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B04263 A second part of Observations, censures, and confutations of divers errours in Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan beginning at the seventeenth chapter of that book. / By William Lucy, Bishop of S. David's.; Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan. Part 2 Lucy, William, 1594-1677. 1673 (1673) Wing L3454A; ESTC R220049 191,568 301

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external impediments but absolute liberty it is not because both it is impeded from overflowing the channel by the banks and likewise because it is restrained by its nature so that it is not absolutely liberty There is libertas à coactione a liberty from constraint of outward causes but there is no liberty à necessitate from the necessity of its nature without which there is no proper liberty any otherwise then a prisoner hath to live in Gaol But liberty is ad opposita to things of divers nature where the Internal Principle hath power to do this or that or at the least to do or not to do as he speaks at the end of the last Paragraph The doer had liberty to omit Now the water hath freedom to do it is not hindred from running in the channel but not so much liberty as School boys take one towards another when the weaker Boy should chuse the best the stronger would give him the worst and bid him chuse that or none for the water hath not liberty to run or not to run but only liberty to run SECT VIII Mr. Hobbs his former instance to voluntary actions His liberty to have or not to have written and dispersed these impious Doctrines HE proceeds So likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do It is not so in the actions which men voluntarily do there is no necessity for them to do their voluntary actions they can chuse whether they will do them or not that man who doth vertuously can chuse and do vitiously And so contrarily he could have chosen whether he would have writ these wicked Doctrines which he hath taught If not let him confess it and I will prove him not to be a Man but a Beast and fit to be used as a Beast yea worse then a Beast to be like a stone which naturally descends or water which necessarily runs down its Channel and so ought to be used like it for indeed there is no one thing more peculiar to man then this liberty SECT IX Mr. Hobbs his Reason of the former Assertion invalid Of the first and second causes Men actively other creatures passively capable of commands Fools and Mad-men incapable of commands BUt he gives a reason for what he speaks And yet because every act of mans will and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some causes and that from another cause in a continual chain whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes proceed from necessity The force of this Argument is invisible for though this will doth proceed from a cause as he expresseth it yet if that immediate cause from which it proceeds be not necessary yea if any one Link in the Chain of Causes be free and not necessary the effect is not necessary for the arbitrariness of any one will make the effect such But this liberty of the Agent he speaks of looks only upon the immediate cause which in humane actions is free and may not be done yea very often the Agent may chuse the contrary That the first cause works with all second causes is as certain as any thing in the Mathematicks for there cannot be a second or a third or any number but it proceeds from a first And yet because the first hath an influence upon the rest it follows not that they are Cyphers but each out of that foundation hath its several operations So in this the first cause is Causa generalis and works with second causes which are derived from it But they have their several ways and powers of working Natural according to their natural inclination Animal according to the peculiar disposition of those Souls which inhabit them only man hath a free nature amongst bodily things in that resembling the Great Cause of Causes he is the Principle of those actions which he doth as a man voluntarily and therefore is capable of Commands actively to do and the other Creatures passively to be done or used and Man is used as a Master or Owner under God of them a Steward who must give an account of such of them as come within the sphere of his Dominion Let any man tell me how a man can be capable of commands if he were like them necessitated No man commands Fools Mad-men or Infants we might account them Fools or Mad who should do it but if he would have them act any thing he must work upon their predominant passion as we would do with Beasts because there is in them a deficiency of this high Power to be Master of their own actions It cannot be then that all those Precepts Councels Commands of God should be given to him who hath no power to obey And from thence we must needs conclude that they have a liberty to do or not to do But let us follow him SECT X. Mr. Hobbs his Supposition impossible without a Revelation The force of the word See His Hypothesis granted His Inference would not follow Causes not otherwise to seem then as they are in their own Nature SO that saith he to him who could see the connexion of those Causes the necessity of all mens voluntary actions would appear manifest This conclusion is founded upon an impossible supposal there is no possibility that a man in this world should see that Chain of Causes in Heaven hereafter he may but here he cannot without a mighty strange Revelation But suppose he could This word See denotes a clear apprehension What would follow then but that he should see such causes necessary which are necessary and such free which are free he would see them as they are not see them in a representation false and so not agreeing to their condition SECT XI Of Gods concurrence with humane actions No man a sinner if necessitated to sin Divine disposure necessitates not to Evil. God not the Author of those actions which are contrary to his commands He is truly the Author of those actions he adviseth Gods concurrence further illustrated from the influx of the Sun Liberal Agents not necessitated by the ordinary concurrence of God HE proceeds And therefore God that seeth and disposeth all things seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will and no more nor less Certainly although I think very many men are too bold to discourse of both Gods Knowledge and Will as they do which are things too high for the weak sight of man to look clearly into yet men may confidently say as his Knowledge cannot be deceived to judge falsly so his Will cannot be deceived in willing that which is not good and therefore because men are free Agents in what they do and must give an account of their actions to him and be judged according to them by him it is not possible to conceive that he should know them other then free which liberty was his own gift And for his will since it hath pleased
God in his holy Word to reveal to us Rules by which we may know what is his will for us to do in doing which we please him and that he likes us as also what is against his will in doing which we shall anger and offend him and he will punish us although God be not only a general but the first cause which works with and in us yet it is not possible for man to think that God doth in that concurrence determine mans actions to such things which he himself hath declared evil and against his will and which he will punish and therefore it was too bold an Assertion to say That man doth no more or less then he is necessitated by Gods will which is to make no man a sinner for although as he spake God disposeth all things and that disposure must needs be to infinitely good and wise ends even the evils and things against his Rules of goodness yet his disposure orders such men according to their evil actions to suffer not makes them do evil that they may suffer But perhaps he explains this For though men may do many things which God does not command nor is therefore Author of them Nay I will tell him more men may do and many men do many things not only which God hath not commanded but which God hath forbidden and hath commanded they shall not do and surely then he is less Author of them But if a man do an act of advise or counsel of Gods without a Command yet that Gods Counsel is Author of Now these actions which are against Gods Command without doubt he is not Author of if he were he could not justly punish them But I would fain make out his sense which is this he doth not do it by Authority given by God but against it Well then Gods Authority is against evil but his power worketh this evil So he seems to affirm in his following words Yet they can have no passion nor appetite to any thing of which appetite Gods will is not the cause True indeed God is the first general cause but not the second and particular The Sun is an universal cause it shines upon the Earth Trees Plants and is the cause of their fertility but diversly according to the diversity of Constitutions it concurs with so doth God as he is the first and general cause meeting with several conditions operate severally to the production of those several effects which are produced by them with things necessary before he produceth necessary effects But as the Suns concourse doth not determine this thing to this and that to that effect so doth not the general concourse of God determine this or that appetite to this or that object in this or that manner but when it meets with things so disposed it concurs in the production of that effect to which it was so disposed so that God concurring with free Agents makes them no more necessary then his concurring with necessary Agents makes them free It is the same infinite Power of God which constituted both and his concurrence destroys neither in its ordinate working I speak not of his extraordinary operation whereby he can and doth controul all the frame of Nature when and how he pleaseth nor doth Mr. Hobbs Nay I may say that God himself being absolutely free bounded with no limits having nothing above or about him which can stop or hinder his Almighty hand from working it is much more reasonable to think that his concourse should make even necessary Agents free and not to be bounded by their natures which he had given them rather then that this most free Agent should against himself make those which he had constituted in a free nature to be necessary because they are by that more like himself which every Agent endeavours Nay in his extraordinary works he doth often for the present shake off those bonds which his former Donation had confined them to so that by his extraordinary concourse he makes them cease from their former operations which by their natures they were necessitated to do as the fire not to burn the water not to run down its channel and the like which are apparent to every man So then though Gods will and concurrence is a cause of those actions yet not being a terminating cause but concurring with that nature which he had given them that concurrence doth not necessitate that operation which he had given to man viz. freedom to do or not to do But he proves the contrary in his following words which are these SECT XII The consequence of this Paragraph examined His meaning conjectured and refuted Every deviation contradicts not the Power and Omnipotency of God Voluntas facere fieri distinguished in God Men not justly punished with Damnation if necessitated to sin Mr. Hobbs censured for obtruding those Doctrines in Divinity amongst his Political Discourses The actions of the King and Subject alike necessitated by Mr. Hobbs his Chain of Causes ANd did not his will assure the necessity of mans will and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth the liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the Omnipotency and liberty of God I do not observe how this consequence can be deduced out of the premises for if God endowed man with liberty and free power in his nature why should it follow if God do not necessitate his actions that mans will would cross and impede the power and liberty of God For the will of God is that man should act freely the free actions therefore are according to his will and the necessitation would be contrary to his will But I think he means that if mans free power could sin against the will of God then man should be able to contradict and stop his Omnipotency and Liberty To understand this therefore consider with me that Gods Dominion over this World is like that of a King in a Kingdom he gives Laws and Rules to the Subjects which if they observe they shall live happily under him but if not he will punish and afflict yea perhaps destroy the offending parties It is an opposition to the Kings power that when men break his Laws and he shall go about to punish them they shall then rebel against him and oppose the power of the County or of the Kingdom or that power which he musters up to do Justice upon them then indeed his power is contradicted and impeded God whilst men live here with these natures hath given Rules and governs them by such Laws as he hath appointed them for their good if they observe those Laws happy are they but he seldom puts in his Omnipotency to make men do the one or the other never to make men break his Laws he ordinarily doth not vary the nature of man or any thing Men may and may not keep his Commandments I do not now dispute of the nature of Grace or any thing of that kind they that do
A SECOND PART OF OBSERVATIONS CENSVRES AND CONFVTATIONS OF DIVERS ERROURS IN Mr. HOBBS his LEVIATHAN Beginning at the seventeenth Chapter of that BOOK By William Lucy Bishop of S. Davids LONDON Printed by S. G. and B. G. for Edward Man at the White Swan in S. Pauls Church-yard 1673. ●CUT DISPENSATOR● MYSTERIORUM DE● To the Reader READER BEfore you go further into this Treatise I think it fit to premonish you of three things First How it is writ Secondly Why by me Thirdly Why now put out Concerning the first expect no other but to read the strongest Discourse in Politiques betwixt Mr. Hobbs and me that ever was writ for the Art of Polity being more properly signified by the name of Prudence is always by those who writ of it from Plato and Aristotle downward until you come to the very last is naturally powder'd with sentences and interlarded with Histories for it being not a Science whose demonstrations come from necessary causes where posita causa most certainly follows the effect or grant the effect you must own the cause from whence it came but a prudence which disposeth men to a wise conformity not by the force of a necessary efficacy but by the perswasions which fear and love induce to which are not necessary but arbitrary men in the manage of such affairs do most discreetly when they produce the sentences of wise men who have gone before and by great experience found those sentences effectual in such occasions and because there is nothing new under the Sun therefore Histories of our Fore-fathers in like conditions are most excellent Guides for the prudent diposure of our lives who indeed do but repeat what they have done but Mr. Hobbs presuming upon the greatness of his own wit which indeed is great and it is a thousand pities he bestow'd it so ill scorns to tread in beaten paths and thinks by the strength of his own fancies to make his feet leave such an impression as all others shall follow him not he them I must follow him for whosoever is to be confuted must have it done out of his own Principles and therefore I fall upon him with only downright reasons therefore if at any time my Pen hath dropt a sentence or a story unawares which was opposite to the business which I believe is very seldom I though it not worth the mending but let it pass And so having shew'd the Reader why I writ so unpolitically of Politiques I pass to the se●ond Advertisement The second Premonition is a question why I should write of this piece and my Answer is short having spoke to the former part of his Leviathan it was proper for me not to step over this but take him in order as he writes But a man may object and some have objected that were acquainted with my undertakings that this is not so proper f●r a Bishop whose time should be taken up with his Profession which is Divinity to meddle with such State affairs I answer that Mr. Hobbs his writings are so interlined with so much Heterodox shall I say or Heretical and Atheistical Divinity that it befits none so well as a Divine t● meddle with them And again I said that although there is a Generation that think we should be Fools in any thing else yet let them know that if so we must be Fools in that likewise as well as other things for Theologia Diuinity is not only Scientia Knowledge but as many of the School-men Mr. Hobbs h●s good friends speak it is Sapientia we may render it in English Wisdom which is the highest knowledge whose principles are the highest and first Rules which habitually are imprinted in man and whose conclusions are the premises of other inferiour Sciences And they say moreover that this which is called Scholastica Theologia School Divinity differs from Natural only in this that it adds one principle to the other which is the Faith in the revealed Will of God which I am forced to fight for in this Treatise with Mr Hobbs And because this is the nature of this great Wisdom of Divinity it may prescribe the Rules to all Sciences and Prudencies and all conditions of men from the King to the Cobler how they may live and demean themselves vertuously But besides this let those men consider that there is one piece of a Divines study without which he will be lame and very deficient which must needs teach him a great deal more of this Prudence then I have need to use in this Discourse unless he be a very dull man which is Ecclesiastical Story wherein he shall find such acts and subtilties practised by Hereticks and Schismaticks whom I have always observed to be more crafty though not wiser then the Orthodox part such applications to Emperours to Emperesses to Favourites at Court such cloaking evil intentions with pious pretences such artificial slandering the persons of their Adversaries that he cannot but know the polity yea the base crafts of men and knowing them to be such may the better learn to avoid those snares which have catched men heretofore and will if not prevented do so again yea shall find that many times the wisdom of learned and pious Bishops have been the prop and stay of both the Empires East and West and which is more even in the practick peace of Polity you shall find Bishops execute them in the most excellent manner for wisdom and courage that ever any men did I write not this to invite men of that condition to muddle themselves with the trivial affairs of this world no as S. Paul to the Philippians 3.20 Our conversation is in heaven The word which we render Conversation is in the Original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is excellently noted by Beza that it is that kind of Conversation which agrees to the Polity of such as are Citizens of the heavenly Hierusalem So that although the Apostle aff●rms this of all men who aspire to Christian perfection that such men should live and converse in that Polity which conduceth to the establishment of that spiritual society which are parts of that Kingdom yet in a more especial manner it agrees to them who are exalted to that high dignity in that society that the Polity of their abilities should be applied to the advance of that Kingdom and in order to that when the benefit or ill of a sublunary King●om or Commonwealth shall conduce to that Kingdom in heaven it will become such men to interpose their counsels in a way most proper for them to imploy themselves in But my intent in writing this is to shew that a poor old man sitting in his Study and principally applying that study to Divinity may easily by that study give advice and admonition to greater doubts then are in his Politiques which indeed are gross mistakes from the first corner stone he laid in the Foundation to the top-tile in the Roof But then it may further be enquired why I
act wickedly which no honest man can consent unto or else justly be destroyed by his fellow Subjects which he understands by that word the rest destruction is the greatest mischief can come to a man and is never inflicted but for some mighty crime which I do not find this man charged with but only a dissenting or protesting against the general Vote a thing often done in Parliaments and yet no such Sentence passeth upon the Dissenter nor were it just to do it men are not bound to be all of one mind Mr. Hobbs would make his Inquisition for Politiques more severe then any Inquisition for Religion But he hath reason for what he writes for saith he If he voluntarily entred into the Congregation of them that were assembled he sufficiently thereby declared his will and therefore tacitly covenanted to stand to what the major part should ordain I thought by what went before he must have declared his assent but now it seems it is enough if he be amongst them but what if he be not amongst them as I have shewed it is impossible all should what condition is that man in He proceeds with his proofs And therefore if he refuse to stand thereto or make protestation against any their Decrees he does contrary to his Covenant and therefore unjustly Suppose all this Shall a man be destroyed for every breach of Covenant or every unjustice Certainly Mr. Hobbs if he were a Law-maker would out-do Draco or the bloudiest that ever acted in that kind This is a foolish consequence that because he did unjustly he should justly be destroyed He goes on And whether he be of the Congregation or not and whether his consent be asked or not he must either submit to their Decrees or he left to the condition of war he was in before wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever The madness of this condition of war before this Covenant I have spoke to heretofore but that he may justly be destroyed by any with whom he will not joyn in the Covenant is wicked We have in England I believe abundance of strangers of Forreign Nations which neither have nor will enter into such a Covenant may they be justly killed Nay amongst those millions which are the Kings Subjects there was never man entred this or the like Covenant may we justly kill one another Nay I think few would make such a Covenant may all these be knocked on the head thus This hath such a force of injustice that men with humanity about them cannot consent unto I leave this therefore and come to his 4th Inference CHAP. VIII SECT I. Mr. Hobbs his fourth Inference censured and refuted from his own conclusions He that impowers another to do justly though he make him Pleni-potentiary is not guilty of his unjust actions his first reason refuted FOurthly Because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the actions and judgments of the Soveraign instituted it follows that whatsoever he doth it can be no injury to any of his Subjects nor ought he by any of them be accused of injustice Accused What doth he mean by that to be convicted arraigned condemned This certainly he cannot because the power of Judgment supposeth Superiority which cannot be over the Soveraign in his own Kingdom But let us observe the consequence of this Argument out of these impossible premises that because by his fancy of the Institution every subject is Author of all his actions he can do no injury to any of them certainly this doth not follow by his own Doctrine for put the case that the Supreme doth authorize a Judge to hear and determine such causes doth the Supreme only do injustice in it when the Royal Authority gives power to the Judge who acts unjustly by that Authority which was given him by the Supreme or the Judge likewise who abuseth that Authority I believe no man will affirm it or if he do he must destroy Mr. Hobbs his conclusion which makes the Kings acting by the Authority of the peoples grant not to offend in himself for which is his reason before spoke to if the Author do solely perform not the Actor or the person who immediately operates which he delivered before the King not the Judge doth unjustly when by his Authority the Judge decrees wickedly But he proceeds with another reason for saith he He that doth any thing by Authority from another doth therein no injury to him by whose Authority he acts This is not true generally a Judge judgeth by the Authority of the Supreme but if he Judge unjustly yea judgeth a cause against the King perhaps unjustly he then doth the King an injury by his own Authority Again a General with Plenipotency to kill slay c. from the King he turns now his Army to the Kings destruction perhaps doth not he then do the King an injury by his own power SECT II. Mr. Hobbs his second reason invalid from the falsity of his supposition Consent or dissent gives not the stamp of Justice or Injustice He that gives power to do any act may complain of ill Execution of that power HE goes on But by this Institution of a Commonwealth every particular man is Author of what the Soveraign doth and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author and therefore ought not accuse any man but himself nor himself of injury because to do an injury to himself is impossible It is first observeab●e here which runs throughout the whole Politiques that it is built totally upon that foundation which neither is nor is probable to be in any but is impossible to be in a great Commonwealth and therefore must needs fall of it self But supposing that impossibility let us consider his inference every man is Author of what the Soveraign doth the reason of that is before expressed because he covenants to avow his actions Now if he do avow them it follows not that therefore they shall be just many a man owns that act which is unjust his owning of it makes it neither just nor unjust These are qualities inherent in the act not adherent to others Opinions or acceptance or disacceptance of them I but saith he Consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author I return that he may do that and complain that he himself hath done amiss men do and it is vertuously done of him who doth it but much rather of that which he acts by anothers hand that which may be good in the Institution may be spoiled and hurt in the Execution and although they did institute him with such a power yet his mannagement of it may be ill and unjust and that they may complain of SECT III. A man may do an injury to himself Mr. Hobbs his distinction between Iniquity and Injustice or Injury disproved and censured UPon this ground will appear the
not be so to another The force of which answer lies in this That there may be many counterfeit Miracles which may appear true to one and may be found false by another and therefore because men may be deceived they have no assurance from them To this I can say that Mr. Hobbs is not so good a Logician here as the Devil for the Devil disputed from the real force of the Argument but Mr. Hobbs draws his Answer from the apprehension of the Hearer or Spectator when it thunders man a man is busie hears it not Doth it not therefore thunder because he doth not hear it The Sun ariseth and shineth out in the morning when I am in bed and see it not Doth it therefore not shine because I discern it not When a man who hath weak Eys or troubled with the Jaundice comes into a Room many colours are there which he perceives not or if he do they appear yellow to his Eyes Are they therefore yellow But this and no other is his consequence against Miracles because some apprehend them not therefore they are not or do not send out that proof which naturally flows from them Many fallacious Arguments are used He hath used many and because they are fallacies Are therefore perfect Demonstrations not good His Answer therefore is not Logical in saying that these things appear marvellous to one which do not to another Let a man consider the possibility or rather impossibility which Nature hath to do such a work and if he be not learned enough to discuss with a Cause let him consult with Learned men who are able to judge of it and he shall by that find whether God hath in an extraordinary manner any hand in it or no but the Answer which he makes may be returned to all Arguments whatsoever one understands another doth not therefore they are not good nor give assurance And ●o I have finished the first Argument which he framed against himself and answered weakly CHAP. XXII SECT X. Mr. Hobbs his second Argument examined The truth of Divine revelation to the Apostles asserted from the gift of Tongues AND I pass to his second Argument and Answer which is at the bottom of that page and the Argument is drawn to prove that these were Divine revelations from the Sanctity of the Persons who delivered it He answers that that may be feigned I reply It is improbable which were enough but I think I may go further and say it is impossible for the first clause that it is improbable we may discern Reason for it First in the Persons the Apostles who delivered these Revelations and affirmed they were such it is not probable they should be counterfeited all counterfeiting is for some end some worldly end for a man cannot think to get Heaven by counterfeiting and lying but the Apostles could have no worldly end in what they did the asserting of these Revelations being the ready way to miseries and unhappiness which was foretold by their great Master our most blessed Saviour We have seen in this distracted world in which we have lived now and then a man proud with an imagined Enthusiasme persevere in an abominable lye even to death but for so many to do it and suffer for the relation of the same story it cannot be imagined And then consider that they were men blessed by God in having these Revelations and the relating them I say relating them for because the Doctrine was to be divulged to all Nations by them God assisted them with the gift of Tongues by which they were able suddenly to relate in their own Language to every Nation the wonderful things which concerned their salvation And from hence I will draw the impossibility of their feigning their sanctity in the delivery of these Revelations for as the Revelation was from God so the very delivery of them by the power of Tongues was from God who cannot countenance and make good a lye But yet certainly although their might be a possibility of being other I grant that for Arguments sake which I allow not yet when there is no probability of the contrary we have great assurance of that truth and his answer is most wicked as well as weak drawn from a possibility of feigning and counterfeiting in the Apostles CHAP. XXII SECT XI Mr. Hobbs his third Argument from the wisdom of the Apostles confirmed The miraculous consent of men to the revelations published by them An Argument from the propagation of Christianity against the opposition of the whole world A serious application and vow for Mr. Hobbs his conversion A Third Argument which he endeavours to put off is drawn from the extraordinary wisdome or extraordinary felicity of his actions all which saith he are marks of Gods extraordinary favour His answer to this is at the bottom of that page thus The visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that another has had a supernatural revelation of Gods will but only a belief everyone as the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser a firmer or weaker belief Thus far he I now answer to the first which concerns their wisdome I do not remember that I have read the wisdome of these men to be produced for proof of their revelations yet because he has put it down and given one answer to it I will urge something for it that it was and is a great convincing argument that such poor ignorant illiterate fishermen should attain or rather be endued from above with such wisdome as to be able to confute the greatest and best studied Philosophers and reduce them to consent to their revelations this must need prove that these men were assisted by some knowledg above Nature But let that pass since he makes no answer but for the other the success of Christianity that is a most rational argument and his answer confutes himself for whereas he saith the visible felicities of this World are most often the work of God by natural ordinate causes I retort it to him that the felicities of this world hapning to these men were nothing but that general propagation of the Gospel which was wrought against the force and power of all natural causes all the Emperours Kings and Princes of this World fighting against and suppressing it with all the force and tyranny which they were able to use so that their strength grew by oppression Sanguis Martyrum was Semen Ecclesiae And M. Hobbs cannot think that that was a natural seed And so I will conclude this discourse for this time hoping that God will so assist him that he may see his own error and with his own hand blot out all these unworthy doubts which he hath cast upon Christianity CHAP. XXII SECT XII Mr. Hobbs his second Question propounded and discussed his assumption not clear the Argument changed and the Reader eluded