may contain something contrary to Reason is already made evident for seeing all such causes are subject to Ignorance and devoid of infallible directive knowledge of all circumstances which may occur in the immediate total production of such effects they are obnoxious to fall into some imprudent and unprovident proceeding in the production of them left wholly to themselves Seeing therefore all things must proceed from Reason it self lest this imprudence committed in the production of any effect should be ascribed to reason it self as an effect to its cause it is plainly necessary that all other causes I speak of necessary not free causes of which we shall treat hereafter should be immediately directed and preserved from such errors and deviations by the infallible all-seeing Wisdom and Providence of Reason it self so that all circumstances and things considered and compared together there will be no real being produced contrary to reason or sullied with the least disorder Now this direction of reason it self seeing it must reach to all and every the least action of all necessary causes is the immediate influence and concourse of reason it self into every effect for it contains a decree of reason it self that such effects be actually produced in such determinate circumstances and by means of such causes for it is not possible to conceive the concourse of God to be any thing save reason it self effectually decreeing and defining the actual being of all things which ever were are or shall be in their fit circumstances all things and occurrences considered as I shall hereafter make manifest Thus therefore I have proved that reason it self produces immediately all things and so is in all things and consequently by reason that all places are filled with these things in which reason it self is by means of them it is in all places and if corporal thing could be in infinite places it would also be in infinite places which is the proper notion of Gods Ubiquity for that is nothing else then that it is impossible that any place should be in which God is not And I adde farther that if place or ubication be any thing distinct from the thing which is in place that God is in that also for the same reasons as he is in all other things not as locally contained immediately in these places but as being the immediate producing cause of those realities or modifications which are called places or ubies and this presence of God in all things is to be confidered for the first instant or priority of Nature as the School speaks which respects the actual being of every thing in it self or before it be considered in time and place so that it is not a local but a causal presence not including place but yet excluding local distance from any thing which supposes place The sixth Attribute The Eternity of God ETernity may be taken either improperly for a succession of time without beginning or ending and in this sense God is not in himself eternal because he hath no change of being of parts or properties which may succeed one to another and be measured by time so that according to this improper acception he can onely be said Denominative or by way of denomination supposing that any changeable beings have been alwayes or in all times without beginning to be in all times or eternally by succession because he hath if this supposition were true been in all those beings which have been from successive eternity no otherwise then I have declared in the former Attribute that he is said to be in local and divisible places Or eternity is taken properly for an unsuccessive and simultaneous or indivisible durance whereby God at once is what he is totally and unchangeably so that as he sums up all perfections in his indivisible being so he sums up all instants and parts of time in one indivisible point of his eternal durance God therefore being reason it self and that being essentially a necessary actual being as is proved it is impossible that he should ever be truly conceived either not to be or to be any thing but what he is and consequently in himself and according to his essence he is most properly eternal The seventh Attribute The Omnisciency of God REason it self can be ignorant of nothing for were it ignorant of any thing in that whereof it is ignorant it might admit or do something contrary to reason as not being an essentical rule of rectitude to it self in such things whereof it is ignorant for if it knew them not it could not determine whether they were conformable to reason or no but reason it self can neither admit into it self nor do any thing contrary to reason for then Reason should not be reason Ergo c. The eighth Attribute Of Gods Omnipotency VVHatsoever hath or can have any finite being must be squared according to reason therefore it must be a participation or expression of the first reason therefore it must proceed from the first reason or reason it self therefore God being Reason in self whatsoever hath or can have a being must proceed from God therefore God is Omnipotent Or thus It is reason that whatsoever reason it self judges to be put in actual being should be put in actual being this is clear but whensoever it is reason all things considered that any thing should be done that is to be done therefore whensoever reason it self judges that any thing should be put in actual being it is to be put in actual being therefore it cannot but be then when reason judges it should be therefore reason it self which is God is Omnipotent seeing every thing must be done which he judges to be done The difficulty will be in this Minor viz. whensoever it is reason all things considered that any thing should be done that is to be done or must necessarily be done Which I prove thus All things must proceed immediately from reason as is proved therefore all things must be done according to reason for reason can do nothing contrary to reason but it would be contrary to reason not to have that done which reason dictates all things considered should be done therefore whatsoever reason dictates or judges all things considered should be done that must necessarily be done Seeing therefore whatsoever can be must be capable to be judged by reason it self that in some circumstance or other it may be done God can produce every thing save himself that can have can actual being which is to be omnipotent Hence follows evidently that those who put any necessary actual being of it self save God who is reason it self take away the omnipotency of God for they put some actual being distinct from God and so not God which God cannot produce and hence appears the vanity and blasphemy of that new revived Opinion of an Eternal Infinite Increated Matter which I have already consuted The ninth Attribute The Goodness of God TO be good is to be communicative of it self to
consequently all things would be impossible and it would imply a contradiction that any thing should ever be put in actual being But that is manifestly false for it is made evident that something is now in actual being therefore there is some actual being essentially necessary Neither will it any way darken the light of this Proposition if denying all contingency one should say that every thing proceeds by fatal necessity and by an inevitable and essential exigency one from another in their different successive durances for such a determinate measure of time as hath been above touched and shall hereafter be examined For seeing even in this supposition every thing hath its necessity from its causes and nothing from it self or of it self it will be as ridiculous and implicatory a supposition as the former supposing contingency For Exempligratiâ the effect A will have no necessity of being now but from the cause B nor the cause B but from its cause C and so each will be necessary dependently of another cause therefore unless there be found a cause independent of all others and having a necessary being essentially from it self it will be a collection of causes and effects hanging one upon another like the stones of a Wall in the air without all ground or foundation and therefore as absurd and implicatory as the former Whatsoever Systeme therefore be put of causes and effects the truth of this fifth Proposition stands firm and immoveable that amongst all things in actual being c. there must be something essentially necessary Yet to give it more strength and light I will endeavour to prove that the Systeme of succeeding subordinate causes producing one another without any cause improducible whereupon whatsoever cause that is produced depends either mediately or immediately whether they have a contingent onely or a necessary connection with their effects to be wholly impossible by this Argument If this Systeme be subsistent and solid then all Causes and Effects that either are now or ever have beem are and have been produced by a Cause but that is impossible Ergo the Major is evident as containing nothing but the supposed Systeme for whatsoever is produced by a cause must have a cause producing it The Minor I prove If it were possible that all the Effects and Causes that are now or ever were could be or have been produced by a Cause then it is possible that they shold be all Causes and Effects and yet should not be all Causes and Effects that either are now or ever were but that is impossible Ergo The Minor is evident exterminis For it onely asserts that both parts of a Contradiction all and not all cannot be true The Major I prove Whatsoever is conceived to be produced by a Cause must be conceived to have a producing Cause this is clear But if all Effects and Causes that either are or ever were be conceived to have a producing Cause they must be conceived to be all and not to be all Ergo This Minor is evident for they must be conceived to be all as is now supposed and affirmed in the Systeme and yet they cannot be conceived to be all for the cause which is conceived to produce all will be excluded from the number of all that are or ever were produced by a Cause The force c. This Argument cannot possibly be avoided otherwise then by answering that it proceeds upon a false supposition for the number of produced Causes and Effects being infinite it is alwayes false to say all for still there will be more and more without end and one can never reach to all To this I reply by demanding whether the Authours of this Opinion intend by this Answer to elude all universal Propositions de omni concerning this number of produced Causes by denying the supposition of all by reason of the infinity of the number if it were admitted exempli gratia all effects and causes that either are now or ever were are and were either Corporal or Spiritual all men that either are now or ever were are and were animalia rationalia all bruits irrationalia c. If they intend this they take away the chief gound of humane discourse by denying all universal Propositions upon pretence that they proceed upon false suppositions there being no such thing as All in an infinity of things proceeding one from another in every particular species of them so omnis homo omnis leo omnis arbor c. will be false suppositions and consequently cannot compose a true proposition nor will this enumerative argument be of force Petrus est animal rationale Paulus Johannes et idem de singulis aliis ergo omnis homo est animal rationale for it may be eluded by saying I deny the supposition omnis homo all men because all cannot be said in an infinite number If this be their intention then they are obliged to give disparity betwixt these forenamed universal propostions and that proposition which I advanced of all causes and effects produced for this being as really and universally true as the other if the supposition of all be admitted they must give a solid reason why all causes may not be admitted in this as well as all men c. in the other If they should give this disparity that omnis homo all men c. in the foresaid propositions is an abstract from time and place and so supposes not to signifie all men as constituted in time and place as omnes causa product all produced causes signifies in my propositions for by omnis homo est animal rationale is no more signified then that it is the formal intrinsecal notion or essence of a man to be a reasonable creature I answer that this is not a sufficient disparity for omnis res est producibilis ab aliquâ causâ abstracts as much from time and place and in this opinion which I impugne is as much signifying the formal intrinsecal notion of every thing as animal rationale is of homo in as much as res in genere is conceived in order to its existency or actual being and hence as from the intrinsecal notion of a man consisting in animal rationale is rightly inferred this Proposition That all the men that ever yet were were animalia rationalia because the same essence is common to all and every individuum of the same kinde though this second Proposition abstract not from time so from this Preposition omnis res est producibilis ab aliquâ causâ must be rightly inferred this All things that ever were yet in actual being were produced from some cause Neither will it avail any thing to instance in the infinite series of things in possibility to have an actual being hereafter one from another by way of cause and effect without end wherein it cannot be said that all effects shall proceed from causes or all causes shall produce their effects because in this infinite series there is
no such thing as all This I say availes nothing for the comparison is not rightly instituted betwixt all things which have been and all things which are in possibility or may be hereafter for those causes which have been or which are past though they be not now any thing themselves yet they remain in virtute sua that is mediately or immediately in the works which they have produced and whereof some now remain by a continual descent of causation from their efficient vertue so that the present effect a exists by vertue of the cause b and b by vertue of c and c by vertue of d c. so that the effect A hath so necessary a dependence immediate or mediate of every precedent cause in this line of production that it could not now be if any of the precedent causes how distant soever from it had not been before it so that from the actual being of any effect now the authors of this line of produced causes without end must confess that a forcible inference is drawn of the actual praeexistency of all and every cause of the said effect either immediately or mediately having a necessary dependence a well of all as of any one of them as being a fruit lineally deduced from them all which cannot possibly be true in an infinite series of produced causes because in a number infinite one can never say all as these Authors affirme but in the instance alledged of Causes and Effects possible hereafter without end and so infinite those which remain and shall remain without end in the state of possibility so long as they remain in that state are a pure nothing not having any being at all neither in themselves nor in virtute sua there being nothing in actual or virtual being save onely causes able to produce them so that they are meerly in potentia causae and no more neither receiveth the cause any vertue to exist from the effects which it can produce for that which is yet nothing cannot give any thing to another thing whence appears that the instance objected is defective there being an evident disparity betwixt the causes which have been produced heretofore and the effects which may be produced without end or time hereafter for first from the effects which now are existent by an ascendent successive line a mediate consequence is forcibly drawn to all the causes which by connected causalities have wrought the being of this present effect which cannot be done possibly in an infinite line even according to the acknowledgement of these Authors but contrariwise the actual existence of this present cause hath no dependence at all of all or any of the effects which may successively proceed from it but can subsist actually by vertue of its causes though it should never produce any effect at all and therefore there is no necessary dependance immediate or mediate betwixt the cause and the effect as there is betwixt the effect and the cause whence no forcible inference can be drawne from the actuality of the cause to the necessary sequele of all possible effects and consequently all the causes that ever have been of this effects mediate or immediate are demonstrable by this present effect to have had an actual being but all effects which may possibly proceed mediately or immediately from this present cause are not inferred from the actuality of this cause so that all may be said in the one but not in the other the first therefore is finite but the second is an infinite number If therefore the instance had beene rightly instituted it should not have been put betwixt the effects which are inpossibility to be hereafter and the precedent causes which already have had their actuall being but betwixt the effects which may be hereafter per posterius posterius without end and the causes which might have been heretofore per prius prius without end For both these are eqully infinite inexhaustible indeterminate in potentia and syncategorematical for as descending from this present effect A there shall or may be alwayes effects one after another without end possible so ascending from the same effect a there might have been causes one before another without end But as the instance thus stated concludes nothing that the produced causes have de facto prodeeded one from another without end so supposes it some improducible cause which might endlesly have produced causes one before another and before all those which it actually produced Or if we turn the comparison another way it should have been proposed betwixt the causes which have had actual being and the effects which shall have actual being wheresoever they are in actual possession of that being and then the instance had been of force for as beginning from the cause A which now is in actual being to all the effects hereafter possible when they are put in actual being the number will be determinate exhaustible and finite so beginning from the same effects A to all the causes which have had actual being in their several precedences the number will be exhaustible and determinately finite the infinity therefore is onely conceiveable in the endless succession of possible effects whereof all can never be in actual possession of their beings à parte post and an infinite precedency of possible causes whereof all could never have been in actual possession of their beings à parte ante which in effect is nothing else then to say that there is some necessary improducible cause which could have produced causes one in time before another without end and can produce effects one in time after another without end and as this improducible cause can produce nothing so late but he can product something which shall exist after it so could it not produce any thing so soon but it could have produced something which might have existed before it Whence followes evidently that there must be alwayes a first and a last a beginning and an end a determinate number and so a proper all of things which either have had or ever shall have had the exercise of their actuall being for the effects which are actual now are the last of all actual beings which ever were before and those of the next ensuing moment shall be then the last and so shall it be without end Now if actual things have an end they must have had a beginning for an infinite actual time without all beginning could never have come to an end because infinity is that which is without end seeing then all actual time which hath been heretofore is come to an end in this present moment which is the last that hath been or is actual it is evident that it had a beginning Neither will it avail to say That it is onely infinitum à parte ante but not à parte post for I answer that such an actual infinitum is a pure Chymera that is a thing without an end which hath an end And it will
that it is as clear a contradiction as the former to affirm that any thing essentially annexed to a determinate space of time should be of it self ab aeterno for that limited eternity must be presupposed to be actually before you suppose that any thing can be actually and essentially annexed to it seeing the actuality of no being can be essentially annexed to that which is nothing actually for then something should depend of nothing now I subsume but it is impossible to conceive that pretended not beginning or eternal determinate time designed in the objections to be presupposed as actually existing before that being commensured essentially to that forenamed space of time ergo This Minor I prove because it is wholly impossible to conceive any actual durance of time whether eternal or not eternal whether infinite of finite before we conceive something actually existent which is a second sign of posteriority of Nature we conceive measured by such a determinate space of time for no part of time whatsoever can have any other proper notion if it be any reality distinct from the thing which dures then to be an affect and as many think consequently an effect of that which dures by it both which suppose either the thing effected to be its subject or the thing effecting it to be its cause and by consequence that thing to be in priority and this in posteriority of nature in relation to it whence it follows according to the common strain of Philosophers that it can have no essential dependence of it in its actual being for what is supposed to be actually before the actual being of another thing cannot essentially depend in its actual being upon that before which it is supposed to be actually Secondly seeing that that which this objection pretends to be eternal or ab aeterno must have an essential relation to this or that determinate actual space of time for which alone and for no other it hath a necessary being of it self and that ended ceases of it self to be any longer I cannot conceive such an essence without a manifest contradiction for it is impossible to conceive any thing to have an essential relation to be so soon or in such a priority of time that no time can be conceived to be possible before it if it continue onely for a determinate space of successive time and then as it existed in his supposition of it self ab aeterno so of it self it ceases to be in this or that determinate instant of time For in this supposition that determinate instant will terminate a time which is determinately finite therefore from that instant ascending one may attain to the first instant of that time and so that time will have a final and last instant and consequently be finite and not eternal wherein no first instant is to be found Seeing therefore as we shall see hereafter successive eternity is but a meer possible indetermination of one priority conceived before another and that no indeterminate thing so long as it remains indeterminate or as such can possibly be or ever have been ens actu an actual being it is also impossible to conceive such an indeterminate successive eternity to be any actual thing in it self or any thing else save the necessary and immutable power of some cause which can produce nothing so soon but it could have produced something which might have been before whatsoever it hath actually produced and if it had produced any thing before that it could yet have produced another thing which would have been and so in infinitum without all term or limit The sixth Proposition Whatsoever is an actual being essentially must be of it self that is independent of any cause different from it Proof THis Proposition is already proved for the essence of a thing is really the thing it self as is evident if therefore any thing exist actually from or of its effence it must exist actually from or of it self now every thing which is essentially an actual being exists actually of its own essence therefore every thing which is essentially an actual being exists actually of it self If it should be instanced that supposing an inevitable necessity of all things all things would essentially be actual beings for that measure of time wherein they are and yet they would not be of themselves but from their determinate causes unavoidably producing them I answer that this necessity were there any such proceeds not from the essence of the effect but from the determination of the cause for therefore onely the effect is necessary because the cause cannot but produce it for the effect being purely nothing before it is produced cannot possibly necessitate the cause to produce it for to necessitate any thing is to do some thing but nothing can do nothing it is not therefore the essence of the effect to be actually in such a space of time but rather the essence of the cause to produce such an effect in such a time So that even this false supposition admitted what soever is an actual being essentially must be of it self for the supposed inevitable necessity of all things is onely extrinsecal from the cause and so not essential or intrinsecal to the thing in actual being neither indeed can either the beginning to be or perseverance in being for such a determinate time onely be essential to any thing for time being nothing but a measure of mutability or rather mutability it self as we shall see hereafter whatsoever is essentially in or for such a determinate space of time will be in time and not in time for that whole space wherein it is supposed to be in time as is supposed and yet not in time for whatsoever it is essentially it is immutably for nothing can change its essence To say therefore that any thing can be essentially for or in such a determinate time is to affirm that is is mutable whilst it is not mutable and necessary whilst it is not necessary which is a plain contradiction Nay farther it is to affirm that such a being is tota simul because it cannot but be for such a time and yet not tota simul but by succeeding parts because it is in time which is another contradiction The seventh Proposition No actual being that is superfluous defective inordinate absurd or difform from the rule of right Reason can be essentially necessary or of it self Proof FOr what necessity can there be of absurdities or defects c. seeing their not being is better then their being and the works of nature are better without them then with them For if any thing absurd and contrary to reason could be essentially necessary and of it self and all thing must proceed from that being which is essentially necessary and of it self as is above proved then all things which have a being must be absurd and contrary to reason But it is evident that all things which have a being are not absurd and contrary to reason
The third Proposition There hath alwayes been something in Actual Being The fourth Proposition There shall be alwayes something in Actual being The fifth Proposition Amongst all things which alwayes have been are now and ever shall be there must be some I determine not yet whether One or more which is absolutely and essentially necessary and not produced by and different cause that is to which it is Essential to be in Actual being and so cannot but be from all Eternity to all Eternity the same without the least change or alteration The sixth Proposition Whatsoever is an Actual Being Essentially must be of it self that is independent of any Cause different from it The seventh Proposition No Actual Being that is superfluous defective inordinate absurd or difform from the Rule of right Reason can be Essentially necessary or of it self The eighth Proposition No Actual Being which is abnoxious to Deordination and Absurdities can be Essentially necessary or of it self The ninth Proposition Nothing can be an Actual Being Essentially and of it self which is not indued with the light of Reason The tenth Proposition Onely Actual Reason in its full Perfection and Latitude that is Reason it self is an Actual Being Essentially necessary The eleventh Proposition Onely Actual Reason in its full perfection or Reason it self is Essentially an Actual Being of it self The twelfth Proposition Reason it self being Essentially necessary and of it self is God The first Attribute The Unity of God The second Attribute Gods Indivisibility The third Attribute The Spirituality of God The fourth Attribute The Simplicity of Gods Being The fifth Attribute The Ubiquity of God The sixth Attribute The Eternity of God The seventh Attribute The Omnisciency of God The eighth Attribute Of Gods Omnipotency The ninth Attribute The Goodness of God The tenth Attribute The Purity and Sanctity of God The eleventh Attribute Of the infallible Veracity of God The twelfth Attribute Gods Justice The thirteenth Attribute Of the ever Blessed Trinity To the Right Honorable HENRY Lord Marquis of Dorchester Earle of Kingston Viscount Newark Lord Pierrepoint c. My Lord SCarce had this Alien born in a Forreign and nourisht in this Nation opened an eye in search of a Noble Mecaenas to naturalize and protect it when your Eminent VVorth and Learning attracted them wholly to your self the one assuring a proneness to accept the other a power to set a true Estimate of this small Present As small indeed as Nothing if you regard the minuteness of the Volume and yet as great as All things if you consider what is exhibites viz. GOD the Best of All things whose unavoidable existence it first endeavors to deduce by Logical Consequence from what every one most evidently experiences then to shadow out his Essence and lastly to give some taste of his Attributes and this onely as a Foundation to a further discovery in some ensuing Tracts of his Power Providence Revelations Mysteries and Conduct of sinful Man to eternal Happiness May it therefore please your Honor to deprive your more Serious and Important Affairs of so small a portion of time as may suffice to cast an eye upon his small Tract And for the Author of it as you Justly possess the Ancient Domaine of his Name and Family so you would please Favourably to Patronize those few dispersed Reliques which yet remain of it whereof I am the least and lowest My Lord Your Honours most Humble though unknown Servant Vincent Hattecliffe Aut Deus aut nihil God or nothing The first Proposition It seems that there is something now in actual being THis Proposition is so evidently true that it cannot possibly be denied or called into question by any one who ever reflected of what passed by most manifest experience in his own thoughts and so neither ever was not ever can be impugned by any who are in their right wits The second Proposition Something is now in Actual Being Proof THis Proposition the first being supposed as a most clear undeniable truth is most evident for that very seeming to any one that something is must be something for it must be a Representation that something now is now every Representation represents something either truly or falsely if it represent something truly then there is something if falsely yet there is a false Representation of something now this Representation represents to represent is to do something that which does any thing must be something for nothing can do nothing therefore if there seem to be something in Actual Being there is something in Actual Being to wit that very Representation or seeming that something is The third Proposition There hath alwayes been something in Actual Being Proof IF ever there had been nothing at all in actual being then there could not possibly be any thing now actually which notwithstanding is proved to be true in the former Proposition for that which should have been after there had been nothing at all would either have been a being essentially necessary which is impossible for such a being must alwayes be and so there would alwayes have been something or it must have been a contingent being that is which can be at one time and not be at another Now every such contingent thing must have some cause to give it its actual existency or being which it hath not essentially of it self for that which once was nothing or had no actual being can never become any thing of it self or without a cause distinct from it for all things contingent are indifferent or indetermined of themselves before they are to be or not to be actually Now it is impossible that that which of it self is indeterminate or indifferent to be or not to be actually should determine it self of it self to be for then it should be indeterminate and determinate to be essentially which is a plain Chymera and contradiction Therefore every contingent thing must be determined to be and be put in actual being by some producing cause really distinct from it now every cause must be supposed to be actually before it can be supposed to produce any thing for to produce any thing is to do something but nothing can do nothing If therefore the time had ever been when there was nothing there could never have been any thing but de facto there is now something as is proved therefore there was alwayes something Neither would this truth be infringed if one should deny all contingency and put every thing to flow one after another and have their beings for such or such a space of time by inevitable necessity which I will prove hereafter to be false for even this admitted for the present yet the production of effects by distinct causes remaining still in force it will remain evident by vertue of the former argument that there hath been alwayes something in actual being for had there ever been nothing at all there could have been no cause of any thing for nothing can do nothing Neither can
any thing possibly begin to be for such a determinate space of time through an essential connexion to such a determinate time as we shall see in the fifth Proposition The fourth Proposition There shall alwayes be something in actuall being Proof THere is now and ever hath been something as is proved if therefore it could ever happen that all things should cease to be either something essentially necessary if there be any such being amongst all things must cease to be which is impossible for if it be essentially necessary it cannot but be for every thing must alwayes be what it is essentially or if there be nothing essentially necessary all things contingent must cease to be but that is impossible for seeing every contingent thing must have its being from some cause really distinct from it so long as that cause is apt and able to conserve it in being and that there is no other cause present and enabled to destroy it it must remain in its being If therefore all things being contingent cease to be they must either lose their beings for want of a cause to conserve all things or by reason of some cause which destroyes all things Not the first for nothing can cease to be for want of that which is wholly impossible and so can confer nothing neither to its being or not being Now that it is impossible that any cause can give being to all things is evident for seeing that very cause is comprized within the number of all things if it give being as a distinct cause to all things it must give being to it self and so be distinct from it self and be supposed to have a being before it is for every cause as is said must be supposed to have an actual being before it can be supposed to do any thing for nothing can do nothing and yet if it be its own cause primarily and absolutely it cannot be supposed to be before it is produced therefore it will be either supposed to be before it is or not to be when it is it is therefore evident that seeing there can be no cause of all things all things which are cannot cease to be for want of a producing cause Neither for the like reason can all things cease to be by reason of some cause destroying all things for such a cause is wholly impossible for if all things be destroyed there can nothing remain in actual being but that which destroyes all things must be supposed to be whilst it destroyes all things for to destroy any thing is to do something and nothing can do nothing If it should be replied that that which destroyes all other things distinct from it may cease to be after it has destroyed all those things and so all things will lose their actual beings and there will be nothing I answer If all things as we now suppose be contingent then nothing can destroy all things save it self for every contingent thing must have a cause as is proved it cannot therefore be supposed to be unless the cause of it be also supposed to be actually therefore is cannot destroy all things save it self and remain it self in being for then a contingent thing should be without a cause which is impossible And the same argument concludes admitting that all things were succeeding one another by way of cause and effect through inevitable necessity For then every thing in actual being must suppose the being of its cause and so could never destroy all things save it self because it could not be when its cause is destroyed Thus the fourth Proposition is made evident that seeing there is something now there must alwayes be something hereafter The fifth Proposition Amongst all things which alwayes have been are now and ever shall be there must be some I determine not yet whether one or more which is absolutely and essentially necessary and not produced by any different cause that is to which it is essential to be in actual being and so cannot but be from all eternity to all eternity the same without the least change or alteration Proof IF there were no such essential necessary being as this there could never either have been be now or ever hereafter be any thing in actual being but there alwayes hath been is now and ever shall be something in actual being as is already proved Ergo. I prove the major or first Proposition Whatsoever is not essentially an actual being cannot be of it self for were it of it self it must be of its own essence or essentially for the essence of a thing is nothing really but the thing it self Seeing therefore it cannot be of it self whensoever it is it must be from something else that is from some cause now if that cause be not essentially of it self it requires as much another cause to have an actual being as the former required it and so there will be no settlement nor firm foundation in causing till one come to some cause which proceeds not from any other but is essentially of it self but every thing which is unsettled in it self that it may have consistency must have its firmness and foundation from something which is in it self firm and constant for other wise it destroyes it self and falls to nothing therefore seeing that every cause which is not essentially from it self is as unsettled and infirm in causing as was the first cause mentioned in this Argument there must necessarily be found some cause essentially from it self to give firmness as a foundation to all the rest And to put a concatenation in dependency of causes and effects without such a firm cause as this would be as foolish and absurd as to put a wall of stones one holding up another in the air without any firm foundation whereon some of them are to rest and stand Neither will the infinite progress in multiplying contingent or caused causes without end help the matter For as a wall composed of infinite stones one holding up another without a foundation would be as absurd as if it consisted of a finite and determinate number of stones so will it be in this infinite progress in causes without being supported by a necessary existent cause and there will be no other difference save this that the one will be onely a finite but the other an infinite absurdity Nay as the now instanced Wall would not be onely absurd but a mere Chymera and fiction of the Brain unless it were sustained by some power able to supply the want of a foundation for otherwise it would fall down as fast as it is builded up and never come to have any frame of a Wall in it So the fore-mentioned contingent causes and effects would not onely be inept and foolish but wholly implicatory and impossible seeing in the former supposition there is nothing possible which can supply the absence of that essential actual being which is to give firmness to all contingent causes as their foundation in causing and