controversie with all clearness and brevity And the substance of it will be reduced to these two debates 1. Whether the sufferings of Christ in general are to be considered as a punishment of sin or as a meer act of dominion 2. Whether the death of Christ in particular were a proper expiatory sacrifice for sin or only an antecedent condition to his exercise of the Office of Priesthood in Heaven 1. Whether the sufferings of Christ in general are to be considered as a punishment of sin or as a meer act of dominion for that it must be one or the other of these two cannot be denyed by our Adversaries for the inflicting those sufferings upon Christ must either proceed from an antecedent meritorious cause or not If they do they are then punishments if not they are meer exercises of power and dominion whatever ends they are intended for and whatever recompence be made for them So Crellius asserts that God as absolute Lord of all had a right of absolute dominion upon the life and body of Christ and therefore might justly deliver him up to death and give his body to the Cross and although Christ by the ordinary force of the Law of Moses had a right to escape so painful and accursed death yet God by the right of dominion had the power of disposal of him because he intended to compensate his torments with a reward infinitely greater than they were but because he saith for great ends the consent of Christ was necessary therefore God did not use his utmost dominion in delivering him up by force as he might have done but he dealt with him by way of command and rewards proposed for obedience and in this sence he did act as a righteous Governor and indulgent Father who encouraged his Son to undergo hard but great things In which we see that he makes the sufferings of Christ an act of meer dominion in God without any antecedent cause as the reason of them only he qualifies this act of dominion with the proposal of a reward for it But we must yet further enquire into their meaning for though here Crellius attributes the sufferings of Christ meerly to Gods dominion without any respect to sin yet elsewhere he will allow a respect that was had to sin antecedently to the sufferings of Christ and that the sins of men were the impulsive cause of them And although Socinus in one place utterly denies any lawful-antecedent cause of the death of Christ besides the will of God and Christ yet Crellius in his Vindication saith by lawful cause he meant meritorius or such upon supposition of which he ought to dye for elsewhere he makes Christ to dye for the cause or by the occasion of our sins which is the same that Crellius means by an impulsive or procatartick cause Which he thus explains we are now to suppose a decree of God not only to give salvation to Mankind but to give us a firm hope of it in this present state now our sins by deserving eternal punishment do hinder the effect of that decree upon us and therefore they were an impulsive cause of the death of Christ by which it was effected that this decree should obtain notwithstanding our sins But we are not to understand as though this were done by any expiation of the guilt of sin by the death of Christ but this effect is hindred by three things by taking away their sins by assuring men that their former sins and present infirmities upon their sincere obedience shall not be imputed to them and that the effect of that decree shall obtain all which saith he is effected morte Christi interveniente the death of Christ intervening but not as the procuring cause So that after all these words he means no more by making our sins an impulsive cause of the death of Christ but that the death of Christ was an argument to confirm to us the truth of his Doctrine which doctrine of his doth give us assurance of these things and that our sins when they are said to be the impulsive cause are not to be considered with a respect to their guilt but to that distrust of God which our sins do raise in us which distrust is in truth according to this sense of Crellius the impulsive cause and not the sins which were the cause or occasion of it For that was it which the doctrine was designed to remove and our sins only as the causes of that But if it be said that he speaks not only of the distrust but of the punishment of sin as an impediment which must be removed too and therefore may be called an impulsive cause we are to consider that the removal of this is not attributed to the death of Christ but to the leaving of our sins by the belief of his Doctrine therefore the punishment of our sins cannot unless in a very remote sense be said to be an impulsive cause of that which for all that we can observe by Crellius might as well have been done without it if any other way could be thought sufficient to confirm his Doctrine and Christ without dying might have had power to save all them that obey him But we understand not an impulsive cause in so remote a sense as though our sins were a meer occasion of Christs dying because the death of Christ was one argument among many others to believe his Doctrine the belief of which would make men leave their sins but we contend for a neerer and more proper sense viz. that the death of Christ was primarily intended for the expiation of our sins with a respect to God and not to us and therefore our sins as an impulsive cause are to be considered as they are so displeasing to God that it was necessary for the Vindication of Gods Honour and the deterring the world from sin that no less a Sacrifice of Attonement should be offered than the blood of the Son of God So that we understand an impulsive cause here in the sense that the sins of the people were under the Law the cause of the offering up those Sacrifices which were appointed for the expiation of them And as in those Sacrifices there were two things to be considered viz. the mactation and the oblation of them the former as a punishment by a substitution of them in place of the persons who had offended the latter as the proper Sacrifice of attonement although the mactation it self considered with the design of it was a Sacrificial act too So we consider the sufferings of Christ with a twofold respect either as to our sins as the impulsive cause of them so they are to be considered as a punishment or as to God with a design to expiate the guilt of them so they are a Sacrifice of Attonement The first consideration is that we are now upon and upon which the present debate
the punishment of one cannot any ways be made the punishment of another and in case it be supposed possible then those in whose stead the other is punished must be actually delivered upon the payment of that debt which was owing to God 1. That one man cannot deserve anothers punishment and therefore one cannot be punished for another for there is no just punishment but what is deserved This being the main Argument insisted on by Crellius must be more carefully considered but before an answer be made to it it is necessary that a clear account be given in what sense it is he understands it which will be best done by laying down his principles as to the justice of punishments in a more distinct method than himself hath done which are these following 1. That no person can be justly punished either for his own or anothers faults but he that hath deserved to be punished by some sin of his own For he still asserts That the justice of punishment ariseth from a mans own fault though the actual punishment may be from anothers But he that is punished without respect to his own guilt is punished undeservedly and he that is punished undeservedly is punished unjustly 2. That personal guilt being supposed one mans sin may be the impulsive cause of anothers punishment but they cannot be the meritorious The difference between them he thus explains The cause is that which makes a thing to be the impulsive that which moves one to do a thing without any consideration of right that one hath to do it Merit is that which makes a man worthy of a thing either good or bad and so gives a right to it if it be good to himself if bad to him at whose hands he hath deserved it Now he tells us that it is impossible That one mans sins should make any other deserve punishment but the person who committed them but they may impel one to punish another and that justly if the person hath otherwise deserved to be punished unjustly if he hath not The reason he gives of it is That the vitiosity of the act which is the proper cause of punishment cannot go beyond the person of the offender and therefore can oblige none to punishment but him that hath committed the fault And therefore he asserts That no man can be justly punished beyond the desert of his own sins but there may sometimes be a double impulsive cause of that punishment viz. His own and other mens whereof one made that they might be justly punished the other that they should be actually but the later he saith always supposeth the former as the foundation of just punishment so that no part of punishment could be executed upon him wherein his own sins were not supposed as the meritorious cause of it These are his two main principles which we must now throughly examine the main force of his book lying in them But if we can prove that it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind that a person may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions if God hath justly punished some for the sins of others and there be no injustice in one mans suffering by his own consent for another then these principles of Crellius will be found not so firm as he imagines them 1. That it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions For which purpose Grotius objected against Socinus who appealed to the consent of Nations about one being punished for anothers fault That the Heathens did agree that Children might be punished for their Parents saults and people for their Princes and that corporal punishment might be born by one for another did appear by the Persians punishing the whole family for the fault of one The Macedonians the near kindred in the case of Treason some Cities of Greece destroying the Children of Tyrants together with them in all which the meer conjunction was supposed a sufficient reason without consent but in case of consent he saith They all agreed in the Justice of some being punished for the faults of others Thence the right of killing hostages among the most civilized nations and of sureties being punished in Capital matters if the guilty appear not who were thence called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who were bound to answer body for body In which cases the punishment did extend beyond the desert of the person who suffered it for no other reason is assigned of these sufferings besides the conjunction of the person or his consent but no antecedent guilt is supposed as necessary to make the punishment just We are now to consider what Crellius doth answer to this 1. As to their acknowledgements of Gods punishing Children for their Parents faults he gives the same answer which he doth to the examples recorded in Scripture to that purpose That either they were punished for the sins of others but their own sins deserved the punishment or that the Parents were punished in the Children but the Children were not properly punished 2. As to punishments among men he answers two things 1. That such persons were truly punished but not justly for he acknowledges That in such a case it is a proper punishment and that it is enough in order to that that any fault be charged upon a person whether his own or anothers whether true or false on the account of which he is supposed worthy to be punished And that such a conjunction is sufficient for cruel angry or imprudent men for where ever there is a place saith he for anger there is likewise for punishment So that he consesseth there may be a true punishment and that which answers all the reason and ends of punishment assigned by him where there is no desert at all of it in the person who undergoes it But then he adds that this is an unjust punishment to which I reply That then the reason of punishment assigned by Crellius before is insufficient for if this answers all the ends of punishments assigned by him and yet be unjust then it necessarily follows that those ends of punishment are consistent with the greatest injustice For he before made punishment to have a natural respect to anger and makes the ordinary end of punishment to be a satisfaction of the desire of revenge in men yet now grants that these may be in an unjust punishment Neither can it be said that he considered punishment only naturally and not morally for he tells us that this is the nature of divine punishments which are therefore just because designed for these ends but in case there be no supposal of a fault at all then he denyes that it is a punishment but only an asfliction and an exercise of dominion So that according to him where-ever there is a proper punishment it must be just when-ever God
depends for if the sufferings of Christ be to be taken under the notion of punishment then our Adversaries grant that our sins must be an impulsive cause of them in another sense than they understand it For the clearing of this I shall prove these two things 1. That no other sense ought to be admitted of the places of Scripture which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to sin but this 2. That this Account of the sufferings of Christ is no ways repugnant to the Iustice of God That no other sense ought to be admitted of the places of Scripture which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to our sins but that they are to be considered as a punishment for them Such are those which speak of Christ hearing our sins of our iniquities being laid upon him of his making himself an offering for sin and being made sin and a curse for us and of his dying sor our sins All which I shall so far consider as to vindicate them from all the exceptions which Socinus and Crellius have offered against them 1. Those which speak of Christs bearing our sins As to which we shall consider First The importance of the phrase in general of bearing sin and then the circumstances of the particular places in dispute For the importance of the phrase Socinus acknowledges that it generally signifies bearing the punishment of sin in Scripture but that sometimes it signifies taking away The same is confessed by Crellius but he saith it doth not always signifie bearing proper punishment but it is enough he says that one bears something burdensome on the occasion of others sins and so Christ by undergoing his sufferings by occasion of sins may be said to bear our sins And for this sense he quotes Numb 14. 33. And your Children shall wander in the Wilderness forty years and bear your whoredoms untill your carcasses be wasted in the Wilderness Whereby saith he it is not meant that God would punish the Children of the Israelites but that by the occasion of their parents sins they should undergo that trouble in wandering in the Wilderness and being deprived of the possession of the promised Land But could Crellius think that any thing else could have been imagined setting aside a total destruction a greater instance of Gods severity than that was to the Children of Israel all their circumstances being considered Is it not said that God did swear in his wrath they should not enter into his rest Surely then the debarring them so long of that rest was an instance of Gods wrath and so according to his own principles must have something of Vindicta in it and therefore be a proper punishment The truth is our Adversaries allow themselves in speaking things most repugnant to Humane Nature in this matter of punishments that they may justifie their own hypothesis For a whole Nation to be for forty years debarred from the greatest blessings were ever promised them and instead of enjoying them to endure the miseries and hardships of forty years travels in a barren wilderness must not be thought a punishment and only because occasioned by their Parents sins But whatever is inflicted on the account of sin and with a design to shew Gods severity against it and thereby to deter others from the practice of it hath the proper notion of punishment in it and all these things did concur in this instance besides the general sense of mankind in the matter of their punishment which was such that supposing them preserved in their liberty could not have been imagined greater And therefore Vatablus whom Socinus and Crellius highly commend thus renders those words dabunt poenas pro fornicationibus vestris quibus defecistis a Deo vestro they shall suffer the punishment of your forications And that bearing the sins of Parents doth imply properly bearing the punishment of them methinks they should not so earnestly deny who contend that to be the meaning of the words in Ezekiel The Son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father viz. that he shall not bear the punishment of his Fathers sins Where in bearing iniquity with a respect to their Parents sins by their own confession must be taken for the proper punishment for otherwise they do not deny but Children notwithstanding that sentence may undergo much affliction on the occasion of their Parents sins But Socinus further objects that bearing sins doth not imply the punishment of them because the Scape-Goat under the Law is said to bear upon him the iniquities of the people and yet could not be said to be punished for them To which Grotius answers that Socinus takes it for granted without reason that the Scape-Goat could not be said to be punished for the sins of the people for punishment in general may fall upon beasts for the sins of men Gen. 9. 5. Exod. 21. 28. Lev. 20. 15. Gen. 8. 21. and Socinus hath no cause to say that the Scape-Goat was not slain for the Iewish Interpreters do all agree that he was and however the sending him into the Wilderness was intended as a punishment and most probably by an unnatural death To which Crellius replies That in the general he denies not but punishment may fall upon beasts as well as men but that he might shew himself true to his principle that one cannot be punished for anothers faults he falls into a very pleasant discourse That the Beasts are not said to be punished for mens sins but for their own and therefore when it is said before the flood that all flesh had corrupted his way he will by no means have it understood only of men but that the sins of the beasts at that time were greater than ordinary as well as mens But he hath not told us what they were whether by eating some forbidden herbs or eâ—…g into conspiracies against mankind their lawful Soveraigns or unlawful mixtures and therefore we have yet reason to believe that when God saith the ground was cursed for mans sake that the beasts were punished for mans sin And if all flâ—sh must comprehend be â—sts in this place why shall not all flesh seeing the glory of the Lord take in the beasts there too for Vâ—â—ablus parallels this place with the other But if saith Crellius any shall contend that some beasts at least were innocent then he saith that those though they were destroyed by the flood yet did not suffer punishment but only a calamity by occasion of the sins of men I wonder he did not rather say that the innocent beasts were taken into the Ark for the propagation of a better kind afterwards But by this solemn distinction of calamities and punishments there is nothing so miserable that either men or beasts can undergo but when it serves their turn it shall be only a calamity and no punishment though it