〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which notes to effect any thing in the most efficacious manner so as to overcome al resistence made against the force of the Agent So 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who efficaciously worketh althings The like v. 11. of which hereafter This efficacious concurse as it cooperates with the second cause is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cooperation or concurse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cooperate So Mark 16. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Lord cooperating or efficaciously concurring So elsewhere that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as applied to God notes his actuose efficacious and predeterminative concurse in and with althings is evident from the use of the word both in sacred and profane Authors So with Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work readily It 's rendred by the Syriac sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work as 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where it notes not only an universal general concurse but a particular present certain efficacious force or efficacitie of Divine Concurse exerting it self in al individual acts and effects Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred by the Syriac Rom. 7. 5. and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work to act with diligence to be efficacious as Boderianus And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendred by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to act to work to perform to effect as Boderianus Lastly it is rendred by the Syriac Ephes 1. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who hath efficaciously wrought althings Which sufficiently demonstrates the predetermination of Gods concurse as to al second causes and acts Hence 2. This efficacious Concurse as it determines and applies the second cause to act is both in sacred Scripture and by scholastic Theologues termed Determinative and Predeterminative We find both these termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurse Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a terme or limit 1 primarily and properly signifies to termine set bounds or limits to any cause effect or thing So Acts 17. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man Nation and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life So Arrian Epictet lib. 1. cap. 12. speaking of God he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Virgils Song is remarquable Stat sua cuique dies Every ones day stands fixed or determined which Servius understands of the fixed determined period of human life So that we see that not only sacred Philosophie but the very Pagans by their dim light asserted a fixed period of Divine life as determined by God albeit some that professe themselves Christians denie the same Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the bounds or the position of termes for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the position of termes or limits to any cause action effect or thing God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or set termes and limits to al second causes their actions effects and events there is nothing so contingent in nature but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to times and places as wel as to causes and acts So Heb. 4. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines or limits a day Thence in the Glossarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a stated or determined day and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I termine or limit as to place Whence Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he gives terme or limit Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the LXX answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to termine determine or constitute termes to any place or thing Num. 34. 6. Josh 13. 27. 15. 11. also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be bounded or determined Whence lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a definition which is the terme or boundary of an essence according to Cicero who renders it the circumscription of a thing 2 From this primary notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 follows a secondary namely to decree destine to a certain end predestine predetermine In which sense it signifies the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predetermine and so it is transferred to predestination predetermination or the decree and purpose of the Divine wil even about the substrate mater or entitative act of sin as Luke 22. 22. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it was determined or predetermined decreed Our Lord speaks of his Crucifixion which was the greatest of sins and intrinsecally evil and yet lo as to the substrate mater or entitative act predetermined and decreed by God The same Acts. 2. 23. Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by that defined determined or predetermined counsel of which more Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to decree deliberate determine is expounded by Theodotion Job 22. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which when applied to the Divine wil note predefinition and predetermination As the simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so also the composite 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predestine or predetermine is used six times in the N. T. 1 of things appertaining to salvation 1 Cor. 2. 7. 2 of persons elect Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. 3 of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin yea that which was intrinsecally evil So Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before or predetermined to be done For so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may more properly be rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily signifies to predefine predestine predetermine to set limits bounds termes to persons or things Thence as to this present text and point when it is said here that those who crucified Christ did what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done it must be understood of the substrate mater or entitative act which was predetermined by God as in what follows Chap. 3. § 2. The Syriac version interprets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to seal constitute or make firm any thing which is rendred by the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to order dispose constitute institute The Divine Wil and Decree gives order constitution limitation determination yea predetermination to althings al persons and things times and places ends and means receive termes limits destination and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the N. T. is made synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to foreknow 1 Pet. 1. 20. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to preordain Act. 17. 26. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to propose or purpose Rom.
and our Hypothesis most true it remains on us to demonstrate Chap. 5. Thus we have given the true and ful state of our Controversie which by reason of the subtile evasions and subterfuges of our Adversaries lies under so much obscuritie and confusion and indeed it is to me a deplorable case and that which argues mens diffidence of the merits of their cause that they contend with so much passionate vehemence for their own Phaenomena and yet never explicate the termes or state the Question in controversie I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my self the more trouble in this part of our Province that so what follows may be the more facile both for him and me CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis Scriptural Demonstration 1 That God is the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. 2 That God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Joseph's vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. 2 The Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10 11. Acts 2. 23. 4. 28. Our Adversaries Evasions taken off 3 That God makes use of wicked Instruments to punish his People Esa 10. 5 6. Jer. 16. 16. Psal 105. 25. Job 1. 21. 4 God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin 2 Sam. 12. 11. 16. 22. 2 Sam. 16. 10 11. 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31 37. 12. 15 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. 10. 30. 1 Kings 22 23. Rev. 17. 17. 5 Gods efficacious permission of Sin 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16 17 20. 6 Gods judicial hardening Sinners Psal 81. 12. 69. 22-27 Rom. 11. 10. Esa 6. 10. 29. 10. 19. 11 14. 44. 18 19. 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in six Propositions 7 Gods ordering Sin for his glorie Exod. 9. 14-16 Rom. 9. 17 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8. HAving explicated the termes relating to and given the genuine state of our Hypothesis namely That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men to al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them we now procede to the Demonstration hereof And because al demonstration must be grounded on some first principes which give evidence firmitude and force thereto and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie but what are originally in the Scriptures we are therefore to begin our Demonstration with Scriptural Arguments which we shal reduce to these seven heads 1 Such Scriptures wherein it is universally affirmed that God is the first Cause of al natural actions and things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 2 Such Scriptures as directly demonstrate That God doth predefine predetermine and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed 3 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his People in such a way wherein they could not but contract guilt 4 Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those acts whereunto sin is appendent 5 Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permission of some to sin 6 Such Scriptures as demonstrate Gods giving up some to judicial Occecation and Obduration 7 Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and disposing the Sins of men for his own Glorie § 1. We shal begin our Scriptural Demonstration with such Texts as universally affirme That God is the first cause of al natural Actions and Things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 1. The Scriptures that speak God to be the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things are many and great we shal mention some as Esa 26. 12. Thou hast wrought al our works in us or for us This Text is urged by Strangius p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurse to al actions of the creature though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church wherein God predetermines and over-rules many actions of wicked men which have much sin annexed to them Again this universal prime Causalitie of God efficaciously influencing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expressed Rom. 11. 36. For of him and through him and to him are althings Of him as he frames althings By him as he operates in and cooperates with althings and for him as the final cause of althings Thus Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme energie as Cyril stiles it reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects and if so then surely such natural entitative Actions as have sin annexed to them Is there any sin so intrinsecally evil which has not some entitative act or subject as the substrate mater thereof And if althings are of God and by him and for him must not also the entitative act of sins intrinsecally evil be so Strangius p. 342. replies thus Al that God workes must tend to his Glorie But what Glorie redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God blasphemie c. A strange replie indeed for a Divine to make 1 Was there not much Hatred of God and Blasphemie in the crucifying of Christ And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this Yea 2 Doth not Strangius himself and those of his partie grant that God directs disposeth and over-rules al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil so as that they conduce to his glorie And how can God direct dispose and over-rule them unless he concur yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act Again Strangius p. 561. answers to this Text thus None that is orthodoxe ever extended these words to sins as if sins were of God by God and for him c. 1 Neither do we extend these words to sins formally considered 2 But must we thence necessarily conclude that the entitative act whereto sin is only accidentally appendent is not from God nor by him nor for him Yea 3 May we not say with Divines that sin formally considered although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient yet it is for him i. e. conducing to his Glorie as wisely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the sinner Thus much Augustin once and again inculcates as De Genes ad liter lib. Imperfecto cap. 5. For God is not the Author of our sins yet he is the Ordinator of them c. And thus much indeed Strangius p. 860. confesseth Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural Actions and Effects is Ephes 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demonstrate Gods efficacious Concurse to al
much malice murder and hatred of God and his People annexed Yea God did not only send Nebuchadnezar to afflict Israel but also give him a reward for his service as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon my servant God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against Israel The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be added to shew how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally considered and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin 2. To mention one or two Scriptures which speak of Gods using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans and Caldeans yea of Satan himself to afflict Job and yet he saith v. 21. The Lord taketh away He saw by faith Gods hand moving yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs materially considered albeit not to the vitiositie So Psal 105. 25. He turned their heart to hate his people to deal subtilely with his servants Here it 's said expressely that God turned i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel God's turning their hearts doth expressely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the entitative material natural act of hatred albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof So much also the next clause importes and to deal subtilely with his servants i. e. al their subtile strategems machinations and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Israel by putting to death their Males oppressing them with hard labors c. al these were as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God who turned their hearts thereto And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus What is said Psal 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people it must be understood that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians but by doing good to his people whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred 1 We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians that 's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us But 2 We avouch that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating by his doing good to his people Is not this a strange Comment God turned their heart to hate his people i. e. gave occasion of hatred by doing good unto his people Doth not Gods turning the heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his efficaâ—… predeterminative concurse in applying the wil to its act 〈◊〉 it 's said Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he wâ—… is it not meant of an efficacious concurse Do not also the following words Psal 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts predetermining them to their act Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts As for the other Texts Strangius's general answer p. 774 775. is That God is the Cause of the act in those sins but not of the pravitie of the Instruments c. And what do we say or desire more But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his for he addes p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure but what he approves as Good i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin because he doth not approve of it Wherein note 1 How he doth with the Pelagians and Arminians confound Gods Decretive Wil with his Approbative complacential Wil. 2 We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts but the Question is touching objects Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit This we peremptorily denie and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place § 4. Another Head of Arguments contains such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan that for his folie committed with Vriah's wife and murder Behold I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes and give them unto thy neighbour c. This threat we find fulfilled 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin Here Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth 1 That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact But 2 then he answers that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned namely by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation Moderation and Direction which he afforded according to the modes already explicated about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel and their actions in this wickedness which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20 c. For this is usual that the effect which ariseth from two causes whereof the one is effective and the other directive be ascribed to both but in a different respect c. This is the commun answer which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures which speake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer 1 Take notice that he allows Gods Gubernation Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed but not the production of the act This is evident by the Conclusion wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause but God the directive only But I replie how can God efficaciously Govern Moderate and Direct the Act unless he be also the effective Cause thereof Take his own instance the sinful wils of Absalom and Achitophel how is it possible that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils but by influencing their wils and efficaciously predetermining them to act If God did as he grants efficaciously govern moderate and direct their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust certainly he must necessarily produce those acts 2 Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie for suppose we grant that God doth only efficaciously govern moderate and direct the sinful act not produce the entitative mater thereof yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of sin as our effective predeterminative concurse For Gods
That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ◠de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the
God should immediately produce this act of the wil without applying the wil to the act Do not the very Jesuites Suarez Carleton with others grant That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil not only simultaneous as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56 Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect but also the wil itself as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries touching immediate concurse that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin Can we imagine that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil and yet God not applie the wil to its act which is al that is meant by predetermination Yea doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act but also influence the wil in the production of that act as Strangius and others grant and yet not applie it to act How is it possible that God should influence the wil in the production of any act without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act doth he not applie it to the act and so predetermine the same Again doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act as Strangius also grants and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration that God predetermines the wil to that act Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act but what is predeterminative Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause and if so must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument Lastly if we allow with the Jesuites unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination may with the same facilitie be reflected on them for if they make God by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we More of immediate Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 5 The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts We shal here reassume a Principe already established and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists namely That the action of the first cause concurring with the second is not as to passive attingence distinct from the action of the second cause This is generally granted by the Molinists as Le Blanc Concil Arbitr par 3. thes 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius August tom 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It 's true the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second as to active attingence or principe because Gods concurse actively considered is the same with his wil yet as to passive attingence the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause This being premissed we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse and that in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward Determinat de Concurs Dei pag. 116 c. And the arguments for it are invict for 1 where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie which is proper to every second cause there posterioritie is essentially appendent Again 2 al second causes in regard of God are but instruments as Aquinas proves yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal Agent But here we are to remember that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence we denie not but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause as Alvarez lib. 3. de Auxil Disput 19. num 4. Twisse Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat part 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous and that 3 because this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect Yea some of the Jesuites grant That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely without respect to this or that second cause so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause So Fonseca Metaphys lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest 5. sect 13. The like Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60 61. Thus also Burgersdicius Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 11. grants Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous which is most absurd for the active concurse of God being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 416. Hence 2 Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect For how is it possible that the second cause should act unlesse the first move and applie it to its act Can a second cause move it self to an act unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause Whence 3 Prop. This previous Concurse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Wil and God concurs in order of nature before the wil yea premove and applie it to the act must he not necessarily predetermine the same Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never extricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil and yet not predetermine it to the act Indeed to speak the truth the Sentiments not only of the Arminians but also
of the new Methodists Baronius Strangius and others about Concurse fal in with those of the Jesuites for a simultaneous Concurse only albeit some of them in termes disown it 6 Lastly the soverain and absolute Independence of Gods Concurse gives us further demonstration of his predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods Concurse is not Conditionate but absolute and independent we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 412 c. And indeed what more absurd yea impossible than such a conditionate Concurse whereby the Molinists and Arminians suppose Gods concurrence to depend on mans Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progresse into infinite For if God concur on condition that man concur doth God concur to that condition or not If not is there not then some act of the creature produced without Gods concurse If God concur to the working of that condition then absolutely or conditionally if absolutely then his former Concurse is not conditional if conditionally then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence We take it then for granted that Gods Concurse is not conditional but absolute and independent And hence we thus argue If God concur absolutely and independently to the substrate mater of sin then he doth predetermine the wil thereto the consequence is rational and clear For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the same action and effect the one must necessarily depend on the other and that which depends on another must be determined by that other for every cause that is dependent on another is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby It 's true natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun without being determined thereby because the Sun is a limited cause and has not efficace sufficient to determine the mater is workes on but is rather determined thereby and so in that respect dependent thereon But as for God the first cause whose wil the principe of his concurse is omnipotent and most efficacious it 's impossible that he should have any dependence on or be any way determinable in his concurse by the mater he workes on he being the most universal cause infinitely perfect and void of al potentialitie or passive power must necessarily predetermine al second causes to their acts but be determined by none But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurse 3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the Principe and Nature of Divine concurse we now procede to demonstrate the same from the Efficace thereof Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurse whereby he concurs to the mater of sin to be predeterminative yet he grants it is efficacious calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the force and efficace of God whereby he subordinates second causes to himself so that whatever they are or act they essentially depend on him in both respects And this ingenuous concession touching the efficace of Divine concurse is al that we require to build our present Demonstration on which we shal distribute into two branches 1 Gods efficacious concurse unto al natural acts and effects 2 Gods efficacious concurse to al supernatural acts and effects 1. We shal demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the efficacitie of Divine concurse as to al natural acts and effects which evidently appears in the following particulars 1 Gods concurse to al physic or natural causes motions and effects is most efficacious This Proposition the sacred Scriptures do abundantly confirme as Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. § 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us as before c. 2. § 1. 2 The efficace of Divine concurse dependes on the efficace and determination of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurse considered actively but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act so or so To presume that active concurse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to crosse the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 3 Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al second causes to al their natural actions and effects Is it not impossible but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of mans wil the said action or effect must necessarily follow Is not the wil of God sufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil so great that not only those things are done which God wils shal be done but in that manner as he wils them Doth not Strangius confesse so much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266. Whence if God in his own wil purpose and determine that the human wil should produce such or such an action suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed is not the human wil necessarily in regard of the Divine wil and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord expressed Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by the decreed fixed determined wil of God The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 4 The efficacious concurse of God modifies and according to its mode determines al actions of second causes not only necessarily but freely Doth the Divine wil determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect and may it not yea must it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al such faculties acts and effects as are subject to its Empire and has not the Divine wil which is infinitely more efficacious power to determine al inferior powers acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion And doth it not hence follow that the soverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurse predetermine al the free acts of the human wil which necessarily fal under its Empire and modification See this wel demonstrated by that judicious Professor Sam. Ward Determinat de Concursu Dei pag. 118 c. Whence 5 The efficacious predeterminative concurse of God equally extendes itself to al natural good even to the substrate mater of sinful acts Strangius and others of our Opponents grant That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurse extendes it self not only to al supernatural good but also to al natural good that has not sin intrinsecally annexed to it whence we may by a paritie of reason demonstrate divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of al actions though never so intrinsecally evil for
1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore
it must be moral and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause and Author of them and is not this an high piece of blasphemie We are so far from asserting that God determines men to the most wicked actions as that we say he determines men to no wicked action no not the least Yea we adde further that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good and in part sinful albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodnesse of the action and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act yet he predetermines not to the vitiositie of the act or the act as sinful So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie 1 Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Predeterminants agree 2 The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience Futurition Divine Concurse and Gods permission of sin 3 The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees the Futurition Divine Permission Prescience Providence Predefinition and Predetermination of Sin THE prolixitie we have used in explicating and stating our Question wil render our subsequent work more facile and concise For here that old Proverbe holds true A good beginning is half the work But before we enter on the Demonstration of our Hypothesis it wil be necessary to manifest 1 Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree 2 Wherein our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis differ among themselves 3 Wherein we differ from them The explication of these Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determination of our Question § 1. Wherein we and our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis do agree Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are others on the contrary make them lesse our first work therefore wil be to shew wherein we agree which I shal endeavor to lay down in the following Propositions 1. Prop. That God hath decreed althings that come to passe Herein our Adversaries generally concord with us albeit they differ from us as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. But also we confesse and say that God doth truly decree althings that happen but not althings in one and the same manner but some things effectively other things permissively which is the commun opinion of Theologues according to that famose Axiome of Augustin There is nothing done which the Omnipotent doth not wil either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it Yet the said Strangius in what precedes gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees It is not needful saith he that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God touching his Concurse to be afforded as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice whereby he hath determined to concur with al the actions of the creature as he hath given them a power to act c. This general Decree foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis is most unworthy of the Divine Being in that it overthrows the Prescience of God imposeth imperfection on the Divine Wil and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianisme 2. Prop. That Election of some to Grace and Glorie is absolute and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man This Proposition although it be denied by the Pelagians Socinians and Arminians yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius Le Blanc and others For these albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans sin yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glorie which to me seems very strange and inconsistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation For if the Decrees of God be absolute as to Election why should they not be also estimed such as to Reprobation Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itself Are not conditional Decrees inconsistent therewith Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee al acts and events of the human wil Must they not then be al decreed absolutely by God See hereafter Chap. 5. § 3. 3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin as wel as of al other Events This Proposition is universally granted by al the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius c. as also by most Arminians although it be utterly incompossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t'other Partie For al the wit of man yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils wil never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees I must solemnely professe I can see no way left to evade the force of Socinus's argument against the certaintie of Gods prescience if we resolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events of which more in what follows Chap. 5. § 2. 4. Prop. That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternitie he predetermines in time This Proposition the New-Methodists seem generally to grant So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. When we speak of absolute predefinition we willingly grant that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that whatever particular singular Act God hath absolutely predefined should be done by us to the same he doth determine our wil For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined it is necessary that he effect the same or cause that it be done because the Decree of God seeing it is absolute and efficacious must necessarily have its effect which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefinite act otherwise if the wil should not act that which is predefined the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustrated which is absurd A good concession which wil be of use to us in what follows Chap. 5. § 3. 5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good as also to some other commun acts and effects This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians as also by Baronius yet the New Methodists who have chalked out a middle Way generally entertain it Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. We have shewen that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil namely not in actions intrinsecally evil and to which Vitiositie is necessarily annexed albeit in things lawful not only in works of
Grace but also in others that are commun according to his own pleasure he determines it with the preservation of its own native libertie sithat he can never offer any violence to the wil but only moves it sweetly according to its own nature See more on this argument in what follows c. 3. § 1. on Prov. 21. 1. This great concession of Strangius indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of al his arguments against our Hypothesis For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to some acts without any violence offered to its Libertie why may he not also predetermine it to al its acts without prejudice to its Libertie The force of this consequence is so strong that it forceth Baronius and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination See Chap. 5. § 4. 6. Prop. That God predetermins the Wil to the substrate mater of some sinful acts even of such as are not intrinsecally evil This Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 4. c. 1. p. 766. But although in the actions of wicked men when God doth use them as Instruments for the execution of some peculiar works it may peradventure be said that God doth determine their wils yet it seems more incommode to say that God moves and predetermines to al other acts as to acts of hatred of God blasphemie c. So that he yieldeth that God may predetermine to the mater of some sinful acts and indeed it cannot be rationally denied sithat Acts imperfectly good are also in part sinful and the substrate mater of the act as good and sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater of the act as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the act as sinful When I say that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act as sinful As here must not yea cannot be taken Reduplicatively but only Specificatively as it specifies one and the same Act and distributes it into its opposite Adjuncts of Good and Evil So that the meaning is no more than this that God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil and if he predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good as our Adversaries grant he must also necessarily predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act whereunto sin is annexed because the substrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the same When our Adversaries shal have given us a rational and distinct solution to this argument I shal confess they have done much for the subversion of our Hypothesis Of this Argument see Chap. 5. § 4 5. 7. Prop. That there is no real positive Act or Entitie in nature whereof God is not the efficient cause This is generally granted by al those that denie sin to be a positive Being So Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 557. There is no Entitie and no action as it is an action or has any realitie whereof God is not the cause or which he hath not decreed either absolutely or respectively So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859. The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God as the first cause on whose concurse and influxe it dependes So a Reverend Divine Cathol Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85. ` It is certain that as motus vel actio is quid naturale it is of God as the first cause of Nature and so when a sinner acteth it is not without the first Universal Cause One would think that this concession if well stated and prosecuted would put an end to our controversie For al that we demand is that the real positive act whereunto sin is annexed be from God as the first cause of Nature But yet what our Opponents grant as limited by them wil not answer our expectations For some hold with Durandus that the action is from God but not immediately others that it is immediately from God yet not by a predeterminative concurse Hence 8. Prop. That God concurs immediately to the substrate mater or entitative act whereunto sin is annexed This Proposition is not granted by such as follow Durandus either in words or sense yet by others it is Thus Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. But we must judge that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature and that both by the Immediation of virtue and supposite or person For as God himself so his virtue is every where present and energetic For the proof whereof he cites Isa 26. 12. Rom. 11. ult 1 Cor. 12. 6. Act. 17. 28. with other Scriptures So Ch. 11. p. 61. he confesseth that there is a common influxe of God unto al actions which he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and efficace of God whereby he doth subordinate second Causes to himself so that whatever they are or do act they essentially depend on him in both respects Whereby he seems to evince that Gods Influxe doth not only render the subject habile to act but also immediately reach the very act even that has sin annexed to it The like he addes l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. It may truely be said and men are wont so to speak That God is the cause of vitiose actions albeit he be not the cause of the actions as they are vitiose And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783. From what has been said it may in some manner be understood how in a sane sense God may be said to impel or incline to some sin when yet he is void of al sin specially if these things be observed 1 That it be not understood that God moves or inclines men to sin in general 2 Neither that it be said that God moves to al sin but only to such in which he useth depraved wils as instruments to execute his good works 3 Neither that it be understood that God doth properly move to sin simply and formally taken or sin as sin but only to the material of sin i. e. not to the sin of the Action but to the Action as substrate to the sin so that he be not the Author of the vitiositie which he only permits but of the substrate Act and of his own direction and ordination which he exerciseth about the vitiose Action c. Yea in Actions intrinsecally sinful he seems to grant that the Act as it is a physic or natural Being is from God So l. 4. c. 12. p. 876. That which is also true of Actions which are intrinsecally evil such as the hatred of God perjurie c. In which also we must distinguish the physic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral evil That God concurs to the physic action but not to the moral vice of the action we have above shewen There are two observables in these concessions of Strangius which if he were candid and uniforme in granting us would put a period to the controversie 1
That in Actions intrinsecally evil there is a physic or natural entitie separable from the ethic or moral vitiositie 2 That the physic or natural entitie of al sinful Actions even such as are intrinsecally sinful is immediately from God as the first cause of Nature But I must confesse I cannot find that Strangius is candid or uniforme in these his concessions but elsewhere he seems to overthrow what he has here granted For 1 He sometimes asserts that the natural act of hating God is so intrinsecally evil as that the vitiositie cannot be separated from it Again 2 albeit he seem frequently to grant an immediate concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts yet when he comes to explain what he intends thereby he doth too much verge unto if not wholly espouse Durandus's mediate concurse as to acts intrinsecally evil Thus also Amyraldus as it is wel noted by Le Blanc Thes Conciliat Arbitrii c. Thes 48. p. 436. 9. Prop. That Gods Providence is universally and efficaciously active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glorie This most of the new Methodists grant albeit some seem to denie it at least in part Our Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 3. c. 4. p. 469. Neither doth it follow from our opinion that any free act is substracted from the Providence of God if man doth that which God permits sithat whether it be good or evil that man doth God must foreknow and direct and order it to the end appointed by himself So l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. ` Furthermore it must be observed which we have oft mentioned that God albeit he doth not wil sin as sin yet he doth advisedly permit direct and ordain it in the best manner to execute his righteous judgements and illustrate his glorie The like p. 764. Albeit we denie that God doth ever determine the wil to sin formally taken or to the actions unto which sin is necessarily annexed yet we acknowledge that God doth so rule and order the sinful wils of Men and Devils that by permitting tentations offering objects subministrating occasions denying Grace which he owes to none letting loose the reins to Satan removing impediments or by operating in any other secret manner the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows and specially that that work be performed for the effecting of which God useth their ministerie How much would this concession conduce to put a period to this controversie were our Adversaries but ingenuous in their assent and consent to it Doth he not say here as much as we abating only the terme Predetermination and yet elsewhere how doth he start off from what is here granted 10. Prop. That God doth no way concur or predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin so as to be the cause or author of Sin This Proposition we chearfully and with our whole Souls assent and consent unto although it be the grand designe and unwearied endeavors of our Adversaries both Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists to fasten the Antithesis on us namely That we make God to be the Author of sin Which Imputation has been in al Ages of the Christian Church fastened on those that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concurse as we shal shew in what follows Chap. 4. § 2. Having laid down the general Propositions wherein our Opponents generally though not without some variation concord with us it follows that we shew briefly wherein they differ among themselves Indeed so great is the difference of our Adversaries specially the New Methodists Amyraldus Baronius Strangius Le Blanc and others among themselves in this point touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin as that it is very difficult for us to forme commun principes or Hypotheses wherein they al agree And albeit they generally agree in their opposing our Hypothesis touching Gods immediate predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil yet they lay down their own Antithesis with so much caution suspension and hesitation of mind as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true Placeus Tractat. de Liber Arbit p. 174. cunningly waves the determination of the Question with this modest concelement of his mind Truely we according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majestie of God dare not define what the Dependence of the second cause on the first is It sufficeth us that too much dependence cannot be asserted provided that it doth not asperse God with any the least spot of our sins Which we readily close with renouncing al such dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of sin So Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 78. pag. 147. having given us the mention of the Thomists previous predeterminative concurse namely that the human wil is in al its motions excited by God and efficaciously i. e. irresistibly moved first to act and then to act this rather than that before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premonishes us In the mean while we professe these two things 1 That we do much against our wil recede from this opinion and that because we conceive so honourably of those great men which are Patrones thereof 2 That we are ready if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine against any article of faith to reject it Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. Thes 55. pag. 438. seems to wave the Controversie yet Thes 56. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius That God cannot physically promove and predetermine free causes to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But Thes 57. he confesseth That provided God be not made the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first in acting cannot be too much asserted c. And Thes 58. he concludes That the force and efficace of the Divine providence even about sinful acts is not to be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse but that God doth many ways procure promove direct and moderate sinful events So great is the hesitation of our Adversaries Yea how frequently do the very same persons differ from themselves in their sentiments about this point Doth not the same person sometimes seem to grant an universal concurse immediately influencing al natural acts and yet elsewhere denie the same to acts intrinsecally evil And so in other points controverted by us But the differences of our Opponents among themselves are more palpable and visible as to the following Particulars 1. They are greatly confused and at variance among themselves as to Gods Prescience of sinful acts Al the New Methodists generally grant Gods certain prescience of al sinful acts but yet they are at a great difference yea contradiction among themselves in the stating of it 1 Strangius lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 594. tels us That among al the modes which are wont to be explicated that seems the most probable which is taken from
the presence of althings in Eternitie Wherein he follows the Dominicans and so must by consequence resolve the futurition of sin into the wil of God permitting it which overthrows his Hypothesis Yet cap. 8. pag. 622. he resolves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events into the more Essence of God And pag. 626. he resolves it into the actions themselves and their determinate causes Lastly cap. 10. pag. 646. he in down right termes confesseth That the science of future sins is referred to the science of Vision Which is al that we contend for and that which necessarily resolves Gods prescience of sin into the act of his wil permitting it Some of our Opponents resolve Gods certain prescience of sin into the infinitude of his science Thus Le Blanc De Concord Libert p 444. Thes 39. As for the fourth opinion which secketh the certitude of Divine prescience in the infinitie of the Divine Intellect and in the determinate veritie of those things which are contingently future it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate Yet Thes 40. he confesseth That this opinion doth not satisfie the Question nor take away the principal difficultie For that which is here most difficult to be understood is how future contingents do from Eternitie passe from mere possibles into the nature of futures that so under that reason they may be perceived by God Which knot he endeavors to untie by telling us that the same causes that give existence to things future give them also their futurition But this is a very jejune and poor evasion as we shal hereafter shew Chap. 5. § 1. 3 Others refer Gods certain prescience of sin to the Jesuites middle science whereby God foresees that if the wil of man come under such a connexion of causes circumstances and providential concurrences the effect wil certainly follow albeit in itself merely contingent Thus Lud. Crocius Dyodec Dissert Dissert 7. where he largely but weakly defends this middle science which Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 449. Thes 26 c. makes to be the opinion of Baronius and others Le Blanc himself pag. 444. Thes 42. confesseth That it wants not great difficultie how a thing which is supposed to depend on a cause in itself indeterminate should be certainly knowen by the Divine Intellect for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot see what is not nor yet change the nature of its object Whence he concludes Thes 43. That seing there is so much darknesse on al sides our safest and most ingenuous course is to confesse our own ignorance herein The like subterfuge Strangius makes use of l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. c. 6. p. 591. with this pretexte That the mode of Divine prescience is not reveled in Scripture A poor refuge indeed why then do they so daringly sift and prie into the Divine prescience and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reason We easily grant that the mode of Divine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals and therefore can content our selves with scriptural descriptions thereof but this we assert that it is impossible the Divine prescience which is in itself most certain should depend on the most incertain ambulatory wil of man and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate 2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves about the futurition of sin and Gods predefinition thereof Strangius l. 3. c. 11. holds That some free acts are absolutely future and knowen of God as such without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts and yet he denies that those free contingent futures can be knowen by God according to any Hypothesis which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create wil and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futurition Whence it wil follow that God can foreknow no contingent sinful act as absolutely future but what he first decreed to be absolutely future which yet Strangius admits not Herein he is opposed by Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 455. 3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves touching Gods concurse its immediation totalitie prioritie efficace and predetermination as to sinful acts 1 How many of them incline to the sentiments of Durandus denying al immediate concurse to sinful acts And of those that grant immediate concurse in termes how many yet denie it in realitie Among those that grant immediate concurse both name and thing do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith yea repugnant thereto 2 Our Adversaries also differ much about Gods total particular concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin Some grant a total concurse to the physic entitative act in the general but not in particular others grant a total concurse to the entitative act in particular abstracting the reference it has to its object Thus Strangius lib. 2. cap. 3. who grants that God doth concur by a special concurse to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically which is al that we contend for Others on the contrary make Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin only partial and general asserting with Molina Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Disp 6. That God is only a partial cause of the entitative act of sin So a Divine of name among us yea he asserts that God never totally permits sin 3 Our Opponents differ also among themselves touching the Prioritie of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Some grant Gods concurse hereto previous though not predeterminative so Strangius but others make it to be only simultaneous asserting that God concurs with the wil of man in the same moment of nature and reason to the same act So Baronius wherein he also follows Lud. Molina and the Arminians 4 Lastly the principal difference among our Adversaries is about the Efficacitie and Predetermination of Divine concurse as to the substrate mater of sin Some make the concurse of God to be only general and indifferent and so determinable by the second cause as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 73 74 75. pag. 142 c. where he makes Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts to be the same with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horse Wherein he follows the Remonstrants and Jesuites more particularly Molina Concord Liber Arbitr cum Grat. donis c. Quaest 14. Disput 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among our selves openly asserts that Gods concurse is determinable by the creature But Strangius albeit he too far fals in with the sentiments of Baronius against predetermination yet he rejects this Hypothesis of a general indifferent concurse as too grosse and Pelagian So l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. We say not therefore that God concurs only by a general concurse as the Sun concurs in the same manner to
denie that it is from God Yea Strangius lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 569. grants That God is the cause of the act though he doth not absolutely predestine or decree the same and then to that objection of Alvarez That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extendes itself to al those things unto which the causalitie and efficience of God extendes he replies That God decrees althings either absolutely or respectively But this is a very poor Pelagian evasion for respective or conditional Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God as our Divines particularly Davenant Animadvers against Hoard pag. 226. have proved against the Arminians Lastly Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 576. denies That God decrees al sins specially the first sin which we shal in its place endeavor to prove with the solution of his objections against it Hence 2. Prop. The Decree of God gives futurition to the substrate mater or material entitative act whereunto sin is annexed The Antithesis hereto is defended by Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he affirmes That it is not repugnant to the nature of God or of the thing itself that something be future which God has not predefined So c. 9. p. 628. he denies that God hath decreed al futures namely the fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost This Proposition is also violently impugned by Le Blanc de Concord Libert Hum. par 1. thes 55 c. But specially I can no way approve of what Twisse doth in many places assert That the Decree of God and his wil is the sole and only cause of the futurition of every event And he instanceth in the fal of Adam and the Angels His Arguments against the futurition of the substrate mater of sin from the Decree of God we shal examine in what follows Chap. 5. § 1. 3. Prop. The permissive Decree of God about sin is not idle but efficacious This Proposition is opposed by Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 556. Neither do we grant what some affirme that the permissive Decree of God whereby he permits al sin is efficacious albeit not effective For so the fal of Adam and al other sins should procede from the efficace of the Divine Decree which is an hard saying Neither is that lesse hard which some affirme that God hath absolutely decreed that men do not more good than what they do and omit not more evil than what they omit This Hypothesis is so far from being hard as that I conceive Strangius's opposite persuasion is most dangerous and destructive of the Divine Decrees as we shal shew in its place Yea Strangius himself in what follows pag. 557. grants what Lombard lib. 1. dist 47. assertes namely that the wil of God is always efficacious c. 4. Prop. Gods Prescience of things future and particularly of acts whereto sin is annexed is founded on his Decrees Thus Hilarie de Trin. lib. 9. What God decreed to do those things he knows in his wil. This sentence of Hilarie Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 576. ownes as orthodox but yet denies that the absolute Decree of God is the reason of knowing althings So Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes â—3 I see no reason why we should denie unto God the knowledge of those things which are freely future under a certain condition albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cause to this or that But Scotus and his followers fully espouse our Hypothesis asserting That God certainly knows al future contingents because his Divine Essence which is the reason of knowing representes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil. And then as to the prescience of sin they hold That albeit God doth not predefine sins as such yet he predefines the permission of sins in which he knows them to be future Which is orthodox and that which we shal demonstrate hereafter Chap. 5. § 2. 5. Prop. It belongs to the Perfection of Gods wil and providence to predefine and predetermine al the free acts of the wil. This predefinition and predetermination as to gratiose acts Strangius lib. 2. c. 8. p. 188. and the rest of the new Methodists excepting Baronius grant but they denie it as to the Fal of Adam and other acts intrinsecally evil So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 568. But if it be said that God predefined and predetermined that Adam should at that very time eat abstracting from the object which he did eat of that cannot be Then he gives his reasons why God could not predefine and predetermine Adam to the act of eating abstracting it from the reference it has to its object And then he addes Moreover we denie that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Providence that he absolutely predefine al free acts and predetermin the Wil unto them The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antithesis we shal endeavor to solve and demonstrate our own hypothesis in its due place Chap. 6. § 1. 6. Prop. Gods predefinition of and predetermination to the substrate mater of sinful Acts destroys not their Libertie Strangius and his Sectators grant That Predefinition and Predetermination destroyes not that Libertie which is essential to the Wil but only that which consistes in Indifference So Strangius l. 3. c. 14. p. 681 682 683 685 686. and c. 16. p. 711. But how frivolous this opinion is and how unapt to serve the designe for which it was coined we have already intimated c. 1. § 3. and intend more fully to demonstrate Chap. 6. § 5. 7. Prop. Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination in time of those entitative Acts whereunto sin is annexed do not make God the Author of Sin This is the principal point in controversie the Antithesis whereof is strongly urged though weakly defended by our Opponents Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. But I judge it no way consentaneous to the natural sanctitie of God that he wil and decree sin to be the vitiositie to exist and that he predefine such acts whereunto the vitiositie is necessarily annexed specially the Fal of the evil Angels and our first Parents from whence al sins sprang So c. 5. p. 579. Whether it be said from the permission or from the Decree of God permitting or from the action of which God is the cause that sin is necessarily inferred truely the necessity of sinning is ascribed to God as the Author namely because he decreed and caused that from which sin necessarily follows The like p. 587. Neither hath God predetermined the wil of Adam to the very act of eating the forbidden fruit which yet as to its entitie is reduced to God as the first cause neither was that act or its vitiositie necessarily inferred from the permission of God That this Antithesis of Strangius and his Sectators is most false
of Soul and self-Dominion yet he grants that the Kings heart was not exemted therefrom 2 By the Heart we must understand according to the Hebraic mode the whole soul and al its movements imaginations ratiocinations contrivements purposes and undertakements 3 In the hand of the Lord i. e. under his efficacious predeterminative influxe or concurse The Hand being the instrument of our most potent operations it 's usually put in Scripture for the energetic potent and predeterminative Concurse of God So Hab. 3. 4. He i. e. Christ whose brightnesse was as the light had hornes i. e. beams as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes coming out of his hands i. e. most potent wil the spring of al his efficacious operations whence it follows and there was the hiding of his power i. e. his most potent efficacious predeterminative concurse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil. So Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power So Solomon saying That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God it must be understood of Gods puissant predeterminative Concurse whereby he applies the heart to its acts conduceth and guideth it therein and determineth it as he pleaseth So it follows 4 As the rivers of waters he turneth it whithersoever he wil. How easie is it by Aquaducts to turne waters this or that way as men please And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipontent God to turne the hearts of men and al their natural conceptions products and issues which way he listes Al this may be evinced from Strangius's glosse on this Text lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions he addes a third and more special mode of Divine influence whereby God doth bend impel and incline human wils which way he please not by proper compulsion but by sweet inspiration and motion For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is essential to the wil yet he doth at times and when he please efficaciously move and impel the wils of men and what Solomon predicates of the Kings heart Prov. 21. 1. that very same may on a greater account be affirmed of the heart of every man So Augustin de Grat. Liber Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture be diligently inspected it shews that not only the good wils of men but even the bad are so in the power of God that where he wil and when he wil he causeth them to be inclined either to performe benefits or to inflict punishments by a most secret yet just judgement So again August de Corrept Grat. cap. 6. God hath in his power the wils of men more than they themselves without dout having most omnipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaseth What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse to al the natural products and issues of mans heart even such as have intrinsecal evil as they cal it appendent to them Yea Strangius lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182. grants That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and predetermine the wils of men not only to supernatural workes but also to natural and civil as oft as it seems good to him to performe certain ends which he has preordained So Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him And how so Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the sinful movements Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of Esau to embrace his brother Gen. 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Israelities Exod. 11. 2 3. 12. 35 36. Thus God determined the wil of Cyrus to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews 2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of Darius and Artaxerxes to grant the Jews libertie for the rebuilding the Temple Ezra 6. 1 c. 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4. So God dealt with Jeremy's enemies Jer. 15. 11. Al these predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by Strangius whence we argue That it is impossible but that God should predetermine to the substrate mater of sinful actions for al these actions being exerted by wicked men had nothing of moral or supernatural good in them albeit God made use of them for the succour of his people yea they were ful of hatred against God To these Scriptures we may adde Act. 17. 28. For in him we live and move and have our being Not only Being in general and Life which implies more than simple being but also al our movements or motions are from God as the prime Motor which Paul demonstrates out of one of their own Poets for we are also his off-spring As if he had said Do not your own Poets tel you that we are the off-spring of God Is he not then the first Cause and Motor of al our motions Doth not Aristotle Phys 8. also strongly demonstrate That al our natural motions must arise from one first immobile Motor And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God Must not then the substrate mater of al sinful motions even such as are intrinsecally evil be reduced unto God as the prime Motor I shal conclude this first Head of scriptural Arguments with Jam. 4. 15. For that ye ought to say If the Lord wil we shal live and do this or that There were a number of Free-willers who proudly conceited that they had an absolute and plenary dominion over their own wils and actions whom James rebukes and tels them they ought to say If the Lord wil c. So that he plainly resolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God as the original Cause and Principe But let us see how poorly Strangius shifts off the force of this Argument lib. 2. cap. 10. pag. 227. he saith Who ever understood these words if God wil i. e. if God predetermine my wil to do this or that Then he addes his own glosse But truly nothing more can be understood by that condition IF GOD WIL than this if God shal permit or wil permit as it is elsewhere explicated Act. 16. 7. 1 Cor. 16. 7. I must confesse I cannot but wonder that a person of so great reason and under so many advantages and assistances from Divine Revelation should satisfie himself with so slender an evasion which not only Reason and Scripture but even Pagan Philosophemes contradict For 1 it is most evident that James here as Luke Act. 16. 7. and Paul 1 Cor. 16. 7. speakes not of a mere permissive wil but of an efficacious influential concurse arising from the wil of God which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concurse for al actions both natural civil and supernatural
they may be extended to althings which God hath decreed So that it 's clear by his own confession that the crucifixion of Christ taken actively was predestined predefined constituted foreordained and predetermined by God Whence by a paritie of reason we demonstrate our Hypothesis that the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereunto intrinsecal sin is necessarily annexed is predefined and predetermined by God The inference and conclusion to me is so natural and evident that I cannot see how the wit of man can evade it But let us examine what subterfuges and evasions our Opponents frame to evade the force and evidence this second Head touching Christs Crucifixion gives to our Hypothesis 1. Bellarmine and from him a reverend Divine of name among our selves replie That the passive crucifixion of Christ was from God not the active i. e. Christs Passion and the effects of it was from God but not the actions of those that crucified him 1 How poor and shiftlesse this shift is we have already demonstrated on the vendition of Joseph from Gen. 45. 5 7 8. 2 But more particularly as to this Head I cannot but wonder how any who have not quite banished Reason and Religion from their minds can satisfie themselves with such jejune notions and evasions Did not the blessed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Christs crucifixion how else could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified Or what certain prescience could he have of the salvation of any one elect soul which wholly dependes on the death of Christ Again what fine-spun nonsense is this God predetermined the Passion of Christs crucifixion but not the Action as if God predetermined that Christ should be kissed and so betrayed by Judas but not that Judas should kisse and betray Christ again that Christ should be mocked blasphemed scourged c. by the Souldiers and Jews but that these should not mock blaspheme scourge c. Christ Lastly that the Spear should be thrust into the side of Christ but yet not that any thrust it in What Logic Reason or sense is this Do not the very Aristoteleans grant us That action and passion are not really but only modally distinct As the way from Athens to Thebes and so back again from Thebes to Athens is but one and the same way diversified only from its relation to different termes so the same fluxe as it procedes from the Agent is called Action and as it termines on the patient Passion Is it possible then that God should predetermine or concur to the passion and not to the action of crucifixion But enough of this which is so strongly refuted by Strangius lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772. 2. Another reverend Divine of estime among us for parts and pietie evades thus Christs crucifixion was a thing which Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done Act. 4. 28. i. e. foreseeing wicked hands would be promt and ready for this tragic enterprise his sovereign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknowledge so only and not with lesse latitude to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie than to let it procede to this execution And to deliver him up not by any formal resignation or surrender as we wel know but permitting him thereunto Though the same phrase of delivering him hath elsewhere another notion of assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of men by dying which was done by mutual agreement between both the parties c. This replie of this learned pious Divine so far as I can penetrate and understand it which seems involved under much obscuritie may be resolved into the following parts 1 He makes Gods prescience or foreseeing the crucifixion of Christ by wicked hands to procede or go before the concurrence and determination of Gods wise counsel or predefinition thereof Wherein he fals in with the Jesuites middle Science making Gods prescience precedent to his predefinition or decree and so dependent only on the mutable wil of men as to the act of sin which he elsewhere seems to intimate whereas the Scripture which he refers to Act. 2. 23. makes the foreknowledge of Christs crucifixion subsequent to the predifinition of his determinate Counsel or Decree And certainly al the wit of man summed up in one cannot conceive or demonstrate how God should have a certain prescience of Christs crucifixion which dependes wholly on the contingent uncertain wil of man and not on the determinate counsel of his own wil. 2 He makes Gods determinate counsel or hand only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie c. As if the bounding and limiting of the malignitie and not the substrate mater or act itself entitatively considered were from God Whereas the Text saith categorically That the hand and counsel of God predefined and predetermined whatever those wicked hands of theirs executed 3 He gives us a new Glosse or Paraphrase on that phrase delivering him Act. 2. 23. as if it implied only an assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation c. But how little this glosse wil accord with the sense of these Texts is evident For that assigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine Decrees but the delivering him here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of those that crucified him and that according to the determinate counsel of God 3. We come now to the more plausible subterfuges of Strangius whereby he endeavors to evade the evidence of those Texts which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. He answers lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 573. thus The occision and crucifixion of Christ also the kind of death were from God and as they were from God they were good and greatly gloriose and properly the means to procure our salvation and God is deservedly judged the Cause and Author of them Who by his determinate counsel and precognition delivered his Son to them whom with wicked hands they killed on the crosse Act. 2. 23. Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God neither was it willed or predefined by God who cannot be said to be the Cause and Author of any sin Therefore speaking absolutely the occision of Christ was not sin otherwise God should be the Author of sin as to kil a man is not sin And truly if God had commanded men to kil Christ and they out of conscience to that command had obeyed God they had not sinned But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil neither can that be any way wel done or commanded by God Observe here 1 he grants that the crucifixion of Christ with al its natural circumstances entitatively considered were from God as the God of nature and so naturally good yea that they were morally good and
10. 20 27. 11. 10. 14. 4 8. Deut. 2. 30. Josh 11. 20. Whence Strangius concludes That this phrase of Scripture oft occurring denotes much more than a mere naked permission Though what this should be he is at a great losse 2. Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 99. pag. 159 160. answers That there are four actions of God in induration 1 He punisheth former sins by permitting men to fal into greater 2 He offers to them an occasion of repentance c. 3 He gives them not grace to improve the occasion whence they are said to be blinded and hardened 4 He offers to them occasions of greater sins by such things as objectively move them to sin But al this which Baronius allows God in judicial execation and Induration comes far short of what the forecited Scriptures mention For besides the mere permission of Sin privation of Grace and offering occasions and objects the Scripture mentions a Tradition and delivering up to the very act of sin yea Gods immediate efficacious hand in the very act of sin considered entitatively and materially 3. But we come to Strangius who in his concessions goes beyond the former Divines yet comes short of the genuine mind and spirit of those Texts which speak of Gods judicial Excecation and Induration 1 He grants contrary to the sentiment of a reverend Divine among us that active excecation is ascribed unto God So l. 4. c. 8. p. 819. Active excecation saith he is ascribed to God Satan and the Sinner himself Satan and the Sinner in that action do greatly sin but God actes most justly God can as justly punish Sinners with excecation of mind as he punished Elymas the sorcerer with corporal excecation Act. 13. 11. 2 Thence p. 822. he addes Herein the whole difficultie lies that in this action we rightly distinguish that which is sin and the cause of sin whereof God is not the cause from the punishment which God in just judgement inflicts So p. 829. In al vitiose action the action substrate to the vice or whatever there is of entitie and positive therein must be reduced to God as the first cause who doth concur therewith as considered separate from the vice or defect annexed thereto and therefore whatever entitative or positive is found in any obduration in like manner it must be referred to God albeit he hath no commerce with the vice of the action This ingenuous concession of Strangius did he not overthrow it by other positions were sufficient to period our controversie for what do or need we desire more than what he here grants If whatever be entitative or positive in obduration be from God then surely the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereto sin is annexed is from God But here lies the point of our Controversie with Strangius he holds that there be some acts so intrinsecally evil as that you cannot separate the entitative act from the sinful reference it has to its object But 3 Strangius addes p. 831. That in the same Indutation the sin and punishment are conjunct c. This indeed is a great concession that which overthrows Strangius's Antithesis for if in the same Act the sin and punishment be conjunct then how can God concur to the act as a punishment and not concur to the substrate mater or entitative act which has sin annexed to it This Knot the acutest of Strangius's Sectators wil never untie Again 4 He addes p. 831. That the very Permission of God is the act and effect of the wil of God For to wil to permit and advisedly to permit is also to act What is done by God negatively in regard of his transient act is done also positively in regard of his interne immanent act Herein also he lays before us a pregnant Truth which is directly contradictory to his own Hypothesis for 1 If Gods permissive Wil as to sin be not only negative but also positive then it must be efficacious Again 2 If Gods permission of sin be positive and efficacious then also his Decree of Reprobation to permit sin must be positive and absolute which directly impugneth Strangius's Opinion 5 He addes p. 832. That other actions also concur with Gods Permission because he also rules moderates and ordains what he permits and concurs to the actions substrate to the sin it self Is it so indeed What then do we contend so vehemently for what made Strangius write such a voluminous discourse and oppose Rutherford Twisse and other Calvinists with so much violence when as here he grants whatever they contend for But to speak the truth there yet lies a Snake under the herbe albeit Strangius seems to grant so liberally Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate act of sin yet indeed when he comes else-where to state this concurse he makes it be only a remote concurse to the act considered in genere in its generic nature not to the individual particular act as so or so circumstantiated And herein he is followed by a Divine of Name among us wherein lies the spirit of al their solutions and oppositions But how inept and evanid this subterfuge is wil be very evident if we consider the nature of al physic or natural acts Is not every natural or entitative act individual or singular Are not al natural Acts the effluxes of singular Supposites or persons and if the subject be singular must not the Action be also singular To talk of a natural action in genere or specie what a wild conceit is this that which al true Logic and Philosophie both new and old contradicts It 's true human acts as to their moral consideration may be distinguished into generic specific or individual but if we consider human acts in their natural entitative Being so there neither is nor can be any such thing as actio in genere action in general but al are singular and individual So that if God concur to the act of sin it must be to the act in its individual singular nature not morally but physically and entitatively considered of which more hereafter Chap. 6. § 1. But to give a distinct and Theologic Idea of Gods Judicial Excecation and Induration with the Vindication of his Sacred Majestie from being the Author of Sin the following Distinctions and Determinations may be of use to us 1 We are to distinguish Gods concurse in Judicial Induration or Hardnesse from that of the Sinner 2 Gods Concurse in Judicial Hardnesse may be considered either in regard of his Decree or in regard of his Providence and actual execution 3 Induration may be distinguished into Moral and Natural or into sinful and penal These things being premissed the true nature of Gods judicial excecation and Induration wil appear in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods Decree is not properly the cause of mans Hardnesse of heart or Damnation but only of the Negation or withdrawment of preventing Grace which God is no way bound to give
of further grace 4 Whereas he saith That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto is not sin but ruine the consequent of their sin the word stumbling and falling signifying their destruction it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words for both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie according to our precedent explication of them primarily their sin and then their ruine or destruction as the consequent of their sin This also is evident from that parallel Text Jude 4. For there are certain men crept in unawares who were of old ordained to this condemnation ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse and denying the only Lord God These ungodly men are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 designed and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination to be given up to this condemnation of turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse c. So that it is evident that God foreordained and decreed not only their destruction but to leave them to those sins which should cause the same But to sum up the whole of this Head we grant 1 That absolute Reprobation is not the cause either of mens sins or damnation It 's true elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damnation 2 That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated Yet we denie 1 That it is injust for God by an absolute efficacious Decree to reprobate some for the glorifying of his own Justice For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of justice yet it is not injust for God to reprobate any 2 We denie also that there is any motive cause or condition of Reprobation as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence also 3 we denie that the act of Reprobation is merely negative but affirme that it is positive and absolute of which see Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprobat p. 113. Hence 4 It necessarily follows that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation he predestines and preordains in like manner by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil to leave men to their own sinful courses and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins See more Chap. 5. § 3. CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin 1 Fathers Augustin Prosper Fulgentius 2 Such as succeeded in the Roman Church Hugo de Sancto Victore Aquinas Scotus Ariminensis Holcot Altissiodorensis Bradwardine his Conversion Parts both natural and acquired zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin How God wils Sin How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin The Dominicans and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conforme to our Hypothesis The concurrent perswasions of Jansenius and his Sectators also of the Tridentine Catechisme 3 The Sentiments of Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Zuinglius Beza Chamier Lud. Crocius the Synod of Dort and Church of England Davenant Sam. Ward c. 4 Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin more ancient Durandus his proper Hypothesis and who may be accounted his Sectators Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and designe Arminius and his Adherents the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes The New Methodistes Camero Amyraldus Placeus Le Blanc Baronius Strangius How these New Methodistes fel into these Sentiments and who may be estimed such § 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis touching the efficacious predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti-pelagians in al Ages of the Church and withal to shew who have in al Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries First among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illustrious name and mention than Augustin that great Propugnator or Champion of efficacious Concurse I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries as Strangius by name are so confident as to cite Augustin's testimonie in defense of their Antithesis but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of Augustin whose sentiments touching this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works Thus de Grat. Lib. Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture saith he be diligently inspected it wil appear that not only the good wils of men but also the bad are so in Gods power that he can incline them where and when he wil to performe his benefices or to inflict his punishments by his most secret yet most just judgement Again in the same book he saith That God workes in the hearts of men to incline them which way he please either to Good out of his Mercie or to evil according to their deserts by his Judgement sometimes open sometimes secret but always just So De Praedestinat Sanct. c. 16. It is saith he in the power of wicked men to sin but that by sinning malitiosely they do this or that is not in their power but of God dividing the darkness and ordering it that so hence what they do against the wil of God might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God Again De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto c. 5. Some things saith he God makes and orders other things he only orders righteous men he makes and orders but sinners as sinners he makes not but only orders i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good and of the action but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin but only of the act ordering it for his glorie Again De Civitate Dei l. 13. c. 22. he saith That Sin as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law that is the Divine Wil or Decree Moreover Augustin frequently asserts that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another So Contra Julian l. 5. c. 3. de Civitate Dei l. 15. c. 6. libro de Natura Gratia from cap. 20. to the end To these Testimonies we may adde several Hypotheses of Augustin which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin As 1 He asserted that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Wil and so in it self positive and absolute 2 He held That Excecation and Obduration is the consequent of Reprobation of which see Jansenius August de Gâ—…t Christ l. 10. c. 3 4. 3 He maintained That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary because punishments as Jansen de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Lastly that Augustin held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians who
this Because the Apostle and Augustin and other holy men placed Predestination Prescience and the like on Gods part the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins and retort the cause and blame on God who so predestinated or foreknew therefore these holy men would say that God by his Predestination Prescience or such like doth not compel them against their wil to sin but that they sin freely and by their own wil and that God by predestinating foreknowing or willing sins doth not sin nor do unjustly neither is he the first imputable or culpable cause of sins but the first imputable and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner This indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day Then he addes pag. 303. But if it yet be said that it always hears il with many to say That God doth any wise wil sin it is certainly true and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited not because that which is said is not wel said but because that which is wel said is not wel understood I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdome and savor and understand the truth which is savory to a sane tast and that they would know that there is no evil in the world which is not for some great good why therefore should we substract from the World and from God the Author of the World this way of doing good or of benefaction which is so admirable and great Yea it seems more miraculose and great to worke good out of evils than out of goods or to worke good only And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many if it be said that God wils and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daughter of the Son with the Mother of Parricide Sedition Blasphemie and other like sins and yet not only the Saints but also the Philosophers speak thus For who in such an incest prepares the seed and moves creates and infuseth the soul into the foetus but God and however it may sound thus the Saints of God speak yea the Spirit of God who speaks in them What could be said more acutely demonstratively and divinely for the deciding our controversie would men but receive it 5 Again Bradwardine l. 2. c. 20. p. 542 c. proves out of Altissiodorensis super 2. sent That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altissiodorensis's arguments are these 1 From the Passion of Christ which was good and proceded from a good cause namely the Wil of God 2 From the act of Fornication whereby an holy Prophet is begotten which act is the cause of good and therefore good and yet it is also evil and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God Thence he addes the Testimonie of Thomas in Quaest de malo q. 19. where he demands Whether the act of sin be from God and he answers thus It must be said that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater some said more anciently that the action of Sin was not from God attending to the very Deformity of Sin which is not from God but some said that the action of Sin is from God attending to the very Essence of the Act which must be granted to be from God and that on a double reason 1 Commun because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence and his very Essence his Being it must thence necessarily follow that whatever doth participate of Being must be derived from him who is Being by Essence 2 Special for it is necessary that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover who is God as p. 554. 6 Bradwardine l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher and proves strongly That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God of himself properly actually and specially applying it to act and moving of it Which he demonstrates many wayes as 1 Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith 2 Because al natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause 3 Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self therefore neither can it act of it self as c. 24. p. 563. 4 Because God by reason of his infinite Actualitie permits nothing but what he wils 8 Bradwardine l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher and demonstrates That God albeit he impel no man violently against his wil yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously and draws them to al their free acts even such as have sin annexed to them But further addes he it may be probably said that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin as to the substance of the act yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin or to the deformitie of sin as it is sin or the deformitie of sin for the omnipotent God may as it appears separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformitie of sin and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good without such a defect and privative malice Specially sithat Sin Deformitie Vitiositie or defect is not essentially the very act nor of the essence of the act nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act Therefore the good God acting rightly pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act according to its substance and nature good the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily follow whence therefore doth it follow but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient and from the wil of the Sinner What could be said more acutely more judiciously more demonstratively and more piously to put a period to this controversie had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth I have been the more prolixe in rehearsing these illustrious and demonstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries but what I find rationally solidly and convictively solved by him above three hundred years since As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then and ours now we shal produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis Ch. 6. § 1 2. Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we might now descend to the later Scholemen specially the Thomists but these lie under the same criminal accusation and imputation with our Adversaries as the orthodoxe Calvinist and it deserves a particular remarque that look as the Pelagian Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calvinists so the Arminians and New Methodists oppose the Calvinists in the same point under the Bears skin of being Dominicans and indeed no wonder sithat the Dominicans and Calvinists in this
concurse to the entitative act of sin for as it is granted by Strangius and others efficacious predetermination always follows as a necessary consequent of absolute predefinition if God absolutely decrees to leave men to sin it necessarily follows that he efficaciously determine men to the entitative act of sin 3 He goes higher than most of our Divines dare do in this point in asserting cap. 5. pag. 424. That damnation excecation obduration are the effects of Reprobation But yet cap. 7. pag. 427. he answers the objection of such that argue hence That God lies in wait to destroy such as are reprobated assuring us that the sinner only is the culpable criminal cause of his own damnation And cap. 10. pag. 433. he demonstrates That Reprobates are not created unto damnation i. e. damnation as such is not the end of their creation which sufficiently vindicates the holy God from being the cause of their sin or damnation As for the Jansenists that they are of the same persuasion with the Dominicans as touching our Hypothesis is evident from their concessions to the Jesuites in their Treatie begun Febr. 18. 1663. mentioned in the Refutation of Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. also Idea of Jansenisme pag. 82. The sum was this The Bishop of Comenge a friend of the Jansenists proposed this as an expedient to reconcile the two Parties That the Jansenists declare that they had no other sentiment about this mater but what was taught by the Thomists And because some of the Thomists flie higher than others the Jesuites demanded That the Jansenists should reduce themselves to the forme of speech used by Alvarez So that it seems the Jansenists in the point of efficacious Concurse are looked on by the Jesuites as indeed they are as those that went beyond the very Dominicans The Jansenists replied That the doctrine of Jansenius was not different from that of the Thomists albeit it was not his designe to render himself conforme to them but to Augustin And the true reason why the Jansenists do not maintain greater correspondence with the Dominicans is not their difference in doctrine but because many of the Dominicans have by a Spirit of Cabal or of Faction joined with the Jesuites Lastly that our Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious Concurse to al actions even to such as have sin appendent to them was generally owned not only by single Sects or Parties but by the generalitie of the Roman Church before the rise of the Jesuites is evident from the Doctrine of the Roman Catechisme published by the command of the Council of Trent where in the explication of the Apostles Creed about the end of the first Article par 1. cap. 2. § 20. pag. 23. edit 1619. we find this great testimonie to confirme our Hypothesis God doth not only preserve and administrate althings that are by his providence but also doth by an intime virtue impel those things that are moved and do act any thing to motion and action so that albeit he doth not impede the efficience of second causes yet he prevents them in as much as his most secret force reacheth unto althings and as the Wise-man testifies Wisd 8. 1. He reacheth from one end to another mightily and sweetly doth order althings Wherefore it is said by the Apostle Act. 17. 21. For in him we live and move and have our being What could have been said more clearly and fully for the asserting a predeterminative Concurse to al actions and motions of the creature even such as have sin annexed to them And by whom is this Doctrine taught By the Council of Trent which is the standard and measure of the Roman Faith and no great friend to the Doctrine of Christ Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea such as would be accounted Calvinists cannot allow the efficacious Concurse of God so much as Trent-Papists allow § 3. We have seen how far the Latin Fathers and those who lived in Communion with the Roman Church have openly espoused our Hypothesis let us now descend to Reformed Theologues and examine what their sentiments have been hereof And here indeed we have an ample field to exspatiate in albeit our Adversaries the new Methodists would confine us to a smal number of Adherents We shal begin with John Wiclef our first English Apostolic Reformer who following Bradwardine his Collegue in this as in many other points about Grace asserted That as God necessitates the futuritions of instants so also he necessitates al the events which in those instants are futures Art Constant damnat 278. Again he held That God necessitates al active creatures to each of their acts as Walden tom 1. cap. 21. pag. 35. cap. 23. pag. 37. also Wideford pag. 240 248. Again he asserted That to whatever Gods permission reached to that also his actual volition reached as Walden tom 1. pag. 39. which clearly demonstrates our Hypothesis But we passe on to John Calvin whom some new Methodists particularly Strangius would force into their Campe. Thus Strang. pag. 384 554. where he endeavors to take off Calvin from our Partie but he that looks into Calvins Institutions l. 1. c. 18. wil find our assertion not only nakedly owned but fully explicated and demonstrated and that by a multitude of scriptural instances Particularly he proves 1 That God wils the existence of mens sins so that things repugnant to Gods wil of precept are yet brought about by his efficacious wil of Decree and Providence 2 That Gods permission of sin is not otiose but active and energetic 3 That Gods providence moderates and orders the sins of men And he concludes the Chapter with this seasonable caution As for those to whom this Doctrine of Gods judicial induration may seem rigid let them but a little think how tolerable their morositie may be who reject a thing attested by such clear testimonies of Scripture because it excedes their capacitie and count it a crime to bring to light things which if God did not know to be profitable for our knowlege he would never have reveled them by his Prophets and Apostles So in other parts of his Works as Resp contra Pighium de Libr. Arbitr pag. 225. also Tractat. de occulta Dei providentia he clearly asserts and demonstrates our Hypothesis This is wel taken notice of by judicious Davenant in his Animadversions on Gods love c. p. 322. It is saith he Calvins opinion de occult Dei provident resp ad 2. Lapsum Adae non fortuitum esse sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum God foresaw Adams fal he had power to have hindred it but he would not because himself had decreed otherwise This is the effect of Calvins doctrine But as for the involving of men in sin and damnation out of his only wil and pleasure these are consequents falsely inferred upon Calvins Doctrine by himself disclaimed c. How much Zuinglius favored this opinion of Gods efficacious
herein Whence in the following Chapters 9 10 11 12. he answers the Objections and Arguments of the Papists whereby they endeavor to prove That the Calvinists make God the Author of sin which imputations are stil fastened on us by the Arminians and new Methodists We may adde hereto the sentiments of Ludovicus Crocius Professor at Breme and a Member of the Synod of Dort who in many points specially that of middle Science and universal Grace follows the new method yet in this of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin seems orthodox and concurrent to Calvins Doctrine So in his Duodecas Dissertat Exegetic De voluntate Dei Dissert 8. thes 74. pag. 415. where he tels us That the fundamen of clearing God from being the Author of sin is the distinction of the material and formal part of sin namely of the action and the vitiositie which is in the action for that not this he wils and decrees and this not that he permits And his reason is invincible for otherwise there should be an action independent as to God and the efficacious providence of God should be denied which is Epicurean And then thes 99. pag. 426. he tels us That as to the act of the Divine wil about sin the Scriptures seem to contradict themselves in that some Scriptures assure us that God doth not wil sin but hate it with those that commit it as Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures say that God wils creates and effects sins as Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. Then he solves these seeming contradictions by distinguishing between the act and the vitiositie of the act also between the act as it procedes from God and as from the Creature lastly between the decreeing wil of God and the preceptive wil of God Whence he concludes thes 100. thus ` For God both wils and produceth the act as an act of it self indifferent to moral bonitie and evil c. And he addes thes 101. ` That this act in itself essentially good even as it is contaminated by the creature God wils it as a punishment and useth it as an ordained convenient means for the best ends The like thes 112. p. 430. where he shews how God wils sin not as sin but as a punishment c. of which more fully hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. These sentiments of Lud. Crocius I rather chuse to cite because he in other points follows the new method and is cried up by some of that partie As for the Judgement of the Synod of Dort touching our Hypothesis it is sufficiently evident by their Determinations as also by the oppositions the Arminians made against them in this point both whiles they sate and afterwards I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries are so confident as to cite the Synods testimonie in favor of their Antithesis but this is so false an imputation as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point than their stout defence of absolute Reprobation of which see Davenants Animadversions on Gods love pag. 242. We might adde almost an infinitude of Testimonies from Reformed Divines Churches and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypothesis but in what remains we shal confine our selves to the Doctrine and Testimonie of the Church of England and those renowned Professors of Theologie who have maintained and vindicated our Hypothesis The Church of England as to Doctrine imbibed even in her first Reformation the sentiments of Calvin and the Reformed Churches in France Holland Helvetia and Germanie albeit as to Discipline she stuck unto Episcopal Jurisdiction This is evident by that noble designe of Cranmer and our first Reformers to reduce the Doctrine of al the Reformed Churches unto one Confession I shal here only cul out a few Testimonies of some great Professors of Theologie both in Oxford and Cambridge who were of an Episcopal Judgement as to Discipline yet stout Champions for our Hypothesis We shal begin with Davenant a great Master of Reason and one that went as far as he could and I think as far as any ought in compliance with those of the New Method yet he stil asserted and with great strength of reason defended absolute Reprobation and Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Thus in his Determinations when Professor of Theologie at Cambridge Quaest 22. In evil acts saith he God hath decreed to permit the event to concur with the Agent as an universal Motor and lastly to order the event itself according to that of Hugo de sacr fid lib. 1. cap. 13. God wils that sin be and yet he wils not sin i. e. with a wil of approbation So Quaest 25. pag. 118. he grants That Gods decree to permit sin is efficacious so as to extract good out of it But he speakes more fully for the defense of our Hypothesis in his Animadversions on Gods love to mankind pag. 72. But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own free wil as the proper efficient cause and the existing or coming of such actions in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente ordinante are in no error at al. But if any shal go about to set mans wil at libertie and to tie up short the decreeing and determining wil of God as if this had not the determining stroke amongst al possible evil actions or events which shal infallibly be and which shal infallibly not be he may avoid the suspicion of Stoicisme and Manicheisme but he wil hardly avoid the suspicion of Atheisme For the greater number of mens actions being wicked and evil if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree human affaires are more over-ruled by mans wil than by Gods What could be said more acutely and distinctly for the demonstration of our Hypothesis He here alsertes 1 That the existence of evil actions is from Gods decree permitting and ordering of them 2 That Gods decreeing wil doth determine or predetermine al possible evil actions or events which shal infallibly be And do or need we assert more than this And frequently in that Book Davenant assertes and demonstrates That the decree of Reprobation is absolute determining sinful acts and events yet so as that it leaves no man under a compulsion to sin So pag. 253. he saith Gods decrees carrie with them a necessitie of infallibilitie as to the event but not a necessitie of compulsion as to the manner of acting And elsewhere he frequently inculcates That let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and the same libertie to the Agent So pag. 333 340 341 351 360. Yea he proves That the Arminians must and do grant immutable absolute decrees which admit the same objections and difficulties as those of the Antiarminians So pag. 354 400 418 419. Lastly he proves
other of Evil. And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the Manichees is this because whoever denies God to be the cause of the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed must hold That there is some real positive entitie in sin whereof God is not the cause whence by consequence such must assert That there are two first Causes one of Good and the other of Evil which was the error of Marcion and Manes who held there were two first Principes the one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme good who was the cause of al good the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme evil God who was the cause of al evil And certainly they that maintain sin to be according to its formal reason something positive or real or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin wil necessarily fal into the sentiments of Marcion and Manes Again Hieronymus Epist ad Ctesiphontem makes this Antithesis of Durandus to be the Doctrine of Pelagius who saith he held That God having once conferred free-wil it is not necessary that he further operate with us and he speaks of natural operations as of the motion of the hand c. which was Durandus's opinion Though I cannot but confesse Jansenius August Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tels us the Pelagians granted That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil. But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testimonies is not difficult in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurse to al operations in termes but denied it in effect and consequences as our Adversaries now-a-days Compton Carleton in his Philosoph Vnivers Disput 28. Sect. 1. § 3. assures us that the opinion of Durandus was asserted and defended before him by Nicolaus Bonetus lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was also by some others But yet it cannot be denied but that the principal Author of this Antithesis was Durandus whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandisme which they cal a rash erroneous dangerous error little better than Arianisme Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. lib. Arb. saith it is repugnant to the Scriptures Testimonies of the Fathers and manifest Reason Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. saith It is erroneous in Faith de Concursu l. 1. he assertes That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended but also rejected by al approved Theologues as an error in Faith Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea some of great vogue for Pietie and Learning should espouse an error so grosse and so much decried by Papists themselves But to give a convictive demonstration that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of Durandisme we are first to examine what Durandus's opinion as to Gods Concurse is and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators Durandus proposeth his opinion in sentent l. 2. Dist 1. Q. 5. in these words Vtrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturae Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature which he denies and the principal reasons of his negation are these 1 Because then God should be the author of Sin 2 Because such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie in that it determines the wil and so puts an end to its Indifference of which see Strangius p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments which were used by Durandus against immediate Concurse are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin And albeit the most of them professe a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of Durandus yet I must freely declare my mind I cannot conceive how they can without apparent contradiction defend their own but by espousing that of Durandus which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth And that the most of our Adversaries even among the New Methodists who in profession disown it fal under the imputation of Durandisme we shal anon make evident when we come to treat of their particular sentiments at present take these Criteria or distinctive notes of Durandisme 1 Al such as assert a Divine Concurse to the principe or subject only and not immediate unto the Act fal under the imputation of Durandisme This is wel observed by Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause moving it to act without a continued concurse to the action fal into the error of Durandus Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus a professed abettor of Durandisme Thus also Amyraldus and a Divine of name among our selves 2 Al those who hold only a general immediate concurse to the act such as is determinable by the mater it workes on as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater are deservedly branded with the black note of Durandisme Thus Baronius together with the Remonstrants and Molinists 3 Al such as denie every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience justly fal under the marque of Durandisme Thus Camero and our Adversaries generally who denie that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsecally evil 4 Al those who affirme That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shal act without immediate concurse must necessarily symbolise with Durandus This is acknowledged by Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurse sithat this involves no contradiction To which he answers wel in the Negative that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as wel as in essence involves a flat contradiction because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature This piece of Durandisme Strangius and others seem chargeable with as hereafter in our account of Strangius But we descend to the particular Sects who oppose our Thesis with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypothesis of Durandus And we shal begin with the Jesuites who now generally passe under the name of Molinists from Ludov. Molina their chief Captain who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr cum Gratiae donis c. Quaest 14. Disp 26. assertes 1 That Gods immediate concurse terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act but only on the act it self and effect Whence 2 That this Concurse is not antecedent or previous as to the act but only simultaneous i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the same act and conserves the same Thence 3 That this immediate concurse of God is not predeterminative at least as to human acts but only indifferent and determinable like that of the
with that of Durandus c. So Thes 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts one externe and the other interne as for the externe act he placeth it in two things 1 in proposing objects 2 in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace The interne act of God consistes according to him in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil obscure or remove the one or cause some other object to be offered which is most taking In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted Yea in his Speciminis special p. 468. he saith in down-right termes That the wil of God dependes on us not we on the wil of God which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points see Pet. Molinaei de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro Judicium praesat Placeus another Salmurian Professor albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method yea in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin he seems pendulous and in suspense Thus De libero Hom. Arbitr p. 174. edit 1656. What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is the Papists sharply dispute It is truly confessed by al that God doth concur with every cause so as to operate conveniently with its faculties but this concurse some make immediate proxime and altogether the same with the very action of second causes but others denie it But we according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majestie of God dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is it sufficeth us that provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God too much cannot be ascribed unto God c. Le Blanc also Professor of Theologie at Sedan though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie Concil Arbitr thes 55. yet thes 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius and others That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But yet thes 57. he recals himself and saith That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted And thes 58. he addes this as most certain That the aide and efficace of Divine providence even about sinful acts may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse c. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland Baronius and Strangius who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin As for Baronius he is accused of rank Arminianisme and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts Thus in his Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78. pag. 146 c. he endeavors to prove That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians Jesuites and Arminians namely that this previous motion and predetermination 1 destroyeth human libertie pag. 147. 2 That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts pag. 148. 3 That it maketh God the Author of sin pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways 1 Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie pag. 150. 2 Because the action then as of such a species must be from God 3 Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel as pag. 151. 4 That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments urged by Pelagians and Arminians to which we shal answer more fully hereafter chap. 6. § 1 c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument That the second cause doth not act but as moved by the first and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse It 's true § 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants which is wel observed by Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 35. pag. 434. This at least without al dout is the opinion of Robert Baronius in his Metaphysic where touching the Concurse of God and so of its concord with human libertie he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action neither is it needful that God premove second causes but it is sufficient that together with them he influence their actions and effects And indeed Baronius's own illustration Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters in itself indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians Lastly pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege Whence it is to me apparent that it would not be an act of injustice should we reckon him among the Arminians whose sentiments and cause he has espoused yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius Professor at Glascow who as they say having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford writ a great Volume in four Books Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans Twisse and Rutherford who in his influences of the life of Grace both Preface and Book oft animadvertes thereon as if these al by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts made God the Author of sin I must confesse he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences yea contradictions that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions But this I impute not to any defect in naturals but in his cause which admits not any solid reason for its defense And that which yet seems more strange to me is this that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus Molina
total and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin For if God totally concur to the substrate act of sin must he not also concur to the wil that puts forth that act And if God concur to the wil in the production of the act must he not also necessarily determine the wil to that act That Gods total concurse doth not only reach the act and effect but also the wil itself is granted by Strangius lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171. Neither faith he do we say that the Concurse of God doth reach only the effect but not the efficient cause sithat the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Energie of the second cause must be from God and the action is not lesse an effect than the work c. 2 The Vniversalitie of Divine concurse as to al effects whatsoever gives us a further demonstration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of sin That Divine concurse is universally extensive to al acts of the wil as wel as to al other objects by giving forces and assistances to faculties exciting and appling them to their acts and ordering them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. § 2. pag. 296 297. And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be predeterminative Yea to speak properly is there or can there be any real efficience influxe or concurse sent forth by God as the prime universal cause of althings which is not predeterminative To talke of an universal general concurse of God which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts and yet doth not predetermine i. e. excite and applie the wil to its act what is it but pure non-sense and virtual contradiction 3 The Particularitie of Gods concurse as to its manner of working doth also invictly demonstrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of sin Divine concurse albeit it be universal as to the extent of its object yet it 's most particular and proper as to its manner of working Our Adversaries generally both Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists talke much of a general indifferent concurse alike commun to al effects and determinable by its substrate mater as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on But alas how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is such a general indifferent concurse Doth not this make the first cause to be second because dependent and the second cause first because independent And doth it not hence also necessarily follow that the first cause may by the indisposition of the mater or resistence of second Agents be frustrated of its intended effect What more expressely overthrows the soverain Dominion and universal Concurse of God than such a general indifferent Concurse And yet is not this one of the most plausible subterfuges our Adversaries have to shelter themselves under They object If God should by a particular predeterminative concurse determine the wil to act in sins intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like then the specification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God and so God inevitably should be the Author of sin This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming against our Hypothesis to which we intend a more ful answer in the next Chapter § 1. at present let this suffice 1 We say not that God is a particular cause but universal working in and by a particular concurse suitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on 2 We say not that this particular Concurse of God doth morally specifie or determine the sinful act to its object but only physically individuate or naturally modifie the substrate mater of the sinful act This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. Samuel Ward that great Professor of Theologie in his Determination of Gods Concurse pag. 117. where he strongly demonstrates That the previous Concurse of God as the first cause doth in its way modifie and determine al the actions of second causes and if so then surely the substrate entitative act of sin as hereafter 3 That general indifferent concurse which our Adversaries so warmly contend for sithat they grant it to be causative and influential on the sinful act doth equally infer God to be the Author of sin as our predeter minative concurse For if it be causative and effective of the act then surely of that individual act as determined to such an object for to talke of its concurrence to the act in genere in the general and not in individuo in its individual determination to its object is such an absurditie in Philosophie that al awakened Philosophers wil decrie it for what Tyro cannot informe us that al physical acts are suppositorum of individual singular substances and so without al peradventure individual and singular and if so then must not their general concurse reach not only the action in general but also individually considered as relating to its object not morally but physically And wil it not hence follow that their general concurse is causative of the entitative act as determined to its object and so makes God the Author of sin as much at least as wel as our predeterminative concurse as more fully Chap. 6. § 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 4 The Immediation of Divine Concurse strongly demonstrates the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of sin thereby Our Adversaries generally both Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists excepting some very few that adhere to Durandus grant an immediate concurse to the entitative act of sin which if wel followed wil necessarily infer predeterminative concurse specially according to the concessions of the new Methodists who say That this immediate concurse reacheth not only the effect and act which the Jesuites and Arminians grant but also the very wil itself as the immediate efficient of the act Touching this immediate Concurse see Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54 c. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jesuites none has more acutely demonstrated this than Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. and our Country-man Campton Carleton in his Philos Vnivers Disp 28. Sect. 2 3. pag. Disput 29. Sect. 1 2. pag. 323 324. where he demonstrates strongly against Lud. à Dola That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of sin Now hence we thus argue If God together with the human wil immediately produceth the very act of sin then certainly he must of necessitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act For suppose the sinful act be motus primò primus as they phrase it or a mere simple volition of the wil how is it possible that
is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged and that with as great color of Reason by the Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination to gracious acts I must confesse I could never neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuites and Arminians if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin be admitted as valid 2 The like may be said of that other objection or reason why our Adversaries reject Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin namely That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and absolutely impossible c. Is not this very objection and the reason urged to enforce it as much urged by Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination even to gracious Acts And are not the reasons as valid on the later as on the former side What reason do the new Methodists give that Predetermination to the entitative act of sin makes Gods Laws impossible but that it takes away the Wils Indifference and destroys the natural power that the wil is invested with to act or not to act And doth not Predetermination to good as much destroy the wils indifference and its power to act or not to act 3 Our Adversaries urge That this Predetermination takes away the use of Promises Invitations and al evangelic offers of Grace and supposeth God not to deal sincerely with Sinners in making offers of Grace and yet irresistibly determining their Wils against the acceptance of these offers Is not this very objection with its reason urged and that with as much force of reason by Jesuites and Arminians against Predetermination to gracious Acts For if no man can entertain those offers of Grace by his own freewil without a predeterminative Concurse are not al gracious Promises Invitations and offers of Grace to Sinners who fal not under this Predetermination vain and uselesse Our Adversaries the new Methodists generally some few excepted denie any sufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace and is not then the vitious wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitiositie against the offers of Grace as by the predeterminative Concurse of God 4 Our Adversaries object That this Predetermination to the entitative act of sin supposeth God to compel and force men to sin and so makes him to be the real Author of Sin yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulsion c. and is not this very argument urged by Jesuites and Arminians against al Predetermination even to what is good and that with as much color of reason For say they If God predetermine the wil to what is good then he compels and forceth the wil to be good so that the wil being under a compulsion cannot be said to be the Author of its own act but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercice of that act which destroyeth al moral good c. Which objection is as valid as that of our Adversaries and can never be solidly answered if their objection be good though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it as we shal demonstrate c. 6. § 5. To conclude this argument I am very confident our Opponents the new Methodists wil never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurse to what is morally or supernaturally good so long as they denie the same to the substrate mater of sin which is naturally good for al or at least the most of those arguments they urge against the later may and are urged by the Molinists and Arminians against the former and that with equal force And this Baronius did by his natural acumen foresee and therefore he took a course more seemingly rational according to his Principes though lesse friendly to divine Concurse to denie al Predetermination as wel to supernatural as natural good of which see his Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. n. 66. c. p. 136. § 5. Our fifth Argument shal be taken from the Nature of Sin its substrate mater and formal reason 1. As to the general Idea and substrate mater of sin we have demonstrated Ch. 1. § 2. 1 That al human acts considered in their natural entitie abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil 2 That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Constitution and Determination from the Moral Law 3 That no human Act considered physically or according to its natural entitative substance is intrinsecally evil but only morally in regard of its moral specification or determination to such or such an object Hence 4 That sin has for its substrate mater some natural good Now these Propositions being laid as so many Principes we hence argue That God must necessarily concur to yea predetermine the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil For if al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil morally are according to their substrate mater physically good doth it not necessarily follow that God the first cause must concur thereto yea predetermine the same Must not every second Cause as such be actuated and so determined by its first Cause and his efficacious Concurse Doth not the subordination of the second Cause to the first necessarily demonstrate not only its dependence on but also Predetermination by the same in al its natural operations and effects Is not every Being by participation necessarily limited defined and predetermined in al its natural entitative motions by the first Being which is such by Essence May not this also be demonstrated from the very concessions of our Adversaries who grant that vitiositie follows not any Act as a natural Act So Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 243. We confesse saith he that Vitiositie doth not follow the act of sin as an act for then every act would be sin also that it doth not follow as the act procedes from God for then every act that procedes from God would have sin Now if sin follows not the act of sin as an act what reason can there be why God should not efficaciously concur to yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin This is wel explicated by Lud. Crocius that Breme Professor who was a member of the Synod of Dort and there began the New Method Duodecas Dissert de Volunt Dei Dissert 8. Thes 99. p. 426. As to the Act saith he of the Divine Wil about sin the effates of Scripture seem to contradict themselves whiles that some expressely affirm That God nils and hates sins and those that commit them Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others seem to say That God wils creates effectes them Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. But these things do wel agree if the distinction be rightly observed 1 Between the Act and the Vitiositie of the Act. 2 Between the Act as it is from God and as it
is from the Creature 3 Between the wil of God decreeing and the wil of God commanding Whence he concludes Thes 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth by the Creature as the first Cause by the second the Act as an Act of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie and Vitiositie and wils and effectes the same albeit depraved by the Creature as invested with his moral rectitude because he produceth it by his own power from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause Whence he addes Thes 101. And this act essentially good even as defiled by the Creature God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment or of exploration or exercice and as an ordinate convenient Medium according to his Justice for the best ends Thes 102. In this sense God is said To create evil to produce it out of his mouth to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren to rob Job of his goods to command Shimei to curse David to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles Thes 103. For God decreed to produce those acts as acts and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners and to use them albeit depraved wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions as Ch. 1. § 2. we have more fully explicated Whence we thus argue If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins and if of some why not of al even such as are intrinsecally evil That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident and that from the concessions of our Adversaries who grant That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good which also according to their own confessions are modally sinful Whence we thus argue The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful When we say That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil As here may not be taken reduplicatively but only specificatively i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good and sinful which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act so that our Opponents granting that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good how can they possibly denie that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful When I can see a rational solution given to this argument which I despair of I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause But they replie If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions it doth not thence follow that he concurs to actions intrinsecally and in the substance of them evil But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor if we consider wel 1 That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it any more than the greatest the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here dare our Adversaries say that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God or the like Whence 2 The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason If God doth concur yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the like imputation Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin as in the greatest And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins Whence if we can prove what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove yea what they approve of namely that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is imperfectly good but modally sinful it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument § 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission which is either legal or natural Natural Permission is either divine or human and both either negative or positive 1 God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin but on the contrary severely prohibites it and that on pain of death 2 Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation It 's true Divine Permission regardes not only the substrate mater of sin but also sin formally considered and so sin under that reduplication as sin yet not simply considered but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie and so much is confessed by Strangius l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin it 's true that sin as sin is permitted by God physically not morally Yet I adde not simply but respectively as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Government And Lud. Crocius Duodec Dissert 8. Thes 74. pag. 415. assertes That God albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin yet unbelieving and disobedient both Iews and Cananites c. 2. Whereas he tels us that the Mythologists say Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs c. This may as well refer to Joshua as to Nimrod For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater or Babylon yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites or Phenicians till Ioshua's time who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories might well be reputed the God of War Mars or Hercules 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is that the Mythologists whom Diodorus
Sin Yea let them but grant as they do Gods certain prescience of sin and the same black Imputations which they lode us with wil al fal with as much weight on themselves as before Chap. 5. § 2. 2. As for what they urge from the Justice of God that our Hypothesis is contradictory thereto in that he cannot in Justice punish that Sin which he predetermines men unto we answer 1 That Gods Predetermination lays no violent force or compulsion on the wil to sin he doth only as the first cause and God of Nature sweetly though potently applie the wil to its act 2 The wil doth in the very same moment wherein it is predetermined by God voluntarily and freely as a deficient depraved facultie elect the very act it is predetermined unto so that it doth as freely deliberately and fully espouse the act as if there were no Predetermination on Gods part and what more just than that the Sinner should be severely punished for that sinful act which he doth deliberately and voluntarily exert 3 Here is in this objection a poor Sophisme which they cal No-cause for a cause For Gods predeterminative Concurse is not the cause of mens sins albeit mens sins be a necessary consequent thereof 4 The same difficulties which our Adversaries urge us with in point of Divine Justice return on them who assert an immediate previous Concurse to the Mater of Sin neither can they without apparent violence to their own Reason impute this objection to us which their own Hypothesis is as much obnoxious unto 3. They urge us with an Imputation on the Clemence and Mercie of God in that predeterminative Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin makes the blessed God to be cruel towards his poor Creature and this two ways As 1 In that it makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment without regard to their Sins 2 In that it supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal Torments and yet irresistibly to predetermine yea impel men thereto as Baron Metaph. p. 151. This Objection our Adversaries adorne and exaggerate with many specious and plausible pretextes for the Vindication of Divine Clemence and Mercy as they pretend and for our confusion Yet we no way dout but to make it appear that al is but as emty vapor before the Meridian Sun Therefore to answer 1 to the first branch of the Objection That our Hypothesis makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment without regard to their sins 1 We grant that the Decree of Reprobation is and must be according to our Hypothesis absolute because there is an adequate commensuration between absolute Predefinition and Predetermination as our Adversaries also maintain of which before Chap. 5. § 3. 2 Yet we peremtorily denie that God reprobates or predestines men to eternal punishment without any regard to their sins Divines say that albeit sin be not the motive or ground moving God to reprobate men yet it is considered in the Decree of Reprobation as that for which God wil at last condemn men It 's true the Supralapsarian Divines who make man as labile the object of Reprobation differ somewhat from those of the sublapsarian perswasion who make the corrupt masse or lapsed man the object of Election and Reprobation yet they both take in the consideration of sin in the Decree of Reprobation and they both make the Decree of Reprobation in it self absolute for the Sublapsarians make sin only a commun condition of the corrupt Masse not distinctive or discriminative of Reprobates from the Elect as Davenant Animadvers on Gods Love p. 84. proves That the Supralapsarians charge not Gods Reprobation with mans destruction Though he himself goes the Sublapsarian way But 3 Here lies the bitter root of this forged Imputation affixed on us by our Adversaries that they consider the Decree of Reprobation as an act of Divine Justice which regards the object as already constituted and not the constitution thereof This is incomparably wel observed by judicious Davenant in his answer to Hoard Animadvers p. 229. For those Inferences therefore That if absolute Reprobation be granted God may be properly called a Father of Crueltie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I marvel how he trembled to thinke of them and how he never trembled to utter them That wherein he perpetually is mistaken is the making of Non-election or Negative Reprobation a Vindicative act the confounding it with the judicial Sentence of Damnation the conceiving it to worke in the Non-elect an invincible necessitie of committing Sin with such like monstrous fansies which he takes for Principles needing no proof whereas they are such grosse errors as need no confutation 2 The second part of the Objection which supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal torments and yet irresistibly to predetermine and impel men thereunto has been sufficiently refuted in what precedes § 1. and indeed throughout this whole Discourse and wil also come under consideration in what follows 4. Our Adversaries charge also our Hypothesis with a Repugnance to the Sanctitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature in that by asserting Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin we make the act of sin to be wel-pleasing to God This objection is greatly aggravated by a Reverend Divine among our selves who in the confutation of Twisse argues thus If God willeth that sin existe by his Permission 1 He willeth Sin Yea 2 God wils sin as much as man Yea 3 This makes God equally to wil Sin and Holiness Yea 4 Then God takes complacence in Sin Answer These are high charges indeed and if they could be made good against us we should not deserve protection from any wel-governed Kingdome or State for what more inconsistent with civil Government than to make the Supreme Rector and Governor of Mankind equally to wil Sin and Holinesse But these Calumnies and Reproches are not of yesterday but have been time out of mind imputed to the assertors of Efficacious Concurse and therefore we have been more large in the refuting of them § 1. of this Chapter Thus Bradwardine De Caus l. 2. c. 28. p. 572. When it is argued saith he that the sinful act doth please God Wel 1 The Adverbe Wel may determine the Verbe to please God in regard of the Divine complacence and so there is no dout but that as the evil Act entitatively considered doth please him so it is highly wel-pleasing to him or 2 in regard of the Act that is wel-pleasing and that either in regard of the substance of the act or in regard of its vitiositie 1 If we regard the act naturally so it 's true that it is wel-pleasing to God but if we regard it morally so it 's false 2 If we regard the vitiositie of the act so it is not properly effected by man nor yet by God it being not properly an effect but pure
the contrary as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do of which hereafter § 8. 2. As for the later part of our Opponents Objection From the Promisses and Invitations of God which are made uselesse and collusive by our supposed divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin we answer 1 That al Gods Promisses and evangelic Invitations which are but branches of the Covenant of Grace are primarily intended for the elect Heirs of Salvation to whom they are many ways useful notwithstanding Divine Predetermination For the blessed God promiseth life and happinesse on the condition of Repentance and Believing not as if there were any potence or abilitie in corrupt nature by its own free-wil to accept of these offers or performe the Condition on which the offers depend but thereby convincing the Soul of its extreme impotence he doth together with the offer and invitation made conveigh Grace into the elect Soul for the inabling of it to performe the Condition So that these general and conditional Promisses are in reference to the Elect for whom they are primarily designed operative of Grace albeit as to others they are only exactive of dutie whence the impossibilitie which attends corrupt Nature is taken off as to the Elect by Divine Grace 2 Neither are those general evangelic Promisses and Invitations uselesse as to Reprobates for 1 They declare the infallible and essential connexion which there is between the condition and the thing promised therein namely Life and Salvation And to make this more clear we are to remember that both Logic and rectified Reason assures us that a conditional enunciation doth not always note a possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent but only their necessary connexion that in al conditional Propositions on which evangelic Exhortations and Invitations are founded there cannot be supposed an indifferent and indeterminate possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent but only the connexion of the Antecedent with the Consequent is evident from that of our Lord John 15 6. If a man abide not in me he is cast forth c. Whence it is apparent that a solid and serious Invitation unto Sinners may be built on a Condition in some mode impossible The God of al grace has by his evangelic Constitution and Covenant established an inviolable connexion between Faith and Salvation so that this Proposition is infallibly true If thou believest thou shalt be saved and the holy God has given his Ministers Commission to preach it to al Mankind neither is there the least collusion or fraudulent intention on Gods part albeit he doth predetermine the Most of men to the substrate mater of Unbelief for the sinceritie of Gods intention appears in the realitie of the offer which consistes in the infallible connexion of the Consequent with the Antecedent grounded on the evangelic Pactum or Ordination as Davenant wel observes Animadvers on Gods Love p. 377. where he shews That the Decree of God permitting Pharaoh to abuse the gifts of God to his own destruction was not contrary unto the end or use whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting ordination in their own nature So p. 387 388. he demonstrates That Divine eternal Decrees whereupon may infallibly be inferred the abuse of Grace temporally offered do not crosse the end for which such Grace is administred to persons not elected And he gives this reason for it p. 352. God meaning must be always interpreted according to the known nature of the Means and not according to the unknown Wil of God concerning the infallible event or successe of the Means Gods meaning when he offers any Grace unto men is that they should performe such actions whereunto such grace conduceth and his meaning when he promiseth glory unto any man if he believe and persevere is truely to performe it if he so do But it is not always Gods absolute wil to cause men to use his Grace to their own good If the Remonstrants wil have nothing termed Gods meaning but his absolute Wil in their opinion as wel as in ours it wil follow that God had no meaning to give Cain or Judas saving Grace or Glorie Lastly p. 392 393 394. he proves That God doth by his wil of Approbation and Complacence unfeignedly wil what he commands and exhorts men to albeit he decree the contrary event Hence 2 These general Promisses and Invitations have this use also as to Reprobates that it leaves them without the least shadow of pretence or Excuse for their unbelief for if God doth by such Promisses and Invitations declare his real intention to save men if they believe and withal an expectation that they accept his offers yea his complacence in such an acceptation in order to life with a provision of al means necessary thereto what excuse can men have for unbelief Wil they say that Gods predetermining men to the entitative act of unbelief contradicts such a real intention Take the Replie of Davenant Animadv p. 271. We answer that God is no otherwise said to intend outward events than by providing orderly means for the producing such events Non-election provideth no means of making men sin and therefore it includeth no intention of God to make men sin though it include a prevision of sinful Events and a Decree to permit them c. 3 The Hypothesis of our Adversaries in granting Predetermination to what is good and Divine Prescience of sinful acts doth as much dispirit and destroy the use of Divine Promisses and Invitations as ours For 1 In that they assert none can performe the condition required and so embrace the evangelic offer made without efficacious predeterminative grace do they not leave al Reprobates under as great an impossibilitie of Believing as we do Are not al offers for want of this predeterminative Grace altogether uselesse to them for whom it never was intended 2 So also as to Gods certain Prescience of their Sins did not God according to their Concessions certainly foreknow that they would never yea never could accept of the offers made to them without predeterminative Grace which he decreed never to give them Hence doth not this certain Prescience infer as natural and absolute impossibilitie as our predeterminative Concurse to the entitative act of Sin This is wel argued by Davenant Animadv p. 242. His Hoard's nibbling at the Synod of Dort and charging them with mantaining a fatal Decree is to little purpose If he cal that fatal which is certain and immutable we are not afraid to affirm that al Gods eternal Decrees are certain and immutable and that very eternal Decree of Reprobation which he imagines to follow upon the foresight of mens final impenitence is as absolute and immutable and in this sense as fatal as that which we defend Thus also p. 332. The Remonstrants we adde also the New Methodists dare not promise Salvation to any persons reprobated according to their decree founded upon the prevision of
must be resolved into the wil of God as their prime cause so that If God wil here is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elsewhere if God concur if he assiste if he by his efficacious predeterminative wil without which we can do nothing concur And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is most evident by the use of this phrase among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans Bensyra that ancient Hebrew Sent. moral xi thus speakes Let man never say he wil do any thing before he hath prefaced this If the Lord wil i. e. assiste or concur not permit So among Pagans Hom. Iliad B. vers 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The like Demosth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil. But none speakes more fully to this point than Plato Alcibiad pag. 135. where Alcibiades demanding How he ought to speak touching Divine efficacious concurse Socrates replies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil and in his Laches But I wil do this and come to thee to morrow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil. Whence it 's evident that this formule of speech was ordinary even among the Heathens as wel as Jews and Christians noting not only a permissive or Directory but Decretory and predeterminative wil. So the same Phrase must be understood Act. 18. 21. If God wil and 1 Cor. 4. 19. If the Lord wil. Is it possible that these Phrases should be understood of a mere permissive wil Do not al mankind need an efficacious concurse and predeterminative wil to conduct them in al their affaires Again 2 Gods permissive wil is either natural or moral it cannot be meant of Gods natural permissive wil because that regardes only sin which there is no mention of in these Textes neither is it necessarily included Neither can it be meant of Gods moral permissive wil because that was already declared and manifest in the Laws of God for al moral permission belongs to Gods Legislative wil declared in his word It remains therefore that this phrase If God wil be understood of Gods efficacious wil whereby al natural motions and so the entitative acts of sin are predetermined § 2. I now descend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demonstrations namely That God doth predefine predetermine and fore-ordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed I shal mention only two Actions The Selling of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord whereof the former was but a Type of the later 1. I shal begin with the Selling of Joseph mentioned Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Joseph saith v. 5. Now therefore be not grieved nor angry with your selves that ye sold me hither for God did send me before you to preservelife Joseph here has a double aspect on his Brothers sin the one regards their hand in the sin which he out of a noble generous principe of fraternal Love passeth by the other regards the special hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin which he admires and adores in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concurse brought so great a good out of so great an evil which no finite power could do men may make good use of what is in it self good but who can bring so great good out of so great evil but a God omniscient and omnipotent 1 Let us remarque their Sin in selling Joseph and of what a black Idea it was 1 It sprang from Hatred yea a deliberate rooted hatred as Gen. 37. 4. They hated him and could not speak peaceably unto him Their hatred was grounded on his fathers love to him Yea 2 There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred as v. 8. Shalt thou indeed reign over us c. whence v. 11. and his brethren envied him c. 3 There was in like manner bloudy Cruelty yea intended Murther in this sin as v. 20 21 22 24. 4 There was also notorious Lying evident in this sin v. 32 33. 5 That this sin was of a very crimson bloudy guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confessions when God began to awaken their Consciences as it is conjectured about fourteen years after Gen. 42. 22. Behold his bloud is required 6 By al which it is most evident that this vendition or selling of Joseph was a sin intrinsecally evil For certainly if a sin of such bloudy Aggravations deserve not the name of intrinsecally evil I know not what sin doth Hence 2 We are to demonstrate that God did predefine and predetermine Josephs Brethren to the entitative act or substrate mater of this Sin And this Province we no way dout but to make good out of the Texte Gen. 45. 5 7 8. compared with other Texts 1 Joseph saith v. 5. 7. God did send me before you to preserve life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sent me forth by his efficacious predeterminative hand which conducted me hither The LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies to send forth with a mighty hand as Captives into Libertie Luke 4. 18. also to send forth with commands autoritie and power Mat. 10. 16. 11. 10. as elsewhere again to send forth executioners Mat. 2. 16. lastly to direct the course of a Ship In al these notions Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse in sending Joseph into Egypt is necessarily included This also appears 2 by what is added v. 5. God did send me before you to preserve life Note here that God certainly and absolutely foresaw the Famine and Josephs being sold into Egypt which he intended to turne for good even for the preservation of Jacobs Familie and the Elect seed in him Now how could God foresee this absolutely and infallibly but in the predefinition or fore ordainment of his own Wil And Strangius grants this that where there is Predefinition there also follows Predetermination Must we not then conclude that this Vendition of Joseph was both predefined and predetermined by God Yea 3 Joseph addes v. 8. So now it was not you that sent me hither but God c. You see here Joseph makes a three-fold mention of Gods over-ruling hand in this their sin and that for their as wel as his good And he tels them plainly that it was not they that sent him but God As if he had said You indeed sent me to be a poor Vassal in Egypt but did not God send me to be a Ruler over Egypt You sent me to destroy me but why did God send me but to preserve both you and me You sent me out of Hatred and Malice but did not God send me out of great Love and pitie both to me and you And what could be spoken more emphatically to illustrate and demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin than this It was not you that sent me hither but God Why doth he use this manner of speech was it not they that sold him Yes but because they were but as mere passive Instruments or Midwifes