power lawfully not to abate it and us'd that last lawful power and not the first and wrong'd none in using it To this may be added That the Iudgment upon a simple Contract is the Act of the Court and compulsory to the Executor and he hath then no Election but must obey the Iudgment In conclusion though it were agreed That in the Action of Debt brought by Allington upon a simple Contract Iudgment ought not to have been given against the Defendant being Administrator but the Writ should have abated because the Administrator was not chargeable And though the Iudgment given were erroneous and for that cause reversible yet standing in force unrevers'd It is a good Barr to the Plaintiffs Action But lest this should countenance Iudges abating the Writ ex officio in such Actions brought or Plaintiffs to bring Error upon Iudgments given in such Actions I conceive the Law is clear That Iudges ought not ex officio to abate such Writ nor otherwise than when the Executor or Administrator Defendant in such Action demurrs and demands Judgment of the Writ and that Iudgment given against such Defendants not demurring to the Writ is not Erroneous unless for other cause If it be urg'd further That though a Iudgment obtain'd upon a simple Contract be a barr to an Action of Debt brought after upon an Obligation or to an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit to pay mony as the present Case is Yet it should not barr if the Action upon which it was obtain'd were commenc'd pending a former Action upon an Obligation or upon an Assumpsit for mony in which the Intestate could not have waged his Law The answer is as before such Iudgment barrs until revers'd if admitted to be reversible as it is not But the Law is setled That wheresoever an Action of Debt upon Bond or Contract is brought against a man he may lawfully confess the Action and give way to a Judgment if there be no fraud in the Case although he have perfect notice of such former Suit depending nor is there any restraint or limit of time for confessing an Action brought upon a simple Contract more than upon a Bond. And to satisfie any Debt upon Obligation 5 H. 7. f. 27. b. Moore Scarleâ— Case f. 678. Crook 38 El. f. 462. Green Wilcocks Case before a Iudgment so obtain'd is a Devastavit in the Executor or Administrator and so it is to satisfie any latter Judgment if there be not assets to satisfie the first also So are the express Books to those points of 5 H. 7. per Curiam and Scarles his Case in Moore and Green and Wilcock's Case in Crook Eliz. Yet in 25 Eliz. when an Action of Debt for 100 l. was brought against an Executor in C. B. and pending that Debt was brought against him in B. R. for 100 l. which latter he confess'd and the Iudgment there had pleaded in Barr to the first Action And upon Question if the Plea were good Fenner and Walmesley held it good but Anderson Mead Wyndham and Periam argued to the contrary and that he ought to have pleaded the first Action pending to the second Action brought The Arguments of both sides you may see in Moore f. 173. Moore 25 El. f. 173. where it is left a Quere the Iudges doubting the Case but since the Law is taken That the Iudgment is a good barr to the first Action It will be still objected That if the Law be that Executors or Administrators may pay debts upon simple Contracts of the deceas'd to which they are not bound and thereby prevent the payment of a debt to which they are bound It is repugnant to Reason and consequently cannot be Law for that is in effect at the same time to be bound and not bound to pay For he who may not pay being bound is not bound at all For clearing this we must know Though Executors or Administrators are not compell'd by the Common Law to answer Actions of Debt for simple Contracts yet the Law of the Land obligeth payment of them For 1. Vpon committing Administration Oath is taken to administer the Estate of the dead duely which cannot be without paying his debts 2. Oath is taken to make true accompt of the Administration to the Ordinary and of what remains after all Debts Funeral Charges and just Expences of every sort deducted 3. This appears also by the Statute of 31 E. 3. c. 11. That Administrators are to administer and dispend for the Soul of the Dead and to answer to other to whom the dead persons were holden and bound which they cannot better do than by paying their debts And as this was the ancient Law and practise before in the Spiritual Court so by the new Act in 22 and 23 of the King for the better settling of Intestates Estates It is enacted accordingly that upon the Administrators accompt deductions be made of all sorts of debts This appears to be the ancient Law by the Great Charter c. 18. and long before by Glanvill in Henry the Second's time and Bracton in Henry the Third's time 4. And by Fitz-herbert in the Writ de rationabili parte bonorum the debts are to be deducted before division to the wife and children And upon the Executors accompt all the Testators debts are to be allow'd before payment of Legacies which were unjust if the payment of them were not due as appears by Doctor and Student Executors be bound to pay Debts before Legacies by the Law of Reason and by the Law of God for Reason wills that they should do first that is best for the Testator that is to pay debts which he was bound to pay before Legacies which he was not bound to give 2. It is better for the Testator his Debts should be paid Doct. Stud. l. 2. c. 11. for not payment of which his Soul shall suffer pain but none for not performing his Legacy The Ordinary upon the accompt L. 2. c. 10. f. 158 in all the Cases before rehears'd will regard much what is best for the Testator And I conceive the Ordinary may inforce the payment of Debts upon Contracts as well as Legacies or Marriage mony and no Prohibition lyes An Executor or Administrator may retain for his own satisfaction a Debt by single Contract due from the Testator or Intestate which he could not do unless the payment were lawful If at the Common Law the Executors payments of Debts upon simple Contracts were not just Why have the Iudges in all Ages given Judgment for the Plaintiffs unless the Defendant either Demurrs in the Commencement of the Plea or avoids the Debt by special matter pleaded and put in issue but he shall never in such case either Arrest the Iudgement or bring Error after Iudgment for that Cause And so it is agreed for Law in Read and Norwoods Case in Plowden where the Iudges had view of numerous Iudgments in that kind as there appears
And if such Debts were not justly to be so demanded and paid it had been against the Iudges Oath to pass such Iudgments for the Defendant is not bound to Demurr but leaves the Iustice of the Plaintiffs demand to the Court. In Decimo H. 6. Cotsmore 10 H. 6. f. 24. b. 25. a. who gave the Rule in the Case in question hath these words The Law will not charge Executors with a duty due by a simple Contract made by the Testator Then if such Action be brought against Executors upon a simple Contract made by the Testator and they will not take advantage at the beginning of the Pleas in abatement of the Writ but plead other matter which is found against them they never shall have advantage to shew that before Judgment that is in Arrest of Judgment and that I have known adjudg'd in this place once before this time Here is not only his own Opinion but a Iudgment by him cited in that Court formerly in the point I shall add another Case to this purpose A man brought a Writ of Debt against another 15 E. 4. f. 29. 2. and counted that he sold certain Goods to his Testator for the Sum in demand Littleton caus'd the Attorney of the Plaintiff as printed but should be Defendant to be demanded and so he was and Littleton demanded of him Si'l voyl avoyder son Suite not his own but his who counted against him que dit que voyl and after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff The Court awards that you take nothing by the Writ for know that a man shall never have an Action against Executors where the Testator might have wag'd his Law in his life time quod nota It was not proper to ask the Plaintiffs Attorney Whether he would avoid his Clyents Suit and an unlikely answer of his to say Yes but a rational demand to the Defendants Attorney Whether he would avoid his Suit who counted against him and probably he should answer Yes and after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff the Court awards you take nothing by your Writ If he had been the person to whom the question was first asked and who immediately before had answer'd Yes the Book had not been that after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff but that Littleton said to him who was the same he discours'd with The Print thus rectified this Case agrees with the Law deliver'd by Cotsmore An Executor is sued and declared against in Court for so was the Course then upon a simple Contract of his Testators the Iudge asks his Attorney Whether he had a mind to avoid the Suit who answer'd Yes If the Iudge had thought fit he might have avoided the Suit without making any question but knowing it was not consonant to Law to avoid a Suit upon a simple Contract unless the Executor himself desired it He therefore asked him the Question and finding he did desire it the Iudge presently told the Plaintiffs Attorney He could take nothing by the Writ Else you see the Consequence of this Iudgment That the Iudges ex officio should prevent any Iudgment for the Plaintiff in Debt brought upon a simple Contract against an Executor whether the Executor would or not against former and subsequent usage Brook in Abridging this Case and not reflecting upon it rightly abridges it that Littleton demanded the Plaintiffs Attorney If he would avow his Suit whereas the word is clearly avoid not avow and to what purpose should he ask that Question for sure it was avow'd as much as could be when counted upon at the instant in Court Then Brook makes a Note Br. Executor pl. 80. Nota cest Judgment ex officio And this Note of Brooks mis-led the Lord Anderson once to the same mistake if the Report be right but the like hath not been before or since Rob. Hughson's Case Gouldsboroughs Rep. 30 Eliz. f. 106. 107. An Action was brought against an Administrator upon a Contract of the Intestates who pleaded fully administred and found against him Anderson said that ex officio the Court was to stay Iudgment and did so because the Administrator was not chargeable upon a simple Contract But since that Case of Hughson one Germayne brought an action of Debt against Rolls as Executor of Norwood for Fees as an Attorney in the Common Bench and for soliciting in the Queens Bench Germayne versus Rolls 37 38 El. Cro. 425. pl. 24. and for mony expended about a Fine for Alienation Rolls pleaded Ne unque Executor which was found against him and Judgment given Vpon which Rolls brought a Writ of Error and the Error assign'd was That the Action lay not against an Executor because the Testator could have waged his Law But it was resolv'd That for Attorney's Fees the Testator could not wage his Law but for the rest he might and that the Executor might have demurr'd at first but pleading a Plea found against him it was said he was Concluded some difference of Opinion was But agreed That the Executor confessing the Action or pleading nil debet in such Case and that found against him he hath no remedy And Popham remembred Hughson's Case in the Common Pleas and would see the Roll for he doubted that both in that Case and this of Germayne the Executor had not confessed the Debt in effect But after it was moved again and all the Judges Hill 38 Eliz. Cro. 459. pl. 4. but Gawdy were of Opinion that the Judgment was well given as to that Cause but it was revers'd for a Cause not formerly mov'd which was That an Action of Debt would not have layn against the Testator himself for part of the mony in demand and recovered that is for the mony for soliciting which was not a certain Debt but to be recovered by Action on the Case Some Cases in the Old Books may seem to colour this Opinion That the Judges ex officio in an Action of Debt brought against an Executor or Administrator for a simple Contract of the Testators or Intestate ought to abate the Writ 25 E. 3. f. 40. The first is 25 E. 3. f. 40. where an Action was brought against an Executor upon a Tally struck by the Testator The Iudges said Nil Capiat per breve if he have no better specialty 12 H. 4. f. 23. The like Case is 12 H. 4. f. 23. where a like Action was brought against the Executor or Administrator upon a Tally of the Testators and there it appears the Defendants Council would have demurr'd and the Cause is mentioned That the writing of the Tally might be washed out by water and a new put in the place and the Notches chang'd and the Iudgment was Nil capiat per breve This being the same Case with the former the reason of the Iudgment was the same of grounding an Action upon a Specialty not good in Law Besides it appears in the latter
more Books Obj. 3 That by the Statute of 9 E. 3. Pleas of Releases or Deeds dated in Franchises within the Realm shall be tryed where the Action is brought Answ Wales is no Franchise or if it were not within the Realm for the questions concerning a Deed pleaded bearing date there but of Original Process for Causes arising and Tryals of them in the next County adjoyning and not in the County where the Action of a Deed dated in a Franchise of the Realm which do toto coelo differ and concerning Executions and Judgments here to be made in another Dominion The same may be said concerning the Statute of 12 E. 2. when Witnesses to Deeds in Forreign Franchises are to be summoned with the Iury and the Tryal notwithstanding their absence to proceed when the Writ is brought Obj. 4 Presidents of Process issued to the Sheriffs of Wales without a Judicial decision upon Argument are of no moment Many things may be done several ways as Bonds though they have regularly one common form yet they may be in other forms as well Presidents are useful to decide questions but in such Cases as these which depend upon Fundamental Principles from which Demonstrations may be drawn millions of Presidents are to no purpose Besides it is known that Officers grant such Process to one Sheriff or County as they use to another nor is it in them to distinguish between the power of the Court over a Sheriff in Wales from a Sheriff in England especially when they find some Writs of Execution going which are warranted by Acts of Parliament which they know not though they do know Process of Execution in fact runs thither as Capias utlagatum Extents upon Statute which are by Acts of Parliament And that other Mandatory Writs issue thither as well at Common Law as by a particular Clause concerning the Chancellor in the Act of 34 H. 8. c. 26. By the Register upon a Judgment had in the Common Pleas against a Clerk Regist f. 43. B Brevium Judicialium who was after made Archbishop of Dublin in Ireland upon a Fieri Facias issued to execute the Judgment to the Sheriff of Middlesex and his Retorn that he had no Lands or Goods in his Bayliwick but was Archbishop in Ireland upon a Testatum of it in the Common Pleas that he had Lands and Goods in Ireland a Fieri Facias issued in the King's name Justiciario suo Hiberniae to make Execution but it appears not whether this Writ issued from the Common Pleas or especially by the King's Direction out of the Chancery which possibly may be as a special Mandatory Writ of the Kings locum tenens there which varies in stile at the Kings pleasure anciently Justiciario suo Hiberniae at other times Locum tenenti nostro at other times Deputat or Capitaneo generali nostro which stiles are not regularly known to the Officers of the Courts at Westminster And perhaps by special Writs to the chief Officer and the King Execution may be made of Judgments given at Westminster in any of his Dominions which would be enquired of FINIS An Exact and Perfect TABLE TO THE REPORTS and ARGUMENTS OF Sir JOHN VAVGHAN Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. Abatement of Writs See Writs 1. WHere a Writ is brought against an Executor in Debt upon a simple Contract he may abate it 94 2. Judges ought not Ex officio to abate Writs but it must come before them by Demurrer 95 Act of the Party 1. Every act a man is naturally enabled to do is in it self equally good as any other act he is so enabled to do 333 Actions and Actions upon the Case 1. Actions upon the Case are more inferior and ignobler than Actions of Debt 101 2. Actions of the Case are all Actiones Injuriarum contra Pacem and it is not a Debt certain but damages for the breach of the promise that must be recovered in it 101 3. Wheresoever the Debt grew due yet the Debtor is indebted to the Creditor in any place where he is as long as the Debt is unpaid 92 4. The Plaintiff must recover by his own strength and not by the Defendants weakness 8 58 5. If you will recover any thing against any man it is not enough for you to destroy his Title but you must prove your own better than his 60 6. In life liberty and estate every man who hath not forfeited them hath a property and a right which the Law allows him to defend and if it be violated it gives an Action to redress the wrong and punish the wrong-doer 337 7. There are several penal Laws by transgressing of which the Subject can have no particular damage and therefore no particular Action 341 8. All Actions brought against Officers within the Statute of the One and twentieth of K. James must be laid in the proper County 115 116 117 9. Case and not Debt lies for a Solicitor for Soliciting Fees 99 Ad quod dampnum 1. When the King can license without a Writ of Ad quod dampnum he may license if he will whatever the Return of the Writ be 341 345 2. Where the Writ of Ad quod dampnum informs the King better then a Non obstante 356 3. Though there be a Return upon an Ad quod dampnum that it is not ad dampnum yet there must be the Kings license afterwards 341 Administration and Administrator 1. How they are to administer the Intestates Estate 96 2 An Administrator hath a private office of trust he cannot assign nor leave it to his Executor 182 3. An Administrator must take an Oath to make a true accompt 96 4. An Action will not lye against them upon a Tally because it is no good Specialty 100 5. In an Action of Debt upon Bond or Contract brought against him he may confess Judgment if there is no fraud although he hath notice of a former Suit depending 95 100 6. If an Administrator durante minore Aetate brings an Action he must averr the Administrator or Executor to be under the Age of Seventeen years 93 7. The manner of pleading Plene administravit praeter ultra 154 Advowson See Quare Impedit 1. The rights of an Advowson 7 2. Where the Plaintiff and Defendant must alledge Seisin in an Advowson by a former Presentation 8 Agent and Patient 1. In a Quare Impedit both Plaintiff and Defendant are Actors and may have a Writ to the Bishop 6 7 58 Age See Infant Alien 1. The time of the birth is of the Essence of a Subject born for he cannot be a Subject unless at the time of his birth he was under the Kings Liegeance 286 287 2. Regularly who once was an Alien to England cannot be inheritable there but by Act of Parliament 274 282 3. He that is priviledged by the Law of England to inherit must be a Subject of the Kings 268 in loco 278 286 4. He must be more
Avowry is in liew of an Action and thereto privity is requisite for the same cause he cannot have an Action of Waste nor many other Actions there mentioned and the Authorities cited and so is Littleton himself expresly Litt. Sect. 580. Section 580. Where a man by grant to himself or by descent from his Ancestor hath a Rent-charge and might once lawfully distrain and Avow for such Rent if Arrear by due Attornment made to him or his Ancestor he may still do so whenever the Rent is behind unless by Law that power be some way lost 1. That power may be lost by extinguishment of the Rent by a perpetual union of the tenancy to the rent or rent to the tenancy or in other manner the Grantee having no Heir 2. It may be lost for a time by Suspension as by such union for a time and after restored again 3. It may be lost by a Grant of the Rent upon Condition 7 H. 6.3 Br. Extinguishment p. 17. and upon performance or breach of the Condition restored again but the power of distraining is not in this Case lost by any of these ways 4. It may be principally lost by a sufficient granting over and transferring the Rent to another which way comes nearest to the Case in question And therefore I shall agree the Case so much insisted on which is said to be agreed per Curiam Andrew Ognell's Case 4. Rep. f. 49. in Andrew Ognell's Case in the fourth Rep. That if a man be seized of a Rent-service or Rent-charge in Fee and grant it over by his Deed to another and his Heirs and the Tenant Attorn such Grantor is without remedy for the Rent arrear before his Grant for distrain he cannot and other remedy he hath not because all privity between him and the Tenant is destroyed by the Attornment to the Grantee and he hath no more right than any Stranger to come upon the Land after such transferring over of the Rent I shall likewise agree another Case That if such Grantee should regrant the same Rent back to the Grantor either in fee in tail or for life and the Tenant Attorn as he must to this regrant yet the first Grantor shall never be enabled to distrain for Arrears due to him before he granted over the Rent for now the privity between him and the Tenant begins but from the Attornment to the regrant the former being absolutely destroyed and the Tenant no more distrainable for the ancient Arrears than he was upon the creation of the Rent for Arrears incurred before till first attorn'd If the Case in question prove to be the same in effect with either of these Cases then the reason of Law for these Cases must sway and determine the Case in question And I conceive that there is no likeness or parity between the Case in question and either of those Cases either for the fact of the Cases or the reason of Law I shall therefore begin with comparing this Case with the first of those Cases 1. In the first of those Cases he that is seis'd of the Rent-charge doth intend to transferr his Estate in the Rent to the Grantee and it is accordingly actually transferr'd by the Tenants Attornment to the Grant 2. The Grantee by his Grant and Attornment to it becomes actually seis'd of the Rent and may enjoy the benefit of it by perception of the Rent 3. His Wife becomes dowable of it 4. It is subject to Statutes Recognizances and Debts enter'd into by the Grantee or due from him to the King 5. It is possible to descend to his Heir 6. It may be Arrear and he hath a possibility to distrain and avow for it 1. But in the Case in question the Conizors of the Fine did never intend to transfer their Estate in the Rent to the Conizee nor that any Attornment be made to him What a man intends to pass to another he intends to be without it himself at least for some time which is not in this Case 2. The Conizee never becomes actually seiz'd of the Rent and not only doth not but never can enjoy the perception of it for there is no moment of time wherein the Conizors themselves are not actually in seisin of it and consequently may distrain if it be in Arrear and the Conizee can never have actually seisin or possibility to have Attornment or distrain his seisin being but a meer fiction and an invented form of Conveyance only 3. The Conizee's Wife is never dowable of it 4. It is not subject to any Statutes Recognizances or Debts of the Conizee 5. It is never possible to descend to his Heir for it instantly vests in the Conizors 6. It can never be Arrear to the Conizee nor hath he ever a possibility to distrain for it To this purpose what is agreed in the Lord Cromwell's Case L. Cromwell's Case 2. Rep. f. 77. 2. Rep. is applicable Then it is to be consider'd what seisin Perkins had who was the Conizee of a Fine in that Case and he had but a Seisin for an instant and only to this purpose to make a Render for his Wife shall not be endowed nor the Land subject to his Statutes or Recognizances f. 77. Therefore that first Case cited out of the Report of Andrew Ognell's Case which I admit to be good Law hath no resemblance with the present Case in any circumstance or consequent but had the Fine been to a third persons use the consequents had been the same as in the Case cited out of Ognell's Case not as to the Conizee but as to that third person to whom the rent was intended To conclude then this first part 1. That whereof the Conizors were alwaies actually and separately seiz'd the same was never by them transferr'd to the seisin of another But of this Rent the Conizors were alwaies in actual seisin for there was no moment of time wherein they were not seis'd therefore this Rent was never transferr'd to the seisin of another nor could any other for any moment of time have a separated seisin thereof for what was mine at all times could be anothers at no time 2. It is an impossibility in Law that two men severally shall have several Rights and Fee-simples in possession in one and the same Land Dyer 28 H. 8. f. 12. a. p. 51. simul semel per Fitz-herbert in the Argument of Bokenhams Case and the same impossibility is so to have of a Rent Nor hath this relation to the learning of Instants in Digbie's Case Coke 1. Rep. and Fitz-williams in the sixth Report That an old Use may be revoked and a new rais'd in the same time and an old possession ended and a new begun this is usual in all transmutation of Estates and things also For in nature a new form introduc'd doth in the same moment destroy the old according to that Generatio unius est corruptio alterius but a separate possession can never be
the Intestate owing by him at the time of his death The Plaintiff taking by protestation that nothing alledg'd by the Defendant was true Demurrs upon the Plea The Causes offer'd to maintain the Demurrer are these 1. That one of the Iudgments pleaded in Barr obtain'd by William Allington in the Court of London before the Mayor c. against the Defendant for 2670 l. 17 s. 7 d. due to the said Allington by the Intestate Everard was not duly obtained and is insufficient to Barr the Plaintiff 2. That the Defendants special Plea in Barr appearing in any part of it to be false and insufficient the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment for his whole debt 1. For the first Cause it was urg'd as an Exception to the Defendants Plea That by the Plea it appears that time out of mind a Court hath been held in the City of London before the Mayor and Aldermen of all personal Actions arising and growing within the said City And that the Intestate was at the time of his death indebted to the said Allington at London within the Parish and Ward of St. Mary Bow and Cheapside But it is not alledg'd That the said debt did arise and grow due in London within the said Parish and Ward for wheresoever the debt did arise and grow due yet the debtor is indebted to the creditor in any place where he is as long as the debt is unpaid And therefore to say The Intestate was indebted to Allington in the said Sum apud London c. affirms not that the debt did arise and grow due at London and if not the Court had no Iurisdiction of the Cause The effect of the Defendants Barr is only to shew That such a Judgment was obtain'd in such a Court against him and not to set forth the whole Record of obtaining it for it were vast Expence of time and mony so to do as often as occasion is to mention a Record and referrs to the Record prout per Recordum plenius liquet where the Plaintiff may take advantage of any defect therein But if that were necessary it is well set forth for his Plea is Et praedictus Willielmus Allington tunc ibidem in eadem Curia secundum consuetudinem Civitatis praedictae affirmabat contra praedictum Rolandum Dee ut Administratorem c. quandam billam originalem de placito debiti c. And the Custome being to hold Plea of personal Actions arising within the City if he affirmed a Bill of Debt according to the Custome It must be of a debt arising and growing due within the City 2. A second Exception was That it is not set forth for what the debt was whereby the Court may judge whether it were payable or not by the Administrator To this it was answer'd That the course in London is for the Plaintiff to declare that the Debtor being indebted to him at such a time and place Concessit solvere such a Sum to him at such a time for they enter not there at large as at Westminster all the pleading and the City Customes have been often confirmed by Parliament and if Exception be taken to the Jurisdiction it must come from the Defendant However that will not avoid the Iudgment and is but Error 3. A third Exception was It is not set forth that the Intestate was indebted to Allington in his own right But it must be intended if he were indebted to him by Law that it was in his own right 4. A fourth Exception was That the Defendant pleads Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff quod recuperaret debitum praedictum where the Iudgment should be quod recuperet It is not the Defendants concern to recite the words of the Iudgment as it was given by the Court but the effect of it relating to the Defendant and so it is more proper to say Iudgment was given quod recuperaret The Court say ideo consideratum est per Curiam but he who relates what they did saith ideo consideratum fuit per Curiam But my Book is quod recuperet 5. A fifth Exception was That the Plea sets forth the Action was brought against the Defendant Dee in London as Administrator of the Intestate omitting durante minori aetate Caroli Everard filii That will not avoid the Iudgment Rolls Good Pincents Case Tit. Executors f. 910. 14 Car. 1. B.R. Piggots Case 5 Rep. though the Minor were of Age sufficient to administer himself nor is it of prejudice to any as was resolved in the Case of one Pincent But if an Administrator durante minori aetate brings an Action he must averr the Administrator or Executor to be under the Age of Seventeen years 6. Sixthly it was urg'd as resolv'd in Turners Case Turners Case 8. Rep. f. 132. That the Recital of Allingtons Declaration in London not mentioning the Debt to be per scriptum obligatorium it shall not be intended to be so And it was urg'd as resolv'd in that Case of Turner also That it being a Debt but by simple Contract the Administrator was not chargeable with it That is a Resolution in Turners Case supernumerary and not necessary to support the Iudgment given and consequently no Iudicial Resolution for the Iudgment given in Turners Case was well given because the Iudgments given before the Mayor of Cicester pleaded in barr of the Plaintiffs Action were resolv'd to be coram non Judice because it appear'd not that the Mayor of Cicester had any Iurisdiction to hold Plea by Patent or Prescription But admitting that an Executor or Administrator according to that Resolution is not chargeable if by chargeable be meant compellable at the Common Law in an Action of Debt brought upon a simple Contract of the Testator or Intestate to pay such Debt what would it avail the Plaintiff in that Case or can in this Case unless the Resolution had been That though the Iurisdiction of the Court of Cicester had been well set forth yet a Iudgment there obtain'd against the Executor upon a simple Contract of the Testators had been no Barr in an Action of Debt brought upon an Obligation of the Testators But there is no such Resolution there for a Iudgment obtain'd upon such a simple Contract is as much a Iudgment when had as any other upon Obligations and the Books and use are clear That Judgments must be satisfied before Debts due by Obligation It is true it is a Waste of the Goods of the Dead in the Executor to pay voluntarily a Debt by simple Contract before a Debt by Obligation whereof he had notice and not otherwise in that Case But no man ever thought it a Devastavit in the Executor to satisfie a Iudgment obtain'd upon a simple Contract before a Debt due by Obligation Yet I shall agree the Executor by the Common Law might have prevented this Iudgment by abating the Plaintiffs Writ at first which he had power lawfully to do but he had equal
Case the Executor opposed the Action by offering to demurr and for any thing appearing he did so in the first 41 E. 3. f. 13. The other Case is 41 E. 3. f. 13. where an Action upon the Testators simple Contract was brought against an Executor and the Executor of a Co-executor to him the Writ was abated for that Reason and said withal There was no Specialty shewed but the first reason abating the Writ necessarily it no waies appears the Iudges would ex officio have abated the Action for the last Cause if the Executor desired it not So as when the Executor or Administrator hath once pleaded to an Action of Debt upon a single Contract he is equally bound up for the event as in any Action wherein the Testator or Intestate could not have waged Law It is therefore an ill Consequence for the Plaintiff to say I have brought an Action upon a simple Contract wherein the Intestate could not have waged his Law Therefore I must be paid before another Creditor by simple Contract bringing an Action wherein the Intestate might wage his Law for it is in the Administrators power by omitting to abate the Writ at first to make the Debt demanded by Action in which the Intestate might have waged his Law to be as necessarily and coercively paid as the other Debt demanded by Action wherein he could not wage his Law And if the Executor believes the Debt by simple Contract demanded by Action of Debt to be a just Debt it is against honesty conscience and the duty of his Office to demurr whereby to delay or prevent the payment of it Besides though since that illegal Resolution of Slade's Case grounded upon Reasons not fit for a Declamation much less for a Decision of Law The natural and genuine Action of Debt upon a simple Contract be turned into an Action of the Case wherein a man is deprived of waging his Law It is an absurd Opinion to think that therefore Debt demanded by it ought to have precedency for payment of a Debt due by simple Contract but quite the contrary For Actions of the Case are all Actiones injuriarum contra pacem and it is not a Debt certain in reason of Law that can be recovered by those Actions but damage for the injury ensuing upon the breach of promise which cannot be known until a Iury ascertain what the damage is Therefore a man did never wage his Law for a demand incertain for he could not make Oath of paying that which he knew not what it was as consisting in damage Now although the Iury give in damages regularly the money promised to be paid yet that changeth not the reason of the Law nor the form for still it is recovered by way of damage and not as a Debt is recovered Which shew the Action much inferiour and ignobler than the Action of Debt which by the Register is an Action of property and no reason a damage uncertain in its own nature should be paid before a certain Debt by simple Contract which were the first Debts and will probably be the last of the World for Contracts by writing were much later and there are many Nations yet where Letters are unknown and perhaps ever will be And that which is so commonly now received That every Contract executory implies a promise is a false Gloss thereby to turn Actions of Debt into Actions on the Case For Contracts of Debt are reciprocal Grants A man may sell his black Horse for present mony at a day to come and the Buyer may the Day being come seize the Horse for he hath property then in him which is the reason in the Register that Actions in the Debet and also in the Detinet are Actions of Property but no man hath property by a breach of promise but must be repair'd in damages The last Exception was That a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute Staple of 2000 l. in the Chancery is pleaded in Barr. And it is not said That it was per scriptum Obligatorium or seal'd as the Statute of 23 H. 8. requires nor that it was secundum formam Statuti Cr. 10 Car. 1. f. 362. Goldsmiths Case versus Sydnor And Goldsmith and Sydnors Case was urg'd to be adjudg'd in the point which Case is so adjudg'd by the Major part of the Court. But in that Case it is pleaded that Sydnor before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas concessit se teneri Ed. Hobert in 400 l. to be paid at Pentecost next ensuing si defecerit c. voluit concessit per idem scriptum quod incurreret super se haeredes Executores poena in Statuto Stapulae So as it appears The Recognizance was taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and that the Conuzor was to incurr the penalty of the Statute Staple and therefore a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute Staple was there intended to be pleaded but it was not pleaded that it was taken secundum formam Statuti in general nor specially per scriptum Obligatorium under Seal as it ought to be But here it is not pleaded That the Conuzor was to incurr the penalty of the Statute Staple nor that it was taken before any person authorized to take a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute Staple by the Statute of 23 H. 8. c. 6. for the Chancellor is not so authorized But that it was a bare Recognizance entred into in the Court of Chancery which all Courts of Westminster have power to take and that it remains there inroll'd And that the said Sum of Two thousand pounds should for default of payment be levied of the Conuzors Lands Goods and Chattels and Execution of such Recognizances are to be made by Elegit of the Lands as well as Goods And it appears by the Statute of Acton Burnell 13 E. 1. which is the Law for the Statute Merchant That such Recognizances for Debt were before the Statute Merchants taken by the Chancellor the Chief Justices and Judges Itinerant but the Execution of them not the same as of the Statute Merchant nor are they hindered by that Statute from being as before expresly And in 4 Mariae upon a great search of Presidents Br. Recognizance p. 20. Hill 4 Mar. It was resolv'd That every Iudge may take a Recognizance in any part of England both in Term and out of Term. The like Resolution was in the Lord Hobart's time Hob. f. 195. Hall Wingfields Case So as the Recognizance here pleaded is not a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute Staple nor so pleaded but a Recognizance entred into in the Court of Chancery as Recognizances are entred into in the Court of Common Pleas or Kings Bench and as they were entred before Recognizances by Statute Merchant or Staple But Such Recognizances are to be satisfied before Debts by simple Contracts and before Debts by Obligations also Rolls Executors f. 925.
But if he after the structure acquire or purchase a Water-course to it and grant it with the Appurtenances the Water-course passes because the Mill cannot be used without it So it is for the Mill-damm or Bank or the like So if he acquire an inlargement or bettering of his Water-course that additional water shall pass as pertaining how lately soever acquired So if a man grants his Saddle with all things thereto belonging Stirrops Girths and the like pass So if a man will grant his Viol the Strings and Bow will pass And the Pool was belonging and appertaining to the Water-work in this last sense as pertaining to the nature of the thing granted without which it could not be us'd for the Iury find Quod Stagnum praedictum fuit necessarium pro structura Anglicè Water-work praedict quodque eadem structura sine eodem Stagno operare non potuit And where a thing is so pertaining to the nature of the thing granted it is belonging and pertaining immediately as soon as the thing is erected and it is annexed to it And note the Iury do not find that aqua Stagni praedict but the Stagnum it self was necessary for the Water-work Nor do they find that the Water-work could not operare sine aqua Stagni but sine Stagno praedict And thereby they find that the Water and Soyl which Stagnum signifies was necessary for the work and it could not work without it Pasch 19 Car. II. Henry Stiles Plaintiff Richard Coxe Baronet Richard Coxe Esquire John Cromwell Thomas Merrett and Charles Davies Defendants In an Action of Trespass of Assault Battery and False Imprisonment 1. THE Plaintiff declares That the Defendants the last day of December in the Seventeenth year of the King in the Parish of St. Mary Bow in the Ward of Cheap in London assaulted wounded and kept him in Prison by the space of two days next following to his Damage of One hundred pounds 2. The Defendants plead They are not Culpable of the Trespass Assault Battery c. aforesaid 3. The Iury find Richard Coxe Esquire and Charles Davies not Culpable accordingly 4. And as to the rest of the Defendants they find specially That before the suppos'd Trespass that is the Eight and twentieth day of September in the Seventeenth year of the King one Richard Baughes Esquire one of the Iustices of the Peace of the County of Gloucester issued his Warrant under his Hand and Seal to the Constable and Tithingmen of Dumbleton in the said County to apprehend and bring before him the Plaintiff Henry Stiles and others to answer to such matters of Misdemeanour as on his Majesties behalf should be objected against them by Sir Richard Coxe Baronet then high Sheriff of the said County They find the Warrant in haec verba 5. That the said Warrant was afterwards and before the Trespass delivered to one Samuel Williams Constable of Dumbleton to be executed and that upon the said last day of December mentioned in the Declaration being Sunday immediately before Divine Service the Plaintiff sitting in a Seat of the said Church of Dumbleton by order of Richard Dasney Esquire his Master who claimed right to the said Seat the said Plaintiff being no Parishioner there nor dwelling in the said Parish the said Samuel being then Constable arrested the said Plaintiff 6. That the said Plaintiff at first resisted and refused to obey the said Warrant and after obey'd it That the said Samuel the Constable required the said Defendant Thomas Merret to assist him to convey him before a Iustice of the Peace But the said Samuel Thomas Merret and John Cromwell convey'd him to the House of the said Samuel in Dumbleton 7. Et tunc the aforesaid Richard Coxe Miles sent for the said Samuel at the House of the said Samuel in Dumbleton aforesaid Et praecepit eidem Samueli to lay the Plaintiff in the Stocks and thereupon the said Samuel John and Thomas convey'd the Plaintiff fromwards the way to the said Richard Baughes Iustice of the Peace and about Eleven of the Clock of the same day in the morning put the Plaintiff in the Stocks 8. They find the Act of 21 Jac. particularly cap. 12. And the Recital therein of the Act of 7 Jac. cap. 5. being an Act intitled An Act for easie pleading against troublesome and contentious Suits against Justices of the Peace Mayors Constables c. 9. And find particularly That it was Enacted by the said Parliament Quod si aliqua Actio Billa c. 10. But whether upon the whole matter by them found the said Sir Richard Coxe Baronet John and Thomas are Culpable they know not Et petunt advisamentum Curiae in Praemissis 11. And if upon the whole matter so found the Court shall think quod actio praedicta possit commensari in London Then they find the said Richard Coxe Baronet John and Thomas Culpable of the Trespass and assess damages to One hundred Marks and Costs to Three and fifty shillings and four pence 12. But if the said Court be of Opinion That the aforesaid Action could only be laid in the County of Gloucester then they find the said Richard Coxe Baronet John and Thomas not Culpable The words of the Act of 21 Jac. cap. 12. and which are particularly found by the Iury are 1. That if any Action Bill Plaint or Suit upon the Case Trespass Beating or False Imprisonment shall be brought against any Justice of the Peace Mayor or Bayliff of City or Town Corporate Headborough Portreeve Constable Tithingman c. or any of them or any other which in their Aid or Assistance or by their Commandment shall do any thing touching or concerning his or their Office or Offices for or concerning any matter cause or thing by them or any of them done by virtue or reason of their or any of their Office or Offices That the said Action Bill Plaint or Suit shall be laid within the County where the Trespass or Fact shall be done and committed and not elsewhere 2. And that it shall be lawful to every person and persons aforesaid to plead the general Issue and to give the special matter in evidence As by the Act of 7 Jac. cap. 5. 3. That if upon the Tryal of any such Action Bill Plaint or Suit the Plaintiff therein shall not prove to the Jury Trespass Beating Imprisonment or other Fact or cause of Action Bill Plaint c. was or were had made or committed within the County wherein such Action Bill Plaint or Suit shall be laid That then the Jury shall find the Defendant or Defendants in every such Action Bill Plaint or Suit Not guilty without having any regard or respect to any Evidence given by the Plaintiff touching the Trespass or other cause of the Action Bill Plaint or Suit c. 4. If Verdict shall pass with the Defendant or Defendants or if the Plaintiff therein become Non-suit or suffer any discontinuance thereof the Defendant or Defendants shall have such
double Costs and other Advantages as by the Act of 7 Jac. cap. 5. is provided The first Question upon this Special Verdict is Whether if any Officer in the Act mentioned or any in his assistance shall do things by colour of their Office not touching or concerning their said Office and shall be therefore impleaded Or if they or any of them shall be impleaded for or concerning any matter cause or thing by them or any of them done by pretence of their Offices and which is not strictly done by virtue or reason of their Office but is a misfeasance in Law shall have the benefit of this Act of having the matter tryed in the County where the Fact was done and not elsewhere If so 1. They shall not have the Tryal for any matter touching their Offices in the County where the Fact was done unless the Plaintiff please to lay it there and if he so pleas'd it might have been laid there before the Act of 21. which was purposely made to compel the laying of the Action where the Fact was done 2. By such Exposition of the Act the Action shall never be laid where the Fact was done for if it may be laid elsewhere at all if it be found upon the Tryal That the Officers question'd did not according to their Office there will be no cause to lay the Action in the proper County for the Iury where the Action is laid will find for the Plaintiff for the Misfeazance and if it be found the Defendants have pursued their Office wherever the Action is laid the Iury will find for the Defendants and then no cause to lay an Action in the County where the Fact was done So Quacunque via data the Act will be useless 3. If it can be laid in another County without hearing Evidence it cannot be known whether the Officer hath misdone or not How then can the Iury as the Act directs find the Defendants Not guilty without regard or respect to the Plaintiffs Evidence for then the Iury must regard the Evidence to find whether the Officer hath mis-done and not regard the Evidence at all to find the Officers Not guilty as the Act doth order Nor is there any inconvenience because by the Intention of Law whether the Officers have done justifiably or not without this Act of 21. the Action ought to be laid where the Fact was done and the Act is but to compel the doing of that where an Officer is concerned that otherwise fieri debuit though factum valet not being done The second Question is Whether upon the special points referred to the Court by the Iury they have found all the Defendants or any of them and whom Not guilty It hath been admitted at the Barr That the Defendants excepting Sir Richard Coxe cannot be found culpable by this Act of 21. and it being a Trespass that some may be guilty and not others which is true But the Question is not Whether some of the Defendants might have been found guilty and others not but whether as this Verdict is all or none must be Culpable 1. The Iury referr to the Court Si actio praedicta potuit commensari in London then they find all the Defendants culpable And if actio praedicta potuit commensari tantummodo in the County of Gloucester then they find all the Defendants by name Not Culpable So as the matter is Whether this individual Action brought joyntly against all the Defendants might be laid in London For that is the Actio praedicta not whether an Action might be laid in London for the Trespass against any of these Defendants and in that first sense Actio praedicta could not be in London for it could not be there laid as to some of the Defendants 2. Secondly they referr to the Court Whether Actio praedicta which is this Action jointly brought against all the Defendants could only be laid in the County of Gloucester and if so they find for the Defendants to which the Court must answer That this Action so jointly brought could only be laid according to Law ad omnem Juris effectum in the County of Gloucester 3. Thirdly if the Court should be of Opinion That the Action was well laid as to Sir Richard Coxe but not the rest the Iury find not him Guilty and not the rest for they find all equally Guilty or equally not Guilty 4. Fourthly That which differs his Case from the rest is That he was not assistant or aiding to the Constable for he bad that is praecepit or commanded the Constable to put the Plaintiff in Cippis But as to that the ancient Law was both adjudg'd in Parliament and allowed That it was contra consuetudinem Regni that a man should be condemn'd in a Trespass De praecepto or auxilio if no man were convicted of the Fact done It was the Case in Parliament of Bogo de Clare 18 E. 1. John Wallis Clerk entred his House and brought Letters of Citation from the Arch-bishop of Canterbury Some of the Family of Bogo made Wallis eat the said Process and Wax thereto affixed Et imprisonaverunt male tractaverunt For which and the Contempt to the King he brought his Action against Bogo who pleaded That he named no persons in certain nor alledg'd that the Fact was done by his command and demanded Iudgment thereupon and was discharged Notwithstanding by the Kings pleasure for so enormous a Trespass done in Contempt of the Church for the Contempt done within the Verge and in time of Parliament and for the bad Example Bogo was commanded to answer the King of the Trespass done in his House Et per Manupastos Familiares suos and a day given him to produce before the King and his Council those of his Family which was accordingly done but they who were said to have done the Fact were fled Et super hoc idem Bogo perit Judicium si de Praecepto missione vel assensu si sibi imponeretur ad sectam Domini Regis respondere debeat antequam factores principales aliquo modo de facto illo convincantur Whereupon Iudgment was given Et quia per consuetudinem legem Angliae Nullus de praecepto vi auxilio aut missione respondere debeat antequam factores aliquo modo convincantur Consideratum est quod praedictus Bogo ad praesens eat inde sinedie praedictus Jo. le Wallis sequatur versus factores principales prout sibi viderit expediri si voluerit six persons manuceperunt praedictum Bogonem ad habendum ipsum coram Domino Rege ad respondendum ipsi Domino Regi ad voluntatem suam cum praedicti factores de facto illo fuerint convicti si Dominus Rex versus eum inde loqui voluerit A Iudgment in Parliament at the Kings Suit That it was against the Custome and Law of the Kingdom to convict a man de praecepto auxilio aut missione in a Trespass before some who
the matter proceeded upon in such Courts might as well be prosecuted in the Common Bench But if a priviledg'd person in Banco were sued in the Ecclesiastical Courts or before the High Commission or Constable and Marshal for things whereof the Common Pleas had no Conuzance they could not Supersede that proceeding by Priviledge And this was the ancient reason and course of Priviledge 1. Another way of Priviledge by reason of Suit depending in A Superiour Court is when a person impleading or impleaded as in the Common Bench is after arrested in a Civil Action or Plaint in London or elsewhere and by Habeas Corpus is brought to the Common Pleas and the Arrest and Cause retorn'd if it appear to the Court That the Arrest in London was after the party ought to have had the Priviledge of the Common Pleas he shall have his Priviledg allow'd and be discharg'd of his Arrest and the party left to prosecute his cause of Action in London in the Common Pleas if he will 2. If the cause of the Imprisonment retorn'd be a lawful cause but which cannot be prosecuted in the Common Pleas as Felony Treason or some cause wherein the High Commission Admiralty or other Court had power to imprison lawfully then the party imprison'd which did implead or was impleaded in the Common Bench before such imprisonment shall not be allow'd Priviledge but ought to be remanded 3. The third way is when a man is brought by Habeas Corpus to the Court and upon retorn of it it appears to the Court That he was against Law imprison'd and detain'd though there be no cause of Priviledge for him in this Court he shall never be by the Act of the Court remanded to his unlawful imprisonment for then the Court should do an act of Injustice in imprisoning him de novo against Law whereas the great Charter is Quod nullus liber homo imprisonetur nisi per legem terrae This is the present case and this was the case upon all the Presidents produc'd and many more that might be produc'd where upon Habeas Corpus many have been discharg'd and bail'd though there was no cause of Priviledge in the Case This appears plainly by many old Books if the Reason of them be rightly taken For insufficient causes are as no causes retorn'd and to send a man back to Prison for no cause retorn'd seems unworthy of a Court. 9 H. 6. 54. 58. Br. n. 5. 14 H. 7. f. 6. n. 19. 9 E. 4. 47. n. 24. 12 H. 4. f. 21. n. 11. Br. If a man be impleaded by Writ in the Common Pleas and is after arrested in London upon a Plaint there upon a Habeas Corpus he shall have Priviledge in the Common Pleas if the Writ upon which he is impleaded bear date before the Arrest in London and be retorn'd although the Plaintiff in the Common Pleas be Nonsuit essoin'd or will not appear and consequently the Case of Priviledge at an end before the Corpus cum causa retorn'd but if the first Writ be not retorn'd there is no Record in Court that there is such a Defendant The like where a man brought Debt in Banco and after for the same Debt arrested the Defendant in London and became Nonsuit in Banco yet the Defendant upon a Habeas Corpus had his Priviledge because he had cause of Priviledge at the time of the Arrest 14 H. 7. 6. Br. Priviledge n. 19. The like Case 9 E. 4. where a man appear'd in Banco by a Cepi Corpus and found Mainprise and had a day to appear in Court and before his day was arrested in London and brought a Corpus cum causa in Banco Regis at which day the Plaintiff became Nonsuit yet he was discharg'd from the Serjeant at London because his Arrest there was after his Arrest in Banco and consequently unlawful 9 E. 4. f. 47. Br. Priviledge 24. and a man cannot be imprison'd at the same time lawfully in two Courts Coke Mag. Chart. f. 53 55. The Court of Kings Bench cannot pretend to the only discharging of Prisoners upon Habeas Corpus unless in case of Priviledge for the Chancery may do it without question And the same Book is That the Common Pleas or Exchequer may do it if upon Retorn of the Habeas Corpus it appear the Imprisonment is against Law An Habeas Corpus may be had out of the Kings Bench or Chancery though there be no Priviledge Mic. C. 2. Coke f. 55. c. or in the Court of Common Pleas or Exchequer for any Officer or priviledg'd Person there upon which Writ the Gaoler must Retorn by whom he was committed and the cause of his Imprisonment and if it appeareth that his Imprisonment be just and lawful he shall be remanded to the former Gaoler but if it shall appear to the Court that he was imprisoned against the Law of the Land they ought by force of this Statute to deliver him if it be doubtful and under consideration he may be bayl'd The Kings Bench may bayl if they please in all cases but the Common Bench must remand if the cause of the Imprisonment retorn'd be just The Writ de homine replegiando is as well retornable in the Common Pleas as in the Kings Bench. All Prohibitions for incroaching Iurisdiction Issue as well out of the Common Pleas as Kings Bench. Quashing the Order of Commitment upon a Certiorari which the Kings Bench may do but not the Common Pleas is not material in this Case 1. The Prisoner is to be discharg'd or remanded barely upon the Retorn and nothing else whether in the Kings Bench or Common Pleas. 2. Should the Kings Bench have the Order of Commitment certified and quash'd before the Retorn of the Habeas Corpus or after what will it avail the Prisoners they cannot plead Nul tiel Record in the one case or the other 3. In all the Presidents shew'd in the Common Pleas or in any that can be shew'd in the King's Bench upon discharging the Prisoner by Habeas Corpus nothing can be shew'd of quashing the Orders or Decrees of that Court that made the wrong Commitment Glanvill's C. Moore f. 836. 4. It is manifest where the Kings Bench hath upon Habeas Corpus discharg'd a Prisoner committed by the Chancery the person hath been again re-committed for the same Cause by the Chancery and re-deliver'd by the Kings Bench but no quashing of the Chancery Order for Commitment ever heard of 5. In such Cases of re-commitment the party hath other and proper remedy besides a new Habeas Corpus of which I shall not speak now 6. It is known That if a man recover in Assise and after in a Re-disseisin if the first Iudgment be revers'd in the Assise the Iudgment in the Re-disseisin is also revers'd So if a man recover in Waste and Damages given for which Debt is brought especially if the first Iudgment be revers'd before Execution it destroys the Process
a House Barns and Tithe of Woolney and thereof seis'd in the right of his Prebendary makes a Lease to Astly of the Prebend una cum the Glebe House Barn and Tithe for Three Lives rendring the accustomed and ancient Rent of Five pounds Twelve shillings Astly demiseth to Taverner the House Glebe and Barn for a year reserving Twenty shillings and dies the Cestuy que vies living As I concluded before Taverner is Occupant of the House Barn and Glebe-land and consequently lyable to pay the whole Rent being Five pounds twelve shillings yearly though the Land House and Barn be found of the yearly value of Twenty shillings only but because the Rent cannot issue out of Tithes or things that lye in Grant it issues only out of the House Barn and Land which may be distrain'd on 2. If Taverner being Occupant of the Land shall not have the Tithes which remain'd in Astly according to his Lease for three Lives at the time of his death and whereof by their nature there can be no direct Occupancy It follows that the Lease made by Doctor Mallory is determin'd as to the Tithe for no other can have them yet continues in force as to the Land and House and all the Rent reserv'd which seems strange the Land and Tithe being granted by the same Demise for three Lives which still continue yet the Lease to be determined as to part 3. Though the Rent issue not out of the Tithe yet the Tithe was as well a Consideration for the payment of the Rent as the Land and Houses were and it seems unreasonable that the Lessor Doctor Mallory should by act in Law have back the greatest Consideration granted for payment of the Rent which is the Tithe and yet have the Rent wholly out of the Land by act in Law too which cannot yield it 4. Though Doctor Mallory could not have reserv'd a Rent out of the Tithe only to bind his Successor upon a Lease for Lives more than out of a Fair though it were as the ancient Rent and had been usually answered for the Fair as is resolv'd in Jewel Bishop of Sarum's Case Jewell's Case 5 Rep. Yet in this Case where the Tithe together with Land out of which Rent could issue was demis'd for the accustomed Rent the Successor could never avoid the Lease either in the whole or as to the Tithe only 13 Eliz. c. 10. This seems clear by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 10. which saith All Leases made by any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical persons having any Lands Tenements Tithes or Hereditaments parcel of the Possessions of any Spiritual Promotion other than for One and twenty years or three Lives whereupon the accustomed yearly Rent or more shall be reserv'd shall be void Cokes Litt. f. 142. a. f. 144. a. Whence it is apparent this Statute intended that Leases in some sense might be made of Tithes for One and twenty years or Three Lives and an ancient Rent reserv'd but of a bare Tithe only a Rent could not be reserv'd according to Jewell's Case for neither Distress nor Assise can be of such Rent though an Assise may be de Portione Decimarum as is clear by the Lord Dyer 7 E. 6. and the difference rightly stated Therefore a Lease of Tithe and Land out of which a Rent may issue and the accustomed Rent may be reserved must be good within the intention of the Statute or Tithe could in no sense be demis'd 5. Taverner the Lessee being Occupant here by his possession becomes subject to the payment of the Rent to Waste to Forfeiture Conditions and all things that Astly the Lessee or his Assignee if he had made any had been subject to Also Coke's Litt. 41. He must claim by a que Estate from Astly he must averr the Life of Cestuy que vie so as he becomes to all intents an Assignee in Law of the first Lessee 6. Without question the Occupant being chargeable with the Rent shall by Equity have the Tithe which was the principal Consideration for payment of the Rent when no man can have the benefit of the Tithe but the Lessor Doctor Mallory who gave it as a Consideration for the Rent which he must still have Therefore I conceive the Reason of Law here ought necessarily to follow the Reason of Equity and that the Occupant shall have the Tithe not as being immediate Occupant of the Tithe whereof no occupancy can be but when by his possession of the Land he becomes Occupant and the Law casts the Freehold upon him he likewise thereby becomes an Assignee in Law of Astly's Lease and Interest and consequently of the Tithe An ancient Rent reserv'd within the Statute of 1. or 13. of the Queen upon a Lease of One and twenty years or Three Lives is by express intention of that Statute a Rent for publique use and maintenance of Hospitality by Church-men as is resolv'd in Elsemere's Case Elsmers C. 5. Rep. the 5. Rep. and therefore if the Lessee provide not an Assignee to answer the Rent to the Successors of the Lessor for the ends of that Law the Law will do it for him and none fitter to be so than the Occupant in case of a Lease pur auter vie as this is And if the Occupant being Assignee hath pass'd all his Estate and Interest to the Plaintiff hath good cause of Action for the Tithe converted by the Defendant Pasch 22 Car. II. Judgment for the Defendant Three Justices against the Chief Justice Trin. 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 2043. Harrison versus Doctor Burwell In a Prohibition for his Marriage with Jane the Relict of Bartholomew Abbot his Great Uncle The Questions are Quest 1 WHether the marriage of Thomas Harrison the Plaintiff with Jane his now wife being the Relict of Bartholomew Abbot his great Vncle that is his Grand-fathers Brother by the Mothers side be a lawful marriage within the Act of 32 H. 8. cap. 38 Quest 2 Admitting it to be a lawful marriage within the meaning of that Act Whether the Kings Temporal Courts are properly Judges of it because the unlawfulness or lawfulness of it by that Act doth depend upon its being a marriage within or without the Levitical Degrees For if within those Degrees it is not a lawful marriage by that Act. And the right knowledge of marriages within or without those Degrees must arise from the right knowledge ot the Scriptures of the Old Testament specially the Interpretation of which hath been and regularly is of Ecclesiastick Conizance and not of Lay or Temporal Conizance in regard of the Language wherein it was writ and the receiv'd Interpretations concerning it in all succession of time Quest 3 Admitting the Kings Temporal Courts have by that Act of 32. or any other special Conizance of the Levitical Degrees and of marriages within them And though this be no marriage within the Levitical Degrees it being articled in general to be an Incestuous marriage
this difference holds in offences by penal Laws 22 Car. 2. c. 8. So a Mayor or Bayliff of a Town or other Toll-taker who is penally bound to provide true Market measures and doth not cannot be pardon'd by the King because the fault still continues but the punishment inflicted the King may pardon But by a Law all these offences may be pardon'd So it is generally true that malum per se cannot be dispensed with but thence to inferr as many do that every malum which the King cannot dispense with is malum per se is not true Nor is there in that Case any sufficient designation of what is malum per se and why to prevent error in disquisition concerning it though some instances thereof mala per se be very right I shall therefore endeavour to in stance in several kinds of mala per se which cannot be dispens'd with and in some mala prohibita by Acts of Parliament and otherwise which the King also cannot dispense with and to give the reason why he cannot in both thereby to make the conclusion I drive at less confused which is to differ penal Laws dispensable from those which are not Murther Adultery Stealing Incest Sacriledge Extortion Perjury Trespass and many other of the like kind all men will agree to be mala per se and indispensable All which are prohibited and by Statutes Nor is it much to say those are also prohibited by the Common Law and therefore cannot be dispens'd with if that were the reason nothing prohibited at the Common Law could be dispens'd with which is not so 2. Where the Suit is only the Kings for breach of a Law which is not to the particular damage of any third person the King may dispense but where the Suit is only the Kings but for the benefit and safety of a third person and the King is intitled to the Suit by the prosecution and complaint of such third person the King cannot release discharge or dispense with the Suit but by consent and agreement of the party concern'd As where upon complaint of any person a man hath entred into Recognizance to keep the Peace against such person the King cannot discharge such Recognizance before it be forfeited but the party whose safety is concerned may though the King only can sue the Recognizance Some more such Cases may be As the Laws of Nusances are pro bono publico so are all general penal Laws and if a Nusance cannot be dispens'd with for that reason it follows no penal Law for the same reason can be dispens'd with Therefore the reason is because the parties particularly damaged by a Nusance have their Actions on the Case for their damage whereof the King cannot deprive them by his dispensation And by the same reason other penal Laws the breach of which are to mens particular damage cannot be dispens'd with 3. Nusances and Ills prohibited by penal Acts of Parliament are of the same nature as to the publique 4 E. 4. f. 31. 22 E. 4. f. 22. 3 H. 7. f. 1. Br. Leet n. 2. 19 25 26 30. although as the Law is now received the mala or nocumenta prohibited by Acts of Parliament are not presentable in Leets or the Sheriffs Torn as Nusances at Common Law are of which some questionless cannot be dispens'd with As obstructing the High way diverting a Water-course breaking down a Bridge breaking the Assise of Bread and Ale for as to these the parties particularly damaged by them have their Actions which the King cannot discharge 4. Other ancient Nusances are by which no man hath a particular damage or action for it as if a man buy provision coming to the Market by the way which is a Nusance by forestalling the Market and sells it not in the Market forestall'd no Action lies for a particular damage to any man more than to every man but the King may punish it So if a may buy Corn growing in the field contrary to the Statute of 5 E. 6. c. 14. he is an Ingrosser So selling Corn in the Sheaf is against the Common Law by Robert Hadham's Case Cok. f. 197. c. 89. Hill 25 E. 3. coram Rege cited in Coke's Pleas of the Crown and punishable by the King but no particular person can have an Action for such ingrossing more than every man yet these are Nusances by the Common Law but so made by prohibiting Laws beyond memory As by a Law of King Athelstans Ne quis extra oppidum quid emat Sax. Laws f. 49. c. 12. Will. the firsts Laws f. 171. c. 60 61. Cok. Pleas Coron 197. forestalling was prohibited And by several Laws of William the First Ne venditio emptio fiat nisi coram testibus in civitatibus Item nullum mercatum vel forum sit nec fieri permittatur nisi in civitatibus regni nostri And no way differ from publique evils now prohibited by Parliament and may by it be permitted for the Statute of 15 Car. 2. c. 5. 15 Car. 2 c. 5. gives leave to ingross without forestalling when Corn exceeds not certain Rates Nor see I any reason why the King may not dispense with those Nusances by which no man hath right to a particular action as well as he may with any other offence against a penal Law by which no third person hath cause of Action Whence it follows That if an Act of Parliament call an offence a Nusance from which no particular damage can arise to a particular person to have his Action the King may dispense with such a nominal Nusance as with an offence against a penal Law for which a man can have no Action for his particular damage 5. The Register hath no Writ of Ad quod damnum upon any Licence to be granted but for alienation of Capite Land or in Mortmain or for diverting or obstructing a Water-course or High-way in which Cases the Writ is directed to the certain Sheriff or Escheator of the County where the Land-way or Water-course lye but for Licences for other things as Exportation or Importation of prohibited Commodities a Writ of Ad quod Damnum cannot be directed to any certain Sheriff or other Officer to enquire Nor is it enough to make a thing malum per se because prohibited at Common Law But the reason is The word Murther ex vi termini in the Language it is us'd in signifies unlawful killing a man The word Adultery unlawful Copulation Stealing unlawful taking from another Perjury unlawful swearing and Trespass ex vi termini an unlawful imprisonment or unlawful entry or the like upon anothers House or Lands and so do the other mala instanced If these mala might be dispens'd with in regard a dispensation as I said makes the thing to be done lawful to him who is dispens'd with it follows that the dispensation would make unlawful killing which the word Murther imports vi termini to be lawful unlawful
convert part of their Wood-land into Arable 35 H. 8. c. 17. contrary to the Statute of 35 H. 8. and contrary also to the Common Law I have a Note of a Charter of King John to an Abbot and his Covent by which they had Licence Nemora sua pertinentia Domui suae redigere in culturam 5. A Licence to erect some Cottages upon their Waste or other Lands 31 El. c. 7. contrary to the Statute of 31 Eliz. c. 7. 6. A Licence to erect a Fair or Market 7. A Licence to an Abbot and his Covent Pl. Com. Grendons C. to appropriate a Rectory In all these Cases the King hath no knowledge of the persons themselves or of their number to whom he grants his Licence or Dispensation Therefore that can be no reason to avoid the Charter of the Corporation of Vintners A Dispensation or Licence properly passeth no Interest nor alters or transfers Property in any thing but only makes an Action lawful which without it had been unlawful As a Licence to go beyond the Seas to hunt in a mans Park to come into his House are only Actions which without Licence had been unlawful But a Licence to hunt in a mans Park and carry away the Deer kill'd to his own use to cut down a Tree in a mans Ground and to carry it away the next day after to his own use are Licences as to the Acts of Hunting and cutting down the Tree but as to the carrying away of the Deer kill'd and Tree cut down they are Grants So to licence a man to eat my meat or to fire the wood in my Chimney to warm him by as to the actions of eating fireing my wood and warming him they are Licences but it is consequent necessarily to those Actions that my Property be destroyed in the meat eaten and in the wood burnt so as in some Cases by consequent and not directly and as its effect a Dispensation or Licence may destroy and alter Property Trin. 2. Jac. To the Presidents of Wright versus Horton alios Of Norris versus Mason Trin. 2 Jac. Both which were the same Cases with the present upon the Letters Patents of Queen Elizabeth the Ninth of her Reign to the Vintners of London Of Young versus Wright Mich. 12 Car. 2. No Answer hath been given but that which is none viz. That the two first Judgments were without Argument which is not essential to a Judgment and Judgments are frequently given when the Cause is conceiv'd clear as it seems these were conceiv'd if there were no Argument which is but a Non liquet The Answer to the last President is That the Judgment upon the Roll is torn off That some of the Judges are living who gave the Judgment and many more who know it to have been given Other Presidents of Licences to Corporations 6 H. 8. 1. A Special Licence to the Fraternity of Corvisors London to exercise their Callings notwithstanding a penal Statute to the contrary 1 R. 3. 1 E. 6. 4. Inhabitantibus in Com. Norf. Civitat Norwic. authoritat barganizare pro Lanis non obstante Statuto 37 H. 8. 2 E. 6. 3. Mercatoribus de Venice Licenc Special emere in aliquo Com. hujus regni Angl. 500 Saccas Lanarum ac illas operare sic operat in partes exteras transmarinas carriare absque impedimento non obstante Statut. 4 H. 7. 7 E. 6. 6. Mercatoribus transeuntibus Licenc asportare pecun contra formam Statuti 1 E. 6. 7. Johanni Gale Mil. Licenc pro omnibus suis servis sagittare in vibrell non obstante Act. Parliament Cons Tho. Com. South 2 R. 3. 1. A Proclamation dispensing with a penal Statute touching Cloth-making 1 R. 3. 9 Eliz. 3. Henr Campion al. Brasiator de Lond. Westm licenc retinere alienos in servitiis suis 27 H. 8. 2. Major Civitat Heref. Licenc perquirere terram ad Annuum valorem 40 Marcarum non obstante Statuto 36 Eliz. 3. Ballivis c. de Yarmouth magna Licenc transportare 40000 quarter frument gran infra 10 Ann. 26 Eliz. 7. President c. Mercatorum Hispaniae Portugal infra Civitat Cestr Licenc transportare 10000 Dickers of Leather per 12 Ann. 1 M. 2. Mercatoribus de le Stillyard Licence for three years to Export any manner of Woollen Cloth at 6 l. and under unrowed unbarbed and unshorn without forfeiture 1 M. 11. Mercatoribus periclitan a Licence to transport all manner of Woollen Cloth non obstante Stat. Roberto Heming alios Licence to sell Faggots within London and Westminster non obstante Stat. 2 Jac. 22. A Licence to the Gun-makers of London to transport Guns 4 Eliz. 2. A Licence to the Mayor c. of Bristoll that they may lade and unlade their Ships c. of their Goods and lay the same on Land and from Land to transport them Non obstante Statut. 6 Eliz. 11. Mercatoribus Periclitan Licence to transport their Merchandises in strange Ships Non obstante Statut. 5 Car. 1. Mercatoribus de le East-Indies Licence to transport 10000 l. in English Gold Objections against the Patent 9 Jac. Obj. 1 That by this Patent every Freeman of London and of the Corporation of Vintners which freedom the City and Corporation gives to whom they please is dispens'd with So in effect the City of London and Corporation of Vintners give Dispensation to sell Wine The Case of penal Laws Seventh Rep. Answ 1. which by Law none but the King can grant as is resolved in the Seventh Report The King Incorporates a Town by name of Mayor and Burgesses with power to the Burgesses annually to choose a New Mayor Brook Commission n. 5. and grants that every Mayor at the end of his Majoralty shall be a Justice of the Peace in that Corporation It is no Inference because the Burgesses elect the Mayors that therefore they make Justices of Peace for they are made so by the King 's Great Seal and not by them The Case is in Brook Title Commission N. 5. Nor is that Case of penal Laws so generally true perhaps if not understood where the King governs in person and not by his Lieutenant as in Ireland or by Governours as in the Plantations of the Western Islands The City of London grants Dispensations in this Case no more than the Burgesses make Justices of the Peace in the other Obj. 2 Another Objection made is That the King cannot dispense with a man to buy an Office contrary to the penal Statute of 5 E. 6. nor with one Simoniacally presented to hold the Living nor with any of the House of Commons not to take the Oath of Allegiance according to the Statute 7 Jac. c. 6. nor to Sue in the Admiralty for a Contract on the Land contrary to the Statute 2 H. 4. First It is against the known practise since the Statute of Answ 1 7 E. 6. That the King cannot dispense for selling of
and Merioneth The residue of the said Lordships Marchers were thereby framed and divided into five particular Counties erected and created by the Act namely the County of 1 Monmouth 2 of Breenock 3 of Montgomery 4 of Radnor 5 of Denbigh The respective Lordships Marchers annexed to the respective English Counties of Salop Hereford and Glocester are now to all intents under the Jurisdiction of the Courts at Westminster in like manner as the Counties to which they were annexed formerly were and yet are So is one of the new erected Counties framed out of the said Lordships Marchers namely the County of Monmouth which by the said Act is to all purposes under the Jurisdiction of the Kings Courts at Westminster as any English Country is All the Lordships Marchers annexed to the ancient Shires of Wales are now since the Statute under the same Jurisdiction for Administration of Justice as those ancient Shires were before the Statute of the 27. and yet are so as the Lordships Marchers annexed to those ancient Shires of Wales are now such parts of them as the Lordships Marchers annexed to the English Shires are parts of them And the four new Shires in Wales excluding Monmouth shire are by the said Act under the same Administration of Justice by the King's Justices to that purpose there Commissioned as the other ancient Shires of Wales formerly were and are and consequently wholly out of the Jurisdiction of the King's Courts at Westminster And the reason appears in the Statute forasmuch as the Counties or Shires of Brecnock Radnor Montgomery and Denbigh be far distant from the City of London and the Inhabitants of the said Shires not of substance to travel out of their Counties to have the Administration of Justice It is therefore enacted that there shall be respective Chanceries and Exchequers in these Counties and that the Sheriffs of those Counties shall make their Accompts before the Chamberlain and Barons there appointed And that Justice shall be used and ministred in the said new Shires according to the Laws and Statutes of England by such Justiciar or Justicers as shall be thereto appointed by the King and after such form and fashion as Justice is used and ministred to the King's Subjects within the three Shires of North-wales which is according to the ancient Administration of Justice by the Statute of Wales 12 E. 1. So as since this Statute the Courts of Westminster have less Jurisdiction in Wales than before for before they had some in all their Lordships Marchers which were in no County as by this Act and since they being all reduced into Counties either of England or Wales their Jurisdiction is absolute over such of them as are annexed to English Counties but none over the rest And accordingly it hath been still practised since the Statute for before Lordships Marchers and Quare Impedits of Churches within them were impleadable in the Kings Courts by Originals out of the Chancery directed to the adjoyning Sheriffs and the Issue tryed in the Counties adjoyning But since no such Original hath issued for real Actions nor any such Tryal been And what hath been in personal Actions of that kind began upon mistake because they found some Originals issued into some part of Wales and knew not the true reason of it that it was by Act of Parliament they then concluded Originals might issue for any cause arising into any part of Wales and the Tryals to be in the adjacent Counties of England generally And though that practise hath been deserted since the Statute of 27 H. 8. as to real Actions because the subject matter of the Lordships Marchers was taken away which in some sense was lawful as is opened before the Statute yet they have retained it still in personal Actions which was never lawful nor found in any Case anciently practised as real Actions were as appears in the Case of Stradling and Morgan in the Commentaries yet that was upon a quo minus out of the Exchequer which I do not see how it can change the Law If Judgments be obtained in the King's Courts against persons Obj. 1 inhabiting in Wales and that Process of Execution cannot be awarded thither the Judgments will be ineffectual The same may be said of Judgments obtained against a Frenchman Answ 1 Scotch man or Dutch-man whose usual Residence Lands and Goods are in those Territories he that sues ought to foresee what benefit he shall have by it and must not expect it but where the Courts have Jurisdiction The same may be said of Judgments obtained here against Irish-men Garnsey or Jersey Inhabitants or formerly against those of Calais Gascoign Guyen which were equally and some are still of the Dominions of England as Wales is subject to the Parliament of England but not under the Jurisdiction of the Courts at Westminster though subject to Mandatory Writs of the King Obj. 2 That of Judgments obtained in the King's Courts Execution is had in Franchises and also in Counties Palatine where the King 's Writ runneth not and by the same reason ought to be had in Wales though the King's Writ runneth not there Answ 1 Franchises inferiour are deriv'd out of Counties by the King's Grant where the King's Writ did run and so were Counties Palatine part of the Realm anciently where the Subjects of the Realm had right to have Execution of the Lands and Goods of those against whom they recovered in the King's Courts whereof they are no more to be deprived than of their Actions by the King's Grant for he may make what Counties he pleases Counties Palatine but in Dominions out of the Realm the Subject had no such Right in the other they have it because they had it at Common Law but in others not because they had it not at Common Law When the Question is of the Jurisdiction in a Dominion or Territory belonging to England the way to determine it is by examining the Law in Dominions the same in Specie with that concerning which the Question is and not to examine the Law in Franchises or Dominions of another kind Therefore to determine what Jurisdiction the King's Courts have in Wales ought to be by examining their Jurisdiction in Ireland the Islands of Garnsey Jersey Calais Gascoign Guyen in former times some part of Scotland and the Western Islands and many others might be named which are Dominions in Specie the same with Wales and belonging to England where the King 's Writ runneth not and not this power in Franchises within the Realm part of English Counties before they were Franchises and continuing so after or in entire Counties Palatine which sometimes were under the Jurisdiction of the King's Courts and in which the Subjects had a right of their Tryals upon Pleas pleaded and of Execution and which cannot be taken from them where the King 's Writ runneth not The Cases are full in this point in 19 H. 6. f. 12. 32 H. 6. f. 25. and many
than a local Subject ibid. 286 5. He must be otherwise a Subject than any Grant or Letters Patents can make him ibid. 6. The Natives of Jersey Garnsey Ireland and the English Plantations c. are not Aliens 268 in loco 278 279 7. Those which are born in the Kings Forreign Plantations are born his Natural Subjects and shall inherit in England 279 8. A Natural Subject is correlative to a Natural Prince and a man cannot have two natural Soveraigns no more than two Fathers or two Mothers 280 273 in loco 283 9. The several ways by which men born out of England may inherit in England 281 10. An Antenatus in Scotland shall not inherit without an Act of Parliament because he is an Alien 274 in loco 284 287 11. Who are the Antenati Postnati and the difference between them 273 in loco 283 12. An Act of Parliament in Ireland shall never Naturalize an Alien to England to make him inheritable there 274 in loco 284 13. No Tenure by Homage c. in any of the Kings Dominions acquired by Conquest or by Grant or Letters Patents can make a man inheritable in England 279 14. No Laws made in any Dominion acquired by Conquest or new Plantation by the Kings Governor or people there by virtue of the Kings Letters Patents can make an Alien inheritable in England 279 15. One Naturalized in Scotland since the Union cannot inherit in England 268 in loco 278 279 280 285 16. A man born a Subject to one that is King of another Country and who afterwards comes to be King of England is an Alien and shall not inherit in England ibid. 285 286 17. An act of Law making a man as if he had been born a Subject shall not work the same effect as his being born a Subject which is an effect of Law 280 18. An Alien hath issue a Son and afterwards is Denizen'd and he afterwards hath another Son here the youngest Son shall inherit 285 Allegiance 1. All Allegiance and Subjection are acts and obligations of Law the subjection begins with the birth of the Subject at which time the Kings protection of him likewise begins 279 Appendant 1. Whatsoever is appendant to the Land goes to the Occupier thereof naturally 190 2. An Advowson may be appendant to a Mannor 12 Apprentice 1. The Law permits not persons who have served Seven years to have a way of livelyhood to be hindred from the exercise of their Trades in any Town or part of the Kingdom 356 Arch-bishop See Ordinary Dispensation 1. The Arch-bishop may dispense for a Plurality 20 Assets 1. The manner of pleading Assets ultra 104 Assignee and Assignment 1. Offices or acts of personal Trust cannot be assigned for that Trust which any man may have is not personal 180 181 2. An Occupant becomes an Assignee in Law to the first Lessee 204 3. If a man Covenants against himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns yet if his Assigns do a tortious act it is no breach of the Covenant because he may have remedy by Action for the tort 118 to 128 Assise 1. An Assise will not lye for a Rent issuing out of Tythes barely 204 Attaint See Title Statutes 3 11. 1. An Attaint lies only in Civil not Criminal Causes 145 146 2. Jurors are not finable for a false Verdict an Attaint only lies against them 145 Attorney 1. An Attorney cannot bring Debt for Soliciting but Case only 99 2. The Defendant cannot wage his Law for Attorneys Fees ibid. Attornment 1. By the Common Law an Attornment was requisite to entitle the Lord the Reversioner the Grantee of a Remainder or of a Rent by Deed or Fine to distrain for Rent in arrear 39 2. By a Grant and Attornment the Grantee becomes actually seised of the Rent 40 3. Attornment and power to distrain follows the possession and not the use 43 4. An Attornment cannot be for a time 27 5. An Attornment of the Tenant doth not disclaim but affirm his possession For it is the act of the Tenant by reason of his being in possession 193 6. A mans Estate in a Rent-charge may be enlarged diminished or altered and no new attornment or privity requisite to such alteration 44 7. Attornment is requisite to the Grant of an Estate for life but to a Confirmation to enlarge an Estate it is not 44 45 46 8. A Rent-charge is granted to Commence Seven years after the death of the Grantor Remainder in Fee Attornment must be made in the life time of the Grantor 46 9. If a Fine is levied of the Reversion of Land or of a Rent to uses the Cestuy que use may distrain without Attornment 50 51 10. Where a Rent Reversion or Remainder is sold by Bargain and Sale the Bargainee may distrain without Attornment 51 11. Where a man is seised of a Rent-charge and grants it over to which the Tenant attorns and he afterwards retakes that Estate here must be a new Attornment for the former privity is wholly destroyed 44 12. Where an Attornment shall be good to a contingent use 52 Bargain and Sale See Intollment 1. WHere a Rent Reversion or Remainder is sold by Bargain and Sale the Bargainee may distrain for the Rent without Attornment 51 Baron and Feme 1. The man after the marriage hath the deduction of the woman ad Domum Thalamum and all the civil power over her and not she over him 306 2. The Interdicts of carnal knowledg in the Levitical Law were directed to the men not to the women who are interdicted but by a consequent for the woman being interdicted to the man the man must also be interdicted to the woman for a man cannot marry a woman and she not marry him 305 Bishop See Ordinary Archbishop 1. What Bishops were originally 22 2. A Parson is chosen Bishop his Benefices are all void and the King shall present 19 20 3. It is not at all inconsistent for a Bishop to be an Incumbent 22 4. A Bishop may be an Incumbent after Consecration 24 5. How many Benefices a Bishop may retain by a Dispensation 25 6. No Canon Ecclesiastical can be made and executed without the Kings Royal assent 329 7. Bishops in Wales were originally of the foundation of the Prince of Wales 411 Canons Ecclesiastical See Title Ecclesiastical Court 1. WHat Canons are good and binding and what not 327 328 Capias ad Satisfaciendum See Execution Certiorari 1. A Certior lies out of the Chancery to Ireland to certifie an Act of Parliament but it doth not lye to Scotland 287 2. A Certiorari doth not lye to Wales to certifie a Record to the Courts at Westminster to the intent that Execution may issue out here upon it 398 Certificate 1. There are many things whereof the Kings Courts sometimes ought to be certified which cannot be certified by Certiorari 288 Chancery 1. The Chancery may grant a Habeas Corpus and discharge a Prisoner thereupon as well