that my Principles are pernicious both to Piety and Policy and destructive to all Relations c. My answer is that I desire not that he or they should so mispend their time but if they will needs do it I can give them a fit Title for their Book Behemoth against Leviathan He ends his Epistle with so God bless us Which words are good in themseves but to no purpose here but are a Buffonly abusing of the name of God to Calumny A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY FROM Antecedent and Extrinsecal Necessity J. D. EIther I am free to write this Discourse for Liberty against Necessity or I am not free If I be Numb 1. free I have obteined the cause and ought not to suffer for the truth If I be not free yet I ought not to be blamed since I do it not out of any voluntary election but out of an inevitable Necessity T. H. RIght Honourable I had once resolved to answer J. D'â— objections to my Book De Cive in the first place as that which concerns me most and afterwards to examine this discoâ—â—se of Liberty and Necessity which because I never had uttered my opinion of it concerned me the less But seeing it was both your Lordships and J. D s. desire that I should begin with the later I was contented so to do And here I present and submit it to your Lordships judgement J. D. a THe first day that I did read over T. H. his defence of the necessity of all things was April 20. 1646. Which proceeded not out of any disrespect to him for if all his discourses had been Geometrical demonstrations able not onely to perswade but also to compel assent all had been one to me first my journey and afterwards some other trifles which we call business having diverted me until then And then my occasions permitting me and an advertisement from a friend awakening me I set my self to a serious examination of it We commonly see those who delight in Paradoxes if they have line enough confute themselves and their speculatives and their practicks familiarly enterfere one with another b The very first words of T. H. his defence trip up the heels of his whole cause I had once resolved To resolve praesupposeth deliberation but what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined by causes without our selves before we do deliberate can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed or not It is even to as much purpose as for a man to consult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath or whether he should increase in stature Secondly c to resolve implies a mans dominion over his own actions and his actual determination of himself but he who holds an absolute necessity of all things hath quitted this dominion over himself which is worse hath quitted it to the second extrinsecal causes in which he makes all his actions to be determined one may as well call again Yesterday as resolve or newly determine that which is determined to his hand already d I have perused this treatise weighed T. H his answers considered his reasons and conclude that he hath missed and missed the Question that the answers are evasions that his arguments are paralogisms that the opinion of absolute and universal Necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill chosen principles and that the defect is not in himself but that his cause will admit no better defence and therefore by his favour I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion Perhaps another man reading this discourse with other eyes judgeth it to be pertinent and well founded How comes this to pass the treatise is the same the exteriour causes are the same yet the resolution is contrary Do the second causes play fast and loose do they necessitate me to condemn and necessitate him to maintain what is it then the difference must be in our selves either in our intellectuals because the one sees clearer than the other or in our affections which betray our unsterstandings and produce an implicite adhaerence in the one more than in the other Howsoever it be the difference is in our selves The outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution nor him to the other resolution But T. H. may say that our several and respective deliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary resolutions and do concur with the outward caufes to make up one total and adaequate cause to the necessary production of this effect If it be so he hath spun a fair thred to make all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denyed or doubted of when all the causes have actually determined themselves then the effect is in being for though there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect yet they are together in time And the old rule is e whatsoever is when it is is necessarily so as it is This is no absolute necessity but onely upon supposition that a man hath determined his own liberty When we question whether all occurrences be necessary we do not question whether they be necessary when they are nor whether they be necessary in sensu composito after we have resolved and finally determined what to do but whether they were necessary before they were determined by our selves by or in the praecedent causes before our selves or in the exteriour causes without our selves It is not inconsistent with true Liberty to determine it self but it is inconsistent with true Liberty to be determined by another without it self T. H. saith further that upon your Lorships desire and mine he was contented to begin with this discourse of Liberty and Necessity that is to change his former resolution f If the chain of necessity be no stronger but that it may be snapped so easily in sunder if his will was no otherwise determined without himself but onely by the signification of your Lordships desire and my modest intreaty then we may easily conclude that humane affairs are not alwaies governed by absolute necessity that a man is Lord of his own actions if not in chief yet in mean subordinate to the Lord Paramount of Heaven and Earth and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward and precedent causes but that fair intreaties and moral perswasions may work upon a good nature so far as to prevent that which otherwise had been and to produce that which otherwise had not been He that can reconcile this with an Antecedent Necessity of all things and a Physical or Natural determination of all causes shall be great Apollo to me Whereas T. H. saith that he had never uttered his opinion of this Question I suppose he intends in writing my conversation with him hath not been frequent yet I remember well that when this Question was agitated between us two in your Lordships Chamber by your command he did then declare himself in words
sensitive appetites yet sin not i The Question then is not whether a man be necessitated to will or nill yet free to act or forbear But saving the ambiguous acception of the word Free the Question is plainly this whether all Agents and all events natural civil moral for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner that concerns not this Question be predetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concurrence in the determination so as all actions and events which either are or shall be cannot but be nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place time number measure order nor to any other end than they are And all this in respect of the supream cause or a concourse of extrinsecal causes determining them to one k So my preface remains yet unanswered Either I was extrinsecally and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse without any concurrence of mine in the determination and without any power in me to change or oppose it or I was not so predetermined If I was then I ought not to be blamed for no man is justly blamed for doing that which never was in his power to shun If I was not so predetermined then mine actions and my will to act are neither compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecal causes but I elect and choose either to write or to forbear according to mine own will and by mine own power And when I have resolved and elected it is but a necessity of supposition which may and doth consist with true liberty not a reall antecedent necessity The two hornes of this Dilemma are so strait that no mean can be given nor room to passe between them And the two consequences are so evident that instead of answering he is forced to decline them Animadversions upon his Reply Numb III. a THus much I will maintaine that that is no true necessity which he calleth Necessity nor that Liberty which he calleth Liberty nor that the Question which he makes the Question c. For the clearing whereof it behooveth us to know the difference between these three Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty I did expect that for the knowing of the difference between Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty he would have set down their Definitions For without these their difference cannot possibly appear for how can a man know how things differ unless he first know what they are which he offers not to shew He tels us that Necessity and Spontaneity may meet together and Spontaneity and Liberty but Necessity and Liberty never and many other things impertinent to the purpose For which because of the length I refer the Reader to the Place I note onely this that Spontaneity is a word not used in common English and they that understand Latine know it means no more than Appetite or Will and is not found but in living Creatures And seeing he saith that Necessity and Spontaneity may stand together I may say also that Necessity and Will may stand together and then is not the Will Free as he would have it from Necessitation There are many other things in that which followeth which I had rather the Reader would consider in his own words to which I referre him than that I should give him greater trouble in reciting them again For I do not fear it will be thought too hot for my fingers to shew the vanity of such words as these Intellectual appetire Conformity of the appetite to the object Rational will Elective power of the Rational will nor understand I how Reason can be the root of true Liberty if the Bishop as he saith in the beginning had the liberty to write this discourse I understand how objects and the Conveniences and the Inconveniences of them may be represented to a man by the help of his sences but how Reason representeth any thing to the Will I understand no more than the Bishop understands there may be Liberty in Children in Beasts and inanimate Creaturs For he seemeth to wonder how Children may be left at Liberty how Beasts imprisoned may be set at Liberty and how a River may have a free course and saith what will he ascribe Liberty to inanimate Creatures also And thus he thinks he hath made it clear how Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty differ from â—â—e another If the Reader find it so I am contented b His Necessity is just such another a Necessity upon supposition arising from the concourse of all the causes including the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable Creatures c. The Bishop might easily have seen that the Necessity I hold is the same Necessity that he denies namely a Necessity of things future that is an antecedent Necessity derived from the very beginning of time and that I put Necessity for an Impossibility of not being and that Impossibility as well as Possibility are never truly said but of the future I know as well as he that the cause when it is adaequate as he calleth it or entire as I call it is together in time with the effect But for all that the Necessity may be and is before the effect as much as any Necessity can be And though he call it a Necessity of supposition it is no more so than all other Necessity is The fire burneth neoessarily but not without supposition that there is fewel put to it And it burneth the fewel when it is put to it necessarily but it is by supposition that the ordinary course of nature is not hindred For the fire burnt not the three Children in the Furnace c But if these causes did operate Freely or Contingently if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence or have concurred after another manner then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary but either free or Contingent It seems by this he understandeth not what these words Free and Contingent mean A little before he wondred I should attribute Liberty to inanimate Creatures and now he puts causes amongst those things that operate Freely By these causes it seems be understandeth onely men whereas I shewed before that Liberty is usually ascribed to whatsoever Agent is not hindred And when a man doth any thing Freely there be many other Agents immediate that concur to the effect he intendeth which work not Freely but necessarily as when the man moveth the Sword Freely the Sword woundeth necessarily nor can suspend or deny its concurrence And consequently if the man move not himself the man cannot deny â—is concurrence To which he cannot reply unless he say a man originally can move himself for which he will be able to find no Authority of any that have but tasted of the knowledge of motion Then for Contingent he understandeth not what it meaneth for it is all one to say it is Contingent and simply to say it is saving that when they say simply it is they consider not how or by what means but in saying it is contingent they tell us
earnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam Therefore none of these supposed impediments take away true liberty T. H. THe fourth Argument is to this effect If the decree of God or his foreknowledge or the influence of the Stars or the concatenation of causes or the physical or morall efficacy of causes or the last dictate of the understanding or whatsoever it be do take away true liberty then Adam before his fall had no true liberty Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulous odi That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action that he may no longer doubt of my meaning is the sum of all those things which being now existent conduce and concurre to the production of that action hereafter whereof if any one thing now â—ere wanting the effect could not be produced This concourse of causes whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes may well be called in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things God Almighty the decree of God But that the fore-knowledge of God should be a cause of any thing cannot be truly said seeing fore-knowledge is knowledge and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the things known and not they on it The influence of the Stars is but a small part of the whole cause consisting of the concourse of all Agents Nor. doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or concatenation but an innumerable number of chains joyned together not in all parts but in the first link God Almighty and consequently the whole cause of an event does not alwayes depend upon one single chain but on many together Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary Agents and necessitates the Will and consequently the Action but for moral efficacy I understand not what he means by it The last dictate of the judgement concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action is not properly the whole cause but the last part of it And yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily in such manner as the last feather may be said to break an Horses back when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that to do it Now for his Argument That if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect that then it follows Adam had no true liberty I deny the consequence for I make not only the effect but also the election of that particular effect to be necessary in as much as the Will it self and each propension of a man during his deliberation is as much necessitated and depends on a sufficient cause as any thing else whatsoever As for example it is no more necessary that fire should burn then that a man or other creature whose limbs be moved by fancy should have election that is liberty to do what he has a fancy to though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy or choose his election or will This Doctrine because he saies he hates I doubt had better been suppressed as it should have been if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer J. D. a THis Argument was sent forth onely as an espie to make a more full discovery what were the true grounds of T. H. his supposed Necessity which errand being done and the foundation whereupon he bnilds being found out which is as I called it a concatenation of causes and as he calls it a concourse of necessary causes It would now be a superfluous and impertineut work in me to undertake the refutation of all those other opinions which he doth not undertake to defend And therefore I shall wave them at the present with these short animadversions b Concerning the eternal decree of God he confounds the decree it self with the execution of his decree And concerning the fore-knowledge of God he confounds that speculative knowledge which is called the knowbedge of vision which doth not produce the intellective objects no more then the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects with that other knowledge of God which is called the knowledge of approbation or a practical knowledge that is knowledge joyned with an act of the Will of which Divines do truly say that it is the cause of things as the knowledge of the Artist is the cause of his work God made all things by his word John 1. that is by his wisdom Concerning the influence of the Stars I wish he had expressed himself more clearly For as I do willingly grant that those Heavenly Bodies do act upon these sublunary things not onely by their motion and light but also by an occuit vertue which we call influence as we see by manifold experience in the Loadstone and Shell-fish c. So if he intend that by these influences they do naturally or physically determine the Will or have any direct dominion over humane Counsels either in whole or in part either more or less he is in an errour Concerning the concatenation of causes where as he makes not one chain but an innumerable number of chains I hope he speaks hyperbolically and doth not intend that they are actually infinite the difference is not material whether one or many so long as they are all joyned together both in the first link and likewise in the effect It serves to no end but to shew what a shaddow of liberty T. H. doth fancy or rather what a dream of a shaddow As if one chain were not sufficient to load poor man but he must be clogged with iunumerable chains This is just such another freedom as the Turkish Galli-slaves do enjoy But I admire that T. H. who is so versed in this Question should here confess that he understands not the difference between physical or natural and moral efficacy And much more that he should affirm that outward objects do determine voluntary agents by a natural efficacy No object no second Agent Angel or Devill can determine the Will of man naturally but God alone in respect of his supreme dominion over all things Then the Will is determined naturally when God Almighty besides his general influence where upon all second causes do depend as well for their being as for their acting doth moreover at some times when it pleases him in cases extraordinary concurre by a special influence and infuse something into the Will in the nature of an act or an habit whereby the Will is moved and excited and applyed to will or choose this or that Then the Will is determined morally when some object is proposed to it with perswasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will Where the determination is natural the liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the will but not so where the determination is moral In the former case the Will is determined extrinsecally in the later case intrinsecally The former produceth an absolute necessity the later onely a necessity of supposition
if every thing be either necessary or impossible Who ever deliberated whether the Sun should rise to morrow or whether he should sail over mountains It is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools children or mad men if all things be necessary Praises and dispraises rewards and punishments are as vain as they are undeserved if there be no liberty All Councells Arts Arms Books Instruments are superfluous and foolish if there be no liberty In vain we labour in vain we study in vain we take Physick in vain we have Tutors to instruct us if all things come to pass alike whether we sleep or wake whether we be idle or industrious by unalterable necessity But it is said that though future events be certain yet they are unknown to us And therefore we prohibite deliberate admonish praise dispraise reward punish study labour and use means Alas how should our not knowing of the event be a sufficient motive to us to use the means so long as we believe the event is already certainly determined and can no more be changed by all our endeavours than we can stay the course of Heaven with our finger or add a cubite to our stature Suppose it be unknown yet it is certain We cannot hope to alter the course of things by our labours Let the necessary causes do their work we have no remedy but patience and shrug up the shoulders Either allow liberty or destroy all Societies T. H. THE second Argument is taken from certain inconveniences which he thinks would follow such an opinion It is true that ill use may be made of it and therefore your Lordship and J. D. ought at my request to keep private that I say here of it But the inconveniences are indeed none and what use soever be made of truth yet truth is truth and now the Question is not what is fit to be preached but what is true The first inconvenience he sayes is this that Lawes which prohibite any action are then unjust The second that all consultations are vain The third that admonitions to men of understanding are of no more use than to fools children and mad men The fourth that praise dispraise reward and punishment are in vain The fift that Councells Arts Armes Books Instruments Study Tutours Medicines are in vain To which Argument expecting I should answer by saying that the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use means he adds as it were a reply to my answer foreseen these words Alas how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means Wherein be saith right but my answer is not that which he expecteth I answer First that the necessity of an action doth not make the Law which prohibits it unjust To let pass that not the necessity but the will to break the Law maketh the action unjust because the Law regardeth the will and no other precedent causes of action And to let pass that no Law can be possibly unjust in as much as every man makes by his consent the Law he is bound to keep and which consequently must be just unless a man can be unjust to himself I say what necessary cause soever preceeds an action yet if the action be forbidden he that doth it willingly may justly be punisht For instance suppose the Law on pain of death prohibit stealing and there be a man who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal and is there upon put to death does not this punishment deterr others from theft is it not a cause that others steal not doth it not frame and make their will to justice To make the Law is therefore to make a cause of Justice and to necessitate justice and consequently it is no injustice to make such a Law The institution of the Law is not to grieve the delinquent for that which is passed and not to be undone but to make him and others just that else would not be so And respecteth not the evil act past but the good to come In so much as without this good intention of future no past act of a delinquent could justifie his killing in the sight of God But you will say how is it just to kill one man to amend another if what were done were necessary To this I answer that men are justly killed not for that their actions are not necessitated but that they are spared and preserved because they are not noxious for where there is no Law there no killing nor any thing else can be unjust And by the right of Nature we destroy without being unjust all that is noxious both beasts and men And for beasts we kill them justly when we do it in order to our own preservations And yet J. D. confesseth that their actions as being onely spontaneous and not free are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do For men when we make Societies or Common-wealths we lay down our right to kill excepting in certain cases as murther theft or other offensive actions So that the right which the Commonwealth hath to put a man to death for crimes is not created by the Law but remains from the first right of Nature which every man hath to preserve himself for that the Law doth not take that right away in case of criminals who were by Law excepted Men are not therefore put to death or punished for that their theft proceedeth from election but because it was noxious and contrary to mens preservation and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest In as much as to punish those that do voluntatary hurt and none else frameth and maketh mens wills such as men would have them And thus it is plain that from the necessity of a voluntary action cannot be inferred the injustice of the Law that for biddeth it or of the Magistrate that punisheth it Secondly I deny that it makes consultations to be in vain 't is the consultation that causeth a man and necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another So that unless a man say that cause to be in vain which necessitateth the effect he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation oâ—t of the necessity of the election proceeding from it But it seems be reasons thus If I musts needs do this rather than that then I shall do this rather than that though I consult not at all which is a false proposition a false consequence and no better than this If I shall live till to morrow I shall live till to morrow though I run my self through with a sword to day If there be a necessity that an action shall be done or that any effect shall be brought to pass it does not therefore follow that there is nothing necessarily required as a means to bring it to pass And therefore when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another t is determined also for what
according to this description many necessary actions should be contingent and many contingent actions should be necessary The Loadstone draweth Iron the Jet chaff we know not how and yet the effect is necessary and so it is in all Sympathies and Antipathies or occult qualities Again a man walking in the streets a Tile falls down from an house and breaks his head We know all the causes we know how this came to pass The man walked that way the pin failed the Tile fell just when he was under it And yet this is a contingent effect The man might not have walked that way and then the Tile had not fallen upon him Neither yet do I understand here in this place by contingents such events as happen beside the scope or intention of the Agents as when a man digging to make a grave finds a Treasure though the word be sometimes so taken But by contingents I understand all things which may be done and may not be done may happen or may not happen by reason of the indetermination or accidental concurrence of the causes And those same things which are absolutely Incontingent are yet Hypothetically necessary As supposing the passenger did walk just that way just at that time and that the pin did faile just then and the Tile fall it was necessary that it should fall upon the Passengers head The same defence will keep out his shower of rain But we shall meet with his shower of rain again Number 34. Whither I referre the further explication of this point Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number XVI IN this Number he would prove that there must be Free Agents and Contingent Agents as well as Necessary Agents from the Order Beauty and Perfection of the World I that thought that the Order Beauty and Perfection of the World required that which was in the World and not that which the Bishop had need of for his Argument could see no force of consequence to inferre that which he calls Free and Contingent That which is in the World is the Order Beauty and Perfection which God hath given the World and yet there are no Agents in the World but such as work a seen Necessity or an unseen Necessity and when they work an unseen Necessity in creatures inanimate then are those creatures said to be wrought upon Contingently and to work Contingently And when the Necessity unseen is of the actions of men then it is commonly called Free and might be so in other living creatures for Free and Voluntary are the same thing But the Bishop in his Reply hath insisted most upon this that I make it a contradiction to say that He that maketh a thing doth not make it necessary and wonders how a Contradiction can be in one Proposition and yet within two or three lines after found it might be and therefore to clear the matter he sayes that such Necessity is not Antecedent but a Necessity of Supposition which nevertheless is the same kind of Necessity which he attributeth to the burning of the fire where there is a necessity that the thing thrown into it shall be burned though yet it be but burning or but departing from the hand that throwes it in and therefore the Necessity is Antecedent The like is in making a Garment the Necessity begins from the first motion towards it which is from Eternity though the Taylor and the Bishop are equally unsensible of it If they saw the whole order and conjunction of Causes they would say it were as Necessary as any thing else can possibly be and therefore God that sees that order and conjunction knowes it is necessary The rest of his Reply is to argue a contradiction in me for he sayes a I grant that there are some Free Agents and some Contingent Agents and that perhaps the beauty of the World doth require it but like a shrewd Cow which after she hath given her milk casts it down with her foot in the conclusion I tell him that nevertheless they are all necessary It is true that I say some are Free Agents and some Contingent nevertheless they may be all necessary For according to the significations of the words Necessary Free and Contingent the distinction is no more but this of Necessary Agents some are Necessary and some are Agents and of Agents some are living creatures and some are inanimate which words are improper but the meaning of them is this men call necessary Agents such as they know to be necessary and contingent Agents such inanimate things as they know not whether they work necessarily or no and by free Agents men whom they know not whether they work necessarily or no. All which confusion ariseth from that presumptuous men take for granted that that is not whith they know not b Neither do I approve his definition of Contingents that they are such Agents as work we know not how The reason is because it would follow that many necessary Actions should be contingent and many contingent Actions necessary But that which followeth from it really is no more but this That many necessary Actions would be such as we know not to be necessary and many Actions which we know not to be necessary may yet be necessary which is a truth But the Bishop defineth Contingents thus All things which may be done and may not be done may happen or may not happen by reason of the Indetermination or accidental concurrence of the Causes By which definition Contingent is nothing or it is the same that I say it is For there is nothing can be done and not be done nothing can happen and not happen by reason of the Indetermination or accidental concurrence of the causes It may be done or not done for ought he knowes and happen or not happen for any determination he perceaveth and that is my definition But that the indetermination can make it happen or not happen is absurd for indetermination maketh it equally to happen or not to happen and therefore both which is a contradiction Therefore indetermination doth nothing and whatsoever causes do is necessary J. D. FIftly take away liberty and you take away the very nature Numb 17. Arg. 5. of evil and the formal reason of sin If the hand of the Painter were the law of painting or the hand of the Writer the law of writing whatsoever the one did write or the other paint must infallibly be good Seeing therefore that the first cause is the rule and Law of goodness if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil either by it self immediatly or mediatly by necessary flux of second causes it will no longer be evill The essence of sin consists in this that one commit that which he might avoid If there be no liberty to produce sin there is no such thing as sin the world Therefore it appears both from Scripture and Reason that there is true Liberty T. H. TO the fift Argument from reason which is that
any effect is the joyning togethâ—r of all causes subordinate to the first into one totall cause If any oâ—â— of those saith he especially the first produce its effect necessarily thâ—n all the rest are determined and the effect also necessary Now it is manifest that the first cause is a necessary cause oâ— all thâ— effects that are next and immediat to it and therefore by hâ—â— own reason all effects are necessary Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the first cause and necessary in respect of second causes mine It does as he well notâ—th imply a contradiction J. D. BEcause T. H. disavowes these two distinctions I have joyned them together in one paragraph He likes not the distinction of necessity or destiny into Stoicall and Christian no more do I. We agree in the conclusion but our motives are diverse My reason is because I acknowledg no such necessity either as the one or as the other and because I conceive that those Christian writers who do justly detest the naked destiny of the Stoicks as fearing to fall into those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from thence do yet privily though perhaps unwittingly under another form of expression introduce it again at the backdoor after they had openly cast it out at the foredoor But T H. rusheth boldly without distinctions which he accounts but Jargon and without foresight upon the grossest destiny of all others that is that of the Stoicks He confesseth that they may be tâ—o kinds of doctrine May be Nay they are without all peradventure And he himself is the first who beares the name of a Christian that I have read that hath raised this sleeping Ghost out of its grave and set it out in its true colours But yet he likes not the names of Stoicall and Christian destiny I do not blame him though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoick To admit the thing and quarrel about the name is to make our selves ridiculous Why might not I first call that kind of destiny which is maintained by Christians Christian destiny and that other maintained by Stoicks Stoicall destiny But I am not the inventer of the tearm If he had been as carefull in reading other mens opinions as he is confident in setting down his own he might have found not only the thing but the name it self often used But if the name of fotâ—m Christi num do offend him Let him call it with Lipsius â—atum verum who divides destiny into four kinds 1. Mathematicall or Astrological destiny 2. Natural destiny 3. Stoical or violent destiny and 4. true destiny which he calls ordinarily nostrum our destiny that is of Christians and fatum pium that is godly destiny and defines it just as T. H. doth his destiny to be a series or order of causes depending upon the divine Counsel de const l 1. cap. 17. 18. 19. Though he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others have made shipwrack upon Yet the Divines thought he came too neer them as appears by his Epistle to the Reader in a later Edition And by that note in the margent of his twentieth Chapter Whatsoever I dispute here I submit to the judgment of the wise and being admonished I will convert it One may convince me of error but not of obstinacy So fearfull was he to overshoot himself and yet he maintained both true liberty and true contingency T. H. saith he hath not sucked his answer from any Sect And I say so much the worse It is better to be the disciple of an old Sect than the ring-leader of a new Concerning the other destinction of liberty in respect of the first cause and liberty in respect of the second causes though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer like those old Lamiae which could put out their eyes when they list As namely that the faculty of willing when it is determined in order to the act which is all the freedom that he acknowledgeth is but like the freedom of a bird when she is first in a mans hand c. Yet he hath espied another thing wherein I contradict my self because I affirm that if any one cause in the whole series of causes much more the first cause be necessary it determineth the â—est But saith he it is manifest that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next I am glad yet it is not I who contradict my self but it is some of his manifest truths which I contradict That the first cause is a necessary cause of all effects which I say is a manifest falshood Those things which God wills without himself he wills freely not necessarily Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily doth act or work all that it can do or all that is in its power But it is evident that God doth not all things without himself which he can do or which he hath power to do He could have raised up children unto Abraham of the very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan Luk. 3. 8. but he did not He could have sent twelve Legions of Angels to the succour of Christ but he did not Matth. 26. 53. God can make T. H. live the yeers of Methuselah but it is not necessary that he shall do so nor probable that he will do so The productive power of God is infinite but the whole created world is finite And therefore God might still produce more if it pleased him But this it is when men go on in a confused way and will admit no distinctions If T. H. had considered the difference between a necessary being and a necessary cause or between those actions of God which are immanent within himself and the transient works of God which are extrinsecall without himself he would never have proposed such an evident error for a manifest truth Qui pauca considerat facile pronuntiat Animadversions upon the Reply Numb XVIII THE Bishop supposing I had taken my opinion from the Authority of the Stoick Philosophers not from my own Meditation falleth into dispute against the Stoicks whereof I might if I pleas'd take no notice but passe over to Number 19. But that he may know I have considered their doctrine concerning Fate I think fit to say thus much that their error consisteth not in the opinion of Fate but in faigning of a false God When therefore they say Fatum est effatum Jovis They say no more but that Fate is the word of Jupiter If they had said it had been the Word of the true God I should not have perceived any thing in it to contradict because I hold as most Christians do that the whole world was made and is now Governed by the Word of God which bringeth a necessity of all things and actions to depend upon the divine disposition Nor do I see cause to find fault with that as he does which is said by
Lipsius that a Fate is a series or order of causes depending upon the Divine counsel though the Divines thought he came to near them as he thinks I do now And the reason why he was cautelous was because being a member of the Romish Church he had little confidence in the judgment and lenity of the Romish Clergie and not because he thought he had over-shot himself b Concerning the other distinction of liberty in respect of the first cause and liberty in respect of the second causes though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer c. as namely that the faculty of willing c. I answer that distinction he alledgeth not to bee mine but the Stoicks and therefore I had no reason to take notice of it for he disputeth not against me but others And whereas he says it concerned me to make that answer which he hath set down in the words following I cannot conceive how it concerneth me whatsoever it may do somebody else to soâ—aâ— absurdly I said that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it which can not be doubted and though he deny it he does not disprove it For when he says those things which God wills without himself he wills freely and not necessarily He says rashly and untruly Rashly because there is nothing without God who is Infinite in whom are all things and in whom we live move and have our being and untruly because whatsoever God foreknew from eternity he willed from eternity and therefore necessarily But against this he argueth thus Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily doth work or act all that it can do or all that is in its power but it is evident that God doth not all things which he can do c. In things inanimate the action is alwaies according to the extent of its power not taking in the Power of Willing because they have it not But in those things that have Wilâ— the action is according to the wâ—ole Power wiâ—â— and all It is true that God doth not all things that he can do if he will but that he can Will that which he hath not Willed from all eternity I deny unlesse that he can not only Wil a change but also change his wil which all Divines say is immutable and then they must needs be necessary effects that proceed from God And his Texts God could have raised up Children unto Abraham c. And sent twelve Legions of Angels c. make nothing against the necessity of those actions which from the first cause proceed immediately J. D. THirdly they distinguish between liberty from compulsion Numb 19. and liberty from necessitation The Will say they is free from compulsion but not free from necessitation And this they fortifie with two reasons First because it is granted by all Divines that hypothetical necessity or necessity upon a supposition may consist with liberty Secondly because God and the good Angels do good necessarily and yet are more free than we To the first reason I confess that necessity upon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty as when it signifies onely an infallible certitude of the understanding in that which it knows to be or that it shall be But if the supposition be not in the Agents power nor depend upon any thing that is in his power If there be an exteriour antecedent cause which doth necessitate the effect to call this free is to be mad with reason To the second reason I confess that God and the good Angels are more free than we are that is intensively in the degree of freedom but not extensively in the latitude of the object according to a liberty of exercise but not of specification A liberty of exercise that is to do or not to do may consist well with a necessity of specification or a determination to the doing of good But a liberty of exercise and a necessity of exercise A liberty of specification and a necessity of specification are not compatible nor can consist together He that is antecedently necessitated to do evil is not free to do good So this instance is nothing at all to the purpose T. H. BUT the distinction of free into free from compulsion and free from necessitation I acknowledg for to be free from compulsion is to do a thing so as terrour be not the cause of his will to do it for a man is then onely said to be compelled when fear makes him willing to it as when a man willingly throws his goods into the Sea to save himself or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed Thus all men that do any thing from love or revenge or lust are free from compulsion and yet their actions may be as necessary as those which are done upon compulsion for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear But free from necessitation I say nothing can be And 't is that which he undertook to disproove This distinction he sayes useth to be fortified by two reasons But they are not mine The first he sayes is That it is granted by all Divines that an hypothetical necessity or necessity upon supposition may stand with liberty That you may understand this I will give you an example of hypotheticall necessity If I shall live I shall eat this is an hypotheticall necessity Indeed it is a necessary proposition that is to say it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered but t is not the necessity of the thing nor is it therefore necessary that the man shall live or that the man shall eat I do not use to fortifie my distinctions with such reasons Let him confute them as he will it contents me But I would have your Lordship take notice hereby how an easy and plain thing but withal false may be with the grave usage of such words as hypotheticall necessity and necessity upon supposition and such like tearms of Schoolmen obscur'd and made to seem profound learning The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from compulsion and free from necessitation he sayes is that God and good Angels do good necessarily and yet are more free than we This reason though I had no need of it yet I think it so far forth good as it is true that God and good Angels do good necessarily and yet are free but because I find not in the Articles of our Faith nor in the Decrees of our Church set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good Angels to work by necessity or in what sense they work freely I suspend my sentence in that point and am content that there may be a freedom from compulsion and yet no freedom from necessitation as hath been prooved in that that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats and without fear of danger But how he can avoid the consisting together of freedom and
drinking or gaming Jam. 1. 14. Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and entised Disordered passions of anger hatred lust if they be consequent as the case is here put by T. H. and flow from deliberation and election they do not only not diminish the fault but they aggravate it and render it much greater h He talks much of the motives to do the motives to forbear how they work upon and determine a man as if a reasonable man were no more than a Tennis-ball to be tossed to and fro by the Rackets of the second causes As if the will had no power to moove it self but were meerly passive like an artificiall Popingay remooved hither and thither by the bolts of the Archers who shoot on this side and on that What are motives but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding and freely mooved by the will What are the will and the understanding but faculties of the same soul and what is liberty but a power resulting from them both To say that the will is determined by these motives is as much as to say that the Agent is determined by himself If there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will then there is no antecedent no extrinsecal necessitation at all i All the world knows that when the Agent is determined by himself then the effect is determined likewise in its cause But if he determined himself freely then the effect is free Motives determine not naturally but morally which kind of determination may consist with true liberty But if T. H. his opinion were true that the will were naturally determined by the Physical and special influence of extrinsecal causes not onely motives were vain but reason it self and deliberation were vain No saith he they are not vain because they are the means Yes if the means be superfluous they are vain what needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done when it is already determined extrinsecally what must be done k He saith that the ignorance of the true causes and their power is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty but when we seriously consider the causes of things we acknowledge a necessity No such thing but just the contrary The more we consider and the cleerer we understand the greater is the liberty and the more the knowledge of our own liberty The less we consider and the more incapable that the understanding is the lesser is the liberty and the knowledge of it And where there is no consideration nor use of reason there is no liberty at all there is neither moral good nor evil Some men by reason that their exteriour senses are not totally bound have a trick to walk in their sleep Suppose such an one in that case should cast himself down a pair of stairs or from a bridge and break his neck or drown himself it were a mad Jury that would find this man accessary to his own death Why because it was not freely done he had not then the use of reason l Lastly he tells us that the will doth choose of necessity as well as the fire burns of neoessity If he intend no more but this that election is the proper and natural act of the will as burning is of the fire or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man as visibility he speaks truly but most impertinently For the question is not now of the elective power in actu primo whether it be an essential faculty of the soul but whether the act of electing this or that particular object be free and undetermined by any antecedent and extrinsecal causes But if he intend it in this other sense that as the fire hath no power to suspend its burning nor to distinguish between those combustible matters which are put unto it but burns that which is put unto it necessarily if it be combustible So the will hath no power to refuse that which it wills nor to suspend its own appetite He erres grossely The will hath power either to will or nill or to suspend that is neither to will nor nill the same object Yet even the burning of the fire if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth m Two things are required to make an effect necessary First that it be produced by a necessary cause such as fire is Secondly that it be necessarily produced Protagoras an Atheist began his Book thus Concerning the Gods I have nothing to say whether they be or they be not for which his Book was condemned by the Athenians to be burned The fire was a necessary Agent but the sentence or the application of the fire to the Book was a free act and therefore the burning of his Book was free Much more the rational will is free which is both a voluntary agent and acts voluntarily n My second reason against this distinction of Liberty from Compulsion but not from necessitation is new and demonstrates cleerly that to necessitate the will by a Physical necessity is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of Compulsion and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner is the true cause of evil and ought rather to be blamed than the will it self But T. H. for all he saith he is not surprised can be contented upon better advise to steal by all this in silence And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the Reader he makes an empty shew of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction between the elicite and imperate acts of the will first because the terms are improper secondly because they are obscure What Triviall and Grammatical objections are these to be used against the universal current of Divines and Philosophers Verborum ut Nummorum It is in words as it is in mony Use makes them proper and current A Tyrant at first signified a lawful and just Prince Now use hath quite changed the sense of it to denote either an Usurper or an Oppressor The word praemunire is now grown a good word in our English Laws by use and tract of time And yet at first it was meerly mistaken for a praemonere The names of Sunday Munday Tuesday were derived at first from those Heathenish Deities the Sun the Moon and the warlike God of the Germans Now we use them for distinction sake onely without any relation to their first original He is too froward that will refuse a piece of coin that is current throughout the world because it is not stamped after his own fancy So is he that rejects a good word because he understands not the derivation of it We see forrein words are daily naturalized and made free Denizons in every Country But why are the tearms improper Because saith he It attributes command and subjection to
a man ought not to follow the dictate of the understanding when it is erroneous b Of which I gave then three reasons one was that actions may be so equally circumstantiated that reason cannot give a positive sentence but leaves the election to liberty or chance To this he answers not a word There was no need of answer for he hath very often in this discourse contradicted it himself in that he maketh Reason to be the true root of liberty and men to have more or lesse liberty as they have more or lesse Reason How then can a man leave that to liberty when his Reason can give no sentence And for his leaving it to chance if by chance he mean that which hath no causes he destroyeth Providence and if he mean that which hath causes but unknown to us he leaveth it to necessity Besides it is false that actions may be so equally circumstantiated that Reason cannot give a positive sentence For though in the things to be elected there may be an exact equality yet there may be circumstances in him that is to elect to make him resolve upon that of the two which he considereth for the present and to break of all further deliberation for this cause that he must not to use his own instance by spending time in vain apply neither of the plaisters which the Chirurgion gives him to his wound Another of his reasons was because Reason doth not weigh every individual action to the uttermost grain True But does it therefore follow a man gives no sentence The Wil therefore may follow the dictate of the judgment whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed His third reason was because Passions and Affections sometime prevail against Judgment I consesse they prevail often against Wisdome which is it he means here by Judgment But they prevail not against the dictate of the understanding which he knows is the meaning of Judgment in this place And the Wil of a passionate and peevish fool doth no lesse follow the dictate of that little understanding he hath then the Wil of the wisest man followeth his wisedome c He explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the last feather wherewith he seems to be delighted seeing he useth it now the second time But let him like it as he Wil it is improper for three Reasons To me this comparison seemeth very proper and therefore I made no scruple though not much delighted with it as being no new comparison to use it again when there was need again For in the examination of truth I search rather for perspicuity then elegance But the Bishop with his School terms is far from perspicuity How neer he is to elegence I shall not forget to examine in due time But why is this comparison improper First because the determination of the Judgment is no part of the weight for the understanding weigheth all things Objects Means Circumstances Convenience Inconvenience but it self is not weighed In this comparison the Objects Means c. are the weights the man is the scale the understanding of a Convenience or Inconvenience is the pressure of those weights which incline him now one way now another and that inclination is the Wil. Again the Objects Means c. are the feathers that presse the Horse the feeling of that pressure is understanding and his patience or impatience the Wil to bear them if not too many or if too many to lye down under them T is therefore to little purpose that he saith the understanding is not weighed Secondly he says the comparison is improper because ordinarily the Means Circumstances and Causes concurrent have their whole weight from the understanding so as they do not presse the Horses back at all until Reason lay them on This and that which followeth that my Objects Agents Motives Passions and all my concurrent Causes ordinarily do onely move the Will morally not determine it naturally so as it hath in all ordinary actions a Free dominion over it self is all non sense for no man can understand that the understanding maketh any alteration in the Object in Weight or lightnesse nor that Reason lays on Objects upon the understanding nor that the Wil is moved nor that any motion is moral nor that these Words the Wil hath a Free dominion over it self signifie any thing With the rest of this Reply I shall trust the Reader and onely note the last Words where he makes me say Repentance hath causes and therefore it is not voluntary but I said repentance hath causes and that it is not voluntary he chops in and therefore and makes an absurd consequence which he would have the Reader believe was mine and then câ—nâ—utes it with these senselesse words Free effects have Free causes necessary effects necessary causes Voluntary effects have sometimes Free sometimes necessary causes Can any man but a Schoolman think the Wil is voluntary But yet the Wil is the cause of voluntary actions J. D. FIftly and lastly the Divine labours to find out a way how Num. 24. liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God But of this I had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse in answer to a Treatise against the prescience of things contingent I shall for the present only repeat these two things First we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner God should be but a poor God if we were able perfectly to comprehend all his Actions and Attributes Secondly in my poor judgment which I ever do and ever shall submit to better the readiest way to reconcile Contingence and Liberty with the decrees and prescience of God and most remote from the altercations of these times is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God according to that presentiality which they have in eternity Not that things future which are not yet existent are co-existent with God but because the infinite knowledge of God incircling all times in the point of eternity doth attain to their future Being from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible Being The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to this way is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession and not one indivisible point But if they consider that whatsoever is in God is God That there are no accidents in him for that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected That as God is not wise but Wisedom it self not just but Justice it self so he is not eternal but Eternity it self They must needs conclude that therefore this eternity is indivisible because God is indivisible and therefore not successive but altogether an infinite point comprehending all times within it self T. H. THE last part of this discourse conteineth his opinion about reconciling Liberty with the Prescience and Decrees of God otherwise than some Divines have done against whom he had formerly written a
by general influence which is evermore requisite Angels or men by perswading evill spirits by tempting the object or end by its appetibility the understanding by directing So passions and acquired habits But I deny that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it Physically to one except God alone who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases And where there is no antecedent determination to one there is no absolute necessity but true Liberry b His second argument is ex concessis It is out of controversie saith he that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause The argument may be thus reduced Necessary causes produce necessary effects but the Will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions I might deny his major Necessary causes do not alwayes produce necessary effects except they be also necessarily produâ—ed as I have shewed before in the burning of Protagoras his book But I answer cleerly to the minor that the will is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions It is without controversie indeed for it is without all probability That it wills when it wills is necessary but that it wills this or that now or then is free More expresly the act of the will may be considered three wayes Either in respect of its nature or in respect of its exercise or in respect of its object First for the nature of the act That which the will wills is necessarily voluntary because the will cannot be compelled And in this sense it is out of controversie that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions Secondly for the exercise of its acts that is not necessary The will may either will or suspend its act Thirdly for the object that is not necessary but free the will is not extrinsecally determined to its objects As for example The Cardinalls meet in the conclave to chose a Pope whom they chose he is necessarily Pope But it is not necessary that they shall chose this or that day Before they were assembled they might defer their assembling when they are assembled they may suspend their election for a day or a week Lastly for the person whom they will choose it is freely in their own power otherwise if the election were not free it were void and no election at all So that which takes its beginning from the will is necessarily voluntary but it is not necessary that the will shall will this or that in particular as it was necessary that the person freely elected should be Pope but it was not necessary either that the election should be at this time or that this man should be elected And therefore voluntary acts in particular have not necessary causes that is they are not necessitated Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXX I Had said that nothing taketh beginning from it self and that the cause of the Will is not the Will it self but something else which it dispâ—seth not of Answering to thiâ— he endeavours to sheâ— us the cause of the Will. a I grant saith he that the Will doth not take beginning from it self for that the faculty of the Wilâ— takes beginning from God who created the soul and powred it into man and endowed it with this power and for that the act of willing takes not beginning from it self but from the faculty or from the power of willing which is in the soul. This is certain finite and participated things cannot be from themselves nor be produced by themselves What would he conclude from hence That therefore the Act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of the Wil It is well that he grants finite things as for his participated it signifies nothing here cannot be produced by themselves For out of this I can conclude that the Act of willing is not produced by the faculty of willing He that hath the faculty of willing hath the faculty of willing something in particular And at the same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same If therefore the faculty of willing be the cause he willeth any thing whatsoever for the same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of nilling it and so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time which is absurd It seems the Bishop had forgot that Matter and Power are indifferent to contrary Forms and contrary Acts. It is somewhat besides the Matter that dâ—termineth it to a certain form and somewhat besides the Power that produceth a certain Act and thence it is that is inferred this that he granteth that nothing can be produced by it self which neverthelesse he presently contradicteth in saying that all men know when a stone descends the beginning is intrinsecal and that the stone mooves in respect of the Form and is moved in respect of the Matter Which is as much to say that the Form moveth the Matter or that the stone moveth it self which before he denied When a stone ascends the beginning of the stones motion was in it self that is to say intrinsecal because it is not the stones motion till the store begins to be moved but the motion that caused it to begin to ascend was a precedent and extrinsecal motion of the hand or other engine that threw it upward And so when it descends the beginning of the stones motion is in the stone but neverthelesse there is a former motion in the ambient Body aire or water that causeth it to descend But because no man can see it most men think there is none though Reason wherewith the Bishop as relying onely upon the Authority of Books troubleth not himself coâ—vince that there is b His second Argument is ex concessis It is out of controversy that of voluntary Actions the Wil is a necessary cause The Argument may be thus reduced Necessary causes produce necessary effects but the Wil is a necessary cause of voluntary Actions I might deny his Major necessary causes do not alwayes produce necessary effects except they be also necessarily produced He has reduced the Argument to non-sense by saying necessary causes produce not necessary effects For necessary effects unlesse he mean such effects as shall necessarily be produced is insignificant Let him consider therefore with what grace he can say necessary causes do not alwayes produce their effects except those effects be also necessarily produced But his answer is chiefly to the Minor and denies that the Wil is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular Actions That it wills when it wills saith he is necessary but that it wills this or that is free Is it possible for any man to conceive that he that willeth can will any thing but this or that particular thing It is therefore manifest that either the Wil is a necessary cause of this or that or any other particular Action or not the necessary cause of any voluntary Action at all For universal Actions
there be none In that which followeth he undertaketh to make his doctrine more expressly understood by considering the Act of the will three ways In respect of its nature in respect of its Exercise and in respect of its object For the nature of the Act be saith that That which the will wills is necessarily volunrary and that in this sense he grants it is out of controversy that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary Actions Instead of that which the will wills to make it sense read that which the man wills and then if the mans will be as he confesseth a necessary cause of voluntary Actions it is no lesse a necessary cause that they are Actions then that they are voluntary For the Exercise of the Act he saith that the will may either will or suspend its Act This is the old canting which hath already been sufficiently detected But to make it somewhat let us reade it thus the man that willeth may either will or suspend his will and thus it is intelligible but false for how can he that willeth at the same time suspend his will And for the object he says that it is not necessary but Free c. His reason is because he says it was not necessary for example in choosing a Pope to choose him this or that day or to chuse this or that man I would be glad to know by what Argument â—e can prove the Election not to have been necessitated For it is not enough for him to say I perceive no necessity in it nor to say they might have chosen another because he knows not whether they might or not nor to say if he had not been freely elected the Election had been void or none For though that be true it does not follow that the Election was not necessary for there is no repugnance to necessity either in Election or in Freedome And whereas he concludeth therefore voluntary Acts in particular are not necessitated I would have been glad he had set down what voluntary Acts there are not particular which by his restriction of voluntary Acts he grants to be necessitated T. H. SEventhly I hold that to be a sufficient cause to which nothing Num. 31. is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect The same is also a necessary cause for if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect then there wanted somewhat which was needful to the producing of it and so the cause was not sufficient But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it Hence it is manifest that whatsoever is produced is produced necessarily for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it or else it had not been And therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated J. D. THis section contains a third Argument to proove that all effects are necessary for clearing whereof it is needfull to consider how a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient First several causes singly considered may be insufficient and the same taken conjointly be sufficient to produce an effect As a two Horses jointly are sufficient to draw a Coach which either of them singly is insufficient to do Now to make the effect that is the drawing of the Coach necessary it is not onely required that the two Horses be sufficient to draw it but also that their conjunction be necessary and their habitude such as they may draw it If the owner of one of these Horses will not suffer him to draw If the Smith have shod the other in the quick and lamed him If the Horse have cast a shoe or be a resty jade and will not draw but when he list then the effect is not necessarily produced but contingently more or less as the concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent b Secondly a cause may be said to be sufficient either because 2. it produceth that effect which is intended as in the generation of a man or else because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced as in the generation of a Monster The former is properly called a sufficient cause the later a weak and insufficient cause Now if the debility of the cause be not necessary but contingent then the effect is not necessary but contingent It is a rule in Logick that the conclusion alwayes follows the weaker part If the premises be but probable the conclusion cannot be demonstrative It holds as well in causes as in propositions No effect can exceed the vertue of its cause If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent the effect cannot be necessary Thirdly that which concerns this question of Liberty from necessity most neerly is That c a cause is said to be sufficient 3. in respect of the ability of it to act not in respect of its will to act The concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect But the cause may be sufficient though the will do not concur As God is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds but it doth not follow from thence either that he hath produced them or that he will produce them The blood of Christ is a sufficient ransome for all mankind but it doth not follow therefore that all mankind shall be actually saved by vertue of his Blood A man may be a sufficient Tutour though he will not teach every Scholler and a sufficient Physician though he will not administer to every patient For as much therefore as the concurrence of the will is needful to the production of every free effect and yet the cause may be sufficient in sensu-divi'so although the will do not concur it followes evidently that the cause may be sufficient and yet something which is needful to the production of the effect may be wanting and that every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause Lastly if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light and say that though the free Agent be sufficient in sensu diviso yet he is not sufficient in sensu composito to produce the effect without the concurrence of the will he saith true but first he bewrayes the weakness and the fallacy of the former argument which is a meer trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a compounded sense And seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur and when it hath concurred the necessity is but hypothetical which may consist with liberty Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXXI IN this place he disputeth against my definition of a sufficient cause namely that cause to which nothing is wanting needfull to the producing of the effect I thought this definition could have been mistiked by no man that had English enough to
know that a sufficient cause and cause enough signifieth the same thing And no man wil say that that is cause enough to produce an effect to which any thing is wanting needful to the producing of it But the Bishop thinks if he set down what he understands by sufficient it would serve to confute my definition And therefore says a Two Horses joyntly are sufficient to draw a Coach which either of them singly is insufficient to do Now to make the effect that is the drawing of the Coach necessary it is not onely required that the two Horses be sufficient to draw it but also that it be necessary they shall be joyned and that the owner of the Horses will let them draw and that the Smith hath not lamed them and they be not resty and list not to draw but when they list otherwise the effect is contingent It seems the Bishop thinks two Horses may be sufficient to draw a Coach though they will not draw or though they be lame or though they be never put to draw and I think they can never produce the effect of drawing without those needful circumstances of being strong obedient and having the Coach some way or other fastened to them He calls it a sufficient cause of drawing that they be Coach hoâ—ses though they be lame or wiâ—â— not draw But I say they are not sufficient absolutely but conditionally if they be not lame nor resty Lâ—t the read r judge whether my sufficient cause or his may properly be called cause enough b Secondly a cause may be said to be sufficient either because it produceth that effect which is intended as in the generation of a man or else because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced as in the generation of a Monster the former is properly called a sufficient cause the latter a weak and insufficient cause In these few lines he hath said the cause of the generation of a Monster is sufficient to produce a Monster and that it is insufficient to produce a Monster How sooâ— may a man forget his words that doth nâ—t understand theâ—â— This term of insufficient cause which also the School calls Deficient that they may rime to efficient is not inteâ—â—eâ—ible but a word devised like Hocus Pocus to juggle a difficulty out of sight That which is sufficient to produce a Monster is not therefore to be called an insufficient cause to produce a mâ—n no more then that which is sufficient to produce a man is to be called an insufficient cause to produce a Monster c Thirdly a cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability of it to act not in respect of its will to act c. As God is sufficient to produce a thousand Worlds He understands little whâ—n â—en say God is sufficient to produce many worlds if he understand not the meaning to be that he is sufficient to prodâ—ce them if he will Without this sâ—pposition It he will a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action not so much as to walk though he be inhâ—alth and at Liberty The will is as much a sufficient cause without the strength to do as the strength without the Wil To that which he adds that my Definition is a meer trifling between a sufficiency in a divided sense and a sufficiency in a compounded sense I can make no answer because I understand no more what he means by sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a compounded sense then if he had said sufficiency in a divided non-sense and sufficiency in a compounded non-sense T. H. LAstly I hold that the ordinary definition of a free Agent namely Num. 32. that a free Agent is that which when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect can nevertheless not produce it implies a contradiction and is non-sense being as much as to say the cause may be sufficient that is necessary and yet the effect not follow J. D. THis last point is but a Corollary or an Inference from the former doctrine that every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily which pillar being taken away the superstructure must needs fall to the ground having nothing left to support it Lastly I hold saith he what he is able to proove is something So much reason so much trust but what he holds concerns himself not others But what holds he I hold saith he that the ordinary definition of a free Agent implies a contradiction and is non-sense That which he calls the ordinary definition of liberty is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of Philosophers and School-men And doth he think that all these spake non-sense or had no more judgment than to contradict themselves in a definition He might much better suspect himself than censure so many Let us see the definition iâ— self A free Agent is that which when all things are present that are needful to produce the effect can nevertheless not produce it I acknowledge the old definition of Liberty with little variation But I cannot see this non-sense nor discover this contradiction For a in these words all things needfull or all things requisite the actual determination of the will is not included But by all things needful or requisite all necessary power either operative or elective all necessary instruments and adjuments extrinsecall and intrinsecall and all conditions are intended As he that hath pen and ink and paper a table a desk and leisure the art of writing and the free use of his hand hath all things requisite to write if he will and yet he may forbear if he will Or as he that hath men and mony and arms and munition and ships and a just cause hath all things requisite for war yet he may make peace if he will Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospel Matth. 2â— 4. â— hâ—ve prepared my dinner my oxen and my fatlings are killed all things are ready come unto the marriage According to T. H his doctrine the guests might have told him that he said not truly for their own wills were not readâ— b And indeed if the will were as he conceives it is necessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will nor to will what it doth not will then if the will were wanting something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting But now when Science and conscience reason and Religion our own and other mens experience doth teach us that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsecal necessitation if the power to will be present in actâ— primo determinable by our selves then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect Secondly these words â—o act or not to act to wâ—rk or not to work to produce or nâ—t to produce have reference to the effect not as a thing which
Which cannot be proved for the contrary is true Or how proveth he that there is no outward impediment to keep that point of the Load stone which placeth it self toward the North from turning to the South His ignorance of the causes external is nâ—t a sufficient argument that there are none And whereas he saith that according to my definition of Liberâ—y a Hauk were at Liberty to fly when her wings are pluckt but not when they are tyed I answer that she is not at Liberty to fly when her wings are tyâ—d but to say when her wings are plâ—ckt that she wanted the Liberty to fly were to speak impropâ—rly and absurdly for in that case men that speak English use to say she cannot fly And for his reprehension of my attributing Libâ—rty to brute beasts and rivers I would be glad to know whether it be improper language to say a bird â—r beast may be sâ—t at Liberty from the cage wherein they were â—mprisoned or to say that a river which was stopped hath recovered its free course and how it follows that a beast or river recovering this freedome must needs therefore be capable of sin and punishment i The reason for the sixt point is like the former a Phantastical or Imaginative reason How can a man imagine any thing to begin without a cause or if it should begin without a cause why it should begin at this time rather then at that time He saith truely nothing can begin without a cause that is to be but it may begin to Act of it self without any other cause Nothing can begin without a cause but many things may begin without anâ—cessâ—ry cause He granteth nothing caâ— begin without a cause he hath granted formerly that nothing can cause it self And now he saith it may begin to Act of it self The action therefore begins to be without any cause which he said nothing could do contradicting what he had said but in the line before And â—or that that he saith that many things may begin not without cause but without a necessary cause It hath bâ—en arguâ—d before and all causes have been proved if entire and sufficiâ—nt causes to be nâ—cessary and that which he repeatâ—th here namely that a free cause may choose his time when he will begin to work and that although free effects cannot be foretold because they are not certainly predetermined in their causes yet when the free causes do determine themselves they are of as great certainty as the other it has been made appear sufficiently before that it is but Jargon the words free cause and determining themselves being insignificant and having nothing in the mind of man naswerable to them k And now that I have answered T. H. his arguments drawn from the private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words I desire him seriously to examine himself c. One of his interrogatories is this whether I find not by experience that I do many things which I might have left undone if I would This question was needlâ—sse because all the way I have granted him that men have libeâ—ty to do many things if they will which they left undâ—ne because they had not the Will to do them Another interrogatory is this whether I do not some things without regard to the direction of right reason or serious respect of what is honest or prâ—fitable This question was in vain unlesse he think himself my Confessour Another is whether I writ not this defence against Liberty onely to show I will have a Dominion over my own actions To this I answer no but to show I have no Dominion over my will and this also at his request But all these questions serve in this place for nothing else but to deliver him of a jest he was in labour with all and therefore his last question is whether I do not sometimes say Oh what a fool was I to do thus and thus or Oh that I had been wise or Oh what a fool was I to grow old Subtil questions and full of Episcopal gravity I would he had left out charging me with blasphemous desperate destructive and Atheistecal opinions I should then have pardonâ—d him his calling me fool both because I do many things foolishly and because in this question disputed between us I think he will appear a greater fool then I. T. H. FOr the seventh point that all events have necessary causes it is Num. 34. there proved in that they have sufficient causes Further Let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual at for example the throwing Ambs-ace upon a paire of Dice and see if it must not have been necessary before it was thrown for seeing it was thrown it had a beginning and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it consisting partly in the Dice partly in the ouâ—ward things as the posture of the parties hand the measure of force applied by the caster the posture of the parts of the Table and the like In sum there was notâ—ing wanting that was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast and consequently that cast was necessarily thrown For iâ— it had not been thrown there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it and so the cause had not been sufficient In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident how contingâ—nt soâ—ver it seem or how voluntary soever it be is produced necâ—ssarily which is that J. D. disâ—utes against The same also may be proved in this manner Let the case be put for example of the weather T is necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain it is necessary it shall not rain Otherwise it is not necessary that the proposition It shall rain or it shall not rain should be true I know there are some that say it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass but not singly that it shall rain or it shall not rain Which is as much as to say One of them is necessary yet neither of them is necessary And therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity they make a distinction that neither of them is true determinatè but indeterminatè Which distinction either signifies no more than this One of them is true but we know not which and so the necessity remains though we know it not Or if the meaning of the distinction be not that it has no meaning And they might as well have said One of them is true Tytyrice but neither of them Tupatulice J. D. a HIs former proof that all sufficient causes are necessary causes is answered before Numb 31. b And his two instances of casting Ambs-ace and raining to morrow are altogether impertinent to the question now agitated between us for two reasons First our present controversie is concerning free actions which proceed from the liberty of mans will both his instances are of contingent actions which
proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of naturall causes First that there are free actions which proceed meerly from election without any outward necessitation is a truth so evident as that there is a Sun in the Heavens and he that doubteth of it may as well doubt whether there be a shell without the Nut or a stone within the Olive A man proportions his time each day and allots so much to his Devotions so much to his Study so much to his Diet so much to his Recreations so much to necessary or civil visits so much to his rest he who will seek for I know not what causes of all this without himself except that good God who hath given him a reasonable Soul may as well seek for a cause of the Egyptian Pyramides among the Crocodiles of Nilus c Secondly for mixt actions which proceed from the concurrence of free and natural Agents though they be not free yet they are not necessary as to keep my former instance a man walking though a street of a Citie to do his occasions a Tile falls from an House and breaks his head the breaking of his head was not necessary for he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation neither was it free for he did not deliberate of that accident therefore it was contingent and by undoubted consequence there are contingent acâ—â—ons in the World which are not free Most certainly by the concurrence of free causes as God the good and bad Angels and men with natural Agents sometimes on purpose and sometimes by accident many events happen which otherwise had never hapned many effects are produced which otherwise had never been produced And admitting such things to be contingent not necessary all their consequent effects not onely immediate but medâ—ate must likewise be contingâ—â—â— that is to say such as do not proceed from a continued connexion and succession of necessary causes which is directly contrary to T. H. his opinion d Thirdly for the actions of bruit beasts though they be not free though they have not the use of reason to restrain their appetites from that which is sensitively good by the consideration of what is rationally good or what is hoâ—est and though their fancies be determined by nature to some kinds of work yet to think that every individual action of theirs and each animal motion of theirs even to the least murmure or gesture is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity to the extrinsecal causes or objects I see no ground for it Christ saith one of these Sparrows doth not fall to the gound without your Heavenly Father that is without an influence of power from him or exempted from his disposition he doth not say which your Heavenly Father casteth not down Lastly for the natural actions of inanimate Creatures wherein there is not the least concurrence of any free or voluntary Agents the question is yet more doubtful for many things are called contingent in respect of us because we know not the cause of them which really and in themselves are not contingent but necessary Also many things are contingent in respect of one single cause either actually hindred or in possibility to be hindred which are necessary in respect of the joynt concurrence of all collateral causes e But whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning so as they must all have concurred as they have done and in the same degree of power and have been deficient as they have been in all events whatsoever would require a further examination if it were pertinent to this question of liberty but it is not It is sufficient to my purpose to have shewed that all elective actions are free from absolute neâ—essity And more-over that the concurrence of voluntary aâ—d free Agents with natural causes both upon purpose and accidentally hath helped them to produce many effects which otherwise they had not produced and hindred them from producing many effects which otherwise they had produced And that if this intervention of voluntary and free Agents had been more frequent than it hath been as without doubt it might have been many natural events had been otherwise than they are And therefore he might have spared his instances of casting Ambs-ace and raining to morrow And first for his casting Ambs-ace If it be thrown by a fair Gamester with indifferent Dice it is a mixt action the casting of the Dice is free but the casting of Ambs-ace is contingent a man may deliberate whether he will cast the Dice or not but it were folly to deliberate whether he will cast Ambs-ace or not because it is not in his power unless he be a cheater that can cogge the Dice or the Dice be false Dice and then the contingency or the degree of contingency ceaseth accordingly as the Caster hath more or less cunning or as the figure or making of the Dice doth incline them to Ambs-ace more than to another cast or necessitate them to this cast and no other Howsoever so far as the cast is free or contingent so far it is not necessary And where necessity begins there liberty and contingency do cease to be Likewise his other instance of raining or not raining to morrow is not of a free elective act nor alwayes of a contingent act In some Countries as they have their stati venti their certain winds at set seasons so they have their certain and set rains The Aethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of the certain inundation of Nilus In some eastern Countries they have rain onely twice a year and those constant which the Scriptures call the former and the later rain In such places not onely the causes do act determinately and necessarily but also the determination or necessity of the event is fore-known to the inhabitants In our Climate the natural causes coelestial and sublunary do not produce rain so necessarily at set times neither can we say so certainly and infallibly it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow Neverthelesse it may so happen that the causes are so disposed and determined even in our climate that this proposition it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow may be necessary in it self and the Prognosticks or tokens may be such in the sky in our own bodies in the creatures animate and inanimate as weather-glasses c. that it may become probably true to us that it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow But ordinarily it is a contingent proposition to us whether it be contingent also in it self that is whether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely necessary whether the vapours or matter of the rain may not yet be dispersed or otherwise consumed or driven beyond our coast is a speculation which no way concerns this question So we see one reason why his two instances are altogether impertinent because they are of actions which are not
free nor elective nor such as proceed from the liberty of mans will Secondly our dispute is about absolute necessity his proofs extend onely to Hypothetical necessity Our question is whether the concurrence and determination of the causes were necessary before they did concur or were determined He proves that the effect is necessary after the causes have concurred and are determined The freest actions of God or man are necessary by such a necessity of supposition and the most contingent events that are as I have shewed plainly Numb 3. where his instance of Ambs-ace is more fully answered So his proof looks another way from his proposition His proposition is that the casting of Ambs-ace was necessary before it was thrown His proof is that it was necessary when it was thrown examine all his causes over and over and they will not afford him one grain of antecedent necessity The first cause is in the Dice True if they be false Dice there may be something in it but then his contingency is destroyed If they be square Dice they have no more inclination to Ambs-ace than to Cinque and Quater or any other cast His second cause is the posture of the parties hand But what necessity was there that he should put his hand into such a posture None at all The third cause is the measure of the force applied by the caster Now for the credit of his cause let him but name I will not say a convincing reason nor so much as a probable reason but even any pretence of reason how the Caster was necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force and neither more nor lesse If he cannot his cause is desperate and he may hold his peace for ever His last cause is the posture of the Table But tell us in good earnest what necessity there was why the Caster must throw into that Table rather than the other or that the Dice must fall just upon that part of the Table before the cast was thrown He that makes these to be necessary causes I do not wonder if he make all effects necessary effects If any one of these causes be contingent it is sufficient to render the cast contingent and now that they are all so contingent yet he will needs have the effect to be necessary And so it is when the cast is thrown but not before the cast was thrown which he undertook to prove Who can blame him for being so angry with the School-men and their distinctions of necessity into absolute and hypothetical seeing they touch his freehold so nearly But though his instance of raining to morrow be impertinent as being no free action yet because he triumphs so much in his argument I will not stick to go a little out of my way to meet a friend For I confess the validity of the reason had been the same if he had made it of a free action as thus Either I shall finish this reply to morrow or I shall not finish this reply to morrow is a necessary proposition But because he shall not complain of any disadvantage in the alteration of his terms I will for once adventure upon his shower of rain And first I readily admit his major that this proposition either it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow is necessarily true for of two contradictory propositions the one must of necessity be true because no third can be given But his minor that it could not be necessarily true except one of the Members were necessarily true is most false And so is his proof likewise that if neither the one nor the other of the Members be necessarily true it cannot be affirmed that either the one or the other is true A conjunct proposition may have both parts false and yet the proposition be true as if the Suu shine it is day is a true proposition at midnight And T. H. confesseth as much Numb 19. If I shall live I shall eat is a necessary proposition that is to say it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered But it is not the necessity of the thing nor is it therefore necessary that the man shall live or that the man shall eat And so T. H. proceeds I do not use to fortifie my distinctions with such reasons But it seemeth he hath forgotten himself and is contented with such poor fortifications And though both parts of a disjunctive proposition cannot be false because if it be a right disjunction the Members are repugnant whereof one part is infallibly true yet vary but the proposition a little to abate the edge of the disjunctions and you shall finde that which T. H. saith to be true that it is not the necessity of the thing which makes the proposition to be true As for example vary it thus I know that either 〈◊〉 will rain to morrow or that it will not rain to morrow is a true proposition But it is not true that I know it will rain to morrow neither is it true that I know it will not rain to morrow wherefore the certain truth of the proposition doth not prove that either of the Members is determinately true in present Truth is a conformity of the understanding to the thing known whereof speech is an interpreter If the understanding agree not with the thing it is an errour if the words agree not with the understanding it is a lie Now the thing known is known either in it self or in its causes If it be known in it self as it is then we expresse our apprehension of it in words of the present tence as the Sun is risen If it be known in its cause we expresse our selves in words of the future tense as to morrow will be an Eclipse of the Moon But if we neither know it in its self nor in its causes then there may be a foundation of truth but there is no such determinate truth of it that we can reduce it into a true proposition we cannot say it doth rain to morrow or it doth not rain to morrow That were not onely false but absurd we cannot positively say it will rain to morrow because we do not know it in its causes either how they are determined or that they are determined wherefore the certitude and evidence of the disjunctive proposition is neither founded upon that which will be actually to morrow for it is granted that we do not know that nor yet upon the determination of the causes for then we would not say indifferently either it will rain or it will not rain but positively it will rain or positively it will not rain But it is grounded upon an undeniable principle that of two contradictory propositions the one must necessarily be true f And therefore to say either this or that will infallibly be but it is not yet 〈…〉 whether this or that shall be is no such senselesse 〈…〉 thaâ—â—t deserved a â—ytyrice Tâ—patulice but an evâ—…th
which no man that hath his eyes in his head can dâ—â—bt oâ— g If all this will not satisfie him I will give one of his own kind of proofs that is an instance That which necessitates all things according to T. H. is the decree of God or that order which is set to all things by the eternal cause Numb 11. Now God himself who made this necessitating decree was not subjected to it in the making thereof neither was there any former order to oblige the first cause necessarily to make such a decree therefore this decree being an act ad extra was freely made by God without any necessitation Yet nevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily true Either God did make such a decree or he did not make such a decree Again though T. H. his opinion were true that all events are necessary and that the whole Christian world are deccived who believe that some events are free from necessity yet he will not deny but if it had been the good pleasure of God he might have made some causes free from necessity seeing that it neither argues any imperfection nor implies any contradiction Supposing therefore that God had made some second causes free from any such antecedent determination to one yet the former disjunction would be necessarily true Either this free undetermined cause will act after this manner or it will not act after this manner Wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunctive proposition doth not prove that either of the members of the disjunction singly considered is determinately true in present but onely that the one of them will be determinately true to morrow Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXXIV a HIs former proof that all sufficient causes are necessary causes is answered before Numb 31. When he shall have read my Animadversions upon that Answer of his he will think otherwise whatsoever he will confesse b And his two instances of casting Ambs-ace and of raining to morrow are altogether impertinent to the question for two reasons His first reason is because he saith our present controversy is concerning free actions which proceed from the Liberty of mans Will and both his instances are of contingent actions which proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes He knows that this part of my discourse which beginneth at Numb 25. is no dispute with him at all but a bare seâ—ting down of my opinion concerning the natural necessity of all things which is opposite not onely to the Liberty of Will but also to all contingence that is not necessary And therefore these instances were not impertinent to my purpose and if they be impertinent to his opinion of the Liberty of mans Will he does impertinently to meddle with them And yet for all he pretends here that the question is onely ab ut Liberty of the Will Yet in his first discourse Number the 16. he maintains that the order beauty and perfection of the world doth require that in the Universe should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some Free some contingent And my purpose here is to shew by those instances that those things which we esteem most contingent are neverthelesse necessary Besides the controversy is not whether free actions which proceed from the Liberty of mans Will be necessary or not for I know no action which proceedeth from the Liberty of mans Will But the question is whether those actions which proceed from the mans Will be necessary The mans Will is something but the Liberty of his Will is nothing Again the question is not whether contingent actions which proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes for there is nothing that can proceed from indetermination but whether contingent actions be necessary before they be done or whether the concurrence of natural causes when they happen to concur were not necessitated so to happen or whether whatsoever chanceth be not necessitated so to chance And that they are so necessitated I have proved already with such arguments as the Bishop for ought I see cannot answer For to say as he doth that there are free actions which proceed meerly from Election without any outward necessitation is a truth so evident as that there is a Sun in the Heavens is no proof 'T is indeed as cleer as the Sun that there are free actions proceeding from Election but that there is Election without any outward necessitation is dark enough c Secondly for mixt actions which proceed from the concurrence of free and natural Agents though they be not free yet they are not necessary c. For proof of this he instanceth in a Tile that falling from an house breaks a mans head neither necessarily nor freely and therefore contingently Not necessarily for saith he he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation Which is as much as taking the question it self for a proof For what is else the question but whether a man be necessitated to choose what he chooseth Again saith he it was not Free because he did not deliberate whether his head should be broken or not and conâ—ludes therefore it was contingent and by undoubted consequence there are contingent actions in the world which are not free This is true and denied by none but he should have proved that such contingent actions are not antecedently necessary by a concurrence of natural causes though a little before he granteth they are For whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes was antecedently determined in the cause of such concurrence though as he calls it contingent concurrence not perceiving that concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one and suppose a continued connection and succession of causes which make the effect necessarily future So that hitherto he hath proved no other contingence then that which is necessary d Thirdly for the actions of brute beasts c. To think each animal motion of theirs is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity I see no ground for it It maketh nothing against the truth that he sees no ground for it I have pointed out the ground in my former discourse and am not bound to find him eyes He himself immediately citeth a place of Scripture that proveth it where Christ saith one of these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without your heavenly father which place if there were nâ— more were a sufficient ground for the assertion of tâ—e necessity of all those changes of animal motion in birds and other living creatures which seem to us so uncertain But when a man is dizzy with influence of power elicite acts permissive will Hypothetical necessity and the like unintelligible terms the ground goes from him By and by after he confesseth that many things are called contingent in respect of us because we know not the cause oâ— tâ—em which really and in themselves are not contingent bu necessary and errâ— therein the other way for he says in effect that
many things are which are not for it is all one to say they are not contingent and they are not He should have said there be many things the necessity of whose contingence we cannot or do not know e But whether there be a necessary connection of all natural causes from the beginning so as they must all have concurred as they have done c. Would require a further examination if it were pertinent to this question of Liberty but it is not It is sufficient to my purpose to have shewed c. If there be a necessary connection oâ— all natural causes from the beginning â—hen there is no doubt but â—hat all things happen necessarily which is that that I have all this while maintained But whether there be or no he says it requires a further exaâ—inatioâ— Hitherto therefore he knows â—ot whether it be true or no and coâ—sequâ—nâ—lâ— all his arguments hitherto have been â—f no effect nor hath he shewed anâ— thing to prov what he purposed that elective Actions are nâ—t necessitated And whereas a little before he says that to my Arguments to prove that sufficient causes are necessary he hath already answered it seemeth he distrusteth his own answer and answers again to the two instances of casting Ambsâ—ace and raining or not raining to morrow but brings no other Argument to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily thrown but this that he doe not deliberate whether he shall throw that cast or not Which Argument may perhaps prove that the casting of it proceedeth not from free will but proves not any thing against the antecedent necessity of it And to prove that it is not necessary that it should rain or not rain to morrow after telling us that the Aethiopian rains cause the inundation of Nilus that in some Eastern Countries they have rain onely twice a year which the Scripture he saith calleth the former and the latter rain I thought he had known it by the experience of some Travellers but I see he onely gathereth it from that Phrase in Scripture of former and latter rain I say after he has told us this to prove that it is not necessâ—ry it should rain or not rain to morrow he saith that in our Climate the natural causes celestial and sublunary do not produce rain so necessarily at set times as in the Eastern Countries neither can we say so certainly and infallibly it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow By this Argument a man may take the height of the Bishops Logick In our Climate the natural causes do not produce rain so necessarily at set times as in some Eastern Countries Therefore they do not produce rain necessarily in our Climate then when they do produce it And again we cannot say so certainly and infallibly it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow therefore it is not necessary either that it should rain or that it should not rain to morrow as if nothing were necessary the necessity whereof we know not Another reason he saith why my instances are impertinent is because they extend onely to an Hypothetical necessity that is that the necessity is not in the antecedent causes and thereupon challengeth me for the credit of my cause to name some reason how the caster was necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force to the cast and neither more nor lesse or what necessity there was why the caster must throw into that Table rather then the other or that the Dice must fall just upon that part of the Table before the cast was thrown Here again from our ignorance of the particular causes that concurring make the necessity he inferreth that there was no such necessity at all which indeed is that which hath in all this question deceived him and all other men that attribute events to fortune But I suppose he will not deny that event to be necessary where all the causes of the cast and their concurrence and the cause of that concurrence are foreknown and might be told him though I cannot tell him Seeing therefore God foreknows them all the cast was necessary and that from antecedent causes from eternity which is no Hypothetical necessity And whereas my argument to prove that raining to morrow if it shall then rain and not raining to morrow if it shall then not rain was herefore necessary because otherwise this disjuntive proposition it shall rain or not rain to morrow is not necessary he answereth that a conjunct proposition may have both parts false and yet the proposition be true as if the Sun shine it is day is a true proposition at midnight What has a conjunct proposition to do with this in question which is disiunctive Or what be the parts of this proposition if the Sun shine it is day It is not made of two propositions as a disjunctive is but is one sâ—â—ple proposition namely this the shining of the Sun is day Either he has no Logick at all or thinks they have no reason at all that are his readers But he has a trick he saith to abate the edge of the disjunction by varying the proposition thus I know that it will rain to morrow or that it will not rain to morrow is a true proposition and yet saith he it is neither true that I know it will rain to morrow neither is it true that I know it will not rain to morrow What childish deceit or childish ignorance is this when he is to prove that neither of the members is determinately true in a disjunctive proposition to bring for instance a proposition not disjunctive It had been disjunctive if it had gone thus I know that it will rain to morrow or I know that it will not rain to morrow but then he had certainly known determinately one of the two f And therefore to say either this or that will infallibly be but it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be is no such senselesse assertion that it deserved a Tity ricè Tupatulicè But it is a senselesse assertion whatsoever it deserve to say that this proposition it shall rain or not rain is true indeterminedly and neither of them true determinedly and little better as he hath now qualified it That it will infallibly be though it be not yet determined whether it shall be or no. g If all this will not satisfie him I will give him one of his own kinds of proof that is an instance That which necessitates all things according to T. H. is the decree of God c. His instance is that God himself made this necessitating decree and therefore this decree being an act ad extra was freely made by God without any necessitation I do believe the Bishop himself believeth that all the Decrees of God have been from all eternity and therefore he will not stand to this that Gods Decrees were ever made for whatsoever hath been made hath had a beginning
Besides Gods Decree is his Will and the Bishop hath said formerly that the Will of God is God the Justice of God God c. If therefore God made a Decree according to the Bishops opinion God made himself By which we may see what fine stuffe it is that proceedeth from disputing of Incomprehensibles Again he says if it had been the good pleasure of God he might have made some causes free from necessity seeing that it neither argues any imperfection nor implies any contradiction If God had made either causes or effects free from necessity he had made theâ—â— free from his own Praescience which had been imperfection Perhaps he will say that in these words of his the decree being an act ad extra was freely made by God I take no notice of that act ad extra as being too hot for my fingers Therefore now I take notice of it and say that it is neither Latiâ— nor English nor Sense T. H. THe last thing in which also consisteth the whole controversy Num. 35. Namely that there is no such thing as an Agent which when all things requisite to action are present can nevertheless forbear to produce it or which is all one that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged For if it be an Agent it can work And if it work there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient And if sufficient then also necessary as hath been proved before J. D. I Wonder that T. H. should confess that the whole weight of this controversy doth rest upon this proposition That there is no such thing as an Agent which when all things requisite to action are present can nevertheless forbear to act And yet bring nothing but such poor Bull-rushes to support it a If it be an Agent saith he it can work what of this A posse ad esse non valet argumentum from can work to will work is a weak inference And from will work to doth work upon absolute necessity is another gross inconsequence He proceeds thus Iâ— it work there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action True there wants nothing to produce that which is produced but there may want much to produce that which was intended One horse may pull his heart out and yet not draw the Coach whither it should be if he want the help or concurrence of his fellows And consequently saith he the cause of the action is sufficient Yes sufficient to do what it doth though perhaps with much prejudice to it self but not alwayes sufficient to do what it should do or what it would do As he that begets a Monster should beget a man and would beget a man if he could The last link of his argument follows b And if sufficient then also necessary Stay there by his leave there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and efficiency otherwise God himself should not be All-sufficient Thus his Argument is vanished But I will deal more favourably with him and grant him all that which he labours so much in vain to prove That every effect in the world hath sufficient causes Yea more that supposing the determination of the free and contingent causes every effect in the world is necessary c But all this will not advantage his cause the black of a bean for still it amounts but to an hypothetical necessity and differs as much from that absolute necessity which he maintains as a Gentleman who travels for his pleasure differs from a banished man or a free Subject from a slave Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXXV a IF it be an Agent saith he it can work what of this A posse ad esse non valet argumentum from can work to will work is a weak inference And from will work to doth work upon absolute necessity is another grosse inconsequence Here he has gotten a just advantage for I should have said if it be an Agent it worketh not it can work But it is an advantage which profiteth little to his cause for if I repeate my argument again in this manner that which is an Agent worketh that which worketh wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action or the effect it produceth and consequently is thereof a sufficient cause and if a sufficient cause then also a necessary cause his answer will be nothing to the purpose For whereas to these words that which worketh wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action or the effect it produceth he answereth it is true but there may want much to produce that which was intended it is not contrary to any thing that I have said For I never maintained that whatsoever a man intendeth is necessarily performed but this whatsoever a man performeth iâ— necessarily performed and what he intendeth necessarily intended and that from causes antecedent And therefore to say as he doth that the cause is sufficient to do what it doth but not alwayes sufficient to do what a man should or would do is to say the same that I do For I say not that the cause that bringeth forth a Monster is sufficient to bring forth a man but that every cause is sufficient to produce onely the effect it produceth And if sufficient then also necessary b And if sufficient then also necessary stay there by his leave there is no necessary connection between sufficiency and efficiency otherwise God himself should not be All sufficient All sufficiency signifieth no more when it is attributed to God then Omnipotence and Omnipotence signifieth no more then the Power to do all things that he will But to the production of any thing that is produced the Will of God is as requisite as the rest of his Power and sufficiency And consequently his all sufficiency signifieth not a sufficiency or Power to do those thing he will not But he will deal he says so favourably with me as to grant me all this which I labour he saith so much in vain to prove and adds c But all this will not advantage his cause the black of a Bean for still it amounts but to an Hypothetical necessity If it prove no more it proves no necessity at all for by Hypothetical necessity he means the necessity of this proposition the effect is then when it is whereas necessity is onely said truely of somewhat in future For necessary is that which cannot possibly be otherwise and possibility is alwayes understood of some future time But seeing he granteth so favourably that sufficient causes are necessary causes I shall easily conclude from it that whatsoever those causes do cause are necessary antecedently For if the necessity of the thing produced when produced be in the same instant of time with the existence of its immediate cause then also that immediate cause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was
is true that seeing the name of punnishment hath relation to the name of Crime there can be no punishment but for Crimes that might have been left undone but instead of punnishment if he had said affliction may not I say that God may afflict and not for sin doth he not afflict those Creatures that cannot sin and sometimes those that can sin and yet not for sin as Job and the Man in the Gospel that was born blind for the manifestation of his power which he hath over his Creature no less but more than hath the Potter over his Clay to make of it what he please But though God have power to afflict a man and not for sin without injustice shall we think God so cruel as to afflict a man and not for sin with extream and endlesse torment Is it not cruelty No more than to do the same for sin when he that so afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning But what Infallible evidence hath the Bishop that a man shall be after this life Eternally in torments and never die Or how is it certain there is no second death when the Scripture saith there is Or where doth the Scripture say that a second death is an endless life Or do the Doctors onely say it then perhaps they do but say so and for reasons best known to themselves There is no injustice nor cruelty in him that giveth life to give withit sicknesse pain torments and death nor in him that giveth life twice to give the same miseries twice also And thus much in Answer to the Inconveniences that are pretended to follow the Doctrine of Necessity On the other side from this Position that a man is free to will it followeth that the Prescience of God is quite taken away For how can it be known before hand what man shall have a will to if that will of his proceed not from necessary causes but that he have in his power to will or not will So also those things which are called future contingents if they come not to passe with certainty that is to say from necessary causes can never be foreknown so that Gods fâ—reknowing shall sometimes be of things that shall not come to passe which is as much to say that his foreknowledge is none which is a great dishonour to the All-knowing Power Though this be all the Inconvenient Doctrine that followeth Freewill for as much as I can now remember yet the defending of this opinion hath drawn the Bishop and other Patrons of it into many inconvenient and absurd conclusions and made them make use of an infinite number of Insignificant words whereof one conclusion is in Suarez that God doth so concurre with the Will of Man that if Man will then God concurres which is to subject not the will of Man to God but the will of God to Man Other inconvenient conclusions I shall then mark out when I come to my observations upon the Bishops reply And thus farre concerning the inconveniences that follow both Opinions The Attribute of God which he draweth into argument is his Justice as that God cannot be Just in punishing any man for that which he was necessitated to do To which I have answered before as being one of the Inconveniences pretended to follow upon the Doctrine of Necessity On the Contrary from another of Gods Attributes which is his Fore-knowledge I shall evidently derive that all Actions whatsoever whether they proceed from the will or from fortune were necessary from eternity For whatsoever God Fore-knoweth shall come to passe cannot but come to passe that is it is Impossible it should not come to passe or otherwise come to passe then it was fore-known But whatsoever was Impossible should be otherwise was necessary for the definition of Necessary is that which cannot possibly be otherwise And whereas they that distinguish between Gods Praescience and his Decree say the Fore-knowledge maketh not the Necessity without the Decree it is little to the purpose It sufficeth me that whatsoever was fore-known by God was necessary but all things were Fore-known by God and therefore all things were necessary And as for the distinction of Fore-knowledge from Decree in God Almighty I comprehend it not They are Acts coeternall and therefore one And as for the Arguments drawn from naturall reason they are set down at large in the end of my discourse to which the Bishop maketh his reply which how well he hath answered shall appear in due time For the present the Actions which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will must either be necessitated or proceed from fortune without any other cause for certainly to Will is Impossible without thinking on what he willeth But it is in no mans Election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on And this I take to be enough to clear the understanding of the Reader that he may be the better able to Judge of the Following Disputation I find in those that write of this Argument especially in the Schoolmen and their Followers so many words strangers to our Language and such Confusion and Inanity in the ranging of them as that a mans mind in the reading of them distinguisheth nothing And as things were in the beginning before the Spirit of God was moved upon the Abiss Tohu and Bohu that is to say Confusion and Emptiness so are their discourses To the Right Honourable the Marquis of NEWCASTLE c. SIR IF I pretended to compose a compleat treatise upon this subject I should not refuse those large recruites of reasons and authorities which offer themselves to serve in this cause for God and man Religion and Policy Church and Common wealth a against the blasphemous desperate and destructive opinion of fatall destiny But as b mine aim in the first discourse was onely to presse home hose things in writing which had been agitated between us by word of mouth a course much to be preferred before verball conferences as being freer from passions and tergiversations less subject to mistakes and misrelations wherein paralogismes are more quickly detected impertinencies discovered and confusion avoided So my present intention is onely to vindicate that discourse and together with it c those lights of the Schooles who were never sleighted but where they were not understood How far I have performed it I leave to the judicious and unpartiall Reader resting for mine own part well contented with this that I have fatisfied my self Your Lordships most obliged to love and serve you I. D. Animadversions upon the Bishops Epistle to my Lord of Newcastle a AGainst the Blasphemous Desperate and Destructive Opinion of fatal Destiny This is but choler such as ordinarily happeneth unto them who contend against greater difficulties than they expected b My aim in the first discourse was onely to press home those things in writing which had been agitated between us by word of mouth a course much to be preferred before verball Conferences
at all For seeing I writ this at his modest request it is no modest expectation to look for as many answers as he shall be pleased to exact b The Sheep should not bragg how much they have eaten but shew it in their Lamb and Wool It is no great bragging to say I was not supprised for whosoever chanceth to read Suarez his Opuscula where he writeth of Free-will and of the concourse of God with Mans Will shall find the greatest part if not all that the Bishop hath urged in this Question But that which the Bishop hath said of the Reasons and Authorities which he saith in his Epistle do offer themselves to serve in this cause and many other passages of his Book I shall I think before I have done with him make appear to be very bragging and nothing else And though he say it be Epictetus his counsell that Sheep should show what they eat in their Lamb and Wool It is not likely that Epictetus should take a metaphor from Lamb and Wool for it could not easily come into the mind of men that were not acquainted with the paying of Tithes Or if it had he would have said Lambs in the Plural as Lay men use to speak That which followes of my leaving things untoucht and altering the state of the Question I remember no such thing unless he require that I should answer not to his Arguments onely but also to his Syllables T. H. THe Praeface is an handsome one but it appears even in that Numb 3. that he hath mictaken the Question for whereas he sayes thus if I be free to write this discourse I have obteined the cause I deny that to be true for 't is not enough to his freedome of writing that he had not written it unless he would himself if he will obtein the cause he must prove that before he writ it it was not necessary he should write it afterward It may be he thinks it all one to say I was free to write it and it was not necessary I should write it But I think otherwise for he is free to do a thing that may do it if he have the will to do it and may forbear if he have the will to forhear And yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it the action is necessarily to follow and if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to forbear the forbearing also will be necessary The Question therefore is not whether a man be a free Agent that is to say whether he can write or forbear speak or be silent according to his will but whether the will to write and the will to forbear come upon him according to his will or according to any thing else in his own power I acknowledge this liberty that I can do if I will but to say I can will if I will I take to be an absurd speech Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause upon this Preface J. D. TAcitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries which evermore begin with a mans praise The Crisis or the Catastrophe of their discourse is when they come to their but As he is a good natured man but he hath a naughty quality or he is a wise man but he hath committed one of the greatest follies So here the Praeface is an handsome one but it appears even in this that he hath mistaken the Question This is to give an Inch that one may take away an Ell without suspicion to praise the handsomeness of the Porch that he may gain credit to the vilifying of the House Whether of us hath mistaken the Question I refer to the judicious Reader a Thus much I will maintain that that is no true necessity which he calls necessity nor that liberty which he calls liberty nor that the Question which he makes the Question First for liberty that which he calls liberty is no true liberty For the clearing whereof it behooveth us to know the difference between these three Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty Necessity and Spontaneity may sometimes meet together so may Spontaneity and Liberty but reall necessity and true liberty can never meet together Some things are necessary and not voluntary or spontaneous some things are both necessary and voluntary some things are voluntary and not free some things are both voluntary and free But those things which are truly necessary can never be free and those things which are truly free can never be necessary Necessity consists in an Antecedent determination to one Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the Appetite either intellectual or sensitive to the object True Liberty consists in the elective power of the rational Will That which is determined without my concurrence may nevertheless agree well enough with my fancy or desires and obtein my subsequent consent But that which is determined without my concurrence or consent cannot be the object of mine election I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon me by another but if it be inevitably imposed upon me by extrinsecal causes it is both folly for me to deliberate and impossible for me to choose whether I shall undergo it not Reason is the root the fountain the original of true liberty which judgeth and representeth to the will whether this or that be convenient whether this or that be more convenient Judge then what a pretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by T. H. such a liberty as is in little Children before they have the use of reason before they can consult or deliberate of any thing Is not this a Childish liberty and such a liberty as is in brute Beasts as Bees and Spiders which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades by experience and consideration This is a brutish liberty such a liberty as a Bird hath to flie when her wings are clipped or to use his own comparison such a liberty as a lame man who hath lost the use of his limbs hath to walk Is not this a ridiculous liberty Lastly which is worse than all these such a liberty as a River hath to descend down the Channel what will he ascribe liberty to inanimate Creatures also which have neither reason nor spontaneity nor so much as sensitive appetite Such is T. H. his liberty b His Necessity is just such another a necessity upon supposition arising from the concourse of all the causes including the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures The adaequate cause and the effect are together in time and when all the conurrent causes are determined the effect is determined also and is become so necessary that it is actually in being But there is a great difference between determining and being determined If all the collateral causes concurring to the production of an effect were antecedently determined what they must of necessity produce and when they must produce it then there is no doubt but the effect is necessary c
But if these causes did operate freely or contingently if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence or have concurred after another manner then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary but either free or contingent This will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of casting Ambs-Ace though it partake more of contingency than of freedome Supposing the positure of the parties hand who did throw the Dice supposing the figure of the Table and of the Dice themselves supposing the measure of force applied and supposing all other things which did concur to the production of that cast to be the very same they were there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary But still this is but a necessity of supposition for if all these concurrent causes or some of them were contingent or free then the cast was not absolutely necessary To begin with the Caster He might have denied his concurrence and not have cast at all He might have suspended his concurrence and not have cast so soon He might have doubled or diminished his force in casting if it had pleased him He might have thrown the Dice into the other Table In all these cases what becomes of his ambs-ace The like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of the Tables and for the maker of the Dice and for the keeper of the Tables and for the kind of Wood and I know not how many other circumstances In such a mass of contingencies it is impossible that the effect should be antecedently necessary T. H. appeales to every mans experience I am contented Let every one reflect upon himself and he shall find no convincing much less constreining reason to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another but onely his own will or arbitrary determination So T. H. his necessity is no absolute no antecedent extrinsecal necessity but meerly a necessity upon supposition d Thirdly that which T. H. makes the Question is not the Question The Question is not saith he Whether a man may write if he will and forbear if he will but whether the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him according to his will or according to any thing else in his own power Here is a distinction without a difference If his will do not come upon him according to his will than he is not a free nor yet so much as a voluntary Agent which is T. H. his Liberty Certainly all the freedome of the Agent is from the freedom of the will If the will have no power over it self the Agent is no more free than a Staff in a mans hand Secondly he makes but an empty shew of a power in the will either to wtite or not to write â— If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever what a man shall will and what he shall not will what he shall write and what he shall not write to what purpose is this power God and Nature never made any thing in vain but vain and frustraneous is that power which never was and never shall be deduced into Act. Either the Agent is determined before he acteth what he shall will and what he shall not will what he shall act and what he shall not act and then he is no more free to act than he is to will Or else he is not derermined and then there is no necessity No effect can exceed the vertue of its cause if the action be free to write or to forbear the power or faculty to will or nill must of necessity be more free Quod efficit tale illud magis est tale If the will be determined the writing or not writing is likewise determined and then he should not say He may write or he may forbear but he must write or he must forbear Thirdly This answer contradicts the sense of all the world that the wil of man is determined without his will or without any thing in his power Why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not Why do we represent reasons to them Why do we pray them Why do we intreat them Why do we blame them if their will come not upon them according to their will Wilt thou be made clean said our Saviour to the Paraiyticke person John 5. 6. to what purpose if his will was extinsecally determined Christ complains We have piped unto you and yâ— have not danced Matth. 11. 17. How could they help it if their wills were determined without their wils to forbear And Matth. 23. 37. I would have gathered your Children together as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings but ye would not How easily might they answer according to T. H. his doctrine Alas blame not us Our wills are not in our own power or disposition if they were we would thankfully embrace so great a favour Most truly said St. Austin Our will should not be a will at all if it were not in our power f This is the belief of all mankind which we have not learned from our Tutors but is imprinted in our hearts by nature We need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth The Poets chant it in the Theaters the Shepheards in the mountains the Pastors teach it in their Churches the Doctors in the Universities the common people in the markets and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto it except an handful of men who have poisoned their intellectuals with paradoxical principles Fourthly this necessity which T. H. nath devised which is grounded upon the necessitation of a mans will without his will is the worst of all others and is so far from lessening those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoicks that it increaseth them and rendreth them unanswerable g No man blameth fire for burning whole Cities No man taxeth poison for destroying men but those persons who apply them to such wicked ends If the will of man be not in his own disposition he is no more a free Agent than the fire or the poyson Three things are required to make an act or omission culpable First that it be in our power to perform it or forbear it Secondly that we be obliged to perform it or forbear it respectively Thirdly that we omit that which we ought to have done or do that which we ought to have omitted h No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun or forbearing those things which never were in his power T. H. may say that besides the power men have also an appetite to evil objects which renders them culpable It is true but if this appetite be determined by another not by themselves Or if they have not the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites they sin no more than a stone descending downward according to its natural appetite or the brute Beasts who commit voluntary errours in following their
not indeed He who casts his goods into the Sea may do it of his own accord in order to the end Secondly he erres in this also that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but onely fear Invincible and Antecedent ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness by removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the action As a man thinking to shoot a wild Beast in a Bush shoots his friend which if he had known he would not have shot This man did not kill his friend of his own accord For the clearer understanding of these things and to know 4. what spontaneity is let us consult a while with the Schools about the distinct order of voluntary or involuntary actions Some acts proceed wholly from an extrinsecal cause as the throwing of a stone upwards a rape or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the Idols Temple these are called violent acts Secondly some proceed from an intrinsecal cause but without any manner of knowledge of the end as the falling of a stone downwards these are called natural acts Thirdly some proceed from an internal principle with an imperfect knowledge of the end where there is an appetite to the object but no deliberation nor election as the acts of Fools Children Beasts and the inconsiderate act of men of judgement These are called voluntary or spontaneous acts Fourthly some proceed from an intrinsecal cause with a more perfect knowledge of the end which are elected upon deliberation These are called free acts So then the formal reason of liberty is election The necessary requisite to election is deliberation Deliberation implyeth the actual use of reason But deliberation and election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsecal praedetermination to one How should a man deliberate or choose which way to go who knows that all wayes are shut against him and made impossible to him but onely one This is the genuine sense of these words Voluntary and Spontaneous in this Question Though they were taken twenty other waies vnlgarly or metaphorically as we say spontaneous ulcers where there is no appetite at all yet it were nothing to this controversie which is not about Words but about Things not what the words Voluntary or Free do or may signifie but whether all things be extrinsecally praedetermined to one These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the words the next thing to be examined is that contradiction which he hath espied in my discourse or how this Argument fights against his fellows If I saith T. H. make it appear that the spontaneous actions of Fools Children mad Men and Beasts do proceed from election and deliberation and that inconsiderate and indeliberate actions are found in the wisest men then this argument concludes that necessity and election may stand together which is contrary to his assertion If this could be made appear as easily as it is spoken it would concern himself much who when he should prove that rational men are not free from necessity goes about to prove that brute Beasts do deliberate and elect that is as much as to say are free from necessity But it concerns not me at all it is neither my assertion nor my opinion that necessity and election may not meet together in the same subject violent natural spontaneous and deliberate or elective acts may all meet together in the same subject But this I say that necessity and election cannot consist together in the same act He who is determined to one is not free to choose out of more then one To begin with his later supposition that wise men may do inconsiderate and indeliberate actions I do readily admit it But where did he learn to infer a general conclusion from particular premises as thus because wise men do some indeliberate acts therefore no act they do is free or elective Secondly for his former supposition That Fools Children mad Men and Beasts do deliberate and elect if he could make it good it is not I who contradict my self nor fight against mine own assertion but it is he who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny He may well find a contradiction between him and me otherwise to what end is this dispute But he shall not be able to find a difference between me and my self But the truth is he is not able to proove any such thing and that brings me to my sixth Consideration That neither Horses nor Bees nor Spiders nor Children nor Fools nor Mad-men do deliberate or elect His 6. first instance is in the Horse or Dog but more especially the Horse He told me that I divided my argument into squadrons to apply my self to your Lordship being a Military man And I apprehend that for the same reason he gives his first instance of the Horse with a submission to your own experience So far well but otherwise very disadvantageously to his cause Men use to say of a dull fellow that he hath no more brains than a Horse And the Prophet David saith Be not like the Horse and Mule which have no understanding Psal. 32. 9. How do they deliberate without understanding And Psal. 49. 20. he saith the same of all brute Beasts Man being in honour had no understanding but became like unto the Beasts that perish The Horse dâ—â—urres upon his way Why not Outward objects or inward fancies may produce a stay in his course though he have no judgement either to deliberate or elect He retires from some strange figure which he sees and comes on again to avoid the spur So he may and yet be far enough from deliberation All this proceeds from the sensitive passion of fear which is a perturbation arising from the expectation of some imminent evil But he urgeth what else doth man that deliberateth Yes very much The Horse feareth some outward object but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same end Fear is commonly of one deliberation of more than one fear is of those things which are not in our power deliberation of those things which are in our power fear ariseth many times out of natural antipathies but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no place at all In a word fear is an enemy to deliberation and betrayeth the succours of the Soul If the Horse did deliberate he should consult with reason whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or not He would represent to himself all the dangers both of going and staying and compare the one with the other and elect that which is less evil He should consider whether it were not better to endure a little hazard than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty towards his Master who did breed him and doth feed him This the Horse doth not Neither is it possible for him to do it Secondly for Children T. H. confesseth that they may be so young that they do not deliberate at all Afterwards as they
If the Will do not suspend but assent then the act is necessary but because the Will may suspend and not assent therefore it is not absolutely necessary In the former case the Will is moved necessarily and determinately In the later freely and indeterminately The former excitation is immediate the later is mediaté mediante intellectu and requires the help of the understanding In a word so great a difference there is between natural and moral efficacy as there is between his opinion and mine in this Question There remains onely the last dictate of the understanding which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the Will and to the necessary production of the act as the last feather may be said to break an Horses back when there were somany laid on before that there wanted but that to do it I have shewed Numb 7. that the last dictate of the understanding is not alwaies absolute in it self nor conclusive to the Will and when it is conclusive yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsecal Necessity I shall only ad one thing more in present That by making the last judgement of right reason to be of no more weight then a single feather he wrongs the understanding as well as he doth the Will and endeavonrs to deprive the Will of its supreme power of application and to deprive the understanding of its supreme power of judicature and definition Neither corporeal agents and objects nor yet the sensitive appetite it self being an inferiour faculty and affixed to the Organ of the Body have any direct or immediate dominion or command over the rational Will It is without the sphear of their activity All the access which they have unto the Will is by the means of the understanding sometimes cleare and sometimes disturbed and of reason either right or mis-informed Without the help of the understanding all his second causes were not able of themselves to load the Horses back with so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth amount unto But we shall meet with his Horse load of feathers again Numb 23. These things being thus briefly touched he proceeds to his answer My argument was this If any of these â—rall these causes formerly recited do take away true liberty that is still intended from necessity then Adam before his fall had no true liberty But Adam before his fall had true liberty He mis-recites the argument and denies the consequence which is so clearly proved that no man living can doubt of it Because Adam was subjected to all the same causes as well as we the same decree the same prescience the same influences the same concourse of causes the same efficacy of objects the same dictates of reason But it is onely a mistake for it appears plainly by his following discourse that he intended to deny not the consequence but the assumption For he makes Adam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall yea he proceeds so far as to affirm that all humane wills his and ours and each propension of our wills even during our deliberation are as much necessitated as any thing else whatsoever that we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do than the fire hath power not to burn Though I honour T. H. for his person and for his learning yet I must confess ingeniously I hate this Doctrine from my heart And I believe both I have reason so to do and al others who shall seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it It destroyes liberty dishonours the nature of Man It makes the second causes outward objects to be the Rackets and Men to be but the Tennis-Balls of destiny It makes the first cause that is God Almighty to be the introducer of all evil and sin into the world as much as Man yea more than Man by as much as the motion of the Watch is more from the Artificer who did make it and wind it up than either from the spring or the wheels or the thred if God by his special influence into the second causes did necessitate them to operate as they did And if they being thus determined did necessitate Adam inevitably irresistably not by an accidental but by an essential subordination of causes to whatsoever he did Then one of these two absurdities must needs follow either that Adam did not sin and that there is no such thing as sin in the world because it proceeds naturally necssarily and essentially from God Or that God is more guilty of it and more the cause of evil than Man because Man is extrinsecally inevitably determined but so is not God And in causes essentially subordinate the cause of the cause is alwaies the cause of the effect What Tyrant did ever impose Lawes that were impossible for those to keep upon whom they were imposed and punish them for breaking those Laws which he himself had necessitated them to break which it was no more in their power not to break than it is in the power of the fire not to burn Excuse me if I hate this Doctrine with a perfect hatred which is so dishonourable both to God and Man which makes Men to blaspheme of necessity to steal of necessity to be hanged of necessity and to be damned of necessity And therefore I must say and say again Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulous odi It were better to be an Atheist to believe no God or to be a Manichee to believe two Gods a God of good and a God of evil or with the Heathens to believe thirty thousand Gods than thus to charge the true God to be the proper cause and the true Author of all the sins and evills which are in the world Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number XI aTHis Argument was sent forth only as an espie to make a more full discovery what were the true grounds of T. H. his supposed Necessity The Argument which he sendeth forth as an Espie is this If either the decree of God or the Fore-knowledge of God or the Influence of the Stars or the Concatenation which he saies falsly I call a Concourse of causes or the Physical or Moral Efficacy of objects or the last Dictate of the Understanding do take away true liberty then Adam before his fall had no true liberty In answer whereunto I said that all the things now existent were necessary to the production of the effect to come that the Fore-knowledge of God causeth nothing though the Will do that the influence of the Stars is but a small part of that cause which maketh the Necessity and that this consequence If the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect then Adam had no true liberty was false But in his words if these do take away true liberty then Adam before his fall had no true liberty the consequence is good but then I deny that Necessity takes away Liberty the reason
perceave so easie a truth as this which he denieth The Bible is a Law To whom To all the World He knowes it is not How came it then to be a Law to us Did God speak it viva voce to us Have we then any other Warrant for it than the Word of the Prophets Have we seen the miracles Have we any other assurance of their certainty than the authority of the Church and is the authority of the Church any other than the authority of the Commonwealth or that of the Commonwealth any other than that of the Head of the Common-wealth or hath the Head of the Commonwealth any other authority than that which hath been given him by the Members Else why should not the Bible be Canonical as well in Constantinople as in any other place They that have the Legislative power make nothing Canon which they make not Law nor Law which they make not Canon And because the Legislative power is from the assent of the subjects the Bible is made Law by the assent of the subjects It was not the Bishop of Rome that made the Scripture Law without his own temporal Dominions nor is it the Clergy that make it Law in their Dioceses and Rectories Nor can it be a Law of it self without special and supernatural revelation The Bishop thinks because the Bible is Law and he is appointed to teach it to the people in his Diocese that therefore it is Law to whom soever he teach it which is somewhat grosse but not so grosse as to say that Conquerors who come in by tho power of the sword make their Lawes also without our assent He thinks belike that if a Conquerour can kill me if he please I am presently obliged without more a doe to obey all his Lawes May not I rather dye if I think fit The Conquerour makes no Law over the Conquered by vertue of his power but by vertue of their assent that promised obedience for the saving of their lives But how then is the assent of the Children obtained to the Laws of their Ancestors This also is from the desire of preserving their lives which first the Parents might take away where the Parents be free from all subjection and where they are not there the Civil power might do the same if they doubted of their obedience The Children therefore when they be grown up to strength enough to do mischeif and to judgement enough to know that other men are kept from doing mischeif to them by fear of the Sword that protecteth them in that very act of receiving that protection and not renouncing it openly do oblige themselves to obey the Lawes of their Protectors to which inreceaving such protection they have assented And whereas he saith the Law of Nature is a Law without our assent it is absurd for the Law of Nature is the Assent it self that all men give to the means of their own preservation d But his cheifest answer is that An action forbidden though it proceed from necessary causes yet if it were done willingly may be justly punished c. This the Bishop also understandeth not and therefore denies it He would have the Judge condemne no man for a crime if it were necessitated as if the Judge could know what acts are necessary unless he knew all that hath anteceded both visible and invisible and what both every thing in it self and altogether can effect It is enough to the Judge that the act he condemneth be voluntary The punishment whereof may if not capital reforme the will of the offender if capital the will of others by example For heat in one body doth not more create heat in another than the terrour of an example creatâ—th fear in another who otherwise were inclined to commit injustice Some few lines before he hath said that I built upon a wrong foundation namely That all Magistrates were at first elective I had forgot to tell you that I never said nor though it And therefore his Reply as to that point is impertinent Not many lines after for a reason why a man may not be justly punished when his crime is voluntary he offereth this that Law is unjust and tyrannical which commands a man to Will that which is impossible for him to Will Whereby it appears he is of opinion that a Law may be made to command the Will The stile of a Law is Do this or Do not this or If thou Do this thou shalt Suffer this but no Law runs thus Will this or Will not this or If thou have a Will to this thou shalt Suffer this He objecteth further that I hegg the question because no mans Will is necessitated Wherein he mistakes for I say no more in that place but that he that doth evill willingly whether he be necessarily willing or not necessarily may be justly punished And upon this mistake he runneth over again his former and already answered non-sense saying we our selves by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should and might have freely given them a kind of dominion over us and again motus primo primi the first motions are not alwayes in our power Which motus primo primi signifies nothing and our negligence in not opposing our passions is the same with our want of Will to oppose our Will which is absurd and that we have given them a kind of dominion over us either signifies nothing or that we have a dominion over our Wills or our Wills a dominion over us and consequently either we or our wills are not Free e He pleads moreover that the Law is a cause of Justice c. All this is most true of a just Law justly executed But I have shown that all Lawes are just as Lawes and therefore not to be accused of injustice by those that owe subjection to them and a just Law is alwayes justly executed Seeing then that he confesseth that all that he replieth to here is true it followeth that the Reply it self where it contradicteth me is false f He addeth that the sufferings imposed by the Law upon Delinquents respect not the evil act past but the good to come and that the putting of a Delinquent to death by the Magistrate for any crime whatsoever cannot be justified before God except there be a reall intention to benefit others by his example This he neither confirmeth nor denieth and yet forbeareth not to discourse upon it to little purpose and therefore I pass it over g First he told us that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his Actions though he command one thing openly and plot another thing secretly though he be the cause not onely of the Action but also of the irregularity c. To all this which hath been pressed before I have answered also before but that he sayes I say having commanded one thing openly he plots another thing secretly it is not mine but one of his own ugly Phrases And the
debt That cannot â—e for they have no sense of debt or duty And I think he will not say that they have received a command to obey him from authority It resteth therefore that the dominion of man consists in this that men are too hard for Lions and Bears because though a Lion or a Bear be stronger than a man yet the strength and art and specially the Leaguâ—ing and Societies of men are a greater power than the ungoverned strength of unruly Beasts In this it is that consisteth this dominion of man and for the same reason when a hungry Lion meeteth an unarmed man in a desert the Lion hath the dominion over the man if that of man over Lions or over Sheeep and Oxen may be called dominion which properly it cannot nor can it be said that Sheep and Oxen do otherwise obey us than they would do a Lion And if we have dominion over Sheep and Oxen we exercise it not as dominion but as hostility for we keep them onely to labour and to be kill'd and devoured by us so that Lions and Bears would be as good Maters to them as we are By this short passage of his concerning Dominion and Obedience I have no reason to expect a very shrewd answer from him to my Leviathan i The next branch of his Answer concerns Consultations which saith he are not superfluous though all things come to pass necessarily because they are the cause which doth necessitate the effect and the means to bring it to pass His Reply to this is that he hath shewed sufficiently that reason doth not determine the will Physically c. If not Physically how then As he hath told us in another place Morally But what it is to determine a thing Morally no man living understands I doubt not but be had therefore the Will to write this Reply because I had answered his Treatise concerning true Liberty My answer therefore was at least in part the cause of his writing yet that is the cause of the nimble local motion of his fingers Is not the cause of local motion Physical His Will therefore was Physically and Extrinsecally and Antecedently and not Morally caused by my writing k He adds further that as the end is necessary so are the means And when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen All which is truth but not the whole truth c. Is it not enough that it is truth must I put all the truth I know into two or three lines No. I should have added that God doth adapt and fit the means to their respective ends free means to free ends contingent means to contingent ends necessary means to necessary ends It may be I would have done so but for shame Free Contingent and Necessary are not words that can be joined to Means or Ends but to Agents and Actions that is to say to things that moove or are moved A Free Agent being that whose motion or action is not hindered nor stopt And a Free Action that which is produced by a Free Agent A Contingent Agent is the same with an Agent simply But because men for the most part think those things are produced without cause whereof they do not see the cause they use to call both the Agent and the Action Contingent as attributing it to fortune And therefore when the causes are Necessary if they perceive not the necessity they call those necessary Agents and Actions in things that have Appetite Free and in things inanimate Contingent The rest of his Reply to this point is very little of it applied to my answer I note onely that where he sayes but if God have so ordered the World that a man cannot if he would neglect any means of good c. He would fraudulently insinuate that it is my opinion that a man is not Free to Do if he will and to Abstain if he will Whereas from the beginning I have often declared that it is none of my opinion and that my opinion is only this that he is not Free to Will or which is all one he is not Master of his future Will After much unorderly discourse he comes in with This is the doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute Necessity which is impertinent seeing nothing flows from it more than may be drawn from the confession of an eternal Prescience l But he tells me in great sadness that my Argument is no better than this If I shall live till to morrow I shall live till to morrow though I run my self thorow with a sword to day which saith he is a false consequence and a false proposition Truly if by running through he understand killing it is a false or rather a foolish proposition He saith right Let us therefore see how it is not like to his He sayes If it be absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to morrow then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult whether he should dye to day or not And this he sayes is a true consequence I cannot perceive how it is a better consequence than the former for if it be absolutely necessary that a man should live till to morrow and in health which may also be supposed why should he not if he have the curiosity have his head cut off to try what pain it is But the consequence is false for if there be a necessity of his living it is necessary also that he shall not have so foolish a curiosity But he cannot yet distinguish between a seen and unseen necessity and that is the cause he beleeveth his consequence to be good m The next branch of my Argument concerns Admonitions c. Which he saies is this If all things be necessary then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools children or madmen but That they do admonish the one and not the other is confessedly true and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this that the former have the use of reason and true liberty with a dominion over their own actions which children fools and madmen have not The true reason why we admonish men and not children c. is because admonition is nothing else but telling a man the good and evil consequences of his actions They who have experience of good and evill can better perceive the reasonableness of such admonition than they that have not and such as have like passions to those of the Admonitor do more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the Admonitor sayeth is so than they who have great passions and such as are contrary to his The first which is want of experience maketh children and fools unapt and the second which is strength of passion maketh madmen unwilling to receive admonition for children are ignorant and mad men in an errour concerning what is good or evill for themselves This
acts and words to acknowledge it than he that thinketh otherwise Yet is this external acknowledgement the same thing which we call Worship So this opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds externally and internally and therefore is far from destroying it And for Repentance which is nothing but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way though the cause that made him go astray were necessary yet there is no â—…ason why he should not grieve and again though the cause â—…hy he returned into the way were necessary there remaines still the causes of joy So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of repentance grief for the errour nor joy for the returning And for Prayer whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroyes prayer I deny it For though prayer be none of the causes that moove Gods Will his Will being unchangeable yet since we find in Gods Word he will not give his blessings but to those that ask them the motive to prayer is the same Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessings And the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed T is manifest that thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past And that which is past is sure and necessary Yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for his blessings in general and though it precede the particular thing we ask yet it is not a cause or means of it but a signification that we expect nothing but from God in such manner as he not as we will And our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray Thy will not our will be done and by example teaches us the same for he prayed thus Father if it be thy will let this cup pass c. The end of prayer as of thanksgiving is not to move but to honour God Almighty in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him onely J. D. I Hope T. H. will be perswaded in time that it is not the Covetousness or Ambition or Sensuallity or Sloth or Prejudice of his Readers which renders this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous but that it is in its own nature destructive to true godliness a And though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions yet I will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed b First he erres in making inward piety to consist meerly in the estimation of the judgement If this were so what hinders but that the Devils should have as much inward piety as the best Christians for they esteem Gods power to be infinite and tremble Though inward piety do suppose the act of the understanding yet it consisteth properly in the act of the will being that branch of Justice which gives to God the honour which is due unto him Is there no Love due to God no Faith no Hope Secondly he erres in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to God but onely the glory of his Power or Omnipotence What shall become of all other the divine Attributes and particularly of his Goodness of his Truth of his Justice of his Mercy which beget a more true and sincere honour in the heart than greatness it self Magnos facile laudamus bonos lubenter Thirdly this opinion of absolute necessity destroyes the truth of God making him to command one thing openly and to necessitate another privately to chide a man for doing that which he hath determined him to do to profess one thing and to intend another It destroyes the goodness of God making him to be an hater of mankind and to delight in the torments of his creatures whereas the very doggs licked the sores of Lazarus in pitty and commiseration of him It destroyes the Justice of God making him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act which they had no more powerto shun than the fire hath power not to burn It destroyes the very power of God making him to be the true Author of all the defects and evils which are in the world These are the fruits of Impotence not of Omnipotence He who is the effective cause of sin either in himself or in the Creature is not Almighty There needs no other Devil in the world to raise jealousies and suspitions between God and his creatures or to poyson mankind with an apprehension that God doth not love them but onely this opinion which was the office of the Serpent Gen. 3. 5. Fourthly for the outward worship of God e How shall a man praise God for his goodness who believes him to be a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault to express his power How shall a man hear the word of God with that reverence and devotion and faith which is requisite who believeth that God causeth his Gospel to be preached to the much greater part of Christians not with any intention that they should be converted and saved but meerly to harden their hearts and to make them inexcusable How shall a man receive the blessed Sacrament with comfort and confidence as a Seal of Gods love in Christ who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the passions of Christ before they had done either good or evil How shall he prepare himself with care and conscience who apprehendeth that Eating and Drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation but because God would damn a man therefore he necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily How shall a man make a free vow to God without grosse ridiculous hypocrisie who thinks he is able to pâ—rform nothing but as he is extrinsecally necessitated Fiftly for Repentance how shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins who thinks himself to be like a Watch which is wound up by God and that he can go neither longer nor shorter faster nor slower truer nor falser than he is ordered by God If God sets him right he goes right If God set him wrong he goes wrong How can a man be said to return into the right way who never was in any other way but that which God himself had chalked out for him What is his purpose to amend who is destitute of all power but as if a man should purpose to fly without wings or a beggar who hath not a groat in his purse purpose to build Hospitals We use to say admit one absurdity and a thousand will follow To maintain this unreasonable opinion of absolute necessity he is necessitated but it is hypothetically he might change his opinion if he would to deal with all ancient Writers as the Goths did with the Romans who destroyed all their magnificent works that there might remain no monument of their greatness upon
if liberty be taken away the nature and formall reason of sin is taken away I answer by denying the consequence The nature of sin consiâ—â—eth in this that the action done proceed from ouâ— will and be against the Law A Judge in judging whether it be sin or not which is done against the Law lâ—oks at no higher cause oâ— the action then the will of the doer Now when I say the action was necessary I do not say it was done against the will oâ— the doer but with his will and so necessarily because mans will that is every act of the will and purpose of man had a sufficient and therefore a necessary cause and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin and nevertheless be necessary And because God may afflict by right derived from his â—mnipâ—tency though sin were not And the example of punishment on voluntary sinners is the cause that produceth Justice and maketh sin less frequent for God to punish such sinners as I have shewed before is no injustice And thus you have my answer to his objections both out of Scripture and Reason J. D. SCis tu simulare â—upressum quid hoc It was shrewd counsâ—il which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles when he was busy about his accounts to the State that he should rather study how to make no accounts So it seems T. H. thinks it a more compendious way to baulk an argument then to satisfie it And if he can produce a Rowland against an Olâ—ver if he can urge a reason against a reason he thinks he hath quitted himself fairely But it will not serve his turn And that he may not complain of misunderstanding it as those who have a politick deafness to hear nothing but what liketh them I will first reduce mine argument into form and then weigh what he saith in answer or rather in opposition to it a That opinion which takes away the formall reason of sin and by consequence sin it self is not to be approoved this is cleer because both Reason and Religion Nature and Scripture do proove and the whole world confesseth that there is sin But this opinion of the necessity of all things by reason of a conflux of second causes ordered and determined by the first cause doth take away the very formal reason of sin This is prooved thus That which makes sin it self to be good and just and lawfull takes away the formall cause and destroyes the essence of sin for if sin be good and just and lawfull it is no more evill it is no sin no anomy But this opinion of the necessity of all things makes sin to be very good and just and lawful for nothing can flow essentially by way of Physicall determination from the first cause which is the Law and Rule of Goodness and Justice but that which is good and just and lawfull but this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of Physicall determination from the first cause as appears in T. H. his whole discourse Neither is it material at all whether it proceed immediatly from the fist cause or mediately so as it be by a necessary flux of second and determinate causes which produce it inevitably To these proofs hee answers nothing but onely by denying the first consequence as he calls it and then sings over his old song That the nature of sin consisteth in this that the action proceede from our will and be against the Law which in our sense is most true if he understand a just Law and a free rationall will b But supposing as he doth that the Law injoins things impossible in themselves to be done then it is an unjust and Tyrahnical Law and the transgression of it is no sin not to do that which never was in our power to do And supposing likewise as he doth that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause then it is not mans will but Gods Will and flows essentially from the Law of Goodness c That which he addes of a Judge is altogether impertinent as to his defence Neither is a Civil Judge the proper Judge noâ— the Law of the Land the proper Rule of Sin But it makes strongly against him for the Judge goes upon a good ground and even this which he confesseth that the Judge looks at no higâ—er cause then the will of the doer prooves that the will of the doer did determine it self freely and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the Law if he would Certainly a Judge ought to look at all material circumstances and much more at all essential causes Whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause will come to be examined more properly Numb 31. For the present it shall suffice to say that liberty flows from the sufficiency and contingency from the debility of the cause d Nature Never intends the generation of a monster If all the causes concur sufficiently a a perfect creature is produced but by reason of the insufficiency or debility or contingent aberration of some of the causes sometimes a Monster is produced Yet the causes of a Monster were sufficient for the production of that which was produced that is a Monster otherwise a Monster had not been produced What is it then A Monster is not produced by vertue of that order which is set in Nature but by the contingent aberration of some of the natural causes in their concurrence The order set in Nature is that every like should beget its like But supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it is in the generation of a Monster the generation of a Monster is necessary as all the events in the world are when they are that is by an hypothetical necessity e Then he betakes himself to his old help that God may punish by right of omnipotence though there were no sin The question is not now what God may do but what God will do according to that Covenant which he hath made with man Fac hoc vives Do this and thou shalt live Neither doth God punish any man contrary to this Covenant Hosea 13. 9. O Israel thy destruction is from thy self but in me is thy help He that wills not the death of a Sinner doth much less will the death of an innocent Creature By death or destruction in this discourse the onely separation of Soul and Body is not intended which is a debt of nature and which God as Lord of Life and Death may justly do and make it not a punishment but a blessing to the party but we understand the subjecting of the Creature to eternal torments Lastly he tells of that benefit which redounds to others from Exemplary Justice which is most true but not according to his own grounds for neither is it Justice to punish a man for doing that which it was impossible always for him not to do Neither is it lawfull to punish an
the Universal work of God and then it is absurd for the universe as one aggregate of things natural hath no intention His Doctrine that followeth concerning the generation of Monsters is not worth consideration therefore I leave it wholy to the Judgement of the Reader e Then he betakes himself to his old help that God may punish by right of omnipotence though there were no sin The question is not now what God may do but what God will do according to that Covenant which he hath made with Man Fac hoc vives Do this and thou shalt live T is plaine to let passe that he puts Punishment where I put Affliction making a true sentence false that if a man do this he shall live and he may do this if he will In this the Bishop and I disagree not This therefore is not the question but whether the will to do this or not to do this be in a mans own Election Whereas he adds He that wills not the death of a sinner doth much lesse Will the death of an innocent creature He had forgot for a while that both good and evil men are by the Will of God all mortall but presently corrects himself and says he means by Death Eternal torments that is to say eternal life but in torments To which I have answered once before in this Book and spoken much more amply in another Book to which the Bishop hath inclination to make an answer as appeareth by his Epistle to the Reader That which followeth to the end of this number hath been urged and answered already divers times I therefore passe it over J. D. BUT the Patrons of necessity being driven out of the Numb 18. plain field with reason have certain retreats or distinctions which they flye unto for refuge First they distinguish between Stoical necessity and Christian necessity between which they make a threefold difference First say they the Stoicks did subject Jupiter to destiny but but we subject destiny to God I answer that the Stoical and Christian destiny are one and the same fatum quasi effatum Jovis Hear Seneca Destiny is the necessity of all things and actions depending upon the disposition of Jupiter c. I add that the Stoicks left a greater liberty to Jupiter over destiny than these Stoicall Christians do to God over his decrees either for the beginnings of things as Euripides or for the progress of them as Chrysippus or at least of the circumstances of time and place as all of them generally So Virgil Sed trahere moras ducere c. So Osyris in Apuleius promiseth him to prolong his life Ultra fato constituta tempora beyond the times set down by the destinies Next they say that the Stoicks did hold an eternall flux and necessary connexion of causes but they believe that God doth act praeter contra naturam besides and against nature I answer that it is not much material whether they attribute necessity to God or to the Starrs or to a connexion of causes so as they establish necessity The former reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity but much more necessity it self upon what ground soever Either they must run into this absurdity that the effect is determined the cause remaining undetermined or els hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the Stoicks did Lastly they say the Stoicks did take away liberty and contingence but they admit it I answer what liberty or contingence was it they admit but a titular liberty and an empty shadow of contingence who do profess stifly that all actions and events which either are or shall be cannot but be nor can be otherwise after any other manner in any other Place Time Number Order Measure nor to any other end than they are and that in respect of God determining them to one what a poor ridiculous liberty or contingence is this Secondly they distinguish between the first cause and the second causes they say that in respect of the second causes many things are free but in respect of the first cause all things are necessary This answer may be taken away two wayes First so contraries shall be true together The same thing 1. at the same time shall be determined to one and not determined to one the same thing at the same time must necessarily be and yet may not be Perhaps they will say not in the same respect But that which strikes at the root of this question is this If all the causes were onely collateral this exception might have some colour but where all the causes being joined together and subordinate one to another do make but one totall cause if any one cause much more the first in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary it determines the rest and without doubt makes the effect necessary Necessity or Liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause but from all the causes joyned together If one link in a chain be fast it fastens all the rest Secondly I would have them tell me whether the second 2. causes be predetermined by the first cause or not If it be determined then the effect is necessary even in respect of the second causes If the second cause be not determined how is the effect determined the second cause remaining undetermined Nothing can give that to another which it hath not it self But say they nevertheless the power or faculty remaineth free True but not in order to the act if it be once determined It is free in sensu diviso but not in sensu composito when a man holds a bird fast in his hand is she therefore free to flie where she will because she hath wrings Or a man imprisoned or fettered is he therefore free to walk where he will because he hath feet and a loco-motive faculty Judge without prejudice what a miserable subterfuge is this which many men confide so much in T. H Certain distinctions which he supposing may be brought to his arguments are by him removed HE saith a man may perhaps answer that the necessity of things held by him is not a Stoical necessity but a Christian necessity c. but this dâ—stinction I have not used nor indeed have ever heard bâ—fore Nor do I think any man could make Stoical and Christian two kinds of necessitiâ—s though they may be two kinds of doctrin Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from the authority of any Sect but from the nature of the things themselves But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place as making against his own Tenet where all the causes saith he being jâ—yned together and subordinate one to another do make but one totall cause If any one cause much more the first in the whole series of subordination of causes be necessary it determines the rest and without doubt maketh the effect necessary For that which I call the necessary cause of
voluntary It seems that he calleth Compulsion Force but I call it a fear of force or of dammage to be done by force by which fear a mans will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will before Force taketh away the sin because the Action is not his that is forced but his that forceth It is not alwayes so in Compulsion because in this case a man electeth the Lesse Evil under the notion of Good But his instances of the betrothed Damsel that was forced and of Tamar may for any thing there appeareth in the Text be Instances of Compulsion and yet the Damsel and Tamar be both innocent In that which immediately followeth concerninâ— how far fear may extenuate a sin there is nothing to be answered I preceive in it he hath some glimmering of the truth but not of the grounds thereof It is true that Just â—ear dispenceth not with the precepts of God or Nature for they are not dispensable but it extenuateth the fault not by diâ—â—inishing any thing in the Action but by being no transgressiâ—n For if the fear be allowed the Action it produceth is allowed also Nor doth it disp use in any case with the Law positive but by making the Action it self Lawful for thâ— breaking of a Law is alwayes sin and it is certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive Precepts though with the losse of their lives unlesse the right that a man hath to preserve himself make it in case of a just Fear to be nâ— Law The omission of circumcision was no sin he says whilst the Israelites were travelling through the Wildernesse 'T is very true but this has nothing to do with Compulsion And the cause why it was no sin was this they were ready to obâ—y it whâ—nsoever God should give them leasure and rest from travel whereby they might be cured or at least when God that daily spake to their Conducter in the Desert should appoint him to renew that Sacrament g I will propose a case to him c. The case is this a Servant is robbed of his Masters money by the Highway but is acquit because he was forced Another Servant spends his Masters money in a Tavern Why is he not acquited also seeing he was necessitated Would hâ— saith he T. H. admit of this excuse I answer no But I would do that to him which should necessitate him to behave himself better anothâ—r time or at least necessitate another to behave himself better by his example h He talkes much of the motives to do anâ— the mâ—tives to forbear how they work upon and determine a man as if a reasonable man were no more then a Tennis-ball to be tossed to and fro by the Rackets of the second causes c. May not great things be produced by second causes as well as little And a Foot-ball as well as a Tennis-ball But the Bishop can never be driven from this that the Will hath power to move it self but says t is all one to say that an Agent can determine it self and that the Will is determined by motives extrinsical He adds that if there be no necessitation before the Judgment of right reason doth dictate to the Will then there is no Antecedent nor Extrinsecal necessitation at all I say indeed the effect is not produced before the last dictate of the understanding but I say not that the necessity was not before he knows I say it is from eternity When a Cannon is planted against a Wall though the battery be not made till the bullet arrive yet the necessity was present all the while the bullet was going to it if the Wall stood still and if it â—liâ—t away the hitting of somewhat else was necessary and that antecedently i All the World knows that when the Agent is determined by himself then the effect is determined likewise in its cause Yes whâ—n the Agent is dâ—termined by himself then the effect is determined likewise in its cause and so any thing else is what he will have it But nothing is determined by it self nor is there any man in the World that hâ—th any Conception answerable to those Words But Motives he says determine not naturally but Morally This also is insignificant for all Motion is Natural or Supernatural Moral motion is a meer Word without any Imagination of the mind correspondent to it I have heard men talk of a Motion in a Court of Justice perhaps this is it which he means by Moral Motion But certainly when the tongue of the Judg and the hands of the Clerks are thereby movâ—d the Motion is Natural and proceed from natural causes which causes also were Natural Motions of the tongue of the Advocate And whereas he adds that if this were true then not onely Motives but reason it self and deliberation were vain it hath been sufficiently answered before that therefore they are not vain because by them is produced the effect I must also note that oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts â—n instead of mine those terms of his own which upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity as here he makes me to say that which I did never say Special influence of extrinsical causes k He saith that the ignorance of the true causes and their Power is the reason why we ascribe the effect â—o Liberty but when we seriously consider the causes of things we acknowledge a necessity No such thing but just the contrary Iâ—â— understand the Authors which he readeth upon this point no better then he understands what I have here written it is no wonder he understandeth not the truth of the question I said not that when we consider the causes of things but when we see and know the strength that moves us we acknowledge necessity No such thing says the Bishop but just the contrary the more we consider and the clearer we understand the greater is the Liberty c. Is there any doubt if a man could foreknow as God foreknows that which is hereafter to come to passe but that he would also see and know she causes which shall bring it to passe and how they work and make the effect necessary for necessary it is whatsoever God foreknoweth But we that foresee them not may consider as much as wâ— will and understand as clearly as we will but are never the neerer to the knowledge of their necessity and that I said was the cause why we impute those events to Liberty and not to causes l Lastly he tels us that the Wil doth chose of necessity as well as the fire burns of necessity If he intend no more but this that Election is the proper and natural Act of the Wil as burning is of the fire c. He speaks truely but most impertinently for the question is not now of the Elective power in actu primo c. Here again he makes me speak non sense I said the man chooseth of necessity he says I say
of things but every individuall creature and not onely in natural but voluntary actions I desire to know how Prester John or the great Mogol or the King of China or any one of so many millions of their subjects do concur to my writing of this reply If they do not among his other speculations concerning this matter I hope he will give us some restrictions It were hard to make all the Negroes accessary to all the murthers that are committed in Europe Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb XXI THere is not much in this part of his Reply that needeth Animadversion But I must observe where he saith a The sum of my answer was that the Stars and complections do incline but not at all necessitate the Will He answereth nothing at all to me who attribute not the necessitation of the Will to the Stars and Complections but to the aggregate of all things together that are in motion I do not say that the Stars or Complections of themselves do incline men to Wil but when men are inclined I must say that that inclination was necessitated by some causes or other b But whereas he mentions a great Paradox of his own that there is hardly any one Action to the causing of which concurres not whatsoever is in rerum natura I can but smile to see with what ambition our great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions c. The Bishop speaks often of Paradoxes which such scorn or detestation that a simple Reader would take a Paradox either for Felony or some other hainous crime or else for some rediculous turpitude whereas perhaps a Judicious Reader knows what the word signifies And that a Paradox is an opinion not yet generally received Christian Religion was once a Paradox and a great many other opinions which the Bishop now holdeth were formerly Paradoxes Insomuch as when a man calleth an opinion Paradox he doth not say it is untrue but signifieth his own ignorance for if he understood it he would call it either a truth or an errour He observes not that but for Paradoxes we should be now in that savage ignorance which those men are in that have not or have not long had Laws and Common-wealth from whence porceedeth Science and Civility There was not long since a Scholler that maintained that if the least thing that had waight should be laid down upon the hardest body that could be supposing it an Anvill of Diamant it would at the first accesse make it yeeld This I thought and much more the Bishop would have thought a Paradox But when he told me that either that would do it or all the waight of the World would not doe it because if the whole waight did it every the least part thereof would do its part I saw no reason to dissent In like manner when I say there is hardly any one Action to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever is in rerum natura It seems to the Bishop a great Paradox and if I should say that all Action is the effect of Motion and that there cannot be a Motion in one part of the World but the same must also be communicated to all the rest of the World he would say that this were no lesse a Paradox But yet if I should say that if a lesser body as a concave Sphere or Tun were filled with air or other liquid matter and that any one little particle thereof were moved all the rest would be moved also he would conceive it to be true or if not he a judicious reader would It is not the greatness of the Tun that altereth the case and therefore the same would be true also if the whole World were the Tun for t is the greatness of this Tun that the Bishop comprohendeth not But the truth is comprehensible enough and may be said without ambition of being the founder of strange opinions And though a Grave man may smile at it he that is both Grave and wise will not J. D. THirdly the moral Philosopher tells us how we are haled hither Num. 22. and thither with outward objects To this I answer First that the power which outward objects have over us is for the most part by our own default because of those vitious habits which we have contracted Therefore though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them yet they were free and voluntary in their first originals As a paralitick man to use Aristotles comparison shedding the liquor deserves to be punished for though his act be unwilling yet his imtemperance was willing whereby he contracted this infirmity Secondly I answer that concupiscence and custome and bad company and outward objects do indeed make a proclivity but not a necessity By Prayers Tears Meditations Vowes Watchings Fastings Humi-cubations a man may get a contrary habit and gain the victory not onely over outward objects but also over his own corruptions and become the King of the little world of himself Si metuis si prava cupis si duceris irà Servitii patiere jugum tolâ—rabis iniquas Interius leges Tunc omnia jure tenebis Cum poteris rex esse tâ—â— Thirdly a resolved mind which weighs all things judiciously and provides for all occurrences is not so easily surprised withoutward objects Onely Ulysses wept not at the meeting with â—is wife and son I would beat thee said the Philosopher but that I am angry One spake lowest when he was most mooved Another poured out the water when he was thirsty Another made a Covenant with his eyes Neither opportunity nor entisement could prevail with Joseph Nor the Musick nor the fire with the three Children It is not the strength of the wind but the lightness of the chaff which causeth it to be blown away Outward objects do not impose a moral much less a Physical necessity they may be dangerous but cannot be destructi e to true liberty T. H. THirdly he disputeth against the opinion of them that say external objects presentâ—d to men of such and such tâ—mperatures do make their actions necessary And sayes the poâ—â—er that such objects have over us proceed from our own fault But that is nothing to the purpose if such â—ault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power And therefore that opinion may â—old true foâ—â— all this answer Further he saith Prayer Fasting c. may alter our habits 'T is true but when they do so they are causes of the contrary habit and make it necessary as the former habit had been necessary iâ— Prayer Fasting c. had not been Besides we are not mooved nor disposed to prayer or any ot er action but by outward objects as pious company godly preachers or something equivalent Thirdly he saith a resolved mind is not easily surprised As the mind of Ulysses who when others wept he alone wept not And of the Philosopher that abstained from striking because he found
judgment is no part of the weight but is the sentence of the trier The understanding weigheth all Things Objects Means Circumstances Convenience Inconvenience but it self is not weighed Secondly the sensitive passion in some extraordinary cases may give a counterfeit weight to the object if it can detein or divert reason from the ballance but ordinarily the Means Circumstances and Causes concurrent they have their whole weight from the understanding So as they do not press the horses back at all until reason lay them on Thirdly he conceives that as each feather hath a certain natural weight whereby it concurs not arbitrarily but necessarily towards the overcharging of the horse So all objects and causes have a naturall efficiency whereby they do Physically determin the will which is a great mistake His Objects his Agents his Motives his Passions and all his concurrent causes ordinarily do onely moove the will morally not determine it naturally So as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over it self His other example of a man that strikes whose will to strike followeth necessarily that thought he had of the sequell of this stroke immediately before the lifting up of his hand as it confounds passionate indeliberate thoughts with the dictates of right reason so it is very uncertain for between the cup and the lip between the lifting up of the hand and the blow the will may alter and the judgment also And lastly it is impertinent for that necessity of striking proceeds from the free determination of the Agent and not from the special influence of any outward determining causes And so it is onely a necessity upon supposition Concerning Medeas choise the strength of the argument doth not lye either in the fact of Medea which is but a fiction or in the authority of the Poet who writes things rather to be admired than believed but in the experience of all men who find it to be true in themselves That sometimes reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion that what he desires is but a pleasant good that what he loseth by such a choise is an honest good That that which is honest is to be preferred before that which is pleasant yet the will pursues that which is pleasant and neglects that which is honest St. Paul saith as much in earnest as is feined of Medea That he approoved not that which he did and that he did that which he hated Rom. 7. 15. The Roman Story is mistaken There was no bribe in the case but affection Whereas I urge that those things which are neerer to the senses do moove more powerfully he layes hold on it and without answering to that for which I produced it infers That the sense of present good is more immediate to the action than the foresight of evil consequents Which is true but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity Let a man do what he may do and what he ought to do and sensitive objects will lose that power which they have by his own fault and neglect Antecedent or indeliberate concupiscence doth sometimes but rarely surprise a man and render the action not free But consequent and deliberated concupiscence which proceeds from the rational will â—oth render the action more free not less free and introduceth onely a necessity upon supposition Lastly he saith that a mans mourning more for the loss of his Child than for his sin makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding Yes very much Reason dictates that a sin committed is a greater evil than the loss of a Child and ought more to be lamented for yet we see daily how affection prevailes against the dictate of reason That which he inferrs from hence that sorrow for sin is not voluntary and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes is true as to the latter part of it but not in his sense The causes from whence repentance doth proceed are Gods grace preventing and mans will concurring God prevents freely man concurs freely Those inferiour Agents which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace of God do not cannot determine the will naturally And therefore the former part of his inference that sorrow for sin is not voluntary is untrue and altogether groundless That is much more truely and much more properly said to be voluntary which proceeds from judgment and from the rational will than that which proceeds from passion and from the sensitive will One of the main grounds of all T. H. his errours in this question is that he acknowledgeth no efficacy but that which is natural Hence is this wild consequence Repentance hath causes and therefore it is not voluntary Free effects have free causes necessary effects necessary causes voluntary effects have sometimes free sometimes necessary causes Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb XXIII a SUpposing the last dictate of the understanding did alwayes determine the Wil yet this determination being not antecedent in time nor proceeding from extrinsecall causes but from the proper resolution of the Agent who had now freely determined himself makes no absolute necessity but onely Hypothetical c. This is the Bishops answer to the necessity inferred from that that the Wil necessarily followeth the last dictate of the understanding which answer he thinks is not sufficiently taken away because the last act of the understanding is in time together with the Wil it self and therefore not antecedent It is true that the Wil is not produced but in the same Instant with the last dictate of the understanding but the necessity of the Wil and the necessity of the last dictate of the understanding may have been antecedent For that last dictate of the understanding was produced by causes antecedent and was then necessary though not yet produced as when a stone is falling the necessity of touching the earth is antecedent to the touch it self For all motion through any determined space necessarily makes a motion through the next space unlesse it be hindered by some contrary external motion and then the stop is as necessary as the proceeding would have been The Argument therefore from the last dictate of the understanding sufficiently inferreth an antecedent necessity as great as the necessity that a stone shall fall when it is already falling As for his other answer that the Wil does not certainly follow the last dictate of the understandig though it alwayes ought to follow it he himself says it is but probable but any man that speaks not by rote but thinks of what he says will presently find it false and that it is impossible to will any thing that appears not first in his understanding to be good for him And whereas he says the Wil ought to follow the last dictate of the understanding unlesse he mean that the man ought to follow it it is an insignificant speech for duties are the man 's not the Wils duties and if he means so then t is false for
Form of Liberty c. How a reall faculty or the elective power should be defined by a negation or by an absence is past my understanding and contrary to all the rules of right reason which I have learned A right dâ—â—nition is that which determineth the signification of the word defined to the end that in the discourse where it is used the meaning of it may be constant and without equivocation This is the measure of a definition and intelligible to an English Reader But the Bishop that measures it by the Genus and the Difference thinks it seems though he write English he writes not to an English Reader unlesse he also be a School-man I confesse the rule is good that we ought to define when it can be done by using first soâ—e more general term and then by râ—straining the signification of that general term till it bâ— thâ— same with that of the word definâ—d And this general term the Scâ—ool calls Genus and the restraint Difference This I say is a good rule where it can be done for some words are so general that they cannot admit a more general in their definition But why this ought to be a Law of definition I doubt it would trouble him to find the reason and therefore I referr him he shall give me leave sometimes to cite as well as he to the 14. and 15. Articles of the 6 Chapter of my Book De Corpore But it is to little purpose that he requires in a definition so exactly the Genus and the Difference seâ—ing he does not know them when they are there For in this my definition of Liberty the Genus is absence of impediments to action and the difference or Restrictiâ—n is that they be not contained in the nature of the Agent The Bishop therefore though he talk of Genus and Difference understands not what they are but requires the matter and Form of the thing in the Definition Matter is body that is to say corporeal substance and subject to dimension such as are the Elements and the things compounded of the Elements But it is impossible that Matter should be part oâ— a Definition whose parts are onely words or to put the name of Matter into the Definition of Liberty which is immaterial How a reall faculty can be defined by an absence is saith he past my understanding Unlesse he mean by reall Faculty a very Faculty I know not how a Faculty is reall If he mean so then a very absence is as reall as a very Faculty And if the word defined signifie an absence or Negation I hope he would not have me define it by a presence or affrmation Such a word is Liberty for it signifieth Freedome from impediments which is all one with the absence of impediments as I have defined it And if this be contrary to all the rules of right reason that is to say of Logic that he hath learned I should advise him to read some other Logic then he hath yet read or consider better those he did read when he was a young man and could lesse understand them He adds that by this Definition a stone hath Liberty to ascend into the aire because there is no outward impediment to hinder it How know he whether there be impediments to hinder it or not Certainly if a stone were thrown upwards it would either go upwards eternally or it must be stopped by some outward impediment or it must stop it self He hath confessed that nothing can moove it self I doubt not therefore but he will confess also that it cannot stop it self But stopped we see it is it is therefore stopped by impediments external He hath in this part of his Answer ventured a little too far in speaking of Definition and of Jmpediments and Motion and bewâ—ayed too much his ignorance in Logick and Philosophy and talketh so absurdly of the current of Rivers and of the motion of the Seas and of the weight of Water that it cannot be corrected otherwise then by blotting it all out T. H. SIxtly I conceive nothing taketh beginning from it self but Num. 30. from the action of some other immediate Agent without it self And that therefore when first a man had an appetite or will to something to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will the cause of his will is not the will it self but something else not in his own disposing So that whereas it is out of controversie that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause and by this which is said the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not it followeth that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes and therefore are necessitated J. D. THis sixt point doth not consist in explicating of tearms as the former but in two proofs that voluntary actions are necessitated The former proof stands thus Nothing takes beginning from it self but from some Agent without it self which is not in its own disposing therefore c. concedo omnia a I grant all he saith The will doth not take beginning from it self Whether he understand by will the faculty of the will which is a power of the reasonable soul it takes not beginning from it self but from God who created and infused the Soul into man and endowed it with this power Or whether he understand by will the act of willing it takes not beginning from it self but from the faculty or from the power of willing which is in the Soul This is certain finite and participated things cannot be from themselves nor be produced by themselves What would he conclude from hence that therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of the will Or that the faculty is alwayes determined antecedently extrinsecally to will that which it doth will He may as soon draw water out of a pumice as draw any such conclusion out of these premisses Secondly for his taking a beginning Either he understands a beginning of being or a beginning of working and acting If he understand a beginning of being he saith most truly that nothing hath a beginning of being in time from it self But this is nothing to his purpose The question is not between us whether the Soul of man or the will of man be eternal But if he understand a beginning of working or mooving actually it is a gross errour All men know that when a stone descends or fire ascends or when water that hath been heated returns to its former temper the beginning or reason is intrinsecal and one and the same thing doth moove and is mooved in a diverse respect It mooves in respect of the form and it is mooved in respect of the matter Much more man who hath a perfect knowledge and prenotion of the end is most properly said to moove himself Yet I do not deny but that there are other beginnings of humane actions which do concur with the will some outward as the first cause
signifies and whether our Antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards And he will not stick to tell you that if his head be upwards theirs must needs be downwards And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof that the Heavens incircle the earth and what is towards Heaven is upwards This same erroneous notion of upwards and downwards before the true reason was fully discovered abused more than ordinary capacities as appears by their arguments of penduli homines and pendulae arbores Again what do men conceive ordinaryly by this word empty as when they say an empty vessel or by this word Body as when they say there is no body in that room they intend not to exclude the aire either out of the vessel or out of the room Yet reason tells us that the vessel is not truly empty and that the aire is a true body I might give an hundred such like instances He who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar notions shall plunge himself into a thousand errours like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an ignis fatuus or a Will with the wispe So his proposition is false b His reason That matter of fact is not verified by other mens Arguments but by every mans own sense and memory is likewise maimed on both sides whether we hear such words or not is matter of fact and sense is the proper judge of it But what these words do or ought truely to signifie is not to be judged by sense but by reason Secondly reason may and doth oftentimes correct sense even about its proper object Sense tells us that the Sun is no bigger than a good Ball but reason demonstrates that it is many times greater than the whole Globe of the earth As to his instance How can it be proved that to love a thing and to think it good is al one to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these words I confess it cannot be proved for it is not true Beauty and likeness and love do conciliate love as much as goodness Cos amoris amor Love is a passion of the will but to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding A Father may love an ungracious Child and yet not esteem him good A man loves his own house better than another mans yet he cannot but esteem many others better than his own His other instance How can it be proved that eternity is not nunc stans to a man that says these words by custome and never considers how he can conceive the thing it self in his minde is just like the former not to be proved by reason but by fancy which is the way he takes And it is not unlike the counsel which one gave to a Novice about the choise of his wife to advice with the Bels as he fancied so they sounded either take her or leave her c Then for his assumption it is as defective as his proposition That by these words spontaneity c. men do understand as he conceives No rational man doth conceive a spontaneous action and an indeliberate action to be all one every indeliberate action is not spontaneous The fire considers not whether it should burn yet the burning of it is not spontaneous Neither is evâ—ry spontaneous action indeliberate a man may deliberate what he will eat and yet eat it spontaneously d Neither doth deliberation properly signifie the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to come But the considering whether this be a good and fit means or the best and fittest means for obtaining such an end The Physician doth not deliberate whether he should cure his Patient but by what means he should cure him Deliberation is of the means not of the end e Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. that deliberation is an imagination or an act of fancy not of reason common to men of discretion with mad men and natural fools and children and bruit beasts f Thirdly neither doth any understanding man conceive or can conceive that the will is an act of our deliberation The understanding and the will are two distinct faculties or that onely the last appetite is to be called our will So no man should be able to say this is my will because he knows not whether he shall persevere in it or not g Concerning the fourth point we agree that he is a free Agent that can do if he will and forbear if he will But I wonder how this dropped from his pen what is now become of his absolute necessity of all things if a man be free to do and to forbear any thing Will he make himself guilty of the non-sense of the School-men and run with them into contradictions for company It may be he will say he can do if he will and forbear if he will but he cannot will if he will This will not serve his turn for if the cause of a free action that is the will to be determined then the effect or the action it self is likewise determined a determined cause cannot produce an undetermined effect either the Agent can will and forbear to will or else he cannot do and forbear to do h But we differ holy about the fifth point He who conceives liberty aright conceives both a liberty in the subject to will or not to will and a liberty to the object to will this or that and a liberty from impediments T. H. by a new way of his own cuts off the liberty of the subject as if a stone was free to ascend or descend because it hath no outward impediment And the liberty towards the object as if the Needle touched with the Load-stone were free to point either towards the North or towards the South because there is not a Barricado in its way to hinder it yea he cuts off the liberty from inward impediments also As if an Hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked but not when they are tied And so he makes liberty from extrinsecal impediments to be compleat liberty so he ascribes liberty to bruit beasts and liberty to Rivers and by consequence makes Beasts and Rivers to be capeable of sin and punishment Assuredly Xerxes who caused the Hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes was of this opinion Lastly T. H. his reason that it is â—ustome or want of ability or negligence which makes a mâ—n câ—nceive otherwise is but a begging of that which he should prove Other men consider as seriously as himself with as much judgement as himself with less prejudice than himself and yet they can apprehend no suchsense of these words Wouldhe have other men feign that they see fiery Dragons in the Air because he affirms confidently that he sees them and wonders why others are so blind as not to see them i The reason for the sixth point is like the former a phantastical or imaginative reason How can a man imagine any
thing to begin without a cause or if it should begin without a cause why it should begin at this time rather than at that time He saith truely nothâ—â—g can begin without a cause that is to be but it may begin to act of it self without any other cause Nothing can begin without a cause but many things may begin and do begin without necessary causes A free cause may as well choose his time when he will begin as a necessary cause be determined extrinsâ—cally when it must begin And although free effects cannot be foretold because they are not certainly predetermined in their causes yet when the free causes do determine themselves they are of as great certainty as the other As when I see a Bell ringing I can conceive the cause of it as well why it rings now as I know the interposition of the earth to be the cause of the Eclipse of the Moon or the most certain occurrent in the nature of things k And now that I have answered T. H. his Arguments drawn from the private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words I desire him seriously without prejudice to examine himself and those natural notions which he finds in himself not of words but of things these are from nature those are by imposition whether he doth not find by experience that he doth many things which he might have left undone if he would and omits many things which he might have done if he would whether he doth not somethings out of meer animosity and will without either regard to the direction of right reason or serious respect of what is honest or profitable onely to shew that he will have a dominion over his own actions as we see ordinarily in Children and wise men find at sometimes in themselves by experience And I apprehend this very defence of necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind Whether he is not angry with those who draw him from his study or cross him in his desires if they be necessitated to do it why should he be angry with them any more than he is angry with a sharp winter or a rainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent wil. Whether he doth not sometime blame himself and say O what a fool was I to do thus and thus or wish to himself O that I had been wise or O that I had not done such an act If he have no dominion over his actions if he be irresâ—stibly necessitated to all things that he doth he might as well wish O that I had not breached or blame himself for growing old O what a fool was I to grow old Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXXIII I Have said in the beginning of this Number that to define what spontanâ—iry is what deliberation is what Will Propension Appetite a free Agent and Liberty is and to prove they are well defined there can be no other proof offered but every mans own experience and memory of what he meaneth by such words For definitions being the beginning of all demonstration cannot themselves be demonstrated that is proved to another man All that can be done is either to put him in mind what thâ—se words signifie commonly in the matter whereof they treâ—t or if the words bâ— unusual to make the Definitions of them true by mutual consent in their signification And though this be manifestly true yet there is nothing of it amongst the School-men whouse to argue not by rule but as Fencers teach to hardle weapons by quickness â—nâ—ly of the hand and eye The Bishop therefore boggles at this kind of proof and says a The true natures of things are not to be judged by the private Ideas or conceptions of men but by their causes and formall reasons Aske an ordinary person what upwards signifies c. But what will â—e answer if I should aske him how he will judge oâ— the causes of things whereof he hatâ— no Iâ—ea or conceptiâ—n in his own â—ind It is therefore impossible to give a true definition of any word without the Idea of the thing which that word signifieth or not acâ—oâ—â—ing to that Idea or conception Here again he discovereth the true cause why he and other School-men so often speak absurdâ—y For they speak without conception of the things and by rote one receiving what he saith from another by tradition from some pust 〈◊〉 or Philosopher that to decline aâ— difficulty speakes in such manner as not to be understood And whereas he bidds us asâ—e an ordinary person what upwards signifieth 〈◊〉 dare Answer for that ordinary person he will tell us as significantly as any Scholler and say it is towards Heaven and as soâ—â— as he knows the earth is râ—und makes no scruple to believe there are Antipodes being wiser in that point then were those which he saith to have been of more then ordinary capacities Again ordinary men understand not he saith the words empty and Body yes but they do just as well as learned men When they hear named an empty vessel the learned as well as the unlearned mean and understand the same thing namely that there is nothing in it that can be seen and whether it be truely empty the Plough-man and the School man know a like I might give he says an hundred such like instances That true a man may give a thousand foolish and impertinent instances of men ignorant in such questions of Philosophy concerning Emptiness Body Upwards and Downwards and the like But the question is not whether such and such tenets be true but whether such and such words can be well defined without thinking upon the things they signifiet as the Bishop thinks they may when he concludeth with these words So his proposition is salfe b His reason that matter of fact is not verified by other mens Arguments but by every mans own sense and memory is likewise maimed on both sides Whether we hear such words or not is matter of fact and sense is the proper Judge of it but what these words do or ought truely to signifie is not to be judged by sense but by reason A man is borne with a capacity after due time and experience to reason truely to which capacity of nature if there be added no Discipline at all yet as far as he reasoneth he will reason truely though by a right Discipline he may reason truely in more numerous and various matters But he that hath lighted on deceiving or deceived masters that teach for truth all that hath been dictated to them by their own interest or hath been cried up by other such teachers before them have for the most part their natural reason as far as concerneth the truth of Doctrine quite defaced or very much weakened becoming changelings through the inchantments of words not understood This cometh into my mind from this saying of the Bishop that matter of fact is not verified by sense and memory but by Arguments How is it
are intelligible enough for he hath said in his Reply to Numb 24. that his opinion is demonstrable in reason though he be not able to comprehend how iâ— consisteth together with Gods eternal Prescience and though it exceed his weak capacitie yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest so that to him that truth is manifest â—nd demonstrable by reason which is beyond his capacity so that words beyond capacity are with him intelligible enough But the Reader is to be Judge of that I could add many other passages that discover both his little Logick as taking tâ—â— insignificant word above recited for Terms of Art aâ—d hiâ— no Philosophy in distinguishing between moral and â—â—turâ—lâ— mâ—tion and by calling some motions Metaphorical and his thâ—r offers at the causes of sight and of the descent of heavy lies and his talk of the inclination of the Lâ—ud-stone and diverse other places of his Book But to make an end I shall briefly draw up the sum of what we have both said That which I have maintained is that no man hath his future will in his own present power That it may be changed by others and by the change of things without him and when it is changed it is not changed nor determined to any thing by it self and that when it is undetermined it is no Will because every one that willeth willeth something in particular That deliberation is common to men with beasts as being alternate appetite and not ratiocination and the last act or appetite therein and which is immediately followed by the action the onely will that can be taken notice of by others and which onely maketh an action in publick judgment voluntary That to be free is no more then to do if a man will and if he will to forbear and consequently that this freedome is the freedome of the man and not of the Will That the Will is not free but subject to change by the operation of external causes That all external causes depend necessarily on the first eternal cause God Almighty who worketh in us both to Will and to do by the mediation of second causes That seeing neither man nor any thing else can work upon it self it is impossible that any man in the framing of his own Will should concur with God either as an Actor or as an Instrument That there is nothing brought to passe by fortune as by a cause nor any thing without a cause or concurrence of causes sufficient to bring it so to passe and that every such cause and their concurrence do proceed from the providence good pleasure and working of God and consequently though I do with others call many events Contingent and say they happen yet because they had every of them their several sufficient causes and those causes again their former causes I say they happen necessarily And though we perceive not what they are yet there are of the most Contingent events as necessary causes as of those events whose causes we perceive or else they could not possibly be foreknown as they are by him that foreknoweth all things On the contrary the Bishop maintaineth That the Will is free from necessitation and in order thereto that the Judgment of the understanding is not alwayes practice practicum nor of such a nature in it self as to oblige and determine the Will to one though it be true that Spontaneity and determination to one may consist together That the Will determineth it self and that external things when they change the Will do work upon it not naturally but morally not by natural motion but by moral and Metaphorical motion That when the Will is determined naturally it is not by Gods general influence whereon depend all second causes but by special influence God concurring and powring something into the Will That the Will when it suspends not its Act makes the Act necessary but because it may suspend and not assent it is not absolutely necessary That sinful acts proceed not from Gods Will but are willed by him by a permissive Will not an operative Will and hardeneth the heart of man by a negative obduration That mans Will is in his own power but his motus primo primi not in his own power nor necessary save onely by a Hypothetical necessity That the Will to change is not always a change of Wil That not all things which are produced are produced from sufficient but some things from deficient causes That if the Power of the Will be present in actu primo then therâ— is nothing wanting to the production of the effect That a cause may be sufficient for the production of an effect though it want something necessary to the production thereof because the Will may be wanting That a necessary cause doth not alwayes necessarily produce its effect but onely then when the effect is necessarily produced He proveth also that the Will is free by that universal notion which the World hath of election For when of the six electors the votes are divided equally the King of Bohemia hath a casting voyce That the Prescience of God supposeth no necessity of the future existence of the things foreknown because God is not eternal but eternity and eternity is as standing Now without succession of time and therefore God foresees all things intuitively by the presentiallity they have in Nunc stans which comprehendeth in it all time past present and to come not formally but eminently and vertually That the Will is free even then when it acteth but that is in a compounded not in a divided sense That to be made and to be eternal do consist together because Gods Decrees are made and are nevertheless eternal That the order beauty and perfection of the World doth require that in the universe there should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some free some contingent That though it be true that to morrow it shall rain or not rain yet neither of them is true determinatè That the Doctrine of necessity is a blasphemous desperate and destructive doctrinâ— That it were better to be an Atheist that then to hold it he that maintaineth it is fitter to be refuted with Rodds then with Arguments And now whether this his Doctrine or mine be the more intelligible more rational or more coâ—â—ormable to Gords Word I leave it to the Judgment of the Reader But whatsoever be the truth of the disputed Question the Reader may peradventure think I have not used the Bishop with that respect I ought or without disadvantage of my cause I might have done for which I am to make a short Apologie A little before the last Parliament of the â—â—te King when every man 〈…〉 freely against the then present Government I thought it worth my study to consider the grounds and consequences of such behaviour and whether it were conformable or contrary to reason and to the Word of God and after some time I did put in order and publish my thoughts thereof first in Latine and then again the same in English where I endeavoured to prove both by reason and Scripture That they who have once submitted themselves to any Soveraign Governour either by express acknowledgment of his power or by receiving protection from his Laws are obliged to be true and faithful to him and to acknowledge no other supreme power but him in any matter or question whatsoever either civill or Ecclesiastical In which Books of mine I pursued my subject without taking notice of any particular man that held any opinion contrary to that which I then writ onely in general I maintained that the office of the Clergy in respect of the supreme civil power was not Magisterial but Ministerial and that their teaching of the People was founded up nâ—o other Authority then that of the civil Soveraign and all this without any word tending to the disgrace either of Episcopacy or of Presbytery Nevertheless I find since that divers of them whereof thâ— Bishop of Derry is one have taken offence especially at two things one that I make the supremacy in matters of Religion to residâ— in the civil Soveraign the other that being no Clergy-man I deliver Doctrines and ground them uâ—on Words of the Scripture which Doctrines they being by profession Divines have never taught And in this their displeasure divers of them in their Books and Sermons without answering any of my Arguments have not onely exclâ—iâ—ed against my Doctrine but reviled me and endeavoured to make me hateful 〈…〉 things for which if they knâ—w their own and the Publick good they ought to have given me thanks There is also one of them that taking offence at me for blaming in part the Discipline instituted heretofore and regulated by the Authority of the Pope in the Universities not onely ranks me amongst thosâ— men that would have the Revenue of the Universities diminished and sayes plainly I have no Religion but also thinks me so simple and ignorant of the World as to believe that our Universities maintain Popery And this is the Author of the Book called Vindiciae Academiarum If either of the Universities had thought it self injured I believe it could have Authorised or appointed some member of theirs whereof there be many abler men then he to have made their vinâ—ication But this Vindex as little Doggs to plâ—ase their Masters use to bark in token of their sedulity indifferently at strangers till they be rated off unprovoked by me hath fallen upon me without bidding I have been publiquely injured by many of whom I took no notice supposing that that humour would spend it self but seeing it last and grow higher in this writing I now answer I thought it necessary at last to make of some of them and first of this Bishop an Example FINIS
THE QUESTIONS Concerning LIBERTY NECESSITY And CHANCE Clearly Stated and Debated Between Dr. Bramhall Bishop of Derry And Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury London Printed for Andrew Crook and are to be sold at the Sign of the Green Dragon in St. Pauls Church-yard 1656. To the Reader YOu shall find in this little Volum the Questions concerning Necessity Freedom and Chance which in all Ages have perplexed the minds of curious Men largely and clearly discussed and the Arguments on all sides drawn from the Authority of Scripture from the Doctrine of the Schools from Natural Reason and from the Consequences pertaining to common Life truly alleadged and severely weighed between two persons who both maintain that Men are Free to Do as they Will and to Forbear as they Will. The things they dissent in are that the one holdeth That it is not in a Mans Power now to choose the Will he shall have anon That Chance produceth nothing That all Events and Actions have their Necessary Causes That the Will of God makes the Necessity of all things The other on the contrary maintaineth That not onely the Man is Free to choose what he will Do but the Will also to choose what it shall Will That when a Man willeth a good Action Gods Will concurreth with his else not That the Will may choose whether it will Will or not That many things come to pass without Necessity by Chance That though God foreknow a thing shall be yet it is not Necessary that that thing shall be in as much as God seeth not the future as in its Causes but as present In sum they adheare both of them to the Scripture but one of them is a learned School-Divine the other a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning This is enough to acquaint you withall in the beginning which also shall be more particularly explained by and by in the stating of the Question and dividing of the Arguments into their several heads The rest you shall understand from the persons themselves when they enter Fare ye well T. H. THE OCCASION OF THE CONTROVERSIE WHether whatsoever comes to passe proceed from Necessitie or some things from Chance has been a Question disputed amongst the old Philosophers long time before the Incarnation of our Saviour without drawing into argument on either side the almightie power of the Deity But the third way of bringing things to passe distinct from Necessitie and Chance namely Freewill is a thing that never was mentioned amongst them nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity For St. Paul that disputes that question largely and purposely never useth the term of Freewill nor did he hold any Doctrine aequivalent to that which is now called the Doctrine of Freewill but deriveth all actions from the irresistible Will of God and nothing from the will of him that runneth or willeth But for some ages past the Doctors of the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of Gods Will the Will of Man and brought in a Doctrine that not onely Man but also his Will is Free and determined to this or that action not by the Will of God nor necessary causes but by the power of the Will it Self And though by the reformed Churches instructed by Luther Calvin and others this opinion was cast out yet not many years since it began again to be reduced by Arminius and his followers and became the readiest way to Ecclesiastical promotion and by discontenting those that held the contrary was in some part the cause of the following troubles which troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at Paris where we discoursed together of the Argument now in hand from which Discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion and for ough I remember without any offensive words as blasphemous atheistical or the like passing between us either for that the Bishop was not then in passion or suppressed his passion being then in the presence of my Lord of Newcastle But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship his opinion concerning the question in writing and desired him to perswade me to send an answer thereunto likewise in writing There were some reasons for which I thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad yet the many obligations wherein I was obliged to him prevailed with me to write this answer which was afterwards not onely without my knowledge but also against my will published by one that found means to get a Copy of it surreptitiously And thus you have the Occasion of this Controversie The State of the Question THe Question in general is stated by the Bishop himself towards the end of Numb 3. in these words Whether all Events Natural Civil Moral for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner that concernes not this question be praedetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concurrence so as all the actions and events which either are or shall be cannot but be nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place time number measure order nor to any other end than they are And all this in respect of the supream cause or a concourse of extrinsecall causes determining them to one Which though drawn up to his advantage with as much caution as he would do a Lease yet excepting that which is not intelligible I am content to admit Not intelligible is First that the conversion of a sinner concerns not the Question If he mean that the conversion of a sinner is from necessity and praedetermined then he is for so much as the Question concerns Religion of the same mind that I am and what he can mean else by that exception I cannot guesse Secondly these words without their own concurrence are insignificant unless he mean that the events themselves should concurre to their production as that fire doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning as the words properly import or at least without concurrence of the fuell Those two clauses left out I agree with him in the state of the Question as it is put universally But when the Question is put of the necessity of any particular event as of the Will to write or the like then it is the stating of that particular Question but it is decided in the decision of the Question universall He states the same Question againe â—n another place thus This is the very Question where the water sticks between us Whether there be such a Liberty free from necessitation and extrinsecall determination to one or not And I allow it also for well stated so Again he sayes In a word so great difference there is between Natural and Moral efficacy as there is between his opinion and mine in this Question So that the state of the Question is reduced to this Whether there be a Moral efficacy which is not Natural I say there is not he sayes there is Again he writes thus And
they know not whether necessarily or not But the Bishop thinking Contingent to be that which is not necessary instead of arguing against our knowledge of the necessity of things to come argueth against the necessity it self Again he supposeth that Free and Contingent causes might have suspended or denied their concurrence From which it followeth that Free causes and Contingent causes are not causes of themselves but concurrent with other causes and therefore can produce nothing but as they are guided by those causes with which they concur for it is strange he should say they might have concurred after another manner for I conceave not how when this runneth one way and that another that they can be said to concur that is run together And this his concurrence of causes contingent maketh he saith the cast of Ambs-ace not to have been absolutely necessary Which cannot be conceaved unless it had hindred it and then it had made some other cast necessary perhaps Deux-ace which serveth me as well For that which he saith of suspending his concurrence of casting sooner or later of altering the casters force and the like accidents serve not to take away the necessity of Ambs-ace otherwise then by making a necessity of Deux-ace or other cast that shall be thrown d Thirdly that which T. H. makes the Question is not the Question c. He hath very little reason to say this He requested me to tell him my opinion in writing concerning Free-will Which I did and did let him know a man was Free in those things that were in his power to follow his will but that he was not Free to Will that is that his will did not follow his will which I expressed in these words the Question is whether the will to write or the will to forbear come upon a man according to his will or according ta any thing else in his own power He that cannot understand the difference between Free to do if he will and Free to will is not fit as I have said in the Stating of the Question to hear this Controversie disputed much less to be a writer in it His consequence if a man be not Free to will he is not a Free nor a Voluntary Agent and his saying the Freedome of the Agent is from the Freedome of the Will is put here without proof nor is there any considerable proof of it through the whole Book â—ereafter offered For why he never before had heard I believe of any distinction between Free to do and Free to will which makes him also say if the Will have not power over it self the Agent is no more Free than a Staff in a mans hand As if it were not Freedome enough for a man to do what he will unless his Will also have power over his Will aâ—d that his Will be not the power it self but must have another power within it to do all voluntary acts c If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever what a man shall Will and what he shall not Will and what he shall write and what he shall not write to what purpose is this power c. It is to this purpose that all those things may be brought to passe which God hath from Eternity predetermined It is therefore to no purpose here to say that God and Nature hath made nothing in vain But see what weak Arguments he brings next which though answered in that which is gone before yet if I answer not again he will say they are too hot for my fingers One is If the Agent be determined what he shall Will and what he shall Act Then he is no more Free to Act than he is to Will as if the Will being necessitated the doing of what we Will were not Liberty Another is If a man be Free to Act he is much more Free to Will because Quod efficit tale illud magis est tale as if he should say if I make him angry then I am more angry because Quod efficit c. The third is If the Will be determined then the writing is determined and he ought not to say he may write but he must write T is true it followeth that he must write but it doth not follow I ought to say he must write unless he would have me say more than I know as himself doth often in this Reply After his Arguments come his difficult Questions If the Will of man be determined without his Will or without any thing in his power why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not I answer Because we desire to know and cannot know but by their telling nor then neither for the most part Why do vve represent reasons to them Why do vve pray them Why do we intreat them I answer because thereby we think to make them have the Will they have not Why do we blame them I answer because th'y please us not I might ask him whether blaming be any thing else but saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect May not we say a Horse is lame though his lameness came from necessity or that a man is a fool or a knave if he be so though he could not help it To what purpose did our Saviour say to the Paralytique person Wilt thou be made clean if his Will vvere extrinsecally determined I answer that it was not because he would know for he knew it before but because he would draw from him a confession of his want We have piped unto you and ye have not danced how could they help it I answer they could not help it I vvould have gathered your Children as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her vvings but ye vvould not Hovv easily might they ansvver according to T. H. his doctrine Alas blame not us our vvills are not in our ovvn povver I answer they are to be blamed though their Wills be not in their own power Is not good good and evill evill though they be not in our power and shall not I call them so and is not that Praise and Blame But it seems the Bishop takes blame not for the dispraise of a thing but for a praetext and colour of malice and revenge against him he blameth And where he sayes our Wills are in our power he sees not that he speaks absurdly for he ought to say the Will is the Power and through ignorance detecteth the same fault in St. Austin who saith our Will should not be a Will at all if it were not in our power that is to say if it were not in our Will f This is the belief of all mankind which we have not learned from our Tutors but is imprinted in our hearts by Nature c. This piece of Eloquence is used by Cicero in his defence of Milo to prove it lawful for a man to resist force with force or to keep himself from killing which the Bishop thinking himself able to make
it s left to her Husbands choice either to establish it or to make it void And Josh. 24. 15. Choose you this day whom you will serve c. But I and my house will serve the Lord. He makes his own choice and leaves them to the liberty of their election And 2 Sam. 24 12. I offer thee three things choose thee which of them I shall do If one of these three things was necessarily determined and the other two impossible how was it left to him to choose what should be done Therefore we have true liberty T. H. ANd the first place of Scripture taken from Numb 30. 14 is one of them that look another way The words are If a Wife make a vow it is left to her Husbands choice either to establish it or make it void for it prooves no more but that the Husband is a free or voluntary Agent but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose by praecedent necessary causes J. D. MY first Argument from Scripture is thus formed Arg. 1. Whosoever have a liberty or power of election are not determined to one by praecedent necessary causes But men have liberty of election The assumption or minor proposition is prooved by three places of Scripture Numb 30. 14. Josh. 24. 15. 2 Sam. 24. 12. I need not insist upon these because T. H. acknowledgeth that it is clearly prooved that there is election in Man But he denieth the major Proposition because saith he Man is necessitated or determined to what he shall choose by praecedent necessary causes I take away this answer three wayes First by Reason Election is evermore either of things 1. possible or at least of things conceived to be possible that is efficacious election when a man hopeth or thinketh of obteining the object Whatsoever the will chooseth it chooseth under the notion of good either honest or delightful or profitable but there can be no reall goodness apprehended in that which is known to be impossible It is true there may be some wandring pendulous wishes of known impossibilities as a man also that hath comitted an offence may wish he had not committed it but to choose efficaciously an impossibility is as impossible as an impossibility it self No man can think to obtein that which he knows impossible to be obteined but he who knows that all things are antecedently determined by necessary causes knows that it is impossible for any thing to be otherwise than it is Therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election to choose this or that indifferently is to make the same thing to be determined to one and to be not determined to one which are contradictories Again whosoever hath an elective power or a liberty to choose hath also a liberty or power to refuse Isa. 7. 10. Before the Child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good He who chooseth this rather than that refuseth that rather than this As Moses choosing to suffer affliction with the people of God did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin Heb. 11. 24. But no man hath any power to refuse that which is necessarily praedetermined to be unlesse it be as the Fox refused the Grapes which were beyond his reach When one thing of two or three is absolutely determined the other are made thereby simply impossible a Secondly I proove it by instances and by that universal 2. notion which the world hath of election what is the difference between an elective and hereditary Kingdom but that in an elective Kingdom they have power or liberty to choose this or that Man indifferently But in an hereditary Kingdome they have no such power nor liberty Where the Law makes a certain Heir there is a necessitation to one where the Law doth not name a certain Heir there is no necessitation to one and there they have power or liberty to choose An haereditary prince may be as grateful and acceptable to his subjects and as willingly received by them according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or violence as he who is chosen yet he is not therefore an elective Prince In Germany all the Nobility and Commons may assent to the choice of the Emperour or be well pleased with it when it is concluded yet none of them elect or choose the Emperour but onely those six Princes who have a consultative deliberative and determinative power in his Election And if their votes or suffrages be equally divided three to three then the King of Bohemia hath the casting voice So likewise in Corporations or Common-wealths sometimes the People sometimes the Common Councell have power to name so many persons for such an office and the Supreme Magistrate or Senate or lesser Councel respectively to choose one of those And all this is done with that caution and secrecy by billets or other means that no man knowes which way any man gave his vote or with whom to be offended If it were necessarily and inevitably predetermined that this individual person and no other shall and must be chosen what needed all this circuit and caution to do that which is not possible to be done otherwise which one may do as well as a thousand and for doing of which no rational man can be offended if the electors were necessarily predetermined to elect this man and no other And though T. H. was pleased to passe by my University instance yet I may not untill I see what he is able to say unto it The Junior of the Mess in Cambridge divides the meat in four parts the Senior chooseth first then the second and third in their order The Junior is determined to one and hath no choice left unless it be to choose whether he will take that part which the rest have refused or none at all It may be this part is more agreable to his mind that any of the others would have been but for all that he cannot be said to choose it because he is determined to this one Even such a liberty of election is that which is established by T. H. Or rather much worse in two respects The Junior hath yet a liberty of contradiction left to choose whether he will take that part or not take any part but he who is precisely predetermined to the choice of this object hath no liberty to refuse it Secondly the Junior by dividing carefully may preserve to himself an equal share but he who is wholly determined by extrinsecal causes is left altogether to the mercy and disposition of another Thirdly I proove it by the texts alleadged Numb 30. 3. 13. If a Wife make a vow it is left to her Husbands choice either to establish it or make it void But if it be predetermined that he shall establish it it is not in his power to make it void If it be predetermined that he shall make it void it is not in his power to establish it
Free acts and Voluntary acts but he saith I confound them and make them the same In his Reply Number 2. he saith that for the clearing of the Question we are to know the difference between these three Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty and because I thought he knew that it could not be cleared without under standing what is Will I had reason to think that Spontaneity was his new word for Will And presently after some things are Necessary and not Voluntary or Spontaneous some things are both Necessary and Voluntary These words Voluntary and Spontaneous so put together would make any man beleeve Spontaneous weâ—e put as explicative of Voluntary for it is no wonder in the eloquence of the School men Therefore presently after these words Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the Appetite either intellectual or sensitive signifie that Spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the object which to me soundeth as if he had said that the Appetite is like the Object which is as proper as if he had said the Hunger is like the Meat If this be the Bishops meaning as it is the meaning of the Words he is a very fine Philosopher But hereafter I will venture no more to say his meaning is this or that especially were he useth terms of Art c Thirdly he saith I ascribe spontaneity onely to Fools Children mad Men and Beasts But I acknowledge Spontaneity hath place in rataonal men c. I resolve to have no more to do with Spontaneity But I desire the Reader to take notice that the common people on whose arbitration dependeth the signification of words in comâ—â—n use among the Latines and Greeks did call all actions and motions whereof they did perceive no cause Spantaneous and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I say not those actions which had no causes for all actions have their causes but those actions whose causes they did not perceive So that Spontaneous as a general name comprehended many actions and motions of inanimate creatures as the falling of heavy things downwards which they thought spantaneous and that if they were not hindred they would discend of their own accord It comprehended also all animal motion as beginning from the Will or Appetite because the causes of the Will and Appetite being not perceived they supposed as the Bishop doth that they were the causes of themselves So that that which in general is called Spontâ—neous being applyed to Men and Beasts in special is called Voluntary Yet the Will and Appetite though the very same thing use to be distinguished in certain occasions For in the publique conversation of Men where they are to judge of one anothers Will and of the regularity and irregularity of one anothers actions not every Appetite but the last is esteemed in the publique judgement for the Will Nor every action proceeding from Appetite but that onely to which there had preceded or ought to have preceded some deliberation And this I say is so when one man is to judge of anothers Will. For every man in himself knoweth that what he desireth or hath an appetite to the same he hath a will to though his will may be changed before he hath obteined his desire The Bishop understanding nothing of this might if it had pleased him have called it Jargon But he had rather pick out of it some contradictions of my self And therefore saith d Yet I have no reason to be offended at it meaning such contradictions for he dealeth no otherwise with me than he doth with himself It is a contradiction he saith that having said that voluntary presupposeth deliberation I say in another place that whatsoever followeth the last appetite is voluntary and where there is but one appetite that is the last Not observing that voluntary presuppâ—seth deliberation when the judgement whether the action be voluntary or not is not in the Actor but in the Judge who regardeth not the will of the Actor where there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice yet knoweth that though there be but one appetite the same is truly will for the time and the action if it follow a voluntary action This also he saith is a contradction that having said no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation though never so suddain I say afterward that by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding Again he observes not that the action of a man that is not a child in publique judgement how rash inconsiderate and suddain soever it be is to be taken for deliberation because it is supposed he ought to have considered and compared his intended action with the Law when nevertheless that suddain and indeliberate action was truly voluntary Another contradiction which he finds is this that having undertaken to proove that Children before they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect I say by and by after a Child may be so young as to do what he doth without all deliberation I yet see no contradiction here for a Child may be so young as that the appetite thereof is its first appetite but afterward and often before it come to have the use of reason may elect one thing and refuse another and consider the consequences of what it is about to do And why not as well as Beasts which never have the use of reason for they deliberate as men do For though men and beasts do differ in many things very much yet they differ not in the nature of their deliberation A man can reckon by words of general signification make propositions and syllogismes and compute in numbers magnitudes proportions and other things computable which being done by the advantage of language and words of general significations a beast that hath not language cannot do nor a man that hath language if he misplace the words that are his counters From hence to the end of this Number he discourseth again of Spontaneity and how it is in Children mad Men and Beasts which as I before resolved I will not meddle with let the Reader think and judge of it us he pleaseth J. D. SEcondly a they who might have done and may do many things which they leave undone And they who leave undone many things which they might do are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what they do but have true liberty But we might do many things which we do not and we do many things which we might leave undone as is plain 1 King 3. 11. Because thou hast asked this thing and hast not asked for thy self long life neither hast asked riches for thy self nor hast asked the life of thine enemies c. God gave Solomon his choice He might have asked riches but then he not had asked wisdom which he did ask He did ask wisdom but he might have asked riches which yet he did not ask And Acts 5. 4. After it was sold was it not in thine own power It was in his own power
the sin of David in killing Uriah Nor when one is cause both of the action and of the Law how another can be cause of the disagreement between them no more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment another can make the inequality that is between them This I know God cannot sin because his doing a thing makes it just and consequently no sin And because whatsoever can sin is subject to anothers Law which God is not And therefore t is blasphemy to say God can sin But to say that God can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man I do not see how it is any dishonour to him Howsoever if such or other distinctions can make it clear that St. Paul did not think Esaus or Pharaohs actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God or that proceeding from his will could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished I will as soon as I understand them turn unto J. D's opinion For I now hold nothing in all this Question between us but what seemeth to me not obscurely but most expresly said in this place by Saint Paul And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture J. D. T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone and satisfie two Arguments with one answer whereas in truth he satisfieth neither First for my third reason a Though all he say here were as true as an Oracle Though punishment were an act of dominion not of Justice in God yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act or why he should chide or expostulate with men why they did that which he himself did necessitate them to do and whereof he was the actor more than they they being but as the stone but he the hand that threw it Notwithstanding any thing which is pleaded here this Stoical opinion doth stick hypocrisie and dissimulation close to God who is Truth it self And to my fift Argument which he changeth and relateth amiss as by comparing mine with his may appear His chiefest answer is to oppose a difficult place of St. Paul Rom. 9. 11. Hath he never heard that to propose adoubt is not to answer an Argument Nec bene respondet qni litem lite resolvit But I will not pay him in his own coin Wherefore to this place alledged by him I answer The case is not the same The Question moved there is how God did keep his promise made to Abraham to be the God of him and of his seed if the Jews who were the legimate progeny of Abraham were deserted To which the Apostle answers ver 6 7 8. That that promise was not made to the carnal seed of Abraham that is the Jewes but to his spiritual Sons which were the Heirs of his Faith that is to the beleeving Christians which answer he explicateth first by the Allegory of Isaack and Ishmael and after in the place cited of Esau and of Jacob. Yet neither doth he speak there so much of their persons as of their posterities And though some words may be accommodated to Gods predestination which are there uttered yet it is not the scope of that text to treat of the reprobation of any man to Hell fire All the posterity of Esau were not eternally reprobated as holy Job and many others But this Question which is now agitated between us is quite of another nature how a man can be a criminal who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsecally necessitated to do or how God in Justice can punish a man with eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone That he who did imprint the motion in the heart of man should punish man who did only receive the impression from him So his answer looks another way But because he grounds so much upon this text that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion I will examine all those passages which may seem to favour his cause First these words ver 11. being not yet borne neither having done any good or evil upon which the whole weight of his argument doth depend have no reference at all to those words ver 13. Jacob have I loved and Esau have I hated for those words were first uttered by the Prophet Malachy many ages after Jacob and Esau were dead Mal. 1. 2. and intended of the posterity of Esau who were not redeemed from captivity as the Israelites were But they are referred to those other words ver 12. The elder shall serve the younger which indeed were spoken before Jacob or Esau were Born Gen. 5. 23. And though those words of Malachy had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were Born yet it had advantaged his cause nothing for hatred in that text doth not signifie any reprobation to the flames of Hell much less the execution of that decree or the actual imposition of punishment nor any act contrary to love God saw all that he had made and it was very good Goodness it self cannot hate that which is good But hatred there signifies Comparative hatred or a less degree of love or at the most a negation of love As Gen. 29. 31. When the Lord saw that Leah was hated we may not conclude thence that Jocob hated his Wife The precedent verse doth fully expound the sense ver 30. Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah So Mat. 6. 24. No man can serve two Masters for either he will hate the one and lóve the other So Luke 14. 26. If any man hate not his Father and Mother c. he cannot be my Disciple St. Matthew tells us the sense of it Mat. 10. 37. He that loveth Father or Mother more than me is not worthy of me Secondly those words ver 15. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy do prove no more but this that the preferring of Jacob before Esau and of the Christians before the Jewes was not a debt from God either to the one or to the other but a work of mercy And what of this All men confess that Gods mercies do exceed mans deserts but Gods punishments do never exceed mans misdeeds As we see in the Parable of the Labourers Matth. 20. Friend I do the no wrong did not I agree with thee for a penny Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as I will Is thy eye evil because I am good Acts of mercy are free but acts of Justice are due That which followes ver 17. comes something nearer the cause The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh for this same purpose I have raised the up that is I have made thee a King or I have preserved thee that I might shew my power in thee But this particle that doth not alwaies signifie the main end of an action but sometimes only a consequent of it As Matt. 2. 15. He departed into Egypt that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the
opinion of T. H almost as there are words Here we learn that God is rich in goodness and will not punish his creatures for that which is his own act Secondly that he suffers and forbeares sinners long and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve Thirdly that the reason of Gods forbearance is to bring men to repentance Fourthly that hardness of heart and impenitency is not causally from God but from our selves Fiftly that it is not the insufficient proposal of the means of their conversion on Gods ' part which is the cause of mens perdition but their own contempt and despising of these means Sixtly that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion but an act of righteous judgement whereby God renders to every man according to his own deeds wrath to them and only to them who treasure up wrath unto themselves eternal life to those who continue patiently in well-doing If they deserve such punishment who only neglect the goodness and long suffering of God what do they who utterly deny it and make Gods doing and his suffering to be all one I do beseech T. H. to consider what a degree of wilfulness it is out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood to contradict the clear current of the whole Scripture Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter 1 Pet. 3. 22. The long suffering of God waited once in the daies of Noah And 2 Pet. 3. 15. Account that the long suffering of the Lord is salvation This is the name God gives himself Exod. 34. 6. The Lord the Lord God mercyful and gracious long suffering c. b Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true That he who doth permit any thing to be done which it is in his power to hinder knowing that if he do not hinder it it will be done doth in some sort will it I say in some sort that is either by an antecedent will or by a consequent will either by an operative will or by a permissive will or he is willing to let it be done but not willing to do it Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer that to be done which otherwise he would not suffer So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the Lions den to make good his rash decree So Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded to make good his rash oath How much more may the immutable rule of justice in God and his fidelity in keeping his word draw from him the punishment of obstinate sinners though antecedently he willeth their conversion He loveth all his creatures well but his own Justice better Again sometimes a man suffereth that to be done which he doth not will directly in it self but indirectly for some other end or for the producing of some greater good As a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body to save the life of the whole Or as a Judge being desirous to save a malefactors life and having power to reprieve him doth yet condemn him for example sake that by the death of one he may save the lives of many Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruine so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of his glory and for the greater benefit of his faithful servants This is a most certain truth that God would not suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out of evil Yet this ought not to be understood as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of God but onely of Nature Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted the other respects him as he is lapsed The objects are the same but considered after a diverse manner Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God for they are the same with the divine essence which is one But the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed Nor lastly do we make this permission to be a naked or a meer permission God causeth all good pemitteth all evil disposeth all things both good and evill c T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action I answer because he concurres to the doing of evill by a general but not by a speciall influence As the Earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants as well to Hemlock as to Wheat but the reason why the one yeilds food to our sustenance the other poison to our destruction is not from the general nourishment of the Earth but from the special quality of the root Even so the general power to act is from God In him we live and move and have our being This is good But the specification and determination of this general power to the doing of any evill is from our selves and proceeds from the free will of man This is bad And to speak properly the free will of man is not the efficient cause of sin as the root of the Hemlock is of poison sin having no true entity or being in it as poison hath But rather the deficient cause Now no defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection d Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God The general power to act is from God but the specification of this general and good power to murther or to any particular evil is not from God but from the free will of man So T. H. may see clearly if he will how one may be the cause of the Law and likewise of the action in some sort that is by general influence and yet another cause concurring by special influence and determining this general and good power may make it self the true cause of the anomy or the irregularity And therefore he may keep his longer and shorter garments for some other occasion Certainly they will not fit this subject unless he could make general and special influence to be all one But T. H. presseth yet further that the case is the same and the objection used by the Jews ver 19. Why doth he yet find fault who hath resisted his will is the very same with my argument And St. Pauls answer ver 20. O man who art thou that repliest against God shall the thing formed say to him that formed it why hast thou made me thus Hath not the Potter power over his Clay c is the very same with his answer in this place drawn from the irresistible power and absolute dominion of God which justifieth all his actions And that the Apostle in his answer doth not deny that it was Gods will nor that Gods decree was before Esaus sin To which I reply First that the case is
of his in his Book de Cive cap. 6. pag. 70. ascribes to power respectively irresistible or to Soveraign Magistrates whose power he makes to be as absolute as a mans power is over himself not to be limitted by any thing but onely by their strength The greatest propugners of Soveraign power think it enough for Princes to challenge an immunity from coercive power but acknowledge that the Law hath a directtive power over them But T. H. will have no limits but their strength Whatsoever they do by power they do justly But saith he God objected no sin to Job but justified his afflicting him by his power First this is an Argument from authority negatively that is to say worth nothing Secondly the afflictions of Job were no vindicatory punishments to take vengeance of his sins whereof we dispute but probarory chasstisements to make triall of his graces Thirdly Iob was not so pure but that God might justly have laid greater punishments upon him than those afflictions which he suffered Witness his impatience even to the cursing of the day of his nativity Job 3. 3. Indeed God said to Job where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth Job 38. 4. that is how canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou wast born or comprehend the secret causes of my judgements And Job 42. 9. Hast thou an arm like God As if he should say why art thou impatient doest thou think thy self able to strive with God But that God should punish Job without desert here is not a word Concerning the blind man mentioned John 9. his blindness was rarher a blessing to him than a punishment being the means to raise his Soul illuminated and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body is common to us with Ants and Flies but the sight of the soul with the blessed Angels We read of some who have put out their bodily eyes because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the Soul Again neither he nor his parents were innocent being conceived and born in sin and iniquity Psal. 51. 5. And in many things we offend all Jam. 3. 2. But our Saviours meaning is evident by the Disciples question ver 2. They had not so sinned that he should be born blind Or they were not more grievous sinners than other men to deserve an examplary judgment more than they but this corporal blindness befel him principally by the extraordinary providence of God for the manifestation of his own glory in restoring him to his sight So his instance halts on both sides neither was this a punishment nor the blind man free from sin His third instance of the death and torments of Beasts is of no more weight than the two former The death of brute Beasts is not a punishment of sin but a debt of nature And though they be often slaughtered for the use of man yet there is a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs and the unsufferable and endless pains of hell between the meer depriving of a creature of remporal life and the subjecting of it to eternal death I know the Philosophical speculations of some who affirme that entity is better than non-entity that it is better to be miserable and suffer the tormenss of the damned than to be annihilated and cease to be altogether This entity which they speak of is a Metaphysical entity abstracted from the matter which is better than non-entity in respect of some goodness not moral nor natural but trancendental which accompanies every being But in the concrete it is far otherwise where that of our Saviour often takes place Mat. 26. 24. Woe unto that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed It had been good for that man that he had not been born I add that there is an Analogical Juctice and Mercy due even to the brute Beasts Thou shalâ— not musâ—â—e the mouth of the Oxe that treadeth out the corn And a just man is merciful to his Beast f But his greatest errour is that which I touched before to make Justice to be the proper result of Power Power doth not measure and regulate Justice but Justice measures and regulates Power The Will of God and the Eternal Law which is in God himself is properly the rule and measure of Justice As all goodness whether Natural or Moral is a participation of divine goodness and all created Rectitude is but a participation of divine Rectitude so all Lawes are but participations of the eternall Law from whence they derive their power The rule of Justice then is the same both in God and us but it is in God as in him that doth regulate and measure in us as in those who are regulated and measured As the Will of God is immutable alwayes willing what is just and right and good So his justice likewise is immutable And that individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us cannot possibly proceed from the special influence and determinative power of a just cause See then how grossely T. H. doth understand that old and true principle that the Will of God is the rule of Justice as if by willing things in themselves unjust he did render them just by reason of his absolute dominion and irresistible power as fire doth assimilate other things to it self and convert them into the nature of fire This were to make the eternal Law a Lesbian rule Sin is defined to be that which is done or said or thought contrary to the eternall Law But by this doctrine nothing is done nor said nor thought contrary to the Will of God St. Anselm said most truly then the will of man is good and just and right when he wills that which God would have him to will but according to this doctrine every man alwayes wills that which God would have him to will If this be true we need not pray Thy Will be done in earth as it is in heaven T. H. hath devised a new kind of heaven upon earth The worst is it is an heaven without Justice Justice is a constant and perpetual act of the Will to give every one his own But to inflict punishment for those things which the Judge himself did determine and necessitate to be done is not to give every one his own right punitive Justice is a relation of equallity and proportion between the demerit and the punishment But supposing this opinion of absolute and universal necessity there is no demerit in the World we use to say that right springs from Law and Fact as in this Syllogism Every thief ought to be punished there 's the Law But such an one is a thief there 's the Fact therefore he ought to be punished there 's the right But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to be punished neither upon Law nor upon Fact but upon the irresistible power of God Yea it overturneth as much as in
it lies all Law First the eternall Law which is the ordination of divine Wisdom by which all Creaturs are directed to that end which is convenient for them that is not to necessitate them to eternall flames Then the Law participated which is the ordination of right reason instituted for the common good to shew unto man vvhat he ought to do and what he ought not to do To vvhat purpose is it to shevv the right vvay to him vvho is dravvn and haled a contrary vvay by Adamantine bonds of inevitalbe necessity g Lastly hovvsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin yet in truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin For he makes him to be the cause not onely of the Lavv and of the action but even of the irregularity it self and the difference betvveen the Action and the Lavv vvherein the very essence of sin doth consist He makes God to determine Davids Will and necessitate him to kill Uriah In causes physically and essentially subordiuate the cause of the cause is evermore the casue of the effect These are those deadly fruits vvhich spring from the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all things vvhich T. H. seeing and that neither the sins of Esau nor Pharaoh nor any vvicked person do proceed from the operative but from the permissive Will of God and that punishment is an act of Justice not of dominion onely I hope that according to his promise he vvill change his opinion Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number XII THE Bishop had argued in this manner If there be no Liberty there shall be no last Judgement no Revvards nor Punishments after death To this I answered that though God cannot sin because what he doth his doing maketh just and because he is not subject to anothers Law and that therefore it is blasphemy to say that God can sin yet to say that God hath so ordered the world that sin may necessarily be committed is not blasphemy And I can also further say though God be the cause of all motion and of all actions and therefore unless sin be no motion nor action it must derive a necessity from the first mover nevertheless it cannot be said that God is the Author of sin because not he that necessitateth an action but he that doth command and warrant it is the Author And if God own an action though otherwise it were sin it is now no sin The act of the Israelites in robbing the Egyptians of their Jewels without Gods warrant had been theft But it was neither theft cousonage nor sin supposing they knew the warrant was from God The rest of my answer to that inconvenience was an opposing to his inconveniences the manifest Texts of St. Paul Rom. 9. The substance of his Reply to my Answer is this a Though punishment vvere an act of dominion not of Justice in God yet this is no sufficient cause vvhy God should deny his ovvn act or vvhy he should chide or expostulate vvith men vvhy they did that vvhich he himself did necessitate them to do I never said that God denied his act but that he may expostulate with men And this may be I shall never say directly it is the reason of that his expostulation viz. to convince them that their wills were not independent but were his meer gift and that to do or not to do is not in him that willeth but in God that hath mercy on or hardeneth whom he will But the Bishop interpreteth hardening to be a permission of God Which is to attribute to God in such actions no more than he might have attributed to any of Pharaohs servants the not perswading their Master to let the People goe And whereas he compares this permission to the indulgence of a parent that by his patience incourageth his son to become more rebellious which indulgence is a sin he maketh God to be like a sinful man And indeed it seemeth that all they that hold this Freedome of the Will concieve of God no otherwise than the common sort of Jewes did that God was like a man that he had been seen by Moses and after by the seventy Elders Exod 9. 10. Expounding that and other places literally Again he saith that God is said to harden the heart permissively but not operatively which is the same distinction with his first namely negatively not positively and with his second occasionally and not causally so that all his three wayes how God hardens the heart of wicked meu come to this one of permission which is as much as to say God sees looks on and dâ—th nothing nor ever did any thing in the business Thus you see how the Bishoâ— expoundeth St. Paul Therefore I will leave the rest of his â—…mentary upon Rom. 9. to the judgement of the Reader to think of the same as he pleaseth b Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H saith That he who doth permit any thing to be done which it is in his power to hinder knowing that if he do not hinder it it will be done doth in some sort will it I say in some sort that is either by an antecedent Will or by a consequent Will either by an operative Will or by a permissive Will or he is willing to let it be done but not willing to do it Whether it be called antecedent or consequent or operative or permissive it is enough for the necessity of the thing that the heart of Pharaoh should be hardened and if God were not willing to do it I cannot conceive how it could be done without him c T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the Action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the Action I answer because he concurres to the doing of evil by a general but not by a special influence I had thought to passe over this place because of the non-sense of general and special influence seeing he saith that God concurres to the doing of evil I desire the Reader would take notice that if he blame me for speaking of God as of a necessitating cause and as it were a principal Agent in the causing of all Actions he may with as good reason blame himself for making him by concurrence an accessory to the same and indeed let men hold what they will contrary to the truth if they write much the truth will fall into their pens But he thinks he hath a similitude which will make this permissive Will a very clear business The earth saith he gives nourishment to all kinds of plants as well to Hemlock as to Wheat but the reason why the one yeilds food to our sustenance the other poison to our destruction is not from the general nourishment of the earth but from the special quality of the root It seemeth by this similitude he thinketh that God doth not operatively but premissively Will that the root of Hemlock should poison the man that eateth it
a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs and the unsufferable and endless pains of Hell As if the length or the greatness of the pain made any difference in the justice or injustice of the inflicting it f But his greatest error is that which I touched before to make Justice to be the proper result of Power He would make men beleeve I hold all things to be just that are done by them who have power enough to avoid the punishment This is one of his pretty little policies by which I find him in many occasions to take the measure of his own wisdom I said no more but that the Power which is absolutely irrefistible makes him that hath it above all Law so that nothing he doth can be unjust But this Power can be no other than the Power divine Therefore let him preach what he will upon his mistaken text I shall leave it to the Reader to consider of it without any further answer g Lastly howsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin yet in truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin for he makes him to be the cause not onely of the Law and of the Action but even of the irregularity it self c. wherein the very essence of sin doth consist I think there is no man but understands no not the Bishop himself but that where two things are compared the similitude or dissimilitude regularity or irregularity that is between them is made in and by the making of the things themselves that are compared The Bishop therefore that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity denies him to be the cause both of the Law and of the Action So that by his doctrine there shall be a good Law whereof God shall be no cause and an Action that is a local motion that shall depend upon another first Mover that is not God The rest of this Number is but railing J. D. Proofs of Liberty drawn from Reason THe first Argument is Herculeum or Baculinum drawn Numb 13. Arg. 1. from that pleasant passage between Zeno and his man The servaâ—t had committed some pettilarceny and the Master was cudgeling him well for it The servant thinks to creep under his Masters blind side and pleads for himself That the necessity of destiny did compell him to steal The Master answers the same necessity of destiny compels me to beat thee He that denies Liberty is fitter to be refuted with rodds than with arguments until he confess that it is free for him that beats him either to continue striking or to give over that is to have true Liberty T. H. OF the Arguments from Reason the first is that which he saith is drawn from Zenos beating of his wan which is therefore called Argumentum baculinum that is to say a wooden Argument The story is this Zeno held that all actions were necessary His man therefore hâ—ing for some fault beaten excused himself upon the necessity of it To avoid this excuse his Master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him So that not he that maintaiued but he that derided the necessity of things was beaten contrary to that he would infer And the Argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story J. D. VVHether the Argument be withdrawn from the story or the answer withdrawn from the argument let the Reader judge T. H. mistakes the scope of the reason the strength whereof doth not lie neither in the authority of Zeno a rigid Stoick which is not worth a button in this cause Nor in the servants being an adversary to Stoical necessity for it appears not out of the story that the servant did deride necessity but rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own justification Now in the success of the fray we were told even now that no power doth justifie an action but onely that which is irresistible Such was not Zenos And therefore it advantageth neither of their causes neither that of Zeno nor this of T. H. What if the servant had taken the staff out of his Masters hand and beaten him soundly would not the same argument have served the man as well as it did the Master that the necessity of destiny did compell him to strike again Had not Zeno smarted justly for his Paradox And might not the spectators well have taken up the Judges Apothegm concerning the dispute between Corax and his Scholar An ill egg of an ill bird But the strength of this argument lies partly in the ignorance of Zeno that great Champion of necessity and the beggarliness of his cause which admitted no defence but with a cudgel No man saith the servant ought to be beaten for doing that which he is compelled inevitably to do but I am compelled inevitably to steal The major is so evident that it cannot be denied If a strong man shall take a weak mans hand perforce and do violence with it to a third person he whose hand is forced is innocent and he onely culpable who compelled him The minor was Zenos own doctrine what answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant very learnedly he denied the conclusion and cudgelled his servant telling him in effect that though there was no reason why he should be beaten yet there was a necessity why he must be beaten And parttly in the evident absurdity of such an opinion which deserves not to be confuted with reasons but with rods There are four things said the Philosopher which ought not to be called into question First such things where of it is wickedness to doubt as whether the soul be immortal whether there be a God such an one should not be confuted with reasons but cast into the Sea with a milstone about his neck as unworthy to breath the air or to behold the light Secondly such things as are above the capacity of reason as among Christians the mystery of the holy Trinity Thirdly such principles as are evidently true as that two and two are four in Arithmetick that the whole is greater than the part in Logick Fourthly such things as are obvious to the senses as whether the snow be white He who denied the heat of the fire was justly sentenced to be scorched with fire and he that denied motion to be beaten until he recanted So he who denies all Liberty from necessitation should be scourged untill he become an humble suppliant to him that whips him and confesse that he hath power either to strike or to hold his hand T. H. IN this Number 13. which is about Zeno and his man there is contained nothing necessary to the instruction of the Reader Therefore I pass it over J. D. SEcondly this very perswasion that there is no true Liberty Numb 14. Arg. 2. is able to overthrow all Societies and Common wealths in the World The Laws are unjust which prohibite that which a man cannot possibly shun All consultations are vain
cause it shall be chosen which cause for the most part is deliberation or consultation And therefore consultation is not in vain and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience Namely that admonitions are in vain for admonitions are parts of consultations The admonitor being â— Counsailer for the time to him that is admonished The fourth pretended inconvenience is that praise and dispraise reward and punishment will be in vain To which I answer that for praise and dispraise they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised For what is it else to praise but to say a thing is good Good I say for me or for some body else or for the State and Commonwealth And what is it to say an action is good but to say it is as I would wish or as another would have it or according to the will of the State that is to say according to Law Does J. D. think that no action can please me or him or the Common-wealth that should proceed from necessity Things may be therefore necessary and yet praise-worthy as also necessary and yet dispraised and neither of both in vain because praise and dispraise and likewise reward and punishment do by example make and conform the will to good or evill It was a very great praise in my opinion thaâ— Velleius Paterculus gives Cato where he sayes he was â—â—od by Nature Et quia aliter esse non potuit To his fift and sixt inconvenience that Councells Arts Arms Books Instruments Study Medicines and the like would be superfluous the same answer servâ— that to the former That is to say that this consequence if the effect shall necessarily come to pass then it shall come to pass without its cause is a false one And those things named Councells Arts Arms c. are the causes of those effects J. D. NOthing is more familiar with T. H. than to decline an Argument But I will put it into form for him â— The first inconvenience is thus preffed Those Lawes are unjust and tyrannical which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done and punish men for not doing of them But supposing T. H. his opinion of the necessity of all things to be true all Lawes do prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done and punish men for not doing of them The former proposition is so clear that it cannot be denied Just Lawes are the Ordinances of right Reason but those Lawes which prescribe absolute impossibilities are not the Ordinances of right Reason Just Laws are instituted for the publick good but those Lawes which prescribe absolute impossibilities are not instituted for the publick good Just Lawes do shew unto a man what is to be done and what is to be shunned But those Laws which prescribe impossibilities do not direct a man what he is to do and what he is to shun The Minor is as evident for if his opinion be true all actions all transgressions are determined antecedently inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of extrinsecal causes Yea even the will of man and the reason it self is thus determined And therefore whatsoever Lawes do prescribe any thing to be done which is not done or to be left undone which is done do prescribe absolute impossibilities and punish men for not doing of impossibilities In all his answer there is not one word to this Argument but onely to the conclusion He saith that not the necessity but the will to break the Law makes the action unjust I ask what makes the will to break the Law is it not his necessity What gets he by this A perverse will causeth injustice and necessity causeth a perverse wilf He saith the Law regardeth the will but not the precedent causes of action To what proposition to what tearm is this answer he neither denies nor distinguisheth First the Question here is not what makes actions to be unjust but what makes Lawes to be unjust So his answer is impertinent It is likewise untrue for First that will which the Law regards is not such a will as T. H. imagineth It is a free will not a determined necessitated will a rational will not a brutish will Secondly the Law doth look upon precedent causes as well as the voluntariness of the action If a child before he be seven years old or have the use of reason in some childish quarrell do willingly stab another whereof we have seen experience yet the Law looks not upon it as an act of murther because there wanted a power to deliberate and consequently true liberty Man-slaughter may be as voluntary as murther and commonly more voluntary because being done in hot blood there is the less reluctation yet the Law considers that the former is done out of some sudden passion without serious deliberation and the other out of prepensed malice and desire of revenge and therefore condemns murther as more wilful and more panishable than Man-slaughtter b He saith that no Law can possibly be unjust And I say that this is to deny the conclusion which deserves no reply But to give him satisfaction I will follow him in this also If he intended no more but that unjust Lawes are not genuine Lawes nor bind to active obedience because they are not the ordinations of right Reason nor instituted for the common good nor prescribe that which ought to be done he said truly but nothing at all to his purpose But if he intend as he doth that there are no Lawes de facto which are the ordinances of reason erring instituted for the common hurt and prescribing that which ought not to be done he is much mistaken Pharaohs Law to drown the Male Children of the Israelites Exod. 1. 22. Nebuckadnezzars Law that whosoever did not fall down and worship the golden Image which he had set up should be cast into the fiery furnace Dan. 3. 4 Darius his Law that whosoever should ask a Petition of any God or man for thirty dayes save of the King should be cast into the Den of Lions Dan. 6. 7. Ahashuerosh his Law to destroy the Jewish Nation root and branch Esther 3. 13. The Pharisees Law that whosoever confesseth Christ should be excommunicated John 9. 22. were all unjust Lawes c The ground of this errour is as great an errour it self Such an art be hath learned of repacking Paradoxes which is this That every man makes by his consent the Law which he is bound to keep If this were true it would preserve them if not from being unjust yet from being injurious But it is not true The positive Law of God conteined in the old and new Testament The Law of Nature written in our hearts by the finger of God The Lawes of Conquerors who come in by the power of the Sword The Laws of our Ancesters which were made before we were
born do all oblige us to the observation of them yet to none of all these did we give our actual consent Over and above all these exceptions he builds upon a wrong foundation that all Magestrates at first were elective The first Governours were Fathers of Families And when those petty Princes could not afford competent protection and security to their subjects many of them did resign their several and respective interists into the hands of one joint Father of the Country And though his ground had been true that all first Legislators were elective which is false yet his superstructure fails for it was done in hope and trust that they would make just Lawes If Magistrates abuse this trust and deceive the hopes of the people by making tyrannical Lawes yet it is without their consent A precedent trust doth not justifie the subsequent errours and abuses of a Trustee He who is duely elected a Legislator may exercise his Legislative power unduely The peoples implicite consent doth not render the tyrannical Lawes of their Legislators to be just d But his chiefest answer is that an action forhidden though it proceed from necessary causes yet if it were done willingly it may be justly punished which according to his custome he proves by an instance A man necessitated to steal by the strength of temptation yet if he steal willingly is justly put to death Here are two things and both of them untrue First he fails in his assertion Indeed we suffer justly for those necessities which we our selves have contracted by our own fault but not for extrinsecal antecedent necessities w ch were imposed upon us without our fault If that Law do not oblige to punishment which is not intimated because the subject is invincibly ignorant of it How much less that Law which prescribes absolute impossibilities unless perhaps invincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ignorance That which he adds if it were done willingly though it be of great moment if it be rightly understood yet in his sense that is if a mans will be not in his own disposition and if his willing do not come upon him according to his will nor according to any thing else in his power it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his horse-load For if that Law be unjust and tyrannical which commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do then that Law is likewise unjust and tyrannical which commands him to wil that which is impossible for him to will Secondly his instance supposeth an untruth and is a plain begging of the Question No man is extrinsecally antecedently and irresistibly necessitated by temptation to steal The Devil may sollicite us but he cannot necessitate us He hath a faculty of perswading but not a power of compelling Nosignem habemus spiritus â—â—ammam ciet as Nazi anzen He blowes the coles but the fire is our own Mordet duntaxat sese in fauces illius objicientens as St. Austin he bites not until we thrust our selves into his mouth He may propose he may suggest but he cannot move the will effectively Resist the Devil and he will flie from you Jam. 4. 7. By faith we are able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked Eph. 6. 16. And if Sathan who can both propose the object and choose out the fittest times and places to work upon our frailties and can suggest reasons yet cannot necessitate the will which is most certain then much less can outward objects do it alone They have no natural efficacy to determine the will Well may they be occasions but they cannot be causes of evil The sensitive appetite may engender a proclivity to steal but not a necessity to steal And if it should produce a kind of necessity yet it is but Moral not Natural Hypothetical not Absolute Coexistent not Antecedent from our selves nor Extrinsecall This necessity or rather proclivity was fâ—â—â— in its causes we our selves by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should and might have freely given it a kind of dominion over us Admit that some sudden passions may and do extraordinarily surprise us And therefore we say motus primo primi the first motions are not alwayes in our power neither are they free yet this is but very rarely and it is our own fault that they do surprise us Neither doth the Law punish the first motion to theft but the advised act of stealing The intention makes the thief But of this more largely Numb 25. e He pleads moreover that the Law is a cause of justice that it frames the wills of men to justice and that the punishment of one doth conduce to the preservation of many All this is most true of a just Law justly executed But this is no god-a-mercy to T. H. his opinion of absolute necessity If all actions and all events be predetermined Naturally Necessarily Extrinsecally how should the Law frame men morally to good actions He leaves nothing for the Law to do but either that which is done already or that which is impossible to be done If a man be chained to every individual act which he doth and from every act which he doth not by indissolvible bonds of inevitable necessity how should the Law either deterre him or frame him If a Dog be chained fast to a post the sight of a rod cannot draw him from it Make a thousand Lawes that the fire shall not burn yet it will burn And whatsoever men do according to T. H. they do it as necessarily as the fire burneth Hang up a thousand Theevs and if a man be determined inevitably to steal he must steal notwithstanding f He addes that the sufferings imposed by the Law upon delinquents respect not the evil act past but the good to come and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the Magistrate for any crime whatsoever cannot be justified before God except there be a reall intention to benefit others by his example The truth is the punishing of delinquents by Law respecteth both the evil act past and the good to come The ground of it is the evil act past the scope or end of it is the good to come The end without the ground cannot justifie the act A bad intention may make a good action bad but a good intention cannot make a bad action good It is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it nor to punish an innoceut person for the admonition of others that is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncertain Again though there were no other end of penalties inflicted neither probatory nor castigatory nor exemplary but only vindicatory to satisfie the Law out of a zeal of Justice by giving to every one his own yet the action is just and warrantable Killing as it is considered in it self without all undue circumstances was never prohibited to the lawful Magistrate who is the Vicegerent or
Lieutenant of God from whom he derives his power of life and death T. H. hath one plea more As a drowning man catcheth at every Buâ—rush so he layes hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause But first it is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular â— First he told us that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his actions though he command one thing openly and plot another thing secretly though he be the cause not onely of the action but also of the irregularity though he both give man power to act and determine this power to evil as well as good though he punish the Creatures for doing that which he himself did necessitate them to do But being pressed with reason that this is tyrannical first to necessitate a man to do his will and then to punish him for doing of it he leaves this pretence in the plain field and flies to a second That therefore a man is justly punished for that which he was necessitated to do because the act was voluntary on his part This hath more shew of reason than the former if he did make the will of man to be in his own disposition but maintaining that the will is irresistibly determined to will whatsoever it doth will the injustice and absurdity is the same First to necessitate a man to will and then to punish him for willing The Dog onely bites the stone which is thrown at him with a strange haud but they make the first cause to punish the instrument for that which is his own proper act Wherefore not being satisfied with this he casts it off and flies to his third shift Men are not punished saith he â—…fore because their theft proceeded from election that is because it was willingly done for to Elect and Will saith he are both one Is not this to blow hot and cold with the same breath but because it was noxious and contrary to mens preservation Thus far he saith true that every creature by the instinct of nature seeks to preserve it self cast water into a dusty place and it contracts it self into little globes that is to preserve it self And those who are noxious the eye of the Law are justly punished by them to whom the execution of the Law is committed but the Law accounts no persons noxious but those who are noxious by their own fault It punisheth not a thorn for pricking because it is the nature of the thorn and it can do no otherwise nor a child before it have the use of reason If one should take mine hand perforce and give another a box on the ear with it my hand is noxious but the Law punisheth the other who is faulty And therefore he hath reason to propose the question how it is just to kill on man to amend another if he who killed did nothing but what he was necessitated to do He might as well demand how it is lawful to murther a company of innocent Infants to make a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the Leprosie It had been a more rational way first to have demonstrated that it is so and then to have questioned why it is so His assertion it self is but a dream and the reason which he gives of it why it is so is a dream of a dream The sum of it is this That where there is no Law there no killing or any thing else can be unjust that before the constitution of Commonwealths every man had power to kill another if he conceived him to be hurtfull to him that at the constitution of Commonwealhts particular men lay down this right in part and in part reserve it to themselves as in case of theft or murther That the right which the Commonwealth hath to put a malefactor to death is not created by the Law but remaineth from the first right of Nature which every man hath to preserve himself that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts in order to our own preservation This may well be called stringing of Paradoxes But first h there never was any such time when Mankind was without Governors and Lawes and Societies Paternal Government was in the world from the beginning and the Law of Nature There might be sometimes a root of such Barbatous Theevish Brigants in some rocks or desarts or odd corners of the World but it was an abuse and a degeneration from the nature of man who is a political creature This savage opinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind Secondly there never was a time when it was lawfull ordinarily for private men to kill one another for their own preservation If God would have had men live like wild beasts as Lions Bears or Tygers he would have armed them with hornes or tusks or talons or pricks but of all creatures man is born most naked without any weapon to defend himself because God had provided a better means of security for him that is the Magistrate Thirdly that right which private men have to preserve themselves though it be with the killing of another when they are set upon to be murthered or robbed is not a remainder or a reserve of some greater power which they have resigned but a priviledge which God hath given them in case of extream danger and invincible necessity that when they cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy that is the Magistrate every man becomes a Magistrate to himself Fourthly nothing can give that which it never had The people whilest they were a dispersed rable which in some odd cases might happen to be never had justly the power of life and death and therefore they could not give it by their election All that they do is to prepare the matter but it is God Almighty that infuseth the soul of power Fiftly and lastly I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to compare the murthering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts The elements are for the Plants the Plants for the brute Beasts the brute Beasts for Man When God enlarged his former grant to man and gave him liberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance Gen. 9. 3. Yet man is expresly excepted ver â— Who so sheddeth mans blood by man shall his blood be shed And the reason is assigned for in the image of God made he man Before sin entred into the World or before any creatures were hurtful or noxious to man he had â—â—minion over them as their Lord and Master And though the possession of this soveraignty be lost in part for the sin of man which made not onely the creatures to rebel but also the inferiour 〈…〉 to rebel against the superiour from whence it comes that one man is hurtful to another yet the dominion still remains wherein we may observe how sweetly the providence of God doth temper this cross that though the strongest creatures
have withdrawn their obedience as Lions and Bears to shew that man hath lost the â—…cy of his dominion and the weakest creatures as Flies and Gnats to shew into what a degree of contempt he is fallen yet still the most profitable and useful creatures as Sheep and Oxen do in some degree retain their obedience i The next branch of his answer concernes consultations which saith he are not superfluous though all things come to pass necessarily because they are the cause which doth necessitate the effect and the means to bring it to pass We were told Numb 11. that the last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which breaks the Horses back It is well yet that reason hath gained some command again and is become at least a Quarter-master Certainly if any thing under God have power to determine the will it is right reason But I have shewed sufficiently that reason doth not determine the will physically nor absolutely much less extrinsecally and antecedently and therefore it makes nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath undertaken to prove k He adds further that as the end is necessary so are the means And when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen All which is truth but not the whole truth for as God ordaines means for all ends so he adapts and fits the means to their respective ends free means to free ends contingent means to contingent ends necessary means to necessary ends whereas T. H. would have all means all ends to be necessary If God hath so ordered the World that a man ought to use and may freely use those means of God which he doth neglect not by vertue of Gods decree but by his own fault If a man use those means of evil which he ought not to use and which by Gods decree he had power to forbear If God have left to man in part the free managery of human affairs and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding then consultations are of use then provident care is needfull then it concerns him to use the means But if God have so ordered this world that a man cannot if he would neglect any means of good which by vertue of Gods decree it is possible for him to use and that he cannot possibly use any means of evill but those which are irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree then not onely consultations are vain but that noble facnâ—ty of reason it self is vain do we think that we can help God Almighty to do his proper work In vain we trouble our selves in vain we take care to use those means which are not in our power to use or not to use And this is that which was conteined in my prolepsis or prevention of his answer though he be pleased both to disorder it and to silence it We cannot hope by our labours to alter the course of things set down by God let him perform his decree let the necessary causes do their work If we be those causes yet we are not in our own disposition we must do what we are ordained to do and more we cannot do Man hath no remedy but patience and to shrug up the shoulders This is the doctrine flowes from this opinion of absolute necessity Let us suppose the great wheel of the clock which sets all the little wheels a going to be as the decree of God that the motion of it were perpetually infallible from an intrinsecal principle even as Gods decree is Infallible Eternal All-sufficient Let us suppose the lesser wheels to be the second causes and that they do as certainly follow the motion of the great wheel without missing or swerving in the least degree as the second causes do pursue the determination of the first cause I desire to know in this case what cause there is to call a Councill of Smiths to consult and order the motion of that which was ordered and determined before to their hands Are men wiser than God yet all men know that the motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means to make the clock sirike l But he tells me in great sadness that my Argument is just like this other If I shall live till to morrow I shall live till to morrow though I run my self through with a sword to day which saith he is a false consequence and a false proposition Truly if by running through he understands killing it is a false or rather a foolish proposition and implyes a contradiction To live till to morrow and â—o dye to day are inconsistent But by his favour this is not my consequence but this is his own opinion He would perswade us that it is absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to morrow and yet that it is possible that he may kill himself to day My Argument is this If there be a liberty and possibility for a man to kill himself to day then it is not absolutely necessary that he shall live till tomorrow but there is such a liberty therefore no such necessity And the consequence which I make here is this If it be absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to morrow then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult and deliberate whether he should dye to day or not And this is a true consequence The ground of his mistake is this that though it be true that a man may kill himself to day yet upon the supposition of his absolute necessity it is impossible Such Heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth which are half builded upon our true grounds and the other half upon his false grounds m The next branch of my argument concerns Admonitions to which he gives no new answer and therefore I need not make any new reply saving onely to tell him that he mistakes my argument I say not onely If all things be necessary then admonitions are in vain but if all things be necessary then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools children or mad men That they do admonish the one and not the other is confessedly true and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this that the former have the use of reason and true liberty with a dominion over their own actions which children fools and mad men have not Concerning praise and dispraise he inlargeth himself The scope of his discourse is that things necessary may be praise-worthy There is no doubt of it but withal their praise reflects upon the free agent as the praise of a statue reflects upon the workman who made it To praise a thing saith he is to say it is good n True but this goodness is not a Metaphysical goodness so the worst of things and whatsoever hath a being is good Nor a Natural goodness The praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of Nature
God saw all that he had made and it was very good But a Moral goodness or a goodness of actions rather than of things The moral goodness of an action is the conformity of it with right reason The moral evil of an action is the deformity of iâ— and the alineation of it from right reason It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of here To praise any thing morally is to say it is morally good that is conformable to right reason The morall dispraise of a thing is to say it is morally bad or disagreeing from the rule of right reason So moral praise is from the good use of liberty moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty but if all things be necessary then moral liberty is quite taken away and with it all true praise and dispraise Whereas T. H. adds that to say a thing is good is to say it is as I would wish or as another would wish or as the State would have it or according to the Law of the Land he mistakes infinitely He and another and the State may all wish that which is not really good but only in appearance We do often wish what is profitatble or delightful without regarding so much as we ought what is honest And though the will of the State where we live or the Law of the Land do deserve great consideration yet it is no infallible rule of moral goodness And therefore to his question whether nothing that proceeds from necessity can please me I answer yes The burning of the fire pleaseth me when I am cold And I say it is good fire or a creature created by God for my use and for my good Yet I do not mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire nor give any moral praise to it as if it were in the power of the fire it self either to communicate its heat or to suspend it but I praise first the Creator of the fire and then him who provided it As for the praise which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato that he was good by nature Et quia aliter esse non potuit it hath more of the Oratour than either of the Theologian or Philosopher in it Man in the State of innocency did fâ—ll and become evil what priviledge hath Cato more than he No by his leave Narratur dij Catonis saepe mâ—ro caluissâ— virtus but the true meaning is that he was naturally of a good temper not so prone to some kinds of vices as others were This is to praise a thing not an action naturally not morally Socrates was not of so good a natural temper yet prooved as good a man the more his praise by how much the difficulty was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right reason Concerning reward and punishment he saith not a word but onely that they frame and conform the will to good which hath been sufficiently answered They do so indeed but if his opinion were true they could not do so But because my aim is not onely to answer T. H. but also to satisfie my self o Though it be not urged by him yet I do acknowledge that I find some improper and analogical rewards and punishments used to brute beasts as the hunter rewards his dog the master of the Coy-duck whipps her when she returns without company And if it be true which he affirmeth a little before â—hat I have confessed that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitaeed and determined to that one thing which they shall do the difficulty is increased But first my saying is misalledged I said that some kinds of actions which are most excellent in brute beasts and make the greatest shew of reason as the Bees working their Honey and the Spider weaving their Webbs are yet done without any consultation or deliberation by a meer instinct of nature and by a determination of their fancies to these onely kinds of works But I did never say I could not say that all their individual actions are necessary and antecedently determined in their causes as what dayes the Bees shall fly abroad and what dayes and houres each Bee shall keep in the Hive how often they shall fetch in Thyme on a day and from whence These actions and the like though they be not free because brute beasts want reason to deliberate yet they are contingent and therefore not necessary Secondly I do acknowledge that as the fancies of some brute creatures are determined by nature to some rare and exquisite works So in others where it finds a natuall propension Art which is the Imitator of Nature may frame and form them according to the will of the Artist to some particular actions and ends as we see in Setting-dogs and Coy-ducks and Parrots and the principal means whereby they effect this is by their backs or by their bellies by the rod or by the morsell which have indeed a shaddow or resemblance of rewards and punishments But we take the word here properly not as it is used by vulgar people but as it is used by Divines and Philosophers for that recompense which is due to honest and dishonest actions Where there is no moral liberty there is neither honesty nor dishonesty neither true reward nor punishment Thirdly p when brute creatures do learn any such qualities it is not out of judgement or deliberation or discourse by infering or concluding one thing from another which they are not capable of Neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do but meerly out of memory or out of a sensitive fear or hope They remember that when they did after one manner they were beaten and when they did after another manner they were cherished and accordingly they apply themselves But if their individual actions were absolutely necessary fear or hope could not alter them Most certainly if there be any defert in it or any praise due unto it it is to them who did instruct them Lastly concerning Arts Arms Books Instruments Study Physick and the like he answereth not a word more than what is already satisfied And therefore I am silent Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb XIV a THe first inconvenience is thus pressed Those Lawes are unjust and tyrannical which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done and punish men for not doing of them I have already in the beginning where Irecite the inconveniences that follow the doctrine of necessity made clear that the same inconveniences follow not the doctrine of Necessity any more than they follow this truth whatsoever shall be shall be which all men must confess The same also followeth upon this that whatsoever God foreknowes cannot but come to pass in such time and manner as he hath foreknown it It is therefore evident that these inconveniences are not rationally deduced from those Tenets Again it is a truth manifest to all men that it is not in a mans power to day to choose what Will
It may be he will say he has done it in calling them Annalogical yet for any thing that can be understood thereby he might have called them Paragogical or Typical or Topical if he had pleased He adds further that whereas he had said that the action of Bees and Spiders were done without consultation by meer instinct of nature and by a determination of their fancies I missaleadge him and say he made their individuall Actions necessary I have onely this to answer that seeing he sayes that by instinct of nature their fancies were determined to special kinds of works I might justly inferre they were determined every one of them to some work and every work is an individual action for a kind of work in the general is no work But these their individual actions he saith are contingent and therefore not necessary which is no good consequence for if he mean by contingent that which has no cause he speaketh not as a Christian but maketh a Deity of Fortune which I verily think he doth not But if he mean by it that whereof he knoweth not the cause the consequence is naught The means whereby Setting-dogs and Coy-ducks and Parats are taught to do what they do is by their backs by their bellies by the rod or by the morsell which have indeed a shaddow or resemblance of rewards and punishments But we take the word here properly not as it is used by vulgar plople but as it is used by Divines and Philosophers c. Does not the Bishop know that the Belly hath taught Poets and Historians and Divines and Philosophers and Artificers their several Arts as well as Parrats Do not men do their duty with regard to their backs to their necks and to their morsells as well as Setting-dogs Coy-ducks and Parrats Why then are these things to us the substance and to them but the shadow or resemblance of rewards or punishments p When brute creatures do learn any such qualities it is not out of judgement or deliberation or discourse by inferring or concluding one thing from another which they are not capable of neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do c. but they remember that when they did after one manner they were beaten and when they did after another manner they were cherished and accordingly they apply themselves If the Bishop had considered the cogitations of his own mind not then when he disputeth but then when he followed those businesses which he calleth trifles he would have found them the very same which he here mentioneth saving instead of beating because he is exempt from that he is to put in dammage For setting aside the discourse of the tongue in words of general signification the Idea's of our minds are the same with those of other living creatures created from Visible Audible and other sensible objects to the eyes and other Organs of sence as theirs are For as the objects of sense are all individual that is singular so are all the fancies proceeding from their operations and men reason not but in words of universal signification uttered or tacitely thought on But perhaps he thinketh remembrance of words to be the Idea's of those things which the words signifie and that all fancies are not effected by the operation of Objects upon the Organs of our senses But to rectifie him in those points is greater labour unless he had better principles than I am willing or have at this timâ— leasure to undergo Lastly whereas he sayes if their Individual actions were absolutely necessary Fear or Hope could not alter them That 's true For it is Fear and Hope that makes them necessarily what they are J. D. THirdly let this opinion be once radicated in the minds Numb 15. Arg. 3. of men that there is no true liberty and that all things come to pass inevitably and it will utterly destroy the study of Piety Who will bewaile his sins with tears what will become of that Grief that Zeal that Indignation that holy Revenge which the Apostle speaks of if men be once throughly perswaded that they could not shun what they did A man may grieve for that which he could not help but he will never be brought to bewaile that as his own fault which flowed not from his own errour but from antecedent necessity Who will be careful or sollicitous to performe obedience that beleeveth there are inevitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions which he can neither go beyond nor come short of To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which are inevitable or to confer those favours which are impossible We indeed know not what good or evill shall happen to us but this we know that if all things be necessary our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that which must be In a word the onely reason why those persons who tread in this path of fatal destiny do sometimes pray or repent or serve God is because the light of nature and the strength of reason and the evidence of Scripture do for that present transport them from their ill chosen grounds and expell those Stoical fancies out of their heads A compleate Stoick can neither pray nor repent nor serve God to any purpose Either allow liberty or destroy Church as well as Commonwealth Religion as well as Policy T. H. HIs third Argument consisteth in other inconveniences which he saith will follow namely impiety and negligence of Religious duties Repentance and zeal to Gods service To which I answer as to the rest that they follow not I must confess if we consider the far greatest part of mankind not as they should be but as they are that is as men whom either the study of acquiring wealth or preferments or whom the apperite of sensual delights or the impatience of meditating or the rash imbracing of wrong principles have made unapt to discuss the truth of things that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety And therefore if he had not desired this answer I would not have written it Nor do I write it but in hope your Lordship and he will keep it private Nevertheless in very truth the necessity of events does not of it self draw with it any impiety at all For piety consisteth onely in two things One that we honour God in our hearts which is that we think of his power as highly as we can for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power The other that we signifie that honour and esteem by our words and actions which is called cultus or worship of God He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from Gods Eternal Will and consequently are necessary does he not think God Omnipotent does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible which is to honour God as much as can be in his heart Again he that thinketh so is he not more apt by external
the face of the earth Therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions nor one of their definitions nay not one of their â—earms of Art standing f Observe what a description he hath given us here of Repentance It is a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way It amazed me to find gladness to be the first word in the description of Repentance His repentance is not that repentance nor his piety that piety nor his prayer that kind of prayer which the Church of God in all Ages hath acknowledged Fasting and Sackcloth and Ashes and Tears and Humi-cubations used to be companions of Repentance Joy may be a consequent of it not a part of it g It is a returning but whose act is this returning Is it Gods alone or doth the penitent person concur also freely with the grace of God If it be Gods alone then it is his repentance not mans repentance what need the penitent person trouble himself about it God will take care of his own work The Scriptures teach us otherwise that God expects our concurrence Revel 3. 19. Be zealous and repent behold I stand at the dore and knock If any man hear my voice and open the dore I will come into him It is a glad returning into the right way Why dare any man call that a wrong way which God himself hath determined He that willeth and doth that which God would have him to will and to do is never out of his right way It followes in his description after the grief c. It is true a man may grieve for that which is necessarily imposed upon him but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of his own if it never was in his power to shun it Suppose a Writing-master shall hold his Scholars hand in his and write with it the Scholars part is only to hold still his hand whether the Master write well or ill the Scholar hath no ground either of joy or sorrow as for himself no man will interpret it to be his act but his Masters It is no fault to be out of the right way if a man had not liberty to have kept himself in the way And so from Repentance he skips quite over New obedience to come to Prayer which is the last Religious duty insisted upon by me here But according to his use without either answering or mentioning what I say Which would have shewed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend not contemplative prayer in general as it includes thanksgiving but that most proper kind of prayer which we call Petition which used to be thus defined to be an act of Religion by which we desire of God something which we have not and hope that we shall obtain it by him Quite contrary to this T. H. tells us h that prayer is not a cause nor a meanes of Gods blessing but onely a signification that we expest it from him If he had told us onely that prayer is not a meritorious cause of Gods blessings as the poor man by begging an almes doth not deserve it I should have gone along with him But to tell us that it is not so much as a means to procure Gods blessing and yet with the same breath that God will not give his blessings but to those who pray who shall reconcile him to himself The Scriptures teach us otherwise Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my Name he will give it you John 16. 23. Ask and it shall be given you seek and ye shall find knock and it shall be opened unto you Matth. 7. 7. St. Paul tells the Corinthians 2 Cor. 1. 11. that he was helped by their prayers that 's not all that the gift was bestowed upon him by their means So prayer is a means And St. James saith chap. 5. 16. The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much If it be effectual then it is a cause To shew this efficacy of prayer our Saviour useth the comparison of a Father towards his Child of a Neighbour towards his Neighbour yea of an unjust Judge to shame those who think that God hath not more compassion than a wicked man This was signified by Jacobs wrestling and prevailing with God Prayer is like the Tradesmans tools wherewithal he gets his living for himself and his family But saith he Gods Will is unchangeable What then He might as well use this against study Physick and all second causes as against Prayer He shewes even in this how little they attribute to the endeavours of men There is a great difference between these two mutare voluntatem to change the will which God never doth in whom there is not the least shadow of turning by change His will to love and hate was the same from eternity which it now is and ever shall be His love and hatred are immovable but we are removed Non tellus cymbam tellurem cymbareliquit And velle mutationem to will a change which God often doth To change the will argues a change in the Agent but to will a change only argues a change in the object It is no inconstancy in a man to love or to hate as the object is changed Praesta mihi omnia â—adâ—m idem sum Prayer works not upon God but us It renders not him more propitious in himself but us more capable of mercy He saith this That God doth not bless us execpt we pray is a motive to prayer Why talks he of motives who acknowledgeth no liberty nor admits any cause but absolutely necessary He saith Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing which we pray for and conteined in the same decrree with the blessing It is true the spirit of prayer is the gift of God will he conclude from thence that the good imployment of one talent or of one gift of God may not procure another Our Saviour teacheth us otherwise Come thou good and faithfull servant thou hast been faithful in little I will make the ruler over much Too much light is an enemy to the sight and too much Law is an enemy to Justice I could wish we wrangled less about Gods Decrees until we understood them better But saith he Thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past and prayer is but a thanksgiving He might even as well tell me that when a beggar craves an almes and when he gives thanks for it it is all one Every thanksgiving is a kind of prayer but every prayer and namely Petition is not a thanks-giving In the last place he urgeth that in our prayers we are bouâ—d to submit our Wills to Gods Will who ever made any doubt of this we must submit to the Preceptive Will of God or his Commandements we must submit to the effective Will of God when he declares his good pleasure by the event or otherwise But we deny and deny again either that God wills things ad extra
the Power he hath and exerciseth in distributing blessings and afflictions Justice is not in God as in man the observation of the Lawes made by his superiours Nor is Wisedom in God a logicall examination of the means by the end as it is in men but an incomprehensible Attribute given to an incomprehensible nature for to honour him It is the Bishop that erres in thinking nothing to be Power but Riches and High place wherein to dominere and please himself and vex those that submit not to his opinions d Thirdly this opinion of absolute Necessity destroyes the Truth of God making him to command one thing openly and to necessitate another privately c. It destroyes the goodness of God making him to be a hater of mankind c. It destroyes the Justice of God making him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act c. It destroyes the very Power of God making him to be the true Author of all the defects and evils which are in the world If the opinion of absolute necessity do all this then the opinion of Gods Prescience does the same for God foreknoweth nothing that can possibly not come to pass but that which cannot possibly not come to pass cometh to pass of necessity But how doth necessity destroy the Truth of God by commanding and hindering what he commandeth Truth consisteth in Affirmation and Negation not in commanding and hindering it does not therefore follow if all things be necessary that come to pass that therefore God hath spoken an untruth Nor that he professesseth one thing and intendeth another The Scripture which is his word is not the profession of what he intendeth but an indication of what those men shall necessarily intend whom he hath chosen to salvation and whom he hath determined to destruction But on the other side from the Negation of necessity there followeth necessarily the Negation of Gods Prescience which is in the Bishop if not ignorance impiety Or how destroyeth it the Goodness of God or maketh him to be an hater of mankind and to delight in the torments of his creatures whereas the very doggs licked the sores of Lazarus in pitty and commiseration of him I cannot imagine when living creatures of all sorts are often in torments as well as men that God can be displeased with it without whose will they neither are nor could be at all tormented Nor yet is he delighted with it but health sickness â—ase torments life and death are without all passion in him dispenced by him and he putteth an end to them then when they end and a beginning when they begin according to his eternal purpose which cannot be resisted That the necessity argueth a delight of God in the torments of his creatures is even as true as that it was pitty and commiseration in the doggs that made them lick the sores of Lazarus Or how doth the opinion of necessity destroy the Justice of God or make him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act If all afflictions be punishments for whose act are all other Creatures punished which cannot sin Why may not God make the affliction both of those men that he hath elected and also of those whom he hath reprobated the necessary causes of the conversion of those he hath elected their own afflictions serving therein as chastisements and the afflictions of the rest as examples But he may perhaps think it no injustice to punish the creatures that cannot sin with temporary punishments when nevertheless it would be injustice to torment the same creatures eternally This may be somewhat to Meekness and Cruelty but nothing at all to Justice and Injustice For in punishing the innocent the injustice is equall though the punishments be unequal And what cruelty can be greaner than that which may be inferred from this opinion of the Bishop that God doth torment eternally and with the extreamest degree of torment all those men which have sinned that is to say all mankind from the creation to the end of the world which have not believed in Jesus Christ whereof very few in respect of the multitude of others have so much as heard of his name and this when Faith in Christ is the gift of God himself and the hearts of all men in his hands to frame them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them to believe He hath no reason therefore for his part to tax any opinion for ascribing to God either cruelty or injustice Or how doth it destroy the Power of God or make him to be the Author of all the defects and evils which are in the world First he seemeth not to understand what Author signifies Author is he which owneth an Action or giveth a warrant to do it Doe I say that any man hath in the Scripture which is all the warrant we have from God for any Action whatsoever a Warrant to commit Theft Murder or any other sin Does the opinion of necessity inferre that there is such a warrant in the Scripture Perhaps he will say no but that this opinion makes him the cause of sin But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all Actions And are not sins of commission Actions Is Murder no Action And does not God himself say Non est malum in civitate quod ego non feci And was not murder one of those evils whether it were or not I say no more but that God is the cause not the Author of all Actions and Motions Whether sin be the Action or the Defect or the Irregularity I mean not to dispute Nevertheless I am of opinion that the distinction of Causes into Efficient and Deficient is Bohu and signifies nothing e How shall a man praise God for his Goodness who beleeves him to be a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault to express his Power If Tyrant signifie as it did when it came first in use a King t is no dishonour to beleeve that God is a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world for he is the King of all Kings Emperours and Common-Wealths But if we take the word as it is now used to signifie those Kings onely which they that call them Tyrants are displeased with that is that Govern not as they would have them the Bishop is nearer the calling him a Tyrant than I am making that to be Tyranny which is but the exercise of an absolute Power For he holdeth though he see it not by consequence in withdrawing the Will of man from Gods dominion that every man is a King of himself And if a man cannot praise God for his Goodness who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault how can the Bishop praise God for his Goodness who thinks he hath created millions of millions to burn eternally when he could have kept them so easily from committing any fault And to his How shall a man hear
difference between my words and his in the sense and meaning for in the one there is honour ascrihed to God and humility in him that prayeth but in the other presumption in him that prayeth and a detraction from the honour of God When I say Prayer is not a cause nor a meanes I take cause and meanes in one and the same sense affirming that God is not moved by any thing that we do but has alwaies one and the same eternal purpose to do the same things that from eternity he hath foreknown shall be done and me thinks there can be no doubt made thereof But the Bishop alledgeth 2 Cor. 1. 11. That St Paul was helped by their prayers and that the gift was bestowed upon them by their means and James 5. 16. The effectual and fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much In which places the words meanes effectual availeth do not signifie any causation for no man nor creature living can work any effect upon God in whom there is nothing that hath not been in him eternally heretofore nor that shall not be in him eternally hereafter but do signifie the order in which God hath placed mens prayers and his own blessings And not much after the Bishop himself saith Prayer works not upon God but us Therefore it is no cause of Gods Will in giving us his blessings but is properly a signe not a procuration of his favour The next thing he replieth to is that I make prayer to be a kind of thanksgiving to which he replies He might even as wel tell me that when a Beggar craves an Alms and when he gives thanks for it it is all one Why so Does not a Beggar move a man by his prayer and sometime worketh in him a compassion not without pain and as the Scripture calls it a yerning of the Bowels which is not so in God when we pray to him Our prayer to God is a duty it is not so to man Therefore though our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks it is not necessary it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God Almighty To the rest of his Reply in this Number 15. there needs no further Answer J. D. FOourthly the order beauty and perfection of the world doth require that in the Universe should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some free some contingent He that shall make either all things necessary guided by destiny or all things free governed by election or all things contingent happening by chance doth overthrow the beauty and the perfection of the world T. H. THE fourth Argument from Reason is this The Order Numb 16. Arg. 4. Beauty and Perfection of the World requireth that in the Universe should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some free some contingent He that shall make all things nenessary or all things free or all things contingent doth overthrow the beauty and pefection of the World In which Argument I observe first a contradiction For seeing he that maketh any thing in that he maketh it he maketh it to be necessary it followeth that he that maketh all things maketh all things necessary to be As if a workman make a garment the garment must necessarily be So if God make every thing every thing must necessarily be Perhaps the beauty of the World requireth though we know it not that some Agents should work without deliberation which he calls necessary Agents And some Agents with deliberation and those both he and I call free Agents And that some Agents should work and we not know how And those effects we both call contingent But this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his election necessarily determined to one by former causes And that which is contingent and imputed to Fortune be nevertheless necessary and depend on precedent necessary causes For by contingent men do not mean that which hath no cause but which hath not for cause any thing which we perceive As for Example when a Travailer meets with a shower the journey had a cause and the rain had a cause sufficient enough to produce it but because the journey caused not the rain nor the rain the journey we say they were contingent one to another And thus you see though there be three sorts of events Necessary Contingent and Free yet they may be all necessary without the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the Univers J. D. THE first thing he observes in mine Argument is contradiction as he calls it but in truth it is but a deception of the sight As one candle sometimes seems to be two or a rod in the water shewes to be two rods Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad mâ—dum recipientis But what is this contradiction Because I say he who maketh all things doth not make them necessary What! a contradiction and but one proposition That were strange I say God hath not made all Agents necessary he saith God hath made all Agents necessary Here is a contradiction indeed but it is between him and me not between me and my self But yet though it be not a formal contradiction yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction in adjecto Wherefore to clear the matter and dispell the mist which he hath raised It is true that every thing when it is made it is necessary that it be made so as it is that is by a necessity of infallibility or supposition supposing that it be so made but this is not that absolute antecedent necessity whereof the question is between him and me As to use his own instance Before the Garment be made the Tailor is free to make it either of the Italian Spanish or French fashion indifferently But after it is made it is necessary that it be of that fashion whereof he hath made it that is by a necessity of supposition But this doth neither hinder the cause from being a free cause nor the effect from being a free effect but the one did produce freely and the other was freely produced So the contradiction is vanished In the second part of his answer a he grants that there are some free Agents and some contingent Agents and that Perhaps the beauty of the World doth require it but like a shrewd Cow which after she hath given her milk casts it down with her foot in the conclusion he tells us that nevertheless they are all necessary This part of his answer is a meer Logomachy as a great part of the controversies in the world are or a contention about words What is the meaning of necessary and free and contingent actions I have shewed before what free and necessary do properly signifie but he misrecites it He saith I make all Agents which want deliberation to be necessary but I acknowledge that many of them are contingent b Neither do I approve his definition of contingents though he say I concurre with him that they are such Agents as work we know not how For
innocent person that good may come of it And if his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true the destinies of men could not be altered either by examples or fear of punishment Animadversions upon the Reply Numb XVII WHereas he had in his first discourse made this consequence If you take away Liberty you take away the very nature of evil and the formal reason of sin I denied that consequence It is true he who taketh away the Liberty of doing according to the will taketh away the nature of sin but he that denieth the Liberty to Will does not so But he supposing I understood him not will needs reduce his argument into form in this manner a That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin and by consequence Sin â—t self is not to be approved This is granted But the opinion of necessity doth this This I deny He proves it thus This opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of Physicall determination from the first cause But whatsoever proceedes essentially by way of Physical determination from the first cause is Good and Just and Lawfull Therefore this opinion of necessity maketh sin to be very Good Just and Lawfull He might as well have concluded whatsoever man hath been made by God is a good and just man He observeth not that sin is not a thing really made Those things which at first were actions were not thâ—n sins though actions of the same nature with those which were afterwards sins nor was then the will to any thing a sin though it were a will to the same thing which in willing now we should sin Actions became sins then first when the commandement came for as St. Paul saith Without the Law sin is dead and sin being but a transgression of the Law there can be no action made sin but by the Law Therefore this opinion though it derive actions essentially from God it derives not sins essentially from him but relatively and by the Commandement And consequently the opinion of necessity taketh not away the nature of sin but necessitateth that action which the Law hath made sin And whereas I said the nature of sin consisteth in this that it is an action proceeding from our will and against the Law he alloweth it for true and therefore he must allow also that the formal reason of sin lieth not in the Liberty or necessity of willing but in the will it self necessary or unnecessary in relation to the Law And whereas he limits this truth which he allowed to this that the Law be just and the will a Free rational Will it serves to no purpose for I have shown before that no Law can be unjust And it seemeth to me that a rationall Will if it be not meant of a Will after deliberation whether he that deliberateth reasoneth aright or not signifieth nothing A rational man is rightly said but a rational Will in other sense then I have mentioned is insignificant b But supposing as he doth that the Law injoynes things impossible in themselves to be done then it is an unjust and Tyrannical Law and the transgression of it no sin c. And supposing likewise as he doth that the Will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause then it is not mans Will but Gods Will. He mistakes me in this For I say not the Law injoyns things impossible in themselves for so I should say it injoyned contradictories But I say the Law sometimes the Law-makers not knowing the secret necessities of things to come injoynes things made impossible by secret and extrinsicall causes from all eternity From this hâ—s error he infers that the Laws must be unjust and Tyrannical and the transgression of them no sin But he who holds that Laws can be unjust and Tyrannical will easily find pretence enough under any Government in the World to deny obedience to the Laws unlesse they be such as he himself maketh or adviseth to be made He says also that I suppose the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause It is true saving that senselesse word Influence which I never used But his consequence then it is not mans Will but Gods will is not true for it may be the Will both of the one and of the other and yet not by concurrence as in a league but by subjection of the will of man to the Will of God c That which he adds of a Judge is altogether impertinent as to his defence Neither is a Civil Judge the proper Judge nor the Law of the Land a proper Rule of sin A Judge is to judge of voluntary crimes He has no commission to look into the secret causes that make it voluntary An because the Bishop had said the Law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity it was no impertinent answer to say the Judge lookes at no higher cause then the Will of the Doer And even this as hâ— sayeth is enough to proove that the Will of the Doer did determine it self freely and that the Malefactor had liberty to have kept the Law if he would To which I answer that it proves indeed that the Malefactor had Liberty to have kept the Law if hâ— would but it proveth not that he had the Liberty to have a Will to keep the Law Nor doth it prove that the Will of the Doer dâ—d determine it self freely for nothing can prove non-sence But here you see what the Bishop pâ—â—sueth in this whole Reply namely to prove that a man hath Liberty to do if he will which I deny not and thinks when he hath done that he hath proved a man hath Liberty to Will which he calles the Wills determining of it self freely And whereas he adds a Judge ought to look at all essential causes It is answer enough to say he is bound to look at no more then hee thinks he can see d Nature never intends the generation of a Monster If all the causes concur sufficiently a perfect creature is produced but by reason of the insufficiency or debility or contingent aberration of some of the causes sometimes a Monster is produced He had no sooner said this but finding his error he retracteth it and confesseth that the causes of a Monster were sufficient for the production of that which was produced that is of a Monster otherwise a Monster had not been produced Which is all that I intended by sufficiency of the cause But whether every suffâ—â—â—â—nt cause be a necessary cause or not he meaneth to examine in Numb 31. In the meane time he saith onely that Liberty flows from the sufficiency and contingency from the debility of the cause and leaves out necessity as if it came from neither I must note also that where he says Nature never intends the generation of a Monster I understand not whether by nature he meane the Author of Nature in which meaning it derogates from God or nature it self as
necessity supposing God and good Angels are freer than men and yet do good necessarily that we must now examin I confess saith he that God and good Angels are more free than we that is intensively in degree of freedom not extensively in the latitude of the object according to a liberty of exercise not of specification Again we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions but made to seem so by tearms invented by I know not whom to cover ignorance and blind the understanding of the Reader For it cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater than for a man to do what he will and to fobrear what he will One heat may be more intensive than another but not one liberty than another He that can do what he will hath all liberty possibly and he that cannot has nonâ— at all Also liberty as he says the Schooles call it of exercise which is as I have said before a liberty to do or not to do cannot be without a liberty which they call of specification that is to say a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular for how can a man conceive that he has liberty to do any thing that hath not liberty to do this or that or somewhat in particular If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this and that and every other particular kind of flesh how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh more than he that hath no lâ—cense at all You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools And I do not doubt but that the imposing of them by authority of Doctors in the Church hath been a great cause that men have laboured though by sedition and evil courses to shake them off for nothing is more apt to beget hatred than the tyrannising over mans reason and understanding especially when it is done not by the Scripture bâ—â— by pretense of learning and more judgment than that of other men J. D. HE who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the grounds of learning had need either to speak by an Interpreter or to learn a new Language I dare not call it Jargon or Canting lately devised not to set forth the truth but to conceal falshood He must learn a new Liberty a new necessity a new Contingency a new Sufficiency a new Spontaneity a new kind of Deliberation a new kind of Election a new Eternity a new Compulsion and in conclusion a new Nothing a This proposition the will is free may be understood in two senses Either that the will is not compelled or that the will is not alwayes necessitated for if it be ordinarlly or at any time free from necessitation my assertion is true that there is freedom from necessity The former sense that the will is not compelled is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable Voluntas non cogitur For if the will may be compelled then it may both will and not will the same thing at the same time under the same notion but this implies a contradiction Yet this Author like the good woman whom her husband sought up the stream when she was drowned upon pretense that when she was living she used to go contrary courses to all other people he holds that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he doth not will that is in his sense may compell the will As when a man willingly throws his goods into the Sea to save himself or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed I answer that T. H. mistakes sundry wayes in this discourse b First he erreth in this to think that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions which in truth are not only voluntary but free actions neither compelled nor so much as Physically necessitated Another man at the same time in the same Ship in the same storm may choose and the same individual man otherwise advised might choose not to throw his goods over-board It is the man himself who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life It is true that if he were not in such a condition or if he were freed from the grounds of his present fears he would not choose neither the casting of his goods into the Sea nor the submitting to his enemy But considering the present exigence of his affairs reason dictates to him that of two inconveniences the less is to be chosen as a comparative good Neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of his desires but as the means to attain his end And what Fear doth in these cases Love Hope Hatred c. may do in other cases that is may occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end which otherwise he would not elect As Jacob to serve seven yeers more rather than not to enjoy his beloved Rachel The Merchant to hazard himself upon the rough Seas in hope of profit Passions may be so violent that they may necessitate the will that is when they prevent deliberations but this is rarely and then the will is not free But they never properly compell it That which is compelled is against the will and that which is against the will is not willed c Secondly T. H. erres in this also where he saith that a man is then onely said to be compelled when fear makes him willing to an action As if force were not more prevalent with a man then fear we must know therefore that this word compelled is taken two wayes sometimes improperly that is when a man is mooved or occasioned by threats or fear or any passion to do that which he would not have done if those threats or that passion had not been Sometimes it is taken properly when we do any thing against our own inclination mooved by an external cause the will not consenting nor concurring but resisting as much as it can As in a rape or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the Idols Temple Or as in the case of St. Peter John 21. 18. Another shall guide thee and carry thee whither thou wouldst not This is that compulsion which is understood when we say the will may be letted or changed or necessitated or that the imperate actions of the will that is the actions of the inferiour faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will may be compelled but that the immanent actions of the will that is to will to choose cannot be compelled because it is the nature of an action properly compelled to be done by an extrinsecal cause without the concurrence of the will d Thirdly the question is not whether all the actions of a man be free but whether they be ordinarily free Suppose some passions are so suddain and violent that they surprise a man and betray the succours of the soul and prevent deliberation as we see in some motus primo primi or antipathies how some men
one private man who will not allow human liberty to others to assume to himself such a license to control so Magistrally and to censure of gross ignorance and tyrannising over mens judgments yea as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in the World the Doctors of the Church in general who have flourished in all ages and all places only for a few necessary and innocent distinctions Truly said Plutarch that a sore eye is offended with the light of the Sun h What then must the Logicians lay aside their first and second Intentions their Abstracts and Concrets their Subjects and Predicates their Modes and Figures their Method Synthetick and Analytick their Fallacies of Composition and Division c Must the moral Philosopher quite his means and extremes his pricipia congenita acquisita his liberty of contradiction and contrariety his necessity absolute and hypothetical c Must the natural Philosopher give over his intentional Species his understanding Agent and Patient his receptive and eductive power of the matter his qualities infinitae or influxae symbolae or dissymbolae his temperament ad pondus and adjâ—stitiam his parts Homogeneous and Heterogeneous his Sympathies and Antipathies his Antiperistasis c Must the Astrologer and the Geographer leave their Apogâ—um and Perigaeum their Arctick and Antarctick Poles their Aequator Zodiack Zenith Meridian Horison Zones c Must the Mathematician the Metaphysician and the Divine relinquish all their tearms of Art and proper idâ—otismes because they do not rellish with T. H. his palate But he will say they are obscure expressions What marvel is it when the things themselves are more obscure Let him put them into as plain English as he can and they shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all grounds of learning Nothing is clearer than Mathematical demonstration yet let one who is altogether ignorant in Mathematicks hear it and he will hold it to be as T. H. tearms these distinctions plain Fustian or Jargon Every Art or Profession hath its proper mysteries and expressions which are well known to the Sons of Art not so to strangers Let him consult with Military men with Physitians with Navigators and he shall find this true by experience Let him go on shipboard and the Mariners will not leave their Sterbord and Larbord because they please not him or because he accounts it Gibrish No no it is not the Schoole-Divines but Innovators and seditious Orators who are the true causes of the present troubles of Europe â— T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book De Cive cap. 12. That it is a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of good and evill belongs to private persons And cap. 17. that in questions of Faith the Civill Magistrates ought to consult with the Ecclesiasticall Doctors to whom Gods blessing is derived by imposition of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths to whom our Saviour hath promised infallibility These are the very men whom he traduceth here There he ascribes infallibility to them here he accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance There he attributes too much to them here he attributes too little Both there and here he takes too much upon him The Spirits of the Prophets are subject to the Prophets 1 Cor. 14. 32. Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb XIX a THis proposition the Will is Free may be understood in two senses Either that the Will is not compelled or that the Will is not alwayes necessitated c. The former sense that the Will is not compelled is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable I never said the Will is compelled but do agree with the rest of the World in granting that it is not compelled It is an absurd speech to say it is compelled but not to say it is necessitated or a necessary effect of some cause When the fire heateth it doth not compell heate so likewise when some cause maketh the Will to any thing it doth not compell it Many things may compel a man to do an Action in producing the Will but that is not a compelling of the Will but of the man That which I call necessitation is the effecting and creating of that Will which was not before not a compelling of a Will already existent The necessitation or Creation of the Will is the same thing with the compulsion of the man saving that we commonly use the word compulsion in those Actions which proceed from terrour And therefore this distinction is of no use and that raving which followeth immediately after it is nothing to the question whether the Will be free though it be to the question whether the man be Free b First he erreth in this to think that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions which in truth are not onely Voluntary but free actions I never said nor doubted but such actions were both Voluntary and free For he that doth any thing for fear though he say truely he was compelled to it yet we deny not that he had Election to do or not to do and consequently that he was a Voluntary and free Agent But this hinders not but that the terrour might be a necessary cause of his Election of that which otherwise he would not have Elected unlesse some other potent cause made it necessary he should elect the contrary And there fore in the same ship in the same storm one man may be necessitated to throw his goods over-board and another man to keep them within the Ship and the same mâ—n in a like storm be otherwise advised if all the causes be not like But that the same invidual man as the Bishops says that close to throw his goods over board might choose not to throw his goods over board I cannot conceive unlesse a man can choose to throw over board and not to throw over board or be so advised and otherwise advised all at once c Secondly T. H. errs in this also where he saith that a man is then only said to be compelled when â—ear makes him willing to an Action As if force were not more prevalent with a man then fear c. When I said fear I think no mâ—n can â—oubt but the fear of force was understood I cannot seâ— therfore what quarrel he could justly take at saying that a man is compelled by â—ar onely unlesse he think it may be called compulsion when â— man by force seizing on another mans limbs moveth them as himself not as the other man pleaseth but this is not the meaning of compulsion Neither is the Action so done the Action of him that suffereth but of him that useth the force But this as if it were a question of the propriety of the English tongue the Bishop denies and sayes when a man is moved by fear it is improperly said he is compelled But when a man is moved by an external cause the Will resisting as much as it can then
he says he is properly said to be compelled as in a Rape or when a Christian is drawn or carryed by violence to the idols Temple Insomuch as by this distinction it were very proper English to say that a stone were compelled when it is thrown or a man when he is carried in a Cart. For my part I understand compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures onely which are moved onely by their own animal motion in such manner as they would not be moved without the fear But of this dispute the English and Well-bred Reader is the proper Judge d Thirdly the question is not whether all the actions of a man be free but whether they be ordinarily free Is it impossible for the Bishop to remember the question which is Whether a man be Free to Wil Did I ever say that no Actions of a man are free On the contrary I say that al his Voluntary Actions are Free even those also to which he is compelled by fear But it does not therefore follow but that the Will from whence those Actions and their Election proceed may have necessary causes against which he hath never yet said any thing That which followeth immediately is not offered as a proof but as explication how the passions of a man surprise him therefore I let it passe noting onely that he expound thâ— Motus primo primi which I understood not before by the word Antipathy e A necessity of supposition is of two kinds sometimes a thing supposed is in the power of the Agent to do or not to do c. sometimes a thing supposed is not in the power of the Agent to do or not to do c. When the necessity is of the former kind of supposition then he says Freedom may consist with this necessity In the latter sense hat it cannot And to use his own instances to vow continence in a Romish Priest upon supposition that he is a Romish Priest is a necessary Act because it was in his power to be a Priest or not On the other side supposing a man having a natural Antipathy against a Cat because this Antipathy is not in the power of the party affected therefore the running away from the Cat is no Free act I deny not but that it is a Free act of the Romish Priest to vow continence noâ— upon the supposition that he was a Romish Priest but because he had not done it unlesse he would if he had not been a Romish Priest it had been all one to the Freedom of his Act. Nor is his Priesthood any thing to the Necessitie of his vow saving that if he would not have vowed he should not have been made a Priest There was an antecedent necessity in the causes extrinsecal first that he should have the Wil to be a Priest and then consequently that he should have the Wil to vow Against this he alledgeth nothing Then for his Cat the mans running from it is a Free Act as being voluntary and arising from a false apprehension which neverthelesse he cannot help of some hurt or other the Cat may do him And therefore the Act is as free as the Act of him that throweth his goods into the Sea So likewise the Act of Jacob in blessing his sons and the Act of Balaam in blessing Israel are equally Free and equally voluntary yet equally determined by God who is the Author of all blessings and framed the will of both of them to blesse and whose Will as St. Paul saith cannot be resisted Therefore both their Actions were necessitated equally and because they were Voluntary equally Free As for Caiphas his prophecy which the Text saith He spake not of himself it was necessary first because it was by the supernatural gift of God to the High-priests as soveraigns of the Common-wealth of the Jews to speak to the people as from the mouth of God that is to say to prophesie and secondly whensoever he did speak not as from God but as from himself it was neverthelesse necessary he should do so not that he might not have been silent if he would but because his will to speak was antecedently determined to what he should speak from all Aeternity which he hath yet brought no argument to contradict He approveth my modesty in suspending my judgement concerning the manner how the good Angells do work Necessarily or Freely because I find it not set down in the Articles of our Faith nor in the decrees of our Church But he useth not the same modesty himself For whereas he can apprehend neither the Nature of God nor of Angels nor conceive what kind of thing it is which in them he calleth Will he neverthelesse takes upon him to attribute to them Liberty of Exercise and to deny them a Liberty of Specification to grant them a more intensive Liberty then we have but not a more extensive using not incongruously in the incomprehensibility of the subject â—â—comprehensible terms as Liberty of Exercise Liberty of Specification degrees of intention in Liberty as if one liberty like heat might be more intensive then another It is true that there is greater liberty in a large then in a strait prison but one of those Liberties is not more intense then the other f His second reason is He that can do what he Will hath all Liberty and he that cannot do what he Will hath no Liberty If this be true then there are no degrees of Liberty indeed But this which he calls Liberty is rather an Omnipotence then a Liberty 'T is one thing to say a man hath Liberty to do what he will and another thing to say he hath power to do what he Will. A man that is bound would say readily he hath not the Liberty to walk but he will not say he wants the Power But the sick man will say he wants the Power to walk but not the Liberty This is as I conceive to speak the English tongue and consequently an English man will not say the Liberty to do what he Will but the Power to do what he Will is Omnipotence And therefore either I or the Bishop understand not English Whereas he adds that I mistake the meaning of the word Liberty of specification I am sure that in that way wherein I expound them there is no absurdity But if he say I understand not what the Schoolmen mean by it I will not contend with him for I think they know not what they mean themselves g And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and Scholastical expressions and the Doctors of the Church who by this means tyrannized over the understanding of other men What a presumption is this for one private man c That he may know I am no enemy to intelligible distinctions I also will use a distinction in the defence of my self against this his accusation I say therefore that some distinctions are Scholastical onely and some are Scholastical and sapiential also
the Will chooseth of necessity And why but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does and say as he does here that Election is the Act of the Wil. No Election is the Act of a man as power to Elect is the power of a man Election and Wil are all one Act of a man and the power to Elect and the power to Wil one and the same power of a man But the Bishop is confounded by the use of calling by the name of Wil the power of willing in the future as they also were confounded that first brought in this senselesse term of Actus primus My meaning is that the Election I shall have of any thing hereafter is now as necessary as that the fire that now is and continueth shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it hereafter Or to use his own terms the Wil hath no more power to suspend its Willing then the burning of the fire to suspend its burning Or rather more properly the man hath no more power to suspend his Will then the fire to suspend his burning Which is contrary to that which he would have namely that a man should have power to refuse what he Wils and to suspend his own appetite for to refuse what one willeth implyeth a contradiction the which also is made much more absurd by his expression for he saith the Will hath power to refuse what it Wils and to suspend its own Appetite whereas the Will and the Willing â—â—d the Appetite is the same thing He adds that even the burning of the fire if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances is not so necessary an Action as T. H. imagineth He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine For I imagine that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence I may truly say now it shall burn necessarily and of that which shall not burn then for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter thrown into it as in the case of the three Children that it is necessary it shall not burn m Two things are required to make an Effect necessary First that it be produced by a necessary cause c. Secondly that it be necessarily produced c. To this I say nothing but that I understand not how a cause can be necessary and the Effect not be necessarily produced n My second reason against this distinction of Liberty from compulsion but not from necessitation is new and demonstrates cleerly that to necessitate the Wil by a Physical necessity is to compel the Wil so far as the Wil is capable of compulsion and that he who doth necessitate the Wil to evil after that manner is the true cause of evil c. By this second reason which he says is new and demonstrates c. I cannot find what reason he means for there are but two whereof the later is in these Words Secondly to rip up the bottom of this business this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools There is a double Act of the Wil the one more remote called Imperatus c. The other Act is nearer called Actus Elicitus c. But I doubt whether this be it he means or no. For this being the resolution of the Schools is not new and being a distinction onely is no demonstration though â—erhaps he may use the word demonstration as every unlearned man now a days does to signifie any Argument of his own As for the distinction it self because the terms are Latine and never used by any Author of the Latine tongue to shew their impertinence I expounded them in English and left them to the Readers judgement to find the absurdity of them himself And the Bishop in this part of his Reply indeavours to defend them And first he calls it a Trivial and Grammatical objection to say they are improper and obscure Is there any thing lesse be seeming a Divine or a Philosopher then to speak improperly and obscurely where the truth is in question Perhaps it may be tollerable in one that Divineth but not in him that pretendeth to demonstrate It is not the universal current of Divines and Philosophers that giveth Words their Authority but the generality of them who acknowledge that they understand them Tyrant and Praemunire though their signification be changed yet they are understood and so are the names of the Days Sunday Munday Tuesday And when English Reaâ—ers not engaged in School Divinity shall find Imperate Elicite Acts as intelligible as those I will confesse I had no reason to find fault But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction between the Elicite and Imperate Acts of the Wil he says was onely to hide from the eyes of the Reader a tergiversation in not answering this Argument of his he who doth necessitate the Wil to evil is the true cause of evil But God is not the cause of evil Therefore he does not necessitate the Wil to evil This Argument is not to be found in this Numb 20. to which I here answered nor had I ever said that the Wil was compelled But he taking all necessitation for Compulsion doth now in this place from necessitation simply bring in this Inference concerning the cause of evill and thinks he shall force me to say that God is the cause of sin I shall say onely what is said in the Scripture Non est malum quod ego non feci I shall say what Micaiah saith to Ahab 1 Kings 22. 23. Behold the Lord hath put a lying Spirit into the mouth of all these thy Prophets I shall say that that is true which the Prophet David saith 2 Sam. 16. 10. Let him curse because the Lord hath said unto him curse David But that which God himself saith of himself 1 Kings 12. 15. The King hearkned not to the people for the cause was from the Lord I will not say least the Bishop exclaim against me but leave it to be interpreted by those that have authority to interpret the Scriptures I say further that to cause sin is not always sin nor can be sin in him that is not subject to some higher Power but to use so unseemly a Phrase as to say that God is the cause of sin because it soundeth so like to saying that God sinneth I can never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his Luther says we act necessarily necessarily by necessity of immutability not by necessity of constraint that is in plain English necessarily but not against our wills Zanchius says Tract Theol. cap. 6. Thes. 1. The freedom of our will doth not consist in this that there is no necessity of our sinning but in this that there is no constraint Bucer Lib. de Concordia Whereas the Catholicks say man has Free Will we must understand it of freedom from constraint and not freedom from necessity Calvin Inst. Cap. 2. § 6. And thus shall man be said to have Free
Will not because he hath equall freedom to do good and evill but because he does the evill he does not by constraint but willingly Monsr du Mouâ—in in his Buckler of the Faith Article 9 The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the Will Witness the Devils who are necessarily wicked and yet sin freely without constraint And the Synod of Dort Liberty is not opposite to all kinds of necessity and determination It is indeed opposite to the necessity of constraint but standeth well enough with the necessity of infallibility I could add more For all the famous Doctors of the Reformed Churches and with them St. Augustine are of the same opinion None of these denied that God is the cause of al Motion Action or that God is the cause of al Laws and yet they were never forced to say that God is the cause of sin o They who invented this term of Actus Imperatus understood not he saith any thing what it signified No Why not It seemeth to me they understood it better then those who except against it They knew there are mentall terms which are only conceived in the mind as well as vocal terms which are expressed with the tongue c. In this place the Bishop hath discovered the ground of all his errors in Philosophy which is this that he thinketh when he repeateth the words of a proposition in his mind that is when he fancieth the words without speaking them that then hee conceiveth the things which the words signifie and this is the most general cause of false opinions For men can never be deceived in the conceptions of things though they may and are most often deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or appellations different from those which are commonly used and constituted to signifie their conceptions And therefore they that study to attain the certain knowledge of truth do use to set down before hand all the terms they are to expresse themselves by and declare in what sense they shall use them constantly And by this means the Reader having an Idea of every thing there named cannot conceive amisse But when a man from the hearing of a word hath no Idea of the thing signified but onely of the sound and of the Letters whereof the word is made which is that he here calleth Mentall terms it is impossible he should conceive aright or bring forth any thing but absurdity as he doth here when he says that when Tarquin delivered his commands to his Son by onely striking off the tops of the Poppies he did it by Mental terms As if to strick off the head of a Poppy were Mental term It is the sound and the Letters that maketh him think Elicitus and Imperatus somewhat And it is the same that makes him say for think it he cannot that to Wil or choose is drawn or allured or fetch 't out of the power to Wil. For drawing cannot be imagined but of bodys and therefore to Will to speak to write to dance to leape or any way to be moved cannot be said intelligibly to be drawn much lesse to be drawn out of a Power that is to say out of an ability for whatsoever is drawn out is drawn out of one place into another He that can discourse in this manner in Philosophy cannot probably be thought able to discourse rationally in any thing p His other objection against this distinction of the Acts of the Will into Elicite and Imperate is obscurity Might it not saith he have been as easily said in English a voluntary Action Yes it might have been said as easily but not as truly nor as properly He says that Actus Imperatus is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the command of the Wil. I say when a man opens and shuts his eyes according to his Wil that it is a voluntary Action and I believe we mean one and the same thing Whether of us speak more properly or more truly let the Reader Judge q But his mistakes are so thick c. I will do my duty to shew him the right way First no Acts which are properly said to be compelled are voluntary Secondly Acts of of terrour c. This is nothing but Tohu and Bohu J. D. THE rest are umbrages quickly dispelled first the Astrologer Num. 21. steps up and subjects Liberty to the motions of Heaven to the aspects and ascensions of the Starrs Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni Quam si nos Veneris commendet Epistola Marti I stand not much upon them who cannot see the fishes swimming besides them in the rivers yet believe they see those which are in Heaven Who promise great treasures to others and beg a groat for themselves The Starrs at the most do but incline they cannot necessitate Secondly the Physitian subjects liberty to the complexion and temperature of the body But yet this comes not home to a necessity Socrates and many others by assiduous care have corrected the pernicious propensions which flowed from their temperatures T. H. IN the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of certain professions of men touching the causes wherein the necessity of things which they maintain consisteth And first he saith the Astrologer deriveth his necessity from the Starrs Secondly that the Physician attributeth it to the temper of the body For my part I am not of their opinion because neither the Starrs alone nor the temperature of the Patient alone is able to produce any effect without the concurrence of all other Agents For there is hardly any one action how casual soever it seem to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum natura Which because it is a great Paradox and depends on many antecedent speculations I do not press in this place J. D. TOwards the later end of my discourse I answered some specious pretences against liberty The two first were of the Astrologer and the Physician The one subjecting liberty to the motions and influences of the heavenly bodies The other to the complexions of men a The sum of my answer was that the Stars and complexions do incline but not at all necessitate the will To which all judicious Astronomers and Physicians do assent And T. H. himself doth not dissent from it So as to this part there needs no reply b But whereas he mentions a great paradox of his own that there is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurres not whatsoever is in rerum natura I can but smile to see with what ambition our great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions as if the devising of an ill grounded Paradox were as great an honour as the invention of the needle or the discovery of the new World And to this Paradox in Particular I meddle not with natural actions because the subject of my discourse is moral liberty But if he intend not only the kinds
himself angry And of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty And the like Such things I confess have or may have been done and do prove onely that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to weâ—p nor for the Philosopher to strike nor for â—hat other maâ— to drink but it does not prove that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abâ—â—ain as he did from weeping nor the Philosopher to abstain as he did from striking Nor the other man to forbear drinking And yet that was the thing he ought to have provâ—d Lastly he confesseth that the disposition of objects may be dangerous to liberty but cannot be destructive To which I answer tâ—â— impossible For liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost And if 〈◊〉 cannot be lost which he confesseth I may inâ—er it can be in no danger at all J. D. a THe third pretense was out of moral Philosophy misunderstood that outward objects do necessitate the will I shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted but onely to satisfie his exceptions b The first is that it is not material though the power of outward objects do proceed from our own faults if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power Well but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power as in truth they do then his answer is a meer subterfuge If our faults proceed from causes that are not and were not in our own power then they are not our faults at all It is not a fault in us not to do those things which never were in our power to do But they are the faults of these causes frâ—m whence they do proceed c Next he confesseth that it â—â—â—n our power by good endeavours to alter those vitious habits which we had contracted and to get the contrary habit True saith he but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way as well as the former habit did the other way By which very consideration it appears that that which he calls a necessity is no more but a proclivity If it were a true necessity it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours The truth is Acquired habits do help and assist the faculty but they do not necessitate the faculty He who hath gotten to himself an habit of temperance may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act And so on the contrary Acts are not opposed to habits but other habits d He adds that we are not mooved to prayer or any other action but by outward objects as pions company godly Preachers or something equivalent Wherein are two other mistakes first to make godly Preachers and pious company to be outward objects which are outward Agents Secondly to affirm that the will is not moved but by outward objects The will is mooved by it self by the understanding by the sensitive passions by Angels good aâ—d bad by men and most effectually by acts or habits infused by God whereby the will is excited extraordinarily indeed but efficaciously and determinately This is more than equivalent with outward objects Another branch of mine answer was that a resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both the appâ—tibility of objects and the unruliness of passions As I shewed by examples e He answers that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep nor the Philosopher to strike but I do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear He saith true I am not now proving but answering Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove that which I intend That the rational will hath power both to sleight the most appetible objects and to control the most unruly passions When he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have produced then it will be time for him to cry for more work Lastly whereas I say that outward objects may be dangerous but cannot be destructive to true liberty He catcheth at it and f objects that liberty is in no danger but to be lost but I say it cannot be lost therefore he infers that it is in no danger at all I answer First that liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost Many more men do abuse their wits than lose them Secondly liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted by our selves and yet it is not totally lost Thirdly though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man as to the exercise of it Reason is the root of liberty and though nothing be more natural to a man than reason yet many by excess of study or by continual gurmandizing or by some extravagant passion which they have cherished in themselves or by doting too much upon some affected object do become very sorts and deprive themselves of the use of reason and consequently of Liberty And when the benefit of liberty is not thus universally lost yet it may be lost respectively to this or that particular occasion As he who makes choise of a bad wife hath lost his former liberty to chose a good one Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb XXII a THe third pretence was out of Moral Philosophy misunderstood that outward objects do necessitate the Will I cannot imagine how the question whether outward objects do necessitate or not necessitate the Wilâ— can any â—ay be referred to Moral Philosophy The principles â—f moral Philosophy are the Laws wherewith outward objects have little to do as being for the most part inanimate which follow alwayes the force of nature without respect to moral Laws Nor can I conceive what purpose he had to bring this into his Reply to my answer wherein I attribute nothing in the Action of outward objects to Morallity b His first exception is that it is not material that the power of outward objects do proceed from our own faults if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power Well but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power as in truth they do then his answer is a meer subterfuge But how prâ—vâ—s he that in truth they do Because else saith he they are not our faults at all Very well reasoned A Horse is lame from a cause that was not in his power therefore the lameness is no fault in the Horse But his meaning is tâ—s no injustice unlesse the causes were in his own power as if it were not injustice whatsoever is willingly done against the Law whatsoever it be that is the cause oâ— the Wil to do it c Next he confesseth that it is in our power by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted and to get the contrary habits There is no such confession in my answer I said Prayer Fasting c. May alter our habits But I never said that the Will to Pray Fast c.
each pace that he walks Thus many steps must he go not one more nor one less under pain of mortal sin What is this but a Rack and a Gibbet to the Conscience But God leaves many things indifferent though man be so curious he will not A good Architect will be sure to provide sufficient materials for his building but what particular number of stones or trees he troubles not his head And suppose he should weigh each action thus yet he doth not so still there is liberty Thirdly I conceive it is possible in this mist and weakness of human apprehension for two actions to be so equally circumstantiated that no discernable difference can appear between them upon discussion Aâ— suppose a Chirurgion should give two plaisters to his Patient and â—id him apply either oâ— them to his wound what can induce his reason more to the one than to the other but that he may refer it to chance whether he will use But leaving these probable speculations which I submit â—o better judgments I answer the Philosopher briefly thus Admitting that the will did necessarily follow the last dictare of the understanding as certainly in many things it doth Yet First this is no extrinsâ—â—al determination from without and a mans own resolution is not destructive to his own liberty but depends upon it So the person is still free Secondly this determination is not antecedent but joyned with the Action The understanding and the will are not different Agents but distinct faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility or an hypothetical necessity as we say Quicquid est quando est necessâ— est esse A necessity of consequence but not a necessity of consequent Though an Agent have certainly determined and so the Action be become infallible yet if the Agent did determine freely the Action likewise is free T. H. THE fourth opinion which he râ—jecteth is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding but it seems he understands that Tenet in another sense than I do For he speaketh as if they that held it did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every astion they do great and small to the least grain which it a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue But I understand it to signifie that thâ— will followes the last opinion or judgment immediatly proceding thâ— action concerning whether it be good to do it or not whether he hath weighed it long before or not at all And that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it As for example when a man strikes his will to strike followes necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke immediately before the liftinâ— of his hand Nâ—w iâ— it be understood in that sense the last dictate of the understanding does â—ertainly necessitate the action though not as the whole cause yet as the last cause as the last feather necessitates the breaking of an horses back when there are so many laid on before as there needeth but the addition oâ— that one to make the weight sufficient That which he alledgeth against this is first out of a Poet who in the person of Medea sayes Video Meliora proboque Deteriora sequorâ— But the saying as prâ—try as it is 〈◊〉 not true for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her Children yet the last dictate of her judgment was that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all and thereupon the wicked action followed necessarily Then the story of the Roman that of two competitors said one had the better reasons but the oâ— her must have the office This also maketh against him for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office was this that it was better to take a great bribe than reward a great merit Thirdly he objects that things neerer the senses moove more powerfully than reason What followeth thence but this That the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the Action than the foresight of the evill consequents to come Fourthly whereas he sayes that do what a man can he shall sorrow more for the death of his son than for the sin of his soul it makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding but it argues plainly that sorrow for sin is not voluntary And by consequence repentance proceedeth from causes J. D. THE fourth pretense alledged against Liberty was that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding This objection is largely answered before in several places of this Reply and particularly Numb 7. In my former discourse I gave two answers to it The one certain and undoubted That a supposing the last dictate of the understanding did alwayes determine the will yet this determination being not antecedent in time nor proceeding from extrinsecal causes but from the proper resolution of the Agent who had now freely determined himself it makes no absolute necessity but onely hypothetical upon supposion that the Agent hath determined his own will after this or that manner Which being the main answer T. H. is so far from taking it away that he takes no notice of it The other part of mine answer was probable That it is not alwayes certain that the will doth alwayes actually follow the last dictate of the understanding though it alwayes ought to follow it b Of which I gave then three reasons one was that actions may be so equally circumstantiated or the case so intricate that reason cannot give a positive sentence but leaves the election to liberty or chance To this he answers not a word Another of my reasons was because reason doth not weigh nor is bound to weigh the convenience or inconvenience of every individual action to the uttermost grain in the balance of true judgement The truth of this reason is confessed by T. H. though he might have had more abetters in this than in the most part of his discourse that nothing is indifferent that a man cannot stroak his beard on one side but it was either necessary to do it or sinful to omit it from which confession of his it follows that in all those actions wherein reason doth not define what is most convenient there the will is free from the determination of the understanding and by consequence the last feather is wanting to break the horses back A third reason was because passions and affections sometimes prevail against judgment as I prooved by the example of Medea and Caesar by the neerness of the objects to the senses and by the estimation of a temporal loss more than sin Against this reason his whole answer is addressed And first c he explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the last feather wherewith he seems to be delighted seeing he useth it now the second time But let him like it as he will it is improper for three reasons First the determination of the
t is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life whether he should do that kind of action or not And hence it is that he that killeth in a suddain passion of anger shall nevertheless be justly puâ— to death because all tâ—â— time wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evill shall be held for one continual deliberation and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election J. D. THis part of T. H. his discourse hangs together like a sickmans dreams a Even now he tells us that a man may have time to deliberate yet not deliberate By and by he saith that no action of a man though never so suddain can be said to be without deliberation He tells us Numb 33. that the scope of this section is to shew what is spontaneous Howbeit he sheweth onely what is voluntary b So making voluntary and spontaneous to be all one whereas before he had told us that every spontaneous action is not voluntary because indeliberate Nor every voluntary action spontaneous if it proceed from fear c Now he tells us that those actions which follow the last appetite are voluntary and where there is one onely appetite that is the last But before he told us that voluntary presuppaseth some precedent deliberation and Meditation of what is likely to follow both upon the doing and abstaining from the action d He defines Liberty Numb 29. to be the absence of all extrinsecal impediments to action And yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to make good that whatsoever is not done is therefore not done because the Agent was necessitated by extrinsecal causes not to do it Are not extrinsecal causes which determine him not to do it extrinsecal impediments to action So no man shall be free to do any thing but that which he doth actually He defines a free Agent to be him who hath not made an end of deliberating Numb 28. And yet defines liberty to be an absence of outward impediments There may be outward impediments even whilst he is deliberating As a man deliberates whether he shall play at Tennis and at the same time the door of the Tennis-court is fast locked against him And after a man hath ceased to deliberate there may be no outward impediments as when a man resolves not to play at Tennis because he finds himself ill disposed or because he will not hazard his mony So the same person at the same time should be free not free not free and free And as he is not firm to his own grounds so he confounds al things the mind and the will the estimative faculty and the understanding imagination with deliberation thâ— end with the means humane â—il with the sensitive appetite rational hope or fear with irrational possions inclinations with intentions A beginning of Being with a beginning of working Sufficiency with efficiency So as the greatest difficulty is to find out what he aimes at So as I had once resolved not to answer this part of his discourse yet upon better advise I will take â— brief survey of it also and shew how far I assent unto or dissent from that which I conceive to be his meaning And first concerning suddain passions as Anger or the like e That which he saith that the action doth necessarily follow the thought is thus far true that those actions which are altogether undeliberated and do proceed from suddain and violent passions or motus primo primi which surprise a man and give him no time to advise with reason are not properly and actually in themselves free but rather necessary actions as when a man runs away from a Cat or a Custard out of a secret antipathy f Secondly as for those actions wherein actual deliberatiâ—n seems not necessary because never any thing appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence I do confess that actions done by vertue of a precedent deliberation without any actual deliberation in the present when the act is done may notwithstanding be truly both voluntary and free acts yea in some cases and in some sense more free than if they were actually deliberated of in present As one who hath acquired by â—ormer deliberation and experience an habit to play upon the Virginals needs not deliberate what man or what Jack he must touch nor what finger of his hand he must move to play such a lesson Yea if his mind should be fixed or intent to every motion of his hand or every touch of a string it would hinder his play and render the action more troublesome to him Wherefore I believe that not onely his playing in general but every motion of his hand though it be not presently deliberated of is a free act by reason of his precedent deliberation So then saving improprieties of speech as calling that voluntary which is free and limiting the will to the last appetite and other mistakes as that no act can be said to be without deliberation we agree also for the greater part in this second observation g Thirdly whereas he saith that some suddain acts proceeding from violent passions which surprise a man are justly punished I grant they are so sometimes but not for his reason because they have been formerly actually deliberated of but because they were virtually deliberated of or because it is our faults that they were not actually deliberated of whether it was a fault of pure negation that is of not doing our duty onely or a fault of bad disposition also by reason of some vitious habit which we had contracted by our former actions To do a necessary act is never a fault nor justly punishable when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsecal causes As if a Child before he had the use of reason shall kill a man in his passion yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it and reason to restrain him from it he shall not dye for it in the strict rules of particular Justice unless there be some mixture of publick Justice in the case h But if the necessity be contracted by our selves and by our own faults it is justly punishable As he who by his wanton thoughts in the day-time doth procure his own nocturnal pollution A man cannot deliberate in his sleep yet it is accounted a sinful act and consequently a free act that is not actually free in its self but virtually free in its causes and though it be not expresly willed and chosen yet it is tacitely and implicitely willed and chosen when that is willed and chosen from whence it was necessarily produced By the Levitical Law if a man digged a pit and left it uncovered so that his neighbours Oxe or his Asse did fall into it he was bound to make reparation not because he did chose to leave it uncovered on purpose that such a mischance might happen but because he did freely omit that which he ought to have done from
whence this dammage proceeded to his neighbour Lastly there is great difference between the first motions which sometimes are not in our power and subsequent acts of killing or stealing or the liâ—â— which alwayes are in our power if we have the use of râ—â—soâ— or else it is our own fault that they are not in our power Yet to such hasty acts done in hot blood the Law is not so severe as to those which are done upon long deliberation and prepensed malice unless as I said there be some mixture of publick Justice in it He that steals an Horse deliberately may be more punishable by the Law than he that kills the owner by Chance-medley Yet the death of the owner was more noâ—ious to use his phrase and more dammageable to the family than the stealth of the Horse So far was T. H. mistaken in that also that the right to kill men doth proceed meerly from their being noxious Numb 14. Animadversions upon the Bishops Answer to my opinion about Liberty and Necessity Numb XXV a EVen now he tells us that a man may have time to deliberate yet not deliberate By and by he saith that no action of a man though never so sudden can be said to be without deliberation He thinks he hath here oatcht me in a contradiction But he is mistaken and the cause is that he observed not that there may be a difference between deliberation and that which shall be constrâ—ed for deliberation by a Judge For a man may do â— rush ast suddenly without deliberation yet because he ought to have deliberated and had time enough to deliberate whether the action were Lawful or not it shall not be said by the Judge that it was without deliberation who supposeth that after the Law known all the time following was time of deliberation It is therefore â—o contradiction to say a man deliberates not and that he shall be said to deliberate by him that is the Judge of volâ—ntary actions b Again where he says he maketh Voluntary and Spontaneous to be alone wher as before he had told us that every Spontaneous Action is not Voluntary because indeliberate Nor every Voluntary Action Spontaneous if it proceed from fear He thinks he hath espied another contradiction It is no wonder if speaking of Spontaneous which signifieth nothing else in Latin for English it is not but that which is done deliberately or indeliberately without compulsion I seem to the Bishâ—p who hath never given any definition of that word not to use it as he would have me And t is easy for him to give it any signification he please as the occasion shall serve to charge me with contradiction In what sense I have used that word once in the same I have used it alwayes calling that Spontaneous which is without co-action or compulsion by tenrour c Now he tells us that those actions which follow the last Appetite are Voluntary and where there is onâ— onely Appetite that 's the last But before he told â—s that Voluntary presupposeth some precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow both upon the doing and abstaining from the Action This is a third contradiction he supposeth he hath found but is again mistaken For when men are to judge of actions whether they be Voluntary or not they cannot call that action Voluntary which followed not the last Appetite But the same men though there were no deliberation shall judge there was because it ought to have been and that from the time that the Law was known to the time of the action it self And therefore both are true that Voluntary may be without and yet presupposed in the Law not to be without deliberation d He defines Liberty Numb 29. to be the absence of all extrinsical impediments to action And yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to make good that whatsoever is not done is therefore not done because the Agent was necessitated by extrinsecal causes not to do it Are not extrinsecal causes which determine him not to do it extrinsecal impediments to Action This definition of Liberty that it is the absence of all extrinsecal impediments to action he thinkes he hath sufficiently confuted by asking whether the extrinsecal causes which determine a man not to do an action be not extrinsecal impediments to action It seems by his question he makes no doubt but they are but is deceived by a too shallow consideration of what the word Impediment signiâ—eth For Impediment or hinderance signifieth an opposition to endeavour And therefore if a man be necessitated by extrinsecal causes not to endeavour an action those causes do â—ot oppose his endeavour to do it because he has no such endeavour to be opposed and consequently extrinsecal causes that take away endeavour are not to be called impediments nor can any man be said to be hundred from doing that which he had no purpose at all to do So that this objection of his proceedeth onely from this that he understandeth not sufficiently the English Tongue From the same proceedeth also that he thinketh it a contradiction to call a Free Agent him that hath not yet made an end of deliberating and to call liberty an absence of outward impediments For saith he there may be outward impediments even while he is deliberating Wherein he is deceived For though he may deliberate of that which is impossible for him to do as in the example he alledgeth of him that deliberateth whether he shall play at Tennis not knowing that the door of the Tennis-Court in shut against him yet it is no impediment to him that the door is shut till he have a will to play which he hath not till he hath done deliberating whether he shall play or not That which followeth of my confounding mind and will the estimative faculty and the understanding the imagination and deliberation the end and the means the humane will and the sensitive appetite rational hope or fear and irrational passions inclinations and intentions a beginning of being and a beginning of working sufficiency and efficiency I do not find in any thing that I have written any impropriety in the use of these or any other English words nor do I doubt but an English Reader who hath not lost himself in School Divinity will very easily conceive what I have said But this I am sure that I never confounded beginning of being with beginning of working nor sufficiency with efficiency nor ever used these words Sensitive Appetite Rational hope or Rational fear or Irrationall Passions It is therefore impossible I should confound them But the Bishop is either mistaken or else he makes no scruple to say that which he knows to be false when he thinks it will serve his turne e That which he saith that the action doth necessarily follow the thought is thus far true that those actions which are altogether undeliberated and do proceed from violent passions c. are not properly and actually in
themselves free but rather necessary actions as when a man runs away from a Cat or a custard Thus far he says is true But when he calls sudden passions motus primo primi I cannot tell whether he says true or not because I do not understand him nor find how he makes his meaning ever the clearer by his example of a Cat and a Custard because I know not what he means by a secret Antipathie For what that Antipathy is he explaineth not by calling it secret but rather confesseth he knows not how to explain it And because he saith it is thus far true I expect he should tell me also how far it is false f Secondly as for those actions wherein actual deliberation seems not necessary because never any thing appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence I do confesse that Actions done by vertue of a precedent deliberation without any actual deliberation for the present may notwithstanding be truely voluntary and free Acts. In this he agrees with me But where he adds yea in some cases and in some sense more free then if they were actually deliberated of in present I do not agree with him And for the instance he bringeth to prove it in the man that playeth on an iâ—strument with his hand it maketh nothing for him for it proveth onely that the Habit maketh the motion of his hand more ready and quick but it proveth not that it maketh it more voluntary but rather lesse because the rest of the motions follow the first by an easinesse acquired from long custome in which motion the Wil doth not accompany all the strokes of the hand but gives a beginning to them onely in the first Here is nothing as I expected of how far that which I had said namely that the action doth necessarily follow the thought is false unlesse it be improprieties of speech as calling that voluntary which is free and limitting the will to the last appetite and other mistakes as that no act can be said to be without deliberation For improprieties of speech I will not contend wâ—th one that can use motus primo primi practice practicum actus elicitus and many other phrases of the same kind But so say that Free actions are voluntary and that the Wil which oauseth a voluntary action is the last appetite and that that appetite was immediately followed by the action and that no action of a man can be said in the judgement of the Law to be without deliberation are no mistakes for any thing that he hath proved to the contrary g Thirdly whereas he saith that some sudden acts proâ—â—eceeding from violent passions which surprise a man are justly punished I grant they are so sometimes but not for his reason c. My reason was because he had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the Law to the instant of his action and ought to have deliberated that therefore he may be justly punished The Bishop grants they are justly punished and his reason is because they were vertually deliberated of or because it is our fault they were not actually deliberated of How a man does deliberate and yet not actually deliberate I understand not If vertual deliberation be not actual deliberation it is no deliberation But he calleth vertual deliberation that which ought to have been and was not and says the same that he condemnes in me And his other reason namely because it is our fault that we deliberated not is the same that I said that we ought to have deliberated and did not So that his reprehension here is a reprehension of himself proceeding from that the custome of School Language hath made him forget the Language of his Country And to that which he adds that a necessary act is never a fault nor justly punishable when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsecal causes I have sufficiently answered before in divers places shewing that a fault may be necessary from extrinsecal causes and yet voluntary and that voluntary faults are justly punishable h But if the necessity be contracted by our selves it is justly punishable As he who by his wanton though in the day time doth procure his own nocturnal pollution This instance because it maketh not against any thing I have held and partly also because it is a stinking passage for surely if as he that ascribing eyes to the understanding allowes me to say it hath a nose it stinketh to the nose of the understanding This sentence I passe over observing only the canting terms not actually free in it self but vertually free in its causes In the rest of his answer to this Number 25. I find nothing alledged in confutation of any thing I have said saving that his last words are that T. H. is mistaken in that also that the right to kill men doth proceed meerly from their being noxious Numb 14. But to that I have in the same Numb 14. already answered I must not passe over that a little before he hath these words If a Child before he have the use of reason shall kill a man in his passion yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it and reason to restrain him from it he shall not dye for it in the strict rules of particular Justice unlesse there be some mixture of publique Justice in the case The Bishop would make but an ill Judge of innocent Children for such are they that for want of age have not use enough of reason to abstain from killing for the want of reason proceeding from want of age does therefore take away tho punishment because it taketh away the crime and makes them innocent But he introduceth another Justice which he calleth publick whereas he called the other particular and by this publick Justice he saith the Child though innocent may be put to death I hope we shall never have the administration of publick Justice in such hands as his or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him But the distinction he makes is not by himself understood There are publick causes and private causes private are those where the parties to the cause are both private men Publick are those where one of the parties is the Common-wealth or the person that representeth it and the cause criminal But there is no distinction of Justice into Publick and Private We may reade of men that having Soverain Power did sometimes put an Innocent to death either upon a vow as â—â—pthah did in sacrificing his Daughter or when it hath been thought fit that an innocent person should be put to death to save a great number of people But to put to death a Child not for reason of State which he improperly calls Publick Justice but for killing a man and at the same time to acknowledge such killing to be no crime I think was never heard of T. H. SEcondly I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall Num. 26.
Liberty which is the question between us in stead of necessitated he puts in not free And therefore to say a man is free till he hath made an end of Deliberating is no contradiction to absolute and antecedent necessity And whereas he adds presently after that I ascribe the necessitation of a man in â—ree acts to his own deliberation and in indeliberate acts to his last thoughts he mistakes the matter for I ascribe all necessity to the universal Series or Order of causes depending on the first cause eternal Which the Bishop understâ—ndetâ— as if I had said in his Phrase to a special influence of extrinsecal causes that is understandeth it not at all c Again Liberty saith he is an absence of extrinsecal impeâ—imentâ— but Deliberation doth produce no new extrinsecall impediment therefore either he is free after Deliberation or he was not free before I canâ—ot perceive in these words any more force of inference then of so many other words whatsoever put together at adventure But be his meaning what he Wil I say not that deliberation porduceth any impediments for there are no impediments but to the Action â—hilst we are endeavouring to do it which is not till we have done deliberating But during the Deliberation there arise thoughts in him that deliberateth concerning the consequence of the action whereof he deliberateth which cause the action following which are not impediments to that which was not done but the causes of that which was done That which followeth in this Number is not intelligible by reason of the insignificance of these words understanding directeth Will electeth hypothetical necessity which are but Jargon and his divided sense and compounded sense non sense And this also Liberty respecteth not future acts onely but present acts also is unintelli ible For how can a man have Liberty to do or not to do that which is at the same instant already done For where he addeth otherwise God did not freely create the World it proves nothing because he had the Liberty to create it before it was created Besides it is a pâ—rphancing of the name of God to make instances of his incomprehensible working in a question as this is meerly natural T. H. FIftly I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner Num. 29. Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and in the intrinsecal quality of the Agent As for example the water is said to descend freely or to have liberty to descend by the Chanel of the River because there is no impediment that way but not across because the banks are impediments And though water cannot ascend yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend but the faculty or power because the impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsecall So also we say he that is tied wants the liberty to go because the impediment is not in him but in his bonâ—s whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame bâ—cause the impediment is in himself J. D. a HOw that should be a right definition of liberty which comprehends neither the Genus nor the Difference neither the Matter nor the Form of liberty which doth not so much as accidentally describe liberty by its marks and tokens How a real faculty or the Elective power should be defined by a negation or by an absence is past my understanding and contrary to all the rules of right Reason which I have learned Negatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined By this definition a stone hath liberty to ascend into the aire because there is no outward impediment to hinder it and so a violent act may be a free act Just like his definit on are his instances of the liberty of the water to descend down the Channell and a sick or a lame mans liberty to go The later is an impotence and not a power or a liberty The former is so far from being a free act that it is scarce a natural act Certainly the proper natural motion of water as of all heavy bodies is to descend directly downwards towards the center as we see in rain which falls down perpendicularly Though this be far from a free act which proceeds from a rational appetite yet it is a natural act and proceeds from a natural appetite and hath its reason within in it self So hath not the current of the river in its Channel which must not be ascribed to the proper nature of the water but either to the general order of the universe for the better being and preservation of the creatures otherwise the waters should not moove in Seas and Rivers as they do but cover the face of the earth and possess their proper place between the aire and the earth according to the degree of their gravity Or to an extrinsecal principle whilst one particle of water thrusteth and forceth forward another and so comes a current or at least so comes the current to be more impetuous to which motion the position of the earth doth contribute much both by restraining that fluid body with its banks from dispersing it self and also by affording way for a fair and easy descent by its proclivity He tells us sadly that the water wants liberty to go over the banks because there is an extrinsecal impediment But to ascend up the channel it wants not liberty but power Why Liberty is a power if it want power to ascend it wants liberty to ascend But he makes the reason why the water ascends not up the channel to be intrinsecal and the reason why it ascends not over the banks to be extrinsecal as if there were not a rising of the ground up the channel as well as up the banks though it be not so discernable nor alwayes so sudden The natural appetite of the water is as much against the ascending over the banks as the ascending up the channel And the extrinsecal impediment is as great in ascending up the channel as over the banks or rather greater because there it must moove not onely against the rising soil but also against the succeeding waters which press forward the former Either the River wants liberty for both or else it wants liberty for neither But to leave his metaphorical faculties and his Catachrestical Liberty How far is his discourse wide from the true moral liberty which is in question between us His former description of a free Agent that is he who hath not made an end of deliberating though it was wide from the mark yet it came much neerer the truth than this difinition of Liberty unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deliberating whether it will go over the banks but hath not done deliberating whether it will go up the channel Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXIX a HOw that should be a right definition of Liberty which comprehends neither the Genus nor the Difference neither the Matter nor the
possible that without Discipline a man should come to think that the estimony of a witness which is the onely verifier of matter of fact should consist not in sense and memory so as he may say he saw and remembers the thing done but in Arguments or Sâ—llegismes Or how can an unlearnâ—d man be brought to think the words he speaks ought to signifie when he speaks sincerely any thing else but that which himself meant by them Or how can any man without learning take the question whether the Sun be no bigger then a ball or bigger then the Earth to be a question of fact Nor do I think that any man is so simple as â—â—t to find that to be good which he loveth good I say so far forth as it maketh him to love it or is there any unlâ—arned man so stâ—pid as to think Eternity is this present instant of time standing still and the same Eternit to be the very next instant after an consequently that there be so many eternities â—aâ— there can be instants of time supposed No there is Scâ—olasticâ— learning required in some measure to make one mad c Then for his assumption it is as defective as his proposition That by these words spontaneity c. Men do understand as he conceives c. No rational man doth conceive a spontaneous Action and an indeliberate Action to be all one Every indeliberate Action is not spontaneous c. Nor every spontaneous Action indeliberate This I get by striving to make sense of that which he strives to make non-sense I never thought the word spontaneity English Yet because he used it I made such meaning of it as it would bear and said it meant inconsiderate proceeding or nothing And for this my too much officioâ—snesse I râ—ceive the reward of bâ—ing thought by him not to be a rati nal man I know that in the Latine of all Authors but School-men Actio spontanea signifies that Action whereof there is no apparent cause derived further thâ—n from the Agent it self and is in all things that have sense the same with voluntary whether deliberated or not dâ—liberated And therefore where he distinguished it from voluntary I thought he might mean indeliberate but let it signifie what it will provided it be intelligible it would make against him d Neither doth deliberation properly signifie the considoring of the good â—nd evil sequells of an Action to come but the considering whether this be a good and fit means or the best and fittest means for obtaining such an end If the Biâ—â—ops words proceeded not from hearing and readiâ—g of others but from his own thoughts he could never have reprehended this â—efinition of Deliberation especiaâ—â—y in the manner he doth it for he says it is the consiâ—â—ring whether this or that be a good and fit means for obtaining such an end as if considering whether a means be good or not were nâ—t all â—nâ— with considering whether the sâ—quei of using those means be good or evil e Much lesse doth any man conceive with T. H. that deliberation is an Act oâ— Fancie not of Reason common to men of discretion with mad men natural fools children and brute beasts I do indeed conceive that dâ—liberation is an Act of Imagination or Fancie â—ay more that Reason and Understanding also are Aâ—â—s of the Imagination that is to say they are Imaginations I find it so by considering my own Ratioâ—â—nation and he might find it so iâ— his iâ— he did consider his own thoughts and not speak as he does by rote by rote I say when he disputes not by rote when he is about those trisâ—â—s he caâ—â—eth businesses then when he speaks he thinks of that is to say he Imagins his business but here he thinks onely upon the words of other men that have gone before him in thâ—â— question transcribing their conclusions and arguments not his oâ—n thoughts f Thirdly neither doth any understanding man conceive or can conceive either that the Will is an Act of our Deliberation the Understanding and the Will are two distinct faculties or that onely the last appetite is to be called our Wiâ—â— Though the understanding and the Will were two distinct faculties yet follow their not that the Will and the Deliberation are two distinct faculâ—iâ—s for the whole Deliberation is nothing else but so many Wills alternatively changâ—d according as a man understandeth or fancieth the good and evil sequels of the thing concerning which he deliberateth whether he shall pursâ—e it or of the means whâ—ther they conduce or not to that end whatsoever it be he seeketh to obtain So that in deliberation there be many wills whereof net any is the cause of a voluntary action but the last as I have said before answering this objection in another place g Concerning the fourth point we agree that he is a free Agent that can do if he Will and forbear if he Will. But I wonder how this dropped from his Pen c. It may be he will say he can do if he will and forbear if he will but he cannot will if he will He has no reason to wonder â—ow this dropped from my Pen. He sound it in my Answer Numb 3. and has been all his while about to confute it so long indeed that he had forget I said it And now agaiâ— brings another Argument to prâ—vâ— a man is free to Will which â—â—th either the Agent can Will and forbear to Will or else be cannot do and forbear to do There is no doubt a man can Will one thing or other and forbear to will it For men if they be awake â—re alwayes willing one thing or other But put the case a man hâ—s a Will today to do a certain Action to morrow is he sure to have the same Will tomorrow when he is to do it Is he free to day to chuse tomorrows Will This is it that 's now in question and this Argument maketh nothing for the assirmative or negative h But we differ wholy about the fifth point He who conceives Liberty aright conceives both a Liberty in the subject to Will or not to Will and a Liberty to the object to Will this or that and a Liberty from impediments T. H. by a new way of his own cuts of the â—iberty of the subject as if a stone were free to ascend or descend because it hath no outward impediment And the Liberty towards the object as if the needle touched with the Load-stone were free to point either towards the North or towards the South because there is not a Baricado in its way How does it appear that he who conceives Liberty aright conceives a Liberty in the subject to Will or noâ— to Will unlesse he mean Liberty to dâ— if he Will or not to do if he wiâ—l not which was never denied Or how does it follow that a stone is as free to ascend as descâ—nd uâ—leâ—â—e he prove there is no outward impeâ—iment to its ascent
no good by fight he seeks to circumvent us under colour of curtesy Fistula dulce canit volucrem dum decipit auceps As they who behold themselves in a glass take the right hand for the left and the left for the right T. H. knows the comparison so we take our own errours to be truths and other mens truths to be errours b If we be in an errour in this it is such an errour as we sucked from nature it self such an errour as is confirmed in us by reason and experience such an errour as God himself in his sacred Word hath revealed such an errour as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church in all ages have delivered Such an errour wherein we have the concurrence of all the best Philosophers both Natural and Moral such an errour as bringeth to God the glory of Justice and Wisedom and Goodness and Truth such an errour as renders men more devour more pious more industrious more humble more penitent for their sins Would he have us resign up all these advantages to dance blindfold after his pipe No he perswades us too much to our loss But let us see what is the imaginary cause of our imaginary errour Forsooth because we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the World as seeing hearing willing knowing Justice Wisedom but deny him such poor things as eyes ears brains and so far he saith we do well He hath reason for since we are not able to conceive of God as he is the readiest way we have is by remooving all that imperfection from God which is in the creatures So we call him Infinite Immortal Independent Or by attributing to him all those perfections which are in the creatures after a most eminent manner so we call him Best Greatest most Wise most Just most Holy c But saith he When they dispute of Gods actions Philosophically then they consider them again as if he had such faculties and in the manner as we have them And is this the cause of our errour That were strange indeed for they who dispute Philosophically of God do neither ascribe faculties to him in that manner that we have them Nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to God Gods Understanding and his Will is his very Essence which for the eminency of its infinite perfection doth perform all those things alone in a most transcendent manner which reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties Thus to dispute of God with modesty and reverence and to clear the Deity from the imputation of tyranny injustice and dissimulation which none do throw upon God with more presumption than those who are the Patrons of absolute necessity is both comely and Christian. It is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed errour which drawes them ordinarily into these exclamations against those who dispute of the Deity For some of themselves dare anatomise God and publish his Eternal Decrees with as much confidence as if they had been all their lives of his cabinet councel But it is for fear lest those pernicious consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially and reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness should be laid open to the view of the world Just as the Turks do first establish a false Religion of their own devising and then forbid all men upon pain of death to dispute upon Religion Or as the Priests of â—olech the Abhomination of the Ammonites did make a noise with their timbrells all the while the poor Infants were passing through the fire in Tophet to keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their Parents So d they make a noise with their declamations against those who dare dispute of the Nature of God that is who dare set forth â—â—s Justice and his goodness and his truth and his Philanthropy onely to deaf the ears and dim the eyes of the Christian world lest they should hear the lamentable ejulations and howlings or see that rueful spectacle of millions of souls tormented for evermore e in the flames of the true Tophet that is Hell onely for that which according to T. H. his doctrine was never in their power to shun but which they were ordered and inevitably necessitated to do onely to express the omnipotence and dominion and to satisfie the pleasure of him who is in truth the Father of all mercies and the God oâ— all consolation f This is life eternal saith our Saviour to know the onely true God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent Joh. 17. 3. Pure Religion and und filed before God and the Father is this to visite the fatherless and widowes in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world saith Sâ— James Jam. 1. 27. Fear God and keâ—p his Commandments for this 〈◊〉 the whole duty of man saith Solomon â—câ—les 12. 13. But T. H. hath found out a more compendious way to heaven True Religion saith he consisteth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants and giving God such honouâ— both in attributes and â—â—â—ions 〈◊〉 they in their several Lieutenancâ—â—â— shaâ— ordain That is to say â—e of the Religion of every Christian Country where you come To make the Civill Magistrate to be Christs Lieutenant upon earth for matters of Religion And to make him to be Supreme Judge in all controversies whom all must obey is a Doctrine so strange and such an uncouth phrase to Christian ears that I should have missed his meaning but that I consulted with his Book De Civ c. 15. Sect. 16. and c. 17. Sect. 28. What if the Magistrate shall be no Christiam himself What if he shall command contrary to the Law of God or Nature Must we obey him rather than God Act. 14. 19. Is the Civill Magistrate become now the onely ground and pillar of Truth I demand then why T. H. is of a different mind from his Soveraign and from the Laws of the Land concerning the Attributes of God and his Decrees This is a new Paradox and concerns not this question of liberty and necessity Wherefore I forbear to prosecute it further and so conclude my reply with the words of the Christian Poet. Caesaris jussum est ore Galieni Princeps quod colit ut colimus omnes Aeternum colemus Principem dierum Factorem Dominumque Galieni Animadversions upon the Answer to the Postscript Numb XXXVIII HE taketh it ill that I say that Arguments do seldome work on men of wit and learning when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion Neverthelesse it is not onely certain by experience but also there is reason for it and that grounded upon the natural disposition of mankind For it is natural to all men to defend those opinions which they have once publickly engaged themselves to maintain because to have that detected for errour which they have publickly maintained for truth is never without some dishonour more or lesse and to find in themselves that they have spent a great
deal of time and labour in deceiving themselves is so uncomfortable a thing as it is no wonder if they imploy their wit and learning if they have any to make good their errours And therefore where he saith a Solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them then upon weaker judgments And that the more exact the ballance is the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it I confess the more solid a mans wit is the better will solid reasons work upon him Bu if he add to iâ— that which he calls learning that is to say much reading of other mens Doctrines without weighing them with his own thoughts then their judgements become weaker and the ballance lesse exact And whereas he saith that they whose Gold is true are not afraid to have it tryed by the touch he speaketh as if â— had been afraid to have my Doctrine tryed by the touch of men of wit and learning wherein he is not much mistaken meaning by men of learning as I said before such as had read other men but not themselves For by reading others men commonly obstruct the wâ—y to their own exact and natural judgement and use their wit both to deceive themselves with Fallacâ—s â—or quite those who endeavour at their own intreaty to instruct them with revilings b If we be in an errour it is such an errour as is sucked from nature as is confirmed by Reason by Experience and by Scripture as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered an errour wherein we have the concurrence of all the best Philosophers an errour that bringeth to God the Glory of Justice c. that renders men more devout more plous more humble more industrious more penitent for their sins All this is bâ—t said and what heretofore hath been offered in proof for it hath been sufficiently refuted and the contrary proved namely that it is an errour contrary to the nature of the Will repugnant to reason and experience repugnant to the Scripture repugnant to the Doctrine of St. Paul and t is pâ—â—ty that the Fathers and Dictors of the Church have not followed St. Paul therein an errour not maintained by the best Philosophers for they are not thâ— bâ—st Philosophers which the Bishop thinketh so an errour that taâ—â—tâ— from God the Glory of his Praescience nor bringeth to him the glory of 〈◊〉 other Attribute an errour that maketh men by imagining they can repent when they will neglect their duties â—n that maketh mâ—n â—ntâ—an ful for Gods graces by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability of their own will c But saith he when they dispute of Gods Actions Philosophically then they consider them again as if he had such faculties and 〈◊〉 such manner as we have them And is this the cause of our errour That were strange indeed for they who dispute Philosophically of God do neither ascribe faculties to him in that manner that we have them Noâ— yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to God Gods understanding and his will is his very essence c. Me thinks he should have known at these years that to dispute Philosophically is to dispute by naturall reason and from principles evident by the light of â—…re and to dispute of the faculties and proprieties of the subject wâ—â—reoâ— they treat It is therefore unskilfully said by him that they who dispute Philosophically of God ascribe unto him no proper faculties If 〈…〉 proper faculties I would fain know of him what improper faculties he ascribes to God I guesse he will make the understanding and the Will and his other Attributes to be in God improper faculties because he cannot properly call them faculties that is to say he knows not how to make it good that they are faculties and yet he will have these words Gods Understanding and his Will are his very Essence to passe for an Axiome of Philosophy And Whereas I had said we ought not to dispute of Gods nature and that he is no â—it subject of our Philosophy he denâ—es it not but says I say it d With a purpose to make a noise with declaiming against those who dare dispute of the nature of God that is who dare set forth his Justice and his goodness c. The Bishop will have much a do to make good that to dispute of the nature of God is alone with setting forth his Justice and his goodness He taketh nâ— notice of these words of mine piâ—â—s men attribute to God Almighty for honours sake whatsoever they see is honourable in the World and yet this is setting forth Gods Justice Goodness c. without disputing of Gods nature e In the flames of the true Tophet that is Hell The true Tophet was a place not far from the Walls of Jerusalem and consequently on the Earth I cannot imagine what he will say to this in his Answer to my Leviathan if there he find the same unlesse he say that in this place by the true Tophet he meant a not true Tophet f This is life eternal saith our Saviour to know the onely true God and Jesus Christ c. This which followeth to the end of his Answer and of the Book is a reprehension of me for saying that true Religion consisteth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants If it be Lawful for Christians to institute amongst themselves a Common wealth and Magistrates whereby they may be able to live in peace one with another and unite themselves in defence against a forraign enemy it will certainly be necessary to make to themselves some supreme Judge in all controversies to whom they ought all to give obedience and this is no such strange Doctrine nor so uncouth a Phrase to Christian ears as the Bishop makes it whatsoever it be to them that would make themselves Judges of the supreme Judge himself No but saith he Christ is the supreme Judge and we are not to obey men rather than God Is there any Christian mâ—n that doâ—s not acknowledge that we are to be judged by Christ or that we ought not to obey him rather then any man that shall be his Lieutenant upon earth The question therefore is not of who is to be obeyed but of what be his commands If the Scripture contain his commands then may every Christian know by them what they are and what has the Bishop to do with what God says to me when I read them more then I have to do with what God says to him when he reads them unlesse he have Authority given him by him whom Christ hath constituted his Lieutenant This Lieutenant upon earth I say is the supreme civill Magistrate to whom belongeth the care and charge of seeing that no Doctrine may be thaught the people but such as may consist with the general Peace of them all and with the obedience that is due to the civil Soveraign In whom would the Bishop have the Authority reside of prohibiting seditious
whereof which is this Liberty is to choose what we will not to choose our Will no iuculâ—ation is sufficient to make the Bishop take notice of notwithstanding he be other where so witty and here so crafty as to send out Arguments for spies The cause why I denied the consequence was that I thought the force thereof consisted in this that Necessity in the Bishops opinion destroyed Liberty b Concerning the eternal Decree of God c. Here begins his Reply From which if we take these words knowledge of Approbation Practical knowledge Heavenly Bodies act upon sublunary things not onely by their motion but also by an occult vertue which we call influence Moral efficacy General influence Special influence Infuse something into the Will The Will is moved The Will is induced to will The Will suspends its own act Which are all Non-sense unworthy of a Man nay and if a Beast could speak unworhthy of a Beast and can befal no creature whose nature is not depâ—aved by Doctrine nothing at all remaineth to be answered Perhaps the word Occult vertue is not to be taxed as unintelligible But then I may tax therein the want of ingenuity in him that had rather say that heavenly Bodies do work by an occult vertue then that they work he knoweth not how which he would not confess but endeavours to make Occult be taken for a Cause The rest of this Reply is one of those consequences which I have answered in the beginning where I compare the inconveniences of both opinions that is That either Adam did not sin or his sin proceeded necessarily from God which is no stronger a consequence than if out of this That a man is lame necessarily one should inferre That either he is not lame or that his lameness proceeded necessarily from the Will of God To the end of this Number there is nothing more of argument The place is filled up with wondering and railing â— D. FIftly If there be no Liberty there shall be no day of Numb 12. Arg. 5. Doom no last Judgement no rewards nor punishments after death A man can never make himself a criminal if he be not left at liberty to commit a crime No man can be justly punished for doing that which was not in his power to shun To take away Liberty hazards Heaven but undoubtedly it leaves no Hell T. H. THE Arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fift and fall both into one Namely If there be a necessity of all events that it will follow that praise and reprehension reward and punishment are all vain and unjust And that if God should openly forbid and secretly necessitate the same action punishing men for what they could not avoid there would be no belief among them of Heaven or Hell To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from St. Paul Rom. 9. ver 11. from the 11. verse of the Chapter to the 18. is laid down the very same objection in these words When they meaning Esau and Jacob were yet unborn and had done neither good nor evil That the purpose of God according to election not by works but by him that calleth might remain firm it was said to her viz. to Rebeckah that the elder shall serve the younger And what then shall we say is there injustice with God God forbid It is not-therefore in him that willeth nor in him that runneth but in God that sheweth mercy For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh I have stirred thee up that I may shew my power in thee and that my Name may be set forth in all the earth Therefore whom God willeth he hath mercy on and whom he willeth he hardeneth Thus you see the case put by St. Paul is the same with that of J. D. and the same objection in these words following Thou wilt ask me thin why will God yet complain for who hath resisted his will To this therefore the Apostle answers not by denying it was Gods will or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did but thus Who art thou O Man that interrogatest God shall the work say to the workman why hast thou made me thus Hath not the Potter power over the Clay of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour another to dishonour According therefore to this answer of St. Paul I answer J. D's objection and say The power of God alone without other help is sufficient Justification of any action he doth That which men make among themselves here by Pacts and Covenants and call by the name of Justice and according whereunto men are counted and tearmed rightly just and unjust is not that by which God Almighties actions are to be measured or called just no more than his counsails are to be measured by human wisedom That which he does is made just by his doing Just I say in him not alwaies just in us by the Example for a man that shall command a thing openly and plot secretly the hinderance of the same if he punish him he so commanded for not doing it is unjust So also his Counsails they be therefore not in vain because they be his whether we see the use of them or not When God afflicted Job he did object no sin to him but justified that afflicting him by telling him of his power Hast thou sayes God an arm like mine Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth and the like So our Saviour concerning the man that was born blind said it was not for his sin nor his parents sin but that the power of God might be shewn in him Beasts are subject to death and torment yet they cannot sin It was Gods will it should be so Power irresistible justifieth all actions really and properly in whomsoever it be found Less power does not And because such power is in God only he must needs be just in all his actions And we that not comprehending his Counsails call him to the Bar commit injustice in it I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer by distinguishing between Will and Permission As that God Almighty does indeed permit sin sometimes And that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed but does not will it nor necessitate it I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action saying God Almighty does indeed cause the action whatsoever action it be but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it that is the discordance between the Action and the Law Such distinctions as these dazel my understanding I find no difference between the will to have a thing done and the permission to do it when he that permitteth it can hinder it and knowes it will be done unless he hinder it Nor find I any difference between an action that is against the Law and the sin of that action As for example between the killing of Uriah and