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A65924 A vindication of the doctrine of Gods absolute decree and of Christs absolute and special redemption. In way of answer to those objections that are brought against them by Mr. Tho: Pierce, in his treatise, entituled, The divine philanthropy. By Tho: Whitfeld, minister of the gospel. Whitfield, Thomas, Minister of the Gospel. 1657 (1657) Wing W2011A; ESTC R222306 60,986 90

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Lord turned the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people Psal 105.35 That when the false Prophet was deceived he had deceived them Ezek. 14.9 That he gave up the Gentiles to vile lusts Rom. 1.26 That he smote the Jews with the spirit of slumber that they should not see with their eyes nor hear with their ears Rom. 11.8 9. That he would send to those that loved not the truth strong delusions that they should believe lies 2 Thes 2.10 11. That God put into the hearts of the ten Kings to give their power to the beast Rev. 17.17 and many other like places there are that speak in the same kinde of language Now can we think that when the Scripture doth in so many places and so constantly set forth the maner of Gods working in sin ●y such expressions as denote action and very seldom if at all as signifie a bare permission onely as that in the selling of Joseph into Egypt in Pharaohs refusing to let the people go and the rest before named God should exercise a bare permission onely without any action that he should sit still as a Spectator without doing any thing at all Object To these places Mr. P. answereth Cap. 4. pag. 48. That by a common Hebraism verbs active in sound are onely permissive in signification Answ This indeed he dictates but he doth not demonstrate nor bring the least patch of an Argument to prove it neither will all his skill in the Hebrew enable him to do it and may he not by this shift evade the clearest and strongest Scriptures that are brought against him by telling us that they signifie quite another thing then the nature of the words do import if we will believe him 2. Why may we not then interpret other Scriptures in the like maner where the like expressions are used as when the Lord saith I form the light and create darkness I make peace and create evil Isa 45.7 I have made the earth and created man upon it my hands spread out the heavens Psal 12. Why may we not by Mr. P. his Hebraisms interpret these verbs that are active in sound to be permissive onely in signification and say that God hath permitted light and darkness to be created and suffered the earth to be made and the heavens to be spread out Object But he further objects That these expressions cannot be properly taken therefore they do not denote any action but onely permission Answ Though they cannot be so properly taken as to signifie that God worketh in the same maner in evil actions as he doth in good or as evil men themselves do yet neither so improperly as to signifie a bare permission without any action at all and though we be not able to apprehend his secret and wonderful maner of working in evil actions yet neither are we to deny that he hath any work at all in them since himself doth so often and so expresly affirm it though he doth it miro ineffabili modo as Austin speaks yet we are not to deny the doing of it And by those former Scriptures mentioned it may appear what little reason Mr. P. had to make such a clamor against those our Protestant Divines some of which God used as principal instruments in advancing that glorious work of Reformation as if they made God to be the Author of sin when he knows that they positively professed and some of them strongly proved the contrary and what expressions they used in this subject were but the same in effect with Scripture expressions yea not altogether so high Yet he labors magno conatu to maintain this charge against them herein complying with the Papists so that Bellarmine himself is not more eager and industrious in carrying on this charge against Calvin and Zuinglius then he is in carrying it on both against these and many others arraigning no less then twelve of them as guilty of the great sin of Blasphemy by making God the Author of sin when they speak but the very same things for substance which the Scripture speaks about it as if it were his drift and design to make them and their doctrine odious That God hath some hand in the acts of sinful men appears Argument 3 because the Substratum or subject of sin namely the natural motion or action whereto sin cleaves is that whereof he is the proper cause and efficient therefore he must needs have some efficiency in it Object Against this Mr. P. objects That it is as impossible to separate the wickedness of the act from the act which is wicked as to separate roundness from the Globe and to separate sinfulness from the sin Cap 4. pag. 48. as from the sinful act Answ God is little beholding to him for so denying him to be the Author of the evil that cleaves to the actions of nature as withall to deny him to be the Author of Nature for maintaining his Purity by denying his Omnipotency 2. Doth not the Scripture tell us expresly that in him we live move and have our being Acts 17.25 As he is the Author of our being so also of all those natural motions and actions that arise from our being as we cannot live without him so we cannot move without him As we cannot move our hand or foot so not our heart or tongue without him Omnes causae secundae sicut dependent à Deo in esse it a dependent ab eo in operari 3. Was not Natures work the same in Adam when he ate the forbidden fruit as when he did his necessary food and in David which is his own instance when he lay with Bathsheba as when he lay with his lawful wife in an Executioner when he murders a man out of malice as when he kills a man by the command of the Magistrate It is a true Rule That Deus agit iu peccato non tanquam causa moralis sed tanquam causa naturalis 4. Every new action and motion is a new entity now all entities and beings are from the first being and so far forth they are good De Vera Relig. c. 4. Ipsum quantulumcunque esse bonum est saith Austin quiasummum esse est summum bonum the smallest being of all is good because the chiefest or greatest being is the greatest good If M. P. will have any natural act quà actus not to proceed from the God of Nature he will have a creature without a Creator 5. Doth not Mr. P. by this Doctrine justly contract on himself that guilt which he unjustly chargeth upon others namely of making God the Author of Sin for if God be the Author of all natural actions as hath been proved and it be impossible as he teacheth to separate the sin from the action then he that is the Author of the action must needs be Author of the sin also which is unseparable from it But I suppose he is not so dull-sighted but if he pleased he could easily discern a
whit infringe the liberty of mans will or take away the contingency of the second causes to which he hath given no answer 3. If he hath forgotten or will take no notice of what was spoken of this subject in the Observations which Mr. Barly prefixed before his Book the same things shall be told him again with some addition That the Will and Decree of God doth not violate the liberty of mans will may appear upon these following grounds Christs death was decreed Argument 1 for he was delivered by the determinate counsel of God Acts 2.23 yet he died most freely for he saith that he laid down his life when no man had power to take it from him John 10.17 18. Besides if Christs death had not been voluntary it had not been meritorious if it had not been an act of most free and perfect obedience it could have merited no reward at the hands of God either for himself or us The firm standing of the good Angels is a free act Argument 2 they are not enforced to it yet this was decreed for they are called Elect Angels 1 Tim. 5.21 The obedience and service which the Saints perform in heaven they perform most freely and willingly without any constraint or necessity hence we are taught to pray that the will of God may be done on earth as it is done in heaven and when the Saints on earth repent believe and obey they do it freely they are not carried to it by any natural or violent necessity yet all these things are decreed for it is said he hath chosen us before the foundation of the world to be holy and without blame before him in love Eph. 1.4 And that God hath from the beginning chosen us to salvation through the sanctification of the Spirit and the belief of the truth 2 Thes 2.13 In all our natural motions and actions Argument 3 in our eating and drinking sitting walking discoursing talking we act freely so also in our civil affairs in our journeying buying selling and all other businesses belonging to our several Callings we act freely without any compulsion or necessity this I suppose Mr. P. will not deny and will he deny that these things are appointed and determined by God What a kinde of Governor of the world will he make him to be when the greatest part of things that are done in the world all the actions of men and angels and all contingent events what ever are excluded from the compass of his Decree How doth this agree with Scripture-Doctrine which teacheth that mans goings are ordered of the Lord Prov. 20.24 That the way of man is not in himself Jer. 10.23 yea that in him we live move and have our being Acts 17. in all our natural motions and actions what we do he doth and what he doth in time he hath determined before all time otherwise he should not work by counsel Gods Decree is actus ad intra an act within himself Argument 4 and of those kinde of actions the rule holds true that they do nihil ponere in objecto Gods Decree alone never works any thing upon the creature till it comes to execution till he puts forth his inward purpose by some outward action Unless therefore it can be shown how God by some outward action upon man doth necessitate mans will his inward purpose and decree alone will never do it And we finde by dayly experience that we sin as freely as we eat or drink or do any other thing in the world Besides Gods inward purpose and decree is altogether unknown to a sinner and ignoti nulla cupido therefore this can never move him to any sinful act The Decree of God is so far from necessitating mans will and infringing the liberty of the second causes Argument 5 as it is the ground and foundation of all freedom and liberty for he doth not onely decernere rem ipsam sed modum rei he doth not onely determine the thing it self that shall be done but the maner how it shall be done for the modi rerum are not really distinguished from the things themselves but so nearly conjoyned as they cannot be severed as therefore some things come to pass necessarily because God hath decreed they shall come to pass necessarily so other things come to pass contingently because he hath decreed they shall come to pass contingently for he hath decreed that all things shall come to pass either necessarily or contingently and the effect of his decree must be as certain in the one as the other Necessity and contingency arise from the intrinsecal nature of the things and not from any thing extrinsecal Argument 6 In things that come to pass necessarily there is such a near and strong connexion betwixt the cause and the effect that if the cause go before the effect must needs follow after as if fire be fire it must needs have the property of burning if a stone be a stone it must needs have the property of descending but in contingent effects though the thing shall certainly come to pass upon supposal of Gods Decree yet there is no such necessary connexion betwixt the cause and effect but in regard of the nature of the things they might have been otherwise then they are It is said The Lord holds the winds in his fist Prov. 30.4 therefore the motion of them is according to his appointment when he caused a strong East winde to blow upon the head of Jonah Jon. 4.8 this was according to his appointment and decree yet this was not out of any natural necessity planted in the winde for that was equally disposed to have blown out of the West or any other quarter if it pleased God so to order it for the winde bloweth where it listeth John 3. Object But if things may come to pass otherwise then they do then Gods Decrees may be frustrated Answ It follows not because as before was shewed he hath decreed that they shall come to pass in the same maner that they do namely that necessary things shall come to pass necessarily and contingent things contingently and his Decree can no more be frustrated in the one then in the other For though it be necessary that what God hath decreed should come to pass yet it is not necessary it should come to pass necessario modo necessariis mediis God had decreed that Christs bones should not be broken therefore it was necessary this should take effect yet the Soldiers were not hindred by any necessity from doing it but did as freely abstain from breaking them as they did freely break the Thieves bones God had decreed the birthright and blessing to Jacob yet this came to pass by as contingent means as might be for there was no necessity that Esau should come hungry from hunting that Jacob should have his pottage in a readiness that he should propound them as a price for the birthright that Esau should accept of the bargain that Isaac should
the Apostle are the same with Election and Rejection for the Apostle makes this the ground why one was loved and the other hated before they had done either good or evil namely That the purpose of God according to Election according to which Jacob was elected might remain and that it might appear that this was not of works but by him that calleth Rom. 9.11 And this holds as well in the hatred of Esau as in the love of Jacob he was hated before he was born that the purpose of God according to rejection might remain Contra Donat lib. 1. cap. 16. To this purpose Austin makes Esau together with Cain and Judas to belong to the Malignant Church Object Though Jacob and Esau had not actually dont good or evil yet they had done it in Gods foresight according to which God might love the one and hate the other Answ This still crosseth the Apostles Scope which is to shew that the first ground of putting a difference betwixt these two in loving the one and hating the other was not in themselves but in God not of works saith he but of him that calleth that the purpose of God according to Election and so also his purpose according to Rejection might remain firm For if this difference should arise from foreseen works yet it should be of works which the Apostle here wholly rejecteth not of works saith he Many who renounce foreseen works as the ground of Election yet make Original sin the ground of Reprobation but the Apostle here excludes both alike namely all foreseen works from the hating of Esau as from the loving of Jacob before they had done either good or evil saith he speaking of both of them alike Learned D. Whitaker brings this as an Argument to prove that Original sin is not the cause of Reprobation Causa illius odii quo Deus Esavum prosequutus est nondum natum Cygna cantio pag. 7. non fuit peccatum originale quia tum aequaliter odisset Jacobum quare si quaeras cur Esau non invenerit nec acceperit misericordiam oportet causam aliquam assignari quae non conveniat Jacobo The cause saith he of that hatred wherewith God hated Esau before he was born was not Original sin for then he should have alike hated Jacob wherefore if you ask why Esau neither found nor received mercy some cause must be assigned which agrees not to Jacob. Now if some other cause must be assigned for the same cause brings forth the same effect what can this be but the good will and pleasure of God who hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardens 2. This conditional Decree crosseth the Apostles Doctrine because it makes the difference betwixt vessels of honor and dishonor to arise from the disposition of the matter whereas the Apostle makes it to arise from the will of the Potter Hath not saith he the Potter power to make of the same lump one vessel to honor and another to dishonor Rom. 9.21 Unbelievers and believers are not the same lump but these are a better qualified and more refined lump then the other but the Apostle makes both sorts of vessels to be made of the very same lump 3. There had been no ground at all of quarrelling at the Will of God or saying Who hath resisted his Will if his Will had not been the cause of difference betwixt one and another And the Apostle might easily have answered Yea for vindicating the Justice of God he was bound to have done it that God did earnestly will and desire their salvation but they resisted his will Yet he goes not this way to work but answers them by checking their malepert and audacious insolence that dare enter into contest with their Creator What art thou c. 4. This Doctrine is easie and obvious to every mans apprehension that hath any use of his rational faculty namely That it is just with God to decree that mans damnation who willingly rejects Christ and salvation when they are offered unto him and God seriously desires that he might be saved and therefore the Apostle needed not to have cryed out 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 O the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God his judgements are unsearchable and his ways past finding out Rom. 11.33 this being the great abyss and hidden depth of the Apostles Doctrine namely How God should hate any man before he was born or had done either good or evil To this purpose Austin saith truly Eos evacuare verba Apostoli Ad Bon●ifa l. 2 c. 7. qui judicium divinae discretionis ad opera reducunt aut praevisa aut praeterita That they make the Apostle speak to no purpose who reduce the judgement or cause of Divine difference of one from another unto Works whether foreseen or already done Argument 8 This conditional Decree cannot stand with the absolute liberty and independency of the Will of God For whereas he saith I will do this because I will Rom. 9.15 this makes him to will because the creature wills and confines the liberty and freedom of his Will to the motions of mans will so that he cannot absolutely and positively determin and will mans salvation till man hath first willed it himself by being willing to believe and to persevere in doing so Pet. Mart. loc commun loc de praed sect 24. According to this opinion as Peter Martyr saith well Deus non operaretur juxta suam voluntatem sed juxta alienam God should not act or work according to his own will but according to the will of others Yea this imposeth a necessity upon the will of God which is the fountain of all freedom for it makes his will and decree to be grounded upon his foreknowledge and his foreknowledge to be grounded upon mans actions and motions So that if he foresees man to persevere in believing he must of necessity determine his salvation and that not because it is his good will and pleasure to save him and in order thereto to work faith in him but because he foresees him to persevere in believing and if he foresees him to do otherwise he must of necessity decree his destruction and can do no otherwise He cannot have mercy on whom he will have mercy and harden whom he will till mans will hath made way for him The Assertors therefore of this Doctrine while they are sollicitous about maintaining the Liberty of Mans Will and tender of the least touch that may tend to the contrary they minde not that they bereave God of the Liberty of his Will and do as it were cast fetters upon it so that he can move no otherwise in point of mans salvation then man shall give him leave This conditional decree cannot stand with the infinite and most perfect Wisdom of God Argument 9 For 1. It makes him to fetch the Idea the model and plot according to which he will frame his greatest works and those
were stirred up betwixt nearest relations upon occasion of it or that Christ was the Author of these persecutions and enmities and of those stirs and troubles that were raised up in the world when he caused his Kingdom to be set up or that the Apostles were the Authors of those divisions and tumults which were stirred up at Ephesus and other places by occasion of their Preaching Acts 19.23 and that they were truly charged by their adversaries to be subverters of the state of the world Acts 17.6 yet upon the very like ground doth he charge many Orthodox Divines to make God to be the Author of sin because they teach that he hath some kinde of efficiency in it by administring occasions as the Preaching of the Apostles was the occasion of these tumults when as all the occasions that he administers tend to good as the Apostles Preaching did 2. God may be said sometimes to administer occasions of sinning by his works As 1. by his works of mercy Because sentence against an evil work is not speedily executed therefore the hearts of the sons of men are fully set to do evil Eccles 8.11 These things thou hast done and I was silent and thou thoughtest that I was such an one as thy self Psal 50.21 When Jeshurun waxed fat he kicked the heel Deut. 32.15 The bountifulness goodness and long-suffering of God do in their own nature lead to repentance yet here they are made occasions of sinning 2. As the works of his mercy so of his justice are sometimes made occasions of sinning When God led his people through the wilderness he suffered them sometimes to want water otherwhile to want flesh for their food and this was to humble them and prove them that he might do them good in their latter end Deut. 8.2 But the bad ones amongst them hence took occasion to murmure and to open their mouthes against God When the Lord pours out the vials of his wrath upon the followers of the beast hence they take occasion to blaspheme the God of heaven for their pains and sores and repented not of their works Rev. 16.9 11. 3. The works of Gods Providence are sometimes also made occasions of sinning it was the work of Gods power and providence that made the Israelites multiply so exceedingly in Egypt which should have made Pharaoh so much more to respect them yet hence he takes occasion to oppress them It was a work of providence that brought David to Ahimelech the priest for relief in his flight at such a time as Doeg the Edomite was there this might have stirred him up to succour at least to pity David in his distress but hence he took occasion by his false slanders to stir up Saul to murther all the Lords Priests at Nob 1 Sam. 23.18 It was a work of providence that brought the wise men to Jerusalem to enquire after the king of the Jews that was then born yet hence Herod takes occasion to seek to kill Christ and rather then fail to kill all the male-children that were in Bethlehem and in the region round about that were two years old and under Mat. 2.16 Thus we see that God by the works both of his Mercy Justice and Providence may administer occasions of evil to evil minded men now shall we say that he is therefore the Author of the evil which they do when all these occasions are such things as do in their own nature tend to good and by accident onely are made occasion of evil Quest But how is it possible that God and man should work together in the same action and the one be blame-worthy and the other blameless Answ Because they differ both in the ground maner and end of their working 1. They differ in the ground the ground of Gods working is the counsel of his own will Eph. 1.11 which is always most holy and just the ground of wicked mens actions is the motion of their own wicked wills they seek to fulfil the will of the flesh and of their mindes Eph. 2.3 in their evil actions they do that which is contrary to the revealed will of God and his secret will they know not if they do the same things that God wills yet not because he wills them but upon some other grounds When Josephs brethren sold him into Egypt they did it out of envy against him but God did it out of love to him and his father Jacob and his whole family 2. The differ in the maner of their working for in sinful actions God works with wicked men not as a moral cause but a natural cause onely he doth no where command counsel or perswade men to do evil but altogether the contrary and when they do evil they are carried on by the dictate of their depraved judgements and sway of their own corrupt wills and disordered affections God being the Author of Nature it belongs to him to uphold the creature in all its natural motions and actions and he moves the creatures with a motion agreeable to their several natures both irrational and rational creatures When he moves good men that are guided by his Spirit they work according to their natures when he moves bad men they also work according to their natures and this without any iniquity or injustice in God for of the natural motion he is the Author and proper Cause of the obliquity of it he is onely an accidental cause and therefore not the Author 3. They differ in the end for the end of all Gods actions is himself and his own glory Prov. 16.4 but wicked men aim at themselves at their own glory or some other base respect of their own Is not this great Babel which I have built for the honor of my Majesty saith that proud King Dun. 4.27 When the High Priests and Elders delivered up Christ to be crucified they did it out of envy and hatred against him to the end they might be rid of him but God did it out of love that by this means all his elect might come to be saved out of their lost condition Object 2. A second principal Objection brought against Gods absolute Decree is That it infers a necessity of sinning and so frees man from all blame in all his sinful actions because what God hath decreed must necessarily come to pass This Mr. P. often urgeth Cap. 1. pag. 13. touching at it almost in every other page and making us to say that men shall sin of necessity do what they can to the contrary Answ 1. If Mr. P. had pleased to stoop so low as to take notice of that distinction usually given by our Divines betwixt necessitas absoluta hypothetica or which is the same necessitas consequentis vel causae necessitas consequentiae he might have been convinced of the weakness of this Objection and of the falseness of that imputation which thereby he seeks to fasten on us 2. It hath been already proved to him that Gods Decree doth no
mistake Jacob for Esau and his savory meat for Esaus Venison there was no necessity in any of these things but all was done most freely yet all was guided by a secret and certain providence so as the event should not fail to come to pass as God had determined Every necessary truth is an eternal truth for it is a true rule Quod necessarium est semper verum est nec falsum esse potest A necessary proposition is that which is alway true and can never be false That Cain should kill his brother was no necessary truth before the thing was done that man should be a reasonable creature was a necessary truth before man was created It was no necessary truth that Adam should eat the forbidden fruit before he had eaten it and though then it was a truth yet no necessary truth for no circumstance can change the nature of things so as to make a necessary truth to become contingent or a contingent truth to become necessary True it is that when a thing is done it cannot be undone for a thing cannot be and not be both at one time but it was not necessary it should be done if it be a thing of a contingent nature What I now speak or write is necessary should be thus spoken or written but before it was not necessary I should speak or write any thing these being acts of liberty and freedom so it is in all actions of like nature in all contingent actions This for the second Objection Object 3. A third thing objected against the Absolute Decree is That it is against Gods Justice for if the Decree of Reprobation go before the foresight of sin then the innocent creature is designed to destruction which cannot agree with the Justice of God Answ For answer of this Two things are needful to be proved 1. That it is no injustice in God to punish the innocent creature 2. That by the Decree of Reprobation no innocent creature is designed to destruction For the first it may be proved these ways Argument 1 Mr. P. asserts Infants to be innocent creatures Cap. 4. Page 25. because they never did hurt any man in thought word or deed and these are subject to death and he cannot deny death to be a punishment for it is the wages of sin Rom. 6.23 And though death differs in degree from damnation yet it is a punishment and God cannot be unjust in any degree It may be Mr. P. may finde out some answer to this therefore we add further Christ Jesus was the most innocent person that ever was in the world Argument 2 one that knew no sin neither was any guile found in his mouth one that fulfilled all righteousness one in whom the Father was well pleased for he had done all his pleasure yet he laid on him the iniquities of us all he was wounded for our iniquities and broken for our transgressions Isa 53. The just suffered for the unjust 1 Pet. 3.18 Yea he suffered such a measure of his Fathers wrath as was answerable to that which all those who are saved by him should have suffered in hell for he being their surety it was necessary that he should fully discharge their debt by making full satisfaction in paying that which they should have paid Mr. P. knows well that many innocent creatures dayly suffer for his sake Argument 3 and are put to divers kindes of deaths some have their throats cut some are strangled some are knockt on the head according to the will and pleasure of those by whom they are killed and these are such as never offended or deserved any ill at his hands and may not God use the same liberty with creatures of his own making as man doth with those creatures which he never made He would think it ridiculous if any should clamor against him for cruelty and injustice when he treads a worm under his foot or crusheth a fly sitting on the wall yet there is not so great a disproportion betwixt him and the smallest worm as there is betwixt him or the greatest King in the world and the great Creator Man compared with God being but as a drop that hangs on a bucket or as the dust that cleaves to the ballance which swayes it neither one way nor another Argument 4 Isa 40.15 May not the Potter do what he will with the vessel which he hath made without any imputation of injustice yea though he breaks it in pieces or puts it to the basest uses the Apostle makes Gods power over his Creature to be full as large as the Potter hath over the Vessel that he hath made and gives this answer to the like Objection Rom. 9.21 God was not bound to preserve man in his being after he was made for he might have annihilated him as he made us of nothing so he might bring us to nothing and some deaths are less then annihilation Neither was he bound to preserve man from a sinful being as he did some of the Angels but he might suffer him to fall as he did some of them and then deal with him accordingly Thus we see it is no injustice in God to inflict sufferings upon innocent creatures 2. That by the Decree of Reprobation innocent creatures are not designed to destruction appears Because Reprobation is that everlasting purpose of God Argument 1 whereby he hath decreed to glorifie his justice in the just condemnation of sinful men here sin goes before condemnation though it goes not before Gods Decree for condemnation is the execution and is in time whereas the Decree is before all time It is a true rule that Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc sed non vult hoc propter hoc the one hath reference to the execution the other to the decree though there be a cause of the being of a thing yet there is none of Gods will It is the Tenet of the Schoolmen Nullamdari posse causam decreti divini ex parte volentis sed tantùm ex parte volitorum There can be no cause given of the Will and Decree of God as it is his act but onely of the things willed by him none of the Decree but onely of the Execution Mr. P. seems sometimes to grant this and if he would stand to it the controversie might soon be at an end for nothing is needful to go before the effect but the cause that which hath efficiency in some kinde or other in producing it and if there can be no kinde of cause going before Gods Decree his Decree may be without it God doth condemn no man in time but for sin Argument 2 therefore he determined to condemn no man but for sin for he doth things in time in that maner and order that he determined to do them before all time He actually condemns no man but for sin actually existing till after men have sinned but sin exists in time therefore if he should determine nothing touching mans everlasting estate
till after he hath sinned his Decrees should not be eternal but temporary and so it is in effect according to this Doctrine which teacheth That there is no absolute nor peremptory Decree passed upon men but upon foresight of what they will do And as for the Conditional Decree it is as good as none because as hath been shewed it is equally disposed to mens damnation as well as their salvation Though sin doth not go before Gods Decree Argument 3 yet neither is his Decree without the consideration of sin because he decrees all things simul semel uno actu simplicissimo as hath been shewed there is no prius posterius in him or in his Decrees but because we are not able with one simple act to apprehend the several things which God hath decreed touching mans everlasting estate therefore Divines usually place an order in his Decrees wherein one thing goes before another though not in him yet in our consideration yet this is such an order as agrees with the order of nature wherein the cause always goes before the effect and the end before the means and upon this ground the foresight of sin cannot go before Gods Decree because when he decrees to permit sin without which there can be no foresight of it the end of this permission must needs be the manifestation of his glory in the merciful Salvation of some and just Condemnation of others therefore this must be first decreed according to the order of nature though for time all be done at one instant Besides when God decreed to create man the end which he propounded to himself in this work was his own glory and that not onely in general but in that particular way in that particular state and condition of man whence in the end he receives his glory but at last he receives greatest glory in the Salvation of some and Damnation of others therefore this was the end which he intended when he intended mans creation for to say that he intended no certain end in this great work or was frustrate of his intentions is altogether unbeseeming the excellent nature of God But Mr. P. thus undertakes to prove that reprobation follows the foresight of sin Object Cap. 4. page 5. We grant saith he that Damnation follows the foresight of sin but Damnation alway follows Reprobation ergo Reprobation follows the foresight of sin He much triumphs in this Objection telling us we put a bitter jeer upon the greatest part of mankinde to say they are rejected without respect of sin and yet not damned without respect of sin this following the other Answ Here we may tell Mr. P. that he puts his pitiful Sophistry upon his Readers this Argument being a meer Fallacy for here the conclusion is general whereas in the third figure as this Argument is it alway ought to be particular the deceitfulness of it will appear in the like instance Suppose a man intends to build a house fit for his habitation by this kinde of Logick we may thus argue The building of the house follows after the providing Wood Stone and other materials But the building of the house follows after his intention to build it Therefore his intention to build his house follows after the providing of Wood and Stone and other fit materials This is Mr. P. his acumen Object But Mr. P. objects Cap. 3. Page 66. That it is impossible as implying a contradiction that God should decree to reprobate any without intuition of sin and yet at the same time to decree not to damn without respect of sin Answ 1. It is very possible that Reprobation should be without foresight of sin and yet Damnation not to be so because these differ both in nature and time reprobation being an immanent act terminated in himself damnation being a transient act terminated in man reprobation being from all eternity damnation being in time the one is the Decree the other the Execution To decree to damn is to decree to do a thing in time We may as well say that a man is saved as soon as he is elected as damned so soon as he is reprobated 2. It is very improper to say that God doth decree to reprobate as if he should decree to decree whereas reprobation it self is the decree but it is usual with Mr. P. to confound the Decree with the Execution and so to jumble these together as thereby a mist is cast upon the eyes of the Reader that he shall not discern the truth Object 4. A fourth Objection against the Absolute Decree is That it cannot stand with Gods Philanthropy with his love to mankinde for Mr. P. tells us That he hates nothing which he hath made and the Scripture tells us That he is gracious merciful abundant in goodness and truth that his mercy is over all his works and therefore designs none to be destroyed Answ 1. Mr. P. tells us indeed that God hates nothing that he hath made but the Scripture tells us no such thing but rather the quite contrary for it saith That the Lord loved Jacob and hated Esau and that before they were born Object To this Mr. P. replies That this hatred is to be understood onely in regard of temporal blessings of the inheritance of the land of Canaan Answ This evasion hath been sufficiently confuted before in confirmation of the seventh Argument against the Conditional Decree where was shewed 1. that the hatred here spoken of stands directly in opposition to the love wherewith Jacob was loved but that was the love of Election Rom. 9.11 compared with verse 13. 2. The earthly Canaan was a type of the heavenly why else had Esau the black Character of Profaneness stampt on him for passing away his right to it by so slightly selling his birth-right Heb. 1.16 3. In regard of outward blessings Esau was no whit inferior to Jacob but rather above him for he had the fatness of the earth the pleasant mount Seir for his possession whereas Jacob was a stranger in the land of Canaan Psal 105.12 having no possession there but onely the burying-place which Abraham had bought Gen. 25.15 therefore it is said That God gave Abraham no inheritance in the land no not so much as whereon to set his foot Acts 7.5 4. Esau had abundance of all things and therefore refused his brothers presents telling him he had enough Also he was a man of great place for he came to meet his brother attended with four hundred men so that Jacob bowed down to the ground before him and called him his lord Gen. 32.18 and 33.3 so that he was no whit inferior to his brother in regard of outward blessings Answ 2. Secondly for those Scriptures which hold forth God to be so merciful gracious good to all c. It is granted that there is a common bounty and goodness which God extendeth to all mankinde making the Sun to shine and rain to fall upon the just and unjust Matth.