is the first cause of it and consequently whatsoever we do we do necessarily in respect of Him This is one of the Arguments which proveth more than our Adversaries would have them and by these Rules have I formerly Answ in the second Argument proved that they make God the Author of sin for if causa causae be causa causati as doubtless it is while they make God the cause of all those actions which either are sins or the causes of sins questionless they make God according to their own Argumentation the cause of sins But they have a limitation for this Rule and say that it holdeth in causis essentialiter subordinatis as they say that God is the cause of all those things which are essentially and districtly done by our wills but sins proceeding from the depravation of our wills are effects of a cause not directly subordinate to God The limitation is sound but not applicable to their instance ye◠the limitation it self quite spoileth them For 1. While Adam's will was yet sound they teach that God decreed that Adam should eat the forbidden fruit now at that time they cannot say but that Adam was a cause essentially subordinate to God 2. They teach that God is a cause not onely of our actions but also of our volitions as I may say then these being the causes of our sins are directly subordinate to him 3. Let us consider not onely the subordination between God and our wills but also between our actions and their moralities and we shall perceive that according to the abuse of these Rules they make God the cause of our sins For that Rule Causa causae est causa causati is infallibly true expounded thus The cause of any effect is the cause of all such events as necessarily follow that effect Now then if as they say God be a necessary cause of all our particular actions seeing our actions in reference to such and such objects must needs be sinful it is manifest what followeth For example Though to take money in general be no sin yet to take this or that money being none of our own is a sin Now then if God be a cause of this action in reference to this object as he is if he be the cause of this particular action it is impossible their Doctrine should excuse God from sin Eating in reference to the forbidden fruit was a sin but according to them God was a principal cause of eating the forbidden fruit Ergo. Minor prob They say he was the necessitating cause of this particular action Eating was a natural action the individuation of this eating by an unlawful object was a moral obliquity But God was the cause of this individual Ergo. The like may be said of all our sinful actions When I have drunk sufficiently both for the necessity and comfort of nature to drink a cup more is sin But our Opposites teach that I cannot take up this superfluous cup without Gods speciall determination Ergo. This Doctrine is enough to make ones hair stand an end making God whatsoever they say the cause not onely of our actions but also of our obliquities for what are the obliquities of our actions but the placing of them upon wrong objects If therefore they make God the principal cause of all our particular actions most of which are particularized by bad objects what do these men make of God But Recrimination is no answer Hitherto I have shewed though perhaps without method yet I hope not without profit how our Opposites are wounded with their own weapons Now I will take their weapons out of their hands and teach them the right use of them shewing how God is the cause of all things onely not the cause of sin a cause of all good things yet so as that many good things are contingent also We have shewed in the third Argument how God hath ordained that all sorts of Inferior or second causes should work according to their proper kinds that voluntary Agents should work voluntarily c. God then is the first cause that all things do work and that they do work in certain kinds If so then God is the cause that many things are done contingently one of the chiefest sorts of second causes by this appointment working voluntarily and therefore contingently which connexion we have formerly justified This being well understood will instruct us not onely that it may be so but also that it must be so That God being the necessary cause of all good things yet all such things are not necessary effects of Him For example It is impossible that man should do any thing without God therefore God is a cause necessary to the being of all things effected by him yet because many things done by the free choice of man might as well have been omitted God no ways constraining him to them these are not necessary effects of God The Reason of this is because God hath decreed that man should work voluntarily having liberty to do as well one thing as another yet so that God giveth him the strength to do whatsoever he chooseth to do and ability to choose what he will without limitation of his choice for this were else ☜ to take it away and to make man an involuntary Agent For example God hath given thee strength of body he hath given thee also ability to choose in what exercise thou wilt employ it thou choosest to Ring or Dance God then the Author of thy strength is the chief cause of these exercises yet so as they are contingent in respect of Him because thou mightest have omitted them hadst thou pleased By this we may plainly see how God is the principal cause of all things of which he is capable to be a cause and yet many things are contingent in respect of him This being cleared we may with more facility conceive how and in what sense God is the cause of all we do and yet we onely the cause of sin God sustains us when we are about our sins even then in Him we live and move and have our being as well as when we are better busied God giveth that strength by which we commit any sin yet because he doth not necessitate or incline unto it but we of our selves abuse it to wickedness God hath still the part of a Creator we onely are sinful An example will make this clear Suppose a King delivereth to his Subject Men Weapons Mony and Warlike provision that he may fight for his Honor against his enemies his Subject proves a Traitor and useth all his Soveraigns strength against himself His Soveraign here is a cause that he hath the command and doth the Office of a Captain but he is no cause of his Treachery the offence is onely the Captains and the wrong is onely the Soveraigns This is just the case between God and us God hath given us many excellent faculties both of body and soul which he intended we should
ita sapientissimus qui decretum de fine non facit nisi decretum de mediis ei aeque sit certum Sapientiae enim non congruit ut decretum de fine quod per media exequendum est fine Mediorum certa limitatione statuatur Resp Ant. Wallaei ad censur Câ—rvini pag. 138. As the Decree for the illustration of his own Glory is absolute and irresistibl and therefore not to be defeated so the Means for the Execution of that Decree is certainly ordained and to be accomplished inevitably and therefore not suspended upon so contingent a thing as Mans Free-will is if left to its own determination Hereupon the Westminster Assemblers and the Congregational Churches treading in their steps unless it be where they thought those tread awry do tell us That Gods Providence is Chap. 5. 〈◊〉 4. extended even to the first fall and all other sins of Angels and men 3 and that not by a bare permission c. So that this permissive Decree is very pregnant and teeming it brings forth in its season as is said by the Prophet of Gods Decree concerning a temporal judgment Zeph. 2. 2. Pâ—ganus Do you think that God allows and approves of sin then for this permission as you define it imports something to that purpose as I conceive it Diotrephes No we do not speak of a moral permission which is a concession but of a physical permission which is no-impedition a not-hindring but such as doth determine the infallible futurition of sin Nam Dei decretum de permittendo pecâ—ato ponit quidem illius infallibâ—lem fâ—turitionem câ—m debeat sieâ—i evenire quod Deus decreviâ— permittere ut fiat saith * In sua Hydra Soâ—in Expug Tom. 1. p. 353. 354. Maresius and a little after he saith By the effective Dâ—crâ—e man determinately and certainly was to be â—ntire to be endued with free-wâ—ll and peâ—cable and by his peâ—missive Decree that pâ—ccable man was to sin ultro sponte of his own acâ—oâ—d and freely but yet determinately certainly and infallibly Hereupon Piscator saith Decretum Ubi supra c. 3. Ibid. permittendi pâ—câ—ata necessit at peccâ—â—a quia se us frustra â—sset The Decree of pâ—rmitting sin doth necessitate sin for otherwise it were to no purpose And â—gain Decretum permissivum etiam est cau a â—fficiens suâ—â—obâ—ectâ— â— e. peccati The permissive Decree is also the efficiâ—nt cause of its object that is of sin And upon this account the Divines of Wedderau at the Synod of Dort * De Artic. 3 4. mihi page 154. part 2. do conclude That sins do come to pass necessarily in respect of the permissive Decree And some English Divines do affiâ—m That Gods Decree is not less efficacious in the permission of evil than in the production of good * But some say 〈◊〉 as permissiva efficâ—â— est non quoad productâ—â—nem sed quoad illationem So R. B. 〈◊〉 â—ect 2 de 〈◊〉 Med. p. 30. â—per in Fol. Dr. Twiss saith That sin cometh not to pass but by the most efficacious Decree and Ordinance of God Iâ—id p 88. Paganus This doth confound Gods Decree of permission with his Decree of effection or operation Diotrephes They do but trifle * Calv. Inâ—it lib. 1. cap. 〈◊〉 Sect. 1. and play the fool that substitute a bare permission instead of Gods Providence as if God sate only as a spectator expecting the forâ—uitous and casual events of things and so his judgment should depend upon mans free-will Paganus Have you any good proof that Gods Decree doth certainly determine the futurition of sin Diotâ—ephes Our Divines do prove it out of Petâ—rs Sermon Acts 2. 22 23. where he thus bespeaks his Auditors Ye men of Dr. Twiss ubâ— supra p. 89 90. Israeâ— hear these words Jesus of Nazareth a man approved of God among you by miracles wonders and signs Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God ye have taken and by wicked hands have crâ—cified and stain In the same breath saith Dr. Twiss both convâ—cting them of crucifying Christ and withall acknowledging that he was delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God the meaning whereof is fully set down Acts 4. 28. to this effect namely That what contumelious outrages soever they committed upon the person of the Son of God in all this they did but that which Gods hand and Gods counsel had predertermined to be done Paganus * Cum ad productionem actus mali concurrit Deus eatenùs concurrit quatenús muneri auctoris naturae de patientia absolutae deesse non oult impediendo per substractionem sui concursus usum libertatiâ— creatae ac proptereà concurrit quatenùs sinit ut influxus oblatus ab ipso in actu primâ— ad opposita pâ—r libertatem creatam determinetur ad â—anc actum secundum quem quantum est ex se hoc est voluntate Antecedente nollet esse God might out of his mercy ordain that his Son should be made a Sacrifice for the sin of the World and he might freely determine his own will to deliver him up to that purpose and out of his fore-knowledge that the will of his malicious Crucifiers would fâ—eâ—ly apply and determine it self to that wicked Act of crucifying him he might as the Author of Nature and to perform the office of the first cause determine to uphold their power of acting and not to hinder the use of their naturâ—l lâ—berty by the withdrawing of his concourse but to afford the simultaneous influence thereof that they might freely act what they had most wickedly determined Diotrephes We do hold with Alvarez * Ibid. That God * Apud Ames Bel. Enervat Tom. 4. l. 2. c. 2â— 4. p. 23. by his Eternal Decree and by his Absolute and Effectual Will hath predetermined all our acts in particular and that before the prevision of them and independently to any middle knowledge of our future free co-operation upon supposition and Amesius * hath given the reason of it because the firmness of Gods Decree doth not properly depend upon the contingent and mutable will of man Paganus This overthrows the liberty of the will to my weak apprehension and turns man whose natural property it is to act freely into the condition of a necessary Agent Diotrephes No you are mistaken for seeing not only every action of the Creature but also the manner of that action depends upon Vid. Ames Bel. Enerv. Tom. 4. l. 3. c. 3. n. 4. ex Alvar. Synopsis Pur Thâ—ol Disp 11. Thes 11. the efficacy of the Divine Will it follows that the Providence of God doth not destroy the liberty of humane actions but establish it as the Belgick professors have observed for God so rules his Creatures that he suffers them also to act and exercise their own motions as Austin hath it Though God be the cause of the action in
one kind * Dato quod voluntas sit causa actionis liberae addam si placet totalis in suo genere ergone Deus ejusdem actionis non est causa in suo genere Mr. Hickman in Br. Refut Tilcâ—i ad â—inem yet man is the cause of the same action in another kind God preserves his Creatures in their nature and properties he moves them also and applies them to act or work agreeably to their nature He affords them his concourse and so concurs with them and so immediatly influenceth the action of the Creature with his action that one and the same action is said to proceed from the first and second cause iâ—asmuch as unum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one production or work derives its existence from them both in which work if there be any thing inordinate it is from the action not as it is the Creaâ—ors but as it is the Creatures Thus the Belgick professors Ibid. Thes 13. Paganus If God as the first Cause and Author of Nature to conserve that order and manner of working instituted in second causes at their first Creation doth afford his general concourse * Deus enim â—t Author naturae tenetur se voluntati creaâ—â— paratum praebere ad concurrendum ad opposita ut ipsa uti possit sua naturali libertate Hence they say Actus pravus quatenâ—â— Ens est 〈◊〉 Deo non ut induâ—enâ—e ad illuâ— sed ut non subtrahente suum necessarium concursum volâ—ntati quae dum ad illum se determinat abutitur sua libertate influxu divino in actu primo ad opposita sibi â—blato Et id 〈◊〉 magis proprie dicitur Dâ—us congerâ— voluntati in talem actum causando quaâ— voluntas dicatur coagere Deo Vid. Greg. in 2. d. 34. 37. q 1. ar 3 ad 8. ad opposita that his Creature may have power and liberty to do good or evil and suffer the will of man to determine its self freely to the evil act and then fore-seeing it so determined upon supposition of his concourse doth yield his simultaneous influence to the production of that evil act then it is possible to conceive how a man may avoid sin notwithstanding that Divine influx for in this case man doth abuse his own liberty and the Divine concurse offer'd to him ad opposita and so doth freely determine himself unto the sin when he might do otherwise and God should co-operate with the created will as the Author of nature according to the exigence thereof rather than the will co-operate with God as its first determiner Diotrephes That opinion doth cast fetters * R. B. P. ubi supra p. 27. Hoc unum asserimus hunc concursum quicunque tandem is est male statim subordinatum aut posteriorem influxâ—â— voluntatis in actum suum quia cum Deus non â—sset causa pâ—ima omnium entium sed secunda deinde quia voluntas in primo motus sui initio non dependeret a Deo sed contra Deus a primo initio mortuuâ—â— voluntatis Râ—sp A. Wallaei ad Censur Coâ—vini pag. 103. upon the Divine Liberty and Providence for if mans will doth freely determine itself before the Divine Determination then it would follow that the power and providence of God can dispose nothing till the assent of the created will be expected and first had with which it may concur as a partial cause to produce the effect and so God should not be the first but the second cause of this act and the will should not so much depend upon him as he depend upon the first motion of the will Paganus If God preserves to his rational Creature its natural propriety and manner of working I suppose he doth ordinarily allow it the liberte of a self-determination And I understand not how this should be any derogation to Gods Power or Providence for the Creature still acts not only under the general concourse of his Providence but also under the special egressions of it and God can and doth as it seemeth good to him put in an immediate and extraordinary finger of power to over-rule and order the actions of it the Creature therefore is not exempted from the conduct of his Providence by this means as you pretend Diotrephes We look upon all created beings as so many emanations from the first cause upon which they depend in Ibid. page 2â— esse operari in their being and working as the Rayes depend upon the Sun neither is the intellectual Creature in the actions of free-will exempted from this order * Synops Pur. Tâ—col ubi supra Thes 10. for it is necessary that every Creature and every action of it and every mode and perfection of every action of it be reduced unto God as unto the first most perfect and therefore most effectual cause We conclude therefore That * Mr. Bagshaw Pract. Dâ—sc pag. 3. Our wills are tyed up so close to the will of God that like lesser wâ—eâ—ls they move only as that great mover doth guide them Paganus Methinks this Doctrine should be very apt to tempt men to believe that God doth very much promote and assist them in their most prodigiously sinful courses Diotrephes The Acts of Gods Omnipotency are carefully to be distinguished from his Legislative Acts by these last God alwayes forbids sin but by those former he secretly incites * Deus homines ad suas pravas actiones incitâ—t seduct traâ—it jubâ—t indurat deceptiones immittit quae pâ—ccâ—ta gravia sunt efficit Mart. in Judic 3. 9. men unto it either by moving their wills tongues and members unto sin or else by not moving them to the contrary virtue but withdrawing his grace and necessary assistance whence it comes to pass that they cannot but sin Paganus This makes God the Author of the sinful act and consequently the cause of all sin in the world Diotrephes Though it sounds ill to weak and tender ears yet Mr. Calvin * Instit lib. 1. Cap. 18. Sect. 3. mihi p. 128. hath openly avouched it Satis apertè ostendi saith he Deum vocari corâ—m omnium Authorem quae iâ—ti câ—nsores volunt otioso tantùm ejus permissu contingere I have cleaâ—ly shâ—wed that God is called the Author of all those sins which these censurers would have come to pass only by his idle permission But that we may clear God of all imputation We are taught to distinguish when we speak of sin betwixt the act and the malice Dr. Twiss ubi supra page 73. or betwixt the act which is sinful called by some the materialty and the sinfulness thereof which is called the formality God is the cause of the former but only the permitter of the latter Paganus This permission then by which you endeavour to free God from the imputation of being the Authour and Cause of sin must not be an action by which God makes us to operate but only
either that God would rescinde his own Decree for their production in me or that he would separate the sinfulness from the entity of them which is impossible Diotrephes But I told you though God doth produce the act and predetermine the will intrinsecally unto it yet he doth but permit the malice or sinfulness of it Paganus You may as well say he doth but permit the burning of the flax who doth actually throw it into the fire and the Adulterer assuming the act of his uncleanness upon himself might with as much shew of Reason protest that he was but the permitter of the obliquity of it Some of your greatest Schoolmen do affirm Potest fieri oppositum ejus quod permissum est quod tamen fit secundum permissionem quia permissio respicit potentiam Thom. in 1. d. 47. q. 1. ar 2. causae ad utrumque oppositorum se habentem unde neutrum oppositorum contra permissionem est sed utrumque secundum eam That the divine permission doth not tye a man up to one of the opposites that is to evil but leaves his will at liberty to make choice of either that is of the evil act or the good one opposed to it This is impossible for him to do under the arrest of such an absolute Decree and intrinsecal predetermination and simultaneous concourse as your permission importeth Again what God permits doubtless it is in his power to hinder but admit the real entity of an act intrinsically evil freely elicited the power of God cannot hinder it but a moral praviâ—y will attend it because it implies a contradiction that an act intrinsecally evil as of blasphemy and the hating of good should be freely elicited and not be depraved with the adhesion of a moral vitiosiâ—y He therefore that is thus the Author of the material act he cannot be the permitter he must be the Author also of the sinfulness that is inseparably annexed to it Diotrephes It seems you will not distinguish Gods permission from his operation and efficiency nor allow him to be Author of any act but he must be charged with those imperfections also which it contracts through the deficienâ—y of the second Cause Paganus You are very much mistaken for I think Gods permission ought by all means to be distinguished from his efficiency but you do most shamefully confound them And I do acknowledge thâ—â—â—ome acts are of that nature that the act it self may be from God and the viâ—iosiâ—y from the Creature as in the act of Prayâ—r and Almes-giving God may stir up a man to pray or give an Almes and yet he may perform it with a mixture of vain-glory Matth. 6. 2. But in acts that are intrinsecally evil in themselves filthy and uncleâ—â— the vitiosity in those cannot be really distinguisht from the act 〈◊〉 the act so long as the Law that makes it sin stands in force be separated from the vitiosity unless it be by a meer mental abstraction as Adultery Blasphemy hating of God In these he that is Author of the act must needs be Author also of the vitiosity He that is Author of the inequality of the Leggs or of the motion in such as are lame is Author likewise of the halting He that is Author of the Antecedent is Author of that which doth necâ—ssarily follow from that Antecedent whether it be positive or privative He that is Author of the Sun is Author also of the Light He that is Author of the interposition of the Moon betwixt the Sun and the Earth is also Author of the Suns Eâ—lipse and the darkness that follows it Quod est causa causae est causa causati for that Rule holds here He that is the Cause of the Cause is Cause also of the effâ—ct or that which is caused But give me leave to put one question to you when God commands Thou shalt not commit Adultery Is this the sense of that precept Take heed lest while you produce the free act of Adultery any moral pravity or sinfulness should attend it Or is this the meaning of it Abâ—ain altogether from the free act of Adultery because the malice or pravity that deforms it is inseparable Is it the very act of Adultery Murder Blasphemy hating of God that is forbidden by the Law of God or only some defect or inordination superadded to it and distinct from it If some defect or inordination only you may do well to discover it that the Adulterer being taught to distinguish may take the pleasure of the act and yet keep himself innocent from the transgression but if the act it self be forbidden by the Law and as such an act then the Author of the act is Author of what the Law forbids which is the sin Where it is impossible to divide them in the commission as in Adultery Blasphemy hating of God why should you distinguish them in the imputation You say the first cause so concurs with the second that they produce but one and the same action that the first is the principal immediate and predeterming cause If then the sinfulness of the action produced betwixt them be as inseparable from it as heat from fire and that action be avoidable to the first but unavoidable to the second nay if the first cause ordains that action and as it is sinful too for otherwise it will not serve his turn to glorifie his vindicative justice and impells the second cause to commit it I pray consider impartially to whose account this action ought rather in equity to be imputed Diotrephes But the second cause is not compel'd but consents freely to the sinful action and takes pleasure in the commission of it Paganus Indeed though you say the will of man is Gods Amesius ubâ— supra 〈◊〉 6. p. 24 Instrument yet you add that it is not a pure and meer instrument but a free one But wherein do you place this liberty not in a free determination to produce or not produce the entity of the act wherein certainly true liberty * Causa libera potest agere non agere quiâ—quid quantum quando lubet Burgersdicii Inst Logic. Lib. 1. cap. 17. De causa efficiente Theorem 12. consisteth but in the consecution which is necessary too of that mâ—ral pravity about which the free power is conversant only by accident and through the intermediation of the entity of the act if God therefore doth premove and predetermine the will to the sinful act hic nunc and produce it in him the man cannot be made culpable by cooperating to this unavoidable production with freedom and pleasure because this is the property and manner of working which God was pleased to concreate and preserve in him Besides where there is an extrinsecal impulsion he that is insuperably acted by it is equally blameless * Quaecunque ista causa est voluntat is si non ei potest resisti sine peccato ei ceditur si autem potest
that insuperably he that produceth the act and that immediatly shall he be blameless What is this but to condemn an accessary and acquit the principal Diotrephes But there is a great difference betwixt Gods concourse unto our good and evil works to good works he concurs not only efficiently Ex parte Potentiae predetermining the very faculty to the work but also morally Ex parte Objecti in that he doth counsel command perswade and aâ—â—ure us unto the lawful object In sinful acts he does only the first and not the latter so that of our sinful actions he is the physical cause only not the moral but of our good he is as well the moral as the physical Paganus You should consider that moral motion doth not give God the honour of a true and proper cause but only of a Metaphorical for the influence it hath into the Agent is not ipsum agere the very act it self and consequently the effect doth not follow that motion If therefore God should move us no otherwise than after such a manner your Partizans do conclude that while we work God should not discriminate us but we should discriminate our selves from such as work not therefore though God concurs unto the good act by a physical predetermination and morally too but unto the evil act by a physical predetermination only yet there remains the same manner of working in respect of good and evil in that which is chiefly considerable and by it self alone attributes the true and proper nature of a cause to God and assigns him the first and perfect original of that determination that this act should rather be than not be But 2. What is this moral motion and from whence and what doth it work upon in its seduction of us to an evil work be it in the understanding or the will in the imagination or the sensitiue appetite if you allow it to be an act you must confess according to your principels that it is from God and of his product on seeing therefore that the total sum of Gods concurse unto the act of sin amounts fully to thus much in your own account That he predetermines man to produce the whole entity of it and the whole reality also of every other act prerequired unto it that besides he predetermines and applies the Divel * Imoâ—â—ne ipse quidem Diabolus quicquam potest nisi determinante Deo Proinde pro certo tenendum Dominum omnes actiones decâ—rnere atque agendo concurrere suo sancto modo cooperari quando peccatum est in fiâ—â—i c. Malcom Com. ad Act. 4. 24. Passio Christi in individuo fuit a Dâ—o praedefinita praedefinitione perfecta Ergo omnes circumstantiae quae concurrunt ad individuationem illius praedeterminatae sunt aeterno Deâ— decreto sed ad talem individuation in etiam concuâ—rit inâ—â—â—sio actus extensio ad tales personas Alvarez Disp 22. 19. Câ—tance approbante Amesio iâ— Bel. ener Tom 4. lib. 2. cap. 2. n. 12. p. 27. and every other cause de facto conâ—urring to propound the unlawful object and allure to it since he predetermines the will and directs the intention and provides the object and applies the Tempter and addresseth all other circumstances that concur to the individuation of the sinful act there seems to be no moral or physical causality wanting that God should therefore be said to produce mens evil works otherwise than he effects their good works Diotrephes But the efficiency of God though he be Author of the act of sin doth not reach the formal malice of it Paganus No more do Men nor Divels in their most importunate contrivances solicitations and actings towards the sins of others notwithstanding they communicate in the fault * Quatenus incredulit adhabâ—t rationem peccati Deus illam non efficit sed Diabolus juxta illud 2. Cor. 4. 4. Piscator Apol. Resp Amicae Collat. Oppos cap. 3. and guilt by impelling to them such acts as are inseparably attended with a moral pravity neither doth any man produce the formal malice of his own wicked act but inasmuch as he produceth the entity of that act * Aquin. 12ae q. 79. ar 2. 2. to which that malice is annexed If the resolution of your Casuist * Amesius ubi supra lately mentioned be authentick he doth indirectly cooperate and so communicate in the sin of others who is deficient in his diligence to prevent it and he is sufficiently diligent to prevent sin who doth predetermine the will to it Diotrephes Now I have freed God so fully from having any hand in sin by a Metaphorical distinction you endeavour to make him communicate therein by a moral interpretation but that one may be accounted the Author of sin he must be culpably deficient saith Dr. Twiss * Ubi supra p. 72. and thus man may beguilty saith he either by doing what he ought to omit or by omitting what he ought to do but this cannot be incident to God He could I confess saith he keep any Creature from sin â—f it pleased him but if he will not and doth not he commits not any culpable defect for he is not bound to preserve any man from sin Therefore all that can be infer'd from hence is this * R. B. Prid. ubi supra p. 13. That man doth necessarily fall into sin if God doth not uphold him not that God sins because he doth not give what he doth not owe him Paganus You grant then that God is the cause of mans fall though inculpable but your Doctors do acknowledge That to love God in such a measure as to contemn our selves in comparison of him and his service is above the power of nature A Dr. Twiss nbi supra p. 49. man mvst be endued with heavenly grace and the Spirit of God to enable him hereunto and that accordingly God created our first parents in a state of grace and endued them with the Spirit that in this capacity such a law of love might be justly impos'd upon them Now I would fain be satisfied with what equity God could withdraw * from his innocent creatures and such were our first parents before the fall * Si Deus hominem sibi obedientem a pietate deturbat bene currentem cadere facit ergo pro bonis mala retribuit injuste punit quod ut fiat impellit Quid tam perversum quid tam insanum dici aut cogitari potest Prosp Aquit ad 12. Gal. Object that supernatural and necessary assistance and yet being thus without any fault in them strip't off their abilities leave them under the obligation of that now become an impossible Commandment that they might inevitably fall and perish yet this he did as you concluded above out of your Divines Diotrephes We satisfie our selves in that God did this for a greater good and that we may have no cause to complain our Divines conclude *
to be conquered according to the ground upon which it is made How Joh. 5. 44. can ye believe saith our Saviour to the Jews who seek honour one of another And he tells the Scribes and Pharisees That the Publicanes and Harlots entred into the Kingdom of heaven before them And Solomon invites us to this observation saying Sâ—est thou a man that is wise in his own eyes there is more hope of a fool that is a wicked man than of him Prov. 26. 12. The dispensâ—tion of the Gospel which is the Ministration of the Spirit goes forth doubtless with a mighty power of conviction but how farre it works upon particular persons affected under the influences of it is not so easie to be resolved There are in the conversion of sinners cases extraordinary which must not he drawn into example nor prejudice the general Rule as in S. Paul Austin c. But ordinarily that there is some disposition and temper of spirit more apt than others to receive the effectual impressions of it is most certain Such is the honest and good heart in the Parable such are the humble and meek Psal 25. 15. Joh. 3. 21. Joh. 7. 17. Mat. 11. 18. Joh. 10. 28. Mat. 11. 25. 1 Pet. 2. 2. Joh. 8. 47 1 Joh. 4. 5 6. Joh. 6. 45. and the pâ—or in spirit such as do the truth and the Will of God so farre as their information serves them such are the weary and heavy ladâ—n and the like They are resembled to sheep and to babes and are sâ—id to be of God to have learned of the Father and to know him These are said to be ordained that is disposed and in a sit posture for eternal life Acts 13. 48 and of this ingenuous and noble temper were those Bereans Acts 17. 11. They were as it were in the Suburbs or Confines not farre from the Kingdom of God and upon the first call by the word of grace they obeyed and stept into it Desolatus But by what means may a man obtain to be thus disposed or qualified for faith and conversion Samaritanus Mr. Baxter tells you very truly that common grace is truly preparative and dispositive to saving grace so Of Saving Faith p. 39 41 46. that if we employ and improve the first we may be confident we shall obtain the other Not by any merit or causolity force or efficacy of our work or by any natural connexion but meerly Dr. Jacks p. 3109 c. by God's grace by the counsel of his holy and irresistible will by which it hath pleased him to appoint the one as a necessary consequent of the other Desolatus Have you any grounds for this assertion Samaritanus Yea that ground so often laid down by our Saviour in the Parable of the Talents Habenti dabitur To him that hath made use of grace shall be given and he shall have more Mat. 25. 28 29. abundance Desolatus That is he shall have more of the same kind if he employes his Talents of common grace he shall have an addition of common grrce if he employes talents of saving grace he shall receive a greater measure of saving grace Samaritanus Nay God's bounty will be extended further a Mat. 25. 21 22. Thou hast been faithful in a little I will make thee ruler over much upon the emprovement of common grace he shall receive saving grace for to him that had emproved his talents he saith Be thou Ruler over so many Cities b Luk. 19. 17 19 The remuneration is in a matter of a higher nature And this God doth vouchsafe not of debt or condignity or congruity but of grace * Praecedaneorum illorum recâ—â—or â—sâ—s causae rationâ—m non habet qua Deus tanquam justus Judex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impulsus est ad majoâ—em gratiam communicandam sed tanquam mitissimus pater c. 〈◊〉 col inter D. Tilon Camer p. 35. and mercy still Desolatus Suppose two persons alike affected in mind and body exposed to the like temptation and attended with equal assistances of grace whether is it possible for one of these to stand impregnable while the other miscarries under this tryal And if he may whence is this difference in the issue and event of this combate Samaritanus Take the Totum Complexum together and there can be no other cause assign'd but the liberty of the will for grace cannot be the cause why any man doth fail of his duty but the will assisted by grace is a Partial cause of that man's standing in his integrity and the total cause of this man's falling from it Thus S. Austin hath determined the question Si aliqui duo aequaliter affecti animo corpore videant unius corporis Lib. 12. de civit cap. 6. apud Grevinch pulchritudinem quâ visa unus eorum ad illicite fruendum moveatur alter in voluntate pudica stabilis perseveret quid putamus esse causae ut in illo fiat in illo non fiat voluntas mala Respondet si eadem tentatione ambo tenentur unus ei cedat atque consentiat alter idem qui fuerat perseveret quid aliud apparet nisi unum voluisse alterum noluisse à castitate deficere unde nisi propriâ voluntate ubi eadem fuerat in utroque corporis animae affectio amborum oculis paritervisa est eadem pulchritudo ambobus pariter institit tentatio Of two persons alike affected in soul and body alike assaulted by the temptation of the same beauty why one of them should prostitute himself to the temptation while the other perseveres in his chastity Austin could assign no other reason but their own will the one would the other would not violate his Sacred chastity 2. If you take the Case apieces Prosper * De vocat Gent. l. 2. c. 26. answers distinctly to the several parts and renders the cause exactly well Quod gratiae opitulatio à multis refutatur ipsorum est nequitiae quod autem à multis suscipitur gratiae est divinae voluntatis humanae That the assistance of grace is rejected of many 't is solely of their own naughtiness but that it is embraced of many 't is both of the divine grace and the humane will Desolatus But Sir that good use and that cooperation of the will are pious actions and savingly good and therefore should be ascribed wholly to the grace of God and not at all to the will of man Samaritanus That good use and that cooperation of the will are to be ascribed to Grace as the Principle and Primary cause but yet as they are moral actions they do derive their efficacy and vertue from the will and not from grace wholly which may be clearly evinced by this Dilemma of the Remonstrants Examen censuraep 180. b. Usus ille bonus gratiae aut est actus officij nostri qui virtuosus dici meretur Aut non est Si
decreed that I shall or I shall not use the means to escape it So that all the Absurdities that dog the Stoâ—câ—l dream of fatal necessity at the heels are inseparable attendants of this Opinion For I may not onely say If I shall die of the Infection I shall if I shall not die I shall not and therefore I need not use means to avoid it But also if I must use means I must if I must not I must not Seeing Gods decree necessitateth as much to use or omit the means as to obtain or lose the end For if their opinion be true all things whatsoever end or means of little or great moment come to passe necessarily and unavoidably by reason of Gods eternal Decree Here they have two Evasions The first is this A beit say they God hath most certainly determined what shall or what shall not be done concerning us Evasio 1. yet his Decree is hid from us and we must use lawful and ordinary means for the obtaining of such and such good Ends keeping on the ordinary course which he hath revealâ—d to us See the vanity of this shift our Opposites teach that whatsoever God hath decreed shall be dâ—ne and whatsoever is omitted Confutatio shall be undone If therefore God hath determined that we should not use such and such means it is impossible for us to use them iâ— he hath decreed that we should it is impossible that we should omit them And therefore it is more than ridiculous to say that although God in his secret will hath determined that we should not do such a thing yet we are to do it seeing his decree though it be sâ—cret yet it will have its effect and it is absolutely impossible we should do that which God hath determined we shall not do Howsoever say our Opposites our opinion is far from Stoicism for the Stoâ—cks thought that all things came inevitably to pass by reason of an indissoluble Chain and Connexion of natural Evasion 2. causes but we teach that all events are irresistably necessary by reason of Gods everlasting dâ—crees and His Omnipotency daily executing them This reason is so poor a one and yet so much made on by some worthy men that I am more troubled to wonder at it Confutation than to confute it yet that I may satisfie it distinctly I will divide the opinion of the Stoâ—cks into two particular Tenets 1. They hold that all things come to pass inevitably 2. They thought the reason of this inevitablenesse of events to be an unchangeable connexion of natural causes Our Opposites stifly maintain the former of these Tenets Now let the Reader observe that the most prodigious absurdities accompanying this Stoical error follow the first part of their opinion though sequestred from the second For if all things come to pass unavoidably what need I care what I do yea if I shall care I shall care whether I will or no and a thousand the like horrid conceits follow the opinion of the necessity of events whatsoever we make to be the cause of this necessity It is a great point of Turkish Divinity at this day that all things are done unavoidably and they with our Opposites make Gods will to be the cause of this unavoidableness and therefore they judge of Gods pleasure or displeasure by the event Yet there is no Christian but abhorreth this Turcism and gives it no better entertainment than Anathema Maranatha It s too apparent therefore that albeit our Adversaries are true Christians yet in this point their opinion is guilty by reason of its consequence both of Stoicism and Turcism Again if we consider the second part of the Stoicks opinion we shall perceive that the opinion which we confute cannot be minced but that it will be compleat Stoicism The Stoicks thought the connexion of causes to be the cause of the necessity of events its true but what did they think to be the connexion of causes doubtless the eternal Laws of Nature which they supposed to be a Deity It is very probable they thought the Fates to be but Natures Laws but whatsoever they meant by the Fates its evident they made their decrees to be the cause of the connexion of causes How often read we both in Philosophers and Poets of Fatorum Decreta Parcarum Leges c. Yea the word Fatum it self is as much as a Decree as Edictum from Edicere so Fatum from Fari Quid aliud est Fatum quam id quod Deus de unoquoquâ— fatur saith Minutius Well then to apply Do not our Adversaries in this point suppose an inviolable linking of all things together one necessarily following in the neck of another Do they not make the cause of this linking to be Gods irresistable decree Do they not defend compleat Stoicism What part of Stoicism do they disclaim Do they not maintain inevitable necessity Do they not teach an indissoluble connexion of all things Do they not believe divine decrees to be the cause of this connexion Certainly they must needs confess themselves Stoicks in this point unless we will give them leave to grant the prezmises and deny the conclusion I know the Stoicks had mis-conceits concerning the Deities as accounting those to be Deities which are not whose decrees they made the causes of all things but they were the common errors of Paganism and are beside the point in hand And truly these set aside I see not wherein our Adversaries differ from the Stoicks I have prosecuted this Argument more copiously because it includeth many others I mean all those which Scripture or Reason furnish us with against the error of the Stoicks and they are many for I think verily there are few opinions which have a greaâ—er retinue of ridiculous and erroneous consequences than this of the unavoidable necessity of events Some of them may make one laugh and some of them may make one tremble I omit the former because they are obvious to every mans conceit and I would not willingly make sport of so serious a matter Of the last sort I will specific one in a second Argument That opinion which being admitted maketh God the Author of sin is gross and erroneous that I may say no worse but so I Arg. 2. speak it with horror doth the Opinion of our Opposites I know they are renowned Christians and as they abhor Stoical errors so they hold this damnable doctrine which is worse than ever any Heretick held which transformeth God into a Devil to be most accursed yet so the case standeth that as the See this Argument confirmed in the Answer to the 4th Objection error of fatal necessity so this of the cause of sin fatally followeth their opinion which I prove thus They teach That nothing is done in the world nor can be done but what God hath decreed to be done Now it 's too certain that three quarters of the things which are done in the world are
sins therefore according to this opinion God is the principal cause of sins Devils and Men are but His Instruments The usual Answer is That God is the cause of all the actions Evasio that are sinful but not of the sirfulness of the actions of all our works but not of our obliquities and imperfections As one that rides upon a halting Jade is the cause of his motion and yet not of his halting It s a hard case when they have but one frivolous distinction to keep God from sinning Might I here without wandring discourse Confutatio of the nature of sin I could prove sin it self to be an action and confute this groundless distinction that way but I will keep my self as much to the purpose as I can and so answer it thus or rather confute it That which is a principal cause of any action is a cause of those events which accompany that action necessarily This Rule is most certainly true Therefore if God by His decrees do force Concomitants us to those actions which cannot be done without sin God Himself I am afraid to rehearse it must needs be guilty of sin For example If God decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the forbidden fruit seeing the eating of the fruit which he had forbidden must needs be with a gross obliquity I do not see how this distinction will justifie God for Adam sinned because he ate the fruit that was forbidden but they say God decreed that he should eat the fruit which was forbidden necessarily and unavoidably The conclusion is too blasphemous to be often repeated The Reader may see how well that common distinction holdeth water yea if this nicety were sound man himself might prove that he committed no murder though he stabbed the dead party to the heart for at his arraignment he might tell the Judge that he did indeed thrust his dagger into his heart but it was not that which took away his life but the extinction of his natural heat and vital spirits Who seeth not the wild frenzie of him who should make this Apology yet this is all our Adversaries say for God They say His decree was the cause that Adam took the fruit and put it into his mouth and ate that which he had commanded he should not eat Yet they say He was not the cause of the transgression of the commandment The example of the halting Jade is a meer impertinency for suppose it were as it is not appliable to us who halt naturally yet Adam before this action was sound and therefore God necessitating him to such an inconveniency dealt with him as if one should drive a lusty Nag into rough passages where he must needs break his leggs Neither is it as I said appliable unto us the lame posterity of Adam for he who rideth an horse that was lame before although he be not a cause of the impotency which he findeth in the horse already yet in urging him to motion he is now a cause of the actual imperfection in the motion and so perhaps a cause of encreasing the impotency for the future though he were not the cause of his lameness yet he is of his limping at that time Let the horse stand still and see whether he will halt or no. Marry if the horse go of himself then the Rider is no cause of his halting and so we may say that all our haltings are from our selves without any instigation from God I know our Opposites have another shift teaching that God useth to punish one sin by making us to commit another so that although we sin He doth but punish Albeit I do not believe this to be true as 't is commonly expounded yet I abstain at this time from a farther examination of it because it weakens not my Argument about Adam for his sin was the first that ever he committed and the original of all that ever followed and therefore if Gods decree were the cause that he ate the forbidden fruit as our Adversaries teach its apparent whom they make the Author of all sin These two Arguments well scanned are sufficient to make any not fore-stalled with pre-conceits to be afraid of that opinion which believeth all things to come to pass necessarily by reason of Gods irresistable decree and therefore they shall suffice for the confutation of it Moreover seeing it is clogged with such monstrous consequences me-thinks out opinion should be far more amiable which giveth no countenance to such hideous mis-shapen errors as it will appear by the process of this disputation Now I proceed to the confirmation of our opinion concerning the contingency of some events in respect of God by two Arguments more The first is this That God hath decreed that all his creatures ordinarily and for the most part should work according to their Arg. 1. several kinds and endowments by which he in the Creation distinguished them For illustration they may be ranked into three several forms In the lowest stand the meer natural Agents inanimate and sensless creatures to these God hath given certain instincts and 1. inclinations by which they are determinately swayed to these or these certain effects and operations unless they are out wardly hindered for heavy bodies cannot chuse but descend fire cannot chuse but burn c. In the second stand the Sensitive creatures four-footed beasts 2. fouls and fishes to these God hath given sense and knowledge to discern what is good for their nature and what is bad and amongst diverse goods to prefer that which is best He hath given them also a free appetite or a kind of sensitive will by which they may either â—reâ—ly prosecute or avoid such objects as they like or mislike not determinately tyed to this or that certain operation as the other were A stone cannot choose but descend but a beast may as well go up hill as down c. In the upper Forme are Men reasonable Creatures whom God hath made more volunâ—ary than the other by giving them 3. greater freedom of choice and presenting unto their more elevated knowledge a great variety of objects Now then without doubt God distinguished thus his creatures in abilities and faculties that they might operate in their several kinds that the natural agents might work naturally the voluntary voluntarily as that eloquent French-man Du Vain hath well explained this point The truth of all this no man will deny explicitely Well then let them hearken to the consequences of this truth so common both in Logick and Metaphysicks among those who handle of natural and voluntary causes If God hath decreed that many things should be done voluntarily by his creatures then also hath he decreed that many things should be done contingently in respect of him but the first is granted truth therefore the second should be The connexion I prove thus All things are done contingently in respect of God which for ought he hath decreed might with as much
Now then God leaving to His creatures free liberty to work or not to work after this or that manner so that for any necessity imposed upon their actions by Him whatsoever they omit was as possible to be done as what they did And yet from all eternity fore-knowing whatsoever his creatures would do or not do his fore-knowledge must needs be infinite and most admirable Infinite I say not in respect of the number of objects for so as I said before no knowledge can be infinite but in respect of the omnipotent and boundless manner of actual comprehending those things with an infallible fore-sight which in respect of God were contingent their not being being as possible as their being And indeed this fore-sight of future contingents is the true character and Royal prerogative of Divine knowledge and Ergo in the 41 of Esay God upbraideth the Pagan Deities with this priviledge peculiar to Himself though juglingly pretended by them in their lying Oracles vers 21. The Lord biddeth them produce Gnatzumotheken the strongest Arguments by which they could prove themselves Gods and in the next verse he particularizeth and thrice bids them tell if they can what shall happen in the times to come It s worth the observing how that there was never any sort of Diviners Artificial I speak not of Devils Witches Gypsies and such palpable Impostors that undertook to fore-tell future contingents for if you prove those things which Astrologers and Physiognomers undertake to foretell to be meer contingent in respect of the Horoscope or Complexion and no way to depend on them as natural causes you have proved their Arts to be but Impostures How much then do our Opposites dishonor God in this case making the great miracle of his foresight of future contingents to be as much as nothing seeing they say that albeit they are contingent in respect of us yet they are necessary in respect of Him When any man hath answered any of these four Arguments then will I change my opinion In the mean time I proceed to the vindicating of it from such exceptions and objections as our enemies in this case make against it The dissipating of those mists wherewith they endeavour to obscure this opinion will not onely clear the truth of it for belief but also the sense of it for understanding First they say That while we avoid their Stoicism as we term Objâ—ct 1. it we fall into flat Epicurism for while we make so many things in the world to fall out according to the inconstant bent of voluntary Agents we Deifie Chance and make Fortune a goddess we do in effect deny Gods providence which they say makes all things come to pass according to a most wise and constant method I will be as forward as any man to Anathematize him whosoever he be who holdeth any thing to fall out fortuito in respect Answ of God I will make it most evident that our opinion makes no Chance in respect of God and most sweetly illustrates Gods Providence First There is a vast difference between Contingency and Casuality Contingency is an equal possibility of being or not being 〈◊〉 Casuality is the coming to pass of an event eximproviso beside the fore-thought as I may say of the thing Now it is our assertion that many things fall out contingently in respect of God because he imposed no necessity upon their being but left them to the pleasure of the inferior causes that they might as well not have been as been But we say withall that nothing falleth out accidentally or casuâ—llâ— in respect of God because nothing cometh to pass without his most certain and unerring foresight he knowing from all eternity what his creatures would do though he left it to their pleasure to do what they list In events there is a great difference between Contingency and Casuality of events in respect of men for most things we do we do contingently we being not bound by any inevitable necessity to do them yet as long as we do them upon certain persuasive reasons for certain ends we do them not by chance The same events yet are not after the same manner contingent in respect of God as they are in respect of us for He out of the Prerogative of His Deity fore-knoweth them but we by reason of our mortality cannot have infallible foresight of them and what foresight we have is in a very little distance And indeed if this point be punctually canvased we shall perceive that in that same proportion we have any knowledge of them they are not contingent but necessary for every thing so far forth as it is in existence or in near preparation for it is necessary Contingency is the middle point between necessity and impossibility of being and therefore so much as any thing inclineth to existence it is necessary The want or neglect of the distinction between contingency and casualty hath been a great cause of the error we confute for our Opposites still taking fortuâ—to and contingenter ☞ for Synonyma because they would have nothing casual in respect of God therefore they would have every thing necessary not discerning the middle path which we walk in between Epicurism and Stoicism Concerning Gods Providence we teach that although according to that ordinary course which we call nature which he 2. hath prescribed for the operation of his creatures in the decree of Creation many things fall out according to the free choice of voluntary Agents no way by Him necessitated yet God is still busie with a double providence The first is universal by this whatsoever natural Agents do contingently He fore-seâ—th most clearly and ordereth it most wisely according to His glory the preservation of the Vniverse and good of His creatures The second is particular by this He puts in oft-times a miraculous finger into such contâ—ngent business as respects his Church and oft-times so worketh the heart of the voluntary Agent that sometimes he doth that which if he had been left alone to himself he would not have done and sometimes is secretly diverted from the doing of that which otherwise he would most willingly and in all likelihood could most easily have done And here our Opposites may please to observe how our opinion is so far from denying particular Providence that it onely maintaineth a Providence properly termed Particular for that particular Providence which our Opposites so much talk of if it be well looked into will appear to be in no better sense particular than the Roman Church is universal They say That there is not any numerical act performed by any creature without an eternal decree from God this they call particular providence Alas this is the general which concerneth all the actions performed by all things or at least one mixt of general and particular As for example Because it raineth to day God so ordering that it should is it any sense to say This rain was by the
use to his Glory in obedience to his commandements and resist His and our enemy the Devil we most traiterously siding with Satan have abused His gifts to His Dishonor God did the part of a Creator we of Rebels A man lives intemperately God gave him not strength to this purpose he necessitated not the man to this intemperancy Man therefore onely sinned God is dishonoured The King made his Subject able to rebel against him by delivering his military furniture unto him the verier miscreant he that did rebell against him So God made Adam indeed able to sin but he never intended that he should sin with that ability God then is the cause of all those things in which we sin and yet whatsoever he doth is exceeding good he is not the cause that we intend any sin but the cause that we are able to commit those sins we intend and yet he intended not our abilities for sin but for his Service Of all our good actions he is the first cause we are the second of all our sins we are the proper cause he is onely the Conditio sine qui non But here some man may say That choice or election of an unlawful object upon which we misplace our actions is that which maketh us sinners now this being an act of our will it must suppose also the concourse of God how then doth our opinion clear the point The same Answer abundantly sufficeth God made Adam able to be willing to sin but he made him not to will sin God set before him life and death that he did choose death it was by the strength of will given him of God but God did not bind him to choose death for that were a contradiction a necessitated choice Briefly whatsoever we choose we do it by the power by which we are voluntary Agents yet if we choose death God is Object ult not to be blamed for he made us voluntary and therefore it was as possible for us to have chosen life If the nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed this point will be most evident The last objection is this Gods fore-knowledge of all futures is most infallible and necessary Ergo All futures in respect of him fall out necessarily otherwise it is possible God may be deceived yea if many things fall out contingently Gods fore-knowledge of them can be but contingent depending after a sort on mans free-will This Argument is plausible at the first view but if it be touched it falls to shatters It is one thing to know that a thing will necessarily be done and another to know necessarily that a thing will be done God doth necessarily and certainly foreknow all that will be done but he doth not know that those things which shall be done voluntarily will be done necessarily he knoweth that they will be done but he knoweth withall that they might have fallen out otherwise for ought he had ordered to the contrary So God necessarily knew that Adam would fall and yet he knew that he would not fall necessarily for it was as possible for him not to have fallen It was the antient and is still the true opinion That Gods Praescience is not the cause of Events he fore-knoweth all things because they will be done things are not done because he fore-knoweth them The infallibility of his knowledge consisteth not in the immutability of his decree but in the prerogative of his Deity it is impossible therefore that any man by his voluntary manner of working should delude Gods fore-sight not because God doth necessitate his will to certain effects for this were indeed to take it away but because his fore-knowledge is infinite Let our hearts therefore be never so full of Mazes and Meanders turning and winding yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to use the Poets language the al-seeing Eye of God cannot but espy them long before not because he himself contrived them for then it were no wonder if he were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but because to Him who is every way infinite all things cannot be but present and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is the significant word of the Author to the Hebrews signifying open by a metaphor or similitude drawn from a word that signifies having the faces laid upwards because such as lye so have their face exposed to the sight of all men FINIS Books Printed or sold by William Leake as the sign of the Crown in Fleetstreet between the two Temple-gates Yorks Heraldry fol. 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An exact Abridgment of the Records in the Tower of London from the Raign of K. Edward the second to K. Richard the third of all the Parliaments holden in each Kings raign and the several Acts in every Parliament by Sir Robert Cotton Kt. and Baronet An Apology for the Discipline of the antient Church intendep especally for that of our Mother the Church of England in answer to the Admonitory Letter lately published by William Nicolson Arch-Deacon of Brecon and now Lord Bishop of Glocestet Le Prince d'Amour or the Prince of Love Wa collection of several Ingenious Poems and Songs by the Wits of the Age. 8. A learned Exposition of the Apostles Creed delivered in several Sermons by William Nicholson Archdeacon of Brecon and now Lord Bishop of Glocester