Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	action_n	effect_n	necessary_a	1,860	5	7.1073	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A85884	The divine right and original of the civill magistrate from God, (as it is drawn by the Apostle S. Paul in those words, Rom. 13.1. There is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God) illustrated and vindicated in a treatise (chiefly) upon that text. Wherein the procedure of political dominion from God, by his ordination; ... is endevored truly and plainly to be laid open. / Written for the service of that eminent truth, order, justice, and peace which the said text, in its genuine sense, holdeth forth, and supporteth: and for the dissolving of sundry important doubts, and mistakes about it. By Edward Gee minister of the Gospel at Eccleston in the county palatine of Lancaster.	Gee, Edward, 1613-1660.	1658 (1658)	Wing G448; Thomason E1774_1; ESTC R202104	279,674	430

that it cannot be otherwise it is impossible the creature should not be in all things subject to dependent on Gods decree and hand of providence both passively and actively the moral is not so but may be and is varied from though this subordination be necessary de jure and ought to be kept inviolate yet it is not de facto but it is oftentimes infringed And here comes in sin what is sin but the creatures breach and transgression of the moral subordination he stands in and owes unto God his preceptive will or word either by a non acting or by a contrary acting to the same 6. By these differences it may appear for I shall not strive to take notice of all that these two subordinations are in humane actions not only distinguishable but separable and dissociable Man may be subordinate to God physically in those actions wherein he is inordinate morally And Gods will of purpose and work of providence may go on and be done when his preceptive will takes no place but is directly crossed as it is in all the sinful motions of man And hence it may appear of the sinfull acts of men as they are something in rerum naturâ how it may be said as in the third Proposition above the thing is of Gods hand working but not of his mouth warranting it to man If it be here asked Why God makes use of such agents to act by as are displeasing and crosse to his preceptive will when as he hath such choice of other ministerial agents yea and makes use of his creatures agency meerly of choice not of necessity I answer though mans sinful acts cannot but be displeasing and dishonorable to him yet the use he can and doth make of them is not so It is for his honour to work by variety of instruments and the commendation of his workmanship to bring to passe a straight and perfect work with crooked and untoward tooles His providences of this nature are the probations of men both good and evil and hereby he both worketh out more good then there is evill in the act of the subordinate agent so peccant and accomplisheth the just punishment both of others and of those he so imployes 7. We must observe in the subordination of the creature to God in its production though it receive all its efficacy and working from God yet the causality of the first and second of the superiour and inferiour cause and the efflux of the effect as from the one and the other are distinguishable As the creatures essence and existence are wholly in and from God yet far enough different and distinct from Gods so the creatures power and operation unto the causing of an effect is totolly received of God yet Gods agency therein is one and the creatures is another Hence our sense tels us the sun shines the fire warmes chalke whitens and it is so really If we should say as many Schoolmen do that in this subordinate agency of the creature under G d and their working together unto any effect Molina Suarez the action of God and the creature is the same strictly and properly as action is taken for productio activa for as taken for productio passiva or the effect it may be clearly granted yet although I see not why totall dependency and derivation should more infer or be a reason for the confounding or identifying Gods and the creatures actions then it is for the identifying of their beings we must understand it of the materiale and not of the formale of their actions and so must be forced to put some distinction betwixt the creatures causality and the virtue by which he causeth betwixt the divine influx to the creature agent and the creatures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or efflux to the eff●ct betwixt the creatures taking in the concourse of the first cause and his issuing or putting it forth That God and the creature are different agents in their producing of the same effect is granted but how should they be so if their action or agents were altogether the same Besides if it were so then the same action must be said to be morally good viz. as from God and evill as from man to be subordinate to a law ●s from man not subordinate as from God Again if in this concurrence of these two agents to the causing of the same effect the action of each were wholly the same then the same action would denominate them both which we see it doth not When a stone fals downward a plant growes a beast goes eats sleeps we do not nor can properly say that God fals growes goes eats sleeps For although all these acts are in and from his concourse yet as they only are in the creature as their subject so they are also from the creatures natural principles from which there is a procedure of these acts different formally from that of the divine cooperation for which they peculiar denominate the creature and not God In man whose actions have a moral 〈◊〉 different from their physical and who acteth with deliberation and choice this difference though it 〈◊〉 in all creature act● is more apparent Let it be granted that in all his actions he is physically ●●●ed by God though some admit it only of his imperate transient and productive actions unto the immanent and illicit acts of his understanding and will they will only allow a moral motiveness * Jo. Cameron Resp ad Epist viri Docti cap. 1. in operibus eius pag. 736. a 737. a. but whether way soever it be let the physical influence be supposed of all in these humane actions the strength and virtue is from God the actuosity or agency is formally mans Though the action be good and so more peculiarly of God he not only sustaining the will in the use of its freedom but determining and carrying it whether by a physical or moral influence is not here to be disputed to the willing and working of that good yet the formal agency is only ascribed to man Hence he is said to believe hope pray and do the like gracious acts and not God Hence it may appear which is the reason I have travailed so far in these School intricacies how in the sinful acts of man the usual distinction betwixt the action and the moral obliquity of it and that the former is from God the latter is mans only may hold For 1. Take it only in its natural or physical consideration and so the action is both from God in as much as from him is the energie or force that goes to it and from man also in as much as he hath an hand or activity in it distinct though inseparable from that of God 2. And take it as a moral act in which the creature oweth subordination and conformity to Gods law and which floweth from a moral faculty in man and so it is only from man from his own will according to that of

minde meerly acted by cruelty or mercenary respects much more may we absolve the providence of the Almighty in the imployment of a sinful instrument to the accomplishment of his most just purpose and act 2. For the other part of the question The punishableness of a person by God thus serving his providence by his sinful action the same things will serve for answer 1. Man hath a concurrence or agency of his own formally different from Gods in the action 2. That his concurrence is free from his own will without all compulsivenesse 3. He therein proposeth to himself not Gods end or the serving of God in it but he hath his own proper aim different from and often contrary to that of God * Who so forlorn or impudent amongst miscreants as to say that in his damned ambition or covetousness or luxury he had respect to the will of God which no man lightly knows but by the event Dr. Sclater Sermon on 2 King 9.31 pag 27. CHAP. III. CHAP. III. A Digressive Enquiry concerning the voice or declarative use of Divine Providence I Have here done comparing and explaining those two wayes of the being of things of God betwixt the which the question lies But before I can come up to the dissolving of it there is another question shews it self in the way which I know not well how to avoid the speaking somewhat to For whereas our enquiry is Whether of these two wayes of the being of a thing of God viz. of his mouth approving and of his hand working both or but one and if but one then which of them is meant in the Text A question may here be started whether these two be not coincident that is whether the working hand of God have not a mouth or voice or be not vocal and declarative of the will of God to us and if it be then how far and wherein CHAP. III. SECT I. SECT I. The usefulness of the said Enquiry THe question intervenient and first to be spoken to then is about the use of Providence in the discovery of Gods preceptive or approving and disapproving will This question I thought not good to omit being of concernment to the subject we are now upon and having here a fit place to discusse it and its discussion being of more then ordinary necessity in these dayes wherein there is not only much variety and manifold revolutions of Divine Providence in the greatest affairs and those very unusuall and amazing but a very frequent studious and solemn reference to it as the voice of God and as a Guide Judge and Interpreter of Gods will of command or warrant for the regulating of our perswasions and actions in matters of chiefest difficulty and difference We see how much Providence is pointed at produced alledged to justifie and condemn wayes and causes and to entitle courses to Gods approval or disapproval and to induce men upon that account to own or disown persons and proceedings I have long desired heartily that this question might be religiously judiciously and impartially debated And to occasion it I shall here seriously deliver my weak thoughts upon it I confesse my self to have entred upon as a usefull so an high and intricate question especially as the tract of mens pens and notions of their mindes of late hath run Therein therefore it behoves a man especially such an one as I to speak with great caution and humble submission SECT II. CHAP. III. SECT II. III. In what sense the word Providence is taken in this enquiry I Take up the word Providence because it is the ordinary term and I take it in the vulgar sense for meer active opera●ive or productive providence Divines do use it in another sense * Vide Molinam de lib. Arbitrio qu. 22. Disp 1. pa. 287. Synopsis profess Leid Disp 11. Sect. 2. and the genuine signification of the word doth so import viz. for that immanent or internal act in God whereby he doth within his own thoughts order and contrive the affaires of the world as they shall be accordingly acted and issued in the creature But the ordinary acceptation and so our present use of it is to mean only effective or eventual Providence and so I here use it SECT III. The Question discussed Whether Divine Providence be and wherein it is regulating or declarative of the will of God to be done by us THe question then is Whether Providence in producing visible effects in the creature be legislative or declare the mind of God by way of rule to men CHAP. III. SECT IIII. Subsect 1. or be a testimony of Gods commanding and prohibiting approving and disapproving will which men are to follow or square their actions by in like manner as his oracles or dictates by vision dream or inward inspiration were to them that received them so immediately of God and still are to us that have the record of them in the Scriptures and if it be in what things and how far Subsection 1. That Providence doth declare something of God IT is not to be doubted or denyed that Providence hath a voice and doth declare something of God to us As God hath a working word Psal 33.6 147.18 Luke 7.7 so he hath a speaking hand Hence it is that his works are said to be declarative and instructive Psal 19.1 c. to be signes Jer. 32.20 and men are willed to hear the rod and who hath appointed it Mica 6.9 to come and behold the works of the Lord Psal 46.8 which would not be to any purpose if they did not shew us something remarkable of God But the question is of what and how these are declarative to us As it is a sort of Atheism to deny Providence a voice so it is a great presumption and high impiety for man to take upon him to assign it its voice or to make it speak to his own mind and turn and an error of very dangerous consequence it is to misunderstand Providence or construe it in any other language then its author imposeth and annexeth to it For the discovery therefore of the truth in this particular I shall endevor by the light of Scriptures as well as I can apprehend them to set down what Providence doth and what it doth not discover Subsection 2. CHAP. III. SECT III. Subsect 2. That Providence doth declare somewhat of Gods counsels 1. THe Providence of God is the image or expresse of his counsels It doth therefore disclose unto us somewhat of Gods will of purpose counsell or decree Two wayes God makes known to us his will of Decrees ●o wi● by Predictions and by Providences The fo●mer looks at and reveales the things of Gods Will as future this latter discovers them to us as p●st or present Providences are the effects executions or acomplishments and so the coppy print or transcript of Gods purposes Our God is in the heavens he hath done whatsoever he pleased Whatsoever the Lord pleased

wit a conquered people captived or possessed at pleasure they owe no duty neither do they sin in not obeying nor do they resist Gods Ordinance if at any time of advantage they use force to free themselves from such a violent possession Mr. Bridge Mr. Bridge against Dr. Fern sect 4. pag. 42. his Answer to Doctor Ferne. Which opinion of the Doctors of the right of conquest for my owne part I must abhor from what danger will it not expose our Dread Soveraign unto Did not Athaliah remain as a Conqueresse six yeares and who knows not that she was lawfully thrust from the Throne againe by a stronger hand then her owne meer conquest being nothing else but an unjust usurpation and if the Conquerour rule the whole Kingdome and keep them under by conquest onely why may not the Subject rise and take up arms to deliver themselves from that slavery Thus doth the Doctor open the doore to greater resistance then those that he disputes against Roger Widdrington Widdrington Theol. Disput in Admon to his Reader sect 6. in his defence of the supremacy of Princes against the Popes claim of a superiority in temporalls over them thus argueth against Schulkenius who will needs maintain Athaliah to have been a lawfull Queen notwithstanding Joas his survivall and claim to the Crown Tell me O Schulkenius may not every faithfull Subject lawfully and ought he not in the like case that is not by his own private authority but by the publique authority of the true King and who is certainly known to be true King the Common-wealth also consenting thereunto kill an Vsurper who is not onely reputed but also certainly known to be such a one and who plotteth Treason against the true King Lastly I observe to this purpose that the Author or Authors of Ladensium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Catalogue of Canterburian maximes of tyranny do charge this position unto that Party as one tyrannical maxime That all this to wit absolute subjection must be used not onely to our Native King but to any forein usurper who can get footing among us and it were the Kings of Spain As also that the title unto this Kingdome by conquest attributed by Doctor Ferne unto our late Kings See vindic of a Treat of Mon. chap. 3. sect 6. is disavowed by the Authors defending the Parliaments cause against him as unreasonable and null and that which exposeth Princes to the offensive Armes of the Subject 2 They that state and determine the question what is a just ground or cause of War lay downe the quarrell de rebus repetendis or for the recovery of what is injuriously invaded or occupyed as one good justifiable and necessary occasion of the taking up of armes by a Prince or people for this see Augustine Quaest super Josue lib. 6. cap. 10. in Tom. 4. part 2. operum P. Martyr loc com clas 4. cap. 16. sect 2. pag. 935. Bucani Theolog. loc 49. quaest 46. pag. 873. Grotium de jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 1. sect 2 But if title followed possession and all they were the true Proprietors or Lords or the powers ordained of God that have the occupation or actuall command of persons and places it could not be so there could be no war just for recovery to dispossess men of what they hold or to out them of what they are without present or actuall superiority of any over them in it seised on could be no lawfull enterprize or warrantable cause of War 3 Neither is it onely the common Tenent of sound and learned Writers that the injurious invader and possessor may be resisted unto deposition and that recuperative arms are just and lawfull but we have many instances of the practice hereof in Scripture not onely of undoubted warrantablenesse to the persons so acting in the story but of a cleer exemplarinesse and imitablenesse to others as having no other ground or rise laid for them in the Text but that which is of a common morall extention The mention of these may serve Upon the warlike conquest captivity and spoile of Sodome Geneses 14. and Gomorrah by the King of Elam and his partakers and their departure and carrying away of what they had there gotten Abraham together with his confederates Aner Eshcol and Mamre make out with their Forces in pursuit of their Conquerors and coming upon they smite and chase them and rescue the people and goods of Sodome and Gomorrah which they had so taken conveyed away and held in custody The people of Israel during the government of the Judges did many times under their conduct rise up in armes to cast off and deliver themselves and their Countrey from the power of several neighbouring Princes and Nations who had one after another invaded and for some time held them under their Dominion * Of whom in general see Jud. 2.16 17. in particular through the rest of that book Neither as far as my observation goes can any immediate or extraordinary command or word for what they so did be pretended to or pleaded from the Text for many of them or for any save Barak and Gideon The same did they in the times and under the commands of Eli Samuel Saul David and many of their following Kings from to time untill the Babylonish captivity And in particular did Hezekiah against the King of Assyria The Text saith he rebelled against the King of Assyria and served him not † See 2 Kings 18.7 As also did some of the Kings of Judah in resistance of the Kings of Israel as Abijah and Asa * 2 Kings ch 11.2 Chr. ch 23 the latter of which was reproved by God for the meanes he used the Syrian Auxiliaries but not for his standing up against Baasha Yea the same did David and Jehoiadah the Priest with some of Judah combining with them the one against Absalom the other against Athaliah the wrongfull possessors of the Crown and Kingdome of Israel CHAP. VIII SECT V. and of Judah And thus also did the Jewes under the Asm●nean government against many of the Seleucian Kings * See the Books of the Maccabees SECT V. The opposition and distance which the Text puts betwixt him that is the power and him that is the resister of the power 5 ANother thing to be observed in the words neighbouring and coherent to the Text is the difference and contra-distinction which this Scripture makes betwixt him that is the power that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ordained of God and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the resister of the power which is such as he that is the one cannot at the same time and in respect of the same place be the other The Apostle puts them at so wide a distance and direct opposition one to another that it is not possible that they should meet in one person In relation to one and the same seate or station of Magistracy he that is the power

culture of our selves or may make for our own honest interest without the wrong of any other that we may or must doe in concurrence with such a possessors command yea and if a necessity of precept lie upon it though it be to his advantage in his unjust occupancy a good and necessary action being not to be declined for such an ill effect as is accidentall to it and ariseth from the use which another makes of it But there are sundry not only personall but politicall acts that may come to be the matter of a civil superiors command which build not themselves upon any of these considerations and there are actions which not only are destitute of such a ground to make them good and necessary but if done to a meer possessor they have in them an access rinesse to his unlawfull occupancy and there may be some things then only to be done when there is for them the warrant and injunction of a reall authority and some acts are lawfull or necessary to be put forth towards or for a justly entitled Magistrate which are warrantlesse or sinfull towards another as being derogatory to the said Magistrates or to the Communities right or an entrenchment upon the divine institution of Magistracy or a bringing of the agent into a participation of another mans sin He that shall take a view of the just prerogatives of the civil M●gistrate and of the particulars of the subjects duty to him may finde that such there are * See before Chap. 8. Sect. 1. In things of this sort there will lie a restriction upon the yieldance of that subjection to a meer possessor which is redditable to a lawfull Soveraign Without particularizing what things are of this nature that it is so may easily appear if we but make a comparison by inverting the case and putting the action on the Magistrates part Let two persons come before a lawfull Magistrate each with his cause or suit the one being a denison of the Countrey the other being a foreiner or suppose them both alike for that but the one having a just cause or suit the others being bad The Magistrate in hearing and handling these diverse causes or the cause of these diversly qualified persons may and is to doe in some kinde the same things for them all and to treat them all alike but in some kindes again he is to observe a difference and his processe may not be altogether the same towards the severalls of them respectively his duty will require him in sundry things to put a difference betwixt the denison and the foreiner betwixt him that hath a just cause and him that hath a bad And thus is it on the subjects part and in his actings there is in many things a diversity to be found in the rule of his proceedings in relation to those two sorts of superiors the just and the unjust or the authorised power and the intruder 2. In relation to the case wherein subjection is performable the extent of it may be to be diversified in reference to those two A lawfull authorized Magistrate one is required to subject himselfe unto voluntarily frankly and out of the case of terror or externall compulsorinesse and though he had ability to contest stand our and make good a refusall but not so to the meer possessor It is then only necessary to comply and sometimes doth a thing then only come to be lawfull in reference to him when matter of awe or menace is cast into one of the scales of the subjects consultation * See Dr. Sanderion and Grotius as above cited SECT IX CHAP. X. SECT IX The conclusion is with a short view of the question what kinde of consent of the community it is which is requisite to the conveying of Gods ordination to the power HAving thus dispatched answer to these objections and queries I intend to proceed no further but think it time now to close up this Chapter and with it this Treatise There is but one query more that occurred to my observation as for answer here viz. Seeing we have found the only ordinary mean of conveyance of Gods ordination to the person who is by that ordination the power of God to be the consent of the Community * As it is layed down Chap. 5. Sect. 4. Subsect 4. before what kinde of consent is that to be This question ariseth from the diversity of wayes whereof the giving of consent seemeth to be capable of as 1. Touching the persons giving consent may be either of the whole or of a part and that whole may either contain all and singular the persons united in one minde or be the major part admitted in virtue to be the whole 2. Touching the manner wherein consent is signified Civilians do deliver severall wayes of consent giving as by word by action and by non-acting and under these are reduced sundry particulars 3. As to the time the consent may either fore-run or follow actuall investure 4. As to truth and reality the consent may be either re●ll or presumed and pretended 5. As to the freedome and consequently as to the valid ty it is susceptible of differences more then one 1. There is a naturall or physicall freedom and opposite to it a naturall restraint or confinement The naturall freedome is a remotion or clearness of outward coaction and this respecteth 1. Either the body by actual stop or impediment 2. Or the minde and this relateth to fear from the menace or danger of harm or losse 2. There is a morall freedome or a freedome of conscience ●ruly so called And opposite to it there is a morall restraint to wit by a preobligation tye or duty of conscience The requisitenesse of freedom as the very formal reason or constitutive essence of consent and the requisitenesse of both those freedomes that i● both the naturall and the morall a freedom both f om outward force and terror and from preobligation of conscience are much insisted on There is not much materiall difficulty in the positive determination of any of these differences except it be the last the point of freedome and for it I had rather suppose my intelligent Reader apprehensive of what is right therein then intangle him or my self here in the dispute of it The truth is we commonly say Leave is light and this proverb may be understood to hold not onely of the easinesse either of the obtaining or of the carriage of it ordinarily but of the discernableness clearness and apparency which for the most part is in that leave or consent which is unfeigned and reall But if there be any whose interest or will inclines them to pretend to a consent which is not or to a freeness of consent where it is not I shall not for their use enter into a debate of it doubting them to be of the number of those who are condemned of themselves and for that I cannot assume either that freedome to deal