't is evident that Rarefaction and Condensation import no more in their Notion but the altering the Subject according to some Quality whereas Division imports directly the taking away the Vnity of the Thing and consequently its Entity Again meer Rarefaction does not change the Substance but the Degree of it when it comes to great height and every Body admits Rarefaction a long time without losing its former Essence whereas Division consists in an Indivisible so that the Divisum esse is esse aliud or esse duo ex uno whereas the Rarefactum esse may be without any such Effect following it 5. Rarefaction and Condensation are the next Actions in Dignity For since as was proved above Rarity and Density are the First Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity as it affects Body in order to natural Action and Passion it follows that those natural Actions that cause Rarity or Density are the next in dignity to Division which works more upon Divisibility their Genus 6. These three sorts of Action take up the whole Head of Natural Action For since the Genus and its two Differences must needs comprehend all under any common Head as being Adequate to it and Division answers to Divisibility the Genus and Rarefaction and Condensation to the Intrinsecal Differences of more or less thus Divisible it follows that these three sorts of Action do take up all that Head so that there cannot be any kind of Natural Action which is not reducible to some of these or not comprehended under them Besides all the First and Second Passible Qualities which generally are the Immediate Objects of Natural Actions are comprehended in or spring out of Rarity and Density as will be seen in Physicks 7. The Formal Virtue of Acting or working any Effect which we call its Causality is the Agent 's being what it is or its very Existence apply'd by Motion to the Patient and Communicated to it or as it were imprinted on it For since no particular Agent in Nature can do every thing whatever the reason why such particular Causes work such particular Effects must spring hence that the Effect has something in its Nature that is like the Cause comes from it and is Communicated to the Patient or partak'd by it Whence come those Vulgar Axioms Operari sequitur esse Every thing acts as it is An Effect is a participation of the immediate Caâ—se c. Thus the Cause or Reason why Water moistens is because it is moist in it self and imparts that Quality to another thing The reason why a Seal makes such an Impression is because it self is of such a stamp The reason why God Creates or is the Cause of Being is because Being is Essential to him Corol. II. Hence Motion is only requisit to apply the Virtue or Existence of the Agent to the Matter or Patient but the Substance of the Effect springs from the Cause's being what it is Whence it happens that the Effect from the same Causes is more or less perfect according as the Existence of a Cause which is of such a Nature or Essence or more or fewer parts of it are apply'd better or worse to the Patient or to more or fewer parts of it by a feebler or smarter Motion 8. It follows from this discourse that there must be Four Sorts of Causes necessarily belonging to every Effect in Nature viz. There must be an Acter which we call the Efficient Cause a Subject for the Acter to work upon called the Material Cause The Effect wrought in that Matter or Receiv'd in it which makes it otherwise than it was before and therefore has the Notion of some Form newly accruing to it which constitutes the Formal Cause And since Corporeal Action is Motion and no Body can move it self and therefore all Motion in Nature must be caus'd either Mediately or Immediately by something that is not a Body that is by a Spiritual or Intelligent Being and such Agents do design or act for an End therefore there must also be a Final Cause to make those Agents to move Bodies and make them act as they do in every particular Action tho' never so minute which grounds our Notion of Providence adequately Governing the World even as to the least circumstance of it Wherefore there are to every Action in Nature Four Causes necessarily requisit which will afford Reflecters ample occasion for Speculation and Contemplation For example When I write a Letter the Efficient Cause is my Self the Material Cause Paper which receives the Effect of my Writing The Formal Cause the Characters received in the Paper the Final Cause to gratify my Friend treat of Business or acquaint him with News 9. There is no Fifth Cause call'd an Idea as Plato affirms For either that Idea is conceiv'd as introduced in the matter and Receiv'd there and then 't is clearly a Formal Cause or as 't is in the Mind of the Artificer and then it concurrs to make him an Efficient Cause for without such an Idea he could not produce such an Artificial Effect 10. Operation has not the same Notion with Action but is Indifferent to Action and Passion or rather a kind of Neutral Notion made up of both For example Notions or Simple Apprehensions are said to be the First Operation of our Understanding tho' the Soul in having them is purely Passive So also my Acts of Discoursing Willing c. are call'd Operations tho' they be both perform'd by my Soul and Receiv'd in it Whence they have a kind of Neutral Notion such as have Curro ardeo and such-like taking such words not in a Grammatical but in a Philosophical and Natural Sense Of which kind are all Immanent Actions or Acts And therefore these are not so properly call'd Actions as Operations in order to what they have of Effective in them or else Acts because they Actuate or Inform the Subject in which they are as well Received as they are Produced by it Whence Action in the Proper and Obvious Sense signifies the Efficience of a Natural Cause which has a Transitive Notion and inferrs Passion and consequently some Effect in the Extrinsecal Subject it lights on Note That since Action inferrs Passion and referrs to it hence whatever is discoursed here of Action may by turning the Tables as it were or considering Motion in order to its other Term be understood likewise of Passion for which reason we treat of both those Heads in the same Discourse LESSON IX Of the Common Head of Ubi or Where 1. UBI or Where signifying in what Place the Notion of Place must first be rightly understood e're we can have a right Notion of the Common Head call'd Ubi And the word Place being no Artificial Term but a Natural one and us'd by all Mankind we are to learn the true and proper meaning of it from the Users of it that is we must take the Notion of Place not from men of Art or Speculaters but from the Vulgar
but must be made so by Proof Yet since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions and those Notions or what corresponds to them must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents as resulting necessarily from it or being immediately Connected with it hence they are by consequence most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects and more immediately the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others or Suffer from others as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident and as such not easily Evidenceable For since as was shewn above such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance or as their very name imports by Accident and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know it follows that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason or prov'd that they must belong to it because we can never know alâ— the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident nor as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence easily Evidenceable by way of Reason that they must belong to them however they may be known to belong actually to them hic nunc by Sense or Experience Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments and many Quantities Qualities and Relations 16. Notwithstanding those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable For as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it from that single Cause so did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God but all Events tho' never so minute or so odd are Equally Certain to him as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments according to their Dependence on one another and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles Our next task is to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally 1. The Soul or the Understanding is at first void of all kind of Knowledge or Rasa Tabula For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain nor acts needlesly he puts no Effects immediately or without Second Causes when there are Causes laid by him to produce them and since we experience that Causes are laid by Him apt to imprint Notions in us and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative we can compare those Notions and can see how they Agree or Disagree which is to know Hence in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwisâ— than by those Causes it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us and make Nature contradict her self Again since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of and that we can compare those Notions and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare and that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects and from the nature of the Soul it falls into the same Absurdity to affirm that those Causes do only Excite and not Beget Knowledge in us Lastly the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body or at least distinct from it and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For this cannot be done Quantitatively as is evident nor by their Acting together as the Cartesians hold both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens as also because the Line or predicament of Action is distinct from that of Ens and Extrinsecal to it and so cannot Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body if it be not one Ens with the Soul can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument and it would be most Absurd to say that my Hand and Pen are oâ—e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways to the Action of Writing Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge but is a Rasa Tabula capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has is that its self or the Man exists For since as was shewn the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself and of his Existence and all Judgmenâ—s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions it follows that the most Obvious most Easie most Natural and consequently the First Judgment in priority of Nature that a Man has when he is ripe to judge is that Himselâ— is or I am 3. The next Judgment is that He is struck or affected by some Object without him for since the Course of Nature is Motion and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is and so do light and act on his Senses that is do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them it follows that he must after he comes to frame Judgments necessarily and frequently know and consequently Judge he is struck Nor can this be the first Judgment both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition I am struck the Proposition I am is most Simple and manifestly antecedes I am struck the Notion of struck being clearly superadded to it 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former in order of Nature is I am struck thus or Affected after such a manner For the Notion of I am struck is more Simple and so antecedes I am struck thus which superadds to it Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section 5. These Judgments had we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us For since we get all our Notions
fill'd by knowing many Truths but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more and being clear of the Body she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fancy but intimately and necessarily present to her self and consequently to what is in her self and so is Addicted Apply'd and Naturally Necessitated to know the Nature of her Body and consequently of her self as being the Form of that Body and fitted for it and by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Knowledge of her self that is as was shown all Nature and this not Successively one Truth after another as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace but being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible and so not commensurable to Time or to before and after which are the Differences of Time she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit that is at the Instant of her Separation These things being evidently so it follows that every Soul separated from the Body that knew any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once in the first instant of her Separation But of this more hereafter Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imperfect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels and how Angels must know things Intuitively For since they have no Senses they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses nor consequently can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition much less can they Discourse or Compare Two Notions to a Third and so deduce thence New Knowledges call'd Conclusions It is left therefore that they must a tone view comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing and all that is in it which we express by an Identical Proposition Whence this Knowledge or Intuition of theirs abating the Composition found in an Identical Proposition which too is the least that is Imaginable is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these Identicals By which we see that the Supremum Infimi in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge is as the Order of Entities requires contiguous as it were to that which is Superiour to it Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separated Soul knows all things after a different manner than Angels do For though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive as is the Angels yet because her natural Genius led and forced her here to dâ—scourse and gather one Truth by another that is to see one Truth in another hence she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here though she cannot in that State exercise it and that though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another or following one another by Consequence We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in themselves and we see them too all at once yet they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another even to a vast distance observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness according as those parts are more or less Shadowed or Luminous So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding yet because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse that is by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths she sees them as following one another or as it were beyond one another because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves but depending on the others for their Evidence LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes 1. THere must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature For since Nothing can do Nothing it follows that Nothing can be Done unless there be something that Does or Acts that is unless there be an Efficient Cause Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient which is the Matter on which it works or the Material Cause And it must work something in that Matter which being Received in it must be some Form either Substantial or Accidental which must consequently concurr to that Action Formally or be the Formal Cause of it And since the Orderer of all Nature or the First Cause is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance for whà t's Blind can Order nothing and this First Cause is the Adequate Governour of the World and being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design that is with prospect of some End in every thing that is done how great or minute soever and eâ—ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World in their several Stations under him whâ—â—her they be Angels or Men do for the same reason act Designingly too that is do propose to themselves some end Good Reason or Moâ—ive for which they Act and without â—hich 't is against their Nature to Act and since Metaphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Immediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him hence there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem Wherefore there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to evâ—ry Effect in Nature viz. The Efficient Maâ—â—rial Formal and Final For Example in my Action of Writing a Letter the Efficient Cause is my self the Material Cause is the Paper the Formal the Characters drawn in the Paper and the Final to gratify my friend acquaint him with News c. 2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Corporeal Nature how Remote soever it is from us and that they must concur to every Effect tho' we do not know the Quid est of them The first part of our Thesis is proved For since the An est of all those Causes or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect follows out of the nature of Action from the Subjectâ—s being Quantitative and consequently variable Substantially or Accidentally and from the Supreme Agent 's being Intelligent and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe how Remote soever they be or in the whole Mass of Bodies it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World as they do in those Bodies near us and with whose Operations we are acquainted The Second part is evident since the knowledg of the An est or that there is something may it be known by Experience tho' we know not what that thing is as we experience when we hit
casually upon something in the dark or run against it tho' we neither see or know what that thing is or when we see a thing a far off we know that that thing is tho' as yet we know not what it is The Course of Nature is carry'd on by Efficient Cauâ—es and Effects For since a First Cause being suppos'd who is Infinitely Wise he Administâ—rs his workmanship the World after the wisest and best manner which is that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack but perfectly Coherent nor can this be done among an infinit variety of Bodies by any other means so as to make up the Course of Nature but by making Effects necessarily follow from their Causes since if that were not the Course of Nature would be at a stand and need the Artificers hand at every turn to make it go on which argues an Imperfection in the Workmanship it self it follows that the Course of Nature must be carry'd on by Efficient Causes and Effects 4. The Course of Nature must be câ—â—ry'd on by such Efficient Causes and Effects as 〈◊〉 â—roper to one another For were â—ot â—â—ese â—auses and Effects Proper to one anotheâ— any 〈◊〉 might do any thing or suffâ—r from any thing v. g. Fire might both heat and cool and mâ—iâ—ten and Water might be as combustible as dry Wood and so of all the rest In whiâ—h case no man could tell how to Order his Actions or what Efficient Cause or what Matter rather than another he is to make use of to produce any Effect nor consequentlâ— sinâ—e â—uch Essences are ordain'd for such and such Ends could the Essences or Natures of things be Known or Distinguisht more than in Outward Appearance 5. Hence follows immediately that every such Proper Efficient Cause put to be Actually Causing must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉 Proper Effect For since to Causâ— is 〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do what 〈◊〉 Actually causing must cause something or proâ—uce some Effect Anâ— this Effect must be a Proper one as has been prov'd § 4. 6. All the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually causing For since the Virtue or Power of working is in the Efficient Cause it self as being nothing but it's Existence and the Matter to be wrought upon is Quantitative that is of it 's own nature either Perfectly or Imperfectly Divisible and Variable innumerable Manners of ways according to it's Qualities nor can it have an Infinite Power of resisting the Efficiency of the least Cause hence it is apt to have an Impression made upon it to some degree by any Quantitative Agent provided there be but Immediate Application of the Agent to the Patient and that it is prâ—st upon it But there being no vacuum immediate Application of one Natural Body to another must needs be throughout all Nature and the Course of Nature consisting in Moâ—ion one Body must necessarily press upon that which is next it From all which it follows evidently that all the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually Causing 7. From these Discourses 't is evident that we can Demonstrate Proper Effects from Proper Efficient Causes which we call Demonstrating â priori and Proper Efficient Causes from Proper Effects which is call'd Demonstrating à posteriori For since a Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this that the word Cause speaks the thing as it is in Nature and Reason the same thing as 't is in our understanding and Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another and consequently do Infer one another naturally it follows that those Causes and for the same reason Effects as they are in our Vnderstanding must be the Reason why one infers the other in our Understanding Whence follows that thoâ—e Causes and Effects can be uâ—'d as Proper Middle Terms to Infer or Conclude one another And that Proofs made by such Mediums are Demonstrative is clear for no Proof can be more Clear than that which is Grounded on those Notions or Natures being connected Naturally and so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise as 't is shown these are § § 5. and 6. 8. This is farther confirm'd because Two Bodies that are Immediate do Act and Re-act or are in some respect mutually Causes and Effects to one another For since their Existences which is their Power of Acting are immediately Apply'd and by the Course of Nature consisting in Motion prest upon one another and no Natural Agent is of Infinite Power nor consequently can it subdue all the Resistence of the Patient in an Instant it follows that till one of them be by degrees totally subdu'd the Resisting Body must necessarily for the reason given Re-act upon it whence they will be to some degree or in some respect Mutual Causes and Effects in regard of each other Corol. I. The carrying on this Connected Course of Natural Causes is called Providence and as joyn'd with a Course of Supernatural ones Interiour and Exteriour perfecting and streâ—gthening the Will all along to the very end and ripening Souls for Bliss which we call Grace is that which is truly meant by Predestinatioâ— which sounds so terribly and is such â—â—ugbeaâ— to those that mis-understand it Corâ—â— â—I Every Step of this Order of Causes has Entity or Goodness in it For it is manifestly the Causing of Something by Something Corol. â—â—I Therefore 't is directly against the 〈◊〉 of â—â—e First Cause to cause or lay any 〈◊〉 for Sin For Sin formally as such has no kind of Entity or Goodness in it either â—etaphysical Physical or Moral but is formally a meer Privation of some Entity or Goodness which ought to be in an Intelligent Creature whence it comes that by falling-short here in using the Means that Creature falls short hereafter of attaining the End which is only attainable by such Means To explicate which high Points fully is left to Solid Divines I mean such as do not guide themselves by meer Words but by Reason and Good Sense Corol. IV. Hence follows also that were all the Efficient Causes that produce any Effect known to us we could have no Accidental Predications nor consequently any Opinions but the Effect would still be equally Demonstâ—able from the Complexion of those Causes as it is now from some one single Efficient as was hinted formerly Corol. V. Hence to one that comprehends the Complexion of all Causes there could be no Chance nor could such a Man have any Ground for such a Notion For Chance as the common use of the word tells us signifies an Vnseen or Vnforeseen Cause whereas no Cause is Vnseen to him who sees Demonstratively how all Natural Effects follow all along from the Causes and that they cannot but follow from such Causes Corol. VI. Hence tho' we know not particularly the Quid est of this Exact Order of the World or the Course of Nature because we Comprehend not all Causes nor know what Cause or Causes did
Sence of their own Words But let them wriggle what way they will their putting it to be without the World and yet not to exist in re but in our Imagination only which is within the World is so full fraught with variety of Contradictions that they cannot even name it or talk of it without speaking palpable Nonsence at every step of their Discourse Moreover they deny it to be a Thing and yet they attribute to it the Properties of a Real Thing by making it have assignable Parts in it as also to be Extended Measurable c. which is the highest strain of Contradiction imaginable For since Ens and Non-Ens do differ more than toto genere and as far as Contradiction can distance them whatever is affirm'd of an Ens must necessarily be deny'd of Non-Ens so that if a Thing a Body for example can be extended measur'd pass'd through or mov'd in it must necessarily be affirm'd that a Non-Ens cannot be mov'd in extended measur'd or have Parts Lastly Imaginary Space or Vacuum never affected our Senses and therefore since we can have no distinct Notion of it from outward Objects neither can it consequently belong to any of those Common Heads of Notions whence follows that one of these Heads which gives Being to all the other being Ens Imaginary Space and Vacuum are meer Nothings Note 1. That this Discourse equally concludes against Vacuum within the World For that Imagin'd Space would neither be Body nor Spirit Subject nor Accident and therefore it must be meerly Nothing Nor consequently could it be Measur'd Extended Mov'd in c. Note 2. That these two Tenets being overthrown the whole Epicurean Hypothesis built on them falls to the Ground and needs no farther Confutation 11. Hence 't is Logically demonstrated that there can be no Protuberancy in the outmost Superficies of the World for were this so there would be some Distance between the Extream Surface and that Protuberancy and that distance could be Measurable Divisible c. which would make Non-Ens to be Ens. 12. This Humour of Fancy or of ill-govern'd Reason making Entities of Non-Entities and conceiting every Negative purely as such to be a Thing because we cannot conceive Nothings but as Thinâ—s destroys all Science and makes it Chimerical For every Species in Nature includes a Negation of all other Species and every Individuum in the World of all other Individuums at which rate we should have far more Nothings in the World than Things if we come to put all those Negations to bee It were very proper but withal very pleasant if such Men of Fancy would in pursuance of their Tenet frame us a new No-Logick of their own and put Non-Ens in Common to be the First Head of their Negative Notions and then divide it by more of Non-ens that is No-Body and Less of it or no Spirit and then descend to its proper Individuums as Non-Petrus Non-Ioannes Non-Bucephalus c. This would be consequent to their Fantastick Tenet But even then they must be forc'd to contradict themselves and confess that as Non-ens means not capable of existing so by the same reason they ought to make Non-Corpus to be Non-quantum Non-quale Non-passivum Non-locabile c. which would spoil all their Positions of Vacuum and Imaginary Space So certain it is that all Errors pursu'd home to their bad Principles will still confute themselves Hence the distinction some make of Ens into Ens-Positivum Privativum and Negativum is no wiser than was the saying of the Fanatick Preacher in Ben's Play viz. That he had three Lights in him a Great Light a Little Light and No Light at all 13. We have no Natural Notion nor Ground from Nature of an Union as they call it For the Asserters of it neither make it the Action that unites two things or parts nor the Effect of that Action wrought upon the Subject that is their being united which hinders it from belonging to the Common Heads of Action or Passion but an Intervening Little Entity whose nature it is to tye them together And since such a Notion was never imprinted by our Senses 't is plain it can be no Natural Notion as those in the Predicaments are nor belong to any of those Common Heads Nor can it be collected by Reason for since the Matter before the Union be made is Ultimately dispos'd by Nature to receive the Form and the Form is Proper and by the course of Causes Necessary to be received into the Matter thus disposed there can need nothing to Unite them as they call it but the Efficient making the Form result from such Matter as was fitted for it and requir'd it which is to be in it any more than if Fire be apt to burn what 's Combustible and what 's Combustible be perfectly fit to be burnt by Fire there can need any thing but Application to burn it or which in their Phrase is the same to unite the Form of Fire to the Matter of the Wood. This Conceit therefore of those little Entities call'd 〈◊〉 to tack things together at every turn is a meer Chimera coin'd by Fancy and seems to be borrow'd from those mens observing that two Things unapt otherwise to cohere diverse pieces of Wood for example do need Glew or Pitch or some such tenacious stuff to fix them together whence by an Unsuitable and Ill-grounded Metaphor they translate it to the Uniting the parts of Natural Entities which by the wise Conduct of the Author of Nature are always ready for an Union e're they come to be made One and can need nothing at all to unite them or make them One Entitatively Vnion therefore is the Effect of the Action of Uniting or the same with their being united or their Vnity and not an Intermediating Entity since whatever Things or Parts are naturally Vnited do cling together into one Entity by a kind of spontaneous Inclination and by means of the antecedent Dispositions requiring the Form are such good Friends of themselves beforehand that there can need nothing to Reconcile them Besides this Conceit is ill-grounded in another respect for the Inventers of it make account that those Vnible Parts were before they were united Two Things whereas in reality there was but One Thing dispos'd to be chang'd into another by sitting the Matter to receive a new Form Which Discourse may be apply'd to those who ask How or by what means the Soul and Body were United or made One Thing To which the proper Answer is They were never Two Things 14. We can have no One Notion of a Transcendent for since Transcendents are those that run through all or many of the Predicaments and the Predicaments are so many Heads of Notions Generically distinct it is impossible to have any one Notion of Transcendents Again there is no more common Genus which can be divided into those Ten Heads as its Species by Intrinsecal Differences but those several Summa Genera are distinguish'd
Nothing more obstructs the way to Natural Science than the doctrin of Vulgar Philosophers That Qualities are certain Kinds of little Entities which of themselves have a diminutive sort of Being and are able to produce such and such Effects For example Ask them how a Bell works that effect upon my Ear which we call Sound they 'll tell you there is a Quality in the Bell call'd Sonoreity whose nature it is to make a Sound Ask how a Green thing makes such a pleasing Impression on my Eye they 'll answer There is a certain Quality in it call'd Greenness whose nature 't is to work such an Effect and so of the rest Which ridiculous Method explicates nothing but makes the Silliest old wife as good a Philosopher as the most Learned Naturalist if she can but name the Word that Signifies that Quality Next it makes Learners rest easily contented and well appay'd with a meer Word whence they will grow Negligent and Careless to take pains to look into the Natures of the Things or else if they have any wit in them to despair of all knowledge of Nature by seeing their Masters so profoundly Ignorant and so Superficially Learned And lastly it hinders Learners from Seeing or even endeavouring to see the Natural Proportion and Alliance between Proper Causes and their Effects and inclines them to take purely upon trust the whole Administration of Nature and all Consequence of one thing from another which renders all natural Science precarious For 't is not Science unless we use our own Eyes and see the point Demonstrated Jurare in verba is in such cases the Fool 's Oath and is in plain terms to swear the Devoting or giving up our Reason to a Slothful Contentedness never to grow Wiser LESSON VII Of the Common Head of Relation 1. THE Notion of Relation being what one Individual Thing is if compar'd to another there must be some Real Ground of it in the thing Referr'd which is the Reason of our Referring it and by which formally we do thus Refer it For otherwise Relation would be a Chimerical and Fictitious Notion and not a Real or Natural one common to all Mankind and held by them to be such which yet we experience by our daily Converse with them it is 2. This Ground cannot be their having Disparate or Disagreeing Notions in them or their being of Disparate Orders which have nothing to do with one another For we find that we cannot Refer or compare Green and Hard Youthful and Transparent Hot and Triangular nor any other disparate Notions nor yet a Writer and a Plough-share a Father and a Mill-stone a Brother and a Handsaw c. because they are in Disparate Orders and have no Respect to one another grounding our Referring them or Comparing them together as have a Writer and a Writing a Father and a Son a Baker and Bread c. 3. Wherefore the Ground of Relation must either be some Notion agreeing to both the things related that is found to belong to both either Intrinsecally or Extrinsecally or else their having Communication with one another by way of natural Action and Passion This is prov'd by the former Section and is evident because there can be no other Considerations by which they can be order'd to one another or be of the same Order but their having some Intrinsecal Notion common to both or else their Acting and Suffering upon and from one another which is an Extrinsecal Consideration 4. Relations of the first sort which have one and the same Notion in them are of as many kinds as there are Heads of Notions since all these have a kind of Nature or Notion in them and so some kind of Transcendent Unity Thus if they have the same Nature or Essence in them which belongs to the Common Head of Substance the Relation between them is call'd Identity which is their being of one and the same kind of Entity If of one and the same Notion of Quantity 't is call'd Equality which is their being of one and the same Quantity If of Quality 't is call'd Likeness if of Action singly consider'd they are call'd Co-actors as Fellow-Souldiers Fellow-Servants c. If of Passion singly consider'd Fellow-Sufferers Fellow-Martyrs c. If of Place or Vbi Bed-fellows Chamber-fellows Townsmen Country-men c. If of Time Contemporaries Co-eve or born at the same time If of Habit Fellow-Mourners Fellow-Curassiers Fellow-Souldiers of the Blew or Grey Regiment If of Situation Fellow-Assessors or Sitters tho' such as this seldom occur Nay there may be a Relation grounded on having the same notion even of Relation in them as Parents or Fellow-begetters 5. Of the second sort grounded on Action and Passion not singly consider'd but with an Order to one another or as Inferring one another are such as these viz. Father and Son Master and Servant Prince and Subject Tutor and Pupil which are grounded on the Actions and Passions of Begetting and being Begotten Commanding and being Commanded Governing and being Governed Teaching and being Taught c. 6. In both these sorts of Relations the things Referr'd must have their Correlates that is there must be a mutual Relation on both sides In the former of them because there is the selfsame Ground or Reason of Referring in one as in the other viz. that one same Notion Common or Belonging to Both to wit the same Essence same Quantity same Quality same Relation same Place same Time same sort of Action and Passion same Situation and the same Habit. 7. This Agreeing and Corresponding of the two things thus Related in those of the former kind of Relation must be meant to be their Agreeing in the same Abstracted and Common or Specifical Notion and not in the same Individual one For otherwise two Men could not have Identity in their Individual Essence since then they would be the same and not the same that is Vnum and Non-unum And for the same reason Intrinsecal Accidents being Identify'd with the Subjects in which they inhere and having no Entity but theirs they can have no Individuality but by them and so the same Individual Intrinsecal Accident cannot be Common to two Subjects or Substances but must be Individually Two as They are Whence the Relations grounded on them must be upon their being the same in Species or Kind and not Individually Which reason holds equally for those Relations that are grounded on Action Passion and Situation and the rest For two things cannot be in one Individual place that is in a place capable to hold but one Individual thing without Penetration of Bodies Nor is it possible in the course of Natural Causes that two should be born or dye at the same precise Time that is in such a portion of Time as is terminated by the same Instants Nor can Two wear the same Individual Arms c. at once Wherefore it must be meant that the Notion common to both must be an abstracted or specifical Notion and
as to the nature of Agent and Patient there needs no more to begin the Effect actually but Application 2. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of Agent and Patient and the Effect be Indivisible there needs no more to begin and end that is to Compleat the Effect at once but Application 3. An Indivisible Effect cannot be perform'd by piecemeal or by parts 4. Every thing operates as it is 5. No Change can be made without the Operation of some Cause 6. A Pure Spirit is not Quantitative a Body is Proposition I. No Corporeal Operation is without Local Motion For since Ax. 4. Every thing operates as it is what is Quantitative operates Quantitatively but nothing can operate Quantitatively or exercise 't is Quantity when it perfectly rests according to it's Quantity that is moves not according to it's Quantity It follows then that to Operate Quantitatively is to move according to Quantity Wherefore since nothing can move according to it's Quantity but either Intrinsically by having it's Quantity made greater or less or Extrinsically that is by having it's Quantity unmov'd as to it 's own parts or it's self mov'd towards Another and both these do evidently require some kind of Local Motion 't is Evident likewise that No Câ—â—poreal Operation is without Local Motion Proposition II. 13. That an Angel is not susceptible of Local Motion For since Motion is Mutation and consequently Local Motion Mutation or Change according to Place and Change of Place does necessarily require some Space and Space is Quantity it follows that Local Motion cannot be made in a Subject which has no Quantity But Angels they being Pure Spirits are not Quantitative therefore they are not Susceptible of Local Motion or capable of having Local Motion made in them Proposition III. 15. That no Body can cause a Change in an Angel For since no Operation of Body is without Local Motion and an Angel it being a Pure Spirit is not susceptible of Local Motion it follows that neither is it Susceptible of the Operation of Body But No Cause can change any thing unless that Cause operates upon it Therefore no Body can cause any Change in an Angel Proposition IV. 16. That an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant For since a Cause the self same in all respects if the Patient be likewise the self same and the Application also the self same produces the self-same Effect equally in any time assignable that is sufficient for such an Effect and an Angel put to act upon it self or change it self after the first Instant is put to be the self-same as to its being a Cause in every Instant before it acts as likewise to be the self-same Patient in all respects and the Application of it self to its self cannot but be Equal it follows that in any time sufficient for the same Effect it will produce the same Effect that is act upon it self or change it self Wherefore since an Effect in an Indivisible subject is Indivisible that is Impossible not to be all at once or in one Instant and an Angel being a Pure Spirit is an Indivisible Subject t is Evident that this Effect or the Action of that Spirit upon it self would be equally made in every Instant in case it were not already made that is can only be made in the First Instant Wherefore an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant Proposition V. 17. If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon the other after the very First Instant of their Being Let there be only Two Angels the one whereof can work upon the other and let the Agent be A the Patient B and because they are suppos'd not to act in the First Instant but after some Duration let the Duration assign'd be C the Instant at the end of that Duration in which they first work D. Since neither A. nor B. are able to work upon themselves except in the First Instant and as is suppos'd one works not upon the other till the Instant D they must necessarily remain in all respects the same they were in the First Instant till the Instant D that is for the whole Intermediat Duration C Therefore they are equally fitted in point of Agent and Patient in each nay in the very First Instant of the Duration C as they are in the Instant D But in the Instant D in which they acted they were in all points fitted to act therefore they were also in all points perfectly fitted to act in the very first Instant of the Duration C Wherefore the Effect Begun and the Subject being Indivisible Ended in the very First Instant in case their wanted not Application of the perfectly-ready Agent to the perfectly-dispos'd Patient But there wanted not Application in the very First Instant For since Quantitative Application or Propinquity is not competent to Pure Spirits all the Application they can be imagin'd to have to one another is by Knowledg and Will But they had the same Knowledg and Will for the Whole Duration antecedent because they are suppos'd Vnchang'd and perfectly the same for that whole Duration And tho' they had not had it formerly the Argument returns with the same force that they could not have had this new Knowledg and Will from Themselves in any part of that Duration nor from a Body and therefore they must have had it from anâ—ther Spirit and this in the First Instant because that Other was then perfectly apt to give it This perfectly apt to receive it And consequently If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon rhe other after the very First Instant of their Being Proposition VI. 18. Put any multitude of Angels how great soever all that they can work upon one another will be perform'd in the First Instant of their Being For since where there are only Two one must therefore act upon the other in the First Instant or not at all because all the imaginable Concurrents to that Action were then adequately put the rest also where there are more will for the same reason be wrought upon in the same Instant in case the Causes of that Action be then adequately put But they are all Adequately put in the same First Instant For the second Angel that acts either is a perfect Agent and perfectly apply'd by what it has of it self or by what it has from another wherefore since it can never want what it has of it self or by it's self it cannot want any thing to work upon the Third unless it be to be wrought upon by the First and so be fitted to work upon the Third but this is done in the very first Instant wherefore also the Third will for the same reason be wrought upon in the self-same Instant Again since the Third cannot be imagin'd to want any thing to enable it to work
to the Cause to Expose him to Contempt by Baffling him 8. To reflect that tho' the Words in Common have the same Sence yet as standing in the Context it may have diverse Constructions and so cause that Fallacy we call Amphibology 9. That not only Single words and Sentences may be Ambiguous but there may lurk an Equivocation even in the Connexion it self as when the Middle Term is Accidentally joyn'd to one Extreme by is and Essentially to another Thus far of Disputation when the Defendent holds a False Tenet which is the only Method an Honest Man whose sole End is to evince Truth and beat down Error ought to take The following ways are more becoming vain Sophisters whose aim it is to combat Truth on any Fashion Yet 't is fit that Honest Men should know them that they may know how to avoid the Ambushes and Snares of Truth 's Enemy 5. The second Case then is when the Defendent holds a True point v. g. that there are Angels and yet holds a False one Inconsistent with it v. g. that That which is no where or in no place is not The Disputant if crafty may make use of this False Thesis to overthrow the True one Thus Nothing that is in no where or in no place is but All Angels are no where therefore No Angels are 6. The Third Case is when the Defendent does not hold an Inconsistent Thesis yet he is Ignorant of the Antecedents and Consequents of his Tenet In which case if the Defendent can be brought to deny some Truth necessarily Connected with his Thesis he will be forc'd to deny the Thesis it self As put case the Defendent holds that GOD our Creator is Infinitly Perfect in himself yet through want of Logick is Ignorant that GOD has no Real Relation to Creatures and therefore that the word Creator apply'd to him is meerly an Extrinsecal Denomination and no ways Intrinsecally perfecting Him or affecting him such a Man may be in danger of foregoing his Christian Tenet by this Argument Fe-Nothing that depends on another for some Perfection is Infinitly perfect in it self but ri-GOD depends on Creatures for his being a Creator which is some Perfection in him therefore a-GOD is not Infinitly Perfect in Himself 7. The Fourth is when the Defendent Understands only his own Thesis and is in a manner Ignorant of all others For example Let us suppose that some Defendent by the Language of Christianity with which he is imbu'd or by some Solid Discourse he has accidently heard and though not Learned yet having a good Mother-wit is made well Understand does hold that GOD is Vnchangeable but yet being not us'd to Disputes or Speculative Reflexions he is little verst in other points as in the Nature of Christian Language in Spiritual Points of which consequently we have no Natural Notions and therefore is not aware that all our Words we use when we speak of them are Equivocal and Improper and especially when we speak of GOD highly Metaphorical Such a man no better qualify'd may be stumbled and perhaps made forego that Evident and True Tenet by a Contentious alledging things very Forrein which he not skilful in and then backing them with Authority on this manner What is not GOD Pleas'd when we do well and when we Sin becomes displeas'd that is changes from being Pleas'd to be Angry and when we repent is he not Pleas'd again Will or dare you deny that which Scripture Fathers Catechisms Prayer-books and Sermons do so often inculcate and the Consent of all good Christians does Unanimously and Constantly avow Why are we afraid of Sinning but for fear of losing GOD's Favour and of a Friend making him become our Enemy Will any but a Heretick deny this Again is not GOD Omnipotent cannot he do all things 'T is an Article of our Creed he both is and can since then to change Himself is to do Something will you stint GOD's Omnipotence and say there is Something he cannot do Such Insulting Talk as this tho' there be never a wise word in it working upon the Weakness of half-witted People may hap to make them forego their True Tenet and even fright them to renounce their Faith out of Fear of renouncing it Corol. I. These three last Cases inform us how dangerous it is that any man be allowed to be Truth 's Champion and to undertake her cause unless he be thorow-pac'd in Logick and such other knowledges as are requisit to defend her lest Truth it self Suffer for the Confident Weakness of the Unable Undertaker Corol. II. This last Case belongs to such Disputants who to maintain Absurd and Impossible things do use to argue from Divine Omnipotence by alledging and magnifying which they hope to fright the Piety of a well-meaning but weak Defendent to admit any thing though never so Senseless or Ridiculous The way to answer these men is to show the Effect to be contrary to our Natural Notions and consequently to the Wise Conduct of the World which was the Cause of those Notions And therefore what GOD can do or cannot do is nothing to the purpose unless the thing in question be Agreeable to his Wisdom and Goodness which determin his Power to act and without which it cannot be that he should act Whence it is generally more Safe more Edifying and more Proper to say in such Cases that it cannot be that GOD should will to do such a thing than bluntly to say GOD cannot do it For This flatly limits Omnipotency That only restrains its exerting it self hic nunc because of some Attribute of the Divine Nature to which 't is Disagreeable I say Generally For oft times such Discourses would havâ— GOD's Power to do perfect Contradictions that is to undo the Natures of things Establisht by himself which is not to do As in the Instance of his Changing Himself which is the same in Effect as not being Himself Or when they say GOD has a Power to Annihilate For since Powers are specify'd by their Objects and Non-ens which can do nothing in any kind nor consequently specify a Power is the Object of Annihilation a Power to Annihilate is to be no Power And 't is as ill to say GOD can suspend his Action of Conserving for this takes away from GOD his Goodness or the Redundancy Exuberancy or Communicativeness of Being which is Essential to him and was the Sole Cause of the Creation Thus far of Disputation it self or True Syllogisms The Faults of it come next to be consider'd which are call'd Fallacies or Paralogisms 8. Fallacies are of two sorts Those which arise out of Words which happens when the Ambiguity of some Single word or of some Words put together do lead us into a Mistake of the Thing And those which are not in the Words but arise out of the Thing or the Sense and thence make us mistake the Thing and the Words too 9. Those of the Former sort are almost all little