himselfe by naturall instinct that which artificiall Logike doth prescribe in her seuerall rules and constitutions Artificiall Logike then is the polyshing of natural wit as discouering the validitie of euerie reason bée it necessary wherof cometh science or contingent whence procéedeth opinion Although I knowe there is a great controuersie and contention among the auncient Philosophers concerning these two whilest some of them mayntayne onely Science some others holde with opinion onely Heraclitus called opinion the falling sicknesse for that thereby men many times fell headlong into diuers delusions and erronious conceiptes So in like maner the Stoikes held this for one of their Paradoxes that Sapiens nihil opinatur a wise man is not opinatiue a wise man neuer iudgeth according to opinion On the other side Anaxarchus was of this opinion that all mans iudgment was but opinion and that his vnderstanding coulde perfitly vnderstand nothing which the Pyrrhonians taught after him and the new Academikes and a man may coniecture that Plato and Aristotle sometimes inclyned that way for Plato in his booke called Timaeus ascribeth truth to God and Gods children leauing nothing but truelike to mortall men and Aristotle in the second of his Metaphisikes compareth mans vnderstanding in respect of perfect knowledge of trueth to the dazeling eyes of a Batt in the broade day light But yet notwithstanding these forealledged places both Plato and Aristotle haue elsewhere euidently declared that man is capable both of Science and certayne Knowledge as in thinges contayned in Arts and also of opinion as in infinit affaires which are dayly incident and this was long before their tyme elegantly put downe by the famous Poet and Logician Parmenides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oportet verò te omnia nosse Tùm veritatis suasufacilis sententiam Tùm verò mortalium opiniones quarum non amplius fidâ—…s vera Because of these two kinds of conceiptes Aristotle wouldâ—… néedes make two Logikes the one for Science the other for Opinion wherein if so it may be sayde of so great a Philosopher it séemeth hée was but an Opinator For although among thinges conceaued and knowne some bée necessary and vnfallible some doubtfull and contingent yet the Arte of Knowing and Reasoning of the same I meane Logike is only one and the same as the sight of the eye in perceyuing all colours bée they chaungeable or not chaungeable And aswell might a man say there must be two arts of Grammer if Grammer bée a distinct Art one for courtly spéeche an other for country talke or two distinct arts of making of cups one for golden cuppes an other for cuppes of siluer as two Logikes one for vnfallible Argumentes and another for Contingent Therefore one Logike suffiseth to dispute of all thinges necessary or contingent whatsoeuer Yet this one Logike her selfe in respect of her preceptes is alway necessary and neuer contingent for otherwise it were no Art but the application of it may bée in contingent causes aswell as necessary Two partes of Logike The Stoicall diuision of Logike into Inuention and Iudgement although both Aristotle himselfe séeme to commend it in some places as in 8. Topi. 3 Rhet and Tully and Quintilian doo altogether obserue it is yet reprehended of some who thinke that Iudgement is not any seuerall part of Logike but rather an adiâ—…ct or propertie generally incident to the whole Art because say they there is vse of iudgement euen in inuention But in my fancie they might better haue founde some fault with these wordes Iudgement and Inuention then reprehended the distribution which is most true if they consider what the Stoikes did vnderstand by these woordes For by the first part called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they intend the explication of the diuers kindes natures affections relations and proprieties of seuerall argumentes which because it helpeth inuention is called Inuention as I sayd before although indéede a man shall no more finde argumentes by this first part â—…f Logike then hée shall get Latine woords by Etymologie the first part of Grammer which made me alter the woords as not proper but rather borowed from the Mathematikes where two or thrée numbers being receiued or put downe a third or fourth number proportionable is found out which of them is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Inuention And by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Iudicium Iudgement is meant nothing els but a Disposition ordering or placing and setling of these seuerall argumentes alreadie inuented to the intent that a man may the better iudge of them so that here Iudgement is taken for Disposition the effect for the cause for Iudgement ariseth of the ordering and disposing of arguments They might therefore haue chaunged the woordes and kept the thing which yet they haue not done but brought in new diuisions of Logike correspondent to the setling and placing of Aristotles Logicall discourses in his booke called Organon sometimes into thrée partes as Apodicticall Topicall Elenchticall sometimes into two by name Apodicticall and Dialecticall Topicall or Dialecticall they will haue to bée a seuerall kinde of Logike by probable argumentes Apodicticall that which disputeth by necessary conclusions as though there were not one and the same Art Science and order of reasoning both by probable and necessary argumentes as I sayde before and the selfe same places of argumentes both in the one and in the other as causes effectes subiectes adiuncts c. both contingent and necessary For as for that third kinde of Logike which they call Elenchticall séeing it is no Logike at all but rather the abuse and peruersion of Logike I sée no cause why it shoulde be taught in Logike yet if any man thinke that the true preceptes of Logike once knowne will not be sufficient to desâ—…ry the falsenesse of sophisticall argumentations he may for his contentation séeke for a full discourse thereof out of some commentarie and not ouercharge the Art it selfe with vnnecessary institutions I graunt there is something profitable in the Elenches as also in some other tractates of the same kind but if wée shall put downe all in Logike for true Logike which doth in any respect helpe Logike wée shall neuer make an ende of Logike Exposition is the first part As in Grammer Aetymologie concerneth seuerall woords and Syntaxis the due coherence of the same so Exposition the first part of Logike declareth the particular affection and nature of euery seuerall argument and Disposition the second part by ordering and setling the same causeth iudgement and vnderstanding And as seuerall woords bée in respect of Grammer so seuered reasons in respect of Logike and as of many woords is made spéech so of diuers arguments arise axioms Exposition and Disposition are not two seuerall arts of Logike as though wée should haue one Logike to expound the natures of seuerall arguments and another to iudge of the same by Disposition but they bée two essentiall parts of the whole
Iudgement but onely such rules and precepts as teach to make order and frame axioms For otherwise euery precept of euery art because it is an axiome should bée taken for a part of Iudgement in Logike whereas indéed they bée but the fruites and examples of that Logicall iudgement appéering in the orderly constitution of euery art And so in Inuention euery rule is an axiome euery rule doth iudge but euery rule teacheth not how to frame an axiome euery rule sheweth not how to iudge which onely is the peculiar duetie of Logicall iudgement The art and doctrine of euery argument is distinct firme constant and immutable yet the affection of arguments may bée altered changed and diuersly considered either in the same things diuersly compared among themselues or in one thing referred to diuers as in those examples put downe by Beurhusius and Talaeus God Created man So the affectioÌ„ is of the Cause procreant with the effect Preserueth man Cause conseruant with the effect Is not man Disparats among theÌ„selues Is not like man Unlikes among themselues Where the things be as they were I meane God and Man which are héere compared togither yet the diuers kinds of relations and respectes make the selfe same thinges haue diuers names and titles according to their seuerall and diuers affections In like manner also it is if one thing be referred to many and drawne as it were through the places of arguments although some arguments bée not incident to some things As Man referred vnto God his maker hath the affection of Effect procreated Body his matter Effect materiall Reason his forme Effect formed Gods glory his end Effect finall Actions his effects Cause Body his part Whole World his whole Part. Liuing creature general Speciall Paule speciall Generall Earth subiect Adiunct Riches adiuncts Subiect Trée his disparate Disparate Beast contrary Contrary Homo ab humo the notation Name interpreted Reasonable liuing The thing defined Creature definition  Angell equall Equall Blub like Like Yet the art is certeine and immutable for that which is a cause can neuer bée an effect in the same respect and relation which relation chaunging altereth the argument not the art An Argument Euery thing hath his seuerall name according to his naturall proprietie or by the imposition and fancie of man but Logike respecting a second vse in these seuerall thinges hath giuen them an artificiall and secondary name As fire hath this his name vsually knowne but because it is sometimes considered of Logicians as a cause of heate therefore hath it his second note and name and is called a Cause one of the arguments for that it argueth heate as his effect and so in others And by this affection wée learne whether one argument agrée or disagrée with another and how it agréeth whether as a cause with his effect which is an absolute and full agréement or as an adiunct with his subiect which is but an agréement in part and after a certeine manner and so of the rest So that argumentes bée nothing els but singularum rerum affectiones extra collocationem consideratae quibus ad arguendum sunt affectae comparatae sed vt Grammatica non voces non vocum significationes sed vocum affectiones sic Logica non res non rerum naturas sed rerum inter se habitudines explicat Itaque omnia argumenta sunt relata sed quia istae relationes variae sunt itaque varia sunt argumentorum genera This affection of argumentes is by Hottoman expounded in this manner Affectio ista est ratio quam quaeque res habet ad alteraÌ„ Graeci 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appellant itaque commodius rationem appellare possemus sed vitandae ambiguitatis causa nomen affectionis delegimus quo eodem Cicero in topicis in ê‘artitionibus hac eadem in re est vsus Rationis auteÌ„ verbuÌ„ á Mathematicis sumptum est qui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 definiunt duarum eiusdem generis quantitatum comparationem interpretes proportionem Latinè nominarunt quidam habitudinem nonnulli habitum qui commodius respectum barbari fortasse correspondentiam appellarent Huius vis ac facultas ea est vt declaret quaenam rei cuiusque cum altera ratio sit quemadmodum inuicem affectae sint quomodò se inter se habeant qualis inter ipsas comparatio aut affectio sit sitne pars an totuÌ„ genus an species consentanea an dissentanea c. To argue To argue is generall either in inuenting onely one argument by the affection of the other as when by the notion of the cause we séeke the effect or els in placing them axiomatically syllogistically or methodically wée argue some other thing either by explication or confirmation The first consideration is of arguments seuerally conceaued and alone by themselues the second as they bée placed by disposition and therfore Piscators animaduersion in this place is to small purpose whereas hée reprehendeth Ramus for saying that euery seuerall thing considered alone is an argument For he in so saying meaned not that an argument should bée so alone as though it had no affection or relation to any other thing but so seuerally considered as that in Inuention we should not intermeddle with axiomaticall syllogisticall or methodicall conioining and setting together of the same seuerall arguments for that dooth wholy and only belong to Disposition Any seuerall conceipt Except those woordes which doo but bind and knit together the parts of spéech as coniunctions which signifie no seueral and distinct thing in nature Except againe copious and Rhetoricall phrases where many woordes expresse but one thing as A man of an excellent and heauenly wit where the woords be many the arguments but two that is the subiect and the adiunct Lastly except full comparisons diuisions definitions and descriptions where the argument is put downe in a whole proposition This is Beurhusius exception although to small purpose for Ramus saith not all such woordes as are alone but all such reasons conceipts and thinges as are alone and by themselues conceaued seuerally as these arguments bée which hée héere excepteth for though there bée many woordes yet they all expresse but one conceipt of reason and that is this single and sole argument which wée héere talke of But to let that passe hée that taketh this woord Argument onely for a proofe or confirmation deceaueth himselfe and bereaueth Logike of halfe hir dignitie Indéede it is vsually taken for that thing onely which dooth prooue and confirme but héere it hath a more generall signification and betokeneth not onely confirmations but also declarations without any syllogisme or forme of concluding and so doth arguere in Latine signifie declarare ostendere perspicuum manifestumque facere vt in Virgilio Degeneres animos timor arguit id est ostendit Yet neuerthelesse the same kinde of argument may commonly serue both to declare and to confirme although some there bée which onely declare so in the end
veste Dianam Praedafuit canibus non minus ille suis. Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est nec veniam laeso numine casus habet In like maner Tully reporteth in his thirde booke de natura deorum what good fortune befell Iason Phaereus who hauing an impostume as hée thought incurable went to fight with purpose to dye but with a wound his impostume was opened a thing which neyther himselfe nor his phisitians euer imagined Héere then was fortune on eyther side in Iason that was wounded and in him that gaue him the wound good in the first bad in the second For the enemies weapon was by fortune a cause of Iasons vnexpected health whereas death was desired of the one and intended by the other for he that gaue the stroake thought rather to make a new wound than cure an olde disease This is fortune with Aristotle Nowe on the other side if a thrée-footed stoole should fall from aloft and yet in falling stand on his féete this with him is chaunce for the stoole fell for no such ende and it is a thing altogether sencelesse Epicurus said that the world was made by the casual concourse and mixture of litle round indiuisible bodies like moates in the funne whose ridiculous blasphemy Tully mocketh not without deserued cause 2. de nat deorum for so if a man shoulde by chaunce cast abroad an hundred thousand or more of characters or Printers stampes hée might as well reade on the ground all saint Austins woorkes or Cowpers dictionary by the casuall scattering of A. B. C. These bée examples of chaunce with Aristotle not of fortune But it is folly tâ—… stand vpon this nice and friuolous distinction of Chaunce and Fortune sith in common spéech they be taken all as one and so they bée héere to bée vnderstoode In this kinde of cause ignorance and vnwitting simplicitie haue place as I sayd before whereof come excuses and supplications when a man pleadeth ignorance and therefore hopeth to finde pardon as Tully for Ligarius Ignosce pater errauit lapsus est non putauit si vnquam posthac And againe Erraui temerè feci ad clementiam tuam confugio delicti veniam peto vt ignoscasoro But indéede this name of Fortune Chaunce Hap or Hazard was onely inuented by such as knewe not the first cause Gods prouidence And therefore when any thing fell out contrary to theyr expectation whereof they neyther vnderstoode the cause nor could yéeld any reason they said it came by chaunce fortune and hazarde Wherevpon Fortune was made a goddesse of good luck and many christians vse these prophane tearmes God send mée good lucke and good fortune Whose idle prayers bée noted by an Ethnike Poet. Nullum numen abest si sit prudentia sed te Nos facimus fortuna deam caeloque locamus Aristotle calleth Fortune 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 improuidum incertum dubium humano iudicio ambiguum and yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vt diuinum quiddam beatum Canons incident to causes generally God onely is the first and principall cause of all thinges All other causes whatsoeuer are secondary and subiect so his eternall direction Nothing is without a cause If all the causes concurre the effect will followe To whatsoeuer thing you ascribe the cause or deny the cause to the same you attribute or deny the effect or thing caused Such as the cause is such for the moste part is the thing caused this holdeth not in destroying causes Particuler Canons of the efficient When many efficient causes ioine and concurre together in any action as the principall cause with other helpers and instrumentes there they all ioyntly together bée onely the full and perfect efficient cause of that effect Cause naturall voluntary accidentall violent God hath distributed to euery creature some naturall proprieties vertues and operations If the naturall vertue and propertie of any thing bée affirmed the naturall effect will follow vnlesse that naturall facultie bée otherwise let or hindered and if the effect bée the cause must also haue gone before If will and aduise or deliberation bée then the effect may bée Such as the naturall disposition and will is suche is the effect iudged to bée If the cause be in hazard that is if the cause bée to vs vncertaine and vnknowne then may the effect fall out vncertainely and by hazard or when wée looke not for it Alone and with others If the sole cause woorke continually the thing caused is alwayes if not then otherwise if the efficient doo necessarily require the helpe of others in woorking then without them nothing can bée doone if not then otherwise if it woorke by instrumentes then are those instrumentes required If the efficient woorke alone then it dserueth the more either prayse or condemnation if with others then the lesse so Nisus 9. Aeneid accuseth himselfe and excuseth Euryalus Me me adsum qui feci in me conuertite ferrum ô Rutuli mea fraus omnis nihil iste nec ausus Nec potuit Procreant conseruant No efficient cause except God can make any woorke without matter Hinc illud gigni E nihilo nihil in nihilum nil posse reuerti And if the matter bée the woorke may bée made If the procreant and conseruant cause bée the thing may bée procreated and conserued If the vndooing and destroiyng cause bée then must the thing decay If the cause efficient bée good the effect will bée good and bad if bad If the destroying cause bée good the thing destroyd was bad If the thing destroyed bée bad the cause destroying must bée good yâ— is to say hath doon some good hath brought some profit The efficient may bée expressed by variety both of Grammaticall cases and Rhetoricall figures as in procreant causes God is the father and fountayne and well of all goodnes The beginning of euery good thing is in of and from God From procreant causes the Poets doo oftentimes fetch their epithites circumloqutions as Sole satus Phaeton c. Phaeton borne of the sunne If you put downe or take away that is if you affirme or deny the cause efficient procreant and conseruant in tyme fit and conuenient to woorke and béeing not idle then the effect must bée put downe or taken away but diuersly according to the diuersitie of the causes themselues For If such a cause bée as that it woorketh of his owne proper force plainly and certainly no other thing helping it then must the effect follow certeinly Now let vs sée a little the vse of these Canons in comparison of the plaine definitions and explications of proprieties put downe by Ramus Let this serue for an example He that is idle is wanton But Paris is idle Therefore Paris is wanton In the proposition which is the first axiome of the thrée Idlenesse as a procreant cause doth argue Wantonnesse as his effect In the second axiome which maketh the assumption the same Wantonnesse is an adiunct of Paris that is a
ne serra en son disaduantage adiudg vn entre car il auera assise del primer disseisin et recouera damages del primer iour del assise car son entent fuit de faire claime et nyent de prendre profit ou de expeller le tenant tout ousterment et de custodier le possession et issint lintent del vener sur le terre est destre respect Annotations THe formall and materiall cause bée essentiall partes of the thing caused the end and the efficient are not so The forme is alwaies made by the efficient the matter is commonly prepared not alwayes made by it as the quill is the matter whereof a pen is made here the maker of the pen dooth but order polish and prepare the quill but hée altogether maketh the forme and fashion of the pen. And although forma bée effectum efficientis yet it is causa formati Dicitur forma à formando differentia verò quia differre facit vna enim eademque res est etsi diuersa nomina and according to these two names hath Aristotle in the first of his Topiks assigned it two properties The one for giuing essence and knowledge of the same essence the other for causing difference And in respect of the former it is sometimes called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quod quid erat esse as 1. post Sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratio essentiae 1. de ortu animal sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essentia rei 1. Philo sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…atio specifica essentialis 4. Phil sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 specifica completiua constitutiua as in Porphyry and sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 forma ratio sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 species exemplar 5. Phil. In consideration of the latter propriety it is commonly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differentia for that especially by the forme things differ one from another so the formall cause of man is his reasonable soule for this maketh man to bée man and to differ from all other thinges that bée not man So euâ—…y naturall thing hath his peculiar forme as a lyon a horse a trée c. the heauen the earth the sea c. So euery artificiall thing also as a house a shippe c. So things incorporall as vertue vice c. So in a woord whatsoeuer is by the formall cause it is that which it is and is different from all other things that it is not Onely the forme among all other causes is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simul congenita extant at the same instant with the thing formed so that there is a most necessary and reciprocall consequence betwéene the forme and the thing formed But now as the vnderstanding of the formall cause causeth surest knowledge so hardly can wée vnderstand what the formall cause is which peraduenture made Democritus thinke that truth lay hidden in the bottome and plunged in the déepe Indéede wée generally conceaue and gather that euery particular thing hath his peculiar forme but what is the peculiar forme of euery particular thing that we know not or if peraduenture wée gesse at them now and then yet hardly can wée expresse our conceits with laboursome and tedious circumlocutions So that for the most part things bée not knowne and if they bée in part perceiued then haue wée no nameâ—… for the thinges Here therefore the auntient philosophers were woonderfully troubled as Aristotle reporteth 2. Meta. Pythagoras would haue his numbers to bée yâ— cause of things and that euery thing was an image or resemblance of numbers and Plato altered their woordes a little saying that Idaea was the forme and that thinges formed were communications and participations of Idaeas of whome Aristotle concludeth thus that they valdè simpliciter imperitè egerunt hée seemed but nugari poeticas metaphoras loqui Canons IF you remooue the forme it is impossible for the thing formed to consist Such is euery thing as the forme permitteth it to bée The forme is the fountayne of actions The forme of euery thing is the especial part of the thinge and the alteration of the forme chaungeth the thing formed and maketh it an other thing but héere wée must distinguish betwéene the vniuersall chaunging of the forme and the particuler alteration thereof For if a house bée vtterly defaced though it bée reediâ—…ied of the selfe same timber and stone yet it is not the same house but if it bée but a litle decayed and so repayred in part it remayneth the same house still though in continuance of time euery stick and stone bée altered by often repayring of it The formall cause is generall as all other partes of Logike For the declaration whereof I will purposely note out some examples of the formall cause in actions and exercises aswell as thinges corporall Formalitie in pleading is now partly abridged by the statutes of 32. H. 8. ca. 20. 18. Elis. ca. 14. and 27. Elis. but how much it was estéemed heretofore sée 14. H. 8. 27. per Brooke Iustice. Car vn forme couyent d'estre tenus et vse ou auterment touts choses serra en confuse et sans order Car en trespasse couyent doner colour et vncore le sentence n'est le melieur en le veritie del matter pur ceoque est formalitie Et a vne plée en l'affirmatiue couyent prendre auerment et si soit en le negatiue couyent concluder al negatiue et ceo n'est forsque formalitie et formalitie est le pluis chiefe chose en nostre ley And the booke of Entries standeth all vpon formall precidents of declarations barres replications reioynders surreioynders rebutters issues verdites iudgements executions processe continuances essoynes c. Brytton whose booke was published in Edward the first both time and name Fol 42. describeth the order and forme of battayle but somewhat discrepant from the forme described 17. E. 3. and 19. H. 4. In 11. H. 6. 7. the ioyning of battayle in a writ of right is solempnly set downe betwéene sir Piers Colts and the Earle of Northumberland for the maner of Capenhow Sée 14. E. 4. 8. the forme of punishment called Fort et dure pronounced in Newgate by Iustice Needham vide 8. H. 4. 2. Finall cause Ramus in his French Logike placeth the end first sith according to Aristotle in the second of his Physikes the ende is first in conceipt and consideration though last in execution But in the last edition of his Latine Logike hée setteth it in the last place respecting rather finem rei then efficientis scopum intentionem which last resolution of his I follow at this present yet not so resolutely but that I can bée content to heare their aduise who bid vs take héede that we confound not the finall cause with the thing caused which wée shall the better doo say they if wée consider exactly the order and due coherence of the foure causes in the absolute constitution of
a thing caused For first the finall cause the end purpose intent drift marke or scope as it were of the whole action is propounded to the efficient and so vrgeth and mooueth him to prepare the matter and apply the forme therevnto for the full accomplishing of the enterprise which beeing once performed the efficient cause now ceaseth as hauing obteined that it sought for And this béeing thus atchieued is not the finall cause but the thing caused As for example I purpose to sweate and therefore I daunce héere the sweating is not the finall cause but the intent and purpose which I had to sweate is the cause that mooued mée to daunce and so caused mée to sweate which sweating is the thing caused and although in vulgar spéech the vse of a thing and the end of the same thing bée confounded yet by art and reason they should bée distinguished the one a cause the other a thing caused If any man obiect that if wée say the end is onely the purpose of the efficient then this place will bée restrained to such things onely as vse reason and can purpose where all Logike must bée generall and applyable as well to Non ens as to Ens to that which is not as that which is they aunswere that wée néede not take this woord purpose or deliberation so strictly as to apply it onely to reasonable creatures but generally say that euery thing woorketh for some end and purpose whether it bée by natures instinct or voluntary consultation Or if this séeme more philosophicall then religious wée may say that in all artificiall thinges and such naturall things as haue no deliberation that which wée call the ende is but the thing caused by them and the cause finall is the purpose of God in naturall thinges and the intent of the artificer in things that bée artificiall Et finis mouet efficientem cogitatio de fine finis vt obiectum cogitatio de fine vt adiunctum agenti inhaerens sayth Piscator Some others make the finall cause to bée nothing but a part of the efficient and no distinct cause it selfe sith it onely mooueth the efficient to forward the operation The end is chiefe or subordinate chiefe which the efficient desireth for it selfe as the couetous man Riches and it is either vniuersall to the which all thinges in the world generally be referred as Gods glory or speciall whervnto euery thing in his kinde is referred as the house is the ende of the builder for hée séeketh no further Subordinate is that which is not for it selfe desired but referred to the chiefe end Canons If the ende bée then the thing must also be whose ende it is and if the ende cease to bée then the thing whose ende it was can no longer bée Euery thing is referred to his ende The end dooth eyther allow or disallow euery mans action Or thus that is good whose end was good and contrarily Sic Aristotle 3. Rhet. Laco cum rationem de Ephoratu in iudicio redderet rogatus an ipse alios iure perijsse existimaret assensus est Ille verò nonne haec tu cum illis decreuisti ille assensus est nonne igitur tu inquit peribis Minimè verò inquit illi enim pecunijs acceptis haec commiserunt ego verò nequaquam sed ex sententia The end is more to bée desired than those things that bée referred to the end He that séeketh the ende séeketh also those things that bée referred to the same end All the arguments that common Rhetoricians fetch from Honestum and Vtile are for the most part deriued from the end or finall cause sith for the cause of these two most things are enterprised In like maner the gesses and coniectures of Iudges are fet from the end as hée was most like to woorke the mischiefe who might haue any end or profit in practising of the same Whose vse is good that is good but not contrarily the thing is bad because it is abused The end dooth not alwaies follow the efficient cause eyther because the efficient could not accomplish the thing alone or els because hée would not Theloall lib. 7. cap. 2. Le finall intent del chescun que pursuyte briefe est ou a recouerer seisin ou possession de terre ou tenement ou d'auer â—…hose dont home peut auer heritage ou franktenement ou terme ou d'auer remedy et recoÌ„pence pur iniury et damage a luy auenue per le act ou non feasance d'un auter ou pur le non performance des contracts et obligations ou auters parts et causes que sont come contracts Home vient pur auower son atturney cest presence ne serra dit apparance car son intent ne fuit d'apperer al briefe c. 8. H. 7. 8. Abuses of causes Sophistry as I haue said elswhere is no Logike therefore least I should iniury the art by ioyning sophisticall fallacians with Logicall institutions I haue rather reserued them to these annotations then thrusted them in among the precepts Some vse I confesse there may bée had of them although I know that who so throughly perceaueth the truth of this art néedes to séeke no other meanes to auoyde these deceipts sith RectuÌ„ est index sui obliqui But if wée shall put downe euery thing in Logike which hath any litle shew of profite therevnto Grammer will be good Logike because it helpeth vs to vtter yâ— which wée haue Logically conceaued The woord Sophista was at the first a title of commendation and onely applyed vnto him that was a Philosopher or teacher of wisedome But now it is become odious as Tyrannus and such like Sophistry therefore is the abuse of Logike deceiuing the simple with a glorious shew of counterfeit reasons commonly called Fallacians Fallacians bée eyther in the woord or in the reason Fallacians in the woord bée of two sorts some in a simple woord some in the coniunction of woordes In a simple woord bée three The first is when vâ—…uall and vpstart woordes bée foisted in as hée putteth his felicitie in circumpugnable goods circumpugnabilibus bonis meaning Riches because men fight about them Le seignieur des Accords in his Bigarrures pag. 198. hath many of this making although somewhat more tollerable because of the ridiculous application Ils font saith hée speaking of some French Carminiâ—…cators de petitelettes descriptionettes qui soÌ„t fort agreabletets aux oreillettes delicatelettes principallettement des mignar delettes damoisellettes Come Ma nymphe follastrelette Ma follastre nymphelette And after Ie vous vens une goutette Vne goute clairelette Vne claire goutelette Qui vient d'une fontenette Miguarde fontenelette Fontaine mignardelette c. And page 65. of another sputatilicall goose he saith thus Un certayne predicant qui veuloit Pindariser en chaire et choisir des mots courtisans pour applaudir a quelques damoiselles fraischemeÌ„t reuenues de la cour auoit coustume â—…e â—…uenter
directera sa operation accordant al entent del partie Fol. 101. b. Et donques icy quant il fuit arraigne pur le tuer del home sur malice prepense le substance del matter fuit s'il luy tue ou nemy et le malice prepense n'est que del forme ou circumstance de tuer Et coment que le malice prepense fait le act plus odious et pur ceo cause l'offendour de perder diuers aduantages que auterment il aueroit come sanctuary et clergy et tiels semblables vncore il n'est auter que le manner del fait et nemy le substance del fait Car le substance del fait est le tuer-de luy et adonques quant le substance del fait et le manner del fait sont mise en issue ensemblement si les iurors troueront le substance et nemy le manner vncore iudgement serra done sur le substance Come si home arraigne assise pur disseisin oue force et le defendant plede al generall issue et les iurors troueront le disseisin mes nemy oue force vncore le plâ—…intife auera son iudgement car le torcious expulsion fuit le substance et le force le manner Et adonques quant le substance est troue il auera iudgement pur ceo et serra acquite del force c. Fol. 381. Et quant al auter point il dit que coment que le rent charge est nouel rent commenceant per graunt vncore il est issint appropre al office que il ne serra seuere del office cy longement come le office continue issint que si le office ne serra forfeite le rent que est annexe al ceo ne serra forfeite Car si vn grant estouers a vn autre d'estre arse en tiel meason il est appurtenant al meason Et issint comen graunt en tiel lieu a vn pur ses auers leuant et couchant en son ferme de Dale le commen est fait appurtenant a ceo issint que il que ad le meason per quecunque title que il vient a ceo apres auera les estouers et il que apres viendra al ferme auera le comen et les estouers ne poient estre seuere del meason ne le comen del ferme si non per extientisment Car s'il que ad le meason voile graunter les estouers a vn auter reseruant a luy le meason ou le meason a vn auter reseruant a luy les estouers les estouers ne serront seperate del meason per ceo pur ceo que serront expende en mesme le meason Et issint le fée icy est graunt pur le exercise del office et l'office fuit receiue en respect del fée sic officium foedum sunt concomitantia et l'un ensue l'auter et le fée continua oue l'office come incident inseperable quae sequuntur in eodem loco del annuitie graunt pro consilio impendendo de office del roy de Haroldes graunt a Garter cum foedis proficuis ab antiquo c. 5. E. 4. Fol. vltimo Et del graunt dex li. à Garter ad terminum vitae suae ratione causa officij 7. E. 4. Fol. 23. et del annuitie graunt per le roy Iohanni clerico coronae ad terminum vitae suae en queux cases le fée est annexe al office et est determinable oue l'office Fòl. 26. b. Si vn reteigne vn auter a seruer pur an pur le salary de xx s. la si le seruant demand les xx s. il doit monstrer que le temps est passe cest assauoir l'an expire et doit ceo pleder certeine pur ceo que son action est done en respect del an passe et del chose fait en temps et le temps est parcell del cause del demaunde et precede le demaunde Annotations ADiunct The same almost which the Graecians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 circumstances if you take that woord largely for whatsoeuer is added to a thing after it is once framed and made of his essentiall causes and some of them procéede from the vniting and coniunction of the forme and matter immediately which are commonly inseparable as laughing to a man c. Some are but hangbyes and remoouable or separable and as it were tenants at wil as white blacke to the wall c. Adiuncts therefore not Accidents are they heere called for Accidens is of it selfe infinite and vndeterminate and dooth properly apperteine to the accidentall cause which we before tearmed chaunce hap or hazard and it conteyneth effectes adiunctes and comparates so that the name béeing neyther fitte nor applyable to this place I haue displaced it purposely One and the same Héere is Logically put downe all that which others peruersly teach in their diuers sortes of Idemtitie as Genere Specie Numero Some there bée that giue a proper and peculiar place to signes and coniecturall tokens but friuolously For they belong all eyther to this of adiuncts or that other of effectes or els they bée testimonies and witnesses Canons If the proper adiunct bée then the subiect must commonly bée and if the subiect bée the proper adiunct must also bée To whome soeuer you ascribe the adiunct to the same you must attribute the effect procéeding from the same adiunct That which is rightly applied to the inherent adiunct must bée applied also to the receiuing subiect Here are gathered diuers phisiognomicall coniectures as that of Martiall Crine ruber niger ore breuis pede lumine loesus Rem magnam praestas Zoile si bonus es Hence are also fet prayses and disprayses deliberations and consultations Herein are conteined all those Rhetoricall places concerning the giftes and qualities of body and soule as also externall and those of fortune If the adiunct bée occupied or exercised then the subiect must bée that exerciseth the same To whatsoeuer you ascribe the adiunct which is occupied to the same you must giue the subiect and what you apply to it you must also attribute to this Sometime the adiunct together with the subiect is taken but for one onely argument as when I say The murthering and vsurping Tyrant Richard the third was deseruedly slayne and yet neuerthelesse here the subiect is argued in some respect by the adiunctes in that it is thereby described and declared Some adiunctes bée antecedent or going before some againe present and conioyned lastly some others consequent and following Therefore some other Logicians haue made these thrée kinds of adiuncts thrée seuerall kindes of arguments as Antecedentia adiuncta consequentia Naturall Philosophers Phisitians Astronomers and other professors vse much this place as when they dispute of chaunge of weather diuersitie of causes and occasions of diseases signes of stormes and tempestes as vento rubet aurea Phoebe when the
de prendre lour action en comon et que le tort fuit en comon ieo prouera car si eux fuesont nonsuit per cause del mayntenance cest in comon si soysoyent barres per cause del mayntenance cest in comon et les expenses del suite sont en comon ergo c. Neither in these nor in that called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Violentum and such like is there any new disposition or art of consequence but onely that of syllogisme A prosyllogisme Vide 4. H. 6. 30. In repl bastardie fuit alledge in le maister le auowant le question fuit an il auera ayd de son maister deuant que il reioyâ—…â—…l bastardy et per Martyn il ne auera Le syllogisme est isâ—…t ou nul entry del ayd la nul ayd Icy nul entry del ayd car Si ascun entry del ayd icy 〈◊〉 serra vâ—…l â—…co que est duuant ple s. petit auxilium d'un tiâ—…l sine quo ipse non potest respondere vel apres ple s. petit auxiliuÌ„ ad manutenendum exitum le consequens est prouâ—… ne sont plusors que deuâ—… maners de entâ—…ies del ayde deuant ple ou apres â—…'un in reall action sauter in personell Ergo si sort omninò opoâ—… tet quòd sit vel hoc ve illud mes icy il nauera lâ—…ntry deuant ple s. fine quo noÌ„ potest 〈◊〉 spondere car 〈◊〉 â—…sme ad responde s. ad fayt Conusance Nec l'entry apres ad manutenenduÌ„â—…xitum car icy nul issue est ioyne inter eux Ergo nul entry omnino In 3. H 6. 21. b. Rolf vsa vne prosyllogisme vide le lieu Ergo nul ayd icy Canons Elenchs In euery simple syllogisme that is not proper there must be some affirmatiue and generall argument Interdum quoque simplex syllogismus ex enunciatis compositis constare potest si modo compositio ipsa argumenti simplex sit Vt apparebit aliâs Freigius Snellius Ramus Héere then generally it is a false syllogisme when all the ariomes bée either negatiue or proper Ex omnibus enim specialibus aut negatis nullus communis syllogismus in vlla figura simplici concluditur Ramus 2. lib. animaduers Proximum genus syllogismi Methodi ignoratur itaque ponitur dispositio Vt in connexo disiuncto axiomate veritas pendet ex connexione disiunctione non veritate partium sic syllogismus ex necessitate consequutionis licet omnes partes sint imposâ—…ibiles vt omnis arbor est lapis omnis leo est arbor ergo omnis leo est lapis In euery syllogisticall conflict and controuersie there is a defendant an opponent The first is to vrge proue conclude the other to repell auoyd and driue backe The disputation being once begon it is an vnorderly confusion for the same man sometimes to aunswere sometimes to reply and neuer constantly to playe out his owne parte much like the two clownes in Virgill which when they could not aunswere what was propounded begin a freshe with a new doubt on the necke of the olde Dic quibus in terris quoth the one and Dic quibus in terris quoth the other Arréede me a riddle sayth Damaetas and Arreede me a riddle replyeth Menalcas thincking it a faire conquest to haue taken and giuen blowe for blowe as Bakers and Butchers vse to doe who neuer care for any curious wardes but lay on loade like good fellowes one for one till both begin to stagger with their valiant blood about their brused pates I haue therefore in a word or two layd downe some generall instructions and directions for orderly disputations Logicall exercise is that which expresseth that in particular practise which is generally put downe in art For as art followeth nature so exercise foloweth art Herein let vs consider 1. The adiuncts affections of it for it is performed either by writing or speaking eyther of these is eyther continued as in long discourses tractats or interrupted as in Diâ—…logues Disputations Vide B B. 2. The specials of it Vide A A. B B. Disputation is an argumentable discussing of a doubtfull proposition where â—…te 1. The disputers The proponent who defendeth the proposition or position wherevnto also the modera for and determiner of the disputatton is referred who commonly manâ—…eyneth the position The opponent whoe defendeth the contrary 2. The duties of the disputers eyther commoÌ„ to both them as in preparation and fur niture of instruments for the disputatiion as bee Logike Rhetorike things re quisite for the same it must be noted therfore 1. What may confirme or confute the position 2 What sect of philosophy the aduersary followeth 3. They must haue in memory the generall heades of artes which are commonly vsed in disputations CoÌ„flict and asassault they must neither Wrangle about trifling wordes Nor make long and impertinent excursion and vagaries Nor seeke starting holes Nor bring in any such thing as may rather make against them then with them Nor seeke to supplant or circumuent one another iniuriously â—…or ouerweene themselues or be obstinate and singuler in conceipt Nor faâ—… to threatning and railing with vndecent tearmes Proper to eyther of them C C. C C. The proper dueties of the Opponent be 1. To haue his weapons in a readines that is to haue his obiections framed artificially with syllogisticall disposition 2. Not to cast his argumentes confusedly on a heape but to vse them distinctly one after another 3. To haue Prosyllogismes in a readynes for the confirmation of such parts of his syllogismes as may by likelyhood be denied 4. To bring in nothing which hath not some probabilitie or shew of truth in it 5. Sometimes to deale directly openly sometimes couertly and by bringing his aduersary to an absurditie or impossibilitie 6. Neuer to choppe in impertinent matters which make nothing at all to the matter in controuersie Defendent be 1. In choise of his position that it be not Repugnant to sence Contrary to equity honesty Too hard and difficult 2. Both in Repetitions of the obiections made that either by the selfe-same words or with the selfe same sence in the like order as they were propounded with a kind of curteous preface that both himselfe may haue some meane-space of conceauing a solution and the auditors better vnderstand what was obiected And also in aunswering of the same D D. The obiectioÌ„s be aunswered either By skorning and reiecting if absurd fooleries be obiected or such as no man vnderstandeth By graunting and confessing when such thinges bee brought in as make nothing against the position By affirming or denying when any interrogation is â—…adr or els by asking what he meaneth by his interrogation if it â—…e ambiguous and sophisticall Or by direct soluti on that either perfect when the very cause is shewed why the conclusion is not sufficient and it is 1. by denying either of The premisses and prosyllogisms when they be