grace of Conversion and last of all bestows it Why all these round-about Methods and ways indirect Would it not have been enough for him to have positively Will'd the Conversion of a Sinner to have effected it in an efficacious and irresistible manner But is not it visible that this proceeds from his acting by the simplest Methods and Orders willing it though we do not always see it For God must necessarily follow Order and Wisdom in his actings though these are Unfathomable Abysses to the Mind of Man There are certain most simple Laws in the Order of Grace by which God for the most part acts For this Order has its Rules as well as that of Nature though we know them not as we see those of the Communications of Motions Only let us follow the Counsels which are given us in the Gospel by him who perfectly knows the Laws of Grace This I say to pacify the unjust Complaints of Sinners who despise the Counsels of JESUS CHRIST and charge their Malignity and disorders upon God They would have God show Miracles in their behalf and dispense with the general Laws of Grace They lead their Life in Pleasures they seek out for Honours and daily renew those wounds which sensible Objects have given their Brain and add more to them and after this expect God should cure them by a Miracle Not unlike wounded Men who in the excess of their Pain tear their Cloaths renovate their Wounds and when in the sight of approaching Death complain of the cruelty of their Surgeons They would have God to save them because say they God is Good Wise Powerful and needs but determine it to make us happy Why did he make us to damn and destroy us They ought to know that God Wills they should be sav'd and to that intent has done all that could be done by Order and Wisdom which he consults We cannot believe that he deserts us whilst he gives us his own Son to be our Mediator and Sacrifice Yes God is willing that all Mankind should be sav'd but by ways that we ought to study with care and follow with caution and weariness God is not to consult our Passions in the Execution of his designs He can have no regard but to his Eternal Wisdom nor follow any other rule than the Divine Order which Order will have us imitate JESUS CHRIST and obey his Counsels for our Sanctification and Salvation But if God has not predestin'd all Men to be conformable to the Image of his Son who is the Model and Exemplar of the Elect 'T is because herein God acts by the most simple means with reference to his designs which all make for his Glory 'T is because God is an universal Cause which ought not to act like particular Causes which have particular Volitions for all they do 'T
their Operation So likewise in point of free Causes I believe that God incessantly gives the Mind an Impression towards Good in General and that he moreover determines this Impression towards particular Goods by the Idea's or Sensations that he gives us as I have explain'd in the first Illustration which is the same with what the Divines intend by affirming That God moves and prevents our Wills Thus the Force which puts our Minds in Motion is the Will of God which Animates us and inclines us towards Good For God Creates not Beings to constitute the moving force of Minds for the same Reason that he Creates none to be the moving force of Bodies The Wills of God being of themselves Efficacious He need but Will to do And we ought not to multiply Beings without necessity Besides whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions proceeds likewise from the Action of God in us as appears from the first Illustration But all we Act or produce is by our Wills that is by the Impression of the Will of God which is our moving force For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than they are of God as mov'd Bodies impel not others but in as much as they have a moving force that translates them which is no other than the Will of God which Creates or preserves them successively in different places Therefore we Act no otherwise than by the Concourse of God and our Action consider'd as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from his but is as say most Divines the self same Action eadem numero actio Now all the Changes which arrive in the World have no other Natural Cause than the Motions of Bodies and Volitions of Minds For First by the General Laws of the Communications of Motions the invisible Bodies which surround the visible produce by their various Motions all these divers Changes whose Cause is not apparent And Secondly by the Laws of Union of our Soul and Body when circumambient Bodies Act upon our own they produce in our Soul a multiplicity of Sensations Idea's and Passions Thirdly Our Mind by its Volitions produces in it self infinite different Idea's for they are our Volitions which as Natural Causes intend and Modifie our Mind Their Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has establish'd And Lastly when our Soul acts upon our Body she produces several Changes in it by vertue of the Laws of her Union with it and by means of our Body she effects in those about it abundance of Changes by vertue of the Laws of Communication of Motions So that the Motions of Bodies and the Volitions of Minds are the only Natural or Occasional Causes of Natural Effects which no Man will deny who uses any Attention supposing only he be not prepossest by those who understand not what they say who fancy perpetually to themselves such Beings as they have no clear Idea's of and who offer to explain things which they do not understand by others absolutely incomprehensible Thus having shown that God by his Concourse or rather by his Efficacious Will performs whatever is done by the Motions of Bodies and the Wills of Minds as Natural or Occasional Causes it appears that God does every thing by the same Action of the Creature Not that the Creatures have of themselves any Efficacious Action but that the Power of God is in a manner Communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has establish'd on their account This then is all that I can do to reconcile my Thoughts to the Opinion of those Divines who defend the necessity of immediate Concourse and hold that God does All in all things by an Action no ways differing from the Creatures For as to the rest of the Divines I think their Opinions utterly indefensible and especially that of Durandus together with the Sentiments of some of the Ancients refuted by St. Austin who absolutely deniâ—d the necessity of God's Concurrence pretending that Second Causes did all things by the Power which God in their Creation gave them For though this Opinion be less intricate and perplex'd than that of other Divines yet to me it seems so repugnant to Scripture and so suitable to Prejudices to say no worse of it that I think it altogether unwarrantable I confess that the School-Men who make God's immediate concourse to be the same Action with that of the Creatures do not perfectly agree with my Explication and all those that I have read except Biel and Cardinal d' Ailly are of Opinion That the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First But as I make it indispensable for me to speak nothing but what I clearly conceive and always to take the side that best comports with Religion I think I am not liable to blame for deserting an Opinion which to many Men seems still more inconceiveable as they strive more to comprehend it and for establishing another which agrees perfectly not only with Reason but also with the Sacredness of our Religion and Christian Morality which is a Truth already prov'd in the Chapter that 's the Subject of these Reflexions However 't is not inconvenient to say something to it that I may fully verifie what I have said upon the present Question Both Reason and Religion evince That God will be Lov'd and rever'd by his Creatures Lov'd as Good and Rever'd as Power Which is such a Truth as it would be Impiety and Madness to doubt of To love God as he requires and deserves we must according to the First Commandment both of the Law and Gospel and by Reason it self as I have somewhere shown Love Him with all our Strength or with the whole extent of our Loving Capacity 'T is not sufficient to prefer Him before all things unless we moreover Love Him in all things For otherwise our Love is not so perfect as it ought to be and we return not to God all the Love that he gives us and gives us only for Himself in whom every one of His Actions Center So to render to God all the Reverence that is due to Him 't is not enough to adore Him as the Supreme Power and fear Him more than His Creatures we must likewise fear and adore Him in all His Creatures all our respects must perpetually tend towards Him to whom alone Honour and Glory are to be ascrib'd Which is what God Commands us in these Words Thou shalt Love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart and with all thy Soul and with all thy Strength And in these Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God and Him only shalt thou serve Thus the Philosophy that convinces us that the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind that the Nature of Aristotle and some other Philosophers is a Chimera that none but God is Strong and Powerful enough not only to Act on our Soul but even to give the
us good but as capable to enjoy together with us the true Good These Truths seem evident to me but Men strangely obscure them by supposing that the surrounding Bodies can Act on us as True Causes Indeed most Christian Philosophers acknowledge That the Creatures can do nothing unless God concur to their Action and that so sensible Objects being unable to Act on us without the Efficacy of the First Cause must not be lov'd or fear'd by us but God only on whom they depend Which Explication makes it manifest That they condemn the consequences which I have now deduc'd from the Principle they receive But if in imitation of Monsieur de la Ville's Conduct I should say 't was a slight and subterfuge of the Philosophers to Cloak their Impiety if I should urge them with the Crime of supporting Aristotle's Opinions and the prejudices of Sense at the expence of their Religion if piercing too into the inmost recesses of their Heart I should impute to them the secret desire of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle which serves to justifie all sorts of disorders and which by the consequences I have drawn from it overthrows the first Principle of Christian Morality Should I be thought in my Senses whilst I went to condemn most Men as impious upon the strength of the inferences I had deduc'd from their Premises Monsieur de la Ville will no doubt pretend that my Consequences are not rightly inferr'd but I pretend the same of his and to ruine them all I need but explicate some Equivocal Terms which I shall sometime do if I find it necessary But how will Monsieur de la Ville justifie the common Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes and by what sort of concourse will he ascribe to God all that is due to Him Will he make it clearly appear that one individual Action is all of God and all of the Creature Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is not useless though without its Efficacy the sole Action of God would produce the same effect Will he prove that Minds neither ought to Love nor Fear Bodies though the latter have a true Power of Acting on the former and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon among those whose Mind and Heart are taken up with sensible Objects from a confus'd Judgment they make that these Objects are capable of making them Happy or Miserable Let him confess then That if we might treat as Hereticks and profane Persons all that hold Principles from which Heretical and Impious Consequences may be drawn no Man what ever could secure his Faith from being suspected ARGUMENT III. The Consequence of the Principle propos'd by Monsieur de la Ville as a Point of Faith viz. That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension This negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrative and direct Proof we have of the Soul 's being a distinct Substance from the Body and consequently of her Immortality When this truth is receiv'd which I presume with many other Persons to have demonstrated which Monsieur de la Ville impugns as contrary to the decisions of the Church viz. That the Essence of matter consists in Extension in Length Breadth and Thickness It is easie to comprehend that the Soul or that which is capable of Thought is a distinct substance from the Body For it 's manifest that Extension whatever Division and Motion be conceiv'd in it can never arrive to Reason Will or Sense Wherefore that thinking thing which is in us is necessarily a substance distinct from our Body Intellectual Notices Volitions and Actual Sensations are Actually Modes of some substances Existence But all the Divisions incidental to Extension can produce nothing but Figures Nor all its various Motions any thing but Relations of Distance Therefore Extension is not capable of other Modifications Therefore our Thought Desire Sensations of Pleasure and Pain are Modes of a Substances Existence which is not a Body Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body which being conceded we thus demonstrate her Immortality No substance can be Annihilated by the Ordinary strength of Nature For as nature cannot produce something out of nothing So she cannot reduce something into nothing Modifications of Beings may be Annihilated Rotundity of a Body may be destroy'd for that which is round may become square But this roundness is not a Being a Thing a Substance but only a Relation of Equality of distance between the terminating parts of the Body and that which is in the Center Which relation changing the Roundness is destroy'd but the substance cannot be reduc'd to nothing Now for the foremention'd Reasons the Soul is not a Mode of a Body's Existing Therefore she is immortal and though the Body be dissolv'd into a Thousand parts of a different Nature and the structure of its Organs broke to pieces since the Soul consists not in that structure nor in any other Modification of matter 't is evident that the dissolution and even the Annihilation of the substance of an humane Body were that Annihilation true could not Annihilate the substance of our Soul Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul grounded upon the same Principle Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing because it is a substance it may notwithstanding die and all its parts may be dissolv'd Because Extension is divisible But the Soul being a substance distinct from Extension cannot be divided For we cannot divide a Thought a Desire a Sensation of Pain or Pleasure as we may divide a square into two or four Triangles Therefore the substance of the Soul is indissoluble incorruptible and consequently immortal because unextended But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes that the Essence of Body consists in something besides Extension how will he convince the Libertines that she is neither material nor mortal They will maintain that something wherein the Essence of Body consists is capable of thinking and that the substance which thinks is the same with that which is extended If Monsieur de la Ville denies it they 'll show that he does it without Reason since according to his Principle Body being something else than Extension he has no distinct Idea of what that can be and consequently cannot tell but that unknown thing may be capable of Thought Does he think to convince them by saying as he does in his Book that the Essence of Body is to have Parts without Extension Certainly they will not take his Word for it for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extension as indivisible Atoms or Circles without two Semi-circles they must have more deference for him than he has for God himself For Monsieur de la Ville in the last part of his Book pretends that God himself cannot oblige us to belive contradictory things such as are the Parts of a Body without any Actual extension But the Libertines on their part would
were true that God acted by particular Wills since Miracles are such only from their not happening by General Laws Therefore Miracles suppose these Laws and prove the Opinion I have establish'd But as to ordinary Effects they clearly and directly demonstrate General Laws or Wills If for Instance a Stone be dropp'd upon the Head of Passengers it will continually fall with equal speed not distinguishing the Piety or Quality or Good or Ill Disposition of those that pass If we examine any other Effect we shall see the same Constancy in the Action of the Cause of it But no Effect proves that God acts by particular Wills though Men commonly fancy God is constantly working Miracles in their Favour That way they would have God to act in being consonant to their own and indulgent to Self-love which centers all things on themselves and very proportionate to their Ignorance of the Complication of Occasional Causes which produce extraordinary Effects naturally falls into Mens Thoughts when but greenly studied in Nature and consult not with sufficient Attention the abstract Idea of an Infinite Wisdom of an Universal Cause of a Being Infinitely Perfect CONCERNING Nature and Grace DISCOURSE II. Of the Laws of GRACE in particular and of the Occasional Causes which regulate and determine their Efficacy PART I. Of the Grace of JESVS CHRIST I. SINCE none but GOD can act immediately and by himself on Minds and produce in them all the various Motions they are capable of 'T is he alone who sheds his Light within us and inspires us with certain Sensations which determine our diverse Volitions And therefore none but he can as a True Cause produce Grace in our Souls For Grace or that which is the Principle or Motive of all the Regular Motions of our Love is necessarily either a Light which instructs us or a confus'd Sensation that convinces us that God is our Good since we never begin to love an Object unless we see clearly by the Light of Reason or feel confusedly by the tast of Pleasure that this Object is good I mean capable of making us happier than we are II. But since all Men are involv'd in Original Sin and even by their Nature infinitely beneath the Majesty of God 'T is Jesus Christ alone that can by the Dignity of his Person and the Holiness of his Sacrifice have access to his Father reconcile him to us and merit his Favours for us and consequently be the meritorious Cause of Grace These Truths are certain But we are not seeking the Cause which produces Grace by its own Efficacy nor that which merits it by its Sacrifice and Good Works We enquire for that which regulates and determines the Efficacy of the General Cause and which we may term the Second Particular and Occasional III. For to the end the General Cause may act by General Laws or Wills and that his Action may be regular constant and uniform 't is absolutely necessary there should be some Occasional Cause to determine the Efficacy of these Laws and to help to fix them If the Collision of Bodies or something of like Nature did not determine the Efficacy of the General Laws of the Communication of Motions it would be necessary for God to move Bodies by particular Wills The Laws of Union of the Soul and Body become efficacious only from the Changes befalling one or other of these two Substances For if God made the Soul feel the Pain of pricking tho' the Body were not prick'd or though the same thing did not happen in the Brain as if it were he would not act by the General Laws of Union of the Soul and Body but by a particular Will If Rain fell on the Earth otherwise than by a necessary Consequence of the General Laws of Communication of Motions the Rain and the Fall of every Drop that composes it would be the Effect of a particular Will So that unless Order requir'd it should rain that Will would be absolutely unworthy of God 'T is necessary therefore that in the Order of Grace there should be some Occasional Cause which serves to fix these Laws and to determine their Efficacy And this is the Cause we must endeavour to discover IV. Provided we consult the Idea of intelligible Order or consider the sensible Order which appears in the Works of God we shall easily discover that Occasional Causes which determine the Efficacy of General Laws and are of use in fixing them must necessarily be related to the Design for which God has establish'd them For Example Experience evidences that God has not made and Reason certifies that he ought not to make the Courses of the Planets the Occasional Causes of the Union of our Soul and Body He ought not to will that our Arm should be mov'd in such or such a manner or that our Soul should feel the Tooth-ake when the Moon shall be in conjunction with the Sun if so be this Conjunction acts not on the Body God's Design being to unite our Soul to our Body he cannot in prosecuting that Design give the Soul Sensations of Pain save when there happen some Changes in the Body repugnant to it Wherefore we are not to seek out of our Soul or Body the Occasional Causes of their Union V. Hence it follows that God designing to form his Church by Jesus Christ could not according to that Design seek the Occasional Causes which serve to settle the General Laws of Grace by which the Spirit of Jesus diffus'd through his Members communicates Life and Holiness to them except in Jesus Christ and in the Creatures united to him by Reason Thus the Rain of Grace is not deriv'd to our Hearts by the diverse situations of the Stars nor by the Collision of certain Bodies nor even according to the different Courses of the animal Spirits which give us Motion and Life All that Bodies can do is to excite in us Motions and Sensations purely Natural For whatever arrives to the Soul through the Body is only for the Body VI. Yet as Grace is not given to all that desire it nor as soon as they desire it and is granted to those who do not ask it it thence follows that even our Desires are not the Occasional Causes of Grace For this sort of Causes have constantly and most readily their Effect and without them the Effect is not produc'd For Instance the Collision of Bodies being the Occasional Cause of the Change which happens in their Motion if two Bodies did not meet their Motions would not alter and if they alter'd we may be assur'd they met The general Laws which shed Grace upon our Hearts find nothing therefore in our Wills to determine their Efficacy as the general Laws which regulate the Rains are not founded on the Dispositions of the Places rain'd upon For it indifferently rains upon all Places on hollow and manur'd Grounds even on the Sands and the Sea it self VII We are therefore reduc'd to confess that
unequally supplied there 's all Reason to believe the Diversity of their Graces must proceed from him who is the Chief of Angels as well as Men and who under that Character has merited by his Sacrifice all the Graces which God has given his Creatures but has variously applied them by his different Desires It being undeniable that Jesus Christ long before his Birth or Meriting might be the Meritorious Cause of the Graces given to the Angels and Saints of the Old Testament it ought methinks be granted that by his Prayers he might be the Occasional Cause of the same Graces long before they were demanded For indeed there is no necessary Relation between Occasional Causes and the Time of Production of their Effects and though commonly these sort of Causes are follow'd by their Effects at the Time of their Action yet their Action being not of it self efficacious since its Efficacy depends on the Will of the universal Cause there 's no necessity of their actual Existence for the producing their Effect For Instance Suppose Jesus Christ at this present time should desire of his Father that such a Person might receive such a Supply of Grace at certain Moments of his Life that Prayer of Jesus Christ would infallibly determine the Efficacy of the General Will God has of saving all Men in his Son This Person will receive these Assistances though the Prayer of Jesus Christ be pass'd and his Soul actually think on another thing and never think again on that which he requir'd for him But the past Prayer of Jesus Christ is no more present to his Father than a future For all that must happen in all Times is equally present to God Thus God loving his Son and knowing he shall have such Desires with respect to his Ancestors and those of his own Nation and likewise to the Angels which must enter into the Spiritual Edifice of his Church and constitute the Body whereof he is the Head ought to accomplish the Desires of his Son before they were made that the Elect which preceded his Nativity and which he purchas'd by the Merit of his Sacrifice might as peculiarly belong to him as others and that he might be their Head as really as he is ours I acknowledge it is fit that Meritorious and Occasional Causes should rather precede their Effects than follow them and that Order would have Causes and their Effects exist together For 't is plain that all Merit ought to be instantly recompenc'd and every Occasional Cause actually to produce its Effect provided nothing hinders bâ—t it may or ought be done But Grace being absolutely necessary to Angels and Patriarchs could not be deferr'd But as for the Glory and Reward of the Saints of the Old Testament since that might be deferr'd 't was fit that God should suspend its Accomplishment till Jesus Christ should ascend into Heaven be constituted High Priest over the House of God and begin to exercise the Sovereign Power of Occasional Cause of all Graces merited by his Labours upon Earth Therefore we are to believe that the Patriarchs entred not Heaven till after Jesus Christ their Head Mediator and Fore-runner But though it should be granted that God had not appointed an Occasional Cause for all the Graces afforded the Angels and Patriarchs I see not how it can be thence concluded that Jesus Christ does not at present endue the Church with the Spirit which gives it Increase and Life that he does not pray for it or that his Prayers or Desires are not effectually heard in a word that he is not the Occasional Cause which applies to Men the Graces he has merited I grant if you 'll have it so that God before Jesus Christ gave Grace by particular Wills the Necessity of Order requiring it Whilst by Order the Occasional Cause could not be so soon establish'd and the Elect were very few in Number But now when the Rain of Grace falls not as heretofore on a small Number of Men but is shower'd on all the Earth and Jesus Christ may or ought be constituted the Occasional Cause of the Goods which he has merited for his Church what reason is there to believe God works so many Miracles as he gives us good Thoughts For in short all that is done by particular Wills is certainly a Miracle as not being a Result of the General Laws he has ordain'd whose Efficacy are determin'd by Occasional Causes But how can we imagine that in order to save Men he works so many Miracles useless to their Salvation I would say affords them all these Graces which they resist because not proportion'd to the actual Force of their Concupiscence St. John teaches us That Christians receive from the Fulness of Jesus Christ Graces in abundance For says he the Law was given by Moses but Grace and Truth came by Jesus Christ. For indeed the Graces which preceded him were not comparable to those he distributed after his Triumph If they were Miraculous we are to suppose they were extremely rare Even the Grace of the Apostles before the Holy Spirit was given them could not come in comparison with those they receiv'd when the High Priest of future Goods having entred by his Blood into the Holy of Holies had obtain'd by the Force of his Prayers and sent through the Dignity of his Person the Holy Spirit to animate and sanctifie his Church The unaccountable Blindness of the Jews their gross and carnal Notions their frequent Relapses into Idolatry after so many Miracles sufficiently manifest their disregard for true Goods and the dispiritedness of the Apostles before they had received the Holy Ghost is a sensible Proof of their Weakness So that Grace in those Days was extremely rare because our Nature in Jesus Christ was not yet establish'd the Occasional Cause of Graces Jesus Christ was not yet fully consecrated Priest after the Order of Melchisedech nor had his Father given him that Immortal and Glorious Life which is the particular Character of his Priesthood For 't was necessary that Jesus Christ should enter the Heavens and receive the Glory and Power of Occasional Cause of true Goods before he sent the Holy Spirit according to the Words of St. John The Holy Ghost was not yet given because that Jesus was not yet glorified And according to others of Jesus Christ himself It is expedient for you that I go away for if I go not away the Comforter will not come unto you but if I go I will send him unto you Now it cannot be imagin'd that Jesus Christ consider'd as God is the Head of the Church as Man he has obtain'd that Quality The Head and Members of a Body must be of the same nature Jesus Christ as Man intercedes for Men as Man he receiv'd from God a Sovereign Power over his Church For as he is God he intercedes not as God he has not receiv'd a Name which is above every Name but he is equal to the Father
different Prospects and make other Discoveries of Truths sometimes they push on certain Enquiries which we out of Laziness have neglected or for want of Strength and Courage have deserted And upon this Prospect of Benefiting my self and some others I run the hazard of being an Author But that my Hopes may not prove abortive I throw in this Precaution That a Man should not be presently discourag'd though he meet with things that run counter to Common Opinions which he has all his Life long believ'd and found generally approved by all Men in all Ages of the World For they are These Universal Errours I more especially strive to extirpate Were Men throughly enlightned Universal Approbation would be an Argument but the case is quite contrary Let him therefore be once for all re-minded that nothing but Reason ought to preside over the Judgments we pass on all Humane Opinions which have no relation to Faith of which GOD alone informs us in a quite different way from that of our discovering Natural things Let him Retire into himself and press near to that Light which perpetually shines Within to the end his Reason may be more and more enlightned Let him industriously avoid all those too lively Sensations and all the Commotions of the Soul which fill the Capacity of the Mind For the least Noise or Glimmering of Light sometimes disturbs the View of the Mind And therefore 't is good to avoid all these things though not absolutely necessary And if after all the struggles he can make he finds himself unable to withstand the continual Impressions that his Body and the Prejudices of Childhood make upon his Imagination recourse to Prayer is needful that GOD may afford those Supplies wherewith his own Strength cannot furnish him Never failing still to resist his Senses For that ought to be the perpetual Employment of those who in imitation of St. Austin have a great love for Truth The CONTENTS of the First Volume CHAP. I. 1. OF the Nature and Properties of the Understanding 2. Of the Nature and Properties of the Will and wherein its Liberty consists Page 1 CHAP. II. 1. Of our Judgments and Reasonings 2. That they depend upon the Will 3. The Use which should be made of its Liberty on their account 4. Two General Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin 5. Some Necessary Reflexions on those Rules 4 CHAP. III. 1. The Answers to some Objections 2. Observations vpon what has been said concerning the Necessity of Evidence 7 CHAP. IV. 1. Of the Occasional Causes of Error whereof there are five Principal 2. The General Design of the whole Work 3. The Particular Design of the First Book 9 CHAP. V. Of the Senses 1. Two ways of Explaining how they were corrupted by Sin 2. That 't is our Liberty and not our Senses which is the true Cause of our Errors 3. A Rule for avoiding Error in the use of our Senses 10 CHAP. VI. 1. Of the Errors of Sight in respect of Extension absolutely consider'd 2. A Continuation of these Errors about Invisible Objects 3. Of the Errors of Sight touching Extension relatively considered 13 CHAP. VII 1. Of the Errors of Sight about Figures 2. We have no Knowledge of the least of them 3. The Knowledge we have of the Greater is not exact 4. An Explication of some Natural Judgments which prevent our Deception 5. That these very Judgments deceive us in some particular Junctures 18 CHAP. VIII 1. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion considered in it self 2. That Duration which is necessary to our Knowledge of the Quantity of Motion is unknown to us 3. An Instance of the Errors of Sight about Motion and Rest 19 CHAP. IX A Continuation of the same Subject 1. A General Demonstration of the Errors of our Sight concerning Motion 2. That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known in order to judge of the Quantity of their Motion 3. The Mediums whereby we know the Distances of Objects are examin'd 21 CHAP. X. Of our Errors about Sensible Qualities 1. The Distinction of the Soul and Body 2. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses 3. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united 4. An Instance to explain the Effect which Objects have upon our Bodies 5. What it is they produce in the Soul and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fibres of the Body 6. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation 25 CHAP. XI 1. The Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the external Fibres of our Senses 2. The Cause of this Error 3. An Objection and Answer 28 CHAP. XII 1. Of our Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses 2. That we have no Perception of these Motions or that we confound them with our Sensations 3. An Experiment that proves it 4. Three kinds of Sensations 5. The Errors that accompany them Ibid. CHAP. XIII 1. Of the Nature of Sensations 2. That a Man knows them better than he thinks he does 3. An Objection and Answer 4. Why a Man imagines he has no Knowledge of his own Sensations 5. That it is an Error to think all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects 6. An Objection and Answer 31 CHAP. XIV 1. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them 2. The Reasons of these false Judgments 3. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments 35 CHAP. XV. An Explication of the particular Errors of the Sight which may serve as an Exemplar of the general Errours of our Senses 37 CHAP. XVI 1. That the Errors of our Senses serve us instead of General and very Fruitful Principles from whence to draw false Conclusions and these Conclusions again become other Principles in their turn 2. The Origine of Essential Differences 3. Concerning Substantial Forms 4. Of some other Errors of the School-Philosophy 38 CHAP. XVII 1. Another Instance taken from Morality which shews that our Senses offer us nothing but false Goods 2. That God alone is our true and proper Good 3. The Origine of the Error of the Epicureans and Stoicks 39 CHAP. XVIII 1. That our Senses make us liable to Error even in things which are not sensible 2. An Example taken from the Conversation of Men. 3. That Sensible Manners are not to be regarded 41 CHAP. XIX Two other Examples 1. The first concerning our Errors about the Nature of Bodies 2. The second concerning those which respect the Qualities of the same Bodies 42 CHAP. XX. The Conclusion of the First Book 1. That our Senses are given us only for the Preservation of our Body 2. That we ought to doubt of the Reports they make 3. That 't is no little thing to doubt as we ought to do 44 Book the Second CHAP. I. 1. A General Idea of the Imagination 2. That it
in the Mind is altogether passive and includes no Action at all I call that Faculty or Capacity the Soul has of receiving all these things the UNDERSTANDING Whence we ought to conclude That 't is the Vnderstanding which perceives since 't is only its business to receive the Idea's of Objects For for the Soul to perceive an Object and to receive the Idea which represents it is one and the same thing 'T is also the Vnderstanding which perceives the Modifications of the Soul since I mean by this word Vnderstanding that passive Faculty of the Soul by means of which it receives all the different Modifications it is capable of For it is the same thing for the Soul to receive a mode of existence which we call pain as to perceive Pain since it has no other way of receiving Pain than by the Perception of it whence it may be inferr'd that 't is the Vnderstanding that imagines the Objects that are absent and is sensible of those that are present and that the Senses and Imagination are nothing but the Vnderstanding perceiving Objâ—cts by the Organs of the Body as shall be explain'd hereafter But because in the Sensation of Pain or any thing else Men generally perceive it by the mediation of the Organs of Sense they customarily say they are the Senses which perceive it without knowing distinctly what it is they mean by the word Sense They fancy there is some Faculty distinct from the Soul which renders It or the Body capable of Sensation as believing the Organs of Sense do really participate of our Perceptions They imagine the Body is so assistant to the Mind in its Sensations that if the Mind was separate from the Body it could have no Sensation at all But these thoughts are the effects of Prejudice and because in the State we are in we are sensible of nothing but through the use of the Instruments of Sense as shall be shewn elsewhere more at large 'T is by way of accommodating my self to the ordinary way of Speaking that I say in the Process of my Discourse the Senses perceive but by the word Sense I mean nothing but that passive Faculty of the Soul before-mention'd that is the Understanding perceiving any thing on occasion of what happens in the Organs of her Body according to the Institutions of Nature as shall be explain'd in another place The other Resemblance between the passive Faculty of the Soul and that of Matter is this That as Matter receives no real alteration by the change which happens in its Figure I mean for instance that as Wax receives no considerable change by becoming Round or Square so the Mind receives no change by the diversity of Idea's it contains I would say the Mind receives no considerable change though it receives the Idea of a Square or a Circle in perceiving a Square or a Circle Again As it may be said that Matter receives considerable Changes when it loses the Configuration peculiar to the parts of Wax to take that which is proper to those of Fire and Smoak when the Wax is chang'd into Fire and Smoak so it may be said that the Soul undergoes very considerable Changes when it alters its Modifications and suffers Pain after it has felt Pleasure Whence we ought to conclude That Idea's are to the Soul in a manner what Figures are to Matter and that Configurations are to Matter almost what Sensations are to the Soul There are still other Corrsepondencies betwixt the Figures and Configurations of Matter and the Idea's and Modifications of the Mind for Matter seems to be an Image or Representative of the Mind I mean only that there are Properties in Matter which have some mutual Respects between them not unlike those which we find between the Properties belonging to the Mind though the Nature of the Mind is very different from that of Matter as we shall clearly see in that which follows From what I have said I would have it well remember'd That by Vnderstanding I mean that passive Faculty the Soul has of Perceiving that is of receiving not only different Idea's bat also an abundance of different Sensations as Matter has a capacity of receiving all sorts of external Figures and internal Configurations The other Faculty of Matter is that of its being capable of receiving many Motions and the other Faculty of the Soul is that Power it has of receiving many Inclinations Let us make the Comparison between them As the Author of Nature is the Universal Cause of all those Motions which we find in Matter so also he is the general Cause of all those natural Inclinations which are found in the Mind And as all Motions proceed in a right line unless otherwise determin'd by the Rencounter of some foreign and particular Causes which by their Opposition put them into a Circular course so all the Inclinations we receive from God have a direct tendency and could only aim at the possession of Good and Truth were there not some extraneous cause which biass'd that natural Impression towards corrupt and mischievous Ends Now 't is that foreign Cause which is the cause of all our Evils and depraves all our Inclinations To understand this rightly we must know there 's a very considerable difference between the Impression or Motion the Author of Nature produces in Matter and the Impression or Motion towards Good in general wherewith the same Author of Nature continually influences our Soul For Matter is wholly inactive it has no power of retarding or stopping its Motion or determining and turning it one way rather than another It s Motion as I have said proceeds always in a right line and if at any time it is hindred from continuing it in that manner it describes the greatest circular Line it can and consequently that which comes nearest to a right because 't is God that impresses its Motion and rules its Determination But 't is not so with the Will which may in one sense be said to be Active and to have a Power in it self of giving a different Determination to the Inclination or Impression it receives from God for though it cannot stop this Impression it may in one sense cause a Deviation to what side it pleases and thereby produce all those Disorders which happen in its Inclinations and all the Miseries which are the certain and necessary Consequents of Sin So that by the Word WILL I would be conceiv'd to design That natural Motion or Impression which carries us towards Good universal and undetermin'd And by that of LIBERTY I mean nothing more than The Power the Mind has of turning that Impression towards agreeable Objects and terminating our natural Inclinations upon some particular Object which before were loose and undetermin'd except towards general or universal Good that is to say towards God who is alone universal Good since 't is he alone who comprehends in himself all Goods Whence it is easie to discover That
likewise that it is not Voluntary But as long as there is any Obscurity in the Subject we consider and we are not perfectly assur'd we have discover'd all that 's necessary to the Resolution of the Question as it most commonly happens in those which are abstruse and difficult and include many Relations we are free to deny our Consent and the Will may still command the Vnderstanding to apply it self to something new Which makes us not so averse to believe that the Judgments we form on such kind of Subjects are Voluntary Howbeit the generality of Philosophers suppose that even the Judgments we form upon things obscure are no ways Voluntary and will have the Consent to Truth in general to be an Action of the Vnderstanding which they call Assensus to distinguish it from the Consent to Good which they attribute to the Will and term Consensus but see the cause of their Distinction and Mistake Which is That in this state of Life we often evidently perceive some Truths without any reason to Doubt of them and so the Will remains not indifferent in the Consent it gives to Truths so manifest as has been just explain'd But 't is not so in point of Good there being no Particular Good we know but we have reason to doubt whether we ought to Love it Our Passions and Inclinations which we naturally have for Sensible Pleasures are though confus'd yet through the Corruption of our Nature very strong Reasons which render us cold and indifferent even in the Love of God himself And so we are manifestly sensible of our Indifference and are inwardly convinc'd we make use of our Liberty in our Loving GOD. But we do not in like manner apprehend that we imploy our Liberty in Consenting to Truth especially when accompanied with full Evidence and Conviction which induces us to believe our Consent to Truth is not Voluntary As if it was necessary our Actions should be indifferent to become Voluntary and that the Blessed did not love God most Willingly without being diverted from it by something or other in like manner as we Consent to that evident Proposition that twice 2 are 4 without being diverted from the Belief of it by any shew of a contrary Reason But to the end we may distinctly discover what the difference is between the Consent of the Will to Truth and its Consent to Goodnesâ— it is requisite to know the difference which is found between Truth and Goodness taken in the ordinary acceptation and with reference to us That difference consists in this That we have an Interest and Concern in Goodness but Truth does not at all affect us For Truth consists only in the Relation which two things or more haâ—â— between them but Goodness consists in the Relation of agreement which things have with our selves which is the reason that the Will has but One Action in respect of Truth which is its Acquiescence in or Consent to the Representation of the Relation which is betwixt things and that it has two in respect of Goodness namely its Acquiescence in or Consent to the Relation of agreement the thing has with our selves and its Love or Tendency towards that thing which actions are extreamly different though they are usually confounded For there is a great deal of difference betwixt simply Acquiescing and being carried to love the thing which the Mind represents since we often Acquiesce in things we could gladly wish were not and which we have an aversion to Now upon a due consideration of things it will visibly appear That 't is ever the Will which Acquiesces not only in things if they be agreeable to it but the Representation of things and that the reason of the Will 's Acquiescing always in the Representation of things of the clearest Evidence is as we have already said because there is no farther Relation in them necessary to be consider'd which the Vnderstanding has not already throughly discuss'd Insomuch that 't is as it were necessary for the Will to leave off disquieting and tireing it self in vain and to rest satisfy'd in a full assurance that it is not deceived since there is nothing left to put the Vnderstanding upon a fresh Inquiry This is especially to be observ'd that in the Circumstances we are under we have but a very imperfect Knowledge of things and consequently there is an absolute necessity we should have this Liberty of Indifference whereby we are impower'd to withold our selves from giving our Consent For the better discovering this Necessity it must be consider'd that we are carry'd by our Natural Inclinations to the imbracing Truth and Goodness so that the Will never reaching after things but what the Mind has some notice and apprehension of must needs pursue that which has the Face and Appearance of Truth and Goodness But because all that has the look of Truth and Good is not always what it appears to be it is plain that if the Will had not this Liberty but must infallibly and necessarily have embrac'd every thing that came cloath'd with an Appearance of Truth and Goodness it would have almost ever been Deceived Whence probably it might be concluded That the Author of its Being was the Author of its Errors and Seducements We have therefore a Liberty given us by God that we might avoid falling into Error and all the Evils consequent upon Errors by not resting with a full Assurance upon Probabilities but only upon Truth that is by commanding the Mind with an indefatigable Application to examine every thing till it has fully enlightned and unravell'd all that comes under its Examinations For Truth generally comes attended with Evidence and Evidence consists in a clear and distinct View of all the Parts and Relations of the Object which are necessary to give a certain and well-grounded Judgment The use then we should make of our Liberty is to IMPLOY IT AS FAR AS IT WILL GO That is never to consent to any thing whatever until we are as it were forc'd to 't by the secret Reproaches of our Reason To submit our selves to the false Appearance of Truth is to inslave our selves contrary to the Will of God but honestly to yield to the inward Reproaches of our Reason which accompany the Denial of our Submission unto Evidence is to obey the Voice of Eternal Truth which speaks within us Here then are Two Rules founded upon what I have been saying which are the most necessary of all others both for Speculative Sciences and Morality and which may be look'd on as the Foundation of all Humane Sciences The First which respects the Sciences is this A Man should never give an entire Consent but only to Propositions which appear so evidently true that he cannot deny it them without feeling an internal Pain and the secret Vpbraidings of his Reason that is without being plainly convinc'd he would make an ill use of his Liberty in case he should refuse to give his Consent
easier for him to preserve his Righteousness than for Us without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST since without this we have no Delight or Satisfaction in our Duty Albeit he misfortunately suffer'd himself to be seduc'd He lost that Uprightness by his Disobedience and the Principal Change he underwent and which was the cause of all the Confusion of his Senses and his Passions was that GOD by way of punitive Justice withdrew himself from him and would no longer be his Good or rather Ceas'd to make him sensible of that Pleasure which pointed out GOD as his Sovereign Good So that Sensible Pleasures which only carry'd him to the Injoyment of the Goods of the Body being left alone and no longer counterpois'd by those which drew him before to his True and Proper Good the close Union that he had with GOD was wonderfully loosen'd and that which he had with his Body as much strengthned or increas'd Sensible Pleasure having got the Dominion debauch'd his Moral Powers by fastening them upon all Sensible Objects and this Corruption of his Morals darkned his Intellectual Parts by turning him from that Light which Enlightned him and inducing him to form his Judgments on things only from the Relation or Analogy they could have to his Body But as to the Nature of the thing it self it cannot be said That the Change which happen'd on Part of the Senses was very considerable For as when two Weights are plac'd in Equilibrium in a Balance if you take away one of them the opposite Scale will be weigh'd down by the other without any alteration on part of the former weight since that still remains the same So after Sin the Pleasures of Sense bow'd and weigh'd down the Soul towards Sensible Objects for want of those Internal Delectations which before Sin counterpois'd that Inclination unto Sensible Good but without any so Substantial a Change in point of the Senses as is generally Imagin'd I come now to the Second Way of accounting for the Disorders introduc'd by Sin which is certainly more Reasonable than that we have been explaining It is very different from it because it is founded on a different Principle yet both these ways are very consistent and agreeable as to what respects the Senses Being we are made up of a Body and a Mind there are two sorts of Goods to imploy our Researches about the Goods of the Body and the Goods of the Mind We have likewise two means of Discovering whether a thing be good or ill for us either by using the Mind alone or by the use of the Mind in Conjunction with the Body We can discover our Good by a clear and evident Knowledge we can discover it likewise by a dark and confus'd Sensation Reason teaches me that Righteousness is Amiable My Taste informs me that such a Fruit is Good The Beauty of Righteousness is not Sensible nor the Goodness of a Fruit Intelligible The Goods of the Body deserve not the application of the Mind which GOD has created only for himself It must needs be then That the Mind discovers such kind of Goods without Examination and by the short and incontroverted Proof of Sensation Stones are not fit for Nourishment the Tryal is a convincing Argument and the Taste alone has made all Mankind agree to it Pleasure then and Pain are the Natural and undoubted Characters of Good and Evil I confess it But 't is only so in respect of those things which having no Power of being Good and Evil in themselves cannot be known for such by a Knowledge clear and evident 't is so in regard of those things only which being inferiour to the Mind can neither Punish nor Reward it In fine 't is only so in point of such things and Objects as are undeserving of the Soul's Applicacation and concern about them such things as GOD not willing we should be taken up with inclines us to only by Instinct that is by Agreeable or Disagreeable Sensations But as for GOD who is the True and only Good of the Mind who is alone above it who alone can Reward it in a thousand different ways who is only worthy of its Application and who is under no Fear of not being found Amiable by those that know him he is not content to be belov'd by a blind and Instinctive Love he will be lov'd by a Rational Love and a Love of Choice If the Mind saw only in Bodies what was really in them without being sensible of what was not therein it could not possibly Love them nor make use of them without great Pain and Reluctancy so that it is as it were necessary they should appear Agreeable by producing Sensations of which themselves are Destitute But 't is far from being so with GOD. 'T is sufficient to see him such as he is to be inclin'd to love him as we ought Nor is there any Necessity he should imploy that Instinct of Pleasure as a kind of Bait and Artifice to allure our Love without deserving it The Pleasure which the Blessed enjoy in the Possession of GOD is not so much an Instinct which inclines them to the Love of Him as the Recompence of their Love For it is not for the sake of that Pleasure that they Love GOD but because they manifestly know Him to be their True their Only Good This being the Case it ought to be concluded That Adam was not invited to the Love of GOD and the rest of his Duty by a Preventing Pleasure forasmuch as the Knowledge which he had of GOD as of his Good and the Joy he was continually possess'd with necessarily consequent to the View of his Felicity in his Uniting himself with GOD were sufficient Motives to recommend his Duty to him and to make his Actions more Meritorious than if he had been as it were determin'd by a Preventing Pleasure In this manner he was in perfect Liberty And 't is possibly in this Capacity the Scripture means to represent Him to us in these words He himself made Man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his Counsel to keep the Commandments c. Eccles. 15.14 That is kept him closely united to Himself only through the clear View he gave him of his Happiness and his Duty without alluring him to it by any Taste of a Preventing Pleasure But Experience has convinc'd us to the Eternal Reproach of Free Will and the Glory of GOD alone of the Frailty Adam was obnoxious to even in a State of such Perfect Order and Sublime Happiness as was that he was possess'd of before his Disobedience But it cannot be said Adam was inclin'd to the Searching out and Using of Sensible things through a nice and exact Knowledge of the Relation and Correspondence they might bear to his Body For indeed if it had been necessary for him to have examin'd the Configurations of the parts of any Fruit those likewise of all the parts of his Body
judging of things with an unwarrantable rashness For we often judge that the Objects whereof we have Idea's exist and likewise that they altogether resemble their Idea's when yet it often falls out that the Objects are neither like their Idea's nor do they exist at all The Existence of a thing does no ways follow from our having an Idea of it much less does it follow that the thing is perfectly like the Idea which we have thereof It cannot be concluded from GOD's giving us such a sensible Idea of Magnitude upon the presentation of a six Foot-rule to our Eyes that this Rule has the same Extension as it is represented to us by that Idea For first All Men have not the same sensible Idea of this same measure since all Men have not their Eyes disposed in the same manner Again The same Person has not the same sensible Idea of a six Foot-rule when he beholds it with his left Eye as when he views it with his right as has been already said Finally It often happens that the self-same Person entertains quite different Idea's of the same Objects at different times according as they are suppos'd nearer or farther off as shall be explain'd in its proper place It is then nothing but prejudice grounded upon no good reason to think we see Bodies according to their real Magnitude for our Eyes being not given us for any other purpose than the security of our Body they discharge their Duty admirable well in giving us such Idea's of Objects as are proportion'd to its magnitude But the better to conceive what ought to be our judgments concerning the Extension of Bodies from the Report of our Eyes let us imagine GOD to have created in Epitomie out of a portion of matter of the bigness of a small Globe an Heaven and Earth and Men upon this Earth with all other things the same proportion being observ'd as in this Grand World These little Men would see each other and the parts of their Bodies as likewise the little Animals which were capable of incommoding them Otherwise their Eyes would be useless to their preservation It is manifest then from this Supposition these little Men would have Idea's of the magnitude of Bodies quite different from ours since they would look upon their little World which would be but a Ball in our account as stretch'd out into infinite spaces just as we do in respect of the World in which we are Or if this is not so easie to be conceiv'd let us suppose GOD had created an Earth infinitely vaster than this which we inhabit so that this new Earth should be to ours what ours would be to that we have spoken of in the fore-going Supposition Let us moreover conceive GOD Almighty to have observ'd in all the parts which went to the Composition of this New World the very same proportion he has done in those which make up Ours It is plain that the Inhabitants of this latter World would be Taller than the space betwixt our Earth and the most distant Stars we can discover And this being so it is manifest that if they had the same Idea's of Extension of Bodies as our selves they would be able to discern some of the parts of their own Bodies and and would see others of a prodigious unweildiness so that 't is ridiculous to think they would see things in the same Bigness as they are seen by us It is apparent in these two Suppositions we have made that the Men whether of the Great or Little World would have Idea's of the Magnitude of Bodies very different from ours supposing their Eyes to furnish them with Idea's of the Objects round about them proportion'd to the Magnitude of their own Bodies Now if these Men should confidently affirm upon the Testimony of their Eyes that Bodies were of the very same bigness whereof they saw them it is not to be doubted but they would be deceiv'd and I suppose no Man will make a question of it And yet it is certain that these Men would have as Good Reason to justifie their Opinion as we have to defend our Own Let us acknowledge then from their Example That we are very uncertain of the Magnitude of Bodies which we see and that all which can be known by us concerning them from the Testimony of Sight is only the mutual Relation there is between Them and Us. In a word that our Eyes were never given us whereby to judge of the Truth of things but only to give us notice of such as might either molest or profit us in something or other But 't is not thought sufficient for Men to credit their Eyes only in order to judge of Visible Objects They think they are to be trusted farther even to judge of those which are Invisible Because there are some things which they cannot see they conclude they do not exist attributing to their Sight a Penetration in a manner Infinite This is an Impediment which prevents their discovering the real Causes of abundance of Natural Effects For that they ascribe them to Imaginary Faculties and Qualities is often meerly for want of discerning the True which consist in the different Configurations of these Bodies They see not for Instance the little parts of Air or Flame much less those of Light or of a matter still more fine and subtil And upon this score they are ready to believe they are not in being at least conclude them void of force and action They betake themselves to Occult Qualities or Imaginary Faculties to explain all the Effects whereof those Imperceptible parts are The True and Natural Cause They had rather have recourse to the horror of a Vacuum to Explain the Elevation of water in the Pump than impute it to the Gravitation of the Air. They chuse to ascribe the Flux and Reflux of the Sea to the Qualities of the Moon rather than to the pressure of the Atmosphere that is to the Air which surrounds the Earth and the Elevation of Vapours to the Attractive Faculties of the Sun than to the simple Motion of Impulse caused by the parts of the Subtil Matter which it continually diffuses abroad They look upon those as Men of trifling and impertinent Thought who have recourse only to the Flesh and Blood in accounting for all the Motions of Animals Likewise for the habits and the Corporeal Memory of Men And this partly proceeds from the Conception they have of the littleness of the Brain and its incapacity thereupon to preserve the Traces of an almost infinite number of things lodg'd in it They had rather admit though they can't conceive how a Soul in Beasts which is neither Body nor Spirit Qualities and Intentional Species for the Habits and Memory of Men or such like things notwithstanding they have no particular Notion of them in their Mind I should be too tedious should I stand to reckon up all the Errors we fall into through this Prejudice There are
that account we judge it is equally distant from us And thus upon the same grounds we conclude the Stars with the Azure which appears in the Heaven are rang'd in the same just distance in a vault perfectly convex since our Mind ever supposes Equality where it discovers no Inequality which yet it ought not positively to admit unless there be evident conviction for it I shall not here insist longer on the Errors of our Sight in respect of the Figures of Bodies since a Man may be sufficiently instructed in any Book of Opticks That Science in effect does only instruct us how to put fallacies on our Eyes and its whole drift and artifice consists meerly in finding means of making us form those Natural Judgments I have been speaking of at a time when they are most impertinent and unseasonable And this cheat may be acted in so many different ways that of all the Figures that are in the World there is not any single one but may be painted in a thousand different fashions so that the Sight must unavoidably be deceiv'd But this is not the proper place of explaining these things more throughly What I have said is sufficient to let us see we should not give over-much credit to the Testimony of our Eyes even in their Representations of the Figures of Bodies though in point of Figures their reports are much more faithful than in any other occasion CHAP. VIII I. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion considered in it self II. That Duration which is necessary to our Knowledge of the Quantity of Motion is unknown to us III. An Instance of the Errors of Sight about Motion and Rest. HAVING already discover'd the most Fundamental and General Errors of our Sight touching Extension and its Figures I come now to correct those in which this same Sight ingages us about the Motion of Matter And this has no great difficulty in it after what I have already said of Extension For there is so necessary a relation and dependence betwixt these two things that if we are deceiv'd in the Magnitude of Bodies we must as certainly be deceiv'd in their Motion too But that I may advance nothing but what is clear and distinct it is necessary to take off whatever is equivocal from the word Motion For this Term has generally two significations The first denotes a certain Power or Force which we imagine in the Body mov'd and which we suppose the cause of its Motion The second is the Translation or continued Conveyance of a Body either in its removal from or approaching to another which we consider as at rest When I say for Instance That a Boul has communicated its Motion to another the word Motion is to be understood in its first signification But if I say simply that I see a Boul in a great Motion it is to be taken in the second In a word the Term Motion signifies at once both Cause and Effect which are yet two things altogether different I am perswaded that Men are under most palpaple and most dangerous mistakes concerning the Force that gives this Motion and Translation to the Bodies mov'd Those fine Terms Nature and Impress'd Qualities are good for nothing but to shelter the Ignorance of the Falsly Learned and the Impieties of the Libertine as I could easily demonstrate But this is not a place proper to discourse of the Power that moves Bodies since that is not of a visible Nature and I am only speaking here of the Errors of our Eyes I defer it till a time when it will be more â—easonable Motion taken in the second sense that is for the Translation of a Body in its removal from another is something of a visible kind and the Subject of this Chapter I have I think sufficiently demonstrated in the sixth Chapter that our Sight does not acquaint us with the Quantity or Magnitude of Bodies in themselves but only with the mutual relation they stand in to each other and especially to our own From whence I infer that we are incapable of knowing the true and absolute Magnitude of their Motion that is of their swiftness or slowness but only the relation these Motions have to one another and more especially to the Motion ordinarily incident to our own Body Which I thus prove It is certain that we know not how to judge how great the Motion of a Body is but by the Length of the Space the Body has ran over Thus our Eyes not informing us of the true Length of the Space describ'd by the Motion it follows that 't is impossible for us to know the true Quantity of the Motion This Argument is only a Corollary of that which I have said of Extension and all the force it has proceeds from its being a necessary Conclusion of what I have there Demonstrated I shall now give one which depends on no Supposition I say then that supposing we were able clearly to discover the true Quantity of the Space describ'd it would no way follow that we could know the Quantity of Motion also The Greatness or the Swiftness of Motion includes two things The first is the Translation or Conveyance of a Body from one place to another as from Paris to St. Germains The second is the Time that necessarily goes to the making this Conveyance Now it is not enough to know exactly how far Paris is distant from St. Germains to know whether a Man has gone it with a Quick or a Slow Motion But it must moreover be known how much time he has imploy'd in his Journey Granting then that the Length of the Journey may be truly known I utterly deny we can have an exact knowledge by our Sight or indeed any other way whatever of the Time that is spent in the passage and of the true Quantity of Duration This is sufficiently evident in that at certain times one Hour seems to us as long as four and on the contrary at other times four Hours slip insensibly away When for Instance a Man's Mind is fill'd with Joy Hours seem no longer than a Moment because then the time passes away without thinking of it But when a Man is dejected with Grief and lies under some sensible Pain or Affliction every day is thought an entire Year The reason of which difference is That in this case the Mind is weary of its Duration because it is Painful The more it applies it self to the thought of it the more it discovers it and thereby finds it longer than in the season of Mirth and Joy or some diverting Imployment which as it were carries the Soul out of it self to fix her closer to the Object of her Joy or her Diversion For as a Man finds a piece of Painting so much larger by how much he stands to consider all the little things represented in it with greater attention or as he finds the head of a Fly considerably
Usefulness from those of the foregoing Discourse We instantly suppose a Man to have made some Reflections upon two Idea's which he finds in his Soul one that represents the Body and the other which represents the Mind and that he is able easily to distinguish them by the positive Attributes they contain In a word that he is very well satisfi'd that Extension is a different thing from Thought Or we will suppose he has read and meditated on some places of St. Austin as the 10th Chapter of the 10th Book Concerning the Trinity the 4th and 14th Chapters of his Book concerning The Quantity of the Soul at least Mr. Des-Cartes's Meditations especially that Part which treats of the Distinction of the Soul and Body or lastly Mr. Cordemoy's sixth Dissertation concerning the Difference of the Soul and Body We suppose farther that he is acquainted with the Anatomy of the Organs of the Senses and knows that they consist of little Threads or Fibres which derive their Origine from the middle of the Brain that they are dispers'd through all the Members wherein there is Sensation and being continued without any Interruption are terminated upon the External parts of the Body that whilst a Man is awake and in health one of the Extremities cannot be mov'd but the other will be mov'd in the same time because they are always somewhat Intense and upon the stretch the same thing which happens to a Cord that is intense one part whereof cannot be mov'd but the other must receive some Vibration 'T is farther necessary to know that these little Threads or Fibres may be mov'd by two several ways either by that end that is external to the Brain or by the end which terminates in the Brain If these Fibres are externally agitated by Objects acting on them and this Agitation be not communicated so far as the Brain as it happens in Sleep the Soul receives no fresh Sensation from them at that time But if these Fibres are moved in the Brain by the course of the Animal Spirits or by any other cause the Soul has a Perception of something though the Parts of these Fibres which are without the Brain and are dispers'd throughout all the Parts of the Body are quiet and undisturb'd as it happens when a Man 's asleep It will not be amiss to observe here by the way that Experience certifies us it is not impossible to feel Pain in those parts of our Body which have been intirely cut off Because the Fibres of the Brain which correspond to them being Vibrated in the same manner as if those Parts were actually wounded the Soul feels in those Imaginary Parts a most real Pain For all these things are a palpable Demonstration that the Soul immediately resides in that Part of the Brain in which all the Organs of the Senses terminate and centre I mean that in this Part she receives the Sensation of all the Changes that there occur in reference to the Objects that have caus'd them or have us'd to cause them and she has no Perception of any thing happening in any other Part but by the Intervention of the Fibres which terminate therein This being laid down and well understood it will be no hard thing to discover how Sensation is effected which is necessary to be explain'd by some particular Instance When a Man thrusts the Point of a Needle into his hand this Point moves and separates the Fibres of the Flesh. These Fibres are extended from that Place to the Brain and whilst he is awake they are so Intense that they can receive no Concussion or Vibration but it is Communicated to those in the Brain It follows then that the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain must be in like manner mov'd If the motion of the Fibres of the Hand is Moderate that of the Fibres of the Brain will be so too and if this Motion is violent enough to break something in the Hand it will be more forcible and violent in the Brain Thus if a Man holds his Hand to the Fire the little parts of the Wood whereof it continually throws out innumerable quantities with great violence as Reason upon the defect of our Sight demonstrates beat against the Fibres and communicate a Part of their Agitation to them If that Agitation be but moderate that of the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain which answer to the Hand will be moderate also And if this Motion be violent enough in the Hand to separate some Parts of it as it happens when it is Burnt the Motion of the Internal Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably stronger and more violent This then is what occurs in our Body when Objects strike upon us we must now see what happens to our Soul She is principally Resident if we may be permitted so to speak in that Part of the Brain where all the Fibres of our Nerves are centred She is seated there in order to cherish and preserve all the Parts of our Body and consequently it is necessary she should have notice of all the Changes that occur therein and that she be able to distinguish those which are adapted and agreeable to the Constitution of her Body from the contrary since it would be to no use or purpose for her to know them absolutely and without Relation to the Body Thus though all the Changes of our Fibres do in true speaking consist merely in the Motions of them which are generally no farther different than according to the Degrees of more or less yet it is necessary for the Soul to look upon these Changes as Essentially different For though they differ very little in themselves they ought however to be consider'd as Essentially different in reference to the Preservation of the Body The Motion for instance that produces Pain has rarely any considerable difference from that which causes Titillation There is no necessity there should be any Essential Difference betwixt these two Motions but it is necessary there should be an Essential Difference betwixt the Titillation and the Pain which these two Motions cause in the Soul For the Vibration of the Fibres which accompanies Titillation certifies the Soul of the good Constitution of her Body and assures her it has Strength enough to resist the Impression of the Object and that she need not be under any Apprehensions of its being injur'd by it But the Motion which accompanies Pain being somewhat more violent is capable of breaking some Fibre of the Body and the Soul ought to be advis'd of it by some Disagreeable Sensation so as to be aware of it for the future Thus though the Motions which are occasion'd in the Body are no farther different in themselves than according to the Degrees of more or less yet being consider'd with Relation to the Welfare and Preservation of our Life they may be said to differ Essentially 'T is upon this account our Soul has no Perception
of the Vibrations which are excited by Objects in the Fibres of our Flesh It would be of very little use for her to know them nor could she from thence receive sufficient Light to judge whether the things about us were capable of Destroying or Maintaining the oeconomy of our Body But she feels her self touch'd with Sensations essentially different which shewing precisely the Qualities of Objects as they are related to her Body make her most exactly sensible in what capacity these Objects are in to hurt it We may farther consider That in case the Soul had no Perception but of that which happen'd in her Hand when it were burnt if she saw nothing there but the Motion and Separation of some Fibres she would not much concern her self about it Nay she might probably sometimes out of an Humour or a Frolick take some satisfaction in doing it like those Freakish kind of Men who divert themselves in their Passions or Debauches in breaking all things they light upon Or as a Prisoner would not be much concern'd to see the Walls batter'd down about him that confin'd him but rather would be glad of it upon the hopes of a Deliverance So if we had no other Perception than of the Separation of the Parts of our Body when we were burnt or hurt in any manner we should soon be perswaded that our Happiness was not confin'd to a Body which prevented our Injoying those things which ought to make us Happy and so should be glad of seeing it destroy'd Hence it is apparent that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body hath with greatest Wisdom ordain'd That we should be sensible of Pain whenever any Change happen'd to our Body capable of incommoding it as when a Needle pierced the Flesh or the Fire separated some parts of it and that we should be sensible of a Titillation or an agreeable Heat when these Motions were moderate without perceiving the Truth of that which occur'd in our Body or the Motions of the Fibres we have been speaking of First because in the Sensation of Pleasure and Pain which are things far more different than in Degree we distinguish with greater Ease the Objects which occasion them Secondly because this way of Informing us whether the Uniting our selves with the Bodies that encompass us or the Separating from them be most convenient is the shortest and the speediest and takes up the capacity of the Mind the least which is only made for GOD himself Lastly because Pleasure and Pain are Modifications of our Soul which she feels with Relation to her Body and which more nearly affect her than would the Knowledge of the Motion of some Fibres belonging to it this obliges her to be more sollicitous about them And this is a Reason of the most strict Union betwixt the two Constituent Parts of Man From all which it is manifest that the Senses are given us for the Preservation of our Body only and not for the Discovery of the Truth What hath been said concerning Titillation and Pain ought universally to be understood of all other Sensations as we shall see hereafter I chose to begin with these two Sensations rather than others because they are more Strong and Lively and Proper to make my Meaning more Sensibly conceiv'd It is at present a very easie thing to shew That we fall into infinite Errors concerning Light and Colours and generally concerning all Sensible Qualities as Cold Heat Smells Tasts Sound Pain and Titillation and if I would stand to make a particular Enquiry into all those we fall into about all the Objects of our Senses whole Years would not suffice to make a Deduction of them because they are in a manner Infinite It will be sufficient therefore to speak of them in general In almost all Sensations there are four different things which Men confound with one another because they happen altogether and as it were in the same Instant And this is the Principle of all the Errors of our Senses The first is the Action of the Object that is in Heat for instance the Impulsion or Motion of the little parts of the Wood against the Fibres of the Hand The Second is the Passion of the Organ of Sense that is to say the Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand caused by that of the little Parts of Fire which Agitation is communicated to the Brain because otherwise the Soul would have no Sensation of it The Third is the Passion the Sensation or Perception of the Soul that is What every one Feels in himself when he is near the Fire The Fourth is the Judgment the Soul makes that what she feels is both in her Hand and in the Fire Now this Judgment is Natural or rather is only a Compound Sensation But this Sensation or this Natural Judgement is for the most part attended with another Free or Voluntary Judgement which is so customary for the Soul to make that she is almost incapable of preventing it Here then are four things of a very different Nature as may be seen which Men are not nice enough to distinguish but are apt to confound because of the strict Union of the Soul and Body which hinders them from making an exact distribution of the Properties of Matter and of the Mind 'T is notwithstanding easie to discover That of these four things which occur within us in the Sensation of an Object the two first belong to the Body and the two last appertain to the Soul only provided a Man has any whit meditated on the Nature of the Soul and Body as he ought to have done as I before suppos'd him But these things demand a particular Explication CHAP. XI I. The Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the External Fibres of our Senses II. The Cause of this Error III. An Objection and Answer IN this and the three succeeding Chapters I shall treat of these four things above-mention'd which I said us'd to be confounded and taken for a simple Sensation and I shall only give a general Explication of the Errors we fall into because if I would descend to Particulars there would never be an end of them But I hope however to put the Mind of those who will seriously consider what I am about to say in a condition of discovering with a great deal of Ease all the Errors our Senses can make us Subject to But in order to this it is demanded That they would attentively Meditate as well upon the following Chapters as upon that they have last been Reading The first of the things we confound in each of our Sensations is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body It is certain a Man makes hardly any Difference betwixt the Sensation of the Soul and that Action of Objects which is so plain as not to need any farther Proof The generality of Men imagine that the Heat for instance which they Feel is in
amiss to declare that no fault is to be found with these Terms of Form and Essential Difference Honey is doubtless Honey by its Form and thus it is that it differs essentially from Salt but this Form or this Essential Difference consists only in the different Configuration of its Parts 'T is this different Configuration which makes Honey to be Honey and Salt to be Salt And though it be accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Honey or Salt and so to have the Form of Honey or Salt yet it may be said to be essential to Honey or Salt that they may be what they are to have such or such a Configuration in their parts just as the Sensations of Cold of Heat of Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul but only to the Soul which feels them in as much as by these Sensations she is said to feel Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Instance taken from Morality which shews that our Senses offer us nothing but false Goods II. That GOD alone is our true and proper Good III. The Origine of the Error of the Epicureans and Stoicks I HAVE I think brought sufficient Arguments to prove that this Prejudice That our Sensations are in the Objects is a most fruitful Principle of Errors in Natural Philosophy It is my Business at present to bring others drawn from Morality wherein the same Prejudice joyn'd with this other That the Objects of our Senses are the true and sole Causes of our Sensations is most highly dangerous There is nothing so common in the World as to see Men devoted to sensible Goods some love Musick some Banquetting and others have a Passion for other things Now this is the way of Reasoning these Men must have taken to perswade themselves that these Objects are their Goods All the pleasant Tasts we are delighted with in Feasting the Sounds which gratifie the Ear and those other Pleasures we are sensible of upon other occasions are doubtless contain'd in sensible Objects or at least these Objects give us the Sensation of them or lastly are the only means of Conveying them to our Senses Now it is impossible to doubt that Pleasure is good and Pain evil We receive a Conviction from within and consequently the Objects of our Passions are most real goods to which we must cleave if we will be happy This is the Reasoning we generally fall into almost without being aware of it Thus because we believe that our Sensations are in Objects or that the Objects are of themselves capable of giving us the Sensation of them we consider these things as our own Goods though we are infinitely exalted above them since they are able to act only upon our Bodies and to produce some Motion in their Fibres but are incapable of acting upon our Souls or making us sensible either of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if our Soul acts not upon her self on occasion of what happens in the Body it is GOD alone who hath that Power And if she be not the Cause of her own Pleasure and Pain according to the Diversity of the Vibrations of the Fibres of her Body as it is most highly probable she is not since she feels Pleasure and Pain without consenting thereunto I know no other Hand potent enough to make her sensible thereof except that of the Author of Nature Certainly it is GOD alone who is our true Good He only is able to fill us with all the Pleasures we are capable of enjoying and it is only by the Knowledge of Him and Love of Him He has resolv'd to make us sensible of them Such as He has affixt to the Motions which happen in our Body to make us the more sollicitous for its Preservation are very little in themselves very weak as to their Capacity and very short in their Duration Notwithstanding in the estate Sin has reduc'd us to we are as it were become their Vassals But those which He shall make His Elect sensible of in Heaven will be infinitely greater since He hath Created us that we might know and love Him For whereas ORDER requires the Perception of the greatest Pleasures in the Possession of the greatest Goods GOD being infinitely above all other things the Pleasure of those who shall enjoy Him will certainly exceed all other Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors in respect of Good gives us a sufficient Knowledge of the falsity of the Opinions the Epicureans and Stoicks embrac'd touching the Sovereign Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because a Man is sensible of this no less in Vice than in Vertue and more generally in the former than in the other it has been commonly thought they let loose the Reins to all sorts of Sensible Pleasures Now the first cause of their Error is this That judging falsly there is something pleasant and agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the real Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being moreover convinc'd by an Internal Sensation which they naturally had that Pleasure was good for them at least for the time wherein they enjoy'd it they let themselves loose to all sorts of Passions from which they had no Apprehensions of receiving any dammage in the Consequence Whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure they reap'd from sensible things could not exist in those things as their true Causes nor any other way and consequently that sensible Goods could not be Goods in respect of the Soul and they should have thought of the things we have already explain'd The Stoicks on the other hand being perswaded that sensible Pleasures were only seated in and fitted for the Body and that the Soul ought to have a peculiar Good of her own plac'd Felicity in Vertue see then the Origine of their Errors Viz. They believ'd that Sensible Pleasure and Pain were not in the Soul but in the Body only and made use of this their false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain was not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of the Senses were not Good in their own Nature that they were common to Men and Beasts c. Notwithstanding it is easie to see that though the Epicureans and Stoicks were in the wrong in many things they were in the right in some for the Happiness of the Blessed consists only in a perfect and accomplish'd Vertue that is to say in their Knowledge and Love of GOD and in a most exquisite Pleasure that never fails to accompany them Let it then be well remembred That External Objects contain nothing either Pleasant or Troublesome in themselves that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures that we have no reason either to fear or love them but it is GOD alone whom 't is our duty to fear and our duty to love since 't is only He that has Power
they widely differ from some others who from an Abhorrence of Heresie having join'd the Idea of Novelty with that of Falsity imagine all New Opinions false and including something of dangerous Importance Thence it may be concluded That this customary Disposition of the Mind and Heart of Man in respect of all that bears the Character of Novelty is one of the most general Causes of their Errours It hardly ever conducts them to the Truth but when it does 't is purely by Chance and good Luck and it constantly obviates their Possession of their True Good by engaging them in that Multiplicity of Divertisements and falsly seeming Goods the World is fill'd with which is the most dangerous Errour Man can fall into The Third Rule against the excessive Desires of Novelty is That when we are otherwise assur'd that some Truths lie so deep that 't is morally impossible to discover them and that some Goods are so little and slender that they cannot make us happy the Novelty of them ought not to excite our Curiosity Every one may know by Faith Reason and Experience That all created Goods are notable to fill the infinite Capacity of the Will We are taught by Faith that all worldly things are Vanity and that our Happiness consists neither in Riches nor Honours Reason assures us that since it is not in our Power to bound our Desires and that we are carried by a Natural Inclination to the loving all Goods that we cannot become Happy but by possessing HIM who contains them all Our own Experience makes us sensible that we are not Happy in the Possession of the Goods we enjoy because we are still desirous of others Lastly We daily see that the mighty Goods which Princes and the most Potent Kings enjoy on Earth are incapable of filling their Desires That they have even more Disturbances and Troubles than other Men and that being on the highest Point of Fortune's Wheel they must be infinitely more shaken and agitated by its Motion than those which sit lower and nearer its Axis For in short they never fall but 't is from a Precipice they receive no little Wounds and all that Grandeur which attends them and which they incorporate with their own Being only enlarges and extends them that they may receive a greater Number of Wounds and be more expos'd to the Insults and Blows of Fortune Faith Reason and Experience thus assuring us that earthly Goods and Pleasures which we have never tasted could not make us Happy though we should enjoy them special Care ought to be taken according to the Third Rule to supersede being flatter'd with the vain Hope of Felicity which Hope insensibly increasing proportionably to our Passions and Desires will at last end in a false Confidence and an ill-grounded Assurance For when we are extreamly passionate for any Good we always imagine it excessively great and by degrees persuade our selves we shall be happy in the Enjoyment These vain Desires then must be resisted since to try to satisfie them would be a fruitless Attempt But especially for this Reason that when we give way to our Passions and spend our Time to afford them Satisfaction we lose GOD and all things with him we only run from one seeming Good to another live always in false Hopes distract and agitate our selves a thousand ways and meet with perpetual Oppositions and frustrations because the desired Goods are sought but can't be possess'd by many at once and at last we die and can enjoy nothing more For as we are taught by St. Paul They that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare and into many foolish and hurtful lusts which drown men in destruction and perdition for the love of money is the root of all evil But if we ought not to be sollicitous for the Goods of the Earth which are new to us as being certain that the Happiness we are in search of is not to be found in them much less ought we to desire to know the new Opinions about a vast many difficult Questions as being otherwise convinc'd that an humane Mind can never discover the truth of them Most of the Questions treated of in Morals and Physicks are of that nature which may afford us Reason to suspect the generality of those Books we see daily compos'd upon very obscure and most perplexing Subjects For though absolutely speaking the Questions they contain are solvable yet so few Truths being hitherto discover'd and so many to be known before we can come to those that are handled in these Books they cannot be read without hazarding to lose much by them But yet this is not the Method that is taken but the quite contrary Men examine not whether what is said be possible Promise them only extraordinary things as the Restitution of Natural Heat Radical Moisture Vital Spirits or other Unintelligible Matters and you excite their vain Curiosity and prepossess them 'T is enough to dazle them and win their Assent to offer them Paradoxes to make use of obscure Words Terms of Influence or the Authority of some unknown Authors or to make some very sensible and unusual Experiment though it have no reference to the thing advanc'd For Confusion is Conviction to some sorts of People If a Physician a Chirurgeon or an Empirick quote but some Greek and Latin Sentences and talk to their Hearers in new and extraordinary Terms they take them for Great Men they give them the Prerogative of Life and Death and believe them as they would an Oracle They imagine themselves too that they are elevated to a pitch above the common size and pierce to the bottom of things And if one happen to be so indiscreet as to testifie that five or six insignificative Words that prove nothing will not go down for Reason they think a Man void of Common-sense and that he denies First Principles And indeed these Gentlemen's First Principles are five or six Latin Words of an Author or some Greek Passage if they have greater Abilities It is even necessary for skilful Physicians to talk sometimes in an unknown Tongue to their Patients to purchase Reputation and to make themselves attended to A Physician who can go no farther than Latin may pass well enough in a Country Parish because Latin is Greek and Arabick to the Illiterate But if a Physician cannot at least read Greek â—o learn some Aphorism of Hypocrates he must not expect to pass for a Scholar with the Inhabitants of a City who commonly understand Latin And so the most Learned amongst them knowing this Humour of the World are forc'd to talk like Cheats and Quacks and we are not always to take an Estimate of their Parts and Learning from the Discourse they have in their Visits CHAP. V. I. Of the Second Natural Inclination or of Self-love II. The Division of it into Love of Being and of Well-being or of Greatness and Pleasure THE Second Inclination which the Author of Nature
all the Passions pleasant and induces us to yield our consent and give up our selves to them and 't is that satisfaction which must be overcome by the Delights of Grace and the Comforts of Faith and Reason For as the Joy of the Mind is the result of a certain or evident Knowledge that we are in the best state that can be in relation to the Objects perceiv'd by the Understanding so the pleasantness of the Passions is a natural consequence of that confused Sensation we have of being in the best state we can be in reference to those things we perceive by our Senses Now 't is by the Joy of the Mind and the Comforts of Grace that the false delight of the Passions which makes us Slaves to sensible Goods must be vanquished All the forementioned things are to be found in all the Passions unless they be raised by confused Sensations and that the Mind perceive not the Good or Evil from whence they proceed for then 't is plain that they have not the three first qualifications It likewise appears that all these things are not free since they are in us without our Consent and even against it since the Sin but that the Consent of our Will is the only thing which is really in our power However it will be fit to explain all these things more at large and to make them more sensible by some Instances Let us suppose a Man to whom an Affront has been actually offer'd or one whose Imagination is either naturally strong and lively or over-heated by some Accident as a Disease or a Surfeit of Sorrow and Melancholy This Man in his Closet fancies that such a one who perhaps does not think upon him is willing and ready to wrong him The sensible View or the Imagination of the Opposition betwixt the Actions of his Enemy and his own designs will be the first Cause of his Passion That the Motion of this Man's Will may acquire some new determination it is not absolutely necessary that he should receive or imagine he receives any Affront for 't is sufficient that his Mind only should think on it without his Body's being concern'd in it However as this new determination would not be the determination of a Passion but only a most weak and languishing Inclination 'T is better to suppose that some great opposition is actually made to this Man's Designs or that he strongly fancies that it will be so than to make another Supposition wherein the Senses and Imagination are little or not at all concern'd The second thing to be consider'd in this Man's Passion is an increase of the Motion of his Will towards that Good of which his real or pretended Enemy endeavours to deprive him the stronger the opposition is or appears the more considerable will be the increase He at first hates his Adversary only because he loves that Good and his Hatred against him grows in proportion to his Love for it because the Motion of the Will in the Passion of Hatred is at bottom nothing else but a Motion of Love that Motion of the Soul towards Good not differing from that by which she avoids its Privation as has been already observ'd The third thing is a Sensation suitable to that Passion in our Instance 't is a Sensation of Hatred But though the Motion of Hatred be the same with that of Love yet the Sensation of Hatred is altogether different from that of Love as any one may experience in himself Motions are Actions of the Will but Sensations are Modifications of the Mind The Motions of the Will are natural Causes of the Sensations of the Mind and these Sensations of the Mind reciprocally encourage and keep up the Motions of the Will in their Determination The Sensation of Hatred is in the Man before us the natural result of the Motion of his Will excited upon the view of Evil and this Motion is afterwards maintained by the Sensation it hath produced What we have just now said of this Man might happen to him though he had not a Body But because he 's made up of two Substances naturally united the Motions of his Soul are communicated to his Body and those of his Body to his Soul so that the new Determination or the increase of the Motion of his Will naturally causes a new Determination in the Motion of the Animal Spirits which is always different in all the Passions though the Motion of the Soul be still almost the same The Spirits therefore are violently driven into the Arms Legs and Face to dispose the Body in a manner adapted to the Passion and to shed over the Face the Look of an injured Person with reference to all the Circumstances of the Injury receiv'd and to the Quality and Capacity both of the Agent and Patient That Expansion of the Spirits is so much the more strong abundant and quick as the Good is greater the Opposition more vehement and the Brain livelyer affected And therefore if the Person whereof we speak only imagine himself injur'd or if he receive a real but slight injury that makes no considerable concussion in the Brain the Expansion of the Animal Spirits will prove weak and languishing and perhaps insufficient to alter the natural and ordinary Disposition of the Body But if the Outrage be exceeding great or the Imagination enflam'd the Brain will be extraordinarily shaken and the Spirits so violently dispers'd that in a moment they will imprint on the Face and Body the Symptoms of the ruling Passion If he be strong enough to obtain the Victory his Countenance will be fierce and threatning If weak and unable to withstand the overwhelming Evil he will appear humble and submissive His Moans and Tears naturally exciting in the Spectators and even in his Enemy Motions of Pity he will draw from thence those succours which he could not expect from his own strength True it is that if the Spirits and Fibres of the Brain in the Spectators and Adversary of that unhappy Wretch be already agitated with a violent Motion contrary to that which breeds Compassion in the Soul the bemoanings of the Distress'd will but increase their Fury and so would his undoing be inevitable should he always keep the same Countenance and Aspect But Nature has provided for it for at the sight of the imminent loss of a great good there are naturally produced on the Face such strange and surprizing Characters of Rage and Despair as to disarm the most Barbarous Enemies and to make them as it were unmovable That frightfull and unexpected sight of the Lineaments of Death drawn by the Hand of Nature upon the Face of an unfortunate Person stops in the very Enemy stricken therewith the Motions of the Spirits and Blood that carried him to Revenge and in that favourable moment of Audience Nature printing again an humble submissive air upon the Face of the poor Wretch that begins to entertain some hopes because of the unmovableness and
affords us the Enjoyment of him as far as we are capable of it in this Life whereas the Blindness of the Mind and the Depravation of the Heart make our Imperfection and are the Results of the Union of our Soul and Body as I have proved in several Places shewing that we never know the Truth nor love the real Good when we follow the Impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions All this is evident and yet Men who all passionately desire the Perfection of their Being care but little to increase the Union which they have with God nay they are continually at work to strengthen and enlarge that which they have with sensible things The Cause of that surprizing Disorder cannot be too much explain'd The Possession of Good must naturally produce two Effects in the Possessour at once must render him more perfect and more happy however it does not always fall out so 'T is impossible indeed that the Mind should actually enjoy a Good without being actually more perfect but it may happen that it actually enjoys it without being actually happier Those that know Truth best and love most the most lovely Goods are always actually more perfect than those that live in blind Ignorance and disorderly Practice but they are not always actually happier It is even so with Evil it ought at once to make both imperfect and unhappy but though it always makes Men more imperfect yet it does not always make them more unhappy or at least makes them not unhappy proportionably to its making them imperfect Vertue is often bitter and distastful whereas Vice is sweet and pleasant so that it is especially by Faith and Hope that pious Men are truly happy whilst the wicked have the actual Enjoyments of Pleasures and Delights It ought not to be so indeed but however it is so Sin has brought forth that Disorder as I said in the foregoing Chapter and that Disorder is the principal Cause not only of the Corruption of our Morals but also of the Ignorance and Darkness of our Mind By that Disorder it is that our Imagination persuades it self that Bodies may be the Good of the Mind For Pleasure as I have often said is the sensible Character or Mark of Good But now of all the Pleasures we enjoy upon Earth the most sensible are those which we imagine to receive by the Body We judge though too inconsiderately without doubt that Bodies can be and are effectually our Good And 't is so hard to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to withstand the Arguments of the Senses that the design of it does not so much as come into our Mind We think not on the Disorders introduc'd by Sin We consider not that Bodies can act upon the Mind but as occasional Causes that the Mind cannot immediately or by it self enjoy any Corporeal thing and that all the ways it has of uniting to an Object are by its Knowledge and Love that God only is superiour to it can reward or punish it by Sensations of Pleasure or Pain that can enlighten and move it in a word act upon it Those Truths though most evident to attentive Minds are not however so powerful to convince us as is the deceiving Experience of a sensible Impression When we consider something as part of our selves or look on our selves as a part of that thing we judge it our Good to be united to it we love it and this love is so much the greater as the thing whereunto we think our selves united seems to be a more considerable part of the whole we make up together with it Now there are two sorts of Proofs which persuade us that a thing is part of our self viz. the Instinct of Sensation and the Evidence of Reason By the Instinct of Sensation I am persuaded that my Soul is united to my Body or that my Body makes part of my Being but I have no full Evidence of it since I know it not by the light of Reason but by the Pain or Pleasure I feel at the presence and impression of Objects My Hand is prick'd I suffer Pain thence I conclude that my Hand makes part of my self my Cloaths are rent and I endure nothing therefore I say my Cloaths are not my self my Hair is cut without Pain but cannot be pluck'd up without smart that puzzles the Philosopher and he knows not what to determine In the mean while this perplexity shows that even the wisest rather judge by the instinct of Sensation than by the light of Reason that such or such things belong or belong not to themselves For should they determine them by Evidence and the light of Reason they would quickly know that the Mind and the Body are two sorts of Beings altogether opposite that the Mind cannot be united to the Body by it self and that the Soul is wounded when the Body is struck only because of her Union with God 'T is then only by the Instinct of the Sensation that we look on our Body and all the sensible things to which we are united as part of our selves that is as belonging to that which thinks and feels in us For what is not cannot be known by evident Reason since Evidence discovers Truth alone But on the contrary 't is by the light of Reason that we know the Relation we have with Intellectual things We discover by a clear View of the Mind that we are united to God in a more strict and essential manner than to our Body that without him we are nothing and neither can doe nor know neither will nor be sensible of any thing that he is our All or if we may so speak that we make up a whole with him of which we are but an infinitely small part The light of Reason discovers us a thousand Motives to love God only and to dispise Bodies as unworthy of our Love But we are not naturally sensible of our Union to God nor persuaded that he is our All by the Instinct of sense 't is only the Grace of our Lord which produces in some Men that spiritual sense to help them to overcome the contrary Sensations by which they are united to their Body For God as the Author of Nature inclines Minds to the love of him by a Knowledge of Illumination and not of Instinct and in all probability 't is but since the Fall that God as the Author of Grace has superadded Instinct to Illumination because our light is at present so mightily impair'd as to be incapable of bringing us to God being besides continually weakn'd by contrary pleasure or instinct and rendred ineffectual We therefore discover by the light of the Mind that we are united to God and to the intellectual World which he contains and are convinced by Sensation that we are united to our Body and by it to the material and sensible World God has Created But as our Sensations are more lively moving frequent and lasting than our Illuminations so 't
on a sudden design'd the destroying of the whole Nation that his Revenge might be the more splendid Two Men sue each other about a Piece of Land they ought only to produce in Court their Titles to it and to say nothing but what relates to the Case or to set it off fair However they seldom fail to slander one another to contradict each other in every thing to raise trifling Contestations and Accusations and to intricate the Suit with an infinity of Accessary Circumstances which confound the Principal In short the Passions reach as far as the sight of the Mind does in those that are affected by them I would say there is nothing to which we may suppose their Object to be related but their Motion will extend to it which is done after the following manner The Tracks of the Objects are so connected to each other in the Brain that it is impossible the Course of the Spirits should violently move any one of them without raising several others at the same time The principal Idea of the Thing perceiv'd is therefore necessarily accompanied with a vast number of accessary Ideas which increase more and more as the Impression of the Animal Spirits is more violent Now that Impression cannot but be very violent in the Passions because they continually hurry into the Brain abundance of such Spirits as are fit to preserve the Traces of the Ideas which represent their Object So that the Motion of Love or Hatred extends not only to the Chief Object of either Passion but also to all the Things that are found any ways relating to it because the Motion of the Soul in the Passion follows the Perception of the Mind as the Motion of the Animal Spirits in the Brain follows the Traces of the Brain as well those that excite the principal Idea of the Passion 's Object as those that are related to it And therefore we must not be surprized if Men carry their Hatred or Love to such a heighth and commit such strange and capricious Actions Every one of those Effects has its proper Cause though unknown to us because their accessary Ideas being not always like to ours we cannot rightly judge of them So that Men act always by some particular Reason even in those Actions that appear most extravagant to us CHAP. VII Of the Passions in particular And first Of Admiration and its ill Effects WHatever I have said hitherto of the Passions is general yet 't is no hard matter to draw particular Inferences from it If one do but reflect upon what occurs in his own Breast and upon the Actions of others he will discover at one View a greater number of those Truths than can be explain'd in a considerable time However there are so few who think of retiring into themselves and make any Attempt to that purpose that to quicken them and raise their Attention it will not be amiss somewhat to descend into Particulars It seems when we handle or strike our selves that we are almost insensible whereas if we be but never so little touched by others we receive such lively Sensations as awaken our Attention In a word as it never comes into our Mind to tickle our selves and if it did perhaps the Attempt would be unsuccessful So almost for the same Reason the Soul cares not to feel and sound her self is presently disgusted at that sort of Exercise and commonly is incapable of feeling or knowing all the Parts that belong to her till touch'd and made sensible to her by others So that it will be necessary for the facilitating some People in acquiring the Knowledge of themselves to mention some of the particular Effects of the Passions to â—each them by touching them of what Make and Constitution their Soul is of In the mean while those that shall read the following Thoughts must be forewarn'd that they will not always be touched to the Quick nor be aware that they are subject to the Passions and Errours of which I shall speak because particular Passions are not always the same in all Men. All Men indeed have the same natural Inclinations which referr not to the Body and likewise all those that relate to it when 't is in a very good Constitution But its various Tempers and frequent Alterations produce an infinite Variety in particular Passions To which diversity of Constitutions if that variety of Objects be added which cause very different Impressions upon those who follow not the same Employments and manner of Life it will plainly appear that such a Person who is lively touched by some Things in one Place of his Soul may be absolutely insensible as to many others so that we should commonly mistake should we always judge of the Commotions of others by what we feel in our selves I am not afraid of being deceiv'd when I assert That all Men would be happy for I fully and certainly know that Chinese and Tartars Angels and Devils in a word all Spirits whatsoever have an Inclination for Felicity Nay I know that God shall never produce any Spirit without that Desire I never saw either Chinese or Tartar so that I never learn'd it from Experience nor yet from my inward Consciousness which only teaches me that I would my self be happy God alone can inwardly convince me that all other Men Angels and Devils desire Happiness and he only can assure me that he will never create a Spirit that shall not care for Felicity For who else can positively assure me of what he does and even thinks And as he cannot deceive me so I may safely relie on what I learn from him And therefore I am certain that all Men would be happy because that Inclination is natural and independent on the Body It goes quite otherwise with particular Passions For because I love Musick Dancing Hunting Sweet-meats high-season'd Dishes c. I cannot certainly conclude that other Men have the same Passions Pleasure is doubtless sweet and grateful to Men but all find it not in the same Things The Love of Pleasure is a Natural Inclination not depending upon the Body and therefore general to all Men But the Love of Musick Hunting or Dancing is not general because the Disposition of the Body from which it proceeds being different in several Persons the Passions they produce are not always the same General Passions as Desire Joy and Sorrow are the Mean betwixt natural Inclinations and particular Passions They are general as well as Inclinations but they are not always of the same strength because the Cause which produces and feeds them is not always equally active There is an infinite Variety in the Degrees of Agitation of the Animal Spirits in their Plenty and Scarcity in their Solidity and Fineness and in the Relation betwixt the Fibres of the Brain and those Spirits And therefore it often happens that we touch not Men in any part of their Soul when we treat of particular Passions but if they chance to
be touched they are violently moved On the contrary the mentioning of general Passions and Inclinations never fail to affect us but so weakly and faintly that we are scarce sensible of it I mention this lest any should judge of what I say by his own Commotions that he either has or shall receive from my Discourse but rather that he should judge of it by considering the Nature of the Passions I speak of Should we purpose to handle all the particular Passions and distinguish them by the Objects that raise them it is plain the Task would be endless and we should only repeat the same thing The former because the Objects of the Passions are infinite the latter because we should be constantly engag'd in the same Subject The particular Passions for Poetry History Mathematicks Hunting Dancing are but one general Passion For for example the Passions of Desire or Joy for whatever pleases are not different Passions though delightful Objects in particular differ much And therefore the Number of Passions must not be multiplied by the Number of Objects which are infinite but only by the principal Relations they may have to us And so it will appear as we shall explain it hereafter that Love and Hatred are the Mother-Passions which produce no other general Passions besides Desire Joy and Sorrow that the particular Passions are made up only of those Three primitive and more or less compounded according to the number of accessary Ideas that attend the principal Idea of the Good or Evil which has rais'd them or as the Good and Evil are more or less circumstantiated with reference to us If we remember what has been said of the Connection of Ideas and that in all great Passions the Animal Spirits being extreamly agitated stir up in the Brain all the Traces any ways related to the moving Object we shall own that there is an infinite Variety of different Passions which have no particular Names and cannot be explain'd but by saying they are inexplicable If the primitive Passions of the Complication of which others are made up were not susceptible of more or less it would not be difficult to determine the Number of all the Passions but that number of complicated Passions must needs be infinite because one and the same Passion having infinite Degrees may by its Conjunction with others be infinitely complicated so that there were perhaps never two Men affected with the same Passion if by that Name be understood an even Mixture and Likeness of all the Motions and Sensations that are occasionally rais'd in us upon the presence of some Object But as more or less do not alter the Species so it may be said that the Number of Passions is not infinite because the Circumstances that attend Good or Evil which excite the Passions are not innumerable But let us explain our Passions in particular When we see any thing the first time or when having seen it several times accompanied with some Circumstances we see it again attended with others we are surprized and admire it Thus a new Idea or a new Connection of old Ideas raises in us an Imperfect Passion which is the first of all and nam'd Admiration I call it imperfect because 't is not excited either by the Idea or Sense of Good The Brain being then struck in some unusual Places or in a new manner the Soul is sensibly moved and therefore must needs strongly apply her self to what is new in that Object for the same Reason that a bare Tickling the Soale of the Feet raises a very lively and moving Sensation in the Soul rather by the Novelty than by the Strength of the Impression There are other Reasons of the Application of the Soul to new Things but I have explain'd them where I speak of the Natural Inclinations Here we consider the Soul only as related to the Body in which respect the Commotion of the Spirits is the natural Cause of her Application to new Things In Admiration strictly taken we consider things only as they are in themselves or as they appear and look not on them as related to us or as good or bad Hence it comes that the Spirits disperse not through the Muscles to give the Body the Disposition that is required for persuing Good or shunning Evil and shake not the Nerves that go to the Heart and other Viscera to hasten or retard the Fermentation or Motion of the Blood as it happens in other Passions All the Spirits go the Brain to print a lively and distinct Image of the surprizing Object that the Soul may consider and know it again whilst the rest of the Body remains in the same posture and as unmovable For as there is no Commotion in the Soul so there is no Motion in the Body When the admired Things appear great Admiration is always follow'd with Esteem and sometimes with Veneration whereas it is always accompanied with Contempt and sometimes with Disdain when they appear little The Idea of Grandeur causes a great Motion of the Spirits in the Brain and the Tracks that represent it are kept very long And likewise a great Motion of the Spirits raises in the Soul an Idea of Greatness and powerfully fixes the Mind on the Consideration of that Idea On the contrary the Idea of Littleness produces but an inconsiderable Motion of Spirits in the Brain and the Traces representing it are soon blotted out And likewise a small Motion of Spirits raises in the Soul an Idea of Meanness and stays the Mind but little on the Consideration of that Idea Those things deserve to be taken notice of When we consider our selves or something united to us our Admiration is always accompanied with some moving Passion which however only agitates the Soul and the Spirits that go to the Heart because there being no Good to seek nor Evil to avoid the Spirits disperse not themselves through the Muscles to dispose the Body to some Action The Contemplation of the Perfection of our Being or of something belonging to it naturally produces Pride or Self-esteem Contempt of others Joy and some other Passions The Contemplation of our own Grandeur causes Haughtiness that of our Strength Valour or Boldness and that of any other Advantage naturally raises some other Passion which is still a kind of Pride On the contrary the Conâ—ideration of some Imperfection of our Being or of something belonging to it naturally produces Humility Contempt of our selves Reverence for others Sorrow and some other Passions The â—ight of our Littleness causes Pusilanimity that of our Weakness Timidity and that of any Disadvantage whatsoever naturally raises some other Passion which is still a kind of Humility But neither that Humility nor that Pride are properly Vertues or Vices being only Passions or involuntary Commotions which yet are very useful to Civil Society and even in some Cases absolutely necessary for the preservation of the Life or Goods of those that are actuated by them 'T is necessary
great and solid Truth which they have rendred familiar and which bears 'em up and strengthens them in all Occasions CHAP. IX Of Love and Aversion and their principal Species LOve and Hatred are the Passions that immediately succeed Admiration for we dwell not long upon the Consideration of an Object without discovering the Relations it hath to us or to something we love The Object we love and to which consequently we are united by that Passion being for the most part present as well as that which we actually admire our Mind quickly and without any considerable Reflection makes the necessary Comparisons to find out the Relations they have to each other and to us or else is naturally aware of them by a preventing Sense of Pleasure and Pain Then it is that the Motion of Love we have for our selves and for the beloved Object extends to that which is admired if the Relation it has immediately to us or to something united to us appear advantageous either by Knowledge or Sensation Now that new Motion of the Soul or rather that Motion of the Soul newly determin'd join'd to that of the Animal Spirits and followed with the Sensation that attends the new Disposition that the same new Motion of the Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion we call here Love But when we feel by any Pain or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge that the Union or Relation of the admired Object would prove disserviceable to us or to something united to us then the Motion of the Love we have for our selves or for the Thing united to us terminates in us or cleaves to the united Object without following the View of the Mind or being carried to the admired Thing But as the Motion towards Good in general which the Author of Nature continually imprints on the Soul carries her to whatever is known and felt because what is either intelligible or sensible is Good in it self so it may be said that the Resistance of the Soul against that natural Motion which attracts it is a kind of voluntary Motion which terminates in Nothingness Now that voluntary Motion of the Soul being join'd to that of the Spirits and Blood and followed by the Sensation that attends the new Disposition which that Motion of the Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion we call here Aversion or Hatred That Passion is altogether contrary to Love and yet 't is never without Love It is altogether contrary to it because Aversion separates and Love unites the former has most commonly Nothingness for its Object and the latter has always a Being The former resists the natural Motion and makes it of no effect whereas the latter yields to it and makes it victorious However Aversion is never separated from Love because Evil the Object of the former is the Privation of Good so that to fly from Evil is to fly from the Privation of Good that is to say to tend to Good And therefore the Aversion of the Privation of Good is the Love of Good But if Evil be taken for Pain the Aversion of Pain is not the Aversion of the Privation of Pleasure because Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure and therefore is not the Privation of it But the Aversion of Pain being the Aversion of some internal Misery we should not be affected with that Passion should we not love our selves Lastly If Evil be taken for what causes Pain in us or for whatever deprives us of Good then Aversion depends on Self-love or on the Love of something to which we desire to be united So that Love and Aversion are two Mother-Passions opposite to each other but Love is the First the Chief and the most Universal As at that great Distance and Estrangement we are from God since the Fall we look upon our Being as the Chief Part of the Things to which we are united so it may be said in some sense that our Motion of Love for any thing whatsoever is an Effect of Self-love We love Honours because they raise us our Riches because they maintain and preserve us our Relations Prince and Country because we are concern'd in their Preservation Our Motion of Self-love reaches to all the Things that relate to us and to which we are united because 't is that Motion which unites us to them and spreads our Being if I may so speak on those that surround us proportionably as we discover by Reason or by Sensation that it is our Interest to be united to them And therefore we ought not to think that since the Fall Self-Love is only the Cause and Rule of all other Affections but that most part of other Affections are Species of Self-love For when we say that a Man loves any new Object we must not suppose that a new Motion of Love is produc'd in him but rather that knowing that Object to have some Relation or Union with him he loves himself in that Object and that with a Motion of Love coeval to himself For indeed without Grace there is nothing but Self-love in the Heart of Man The Love of Truth of Justice of God himself and every other Love that is in us by the first Institution of Nature have ever since the Fall been a Sacrifice to Self-love There is no doubt however but the most wicked and barbarous Men Idolaters and Atheists themselves are united to God by a natural Love of which consequently Self-love is not the Cause for they are united to him by their Love to Truth Justice and Vertue they praise and esteem good Men and do not love them because they are Men but because they see in them such Qualities as they cannot forbear to love because they cannot forbear to admire and judge them amiable And therefore we love something besides our selves but Self-love over-rules all the rest and Men forsake Truth and Justice for the smallest Concerns For when by their natural Force they venture their Goods and Lives to defend oppress'd Innocence or on any other Occasion their greatest Spur is mere Vanity and the hopes of getting a Name by the seeming Possession of a Vertue which is reverenc'd by all the World They love Truth and Justice when on their side but never against themselves because without Grace they cannot obtain the least Victory over Self-love There are many other sorts of natural Love We naturally love our Prince Country Relations those that have any Conformity of Humour Designs and Employments with us But all those sorts of Love are very weak as well as the Love of Truth and Justice and Self-love being the most violent of all conquers them so easily as to find no other Resistance but what it creates against it self Bodies that strike against others lose their Motion proportionably as they communicate it to the stricken and after having moved many other Bodies may at last entirely lose their own Motion It is not so with Self-love It determines every
may dissipate their Errours yet their Imagination being disorder'd by Fear and their Heart corrupted by Hatred and false Zeal those Reasons how solid soever they might be could not long stop the impetuous Stream of those violent Passions nor hinder them from speedily justifying themselves by sensible and convincing Proofs For we ought to observe that there are transitory Passions which never return whereas there are others that are constant and permanent Those that are not kept up by the sight of the Mind but are only produced and fortified by the sensible View of an Object and the Fermentation of the Blood are not lasting but commonly die soon after their Birth whereas those that are associated with the Contemplation of the Mind are steady because the Principle that produces them is not subject to change as Blood and Humours are So that Hatred Fear and all other Passions that are excited or preserved by the Knowledge of the Mind and not raised by the sensible View of Evil must needs be durable and withal very violent and unjust However those Passions are not the most lively and sensible as we shall now shew The Perception of Good and Evil which raises the Passions is produced Three ways by the Senses by the Imagination and by the Mind By way of the Senses it produces very quick and sensible Passions by way of the Imagination much weaker but those which proceed from the Perception of Good and Evil by the Mind alone are true Passions on no other account than as that View of Good and Evil is always attended by some Motion of the Animal Spirits Passions are only given us for the good of the Body and for uniting us by it to sensible Things For though sensible Things are neither good nor bad in reference to the Mind yet they are so in relation to the Body to which the Mind is united So that the Senses and Imagination discovering much better than the Mind the Relation of sensible Objects to our Body must needs raise Passions far livelier than a clear and evident Knowledge But because our Knowledge is always attended with some Commotion of the Spirits a clear and evident Knowledge of a great Good or a great Evil not to be discover'd by the Senses always raises some secret Passion However all clear and evident Knowledge of any Good or Evil is not always followed with a sensible and perceptible Passion as all our Passions are not accompanied with an intellectual Knowledge For as we sometimes think upon Good or Evil without being conscious of any Commotion so we often feel our selves agitated with Passion without knowing or sometimes without being sensible of the Cause A Man that sucks in a good Air is affected with Joy and knows not why nor what sort of Good he enjoys that produces it And if some invisible Corpuscle mixes with his Blood and hinders its Fermentation he is taken with Sorrow and may even ascribe the Cause of it to something visible that offers it self to him in the time of his Passion Of all Passions none are more sensible nor quick and consequently less mingled with Knowledge than Horrour and Antipathy Agreeableness and Sympathy A Man sleeping under the Shadow of a Tree often starts up when a Fly stings him or a Leaf tickles him as though a Serpent had bitten him The confused Sense of a Thing as terrible as Death it self frightens him and he finds himself surpriz'd with a very strong and violent Passion which is an Aversion of Desire before he bethinks himself On the contrary a Man in want discovers by chance some small Good the Sweetness of which surprizes him and he is inconsiderately taken up with that Trifle as though it were the greatest Good in the World without making any Reflection on it The same happens in the Motions of Sympathy and Antipathy We see in a Company a Person whose Deportment and Manners have some secret Agreeableness to the present Disposition of our Body so his Sight pierces and strikes us and we are inclined without Reflection to love and wish him well Thus we are agitated by I don't know what since Reason has no Share in it The contrary befals those whose Aspect and Looks shed as it were Disgust and Aversion They have I know not what that offends and puts us back for the Mind understands nothing in it the Senses only are competent Judges of sensible Beauty and Ugliness which are the Objects of those kinds of Passions F. MALEBRANCHE's TREATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH BOOK VI. Concerning METHOD CHAP. I. The Design of this Book Two general Ways for the Preserving Evidence in the Search of Truth which shall be the Subject of this Tract WE have seen in the foregoing Books that the Mind of Man is very obnoxious to Errour that the Deceptions of his Senses the Visions of his Imagination and the Abstractions of his Mind lead him into frequent Mistakes that the Inclinations of his Will and the Passions of his Heart almost ever conceal the Truth from him and never suffer it to appear without being tinged with those false Colours that flatter Concupiscency In short we have partly discover'd the Errours of the Mind with their Causes Now 't is time we should shew the Way that leads to the Knowledge of Truth and give the Mind all the possible Skill and Strength to walk therein without straying or wearying it self in vain But to spare the Readers an unprofitable Labour we think fit to advise them this Last Book is only made for such as earnestly desire to seek the Truth by themselves and to make use of the Force of their own Mind for that purpose I require them to despise for a while all probable Opinions to wave the strongest Conjectures to neglect the Authority of all the Philosophers to free themselves as far as possible from all Prejudice Interest and Passion to enter into an extreme Mistrust of their Senses and Imagination In a word well to remember the greatest part of the Things that have been said in the former Books I attempt in this last Book to give the Mind all the Perfection it can naturally attain to by supplying it with the necessary Helps to become more attentive and enlarg'd and prescribing it those Rules that must be observed in the Inquiry after Truth that it may never mistake but learn in time whatever can be known Could I carry this Design to its utmost Perfection which I pretend not this being but an Essay towards it I might boast to have found out an Universal Science which would make those truly learned that knew how to make use of it since they would have the Foundation of all the particular Sciences which they would acquire proportionably as they should make use of that Universal Science For by this Treatise we endeavour to render the Mind capable of passing a true and certain Judgment upon all the Questions that are not beyond its reach
false Supposition of the Philosophers which we are here endeavouring to destroy that the surrounding Bodies are the true Causes of our Pain and Pleasure Reason seems to justifie a Religion like the Pagan Idolatry and approve the universal Depravation of Morals Reason I grant teaches not to adore Onions and Leeks for instance as the Sovereign Divinity because they can never make us altogether happy when we have them or unhappy when we want them neither did the Heathens worship them with an equal Homage as their great Jupiter whom they fansied to be the God of Gods or as the Sun whom our Senses represent as the universal Cause that gives Life and Motion to all things and which we can hardly forbear to look on as the Sovereign Divinity if we suppose as the Pagan Philosophers that he Comprehends in his Being the true Causes of what he seems to produce as well upon our Soul and Body as upon all the Beings that surround us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Worship to Leeks and Onions they deserve at least some particular Adoration I mean they may be thought upon and loved in some manner if it be true that they can in some sort make us happy and may be honour'd proportionably to the good they doe us Surely Men that listen to the Reports of Sense think Pulse capable of doing them good otherwise the Israelites would not have bewailed the loss of them in the Wilderness or look'd on themselves as unhappy for being deprived thereof had they not fansied to themselves some great Happiness in the Enjoyment of them See what an Abyss of Corruption Reason plunges us into when it goes hand in hand with the Principles of Pagan Philosophy and follows the footsteps of the Senses But that the Falshood of that wretched Phylosophy and the Certainty of our Principles and Distinctness of our Ideas may not be longer doubted it will be necessary plainly to establish the Truths that contradict the Errours of the Ancient Philosophers or to prove in few words that there is but one true Cause since there is but one true God that the Nature and Force of every thing is nothing but the Will of God that all Natural things are not real but only occasional Causes and some other Truths depending on them It is evident that all Bodies great and little have no force to move themselves a Mountain a House a Stone a Grain of Sand the minutest and bulkiest Bodies imaginable are alike as to that We have but two sorts of Ideas viz. of Spirits and Bodies and as we ought not to speak what we conceive not so we must only argue from those two Ideas Since therefore our Idea of Bodies convinces us that they cannot move themselves we must conclude that they are moved by Spirits But considering our Idea of finite Spirits we see no necessary Connexion betwixt their Will and the Motion of any Body whatsoever on the contrary we perceive that there is not nor can be any Whence we must infer if we will follow Light and Reason That as no Body can move it self so no Created Spirit can be the true and principal Cause of its Motion But when we think on the Idea of God or of a Being infinitely perfect and consequently Almighty we are aware that there is such a Connexion betwixt his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that it is impossible to conceive he should will that a Body be moved and it should not be moved And therefore if we would speak according to our Conceptions and not according to our Sensations we must say that nothing but his Will can move Bodies The moving force of Bodies is not then in themselves this force being nothing but the Will of God Bodies then have no proper Action and when a moving Ball meets with another and moves it the former communicates nothing of its own to the latter as not having in it self the Impression it communicates though the former be the Natural Cause of the latter's Motion and therefore a natural Cause is not a true and real Cause but only an occasional which in such or such a Case determines the Author of Nature to act in such or such a manner 'T is certain that all things are produced by the Motion of visible or invisible Bodies for Experience teaches us that those Bodies whose parts are in greater Motion are always the most active and those that Cause the greatest Alterations in the World so that all the Forces of Nature are but the Will of God who Created the World because he will'd it who spake and it was done who moves all things and produces all the Effects we see because he has established some Laws by which Bodies Communicate their Motion to each other when they meet together and because those Laws are efficacious they and not the Bodies act There is then no Force Power nor true Cause in all the Material and sensible World Nor need we admit any Forms Faculties or real Qualities to produce Effects which the Bodies bring not forth or to divide with God his own Essential Force and Power As Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing so likewise the most Noble Spirits are subject to the same impotency on that respect They cannot know any thing unless God enlightens them nor have the Sensation of any thing unless he modifies them nor will unless he moves them towards himself They may indeed determine the Impression God has given them to himself towards other Objects but I doubt whether it can be call'd a Power For if to be able to sin is a Power it is such a one as the Almighty wants saith St. Austin somewhere If Men had of themselves the Power of loving Good it might be said that they have some Power but they cannot so much as love but because God Wills it and that his Will is Efficacious They love because God continually drives them towards Good in general that is towards himself for whom alone they are Created and preserved God moves them and not themselves towards Good in general and they only follow that Impression by a free Choice according to the Law of God or determine it towards false and seeming Goods according to the Law of the Flesh But they cannot determine it but by the sight of Good For being able to doe nothing without an Impression from above they are incapable of loving any thing but Good But though it should be supposed which is true in one sense that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truths and loving Good should their Thoughts and Will produce nothing outwardly it might still be said that they were impotent and unoperative Now it seems undeniable that the Will of Spirits is not able to move the smallest Body in the World it being evident there is no necessary Connexion betwixt the Will we may have of moving our Arm for instance and the Motion of the same Arm. It moves
and agitated than those we daily see 't is to be consider'd that the Hardness of Bodies is not to be measur'd with relation to our Hands or the Endeavours we are able to make which are different at different times For indeed if the greatest Force of Men be nothing in comparison with that of the subtle Matter we should be much to blame to believe that Diamonds and the hardest Stones cannot derive their Hardness from the Compression of those little rapid Bodies which environ them Now we may visibly discover how inconsiderably weak is Humane Force if it be consider'd that Man's Power of moving his Body in so many manners proceeds from a very moderate Fermentation of the Blood which somewhat agitates the smaller Parts of it and so produces the Animal Spirits For 't is the Agitation of these Spirits which makes the Strength of the Body and gives us the Power of making those Endeavours which we groundlesly regard as something great and mighty But it must be observ'd that this Fermentation of our Blood is but a small Communication of that subtle Matter 's Motion we have been speaking of For all the Fermentations of visible Bodies are nothing but Communications of Motion from the Invisible since every Body receives its Agitation from some other 'T is not therefore to be wonder'd if our Force be not so great as that of the same subtle Matter we receive it from But if our Blood fermented as much in our Heart as Gun-Powder ferments and is agitated when Fire is put to it that is if our Blood receiv'd as great a Communication of Motion from the subtle Matter as Gun-Powder receives we might do extraordinary things with a great deal of Ease as break a Bar of Iron overturn an House c. provided we suppose a competent proportion between our Members and our Blood so violently agitated We must therefore rid our selves of our Prejudice and not following the Impression of our Senses imagine that the Parts of hard Bodies are so strongly united to one another because of the Difficulty we find to break them But if moreover we consider the Effects of Fire in Mines the Gravity of Bodies and several other natural Effects which have no other Cause then the Commotion of these insensible Corpuscles as is prov'd by M. Des Cartes in many places of his Works we shall manifestly discover that it does not exceed their Force to unite and bind together the Parts of hard Bodies so powerfully as we find them For in short I fear not to affirm that a Cannon-Bullet whose Motion seems so extraordinary receives not the thousandth part of the Motion of the subtle Matter which surrounds it My Assertion will not be doubted of if it be consider'd First That the Gun-Powder is not all inflam'd nor at the same instant Secondly That though it were all on Fire in the self-same Moment yet it floats a very short time in the subtle Matter and Bodies swimming but a little while in others can receive no great Motion from them as may be seen in Boats when riding in a Stream which receive their Motion by degrees Thirdly and principally That each part of the Powder can receive but a collateral Motion which the subtle Matter yields to For Water only communicates to the Vessel the direct Motion which is common to all the parts of it which Motion is generally very inconsiderable in respect of the others I might still prove to M. Des Cartes's Followers the Greatness of the subtle Matter 's Motion by the Motion of the Earth and the Heaviness of Bodies from whence might be drawn very certain and exact Proofs if that were necessary to my Subject But in order to have one sufficient Proof of the violent Agitation of the subtle Matter to which I ascribe the Hardness of Bodies it suffices without seeing Des Cartes's Works to read attentively what I have written in the second Chapter of the fourth Book towards the End Being now deliver'd from our Prejudices which induc'd us to believe our Efforts very potent and those of the subtle Matter which surrounds and constringes hard Bodies very feeble being likewise satisfied of the vehement Commotion of this Matter by what has been said of Gun-Powder 't will be no hard Matter to discover that 't is absolutely necessary that this Matter acting infinitely more on the Surface than the Inside of the hard Bodies it encompasses and compresses should be the Cause of their Hardness or of the Resistance we feel when we endeavour to break them But since there are always many Parts of this invisible Matter passing through the Pores of hard Bodies they not only render them hard as I have before explain'd but are also the Causes that some are springing and elastical that others stand bent and others still are Fluid and liquid and in short are the Cause not only of the Force which the Parts of hard Bodies have to remain close by one another but of that likewise which the parts of fluid Bodies have to separate or which is the same thing are the Cause of the Hardness of some Bodies and the Fluidity of others But whereas 't is absolutely necessary to know distinctly the Physicks of M. Des Cartes the Figure of his Elements and of the parts which constitute particular Bodies to account for the stiffness of some and the flexibility of others I shall not insist upon explaining it Such as have read the Works of that Philosopher will easily imagine what may be the cause of these things whereas it would be a difficult task for me to explain it and those who are unaquainted with that Author would have a very confus'd Notion of the Reasons I might offer Nor shall I stand to resolve a vast number of Difficulties which I foresee will be urg'd against what I have been establishing because if those who propose them have no knowledge of true natural Philosophy I should but tire and confound them instead of satisfying them But if they were Men of Science I could not answer them without a long train of diagrams and reasoning Wherefore I think it best to intreat those who shall find any Difficulty in what I have said to give this Discourse a more careful perusal not doubting but if they read it and consider it as they ought all their Objections will fall to the Ground But after all if they think my Request inconvenient let them sit still there being no great danger in the Ignorance of the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies I speak not here of contiguity for 't is manifest that contiguous things touch so little that there 's always a good quantity of subtle Matter passing between them which endeavouring to continue its Motion in a right Line hinders them from uniting As to the union found between two Marbles that have been polish't one upon another I have already explain'd it and 't is easie to see that though the subtle Matter passes constantly between the
it to circumambient Objects and so remove us from the Divine Light which would penetrate and illuminate us Nor does Man give himself new Modifications For the Motion of Love which God constantly imprints on us is neither augmented nor diminish'd whether we do or do not actually love I mean whether this natural Motion of Love be or be not determin'd by some Idea of our Mind Nor does this Motion cease by its Acquiescence in the Possession of Good as Motion of Bodies ceases by their Rest. There is great likelihood that God pushes us at all times alike with an even Force towards him for he pushes us on towards Good in general as fast as we are capable and we are at all times equally capable because our Will or our natural Capacity of Willing is always equal to it self Thus I say the Impression or natural Motion which carries us towards Good never encreases or diminishes I confess we have no clear Idea nor indeed inward Sensation of the Evenness of that Impression or natural Motion towards Good But this comes from our not knowing it by Idea which I have formerly prov'd and from our not being conscious of our Faculties whilst they do not actually operate We feel not what is natural and common and always the same in us as the Heat and Beating of the Heart We are even insensible of our Habits and whether we are deserving of the Love or Wrath of God We have perhaps infinite Faculties which are perfectly unknown to us For we are not inwardly conscious of all that we are but only of all that we feel Had we never felt Pain nor desir'd particular Goods we could not by our Self-Consciousness have told whether we are capable of feeling Pain or of willing those Goods It being our Memory and not our internal Sense which teaches us we are capable of feeling what we do not feel or of being mov'd by such Passions as do not actually agitate us There is nothing therefore that can hinder our believing that God draws us towards him with an equal Force though in a very different manner and that he preserves in our Soul an equal Capacity of willing or one and the same Will as he preserves in Matter collectively taken an equal quantity of Motion But though this should not be certain yet I can't see how it can be said that the Augmentation or Diminution of the Natural Motion of our Soul depends on us since we cannot be the Cause of the Extent of our own Will It is moreover certain from what I said before That God produces and preserves in us all that 's real and positive in the particular Determinations of the Motion of our Soul namely our Ideas and Sensations For this it is which determines our Motion towards Good in general to particular Goods but not in an irresistible manner because we have a tendency to go farther Hence all that is done on our part when we sin is our not doing all we yet have the power to do by means of our impression towards Him who comprehends all Goods for all our Power is deriv'd from our Union with Him who works all in us Now the principal cause of our sinning is that preferring Enjoyment to Examination by reason of the Pleasure accruing to our Enjoying and the Pain attending our Examining we desist to employ the Motion which is given us for the pursuit and disquisition of Good and we dwell upon the enjoyment of things which we should no more than make use of But if we observe the Matter nearly we shall see that in this there is nothing real on our part but only an intermission and cessation of Enquiry which corrupts as I may say the Action of God in us but yet can never destroy it So then when we do not sin What is it we do We do all that God does in us for we do not confine to a particular Good or rather a False one the Love which God impresses on us for the True And when we sin What do we do then Nothing For we love a false Good to which God does not carry us by an irresistible impression we cease to persue the true Good and frustrate the Motion God gives us towards it Now whilst we love a particular good only or against ORDER we receive as great an impression of Love from God as if we did not fix upon it Moreover this particular Determination which is neither necessary nor invincible is given us of God and therefore in sinning we produce no new Modification in our selves However I own that when we sin not but resist Temptation we may be said in one sense to give our selves a new Modification because we chuse to think on other things than the seeming Goods wherewith we are tempted But all that we then do is produc'd by the Action which God puts in us that is either by our Motion towards Good in general or by our Will assisted by Grace I mean enlightned by Knowledge and forwarded by a preventing delectation For in fine If the willing different things be suppos'd to be giving different Modifications I deny not but in this Sense the Mind may diversly modifie it self by the Action it receives from God But 't is always to be observ'd that this Action deriv'd into us from God depends upon our selves and is not irresistible with respect to particular Goods For upon the presentation of a particular Good we are inwardly conscious of our Liberty on its behalf as we are of our Pleasure and Pain when they sensibly affect us And the same Reason convinces us we are Free that convinces us we Exist for 't is the inward consciousness or feeling of our own Thoughts that give us to know we have a Being And if at the same time that we are sensible of our Liberty with respect to a particular Good we ought to doubt of it for want of having a clear Idea thereof we ought no less to doubt of our Pain and our Existence at the time of our Misery since we have no clear Idea either of our Soul or Pain It goes quite otherwise with our inward Sensation or Conscience than with our outward Senses The latter always deceive us in something when we follow their reports but the former never deceives us 'T is by the outward Senses I see Colours on the surface of Bodies that I hear Sound in the Air that I feel Pain in my Hand and their Testimony deceives me if I rely upon it But 't is by my inward Sensation that I see Colour that I hear Sound that I suffer Pain and I err not in believing I see when I see hear when I hear and suffer when I suffer provided I stop and go no farther These things are too self-evident to be longer insisted on Therefore being inwardly conscious of our Liberty at the time of a particular Good 's being present to the Mind we are not to be doubtful of
have it so and consequently HE whose essential and necessary Will is always conformable to ORDER Which Will remaining immutably the same the Establish'd Order was subverted by the first Man's Disobedience because for the demerits of his Sin it was consonant to Order that he should be Lord of nothing It is not reasonable that the Sinner should suspend the Communication of Motions that the Will of God should conform to his or that any exceptions should be made to the Law of Nature on his Behalf In so much that Man is subject to Concupiscence his Mind depends on his Body he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures and involuntary and rebellious Motions pursuant to that most just and exact Law which unites the two Parts of which he is compos'd Thus the formal Reason of Concupiscence no less than that of Sin is nothing real and positive being no more in Man than the loss of the Power he had to wave and suspend to the Communication of Motions on some occasions Nor are we to admit any positive Will in God to produce it For this loss which Man has sustain'd was not a consequence of Order or of the immutable Will of God which never swerves from it and is constantly the same but only a consequence of Sin which has rendred Man unworthy of an Advantage due only to his Innocence and Uprightness Wherefore we may say that not God but Sin only has been the Cause of Concupiscence Nevertheless God Works all that is Real and Positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence for God does every thing but all that has nothing of Evil. 'T is by the general Law of Nature that is by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce in Man's Body certain Motions and that these Motions raise in the Soul certain Sensations useful to the preservation of the Body or the Porpagation of the Species Who then dare presume to say these things are not good in themselves I know it is said that Sin is the Cause of certain Pleasures But do they that say it conceive it Can it be thought that Sin which is nothing should actually produce something Can nothing be suppos'd to be a real Cause However 't is so said but possibly for want of taking due pains of seriously considering what they say or because they are unwilling to enter on an Explication that is contrary to the Discourses they have heard from Men who it may be talk with more Gravity and Assurance than Reflexion and Knowledge Sin is the Cause of Concupiscence but not of Pleasure as Free Will is the Cause of Sin though not of the natural Motion of the Soul The Pleasure of the Soul is good as well as its Motion or Love and there is nothing good but what God does The Rebellion of the Body and the guilt of Pleasure proceed from Sin As the Adherency of the Soul to a particular Good or its Rest proceeds from the Sinner But these are only Privations and Nothings whereof the Creature is capable Every Pleasure is Good and likewise in some measure makes happy the Possessour at least for the time of the Enjoyment But it may be said to be evil because instead of elevating the Mind to Him that is the true Cause of it through the Errour of our Intellectual and corruption of our Moral Part it prostrates it before sensible Objects that only seem to produce it Again it is evil in as much as it is Injustice in us who are Sinners and consequently meriting rather to be punish'd than rewarded to oblige God pursuant to his Primitive Will to recompense us with pleasant Sensations In a word not to repeat here what I have said in other places it is evil because God at present forbids it by Reason of its alienating the Mind from himself for whom he hath made and preserves it For that which was ordain'd by God to preserve Righteous Man in his Innocence now fixes sinful Man in his Sin and the Sensations of Pleasure which he wisely establish'd as the easiest and most obvious Expedients to teach Man without calling off his Reason from his true Good whether he ought to unite himself with the invironing Bodies at present fill the Capacity of his Mind and fasten him on Objects incapable of acting in him and infinitely below him because he looks upon these Objects to be the true Causes of the Happiness he enjoys occasionally from them THE SECOND ILLUSTRATION UPON THE First CHAPTER of the First BOOK Where I say That the Will cannot diversly determine its Propensity to Good but by commanding the Vnderstanding to represent to it some particular Object IT must not be imagin'd that the Will commands the Understanding any other Way than by its Desires and Motions there being no other Action of the Will nor must it be believ'd that the Understanding obeys the Will by producing in it self the Ideas of Things which the Soul desires for the Understanding acts not at all but only receives Light or the Ideas of Things through its necessary Union with Him who comprehends all Beings in an intelligible manner as is explain'd in the Third Book Here then is all the Mystery Man participates of the Sovereign Reason and Truth displays it self to him proportionably to his Application and his praying to it Now the Desire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer that is always heard it being a natural Law that Ideas should be so much readier and more present to the Mind as the Will is more earnest in desiring them Thus provided our Thinking Capacity or Understanding be not clogg'd and fill'd up by the confus'd Sensations we receive occasionally from the Motions occurring in our Body we should no sooner desire to think on any Object but its Idea would be always present to our Mind which Idea Experience witnessing is so much more present and clear as our Desire is more importunate and our confus'd Sensations furnish'd to us by the Body less forcible and applicative as I have said in the foregoing Illustration Therefore in saying that the Will commands the Understanding to represent to it some particular Object I meant no more than that the Soul willing to consider that Object with Attention draws near it by her Desire because this Desire consequently to the efficacious Wills of God which are the inviolable Laws of Nature is the Cause of the Presence and Clearness of the Idea that represents the Object I could not at that time speak otherwise than I did nor explain my self as I do at present as having not yet prov'd God the sole Author of our Ideas and our particular Volitions only the occasional Causes of them I spoke according to the common Opinion as I have been frequently oblig'd to do because all cannot be said at once The Reader ought to be equitable and give Credit for some time if he would have Satisfaction for none but Geometricians pay always down in hand THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE
her Infant the Mother is the cause of the Sin and the Father has no part in it Yet St. Paul teaches us that by Man came sin into the World He does not so much as speak of the Woman Therefore c. ANSWER David assures us that his Mother conceiv'd him in iniquity and the Son of Syrach says Of the Woman came the beginning of Sin and by her we all dy Neither of them speak of Man St. Paul on the contrary says that by Man Sin entred into the World and speaks not of the Woman How will these Testimonies accord and which of the two is to be justify'd if it be necessary to vindicate either In discourse we never attribute to the Woman any thing peculiar to the Man wherein she has no part But that is often ascrib'd to the Man which is proper to the VVoman because her Husband is her Master and Head We see that the Evangelists and also the Holy Virgin call Joseph the Father of Jesus when she says to her Son Behold thy Father and I have sought thee sorrowing Therefore seeing we are assur'd by Holy Writ that Woman has subjected us to Sin and Death it is absolutely necessary to believe it nor can it be thrown upon the Man But though it testifies in several places that 't is by Man that Sin enters into the World yet there is not an equal necessity to believe it since what is of the Woman is commonly attributed to the Man And if we were oblig'd by Faith to excuse either the Man or the Woman it would be more reasonable to excuse the former than the latter However I believe these forecited passages are to be litterally explain'd and that we are to say both the Man and Woman are the true causes of Sin each in their own way The Woman in that by her Sin is communicated it being by her that the Man begets the Children and the Man in that his Sin is the cause of Concupiscence as his action is the cause of the fecundity of the Woman or of the communication that is between her and her Infant It is certain that 't is the Man that impregnates the Woman and consequently is the cause of that communication between her Body and the Child's since that communication is the Principle of its Life Now that Communication not only gives the Child's Body the dispositions of its Mother's but also gives its Mind the dispositions of her Mind Therefore we may say with St. Paul that by one Man sin entred into the world and nevertheless by reason of that communication we may say that Sin came from a Woman and by her we all dye and that our Mother has conceiv'd us in Iniquity as is said in other places of Scripture It may be said perhaps that though Man had not sinn'd yet Woman had produc'd sinful Children for having her self sinn'd she had lost the Power God gave her over her Body and thus though Man had remain'd Innocent she had corrupted the Brain and consequently the Mind of her Child by reason of that communication between them But this surely looks not very probable For Man whilst righteous knowing what he does cannot give the Woman that wretched fecundity of conceiving sinful Children If he remains Righteous he wills not any Children but for God to whom Infant Sinners cannot be well pleasing for I suppose not here a Mediator I grant however that in that case the Marriage had not been dissolv'd and that the Man had known his Wife But it is certain that the Body of the Woman belong'd to her Husband since it was taken out of his and was the same Flesh. Duo in carne una It is moreover certain that Children are as much the Fathers as the Mothers Which being so we can't be persuaded that the Woman would have lost the Power over her Body if her Husband had not sinn'd as well as she For if the Woman had been depriv'd of that Power whilst the Man remain'd Innocent there had been this Disorder in the Universe that an upright Man should have a corrupt Body and sinful Children Whereas it is against Order or rather a contradiction that a just God should punish a perfectly Innocent Man And for this reason Eve feels no involuntary and rebellious Motions immediately after her sin as yet she is not asham'd of her Nakedness nor goes to hide her self On the contrary she comes to her Husband though naked as her self her Eyes are not yet open'd but she is still as before the absolute Comptroller of her own Body Order requir'd that immediately after her Sin her Soul should be disturb'd by the rebellion of her Body and by the shame of her own and her Husband's nakedness for there was no reason that God should any longer suspend on her behalf the Laws of the Communication of Motions as I have said in the seventh Article But because her Body is her Husband 's who is as yet Innocent she is not punish'd in this Body but this punishment is deferr'd till the time that he should eat himself of the Fruit which she presented him Then it was they both began to feel the rebellion of their Body that they saw they were naked and that shame oblig'd them to cover themselves with Fig-leaves Thus we must say that Adam was truly the cause of Original Sin and Concupiscence since it was his Sin that depriv'd both himself and his Wife of their power over their Body by which defectiveness of power the Woman produces in the Brain of her Child such tracks as corrupt its Soul at the very instant of its Creation OBJECTION against the Twelfth Article 'T is but random divining to say the communication between the Mother's and the Infant 's Brain is necessary or useful to the conformation of the foetus For there is no such Communication between the Brain of an Hen and that of her Chickens which notwithstanding are perfectly and compleatly form'd ANSWER I answer that in the seventh Chapter of the Second Book I have sufficiently demonstrated that Communication by the use I make of it in explaining the Generation of Monsters as also certain natural Marks and Fears deriv'd from the Mother For 't is evident that a Man who swoons away at the sight of a Snake because his Mother was frighted with one when she bore him in her Womb could not be subject to that Infirmity but because formerly such Traces had been imprinted on his Brain as these which open upon seeing a Snake and that they were accompany'd with a like Accident And herein I am no Diviner for I do not venture to determine wherein that Communication precisely consists I might say it was perform'd by those Fibres which the Foetus shoots into the Matrix of the Mother and by the Nerves wherewith that part is very probably fill'd and in saying so I should no more divine than would a Man who had never seen the Engines call'd La Samaritaine in affirming
resolv'd whether we may go to a Ball or a Play Whether we may in Conscience spend a great part of the Day in Sports and vain Conversation whether certain Conversations Studies and Employs are conformable to our Obligations Let us retire into our selves and hush our Senses and Passions and then see in the Light of God whether we can do for him any such Action Let us interrogate him who is the Way the Truth and the Life to know if the Road we pursue will not lead us to the Gates of Death And whether God being Essentially Just and necessarily oblig'd to punish what is not agreeable to Order and to reward all conformity to it we have reason to believe we are going to augment or ensure our Felicity by the Action we intend to do If it be our Love to God that leads us to the Ball let us go If Heaven is to be gain'd by playing let us play Day and Night If we have in prospect the Glory of God in our Employment let us exercise it Let us do all things with Joy for our Recompence shall be great in Heaven But if after having carefully examin'd our Essential Obligations we clearly discover that neither our Being nor the Time that measures it is at our own disposal and that we do an unjust thing which it necessarily lies upon God to punish when our only study is how to spend our time in Mirth and Pleasure If our Lord and Master CHRIST who has purchas'd us by his Blood â—eproaches our Inâ—idelity and Ingratitude in a most clear and intelligible manner for living after the Flesh and the World for Leading an Effeminate and Voluptuous Life and following Opinion and Custom Let us yield to his Voice and not harden our Hearts nor seek out such Spiritual Guides as comfort us under these Reproaches and secure us against these Menaces and involve in delightful Clouds that Light which strikes and pierces our very Soul When the Blind leads the Blind they both fall into the Ditch says the Evangelist But if God excuses not the Blind who commits himself to the Conduct of a Blind Leader will he excuse him who seeing clearly will yet willingly be guided by the Blind because he leads him pleasantly and entertains him by the way according to his Inclinations These voluntary Blind Men ought to know that God who never deceives frequently permits these Seducers in punishment to the corrupt Affections of those that seek them That Blindness is a penalty of Sin though it be often the cause of it and that it is just that he who cared not to hear Eternal Wisdom who spoke only for his good should at last suffer himself to be corrupted by Men whose deception is so much more dangerous as their Flatteries are more pleasing 'T is true 't is no easie thing to retire into our selves to silence our Senses and Passions and to distinguish the Voice of God from that of our Body For we most commonly take sensible Proofs for evident Reasons and on that account it is necessary to consult the Casuists But it is not always needful For we see our Duty on many occasions with the clearest Evidence and an undoubted certainty And then it is even dangerous to consult them unless it be done with the greatest Sincerity and by a Spirit of Humility and Obedience For these dispositions oblige God to prevent our deception or at least to keep us from deceiving our selves in any hurtful manner When it is convenient to advise with a Spiritual Guide such an one is to be chosen as understands Religion and reverences the Gospel and is acquainted with humane Nature We must take heed least the converse of the World has corrupted him least Friendship should make him too Gentle and Complaisant least he should be Brib'd by his hopes or fears of us We must choose one in a thousand says St. Theresia who as she relates her self had like to have lost her way to Heaven by the means of an Ignorant Guide The World is full of Deceivers I say of Well-Meaning Deceivers no less than others Those who Love us seduce us by their Complaisance Those who are below us flatter us out of Respect or Fear Those above us out of Contempt or Negligence overlook our necessities Besides all Men give us Counsel agreeable to the Breviates we give of our own Condition and we never fail to make the best of our Case insensibly laying our hand upon our sore when we are asham'd of it We often deceive our Counsellours that we may deceive our selves For we fancy our selves secure whilst we follow their Directions They do but conduct us whither we design'd to go and yet we would fain perswade our selves in spite of our Light and the Secret reproofs of our Reason that 't is our Obedience which determines us We seduce our selves and God permits us but we can never deceive him who Penetrates the Bottom of our Hearts And though we deafen our selves never so much to the Voice of Internal Truth we are sufficiently made sensible by the inward Reproaches we receive from the Supream Truth leaving us to our selves that it enlightens our Darkness and discovers all the Wiles and Stratagems of Self-Love 'T is therefore evident that our Reason must be consulted for the Health of our Soul as our Senses are to be advis'd with for the Health of our Body and that when the former cannot clearly resolve us we must apply to the Casuist as we must have recourse to the Physician when the latter are defective But this is to be done with Judgment since Ignorant Casuists may Murther our Soul as Vnskilful Physicians may Poison our Body Whereas I explain not in particular the Rules which may be given about the choice and use that 's to be made of Physicians and Casuists I desire my Sentiments may be candidly interpreted and that it may not be imagin'd I am against drawing all possible supplies from other Men. I know that a particular Blessing attends our submission to the Opinions of the Wise and Understanding And I am willing to believe this general Rule that 't is requisite to die in the usual Forms is surer for the common sort of Men than any I could establish for the Preservation of Life But because 't is of perpetual use to retire into our selves to consult the Gospel and to listen to JESUS CHRIST whether he speaks immediately to our Mind and Heart or by Faith declares himself to our Ears and Eyes I thought I might be allow'd to say what I have said For our Casuists deceive us when they go contrary to the Doctrine of our Faith and Reason And as we give Honour to God by believing that his Works have what is necessary to their preservation I thought I could make Men sensible their Machine was so admirably contriv'd that it 's own Nature can better furnish it with what 's necessary to it's safety than Science and even the
and the Accidental Form Accidents Others say that the Forms produce both other Forms and Accidents Others still that bare Accidents are not only capable of producing Accidents but even Forms But it must not be imagin'd that those for instance who say that Accidents can produce Forms by vertue of the Form they are join'd to understand it the same way For one part of them will have Accidents to be the very Force or Virtue of the Substantial Form Another that they imbibe into them the Influence of the Form and only act so by vertue of it A Third lastly will have them to be but Instrumental Causes But neither are these latter sort altogether agreed about what is meant by Instrumental Cause and the vertue they receive from the Principal Nor can the Philosophers compromise about the Action whereby second Causes produce their Effects For some of them pretend that Causality ought not to be produc'd since it is this which produces Others will that they truly act by their own Action But they are involv'd in so many Labyrinths in explaining precisely wherein this Action consists and there are so many different Opinions about it that I cannot find in my Heart to recite them Such is the strange variety of Opinions though I have not produc'd those of the Ancient Philosophers or that were born in very remote Countries But we have sufficient Reason to conclude that they are no more agreed upon the subject of second Causes than those before alledg'd Avicenna for instance is of Opinion that Corporeal Substances cannot produce any thing but Accidents This according to Ruvio is his Hypothesis He supposes that God produces immediately a most perfect Spiritual Substance That this produces another less perfect and this a third and so on to the last which produces all Corporeal Substances and Corporeal Substances Accidents But Avicembrom not able to comprehend how Corporeal Substances which cannot penetrate each other should cause alterations in them supposes that there are Spirits which are capable of acting on Bodies because they alone can penetrate them For these Gentlemen not admitting the Vacuum nor the Atoms of Democritus nor having sufficient knowledge of the subtil matter of M. des Cartes could not with the Gassendists and Cartesians think of Bodies which were little enough to insinuate into the pores of those that are hardest and most solid Methinks this diversity of Opinions justifies this thought of ours that Men often talk of things which they understand not and that the Power of Creatures being a Fiction of Mind of which we have naturally no Idea every Man makes it and imagines it what he pleases 'T is true this Power has been acknowledg'd for a Real and True by most Men in all Ages but it has never yet been prov'd I say not demonstratively but in any wise so as to make an impression upon an Attentive thinking Man For the confus'd Proofs which are built only upon the fallacious Testimony of the Senses and Passions are to be rejected by those who know how to exercise their Reason Aristotle speaking of what they call Nature says it is Ridiculous to go about to prove that Natural Bodies have an inward Principle of Motion and Rest because says he it is a thing that 's Self-Evident He likewise does not doubt but a Bowl which strikes another has the force of putting it in Motion This is witnessed by his Eyes and that 's enough for him who seldom follows any other Testimony than of the Senses very rarely that of his Reason and is very indifferent whether it be intelligible or not Those who impugn the Opinion of some Divines who have written against Second Causes say like Aristotle that the Senses convince us of their Efficacy And this is their first and principal Proof 'T is evident say they that the Fire burns that the Sun shines that Water cools and he must be out of his Senses who can doubt of it The Authors of the other Opinion says the great Averroes are out of their Wits We must say almost all the Peripateticks use sensible Proofs for their Conviction who deny this Efficacy and so oblige them to confess we are capable of acting on them and wounding them 'T is a judgment which Aristotle has already pronounc'd against them and it ought to be put in Execution But this pretended Demonstration cannot but create Pity For it gives us to know the Weakness of an Humane Mind And that the Philosophers themselves are infinitely more sensible than Reasonable It evinces that those who glory in being the Inquirers of Truth know not even whom they are to consult to hear any News of it Whether Soveraign Reason which never deceives but always speaks things as they are in themselves or the Body which speaks only out of Interest and with reference to the preservation and convenience of Life For in fine what prejudices will not be justified if we set up our Senses for Judges to which most of them owe their Birth As I have shown in The Search after Truth When I see a Bowl shock another my Eyes tell me or seem to tell me that it is the True Cause of the motion it impresses for the true cause that moves Bodies is not visible to my Eyes But if I interrogate my Reason I evidently see that Bodies having no Power to move themselves and their moving force being nothing but the Will of God which preserves them successively in different places they cannot communicate a Power which they have not nor could communicate if they had it For 't is plain that there must be Wisdom and that Infinite to regulate the communication of motions with that exactness Proportion and Uniformity which we see A Body cannot know that infinite multitude of impuls'd Bodies round about it and though we should suppose it to have knowledge yet it would not have enough so proportionably to regulate and distribute at the instant of protrusion the moving force it self is carried with When I open my Eyes the Sun appears to me splendidly glorious in Light And it seems not only to be visible it self but to make all the World so too Methinks 't is he that arrays the Earth with flowers and enriches it with Fruits That gives Life to Animals and striking by His Heat into the very Womb of the Earth impregnates Her with Stones Marbles and Metalls But in consulting my Reason I see nothing of all this And if I faithfully consult it I plainly discover the seducement of my Senses and find that God Works all in all For knowing that all the changes which accrue to Bodies have no other principle than the different Communications of Motions which occur in visible and invisible Bodies I see that God does all since 't is his Will that causes and his Wisdom that regulates all these Communications I suppose that Local Motion is the principle of Generations Corruptions Alterations and Universally of all the changes
but acts always by the simplest Ways and for that Reason he makes use of the Collision of Bodies in giving them Motion Not that this Collision is absolutely necessary to it as our Senses tell us but that being the Occasion of the Communication of Motions there need be but very few Natural Laws to produce all the admirable Effects we see For by this means we may reduce all the Laws of the Communication of Motions to one Viz. That percutient Bodies being considered as but one at the Moment of their Contact or Collision the moving Force is divided between them at their Separation according to the Proportion of their Magnitude But whereas concurrent Bodies are surrounded with infinite others which act upon them by Virtue and Efficacy of this Law however constant and uniform this Law be it produces a World of quite different Communications because it acts upon infinite Bodies which are all related to one another It is necessary to Water a Plant to make it grow because by the Laws of the Communication of Motions hardly any other than Watry Particles can by their Motion and by reason of their Figure insinuate and Wind up themselves into the Fibres of Plants and by variously fastning and combining together take the Figure that 's necessary to their Nourishment The subtil Matter which is constantly flowing from the Sun may by its agitating the Water lift it into the Plants but it has not a competent Motion to raise gross Earthy Particles Yet Earth and Air too are necessary to the Growth of Plants Earth to preserve the Water at their Root and Air to give this Water a Moderate Fermentation But the Action of the Sun the Air and Water consisting but in the Motion of their Parts in proper speaking GOD is the only Agent For as I have said there is none but He that can by the efficacy of his Will and by the Infinite Extent of his Knowledge cause and regulate those infinitely infinite Communications of Motions which are made every moment and in a Proportion infinitely exact and regular ARGUMENT IV. Can God resist and Fight against Himself Bodies justle strike and resist one another therefore Gods Acts not in them unless it be by his concourse For if it were he only that produc'd and preserv'd Motion in Bodies he would take care to divert them before the Collision as knowing well that they are impenetrable To what purpose are Bodies driven to be beaten back again why must they proceed to recoil Or what signifies it to produce and Preserve useless Motions Is it not an Absurdity to say that God impugns himself and that He destroys his Works when a Bull fights with a Lyon when a Wolf devours a Sheep and a Sheep eats the Grass which God makes to grow Therefore there are Second Causes ANSWER Therefore Second Causes do all and God does nothing at all For God cannot act against himself but Concourse is Action The concurring to contrary Actions is giving contrary Concourse and consequently doing contrary Actions To concur with the Action of Creatures that resist each other is to Act against himself To concur to useless Motions is to Act in vain But God does nothing needless or in vain he does no contrary Actions and therefore concurs not to the Action of Creatures that often destroy one another and makes useless Actions and Motions See where this proof of Second Causes leads us But let us see what Reason says to it God Works all in every thing and nothing resists him He Works all in all things in as much as his Will both makes and regulates all Motions And nothing resists him because he does what ever he Wills But let us see how this is to be conceiv'd Having resolv'd to produce by the simplest ways as most conformable to Order that infinite Variety of Creatures which we admire he will'd that Bodies should move in a right line because that is the most simple But Bodies being impenetrable and their Motions tending in Lines that oppose or intersect one another they must necessarily fall foul together and consequently cease moving in the same manner God foresaw this yet notwithstanding positively will'd the Collision or shock of Bodies not that he 's delighted in impugning himself but because he design'd to make use of this Collision as an Occasion for his establishing the General Law of the Communication of Motions by which he foresaw he must produce an infinite Variety of admirable Effects For I am perswaded that these two Natural Laws which are the simplest of all others Namely that All Motion tends to make it self in a right line and that in the Collision Motions are Communicated proportionably to the magnitude of the Colliding Bodies are sufficient to produce such a World as we see That is the Heaven and Stars and Planets and Comets Earth Water Air and Fire In a Word the Elements and all Unorganiz'd and inanimate Bodies For Organiz'd Bodies depend on many other Natural Laws which are perfectly unknown It may be living Bodies are not form'd like others by a determinate number of Natural Laws For there is great probability they were all form'd at the Creation of the World and that Time only gives them a necessary Growth to make them Visible to our Eyes Nevertheless it is certain they receive that Growth by the General Laws of Nature whereby all other Bodies are form'd which is the Reason that their Increase is not always Regular I say then that God by the first of Natural Laws positively Wills and consequently Causes the Collision of Bodies and afterwards imploys this Collision as an Occasion of establishing the Second Natural Law which regulates the Communication of Motions and that thus the actual Collision is the Natural or Occasional Cause of the Actual Communication of Motions If this be well consider'd it will be evidently acknowledg'd that nothing can be better Order'd But supposing that God had not so Ordain'd it and that he had diverted Bodies when ready to encounter as if there were a Vacuum to receive them First they would not be subject to that perpetual Vicissitude which makes the Beauty of the Universe For the Generation of some Bodies is perform'd by the Corruption of Others and 't is the contrariety of their Motion which produces their Variety Secondly God would not act in the most simple manner For if Bodies ready to meet should continue on their Motion without touching they must needs describe Lines curv'd in a thousand different Fashions and consequently different Wills must be admitted in God to determine their Motions Lastly if there were no Uniformity in the Action of Natural Bodies and that their Motion were not made in a right Line we should have no certain Principle for our Reasonings in natural Philosophy nor for our conduct in many Actions of our Life 'T is not a disorder that Lyons eat Wolves and that Wolves eat Sheep and Sheep grass of which God has had so
is because his Wisdom which in this respect is an Abyss to our apprehensions Wills it so Lastly 't is because this Conduct is more worthy of God than could be any other more favourable for the Reprobate For even they are condemn'd hy an Order as worthy our Adorations as that whereby the Elect are sanctified and sav'd And nothing but our Ignorance of Order and our Self-love make us blame a Conduct which the Angels and Saints eternally admire But let us return to the proofs of the efficacy of second Causes ARGUMENT V. If Bodies had not a certain Nature or Force to act with and if God did all things there would be nothing but what was Supernatural in the most ordinary effects The distinction of Natural and Supernatural which has been so well receiv'd in the World and establisht by the universal approbation of the Learn'd would be Chimerical and Extravagant ANSWER I answer that distinction is absurd in the Mouth of Aristotle since the Nature he has establisht is a meer Chimera I say that distinction is not clear in the mouth of the Vulgar part of Men who judge of things by the Impression they make upon their Senses For they know not precisely what they mean when they say the Fire burns by it's Nature I say that this distinction may pass in the mouth of a Divine if he means by natural Effects the consequences of the General Laws which God has settled for the production and preservation of all things And by supernatural Effects those which are independent on these Laws In this sense the Distinction is true But the Philosophy of Aristotle together with the Impression of the senses makes it as I think dangerous because it may divert from God the too respectful admirers of the Opinions of that wretched Philosopher or such as consult their senses instead of retiring into themselves to consult the Truth And therefore that distinction is not to be made use of without an Explication St. Austin having us'd the word fortune retracted it though there are few that could be deceiv'd by it St. Paul speaking of meats offer'd to Idols advertises that an Idol is nothing If the Nature of the Heathen Philosophy be a fiction if that nature be nothing it should be precaution'd for that there are many who are abus'd by it And more than we suppose who inconsiderately attribute to it the Works of God who are taken up with this Idol or fiction of the Humane mind and pay it those Honours which are only due to the Divinity They are willing to let God be Author of Miracles and some Extraordinary effects which in one sense are little worthy of his Greatness and Wisdom and they refer to the Power of their Imaginary nature those constant and regular Effects which none but the Wise know how to admire They suppose too that this so wonderful disposition which all living Bodies have to preserve themselves and beget their like is a production of their Nature For according to these Philosophers the Sun and Man beget a Man We may still distinguish between supernatural and natural Order several ways For we may say that the supernatural relates to future Goods that it is establish't upon consideration of the merits of CHRIST that it is the first and principal in the designs of God and other things enough to preserve a distinction which they are vainly apprehensive should fall to the ground ARGUMENT VI. The main proof which is brought by the Philosophers for the Efficacy of second Causes is drawn from the will and liberty of Man Man wills and determines of himself But to Will and Determine is to Act. 'T is certainly Man who commits Sin God not being the Author of it any more than of Concupiscence and Error Therefore Man acts ANSWER I have sufficiently explain'd in several Places of the Treatise about the Search of Truth what is the Will and Liberty of Man and especially in the first Chapter of the first Book and in the first Illustration upon it so that it is needless to repeat it again I acknowledge Man Wills and Determines himself in as much as God causes him to Will incessantly carries him towards good and gives him all the Idea's and Sensations by which he determines his Impression I know likewise that Man alone commits Sin But I deny that therein he does any thing For Sin Errour and even Concupiscence are nothing I have explain'd my self upon this Point in the first Illustration Man wills but his Volitions are impotent in themselves they produce nothing and God works all notwithstanding them For 't is even God that makes our Will by the Impression he gives us towards Good All that Man has from himself are Errour and Sin which are nothing There is a great difference between our Minds and Bodies that are about us I grant Our Mind in one sense Wills Acts and Determines it self Our own inward Consciousness is an evident Conviction If we were destitute of Liberty there could be no future Recompence and Punishment for 't is our Liberty that makes our Actions good or bad and without it Religion would be but a Phantasm and a Dream But that which we cannot see clearly is That Bodies have a force of Acting This it is we cannot comprehend and this we deny when we deny the Efficacy of Second Causes Even the Mind acts not in that measure which is imagin'd I know that I will and that I Will freely I have no Reason to doubt of it which is stronger than that inward feeling I have of my self Nor do I deny it but I deny that my Will is the true Cause of the Motion of my Arm of the Idea's of my Mind and of other things which accompany my Volitions For I see no Relation between so different things Nay I most clearly see there can be no Analogy between my Will to move my Arm and the Agitation of some little Bodies whose Motion and Figure I do not know which make choice of certain Nervous Canals amongst a Million of others unknown to me in Order to cause in me the Motion I desire by a World of Motions which I desire not I deny that my Will produces in me my Idea's I cannot see how 't is possible it should for since it cannot Act or Will without Knowledge it supposes my Idea's but does not make them Nay I do not so much as know precisely what an Idea is I cannot tell whether we produce them out of nothing and send them back to the same nothing when we cease to perceive them I speak after the Notion of some Persons I produce you 'll say my Idea's by the Faculty which God gives me of Thinking I move my Arm because of the Union which God has establish'd between my Mind and Body Faculty Vnion are Logical Terms of loose and indeterminate Signification There is no particular Being nor Mode of Being which is either Faculty or Vnion Therefore
that God should continue to them their Vertue he endow'd them with in their Creation And since this Opinion is exactly agreeable with Prejudice because of the insensible Operation of God in Second Causes it is commonly embrac'd by the vulgar sort of Men and such as have more studied Ancient Naturalists and Physicians than Theology and Truth Most are of Opinion that God created all things at first and gave them all the Qualities and Faculties that were necessary to their preservation that he has for example given the first Motion of Matter and left it afterwards to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions that admirable variety of Forms we see 'T is Ordinarily suppos'd that Bodies can move one another and this is said to be Mr. des Cartes's Opinion though he speaks expresly against it in the Thirty Sixth and Seventh Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Since Men must unavoidably acknowledge that the Creatures depend on God they lessen and abridge as much as possible that dependance whether out of a secret Aversion to God or a strange and wretched stupidity and insensibility to his Operation But whereas this Opinion is receiv'd but by those who have not much studied Religion and have preferr'd their Senses to their Reason and Aristotle's Authority to that of Holy Writ we have no reason to fear its making way into the Mind of those who have any Love for Truth and Religion for provided a Man seriously examin'd it he must needs discover its falsity But the Opinion of God's Immediate Concourse to every Action of Second Causes seems to accord with those Passages of Scripture which often attribute the same Effect both to GOD and the Creature We must consider then that there are places in Scripture where 't is said that God is the only Agent I am the Lord that maketh all things that stretcheth forth the Heavens alone that spreadeth abroad the Earth by my self Ego sum Dominus says Isaiah faciens OMNIA Extendens coelos SOLVS stabiliens Terram NVLLVS Mecum A Mother Animated with the Spirit of God tells her Children it was not her that form'd them I cannot tell how you came into my Womb For I neither gave you Breath nor Life neither was it I that form'd the Members of every one of you But doubtless the Creator of the World c. Nescio qualiter in utero meo apparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI sed mundi Creator She does not say with Aristotle and the School of the Peripateticks that to her and the Sun they ow'd their Birth but to the Creator of the Universe Which Opinion that God only Works and forms Children in their Mothers Womb not being conformable to Prejudice and Common Opinion These Sentences according to the pre-establish'd Principle must be explain'd in the Literal Sense But on the contrary the Notion of Second Causes falling in with the vulgar Opinion and being Suited to the sensible impression the Passages which expresly make for the separate Efficacy of Second Causes must be reckon'd invalid when compar'd with the former Concourse therefore is insufficient to reconcile the different Texts of Scripture and all Force Power and Efficacy must be ascrib'd to God But though the immediate concurrence of God with Second Causes were fit to accommodate the disagreeing passages of Holy Writ yet after all it is a question whether it ought to be admitted For the Sacred Books were not compos'd for the Theologists of these times but for the People of the Jews So that if this People had not understanding or Subtilty enough to imagine a Concourse such as is admitted in School-Divinity and to agree to a thing which the greatest Divines are hard put to to explain it follows if I mistake not that the Holy Scripture which Attributes to God and even to God alone the production and preservation of all things would have betray'd them into Error And the Holy Pen-Men had stood chargeable with writing not only in an unintelligible but deceitful Language For in saying that God Work'd all they would have design'd no more than that God assisted to all things with his concourse which was not probably so much as thought on by the Jews Those amongst them who were not very great Philosophers believing that God Work'd all and not that he concurr'd to all But that we may pass a more certain judgement about this Concourse it would be requisite to explain with care the different Hypotheses of the School-Men upon it For besides those impenetrable Clouds and Obscurities which involve all the Opinions that cannot be explain'd and defended without loose and indefinite Terms there are upon this Matter so great a variety of Opinions that it would be no hard Matter to discover the cause of them But I design not to engage in a discussion that would be so wearisom to my self as well as the greatest part of Readers On the contrary I had rather try to show that my Opinions may in some thing accord with those of the greater number of Scholastick Divines though I cannot but say their Language looks very Ambiguous and confus'd To explain my self I am of Opinion as I have said elsewhere that Bodies for example have no Force to move themselves and that therefore their moving force is nothing but the Action of God or not to make use of a Term which has no distinct import their moving force is nothing but the Will of God always necessarily Efficacious which successively preserves them in different Places For I believe not that God Creates any particular Beings to make the moving force of Bodies not only because I have no Idea of such a kind of Being nor see how they could move Bodies But also because these Beings themselves would have need of others to move them and so in infinitum For none but God is truely Immoveable and Mover altogether Which being so when a Body strikes and moves another I may say that it Acts by the Concurrence of God and that this Concurrence is not distinct from its own Action For a Body meeting another moves it by its Action or its moving force which at bottom is nothing but the Will of God preserving the Body successively in different Places the translation of a Body being not it's Action or moving force but the Effect of it Almost all Divines say too that the Action of Second Causes is not different from that of God's Concurrence with them For though they have a various Meaning yet they suppose that God Acts in the Creatures by the same Action as the Creatures And they are oblig'd if I mistake not thus to speak For if the Creatures Acted by an Action which God Work'd not in them their Action consider'd as such would no doubt be independent But they acknowledge as it becomes them that the Creatures depend immediately on God not only as to their Being but likewise as to
his Creatures also For hereby we pay Legitimate Honour to their Creatour Merit his good Graces and oblige him to shower new Benefits upon us 'T is manifest he approves of the Honour that is given to his Creatures since they partake of his Power and all Power deserves to be honour'd But because Honour ought to be Proportion'd to Power and that the Power of the Sun and all other sensible Objects is such as derives to us all sorts of Goods 't is reasonable we should Honour them with all our Strength and next to God Consecrate to them all our Being These are the Natural Reasonings a Man would fall into that should ground upon the Prejudice of the Efficacy of Second Causes and probably such was the Arguing of the first Founders of Idolatry Take here his Sense of it who passes for the most Learned of all the Jews He Prefaces a a Treatise he wrote about Idolatry with these Words In the days of Enos Men fell into strange Illusions and the Wise Men of that Age quite lost their Sense and Reason Enos himself was one of those deluded Persons whose Errours were these Since God said they has created the Heavens and Stars to govern the World has constituted them on â—igh and invested them with Glory and Lustre and employs them in executing his Commands 't is just that we should honour them and pay them our Deference and Homage 'T is the Will of our God that Honour should be given to those whom he has exalted and enthron'd in Glory as a Prince requires that his Ministers should be â—onour'd in his Presence because the Honour which is given to them redounds to himself When once this Notion had entred their Head they fell to building Temples in Honour of the Stars gave them Sacrifice and Praises and even prostrated themselves before them thereby imagining to purchase the favour of Him that created them And this was the Original of Idolatry It is so Natural and just to have grateful Resentments in Proportion to the Goods we receive that almost all Nations have ador'd the Sun because they all concluded him the Cause of the Blessings they enjoy'd And if the Aegyptians ador'd not only the Sun and Moon and River Nile because its overflowing caus'd the Fertility of their Country but even the vilest of Animals 'T was as Cicero relates from the Emolument they receiv'd from them Therefore as we cannot and indeed ought not to Extirpate from Men's Minds their Natural Inclination for the true Causes of their Happiness 't is evident there is at least some danger in ascribing Efficacy to Second Causes though we conjoyn the necessity of an immediate Concourse which has methinks I know not what of incomprehensible purport and which strikes in as an after-game to justifie our imbib'd Prejudices and Aristotle's Philosophy But there 's no danger in speaking only what we see and of Attributing only to God Efficacy and Power since we see nothing but His Wills which have an absolutely necessary and indispensible connexion with Natural Effects I own that now adays Men are Wise enough to avoid those gross Errors of Heathens and Idolaters but I fear not to say our Mind is still dispos'd or rather our Heart is often bent like that of the Heathens and that there will ever be in the World some kind of Idolatry until the Day in which JESUS CHRIST shall restore up His Kingdom to God his Father having first destroy'd all Empire Dominion and Power that God may be All in all For is it not a kind of Idolatry to make a God of ones Belly as speaks S. Paul Is not he an Idolater to the God of Riches who labours Night and Day to acquire them Is this to render to God the Worship we owe Him Is this to adore Him in Spirit and in Truth to have our Hearts fill'd with some sensible Beauty and our Mind struck and dazled with the Lustre of some imaginary Grandeur Men fancying to themselves that Circumambient Bodies afford the pleasures they enjoy in the use of them Unite to them with all the Powers of their Soul and thus the Principle of their Corruption lies in the sensible Conviction of the Efficacy of Second Causes 'T is only Reason that assures them none but God Acts in them But besides that this Reason speaks so low that it is scarce Audible and that the Contradicting Senses cry so loud that their Clamour Stunns and Stupefies them they are yet farther confirm'd in their Prejudice by Reasons and Arguments that are so much dangerous as they have more External Characters and sensible marks of Truth The Philosophers but especially the Christian Philosophers ought to wage an uninterrupted War with Prejudices or the Judgements of their Senses and particularly those of so dangerous importance as that of the Efficacy of Second Causes And yet there are Men whom I extremely honour as I have just Reason who from I know not what Principle endeavour to confirm this Prejudice and to make so holy so pure and solid a Doctrine as this which owns no other true Cause than God pass for Superstitious and Extravagant Opinion They will not have us to Love and Fear God in all things but to Love and Fear all things with reference to God We ought say they to Love the Creatures since they are good to Love and respect our Father to give Honour to our Prince and Superiours since God Commands it Nor do I deny it but I deny that we are to Love the Creatures as our Goods though they be good or perfect in themselves I deny that we are to pay service and respect to Men as to our Masters Or to explain my self more clearly I say we must not serve our Master obey our Father or Prince with any other design than to serve and obey God S. Paul who became all things to all Men and was complaisant in all things for the Salvation of those he Preach'd to speaks thus Servants be obedient to them that are your Masters according to the flesh with fear and trembling in singleness of your Heart as unto CHRIST not with Eye-Service as Men pleasers but as the Servants of Christ doing the Will of God from the Heart with good Will doing Service AS TO THE LORD AND NOT TO MEN. And in another Epistle Not with Eye-Service as to MEN but in singleness of Heart fearing GOD. And whatever ye do do it Heartily AS TO THE LORD and NOT VNTO MEN. We must therefore obey our Father serve our Prince and Honour our Superiours AS UNTO GOD AND NOT UNTO MEN. This is manifest and can have no Evil consequences For hereby Superiours would always be more honour'd and better serv'd But I think it may be said That a Master who would be honour'd and serv'd as having in himself another Power than that of God would be a Devil and that those who serv'd him under that apprehension would be
The Soul of a Beast is a Substance distinct from its Body This Soul is Annihilated and therefore Substances may naturally be Annihilated Therefore though the Soul of Man be a Substance distinct from his Body it may be Annihilated when the Body is destroyed And thus the Immortality of the Humane Soul cannot be Demonstrated by Reason But if it be own'd to be most certain That no Substance can be naturally reduc'd to nothing the Soul of Beasts will subsist after Death and since they have no reward to hope for and are made for Bodies they must at least pass out of one to another that they may not remain useless in Nature Which seems to be the most reasonable Inference Now 't is Matter of Faith That God is just and Wise That he Loves not Disorder That Nature is corrupted That the Soul of Man is Immortal and that That of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed it is not a distinct Substance from their Body nor consequently capable of Knowledge and Love or of any Passions and Sensations like ours Therefore in the Stile of Monsieur de la Ville who condemns Men upon Consequences that he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may justly charge him with a Crime and all Mindkind besides for believing Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if in his way of proceeding we should tax him of Impiety for entertaining Opinions from whence it might be concluded That God is not Just Wise or Powerful Opinions that overthrow Religion that are opposite to Original Sin that take away the only Demonstration Reason can give of the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should charge him with Injustice and Cruelty for making innocent Souls to suffer and even for Annihilating them to feed upon the Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner but they are Innocent and yet for the Nourishment of his Body he kills Animals and Annihilates their Souls which are of greater Worth than his Body Yet if his Body could not subsist without the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of a Soul should render his Body for ever Immortal this Cruelty as unjust as it is might perhaps be excusable But with what Pretence can he Annihilate Substances altogether innocent to sustain but a few days a Body justly condemn'd to Death because of Sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the Place he lives in But what if his Zeal should carry him into the Indies where the Inhabitants found Hospitals for Beasts and the Philosophers and the better and more gentile Part of them are so charitable to to the smallest Flies that for fear of killing them by Breathing and Walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways through which they pass Would he then fear to make innocent Souls to suffer or to Annihilate them for the Preservation of a Sinner's Body Would he not rather chuse to subscribe to their Opinion who give not Beasts a Soul more Noble than their Body or distinct from it and by publishing this Opinion acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice which these People would charge upon him if having the same Principles he follow'd not their Custom This Example may suffice to shew that we are not permitted to treat Men as Hereticks and dangerous Persons because of Irreligious Consequences that may be deduc'd from their Principles when these Consequences are disown'd by them For though I think it would be an infinitely harder Task to answer the aforesaid Difficulties than those of M. de la Ville's yet the Cartesians would be very Ridiculous if they should accuse Monsieur de la Ville and others that were not of their Opinion of Impiety and Heresie 'T is only the Authority of the Church that may decide about Matters of Faith and the Church has not oblig'd us and probably whatever Consequence may be drawn from common Principles never will oblige us to believe that Dogs have not a Soul more Noble than their Body that they know not their Masters that they neither fear nor desire nor suffer any thing because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths ARGUMENT II. Almost all Men are perswaded That sensible Objects are the true Causes of Pleasure and Pain which we feel upon their Presence They believe that the Fire sends forth that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us and that our Aliments Act in us and give us the Welcome Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which makes the Fruits necessary for Life to thrive and that all sensible Objects have a peculiar Vertue by which they can do us a great deal of Good and Evil. Let us see if from these Principles we cannot draw Consequences contrary to Religion and Points of Faith A Consequence opposite to the first Principle of Morality which obliges us to love God with all our Strength and to fear none but Him 'T is a common Notion by which all Men Order their Behaviour That we ought to love and fear what has Power to do us Good and Harm to make us feel Pleasure and Pain to render us happy or miserable and that this Cause is to be lov'd or fear'd proportionably to its Power of Acting on us But the Fire the Sun the Objects of our Senses can truly Act on us and make us in some manner happy or miserable This is the Principle suppos'd we may therefore Love and Fear them This is the Conclusion which every one naturally makes and is the general Principle of the corruption of Manners 'T is evident by Reason and by the First of God's Commandments That all the motions of our Soul of Love or Fear Desire or Joy ought to tend to God and that all the Motions of our Body may be Regulated and Determin'd by encompassing Objects By the Motion of our Body we may approach a Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that 's ready to devour us But we ought to Love and Fear none but God all the Motions of our Soul ought to tend to Him only we are to Love Him with all our strength this is an indispensible Law We can neither Love or Fear what is below us without disorder and corruption Freely to fear a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to give them some honour to Love a Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the light of the Sun as if he were the true cause of it to Love even our Father our Protector our Friend as if they were capable of doing us good is to pay them an Honour which is due to none but God in which sense it is lawful to Love none But we may and ought to Love our Neighbour by wisâ—ing and procuring him as Natural or Occasional Cause all that may make him happy and no otherwise For we to Love our Brothers not as if able to do
them which by the Efficacy of the same Law giving the Elasticity to visible Bodies oblige them to rebound and hinder them from observing it But this I ought not to explain more at length XVII Now these two Laws are so Simple so Natural and at the same time so Fruitful that though we had no other Reason to conclude they are observ'd in Nature we should be induc'd to believe them establish'd by Him who works always by the simplest Ways in whose Action there is nothing but what 's so justly uniform and wisely proportion'd to his Work that He does infinite Wonders by a very small Number of Wills XVIII It fares not so with the General Cause as with the Particular with infinite Wisdom as with limited Understandings GOD foreseeing before the Establishment of Natural Laws all that could follow from them ought not to have constituted them if He was to disannul them The Laws of Nature are constant and immutable and general for all Times and Places Two Bodies of such degrees of Magnitude and Swiftness meeting rebound so now as they did heretofore If the Rain falls upon some Grounds and the Sun scorches others if a seasonable Time for Harvest is follow'd by a destructive Hail if an Infant comes into the World with a monstrous and useless Head growing from his Breast that makes him wretched this proceeds not from the particular Wills of GOD but from the Settlement of the Laws of Communication of Motions whereof these Effects are necessary Consequences Laws at once so simple and so fruitful that they serve to produce all we see Noble in the World and even to repair in a little time the most general Barrenness and Mortality XIX He that having built an House throws one Wing of it down that he may rebuild it betrays his Ignorance and he who having planted a Vine plucks it up as soon as it has taken root manifests his Levity because he that wills and unwills wants either Knowledge or Resolution of Mind But it cannot be said that GOD acts either by this Freakishness or Ignorance when a Child comes into the World with superfluous Members that make him leave it again or that an Hail-stone breaks off a Fruit half ripe If he causes this 't is not because he wills and unwills for GOD acts not like particular Causes by particular Wills nor has he establish'd the Laws of the Communications of Motions with design to produce Monsters or to make Fruit fall before Maturity it not being their Sterility but Fecundity for which He will'd these Laws Therefore what He once will'd He still wills and the World in general for which these Laws were constituted will eternally subsist XX. 'T is here to be observ'd That the Essential Rule of the Will of GOD is Order and that if Man for example had not sinn'd a Supposition which had quite chang'd the Designs then Order not suffering him to be punish'd the Natural Laws of the Communications of Motions would never have been capable to incommodate his Felicity For the Law of Order which requires that a righteous Person should suffer nothing against his Will being Essential to GOD the Arbitrary Law of the Communication of Motions must have been necessarily subservient to it XXI There are still some uncommon Instances where these General Laws of Motions ought to cease to produce their Effect not that GOD changes or corrects His Laws but that some Miracles must happen on particular Occasions by the Order of Grace which ought to supersede the Order of Nature Besides 't is fit Men should know that GOD is so Master of Nature that if He submits it to His Laws establish'd 't is rather because He wills it so than by an absolute Necessity XXII If then it be true that the General Cause ought not to produce His Work by particular Wills and that GOD ought to settle certain constant and invariable Laws of the Communication of Motions by the Efficacy whereof He foresaw the World might subsist in the State we find it in one Sense it may be most truly said that GOD desires all his Creatures should be perfect that He wills not the Abortion of Children nor loves monstrous Productions nor has made the Laws of Nature with design of causing them and that if it were possible by ways so simple to make and preserve a perfecter World He would never have establish'd those Laws whereof so great a Number of Monsters are the necessary Results But that it would have been unworthy His Wisdom to multiply His Wills to prevent some particular Disorders which by their Diversity make a kind of Beauty in the Universe XXIII GOD has given to every Seed a Cicatricle which contains in Miniature the Plant and Fruit another Cicatricle adjoining to the former which contains the Root of the Plant which Root contains another Root still whose imperceptible Branches expand themselves into the two Lobes or Meal of the Seed Does not this manifest that in one most real Sense He designs all Seeds should produce their like For why should He have given to those Grains of Corn He design'd should be barren all the Parts requisite to render them Fecund Nevertheless Rain being necessary to make them thrive and this falling on the Earth by General Laws which distribute it not precisely on well manur'd Grounds and in the fittest Seasons all these Grains come not to good or if they do the Hail or some other mischievous Accident which is a Necessary Consequence of these same Natural Laws prevents their earing Now GOD having constituted these Laws might be said to will the Fecundity of some Seeds rather than others if we did not otherwise know that it not becoming a General Cause to work by Particular Wills nor an infinitely wise Being by Complicated Ways GOD ought not to take other Measures than He has done for the Regulating the Rains according to Time and Place or by the Desire of the Husbandman Thus much is suffiâ—ient for the Order of Nature Let us explain that of Grace a little more at large and especially remember that 't is the same Wisdom and the same Will in a word the same GOD who has establish'd them both PART II. Of the Necessity of the General Laws of GRACE XXIV GOD loving Himself by the Necessity of His Being and willing to procure an Infinite Glory and Honour on all Hands worthy of himself consults His Wisdom for the accomplishing His Desires This Divine Wisdom fill'd with Love for Him from whom He receives His Being by an Eternal and Ineffable Generation seeing nothing in all possible Creatures worthy of the Majesty of His Father offers Himself to establish to His Honour an Eternal Worship and to present Him as High Priest a Sacrifice which through the Dignity of His Person should be capable of contenting Him He represents to Him infinite Models for the Temple to be rais'd to His Glory and at the same time all possible Ways to execute His Designs
Principle In a word Jesus Christ needing Minds of particular Dispositions for the causing particular Effects may in general apply to them and by that Application infuse into them sanctifying Grace As the Mind of a Projector thinks in general of square Stones when these Stones are actually necessary to his Building XVIII But the Soul of Jesus being not a general Cause we have reason to think it has often particular Desires in regard to particular Persons When we intend to speak of God we must not consult our selves and make him act like us but consider the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect and make God act according to that Idea But in speaking of the Action of the Soul of Jesus we may look into our selves and make him act like particular Causes For Example We have reason to believe that the Conversion of St. Paul was owing to the Efficacy of a particular Desire of Jesus Christ. And we are to look upon the Desires of the Soul of Jesus which have a general respect to Minds of a certain Character as particular Desires though they comprehend many Persons because these Desires change daily like those of particular Causes But the general Laws by which God acts are always the same because the Wills of God ought to be firm and constant by reason that his Wisdom is infinite XIX The diverse Desires of the Soul of Jesus distributing Grace we clearly conceive why it is not equally dispers'd to all Men and why bestow'd on some more abundantly at one time than another For his Soul not thinking on all Men at once cannot at the same time have all the Desires whereof it is capable So that he acts not on his Members in a particular manner except by successive Influences as the Soul moves not at once all the Muscles of our Body For the Animal Spirits are unequally and successively distributed into our Members according to the various Impressions of Objects the diverse Motions of our Passions and the several Desires we freely excite within us XX. True it is that all the Righteous constantly receive the Influence of their Head which gives them Life and that when they act by the Spirit of Jesus Christ they merit and receive new Graces though it be not necessary that the Soul of Jesus should have any particular Desires as the occasional Causes of them For Order which requires that every Desert should be rewarded is not an arbitrary but a necessary Law and independent from any occasional Cause But though he who performs a meritorious Action may be rewarded for it whilst the Soul of Jesus has no actual Desires relating to him yet 't is certain that he merited not this Grace but by the Dignity and Sanctity of the Spirit which Christ has communicated to him For Men are not well-pleasing to God nor able to do good but in as much as they are united to his Son by Charity XXI It must be farther acknowledg'd that those who observe the Counsels of Jesus Christ out of an Esteem they have for them and through the Fear of future Punishment sollicite as I may say by their Obedience the Charity of Christ to think on them though they act from a Principle of Self-love But their Actions are not the Occasional Causes either of Grace since it does not infallibly follow them or even of the Motions of the Soul of Jesus in their Favour since these Motions never fail to communicate it Thus only the Desires of Jesus Christ as Occasional Causes have infallibly their Effect because God having constituted him Head of the Church ought by him only to communicate his sanctifying Grace to his Elect. XXII Now we may consider in the Soul of Jesus Christ Desires of two sorts viz. Actual Transitory and Particular that have but a short-liv'd Efficacy and Stable and Permanent which consist in a setled and constant Disposition of the Soul of Jesus Christ with relation to certain Effects which tend to the Execution of his Design in general If our Soul by its various Motions communicated to our Body all that was necessary to its Formation and Growth we might distinguish in her two kinds of Desire For it would be by the actual and transitory Desires that she would drive into the Muscles of the Body the Spirits which gave it a certain Disposition with reference to present Objects or to the actual Thoughts of the Mind But it would be by stable and permanent Desires that she would give to the Heart and Lungs the natural Motions by which Respiration and the Circulation of the Blood were perform'd By these Desires she would digest the Aliments and distribute them to all the Parts that needed them in as much as that sort of Action is at all times necessary to the Preservation of the Body XXIII By the actual transitory and particular Desires of the Soul of Jesus Grace is deriv'd to unprepar'd Persons in a manner somewhat singular and extraordinary But 't is by his permanent Desires that it is given regularly to those who receive the Sacraments with the necessary Dispositions For the Grace we receive by the Sacraments is not given us precisely because of the Merit of our Action though we receive them in Grace but because of the Merits of Jesus Christ which are freely applied to us in consequence of his permanent Desires We receive in the Sacraments much more Grace than our Preparation deserves and it suffices to our receiving some Influence from them that we do not oppose and resist it But 't is abusing what is most Sacred in Religion to receive them unworthily XXIV Amongst the actual and transitory Desires of the Soul of Jesus there are certainly some more durable and frequent than others and the Knowledge of these Desires is of greatest Consequence in Point of Morality Doubtless he thinks oftner on those who observe his Counsels than on other Men. His Motions of Charity for Believers are more frequent and lasting than those for Libertines and Atheists And as all Believers are not equally prepar'd to enter into the Church of the Predestinate the Desires of the Soul of Jesus are not equally lively frequent and durable on the account of them all Man more earnestly desires the Fruits that are fittest for the Nourishment of his Body he 〈◊〉 oftner on Bread and Wine than on Meats of difficult Digestion So Jesus Christ designing the Formation of his Church ought to be more taken up with those who can most easily enter than on others which are extremely remote The Scripture likewise teaches us that the Humble the Poor the Penitent receive greater Graces than other Men because the Despisers of Honours Riches and Pleasures are the fittest for the Kingdom of Heaven Those for Example who have learn'd of Jesus Christ to be meek and humble in Heart shall find Rest to their Souls The Yoke of Christ which is insupportable to the Proud will become easie and light by the Assistances of Grace For God
the Grace of the Creator XXXVI In the establish'd Order of Nature I can see but two Occasional Causes which shed Light on Minds and so determine the General Laws of the Grace of the Creator one which is in us and depends in some measure on us the other which is found in the Relation we have with surrounding Objects The former is nothing but the diverse Motions of our Will the second is the Occurrence of sensible Objects which act on our Mind in consequence of the Laws of Union of our Soul with our Body XXXVII We are taught by our own inward Consciousness That the Love of Light produces it and that Attention of Mind is a Natural Prayer by which we obtain Instruction of God for all the Enquirers of Truth who apply themselves to Truth discover it in proportion to their Application And if our Prayer were not interrupted nor our Attention disturb'd if we had any Idea of what we ask and should ask it with a competent Perseverance we should not fail to obtain whilst we were capable of receiving it But our Prayers are continually interrupted unless Self-interess'd our Senses and Imagination muddy and confound all our Ideas And â—hough the Truth we consult answers our Enquiries the confus'd Noise of our Passions deafens us to its Answers or makes us speedily forget them XXXVIII If it be consider'd that Man before the Fall was animated with Charity and possess'd with all that was requisite to his Perseverance in Innocence and that by his Perseverance and Application he ought to merit his Reward 't will easily be conceiv'd that the several Desires of his Will were establish'd the Occasional Causes of the Light receiv'd in his Understanding otherwise his Distraction had not been voluntary nor his Attention meritorious But Nature however corrupted is not destroy'd God has not desisted to will what he once will'd And the same Laws still subsist Therefore our manifold Volitions are still the Occasional or Natural Causes of the Presence of Ideas to our Mind But because the Union of the Soul with the Body is chang'd into a Dependence on it by a Natural Consequence of Sin and the immutable Will of God as I have explain'd elsewhere our Body at present disturbs our Ideas and speaks so loud in favour of its respective Goods that the Mind but seldom consults and distractedly listens to Internal Truth XXXIX Moreover Experience daily teaches us that our Conversation with Understanding Persons is capable of instructing us by raising our Attention that Preaching Reading Converse a thousand Occurrences of all sorts may raise some Ideas in us and likewise inspire us with good Thoughts The Death of a Friend is doubtless capable of putting us in Mind of Death unless some great Passion takes us up And when a Preacher of great Natural Endowments undertakes to demonstrate a most simple Truth and convince others of it it must be own'd that he may persuade his Hearers and even move their Conscience give them Fear and Hope and raise in them such other Passions as put them in a less State of Opposition to the Influence of the Grace of Jesus Christ. Men being made for a sociable Life 't was requisite they should mutually communicate their Thoughts and Motions 'T was fit they should be united in Mind as well as Body and that speaking by the Voice to their Ears and by Writing to their Eyes they should infuse Light and Understanding into one anothers Minds XL. But Light whatever way produc'd in us whether by particular Desires or fortuitous Instances as the Occasional Causes of it may be call'd Grace especially when it nearly relates to Salvation though it be but a Consequence of the Order of Nature because since Sin God owes us nothing and all the Good we have is merited for us by Jesus Christ in whom our very Being subsists But this kind of Grace though merited for us by Jesus Christ is not the Grace of our Lord but that of the Creator since Jesus Christ is not usually the Occasional Cause of it but the Cause of it is discoverable in the Order of Nature XLI There are still several other Natural Effects which we might reasonably look upon as Graces For Example Two Persons have at the same time two Desires of Curiosity The one to go see an Opera the other to hear a celebrated Preacher If they satisfie their Curiosity he that goes to the Opera shall find such Objects as according to his present Disposition of Mind shall raise in him Passions that will damn him whilst the other shall find in the Preacher so great Force and Light that the Grace of Conversion working in him at that moment shall be able to save him Which suppos'd Let but a shower of Rain or any other Accident happen that may stay them at home Though the Rain be a Natural Effect as depending on the Natural Laws of the Communication of Motions yet it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Damnation it prevents and a Punishment to him whose Conversion it hinders XLII Grace being conjoin'd to Nature all the Motions of our Soul and Body have some relation to Salvation This Man is sav'd by having in a State of Grace made a false Step which happily broke his Neck and another is damn'd by having on some Occasion misfortunately avoided the Ruines of a falling House We know not what is for our Advantage but we well know there is nothing of it self so indifferent but has some reference to our Salvation because of the Mixture and Combination of Effects depending on the General Laws of Nature with others that depend on the General Laws of Grace XLIII As therefore Light points out to us the True Good the Means to obtain it our Duties to God in a word the Ways we are to follow it is sufficient to cause those who are animated with Charity to do good to merit new Graces and to conquer some Temptations as I shall explain in another Place so I think we may lawfully give it the Name of Grace though Jesus Christ be only the Meritorious Cause of it And whereas External Graces which have no immediate Influence on the Mind come nevertheless into the Order of Predestination of Saints I consider them also as True Graces In a word I see not why we may not give the Name of Grace to all Natural Effects when relating to Salvation subservient to the Grace of Jesus Christ and delivering us from some Hindrances to his Efficacy Yet if others will not agree with me I shall not contend with them about Words XLIV All these Graces if we may be allow'd to call them so being those of the Creator the General Laws of these Graces are the General Laws of Nature For we must still observe that Sin has not destroy'd Nature though it has corrupted it The General Laws of the Communications of Motions are always the same and those of the Union of the Soul
they had committed in murthering our Saviour it was fit that Jesus Christ should come into the World about the Reign of Herod supposing that People by the necessary Consequence of the Order of Nature was to be divided about that time that Civil Wars and perpetual Seditions were to weaken them and that lastly the Romans were to ruine and disperse them with the total Destruction of their City and Temple 'T is true there seems to be something extraordinary in the Desolation of the Jews But as it shews greater Wisdom in God to produce so surprizing Effects by the most simple and general Laws of Nature than by particular Wills which are always Miracles I question whether on that Occasion we are to fly unto a Miracle But for my part I dispute it not here since 't is a Fact that we cannot easily nor need we explain our selves upon And I produce this Instance only to make some Application of my Principles and to make them more easily intelligible to others I have I think said enough of Nature and Grace to satisfie all equitable and moderate Persons about an infinite Number of Difficulties which disturb only their Minds who must needs judge of God by themselves For if Men would consult the Idea of an Infinitely Perfect Being of a General Cause of an Infinite Wisdom and if they would consent to the Principles I have establish'd conformable to that Idea I believe they would neither be surpriz'd nor offended at the Conduct of GOD and that they would change their Murmurs and Censures into Wonder and Adoration CONCERNING Nature and Grace DISCOURSE III. Of the Manner of GRACE's acting in us PART I. Concerning Liberty I. THERE is nothing more rude and unform'd than the Substance of Spirits if we separate it from God For what 's a Mind void of Understanding and Reason destitute of Motion and Love Yet it is the Word and Wisdom of God which is the universal Reason of Minds and 't is the Love whereby God loves himself that gives the Soul the Motion she has towards Good If the Mind knows Truth 't is by its Natural and Necessary Union with Truth it self If it is reasonable 't is so through supreme Reason Lastly If it be a Spirit or Intelligence 't is in one sense because its Substance is enlightned penetrated and perfected by the Light of God himself These Truths I have explain'd in another Place So likewise the Substance of the Soul is not capable of loving Good save by its Natural and Necessary Union with the Eternal and Substantial Love of the Supreme Good it advances not towards Good any farther than convey'd by God it is volent only from the Motion it continually receives from him it lives only through Charity and wills merely through the Love of Good which God makes it participate though it abuses it For in fine God making and preserving Minds only for himself inclines them towards him as long as he preserves their Being and communicates the Love of Good to them whilst they are capable of receiving it Now that natural and continual Motion of the Soul towards Good in general towards Good indefinite towards God is what I here call Will Since 't is that Motion which capacitates the Substance of the Soul to love different Goods II. This Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general is invincible for 't is not in our Power not to will to be happy We necessarily love what we clearly know and lively feel to be our Good All Minds love God by the Necessity of their Nature and if they love any thing else by a Free Choice of their Will 't is not because they seek not God or the Cause of their Felicity but because they are deceiv'd 'T is because perceiving by a confus'd Sensation that surrounding Bodies make them happy they consider them as good and by an Ordinary and Natural Consequence love them and unite to them III. But the Love of all these particular Goods is not naturally invincible Man consider'd in his Original State might supersede loving those Goods that fill'd not the whole Capacity of his Affection There being but one Good which includes all others he might sacrifice every other Love to the Love of this For God having made Minds only for himself cannot invincibly carry them to the loving any thing besides him or without relation to him Lastly our own inward Consciousness informs us that we can reject a Fruit though we are inclin'd to take it Now that Power of loving or not loving particular Goods the Non-invincibility which is found in the Motion which carries Minds to the loving what does not seem every way inclusive of all Goods That Power or Non-invincibility is what I call Liberty Thus placing the Definition instead of the thing defin'd that Expression our Will is free signifies that the Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general is not invincible in point of Good in particular To the Word Free the Idea of Voluâ—tary is commonly annex'd but in the Sequel of this Discourse I shall take the Word in the Sense I have observ'd as being the most Natural and Ordinary IV. The Word Good is equivocal and may signifie either Pleasure which makes formally happy or the true or seeming Cause of Pleasure In this Discourse I shall constantly take the Word Good in the second Sense because indeed Pleasure is imprinted on the Soul that she may love the Cause that makes her happy that she may advance towards it by the Motion of her Love and may strictly unite to it to be perpetually happy When the Soul loves nothing but her own Pleasure she in effect loves nothing distinct from her self For Pleasure is only a Condition or Modification of the Soul which renders her actually happy and content But whilst the Soul cannot be the Cause of her own Pleasure she 's unjust ungrateful and blind if she loves her Pleasure and forgets to pay the Love and Devotion which is due to the true Cause that produces it in her As none but God can act immediately and by himself on the Soul and make her sensible of Pleasure by the actual Efficacy of his all-potent Will so he alone is truly Good However I term the Creatures Good which are the seeming Causes of the Pleasures we feel occasionally from them For I am unwilling to deviate from the customary way of Speaking any farther than is necessary to explain my self clearly All Creatures though Good in themselves or Perfect with reference to the Designs of God are not Good with reference to us They are not our Good nor the true Cause of our Pleasure or Felicity V. The natural Motion which God constantly imprints on the Soul to carry it to love him or to make use of a Term which is the Abridgement of several Ideas and can be no longer equivocal or confus'd after the Definition I have given of it the Will is determin'd towards particular Goods either
by a clear and evident Knowledge or by a confus'd Sensation which points these Goods out to us Whilst the Mind perceives or tasts not any particular Good the Motion of the Soul remains as it were undetermin'd it tends towards Good in general But this Motion receives a particular Determination as soon as the Mind has the Idea or Sensation of some particular Good For the Soul being continually bent towards Good undetermin'd ought to move when the Good appears VI. But when the Good which is present to the Mind and Senses fils not these two Faculties when it 's discover'd under the Idea of a particular Good of a Good that comprehends not all Goods and when it is tasted by a Sensation that takes not up the whole Capacity of the Soul she may still desire the Perception and Fruition of some other Good she may suspend the Judgment of her Love She may refuse to acquiesce in the actual Enjoyment and by her Desires seek out some novel Object And as her Desires are the Occasional Causes of her Light and Knowledge she may by the natural and necessary Union of all Minds with him who includes the Ideas of all Goods discover the True Good and in the True many other particular Goods different from that she perceiv'd and enjoy'd before Therefore having some Knowledge of the Emptiness and Vanity of sensible Goods and attending to the secret Reproaches of her Reason to the Remorses of her Conscience to the Complaints and Menaces of the True Good who will not that she should sacrifice to seeming and imaginary Goods may by the Motion which God continually imprints on her for Good in general Sovereign Good that is for himself check her self in her Course towards any particular Good She may resist the sensible Allurements search and find out other Objects compare them together and with the indelible Idea of the Supreme Good and love none of them with a determinate Love And if the Sovereign Good comes to be somewhat relish'd she may prefer it to all particular Goods though the Pleasure and Satisfaction they seem to infuse into the Soul be extremely great and very agreeable But these Truths require a larger Explication VII The Soul is constantly driven towards Good in general she desires the Possession of all Goods and will never limit her Love there being no Good that appears such that she refuses to love Therefore when she actually enjoys a particular Good she has a Tendency to proceed farther she still desires something more by the natural and invincible Impression which God gives her and to change or divide her Love it suffices to present her another Good besides that of her present Enjoyment and to give her a Tast of the Pleasure it affords Now the Soul may ordinarily seek and discover new Goods She may likewise approach and enjoy them For in fine her Desires are the Natural or Occasional Causes of her Knowledge and Objects appear and draw towards her in proportion to her Earnestness to know them A Man of Ambition who considers the Lustre of a Dignity may likewise think on the Slavery Constraint and the true Evils that accompany Humane Grandeur he may summ up the Account weigh and compare all together if his Passion does not blind him For I confess there are Moments in which Passion takes away all Liberty from the Mind and that it always lessens it Thus as a Dignity however great it appears cannot be taken by a perfectly free and rational Man for universal and infinite Good whilst the Will extends to all Goods This perfectly free and perfectly rational Man may enquire after and find out others in as much as he can desire them it being his Desires which discover and present them to him He may then examine them and compare them with that which he enjoys But whereas he can find only particular Goods on Earth he may and ought whilst he lives here below to examine them and perpetually seek and never acquiesce Or rather that he may not be constantly following a fresh Chase he ought in general to neglect all transitory Goods and desire only such as are Immutable and Eternal VIII But whereas we love not to seek but to enjoy and that the Labour of Examination is at present very painful but Repose and Enjoyment always very agreeable the Soul commonly rests when she has found any Good she stops at it to enjoy it she deceives her self because by her mistaking and judging she has found what she looks for her Desire is chang'd into Pleasure and Pleasure makes her happier than Desire But her Happiness cannot last long Her Pleasure being ill-grounded unjust and deceitful immediately disquiets and molests her because she desires to be solidly and truly happy Thus the natural Love of Good quickens her and produces in her new Desires These confus'd Desires represent new Objects The Love of Pleasure puts her on the Pursuit of those which afford or seem to afford it and the Love of her Repose fastens her upon them She does not immediately examine the Defects of the present Good when prepossess'd with its Sweetness but rather contemplates it on its best side applies to that which charms her and thinks only of enjoying it But the more she enjoys the more she loves it and the closer she approaches the more curiously she considers it But the more she considers it the more Imperfections she spies in it and since she desires to be truly happy she cannot for ever be mistaken When she is thirsty and hungry and weary with seeking she presently inebriates and fills her self with the first Good she finds but she is presently disgusted with a Nourishment which was not made for Man Thus the Love of the True Good excites in her new Desires for fresh Goods and whilst she constantly changes her Pursuit all her Life and her whole Happiness on Earth consists in a continual Circulation of Thoughts Desires and Pleasures Such is the Soul which makes no use of her Liberty but leaves her self to the Conduct of Chance to be guided by the obtaining Motion and the fortuitous Concourse of determining Objects But this is the State of a Man whose Understanding is so weak as daily to mistake the false for the true Good and whose Heart is so corrupt as to betray and sell it self to every thing it is touch'd with to the Good which gives it an actual Sense of the most sweet and agreeable Pleasures IX But a Man perfectly free such as we conceive Adam immediately after his Creation knows clearly that none but God is his Good or the true Cause of the Pleasures he enjoys Though he feels Satisfaction upon the approach of circumambient Bodies he loves them not God only he loves and if God forbid him to unite to Bodies he is ready to forsake them what Pleasure soever he finds in them He resolves to fix only in the Enjoyment of the supreme Good and to sacrifice all others to
the Light of Reason that God is its Good and has a lively Sense of him by the Tast of Pleasure 't is not possible to avoid loving him For the Mind desires Happiness and then nothing hinders it from following the agreeable Motions of its Love It feels no Remorses which oppose its present Felicity nor is it withheld by Pleasures contrary to that which it enjoys The Delight of Grace is then invincible nor is the Love it produces meritorious unless it be greater than its Cause I say that the Love which is merely a Natural or Necessary Effect of the Delectation of Grace has nothing meritorious though it be good in it self For whilst we move no farther than we are driven or rather when we advance no longer than we are paid in hand we have no Claim to any Recompence When we love God but so far as we are attracted or because we are attracted we love him not by Reason but by Instinct we love him not on Earth as he requires and deserves from us But we merit only when we love God by Choice by Reason by the Knowledge we have of his being amiable We merit in proceeding on as I may say towards Good when Pleasure has determin'd the Motion of Love XXV This sole Reason demonstrates either that the first Man was not invited to the Love of God by the blind Instinct of Pleasure or at least that this Pleasure was not so lively as what he felt in reflecting on his own Natural Perfections or in the actual use of sensible Goods For 't is evident such a Pleasure would have made him impeccable it would have put him in a State like that of the Blessed which merit no longer Not because they are out of a Wayfaring State for Merit always follows from meritorious Actions and God being Just must necessarily reward them But they merit not because the Pleasure they find in God is equal to their Love that they are throughly imbued with it and that being freed from all sort of Pain and all Motions of Concupiscence they have nothing left to sacrifice to God XXVI For that which makes us impeccable is not precisely that which incapacitates us to merit Jesus Christ was impeccable and yet he merited his Glory and that of the Church whereof he is the Head Being perfectly free he lov'd his Father not by the Instinct of Pleasure but by Choice and Reason He lov'd him because he intuitively saw how amiable he was For the most perfect Liberty is that of a Mind which has all possible Light and is not determin'd by any Pleasure because all Pleasure preventing or other naturally produces some Love and unless we resist it it efficaciously determines towards the agreeable Object the Natural Motion of the Soul But Light though conceiv'd never so great leaves the Mind perfectly free supposing this Light be consider'd alone and separate from Pleasure XXVII As Jesus Christ is nothing but the Word or Reason Incarnate certainly he ought not to love Good with a blind Love with the Love of Instinct with the Love of Sensation but by Reason He ought not to love an infinitely amiable Good and which he knew perfectly worthy of his Love as we love Goods that are not amiable and which we cannot know as worthy of Love He ought not to love his Father by a Love in any respect like that wherewith we love the vilest Creatures wherewith we love Bodies His Love to be pure at least to be perfectly meritorious ought to be no wise produc'd by preventing Pleasures For Pleasure may and must be the Recompence of a Legitimate Love as in effect it is in the Saints and Jesus Christ himself But it cannot be the Principle of Merit nor ought it to precede Reason unless debilitated But Reason in Jesus Christ was no ways weakned Supreme Reason supported the Created Jesus Christ who was free from the Motions of Concupiscence had no need of preventing Delight to counterbalance sensible Pleasures which surprize us Nay it may be he refus'd to tast the Pleasure of Joy which was a natural Result of the Knowledge he had of his Vertue and Perfections that being deprived of all sorts of Pleasures his Sacrifice might be more holy more pure and more disinteress'd Lastly Beside the Privation of all Pleasures preventing and others 't is likely he inwardly suffer'd unspeakable Droughts not better expressible by Souls fill'd with Charity than by the Dereliction of God according to these Words of our Saviour on the Cross My God my God why hast thou forsaken me But if we will absolutely have it that Jesus Christ was carried by preventing Pleasures to the Love of his Father 't is necessary to say according to the Principles I have laid down either that his Love was more intense than his Pleasure since Natural Love produc'd by the Instinct of Pleasure is no ways meritorious or at least we must say he merited by sensible Pains by the continual Sacrifice which he freely and voluntarily offer'd to his Father For 't was necessary he should suffer to enter in Possession of his Glory as we are taught by Scripture XXVIII Though the Delectation of Grace without relation to any contrary Pleasure infallibly gains the Consent of the Will yet it is not so with the Pleasures of Concupiscence These Pleasures consider'd in themselves without respect to other actual Pleasures are not always insurmountable The Light of Reason condemns them the Remorse of Conscience makes us abhor them and we may commonly suspend our Consent Therefore the Grace of Jesus Christ is stronger than Concupiscence and we may call it Victorious since the former always masters the Heart when equal to the latter For when the Balance of our Heart is perfectly in Equilibrio by the even Weights of contrary Pleasures that which is most solid and reasonable has the Advantage because Light adds some Grains to its efficacy and the Remorses of Conscience withstand the Influence of a counterfeit Pleasure XXIX We must conclude from what we have said that we always merit when we love the true Good by Reason and that we merit not at all when we love it by Instinct We merit always when we love the true Good by Reason because Order will have the true Good lov'd in that manner and that mere Light does not convey us or invincibly determine us to the Good discover'd by it We merit not when we love the true Good by Instinct or as much as we are invincibly mov'd and determin'd by Pleasure Because Order requires that the true Good or the Good of the Mind should be lov'd by Reason by a free Love a Love of Choice and Judgment whilst the Love which is produc'd by Pleasure is a Blind Natural and Necessary Love I own that when we advance farther than Pleasure forces us we merit But that 's because we therein act by Reason and in the way that Order would have us For Love so much as it
exceeds Pleasure is a pure and reasonable Love XXX So likewise we must conclude that we always demerit when we love a false Good by the Instinct of Pleasure provided we love it more than we are invincibly forc'd For when our Liberty is naturally so straitned and our Capacity of Mind so little that we are carried in an irresistible manner then though we are corrupt and our Love be evil and against Order yet we don't demerit To demerit I mean to deserve to be punish'd we must pursue false Goods with more ardency or tend farther than Pleasure irresistibly carries us For we must observe that there is great difference between a Good and a Meritorious Action between a Corrupt and a Demeritoous The Love of the Blessed is Good but it is not Meritorious The Love of a Righteous Person is often deprav'd in his Sleep but it is not Demeritorious Whatever is conformable to Order is good and whatever is contrary to it is naught But there is nothing of Merit or Demerit save in the good or ill use of our Liberty save in that in which we are the Factors But we make a good use of our Liberty when we follow Light when we unconstrain'd and of our selves advance to the true Good or were at first determin'd by preventing Delectation or the Light of Reason when we sacrifice sensible Pleasures to our Duty and surmount Pain by the Love of Order On the contrary we make an ill use of our Liberty when we make Pleasure our Reason when we sacrifice our Duty to our Passions our Perfection to present Felicity the Love of Order to the Love of our selves and all this at a time when we might really have prevented it But I proceed to explain this still more clearly XXXI When two Objects are offer'd to the Mind and it determines it self about them I confess it never fails to take that side where most Reason and Pleasure appears or all things consider'd where most Good is to be found For the Soul not being able to will or love but through the Love of Good since the Will is nothing but the Love of Good or the Natural Motion of the Soul towards it she unavoidably loves what has most conformity with what she loves invincibly But 't is certain that when sensible Pleasure or something of like nature does not perturbate the Mind we may ever suspend the Judgment of our Love and not determine especially in point of false Good For the Soul can have no Evidence that false Goods are the true or that the Love of the former agrees perfectly with the Motion which carries us to the latter Therefore when a Man loves false Goods whilst his Senses and Passions leave his Reason entirely free he demerits Because then he may and ought to suspend the Judgment of his Love For if he stood any time to examine what was speedily to be done the false Good would appear in its own Colours the Pleasure which it seems to infuse into the Soul would vanish the Idea of some other Good would present it self to the Mind the Remorse of Conscience and perhaps the Delectation of Grace would change all the Dispositions of his Mind and Heart For the State of a Traveller has nothing certain A thousand different Objects are continually offer'd to the Mind and the Life of Man on Earth is nothing but a continual train of Thoughts and Desires XXXII At first Sight it seems that in point of the true Good we cannot suspend the Judgment of our Love for we cannot suspend our Judgment save when Evidence is not perfect Now we may see with the clearest Evidence that God is the true Good and that none but he can be good to us We know that he is infinitely more amiable than we can conceive But it is observable that though we cannot suspend the Judgment of Reason in respect of Speculative Truths when the Evidence is entire yet we may suspend the Judgment of our Love in point of Goods whatever Evidence there is in our Ideas For when Sense fights against Reason when Tast opposes Light when that is found sensibly bitter and disagreeable which Reason clearly represents as sweet and delectable we may suspend our Choice and follow either Reason or the Senses We may act and commonly do act against our Light because when we attend to the Sensation Light disappears unless we strive to retain it And because we are ordinarily more attentive to Sensation than to Light because Sensation is always more lively and agreeable than the most evident Knowledge XXXIII 'T is Pleasure which makes Minds actually happy Therefore we ought to enjoy Pleasure when we love the true Good Yet a Mind thinks on God draws nigh him by its Love and tasts no Satisfaction On the contrary God fills it sometimes with Bitterness and Drought he deserts it and repels it as I may say not that it may cease to love him but rather that its Love may be more humble more pure and meritorious Lastly he prescribes it certain things which render it actually miserable But if it approaches Bodies it finds it self happy in proportion to the Strictness of its Union to them Certainly this is perplexing to a Man never so intelligent since we are invincibly passionate for Happiness Therefore we merit much if following our Light we renounce our selves notwithstanding those discomforting Droughts if we sacrifice our actual Happiness to the Love of the true Good if living by Faith and relying on the Promises of God we remain inviolably bent upon our Duty Hence we clearly understand that Jesus Christ might merit his Glory though he knew the true Good in the highest Evidence because having an extreme Love for his Father he was entirely conformable to his Orders without being carried by preventing Pleasures because being steadily guided by his Light he suffer'd most violent Pains and sacrific'd the most lively and sensible Pleasures to his Charity For he took on him a Body like to ours that he might have a Victim to offer to God and that duly receiving through this Body as the Occasional or Natural Cause an abundance of various Sensations he might accomplish a perfect Holocaust to the Honour of the true Good by the enduring Pain and the Privation of sensible Pleasures XXXIV To the end every one may have a most perfect Idea of the Grace of Jesus Christ I think it requisite to add that it consists not in Delectation alone For all Grace of Sensation is the Grace of Jesus Christ. But of this Grace there are many Species and of every Species infinite degrees God sometimes casts Distast and Bitterness on the Objects of our Passions he weakens their sensible Charms or makes us hate or abhor them And this kind of Grace of Sensation makes the same Effect as preventing Delight It restores and fortifies our Liberty reinstates us almost in Equilibrio and thereby puts us in a Capacity of following our Light in the Motion of
our Love For to restore a Balance to an even poize or to change its propension we need not augment the lesser Weight but only retract from the over-loaden Scale Thus there are Graces of Sensation of several sorts and every sort is capable of infinite degrees For there are Pleasures Aversions and Dislikes greater and lesser ad infinitum What I have hitherto said of Delectation may be easily apply'd to other Species of the Grace of Sensation I only made choice of Pleasure or Delectation as a particular Example to explain my self clearly and without Ambiguity If there be any other Principle of our Determinations to Good besides the Grace of Sensation and that of Light I confess I am utterly ignorant of it and therefore I have resolv'd to explain the Effects of Grace necessary to the Conversion of Heart but by these two Principles for fear of incurring the blame of discoursing in general Terms that of themselves excite only confus'd Ideas which thing I avoid with all possible Care But though I have explain'd my self in Terms understood by all Mankind since there is no body but knows that the Knowledge and Sense of Good are Principles of our Determinations yet I presume not to impugn those who sticking not to these clear Ideas say in general that God operates the Conversion of our Souls by a particular Action different it may be from all I have here and elsewhere said that God works in us Experiencing in my self no other Motion than towards Good in general and that determin'd by Knowledge or Sensation I ought to suppose nothing more if by this alone I can account for all that the Scripture and Councils have determin'd about the present Subject In a word I am well assur'd that Light and Sensation are the Principles of our Determinations but I declare that I cannot tell but there may be some other whereof I have no Knowledge XXXV Besides Grace of it self efficacious and that the Effect whereof entirely depends on the good Dispositions of the Mind besides the Grace of Sensation and the Grace of Light the Righteous have moreover an Habitual Grace which makes them agreeable to God and capacitates them to work Actions meritorious of Salvation This Grace is Charity the Love of God or the Love of Order a Love which is not properly Charity unless it be stronger and greater than every other Love As it is commonly Pleasure which produces the Love of the Object that 's the true or apparent Cause of it so 't is the Delectation of Grace which produces the Love of God 'T is the Enjoyment of Sensible Pleasures which heightens Concupiscence and 't is the Grace of Sensation which encreases Charity Concupiscence diminishes by the deprivation of Sensible Pleasures and then Charity is easily preserv'd and nourish'd And whilst Charity faints by the privation of the actual Grace of Jesus Christ Concupiscence speedily thrives and grows upon it For these two Loves Charity and Cupidity constantly war with one another and gather Strength from the Weakness of their Enemy XXXVI Whatever participates of Charity is well-pleasing to God but Charity is not always active in the Just themselves In order to its working 't is necessary at least it be Illuminate For Knowledge is needful to determine the Motion of Love Thus the Grace necessary to every Good Work relating to Salvation is that of Sensation in those who begin their Conversion is that of Light at least or some Motion of Faith or Hope in those who are animated with Charity For though the Righteous may do Good Works without the Grace of Delectation they have always need of some actual Assistance to determine the Motion of their Charity But although Charity without Delectation is sufficient to conquer many Temptations yet the Grace of Sensation is necessary on many Occasions For Men cannot without the continual Help of the Second Adam resist the continual Action of the First They cannot persevere in Righteousness unless frequently assisted with the particular Grace of Jesus Christ which produces augments and maintains Charity against the continual Efforts of Concupiscence XXXVII The Effects of Pleasure and of all the Sensations of the Soul have a thousand several Dependencies on the actual Dispositions of the Mind The very same Weight has not always the same Effects It depends in its Action on the Structure of the Machine by which it is applied to the contrary Weight If a Balance be unequally suspended the force of the Weights being unequally applied the lighter may overweigh the heavier So it fares with the Weight of Pleasures They act one on another and determine the Motion of the Soul according as they are diversly applied Pleasure ought to have a greater Influence on the Person who has already a Love for the Object which causes it than on another who has an Aversion or that loves opposite Goods Pleasure forcibly determines a Person who clearly knows or vividly imagines the Advantages of Good which seems to cause it and acts feebly on the Mind of him who knows this Good but confusedly and is distrustful of it Lastly It acts with its whole Force on him who blindly follows all that gratifies Concupiscence and perhaps will have no Effect on him who has acquir'd some Habit of suspending the Judgment of his Love Now since the different degrees of Light Charity Concupiscence and the different degrees of Liberty are perpetually combining infinite ways with the different degrees of actual Pleasures which Pleasures are operative but according to their relation to the Dispositions of the Mind and Heart 't is manifest that no finite Mind can with any certainty pronounce of the Effect a particular Grace ought to produce in us For besides that there 's an infinite Combination in the things concurring to the Efficacy of Grace or the Production of its Effect this Combination is not like that of moving Springs and Forces which have always infallible and necessary Effects Therefore 't is impossible for any finite Mind to discover what passes in the Heart of Man XXXVIII But whereas God has an infinite Wisdom 't is visible that he clearly knows all the Effects that can result from the Mixture and Combination of all these things and that penetrating the Heart of Man he infallibly discovers even the Effects which depend on an Act or rather on a free Consent of our Wills Nevertheless I confess I cannot conceive how God can discover the Consequences of Actions which derive not their Infallibility from his absolute Decrees But I have no Mind to insist on Metaphysicks at the Expence of Morality and to affirm as undeniable Truths Opinions that are contrary to my own inward Consciousness of my self or in fine to speak to the Ears a certain Language which affords no clear Idea to the Mind I know well that such Objections may be made as would be too hard for me to answer satisfactorily and clearly But it may be these Objections are naturally
full of Obscurity and Darkness are founded on the Ignorance we are in of the Properties of our Soul 'T is from our having as I have elsewhere proved no clear Idea of our Being and that what is in us which gives way to be conquer'd by a Determination not invincible is absolutely unknown to us Furthermore if I cannot clearly answer these Objections I can answer by others which to me seem more incapable of Solution I can from Principles oppos'd to mine deduce more harsh and unlucky Consequences than those which are presum'd to follow from Liberty such as I have suppos'd in us But I engage not on the Particulars of all this as taking no delight to walk in the dark and to lead others upon Precipices THE ILLUSTRATION OR CONTINUATION OF THE TREATISE CONCERNING Nature and Grace What is meant by acting by General and Particular Wills I. I Say that God acts by General Wills when he acts in consequence of the General Laws which he has establish'd For Example I say that God acts in me by General Wills when he gives me the Sense of Pain when I am prick'd since in pursuance of the General and Efficacious Laws of Union of my Soul and Body which he has constituted he makes me suffer Pain when my Body's ill dispos'd So when a Bowl strikes another I say God moves the stricken by a General Will because he moves it in pursuance of the General and Efficacious Laws of the Communications of Motions God having generally Ordain'd that at the Instant of Collision of two Bodies the Motion should be distributed between them according to certain Proportions and 't is by the Efficacy of that General Will that Bodies have the force of moving one another II. I say on the contrary that God acts by Particular Wills when the Efficacy of his Will is not determin'd by some General Law to the producing any Effect Thus supposing God should make me feel the Pain of pricking whilst there happen'd no Change in my Body or in any Creature whatsover which determines him to act in me by some General Law I say that then God acts by Particular Wills So again supposing a Body begins to move without being stricken by another or without any Alteration happening in the Will of Spirits or in any other Creature which determines the Efficacy of some General Laws I say that God would move that Body by a Particular Will III. According to these Definitions it plainly appears that so far from denying Providence I suppose on the contrary that God works all in all things that the Nature of the Heathen Philosophers is a Chimera and that to speak properly Nature is nothing but the General Laws which God has establish'd for the Construction or Preservation of his Work by the simplest ways by an Action always uniform constant perfectly worthy of an infinite Wisdom and an universal Cause But that which I here suppose though certain for the Reasons I have given in The Search after Truth is not absolutely necessary to what I design to prove For if it be suppos'd that God had communicated his Power to the Creatures in such a manner as that surrounding Bodies had a real and true Force by which they might act on our Soul and make her happy and miserable by Pleasure and Pain and that Bodies in Motion had in themselves a certain Entity which they call Impress'd Quality that they can communicate it to those about them and with that Celerity and Uniformity we observe it would be still equally easie to prove what I intend For then the Efficacy of the concurrent Action of the General Cause would be necessarily determin'd by the Action of the Particular Cause God for Instance would be oblig'd by these Principles to afford his Concourse to a Body at the Instant of Collision that it might communicate its Motion to others which is still to act by virtue of a General Law Yet I do not argue upon that Supposition as believing it utterly false as I have shewn in the Third Chapter and Second Part of the Sixth Book of The Search after Truth in the Illustration of the same Chapter and elsewhere Which Truths suppos'd here follow the Notes by which we may discover whether an Effect be produc'd by a General or Particular Will MARKS by which we may judge whether an Effect be produc'd by a General or Particular Will IV. When we see an Effect immediately produc'd after the Action of an Occasionl Cause we ought to judge it produc'd by the Efficacy of a General Will. A Body moves immediately after the Collision the Collision of Bodies is the Action of an Occasional Cause Therefore this Body moves by a General Will. A Stone falls on the Head of a Man and kills him and this Stone falls like all others that is continues its Motion almost in Arithmetical Proportion 1 3 5 7 9 c. Which suppos'd I say it moves by the Efficacy of a General Will or by the Laws of the Communications of Motions as is easie to demonstrate V. When we see an Effect produc'd without the Mediation of the known Occasional Cause we have reason to think it produc'd by a Particular Will supposing this Effect be not manifestly unworthy of its Cause as I shall say hereafter For Example When a Body 's mov'd without being smitten by another there 's great Probability it was mov'd by a Particular Will but yet we cannot be confident of it For on Supposition of a General Law that Bodies should move according to the several Volitions of Angels or the like 't is visible this Body might be put in Motion without Impulsion the particular Will of some Angel being in this case able to determine the Will of the general Cause to move it Thus we may be often positive that God acts by general Wills but we cannot have the like Assurance that he acts by particular Wills even in the most averr'd Miracles VI. Since we have not a competent Knowledge of the various Combinations of Occasional Causes to discover whether such and such Effects arrive in consequence of their Action and are not sufficiently Intelligent to discover for Instance whether such a Rain be Natural or Miraculous produc'd by a necessary Consequence of the Communication of Motions or by a particular Will we must judge an Effect is produc'd by a General Will when 't is visible the Cause did not propose it self a particular End For the Wills of Intelligences have necessarily an End general Wills a general End and particular Wills a particular Design Nothing can be more plain and evident For Example Though I cannot discover whether a Shower of Rain which falls on a Meadow falls in consequence of general Laws or by a particular Will of God I have reason to think it falls by a general Will if I see it fall as well on the neighbouring Grounds or on the River which bounds the Meadow no less than on the Meadow it self For
if God caus'd it to rain on this Meadow by a particular Benevolence to the Owner this Rain would not fall on the River where 't is insignificant since it could not fall there without a Cause or Will in God which has necessarily some End VII But we have still more Reason to think an Effect is produc'd by a general Will when this Effect is contrary or even useless to the Design which we are taught by Faith or Reason the Cause propos'd For Instance The End which God proposes in the various Sensations he affords the Soul in our tasting different Fruits is that we may eat those which are fit for Nourishment and reject the rest I suppose thus Therefore when God gives a grateful Sensation at the Instant of our eating Poisons or empoison'd Fruits he acts not in us by particular Wills So we ought to conclude since that agreeable Sensation is the Cause of our Death whilst the End of God's giving us diverse Sensations is to preserve our Life by a convenient Nourishment for I once more suppose thus For I speak only with reference to the Grace which God gives us doubtless to convert us so that 't is visible God showers it not on Men by particular Wills since it frequently renders them more Culpable and Criminal For God cannot have so Fatal a Design God gives us not therefore agreeable Sensations by particular Wills when we eat poisonous Fruits But because a poisonous Fruit excites in our Brain Motions like those produc'd by wholsome Fruits God gives us the same Sensations by reason of the general Laws which unite the Soul to the Body that she might be wakeful for its Preservation So likewise God gives not those who have lost an Arm Sensations of Pain relating to it but by a general Will For 't is useless to the Body of this Man that his Soul should suffer Pain relating to an Arm that 's lost 'T is the same case with Motions produc'd in the Body of a Man in the Commission of a Crime Finally supposing we are obliged to think that God scatters his Rain upon the Earth witâ— Intent to make it fruitful we cannot believe he distributes it by particular Wills since it falls upon the Sands and in the Sea as well as on plow'd Lands and is often so excessive on seeded Ground as to extirpate the Corn and frustrate the Labours of the Husbandman Thus it is certain that Rains which are useless or noxious to the Fruits of the Earth are necessary Consequences of the general Laws of the Communications of Motions which God has establish'd for the producing better Effects in the World supposing which I again repeat that God cannot will by a particular Volition that Rain should cause the Barrenness of the Earth VIII Lastly When an Effect happens which has something extraordinary 't is reasonable to believe it is not produc'd by a general Will. Nevertheless 't is impossible to be sure of it If for Example in the Procession of the Holy Sacrament it rains on the Assistants save on the Priests and those which carry it we have reason to think this proceeds from a particular Will of the universal Cause yet we cannot be certain because an occasional intelligent Cause may have this particular Design and so determine the Efficacy of the general Law to execute it IX When the preceding Marks are not sufficient for us to judge whether a certain Effect is or is not produc'd by a general Will we are to believe it is if it be certain there is an Occasional Cause establish'd for the like Effects For Example We see it rain to some Purpose in a Field we do not examine whether this Rain falls or not in the great Roads we know not whether it be noxious to the bordering Grounds nay we suppose it only does good and that all the attending Circumstances are perfectly accommodated to the Design for which we are oblig'd to believe that God would have it rain Nevertheless I say that we ought to judge this Rain is produc'd by a general Will if we know that God has setled an Occasional Cause for the like Effects For we must not have recourse to Miracles without Necessity We ought to suppose that God acts herein by the simplest ways and though the Lord of the Field ought to return Thanks to God for the Bounty yet he ought not to imagine it was caus'd in a miraculous manner by a particular Will The Owner of the Field ought to thank God for the Good he receives since God saw and will'd the good Effect of the Rain when he establish'd the general Laws whereof it is a necessary Consequence and that it was for the like Effects they were establish'd On the contrary if the Rains are sometimes hurtful to the Earth as it was not to render them unfruitful that God establish'd the Laws which make it rain since Drought suffices to make them barren 't is plain we ought to thank God and to adore the Wisdom of his Providence even when we do not â—eel the Effects of the Laws establish'd in our Favour X. But to conclude when we cannot be certified by the Circumstances which accompany certain Effects that there is an Occasional Cause establish'd to produce them 't is sufficient to know they are very common and relate to the principal Design of the general Cause in order to judge they are produc'd by a general Will. For Example The Springs which water the Surface of the Earth are subservient to the principal Design of God which is that Mâ—n should not want things necessary to Life I suppose so Besides these Fountains are very common therefore we ought to conclude they are foâ—m'd by some General Laws For as there is much more Wisdom in executing his Designs by Simple and General Means than by Complicated and Particular as I think I have sufficiently prov'd elsewhere We owe that Honour to God as to believe his way of acting is general uniform constant and proportion'd to the Idea we have of an infinite Wisdom These are the Marks by which we are to judge whether an Effect be produc'd by a general Will. I now come to prove that God bestows his Grace on Men by general Laws and that Jesus Christ has been establishâ—d the Occasional Cause to determine their Efficacy I begin by the Proofs of Holy Scripture XI St. Paul teaches us That Jesus Christ is the Head of the Church That he constantly influences it with Spirit and Life That he forms the Members and animates them as the Soul animates the Body or to speak still more clearly the Holy Scripture teaches us two things The first that Jesus Christ prays continually for his Members The second that his Prayers or Desires are always heard Whence I conclude that he was constituted by God the Occasional Cause of Grace and likewise that Grace is never given to Sinners but through his Means The Occasional Causes have constantly and readily
videbimus eum sicuti est Joh. Ep. 1. ch 3. v. 2. * Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam Sap. 9.10 Terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore Sap. 9.15 †Deus intelligibilis lux in quo a quo per quem intelligibiliter lucent omnia 1. Sol. Insinuavit nobis Christus animam humanam non vegetari non illuminari non beatificari nisi ab ipsa substantia Dei August in Joh. Illa autoritas divina dicenda est quae non solum in sensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem sed ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei quousque se propter ipsum depresserit non teneri sensibus quibus videntur illa miranda sed ad intellectum jubet evolare simul demonstrans quanta hic possit cur haec faciat quam parvi pendat Aug. 2. de Ord. 9. * Tract in Joan. 27. Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum jam non secundum carnem novimus 2 ad Cor. Nolite putare quenquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae si non sit intus qui doceat inanis fit strepitus noster Aug. in Joan. Auditus per me factus intellectus per quem Dixit aliquis ad cor vestrum sed non eum videtis Si intellexistis fratres dictum est cordi vestro Munus Dei est intelligentia August Johan Tract 40. Noli putare te ipsam esse lucem Aug. in Psal. Sicut audio sic judico judicium meum justum est quia non quaero voluntatem meam Johan cap. 5.30 Qui hoc videre non potest oret agat ut posse mereatur nec ad hominem disputatorem pulset ut quod not legit legat sed ad Deum Salvatorem ut quod non valet valeat Epist. 112. cap. 12. Supplexque illi qui lumen mentis accendit attendat ut intelligat Conf. Ep. Fund cap. 33. Nullo modo resistitur Corporis sensibus quae nobis sacratissima disciplina est si per eos inflictis plagis vulneribusque blandimur Ep. 72. * See the 6 th Book Of the Nature Properties of the Vnderstanding II. Of the Nature and Properties of the Will and of its Liberty * See the Illustrations * See the Illustrations I. Of our Judgments and Reasonings II. That Judgments and Reasonings depend upon the Will Geometricians love not Truth but only the Knowledg of Truth tho' it be otherwise said III. What use should be made of our Liberty that we never may be deceiv'd IV. General Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin A necessary Reflexion on the two Rules I. The Answer to some Objections II. Observations on what has been said concerning the necessity of Evidence See the Illustrations I. Of the Occasional Causes of our Errors and that there are five principal II. The General Design of the whole Work III. The particular Design of the first Book I. Two ways of explaining how our Senses were corrupted by Sin S. Gregor Homil. 39. upon the Gospels * Fr. Son â—â—ur †Fr. Son Esprit See the Illustrations Deus ab initio constituit hominem reliquit illum in manu Consilii sui adjecit mandata praecepta sua c. Ec. 15.14 A Remedy for the Disorder which Original Sin has caus'd in the World and the Foundation of Christian Morality * See the Illustrations II. That our Liberty not our Senses is the true cause of our Errors III. A Rule for avoiding Error in the use of our Senses I. Of the Errors of sight in respect of Extension absolutely consider'd * See the Journal of the Learned Nov. 12. 1668. Fr. Le germe * The Cicatricle or the Sperm of the Egg is a little white spot upon the Yolk See Malpigh de Formatione Pulli in Ova †See Swammerdam 's Miraculum naturae II. A Continuation of these Errors about Invisible Objects III. Of the Errors of sight touching Extension relatively consider'd I. Of the Errors of sight about Figures II. We have no knowledge of the least of them III. The knowledge we have of the greater is not exact IV. An Explication of some Natural judgments which prevent our deception V. That these very judgments deceive us in some particular junctures See the 9. Chapter towards the end See the 3 d. Ch. of the 2 d. Part of the 6 Book I. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion consider'd in it self II. That Duration which is necessary to our knowledge of the Quantity of Motion is unknown to us III. An Instance of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest. I. A general Demonstration of the Errors of our Sight concerning Motion II. That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known in order to judge of the Quantity of their Motion III. The Mediums whereby we know the Distances of Objects are examined The Soul does not make all those judgments I aâ—tribute to her these Natural judgments are nothing but Sensations and I only speak thus the better to explain things The second Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objctes The third Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objects The fourtâ— and fifth Mediums The sixth Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objects * Seethe Illustrations * I call by the Name of Idea here whatever is the Immediate Object of the Mind I. The Distinction of the Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Fibres of the Organs of the Senses centre IV. An Instance to explain the effect which Objects have upon our Bodies V. What it is that Objects produce in the Soul and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fiâ—res of the Body This confus'd Reasoning or this Natural Judgement is only a Compound Sensation See what I have said before of Natural Judgements and the first Ch. of the 3 d. Book VI. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation I. Of the Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the External Fibres of our Senses III. The Cause of this Error III. An Objection and Answer I. Of our Errors concerning the Motions or Vibrations of the Fibres of our Senses II. That we confound them with the Sensations of our Soul and sometimes have no Perception of them III. An Experiment that proves it IV. An Explication of three sorts of Sensations of the Soul V. The Errors that accompany the Sensations I. The Definition of the Sensations II. That a Man knows his own Sensations better than he thinks he does III. An Objection and Answer IV. From whence it proceeds that a Man imagines he has no knowledge of
Brutal They find Pleasure in living by the Impressions of their Passion and suffer inward Pain in resisting it which is sufficient to make Reason that commonly descends to be the Slave to Pleasure to argue in such a manner as may best defend the Cause of it If therefore it be true that all Passions justifie themselves 't is evident that Desire must of it self move us to judge favourably of its Object if it be a Desire of Love and unkindly if it be a Desire of Aversion The Desire of Love is a Motion of the Soul raised by the Spirits that provoke it to the Enjoyment or Use of such things as are not in its power for we desire even the Continuation of our Enjoyment because future things depend not on us 'T is then necessary for the Justification of that Desire that the Object which produces it be esteemed good in it self or in reference to something else the contrary must be said of that Desire which is a kind of Aversion I grant we cannot judge any thing to be good or bad without some Reason but Passions have no Object which is not good in some sense And if it may be said there are some which contain no real Goodness and therefore cannot be contemplated as Good by the Mind yet no one can say but they may be enjoyed as Good since they are supposed to agitate us and that Commotion Enjoyment or Sense is more than sufficient to move the Soul to entertain a kind Opinion of the Object If we so easily judge that Fire contains in it self the Heat we feel and Bread the Savour we relish because of the Sensation those Bodies excite in us though that be never so incomprensible to the Mind which cannot conceive Heat and Savour as Modifications of a Body thence it follows That there is no Object of our Passions how vile and contemptible soever it appears but we may judge it good when the Enjoyment of it affects us with pleasure For as we imagine that Heat goes out of Fire when we feel it so we blindly believe that the Objects of the Passions cause the pleasure which we receive in their Enjoyment and that therefore they are good since they are able to doe us good The like may be said of the Passions that have Evil for their Object But as I said just before there is nothing but deserves either Love or Aversion either by it self or by something else to which it relates and when we are agitated with some Passion we quickly discover in its Object the Good or Evil that may nourish the same It is therefore easie to know by Reason the Judgments which our Passions make whilst agitating us For if a Desire of Love move us we may well conceive that it will not fail to justifie it self by the favourable Judgments it shall make of its Object We easily perceive that those Judgments will have more Extent as the Desire shall be more violent and that they will be sometimes absolute and without exception though but a very small part of the thing appears good We may without difficulty understand that those favourable Judgments will reach all things that shall have or seem to have any Connection with the principal Object of the Passion proportionably to the strength of the Passion and the Extent of the Imagination The contrary will happen if it be a Desire of Aâ—version the Reasons of which are as easily comprehended and perfectly confirmed and made good by Experience But let us make these Truths more sensible and familiar by some Instances Men naturally desire Knowledge because all Minds are created for Truth But that Desire how just and reasonable soever it may be in it self often becomes a dangerous Vice by the false Judgments that attend it Curiosity frequently offers to the Mind vain Objects of its Study and Lucubrations ascribes to them false Ideas of Greatness ennobles them with the deceiving Lustre of Rarity and dresses them up with such gay and splendid Apparel that one can hardly forbear to Contemplate them with too much Pleasure and Application There is no Trifle but will wholly take up some Persons whose fruitless Toil is still justified by the false Judgments that arise from their vain Curiosity For instance those that bestow their time in Learning Tongues imagine that all the Sciences consist in the Knowledge of Terms and find out a Thousand Reasons to justifie themselves and the Veneration those pay them whom an unknown Term confounds is none of the weakest though the least reasonable Some Persons employ their whole lives in learning to speak who ought perhaps to hold their Peace all the while since 't is evident he ought to be silent who has nothing worth the hearing to say But 't is not that which they propose from their Learning They should know that he must think well use his Understanding to exactness discern Truth from Falshood clear Ideas from obscure those of the Mind from those of the Imagination that will speak accurately They imagine themselves fine and uncommon Wits because they know how to please the Ear with an Elegant Harmony how to flatter the Passions by Figures and â—aking Gestures how to rejoyce the Imagination by lively and sensible Expressions whilst they leave the Mind empty of Ideas void of Light and Understanding Some probable reason may justifie their Passion that spend a great deal of time in the study of their own Tongue since they make use of it all their Life but as to those who indifferently apply themselves to all sorts of Languages I know not what to say in their behalf The Passion of those who make a complete Library of all sorts of Dictionaries may be excusable as well as the Curiosity of those who make a collection of Coins and Medals of all Countries and Times that may be useful in some occasions and if it doe them not much good at least it does them no harm a Store-house of such Curiosities being not cumberâ—ome since they carry not with them either their Books or Medals But how may the Passion of those be justifiable that make their Head a Library of Dictionaries that neglect their Affairs and Essential Duties for words of no use They are smatterers in their own Tongue frequently mingling strange and unknown words in their Discourses and never paying their Countreymen with Current Money Their Reason seems not to be better guided than their Tongue for all the Corners and Recesses of their Memory are so full of Etymologies that their Minds must lie as stifl'd under the innumerable number of words that are perpetually flying about it However it must be granted that Philologers and Linguists will not stick for Reasons to justifie their capricious Studies Which to know you need but to listen to the Judgments those pretenders to Science make of Tongues or suppose some Opinions that are taken amongst them for undoubted Axioms together with the Inferences that may be deduc'd from