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A30630 An essay upon reason, and the nature of spirits by Richard Burthogge ... Burthogge, Richard, 1638?-ca. 1700. 1694 (1694) Wing B6150; ESTC R1885 119,896 286

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evidenced by several considerations An Objection against it removed I Have spoken of words the ordinary but instituted means of Apprehension I am now to speak of Notion the immediate Object some would call it the natural means of Apprehension The word Notion may be considered two ways either as it does signifie more generally and largely or as it is taken in a more restrained special and particular sense A Notion in the general and larger aceptation of the word is any conception formed by the Mind in reference to Objects and so taken is the same with a thought or that in respect of the Mind that a Sentiment largely taken is in respect of the sense I say a Sentiment largely taken for instance when Sentiment is taken in spect of the Visive Power not strictly and properly for light or colour only but largely for any perception that the Eye has by way of sight of things or of their relations and habitudes And since there is so great an Analogy between the Eye and the Understanding and between the Sentiments of the one and of the other it will be an easy inference that no reason can be given why there should be Original Innate Notions in the Understanding as some imagine there must that it may be able to apprehend which will not equally argue that there should be the like original Figures and Images in the Eye which should enable it to see and yet none will Allow of these But to show how lt comes to pass that there are as there are appearances as if the mind had some original innate Notions which for that reason are called Prolepses and Anticipations and withal to bring some light to the business of Apprehension which as to the way of it is obscure enough and but seldom touched to any purpose I will offer an Observation very common but as it may be applied very luciferous in reference to this Subject Every body observes that if a Blow is aimed at the Head of any person he will hold up his Arm to receive it and keep it from his head without thinking either that or why he does so and this is said to be done Naturally and by instinct because in truth it is done without premeditation and so at that time without any actual conceived design And yet again it is certain that an Infant will not do so or any Child before it has been taught and instructed to do it which makes it plain that the doing so in those who are come to reason is no effect of natural instinct but of use only the Child was taught to do it so early that by the time he comes to the Age of Discretion having forgotten or rather having made no observation when it was first taught or first did it and upon what Motives and doing it now without deliberation it hath the aspect of a thing effected by Nature and not of a custom or habit In the same manner in the business of Reason we may and often do proceed upon Principles instilled into us very early and are Acted by them without Knowing how or why it being no Effect of present consideration Experience confirms this since we may be certain if we do but attend to our own Actions that many times we are carried to the Affection or Disaffection of things and the Approbation or Disapprobation of them we Know not why and yet all the passions and Motions of our Mind have Reasons for them for all Effects must have Causes but these sometimes are so early graffed in us and at other times so unawares that we remember not they were so and then the Effects only being observed and the causes lying deep hidden and secret we do call it Nature or Instinct though in truth it be Reason and habit as much as any thing else is Again much the same way we do compute or reckon for when we use any greater numbers either in Addition or in Substraction or in any other Arithmetical operation we do it without any actual consideration of what the lesser particular numbers are that make the greater for that we have done before perhaps long and consequently are possessed of the Ideas may I so express it without the Images of them But at first we had a particular Knowledge As when we Multiply and say Six and Six is Twelve and Twelve and Twelve is Four and Twenty we do it without considering actually at that time that six is so many unites though at first but possibly so long ago that we do not remember it we did so and must do so to Know the particular value of that number and the like is of others And thus also with an easie Application may it be conceived how words come to stand in the mind for things and that when we have the word we think we have the simple Idea of the thing it is just as the Figure 6 doth stand for the number Six And that when once we have had a distinct Idea or Notion of the Number afterward without actual thinking thereof we use the Figure instead of it and that as well or better than if we did distinctly consider the Number it self Now words do carry the same Relation unto things that Figures do unto Numbers and both Words and Figures seem to derive the power which they have of standing in the Mind as Representatives from the connexion they have Figures with Numbers and Words with Things after the same manner as we hold up our Arm or a Stick to save our Head without thinking of saving it For though the Action prevents all actual thought of the End of it yet 't is done for an End in vertue of it its first Direction and Use This Discourse attended to and well digested will open a great light into the way in which the Understanding comes to have Apprehension of things by the means of Words and to form its Ideas and Notions taking Notions largely for any Thoughts or Conceptions But besides the former Sense of the Word Notion there is Another which is more Restrained and Limited in which a Notion is Modus Concipiendi a certain particular manner of conceiving a manner of conceiving things that corresponds not to them but only as they are Objects not as they are Things there being in every Conception some thing that is purely Objective purely Notional in so much that few if any of the Ideas which we have of things are properly Pictures our Conceptions of things no more resembling them in strict Propriety than our Words do our Conceptions for which yet they do stand and with which they have a Kind of Correspondence and Answering just as Figures that do stand for Numbers yet are no wise like them To make this clearer it must be considered that the Eye has no perception of things but under the Appearance of Light and Colours and yet Light and Colours do not really exist in the things themselves that are perceived and seen by means
several Faculties in which the Organ or System of Organs would be the Body the Faculty or System of Faculties the Soul so all of them taken together would be an Entire Body of the Universe Actuated by an Universal Principle as by a Common Soul that should Endow it with those several Powers and Faculties In short why may not the Universe Really be Body and Soul and every Particular Animal as a part thereof be Organ and Faculty in the same sense that in our ordinary Common way of Conceiving every Particular Animal is Body and Soul and the Parts of it Organs and Faculties But to Proceed This is Certain that what in Animals and particularly in a Man we do Commonly call a Faculty is neither that which commonly is called the Soul nor is it meerly the Body or any Part of the Body but a Result some Third thing Arising from them both in Conjunction For the Eye for Example tho' never so well Qualified doth not see unless the Mind or Soul do Attend and again the mind or Soul tho' never so Attentive cannot see unless it has the use of an Eye to see with so that the Power of seeing neither is in the Eye barely nor in the Soul barely but belongs to the Animal which is Soul and Body as arising from the presence of the Soul in such a Particular Part or Organ of the Body And the like is to be said of other Powers And yet if all the Faculties that are united in Man were supposed Separated each from other with their several Organs and so to be in the Nature of wholes and this without the supposal of any Thing else for Example that the Eye could see apart the Ear hear apart and the Tongue taste apart from the Body there would to all Appearance be so many several Animals and Consequently so many several Souls So that what is called a Faculty only while it is in a part is Denominated a Soul in the whole and then where the Body is a Compage or System of Organs the Soul must be a System of Faculties and yet be one still in the same sense as the Body is But here I must expect it shall be told me that the True and commonly Received Notion of a Soul is that it is the Principle of the Faculties called Vital and Animal and not any one of them it self or any System of them All To which I Answer that this is indeed the Popular and Common Notion but how true it is and how much Adjusted to the Nature of the Soul cannot be understood but by making some Distinction in the sense of word Soul The word Soul may be taken Two ways the one of which I will call the Philosophical the other the Popular sense of the Word First then word Soul may be taken Philosophically as a Name of all the Causes together that are necessary for the Producing of Vital and Animal Actions in the several Species of Animals and so tho' it is commonly considered as if it were some Substantial thing that Differ'd from them All yet indeed it is nothing but a Modification of their Action as they are All in Conjunction And Dicearchus who Affirmed there was no such thing as a Soul if he meant but thus was very Excusable for in this sense a Soul is nothing but a Result that is a Mode of Conceiving for this I mean by Result of all the Causes that must be Joyned for Animal or Vital Actions as they do either Qualifie or else Aid each others Influence And in this sense as a Soul in respect of the Action of a Particular Organ may be called a Faculty so in respect of the whole Body a Soul is a System of Faculties Thus Life in Animals arises from the Concurrence of many things which things therefore in that Concurrence as they are the Prince of Life so they may be called the Soul for by Soul is meant nothing but the Principle of that we call the Life if one of these is wanting that are necessary the Life ceases and we say the Soul is gone but then again supposing all the other Requisites Remaining as they ought to be and Ready to do their Parts if that one which was wanting is Restored there is again a Concurrence of all the Causes Requisite to Life and so with the Life the Soul is said to Return or come again For Example there is in Snakes in Dormice in Swallows and in other Dormitive Creatures of that kind and if we shall believe Guagninus apud Schottum Phys Curios l. 1. part 2. C. 38. § 4. in some Men too for so he says of the Inhabitants of Lucomoria a certain Country of Russia that there is an Actual Suspension of the Exercise of Life in all the Species of it during Winter while their Spirits lie Congealed and un-active so that tho' all the Organs of those Animals in other Respects are duly Qualified and Disposed yet there being not for that season sufficient Heat Imparted to them from the Sun to put their Spirits in Motion These like Mercury while Cold are wholly un active and so for several Months there is a Cessation of Life for Life is a Sort of Action in all the sensible Instances of it But then again on the other side nothing being wanting but a due Heat as unto Mercury to put it in Actual Motion as soon as the Sun Returns and with its warmth Communicates that Motion that is Requisite to the Spirits and other Parts for the Invigorating and the stirring of them there Results that Action or Exercise of Organs which we call Life and which in many Places of Holy Scripture is called the Soul tho' commonly we call the Soul the Principle not the Exercise of Life but then by a Principle we must mean the Concourse of all the Requisite Causes and so the Soul in Effect will be but a Faculty or rather a System of Faculties And so much for the Philosophical Sense of the Word Soul But besides the Former there is Another meaning of the word Soul which I call the Popular because it is the most usual and that is when it is Taken not for all the Causes together or the Result of them as in the Former but for the Principal and Chief Cause of Animal and Vital Actions which in the Holy Scriptures is called the Spirit who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth Upward or the Spirit of a Beast that goeth Downward And so when a Person dies he is said to to give up his Spirit to Give up the Ghost And thus a Soul may be Conceived a System of very subtle Refined Matter such as Light but in some more in others less Refined that gives the last Disposition to a Body and its Organs for the receiveing of Vital Cogitative Influence from the Original Mind it is the Texture and Qualification of the Body and the Organs that compose it that is the Ligament and Bond
of union between this subtle Matter or Spirit and That but it is the Subtle Matter or Spirit that is the Vinculum or Bond of Union between the Body and the Original Mind In this way of Conceiving This System of Subtle Matter while it is in the Body tho' it is called a Spirit because of its subtlety in truth may be but a Soul that is a Means only of Conveying the Vital Influence into the Body from the Original Mind but then again out of the Body as the System of it may be it may become a Spirit properly so called it being then no longer a Part as a Soul must be which is only a Mediate Subject but a whole and so a Terminative Subject of the Influence of the Original Mind in short it becomes a Suppositum or Subsistent by it self That the Soul is but a Mediate Subject while it is in the Body and not a Terminative so that properly the Animal which is Soul and Body and not the Soul only is Agent in all that Passes seems Probable in that all the Ordinary Actions of the Man that commonly are said to be the Souls are plainly Organical nothing can be Instanced in as Proceeding from the Soul while it is in the Body that is not properly Animal even Intellection it self is not an Action only of the Soul or Anima but as the Latins would Express it an Action of the Animus or Understanding which is to be Conceived as an Animal and Organical Faculty that is as a thing arising Principally but not only from the Soul for so does Cotta Distinguish apud Cicerol 3. de nat Deor. when he says Probabilius videtur tale quiddam esse Animum ut sit ex Igne atque Anima temperatum It is true the Ordinary way of Conceiving is much otherwise for the Soul is Considered by the Most as if it were an Angel or Spirit that only dwelt in the Body as in a House and thus the Soul is the man the Body but as a Tabernacle or a Garment to it nor is this a meer Platonical Notion it is Conformable to the way of speaking in the Holy Scriptures as where St. Paul says I Desire to be Dissolved and to be with Christ Also where he tells the Corinthians we know if our Earthly House of this Tabernacle were Dissolved c. And for certain if the Theory of the Pre-existence of Souls is a True one this Opinion is beyond dispute However I will not Determine in this matter since the Language of the Scripture is often Adapted but to the Conceptions of the Vulgar and therefore cannot be the Standard of Philosophical Truth and it is certain that even in our Saviours time a many Pythagorean and Platonical Doctrines and this in particular of the Pre-existence of Souls and the Souls being the Man had obtained to be Vulgar among the Jews As appears by that Question of the Disciples which they put to our Lord was this Man Born Blind for his own or for his Parents sin for it supposes that the Man might sin and therefore also supposes that he was before he was Born for he could not Sin if he was not in Being Besides the Genesis or way of Generation of Animals seems to Favour the former opinion more than the latter for in the latter Opinion the Soul is conceived as an Assistant rather than an Informing Form and so rather as an Animal than as a Part of one which doth not so well consist with the Method of Generation In fine the Distinction between Souls and Abstract Spirits as to their Natures cannot be set out with that Distinctness and clearness in the Latter as in the Former Opinion But Take it either way if we Distinguish Soul and Faculties and do hold that Animal Actions are the Effects of Faculties but that the Soul is the Principal cause of those Faculties why may it not be Affirmed as I Hinted before that the Mosaical Spirit is unto all the Bodies in the Universe those of Invinsible as well as of Visible Animals what the Soul Conceived of after this manner is in our selves unto ours So that All particular Animals in respect of the Universe should be but as the several Organs in any Particular Animal and then Particular Souls should be but as so many Portions of the subtle Matter through which and by means of which the Mosaical Spirit as a Soul of the Universe should Radiate into the several Bodies and give them their Faculties In short we may conceive particular Souls as so many Animi for now I Distinguish as Cotta do's between Animus and Anima and that the Anima that is the Sourse of All these Animi is but one throughout the Universe Why may not this be so And if it may it must since then the being of Subordinate Anima other than Animi would be superfluous and unnecessary and Beings are not to be Multiplied but on Necessity Besides there is Reason to think there is but one Soul Diffus'd throughout the Universe if it be Allowable to make the same Judgment in Reference to the whole that upon good Considerations may be Framed of the Parts which come Distinctly within our View For in this Terrestrial World as to the several Regions of it the Animal the Vegetable and the Mineral it is as certain that all had but one Plastic as that the Body of a Man or any other particular Animal had not more The Evidence is the same for Both. There is a sensible Analogy and Correspondence in Fabric and Conformation not only between the several Species of Animals which is very manifest in Comparative Anatomy but also in a good degree between Plants and Animals and Minerals and Plants Again there is a like Connexion between the Beings that fill those several Regions as there is between the Parts that compose particular Animals There are no Vacuities or Gaps in Nature in respect of Species no Jumps or Leaps but all in orderly Gradation Extreams are Knit and United by Participles that partake of Both and all is full without any Chasms Thus to touch it in an Example Minerals and Vegetables are Joyned by Lithodendra or Stone-Plants such as Coral and the like Vegetables and Animals by Zoophytes or Plantanimals such as the sensible Plant the Scythian Lamb and the like And in the General Kinds of Animals between Fowls and Beasts the Bat between Fishes and Fowls the Flying Fish between Terrestrial and Aquatic Animals those that are called Amphibious are Middle Uniting Species c. Farther there is a Conformity in their Origination as well as in their Structure and Fabrick for Plants as well as Animals are Produced by Semination and even Minerals and Mettals have their Matrices and tho' they have not what is properly called Seed they have something that is Analogous in their Production In fine the Transmutation of things and the Easie Transition of them from one Region unto Another evinces it The Transmutation
as another their Grounds and Foundations in the things that are external to our Faculties both are equally Real and yet every one that considers must Acknowledge that they are of very different natures and that Bowedness is Not in all respects of the same sort of Appearance that Green is as to its General Nature The differences that are in such Appearances depend upon the differences that are in their Grounds and therefore must be accounted for from these Some Appearances there are that do Arise from sensation for I will begin with those of sense when it is made with all the Conditions and Circumstances that are Requisite to make it Right and these I call Connatural Appearances such as the Greens in Grass or in an Emerauld But there are others that arise from sensation when it is not made with all the Conditions and Circumstances that are requisite to its being right and natural as when Vision is made thro' a double Medium a thicker and a thinner and these Appearances I call Preternatural of which sort is that of Bowedness in the Oar or Staff These Appearances I call the former Connatural the latter Preternatural not in reference to Nature as it is taken for the complex of all or any Causes for in relation to their proper Causes all Effects are equally natural but as Nature is taken in a more restrained special sense of which more hereafter for a certain particular order of Causes and Effects As for the Colours in a Rainbow those of a Pigeons neck and others of like nature tho' they are commonly call'd Apparent and Emphatical and by that Denomination distinguished in School Philosophy from those that are Real and Existent yet I think not fit to make another Classis for them For those fugitive changeable Colours tho' they are not so fix'd and permanent as others are yet they are as Real and as Connatural as they the fugitive waving Colours of Changeable Taffata and those of standing Corn while Green Agitated and waved by the wind are equally as real and Connatural as the certain fixed Colour in Scarlet Cloth or in Purple Only tho' all these Colours are equally Real as having causes of their Appearance that are equally real and all equally Connatural because All alike are Results of sensations duly made with all their requisite Circumstances yet since their Causes are not equally permanent and fixed but some are more some less it follows that some of these Colours are more abiding and permanent and some but Transient and Fugitive for all Effects must be as their Causes Are. But to return What I have said concerning Real Cogitables of Sense as to their Distribution may likewise be said of those of the Understanding that some are Connatural some Preternatural Those I call Connatural that result in the Understanding when it has all the requisite Conditions and Circumstances and these Preternatural that arise from the working of the Understanding when it wants at least some of the Requisite Conditions and Circumstances particularly when it is Prejudiced or not well Ballasted with Observations and Experiments made by sense In a word there are Visa animi as well as Visa sensus and some of them Connatural some Preternatural of the former every one that is well weighed and well Grounded is an Example and for the latter we have as many Examples as there are ungrounded and senseless distinctions and Notions of which the Schoolmen afford us but too many in their Substantial Forms Inherent Accidents c. Real Cogitables Reductive are such as come from Causes that are Causes only and not Objects as well as Causes of the Act of Cogitation which immediately produces them And these as well as those that are proper are either of the External sense or of the Imagination or of the Reason and Understanding Since whatever is an Effect of Cogitation and withal arises from an external Cause that is but a Cause and not also an Object of that Act is a Real Cogitable Reductive and not a Fiction only of the mind and there may be such in the sense and Imagination as well as in the Understanding and Reason Before I give any Instances of Real Cogitables Reductive it may be necessary that I shou'd explain the meaning of a Term that I have used to wit External Cause by which I understand whatever is without the Faculty and forreign to it tho' in other respects it may be internal as being within the Agent To be plain whatever the Understanding the Imagination or any of the external Senses conceive by means of any Impressions even of Causes within the Agent if they act without its will is intended by me to come from an external Cause and these Objective Conceptions if they come from Causes that are not also Objects I call Real Cogitables Reductive In this Classis of Beings I do reckon Dreams not only Divine if any such there be and Angelical Dreams Dreams that are the effects of Divine or of Angelical Impression but also ordinary Dreams as also the Visions of the Feaverish the Melancholly and the Hysterical And here likewise I reckon that Appearances in our ears of the Ringing of Bells which is only made by Agitation of the Internal Air as also those Sparkles as of Fire that do appear to the eye upon a smart percussion or shaking of the Fibres of the Optick Nerves either by a vehement Agitation of the spirits within or a violent Stroke or a strong Frication of the eye from without SECT II. Of meer Cogitables or Fictions What a Fiction is That all Fictions are Creatures either of the Mind or of the Internal Sense None made by the External Senses The Reason of it Two Philosophical Doctrines observed one concerning meer Cogitables the other about Real Cogitables Reductive Why the Representations of things in Prophetical Dreams are always made as if they were present ALL that I have said already relates to things that are in our Faculties by virtue of impressions made upon them from External Causes which Causes are either Causes and also Objects or Causes only and not Objects there are others that do arise in us from the working of our Faculties of themselves without any grounds for it in any thing that is external either as a Cause or as an Object and these I call meer Cogitables or Fictions such as an Hirco-cervus or a Chimaera a Golden Mountain and the like Fictions are all forged either by the Mind and Understanding or by the Imagination and internal Sense there are none in the external the Eye the Ear or the like and the Reason is evident for Fictions are voluntary things things that have always something of the Will in them and therefore cannot be created by any Faculty but That which is under the Empire of the Will which the External Senses are not but the other Powers are For though we may think and also imagine what we will we cannot See or Hear or
of Earthly and Aqueous Bodies into Vegetables is so Obvious as I need not to Instance That of Vegetables into Animal Concretes is as certain tho' not so Obvious and Usual The Animation of Horse-hairs that fall into Pools in the Summer time may be an Example but those are more Adequate that are Given in the Generation of Barnacles and in the Animation of the Branches of certain Trees I Vouch not these Instances upon uncertain Report tho' some will believe it no other but on the credit of a Person Grave and Unsuspected I mean the Excellent Schottus who in his Physica Curiosa l. 1. C. 20. among other Examples very pertinent to this purpose relates those I have mentioned on his own Knowledge Pili says he è caudis equorum in aquam pluviam fossis ac scrobibus exceptam decidentes Animantur in graciles ac Longos vermes instar Serpentum convertuntur ut ipsemet non semel vidi Aves Anatum formà ex Ramis Arborum deciduis intra aquas in Scotià Hebridibus Insulis nasci testantur multi Scriptores Ipsemet vidi Ramorum extremitates paulatim animà sensitiva Informatas decidisso Avolasse Now so much Uniformity even in difformity such Connexion and so Easie Transition from one Region into Another cannot be conceived to be in the World without conceiving at the same time that as it had but one Author or common Plastic at first so still it has but one Principle that hath the ordering the Disposing the Framing and Actuating of it in all its Parts But to make it more Conceivable that all Particular Beings may be Animated by but One and yet being such Diversity as they are let us consider that Glorious thing we call Light which as it Proceeds and Issues from the Sun is of one Nature but meeting with divers Objects and Receiving Different Modifications according to those of the Objects it meets with is varied into a Thousand Colours of Different Natures from the Light as well as one from Another And it is even thus with the Vital Energy or Light that flows from God the Intellectual Sun and Father of Spirits for This tho' as it Proceeds and flows from him it is but of one Nature yet according to the Bodies it meets with it becomes Diversified and Varied into a Thousand shall I say or rather into Infinite Faculties and Powers that in their particular Natures are as Different from the Original Vital Energy it self taken in it self as All are one from Another In short the first Subject of Vital Energy is the Mosaical Spirit but This as it is Received in Bodies of several Fabricks Dispositions and Textures as well in Visible as in Invisible Animals become Diversified into several Powers and Faculties or which is the same in Effect becomes in Each a Principle of Actions that Differ one from Another as much as the Bodies do that Invest it and as the Motions that by means of those Bodies do Affect and Modifie it Modifications of the Cogitative Faculties or of the Immediate Principle that makes the Being Cogitative are called Ideas or Images and are the same unto the Mind in the Sense and the Understanding that Sensible Species as they commonly are called are unto the Light in the Air for as These are nothing but Modification of the Light so Those are of the Mind SECT II. Several Objections against the Former Hypothesis considered First that it makes Souls to be Faculties or Powers whereas indeed they are Actions or Acts. This Objection Answered and the notion of the Souls being a Principle and Faculty rather than an Action cleared The Second Objection that in this Hypothesis the Deity is considered as an Immanent and not what he is as a Transient cause of all things Removed and how he is both the one and the other shewed and Confirmed by the Authority of St. Austin and other Christian Fathers as well as of the Chiefest Philosophers The Third Objection that hereby God and Nature are Confounded Answered by shewing how God and Nature are Distinguished in this Hypothesis The Last and strongest Objection that if there were but one Original Perceptive Principle throughout the Universe all Animals would have the same Perceptions which they have not This Objection Removed and the Reason of Different Perceptions in Different Animals cleared THO' I have Endeavoured to Anticipate Objections in the Discourse that I have made all along as I made it yet to give them a farther clearing and thereby elucidate more fully the Hypothesis that I Espouse this Section shall be Employed in proposing in express Terms such Objections as do lye against it and in giving them the necessary Answers The First Objection against this Hypothesis is that it speaks of Souls as of Faculties or Powers and not as of things that are Essentially Active whereas a Soul is a Knowledge a Cogitation or at least a thing that is always Busie and Doing insomuch that even in sleep it does not all Rest but that Men do always Dream when they sleep tho' perhaps they are not always sensible that they do I know not how truly it is said that the Soul is always Busie and that Men do always Dream when they sleep but I could wish they did only Dream at that Time for then we should not be Troubled with so many Groundless Fantastick Opinions But to come nearer the Matter I know a person who Affirms that to his Knowledge he never Dreamt in his whole Life and certainly since we are always Conscious that we Dream when ever we do we ought to believe we have not Dreamed at all when we are not sensible we have Besides how do they know that the Soul is always Doing for my part I am much mistaken if I do not Experience in my self what I think any other may that I am able to suspend all Thought or as we commonly Express it think of nothing To be sure every one who hath made the Least Reflexion must needs know that as we have Eyes and Ears and other sensitive Organs and so do see and hear and are Conscious of other Sentiments in Case our Eyes and Ears and those other Organs which we have are Impressed by External Objects so ordinarily we do neither see nor Hear or are Conscious of any other sentiment of any External Objects if these do not Affect our Organs without the presence of Objects we are only said to have the Faculties or Powers that is we are said only to be Able to see to Hear c. but upon the presence of Objects and the Application of our Faculties or Powers we are said to have the Exercise of them and actually to See and Hear c. Thus it is in the External Sense Now since the Mind or Understanding is an Organical thing as well as the External sense I see no Reason to think but that as there is no Actual Sensation but when the Organs of the sense are stirred so
more plainly since Faculties and Principles are notions rather than things and some will be apt enough without considering their grounds to regard them only as meer notions I shall therefore set out the difference that is between them in more Real Expressions by saying that the Influence of God or his active presence in things by means of the Mosaical Spirit is as Light and that Nature the System of all the Powers in the Universe is as a Complex of all Colours so that as Colour is the Modification of Light and Light the essence of Colour so particular Powers and Actions that are but Powers in act are Modifications of the Divine Energy and the Divine Energy the substance both of the Act and the Power and thus the influence of the first and second Causes differ as Motion and Modification of Motion the Motion arises from the first the Modification from the second Cause either as it is an Organ or as an Object and so too the Aberrations of Nature in Monsters and in other instances are accounted for either by the ill Texture of the Organs the over-whelming of matter or by some other vitiosity and defect in the second Causes without any impeachment of the first As the scriblings of a bad mishaping Pen are not imputed to the hand that guides it which perhaps may be skilful enough but to the Instrument that depraves the motion and this tho' the Motion comes from the Writer In fine I do not see any reason why vital Energy may not be Imparted and Communicated as well as Local which our sense evinces to be so one Body that is in motion striking another that is not thereby Communicates its Motion to it and thus a Cogitative vital Energy may come from God and being diffused as Light is throughout the Universe may be catched by agreeable Organs and Modified by Objects in the way that I have shewed before I only hint this by way of Anticipation to such as will inquire whether this Cogitative vital Energy diffus'd throughout the World be God himself or no or what it is for there I stick and call in the assistance and united force of greater understandings mine beginning to be dazled with the lustre or the subtilty of the Object as yet I take it to be the Mosaical Spirit So much for this Objection The last I shall propose is the Herculean one that is insisted upon by many Great and very Judicious Men which is that if there is but one Original Perceptive throughout the Universe all Animals would have the same Perceptions so that what is known by one could be ignored by none ay the same sentiments the same Resentments the same Pains the same pleasures that are in any one would be in every one and there could be no Numerication no individuation of Spirits or Souls because no separate particular Perceptions But this Objection as it is greater in appearance than in reality so it can have little effect if we consider that it does equally destroy the diversity of Perceptions in the several Organs and Parts of one Animal which yet our own Experience attests unto as that of the perceptions of several Animals in the Universe since as there is but one Original Perceptive throughout the Universe in the proposed Opinion so in the common there is but one in every Animal and yet tho' the Soul is but one the Faculties are many and the exercises of them several For if but one Eye is inflamed the sense of Pain is not in both and when but one Arm or one Hand is wounded the smart thereof is only in one ay the pains and ailments of the Superior Parts are not felt in the Inferior nor the sufferances of these in those so that though the Animal it self may be said to have the Perception of all those of its several parts yet these cannot be truly said to have one anothers I acknowledge that as the Soul may be said to have a common sense of all perceptions but the several Members each to have but a private sense for it self so answerably tho' the Original Perceptive is sensible of all and needs must for he that made the Eye must needs see and he that planted the Ear must needs hear and he that gave an heart unto man must needs understand yet Particular Percipients particular Animals as so many particular Organs must have but their share one Animal can no more pretend to have the perceptions of another tho' the Original perceptive is the same in both and is conscious to the perceptions of both than in the same Animal the Eye can pretend to Hear or the Ear to See or either of them to Smell Hence it is evident that the Individuation and Numerication of Perceptions and consequently of Perceptive Powers arises from the Bodies or Organs by means of which such perceptions are made for where the Bodies are separated or the Organs distinct there the Perceptions made in those Bodies and by means of such Organs are likewise so In short as I hinted before perceptions and perceptive powers are individuated by Bodies in the same ways as Images are by Looking-Glasses or Eccho's by the contrivance of Objects But to demonstrate it in Experience as well as by discourse I will add a History or two of Monsters that will do it plainly The first shall be out of Trivet and in his own Terms as I read them in an Ancient Manuscript who reports the Accident just as Sigebert also does in his Chronicle add An. 396. ' In the time of this Valentinian says he but it should be as others say in the time of Theodosius at the Town of Emaus in Jewry there was a Child bore the which from the Navel upward had double Body that is to say double Breast and double Head and proper feeling of all parts and sometimes the one sleepeth and eateth and drinketh when the other doth nought and otherwise they eat and drink and sleeep together and sometimes they weep and smile together and sometimes strived and chid together and when they were almost of two year Age the one of them died four days before the other Schenckius the Son Reports another but resembling story and with more Particularity and Circumstance and Consequently more to our purpose out of Buchanan his Scottish History Monstrum novi generis says he in Scotiâ natum est inferiore quidem corporis parte specie Maris nec quicquam à communi hominum formâ discrepans Umbilicum vero supra trunco corporis ac reliquis omnibus membris geminis ad usum atque speciem discretis id Rex diligenter Educandum erudiendum curavit ac maxime in musicis quâ in re mirabiliter profecit quin varias Linguas edidicit variis voluntatibus due Corpora secum discordìa dissentiebant ac interim Litigabant cum aliud alii placeret interim veluti in communi consultabant Illud etiam in eo memorabile fuit