his eating swines flesh The latter which was evil because forbidden was after the Law for that very reason But the former which was forbidden because t was evil was such in order of Nature before the Law The want of heed to which thing I have the rather desired to remove by insisting on it a second time because I think it is the parent of many errours § 16 HAving thus done with my Reply to the several Answers of M. Barlow I now proceed to another Argument which I lately gathered out of FRANCISCUS DIOTALLEVIUS and which is the fitter to succeed the immediate Argument going before because it will make for its Confirmation Evil works saith this Author who for strength and accuteness gives place to none are synonymous with works which are forbidden by God Almighty who hath left it in our power to make our wayes evil which yet could not be if he did not onely permit but efficaciously make us to do the thing that he forbiddeth Now the thing that he forbiddeth will be confessed not to be this That when we act what he forbids us we do not suffer to come to pass that formal obliquity annexed to all such acts by the repugnance which they have to the Law forbidden them But the thing forbidden to us is this That we do not produce the positive being of that act with which the moral obliquity is inseparably annexed The former cannot be the thing because the law being given Thou shalt love the Lord thy God we cannot possibly hate him without a repugnance unto the law which by commanding our love forbids our hatred The latter therefore must be the thing which we are forbid to put in being And which is properly our work though a positive entity because it is absolutely impossible that God who forbids us the act of hating him should make that act which he thus forbids the making of or that by acting us with his power which is irresistible he should make us to do what he forbids us the doing of But to return to Diotallevius when it is said Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife the meaning of it cannot be this Beware that whilst thou proâ—ucest the free act of concupiscence the moral obliquity do not follow it for alas it cannot but follow The meaning therefore must needs be this see that thou abstain from that free act of concupiscence because of that obliquity which is inseparably annext Or determine not thy will to that object which makes the act become contrary to the rule of right Reason And so he concludes it to be the Judgement of the whole Council at Trent which in matters of this Nature must needs be of great consideration That God's concurrence is onely permissive to the free determination of the created will in producing the very being of the evil act And God's permission is so distinguished both by Fathers and Schoolmen from his effection or operation as to signifie no more then the negation of an impediment or cohibition Scotus calls it the negation of the divine positive act which by consequence is not a positive act And it is not an action saith Diotallevius but the negation of an impediment in respect of that operation which doth depend upon our free determination From whence it follows that he who hates God be he man or divel is the sole cause of that act which for that reason also is wholly sin § 17. THis is farther confirmed by an Argument leading ad absurdum For if God does concurr to the positive act of hating God not onely permissively by not hindering it but physically too by praedetermining the will of the Sinner to it then he absolutely wâ—â—leth the actuall hating of himself which of all absurdities is the greatest And again when man is forbid by God to hate him and when God does grievously complain and threaten to punish with Hell fire the man that doth not obey his prohibition It cannot choose but follow that if he absolutely willeth the positive act which he forbiddeth to wit the sinners hating of him he willeth and nilleth the same thing and after the very same manner which is a blasphemous contradiction And thus it is proved to Mr. Hickman to whom alone I am henceforth speaking that the sin of hating God hath a positive being because that quality or action which hath a positive being is clearly proved to be a sin And it is proved to be a sin by being proved to be a Thing which is not made or produced but onely suffered or permitted by God Almighty to come to pass And only made or produced by them that hate him § 18. CAIETAN proves the positive Entity of sin because saith he it consisteth as well of a conversion to an object contrary to the object of virtue as of an aversion from the law And hence saith the Cardinal there is in sin a double nature of evil the one arising from the object the other from the not observing of the law the first is positive the second privative The first inferreth the second for it cannot be that a man should hate God but that in so doing he must break the law because it is simply and intrinsecally evil so that to do it is a sin And as this is observed by D. Field in confirmation of his Doctrine l. 3. c. 23. p. 120. so I find the same Cardinal elsewhere saying that in moralibus pars subjectiva mali est malum and est in moralibus malum dupliciter Implying the whole sin to be a concrete not a repugnance to the law without an act which doth imply a contradiction § 19. THe most acute EPISCOPIVS doth implicitly thus argue although by way of paralipsis As an act commanded by the law is the virtue it self or ordination of the will unto the law so the act forbidden by the law is the vice it self or inordination of the will against the law And as the act of virtue doth not contain or connote any reall thing positive superadded to the act which may be called ordination so the act of vice doth connote nothing privative superadded to the act which may be called inordination § 20. DOctor STERN a very late but Learned Writer doth briefly urge six Arguments to prove that sin may have a positive being four of which I praetermit because I have already shewd them as long since urged by other men though otherwise urged by him than others and perhaps in some places to more advantage The other two I shall mention as not yet touched First saith he a Non-entity may be morally good and therefore an entity may be morally evill The Consequence is evident both by the Rule of opposites and because there is not more repugnance betwixt Obliquity and Entity as obliquity is taken or mistaken by the adverse party then betwixt goodness and Non-entity The Antecedent is proved because a mere omission of a forbidden
act although a Non-entity is morally good Again the Schoolmen do hold a twofold punishment the one of sense the other of loss whereof the latter is the wages of an aversion from God as is also the former of a conversion to the Creature so that if sin were nothing but mere privation the poena sensus would be inflicted without all justice under the notion of Revenge for a conversion to the creature § 21. AGain it may be thus argued and out of BARONIVS his Metaphysica Generalis That which hath not a positive entity cannot be the cause of any thing But sin many wayes is the cause of something For 1. it is the cause of punishment and 2 one sin is the cause of another A vitious act is the cause of a vitious habit A vitious habit is the cause of vitious actions And a natural propension to evil which Baronius calls original sin is said by him to be the cause of all the vitious actions oâ— our will T is true he answers this argument but his answer may be refuted by my Replyes to Mr. Barlow and by what Baronius grants of which anon as the Reader will finde if he makes a triall § 22. Now besides these Arguments thus largely urged and that from many more Authors then Mr. Hickman hath named for his opinion I shall exhibit a larger Catalogue but with a lesser expense of time and paper of such eminently learned and knowing men as have justified my judgement with the authority of their own and of whom unawares I have undertaken a justification I will begin with those Writers with the concurrence of whose opinions Dr. Field thought fit to credit his § 23. ALVAREZ saith the sin of commission is a Breach of a negative Law which is not broken but by a positive Act. Aquinas also saith that though in a sin of omission there is nothing but a privation yet in the sin of commission there is some positive thing Nay he saith more plainly what Dr. Field doth not observe that the ratio formalis of sin is two fold whereof the one is according to the intention of the sinner And that it consisteth essentially in the Act of the free-will He also infers it to be an accident whilst he saith that every sin is in the will as in its subject And very often that in every sin there are two things whereof the one is a quality or action and so the whole sin must have a positive being Farther yet it is consequent to the opinion of Cajetan saith Gregory de Valentiâ that sin formally as sin is a positive thing which he expresly also affirmeth in primam 2 dae q. 71. art 6. Some hold saith Cumel that the formal nature of sin consisteth in some positive thing to wit in the manner of working freely with a positive repugnance to the rule of Reason and the law of God Ockam saith further that the very deformity in an act of Commission is nothing else but the act it self viz. actus elicitus against the Divine Law And these are cited by Dr. Field l. 3. c. 23. p. 120. § 24. To these I add many more which partly were not and partly could not have been observed by Dr. Field LESSIVS saith that an evil act is in somâ— sort evil even according to its Physical Entity Nay upon this passage of C. VORSTIVS Omne ens quà ens bonum est Piscator himself hath this note and it is a note of exception At vitiosa illa qualitas in nobis unde oriuntur actuâ—lia peccata bona non est The learned Professor of Divinity in Academiâ Tubingensi affirmes Original sin to be an accident as the opposite member to substantia and calls it the accident of a substance and compares it to the image of God in man which he also saith was not a substance but an Accident And that will be yielded to have a positive being especially if he means as Piscator did that that accident is a Quality Another learned Professor in Academiâ Oxoniensi by saying Concupiscence is a sin inferreth that sin to be a positive entity which concupiscence will be granted by all to be And if it is with consent it is an actual sin if without consent it is an inbred Rebellion of the flesh against the law of God He also takes it to be an accident by ascribing to it subjectum quo subjectum quod because by entring at the flesh it did infect the spirit Dr. GOAD who was sent to the Synod at DORT whilest he was speaking in that Tract which some do call his Retractation against an ordinary Calvinian distinction which he conceived to make God the Author of sin expressly used these words Might I here without waâ—dring discourse the nature of sin I could prove sin it self to be an action and confute this groundless distinction that way The tract is a Manuscript but divers have Copyes as well as I. And sure the world must enjoy it if not by other men's care at least by mine That Great Divine Dr. IACKSON who was withall a great Philosopher and inferiour to none for skill in Metaphysicks doth not content himself to say of original sin that it is not a mere privation but also defineth it to be a positive Renitency of the flesh or corrupt nature of man against the spiritual law of God especially against the negative Precepts c. And as he highly commends Illyricus for an extraordinary writer so he vindicates his notion by explaining his true sense of Original sin which if the Dr. took by the right handle Mr. Barlow took it by the wrong in the latter part of his 2. excercitation It was the businesse of Illyricus saith Dr. IACKSON to banish all such nominal or grammatical definitions as have been mentioned out of the Precincts of Theology and to put in continual caveats against the Admission of abstracts or mere relations into the definition of Original sin or of that unrighteousness which is inherent in the man unregenerate The Judicious Doctor doth also tell us and who could tell better then he that St. Austine Aquinas and Melanchthon do say in effect as much as Illyricus if their meanings were rightly weighed and apprehended by their Followers Nay Calvin and Martyr and many other good writers consort so well with Illyricus in their definitions of sin in the unregenerate that they must all be either acquitted or condemned together Illyricus himself explains his meaning by producing the definitions of Original sin not onely given by Calvin and Martyr but explained by themselves into Illyricus his sense In so much that Dr. Iackson ranking Calvin and Martyr with Illyricus doth affirm them to make original sin to be the whole nature of man and all his faculties so far forth as they are corrupted Yet still their meaning was no more
of sin Three Reverend Bishops have praefixed their approbation of what is asserted by Doctor Stearn in his Animi Medela of which I have given an account § 20. And though I have not a convenience to examine the Truth of what is told me yet it is told me by a person of great repute for integrity That Ariaga Amicus and Cardinal de Lugo do ex prosesso assert the posiâ—ive entity of sin I am sure the Bishop of Damascus and Claudius Devillius appointed to censure Books by the Archbishop of Lyons Claudius de Bellieure and Emanuel Chalom his Vicar General An. Dom. 1611. did very highly approve of what was taught by Diotallâ—vius of Aâ—iminum concerning sins having a positive being from whence I groundedly conclude them to have been of that judgement Mr Hickman confesseth he cannot deny but that our Protestant Divines in their Disputes against the Papists do make a positive as well as privative part of original sin pag. 85. and though he labours to salve the matter with a distinction of positive out of Maccoviâ—s yet that appears to be a shift and a shamefull one too by what I have cited from Doctor Iackson and other Writers of greatest Note and by what I shall cite from the Fathers also Chap. 5. § 3. as well as from some of the learnedest Moderns Chap. 5. § 4. Last of all the REMONSTRANTS do say expresly Culpa est actus hominis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A very short but an important Instance § 26. The case in hand is so clear that I need no other proof then the confessions of those on the other side For sure that Truth is irresistibly praevalent which is submitted unto by such as do most endeavour to oppose it Doctor Robert BARON was one of the learnedst of those men who were ingaged by education to deny what they felt and had a daily experience of to wit the positive being of sin But yet he was forced to confâ—ss it to be a very great Truth That not onely the privation annexed to the vitious habit but even the habit of vice it self the very positive entity of the habit of luxury and the positive entity of a vitious action is not quid appetibile or good but fugible or evil An instance was given from the objection in the action of lying with a beast which very action he confesseth to be quid execrabile And though he saith that such an entity becomes a sin by reason of a Disconvenience which is inseparably annexed yet he doth not by that deny the positive entity of the sin but onely saith how it comes to be a sin which all men say as well as he who affirm the most professedly its positive being It being granted to be impossible for any action to be a sin without some kind of disconvenience as to the rule of right reason and to the perfect nature and wil of God He also ascribeth unto the will of man a real efficacy and production of the effect And farther saith that sin original is a natural propension of the will to evil Nay giving the definition of ens positivum he saith it is that which puts something in the thing to which it is attributed And whether sin doth not do that I leave the Reader to judge by his own experience In a word he joyns with Timpler in refuting the vulgar Errour which hath imposed so much on Mr. Hickman of sins having onely a deficient cause and smartly sheweth the absurdities to which it leads § 27. Mr. Barlow also doth seem to have implicitly confessed the positive entity of sin by acknowledging that God in the sin of hating God is meerly positive in terminating the act of hatred and does not actively excite the act 1. If his meaning is onely this that God is passive altogether and the sinner alone active in producing the act of hating God then he grants the very act to be the creature of the creature and not of God which he cannot grant possibly but by granting also that the act it self although positive is wholly evil Because he every where saith in terms aequivalent to these that God is active in the production of every thing that is good 2. If his meaning is precisely That God is onely passive so as merely not to hinder but to suffer or to permit whilst the sinner doth determin his will to hate God Then he grants that Act of determining the will to a thing forbidden to be the meer production of the Creature and by consequence a sin for the reason now mentioned And in granting that act which hath a positive beiâ—g to be a sin he must needs gâ—ant a sin to have a positive being One of these two things I suppose he must mean aâ—d which of the two it matters not because though he saith a little before That God may be the cause of the very pravity or obliquity in the act of hating God which he certainly doth wish he had never said yet he explains his meaning of the word cause to be nothing but a moral or objâ—â—tive occasion of that obliquity which proves his sense to be onely this That God is altogether passive the conditio sine-quâ—â—on in the creatures determining his will to sin which determining of the will is a sin also and in producing that act which is intrinsecally evil and so the sin of hating God If I have hit his right meaning I have my end But if I have not I shall be glad to be told another which may agree with the context as well as this which I have given besides he confesseth with Hurtado de Mendozâ— that in the exercisâ— of the will there is a positive act p. 63. such as is the act of willing sin And that to will sin is sin I know he will not deny § 28. But now Mr. Hickman out of all measure confesseth the thing that he denyes I mean the positive being of sin For 1. he confesseth it a sin to hate God which he also confesseth to be an action and so to have a positive being p. 93 94 95. Again 2. the first sin of Angels he supposeth to have been a proud desire to be equall unto God p. 103. Now that pride and desire are both in the praedicament of Quality and have as positive entities or beings as any qualities to be nam'd is so vulgarly known to every youngster that Mr. Hickman dares not sure deny it for fear the youngsters should fall aboard him which he professeth to fear in another place They might well fall aboard him for calling proud desire an action p. 103. lin 13. as a little before he call'd hatred p. 95. l. 17. but that it is likely they know him too well to think it much that a Thistle should bear no Grapes I shall not therefore insist upon his no skill in Logick whilst again and again he takes a quality
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sanct. THEOPHILVS ad Autolychum lib. 3. p. 125. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 TERTULLIAN de Poenit. p. 375. Porrò peccatum nisi MALVM FACTVM dici non meretur Nec quisquam benefaciendo delinquit Cùm Deum grande quid Boni constet esse utique Bono nisi Malum non displiceret quòd inter CONTRARIA sibi nulla Amicitia est MACARIVS in Hom. 15. p. 100. c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having spoken before of Adam's disobedience Hom. 24. p. 137. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hom. 38. p. 204. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And long before Hom. 3. p. 15. A. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 LACTANTIVS in Instit. l. 2. c. 7. p. 102. Dupliciratione peccatur ab insipientibus primum quod Dei opera Deo praeferunt deinde quod elementorum ipsorum figuras humana specie comprehensas colunt Haec facere peccatum est Nesciunt quantum sit nefas adorare aliud praeter Deum Si libido appetit thorum alienum licet sit mediocris vitium tamen maximum est Cupiditas inter vitia numeratur si haec quae terrena sunt concupiscat c. Recens natos oblidere maxima Impietas exponere necare duplex scelus See much more l. 5. c. 9. p. 299. especially c. 20. p. 319. So whilst the Blasphemy of Marcus the Magician and his Followers or their positive speaking against the honour of Gods essence is called an Impiety by IRENAEVS and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above all Impiety he unavoidably imply's the positive being of Impiety which I hope M. Hickman will not affirm to be good or say impiety is one thing and sin another AMBROS de Cain Abel lib. 2. cap. 9. fol. 260. Quanto gravius pecâ—ato ipso ad Deum referre Quod fâ—ceris There the positive fact is said to be a sin though the ascribing it to God which is done by Mr. Hickman is said to be worse then the sin it self that is to say â— greater sin CYPRIAN de Eleemosynâ 1. Serm. p. 179. Coarctati eramus c. nisi iterum pietaâ— Divina subveniens viam quandam tuendae salutis aperuisset ut Sordes postmodum quascunque contrahimus Eleemosynis abluamus compare this with Daniel 4.27 Quia voluntas non erat in culpâ providit Deus generali Damnationi remedium suae sententiam Justitiae temperavit haereditarium ONVS à sobole removens misericorditer ablutione unctione medicinali corruptionis primitivae Fermentum expurgans ORIGEN ad Ioan. 2. in Cat. pat Gr. p. 77. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 AUGUSTINVS Confess c. 11. Talis motus nimirum voluntatis Delictum atque peccatum est Metus ille Aversionis quod fatemur esse peccatum vide quò pertineat c. SALVIAN l. 4. p. 128. Furtum in omni quidem est homine malum Facinus sed damnabilius ab que dubio si Senator furatur aliquando Cunctis Fornicatio interdicitur sed Gravius multò est si de Clero aliquis quà m si de populo fornicetur Ita nos qui Christiani Catholici esse dicimur si simile aliquid Barbarorum Impuritatibus facimus Gravius erramus Atrocius enim sub sancti nominis professione peccamus quanto minori peccato illi per Daemonia pejerant quà m nos per Christum Quanto minoris Res Criminis est Jovis nomen quà m Christi c. The force of this last testimony may be learnt by Mr. H. from Dr. Field It must not be said that God is the original cause that man hath any such action of will as is evil ex objecto for if he should Originally and out of himself will any such act he must be the author of sin seeing such an aâ—t is intrinsecally evil so that it cannot be separated from deformity p. 125 126. after this let Salvian speak Nil ad Deum pertinens Leve ducendum est quia etiam quod videtur exiguum esse Culpa Grande hoc faciebat Divinitatis Inâ—uria EPIPHANIVS adv Haer. l. 1. Tom. 3. p. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 More instances may be seen p. 281.548 549. And to sin is expressed at every turn by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All importing the positivity of sin BERNARDUS de modo bene vivend Serm 37 p. 1281. Superbia est Râ—â—ix omnium malorum Superbia Cupiditas in tantum est unum malum ut nec superbia sine cupiditaâ—e nec cupiditas sine superbiâ esse possit Quid est omne peccatum nisi Dei Contemptus quo ejus praecepta contemnimus Luxuria flagitium est Avaritia spiritualis nequitiâ— unde illud vitium corporis istud Animae viz. quia nullum est peccatum quod ita inquinet corpus sicut Luxuria similiter super omne peccatum avaritia inquinat Animam unde Idolorum servitus dicitur Nor do I see how those Fathers who say that an habit of sin is gotten by the custom of such acts as are avoidable of themselves can be imaginable not to hold the positivity of sin or to hold that such acts can be impuâ—able to God which they affirm the Creature might have avoided Evitabilium Actuum consuetudine censent generari in homine habitum vitiosum so Ger. VOSSIVS in Hist. Pelag p. 215. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so he calls Idolatry 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Orat. 38. p. 620. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Initium omnis peccati superbia non solùm peccatum est ipsa sed nullum peccatum fieri potuit potest aut poterit fine ipsâ siquidem nihil aliud omne peccatum nisi Dei contemptus est quo ejus praecepta calcantur which compare with Ecclus. 10.13 FULGENTIUS ad Monim l. 1. p. 275. so also p. 302 Si initium peccati requiritur nihil aliud nisi superbia invenitur quae tùm initium sumpsit cum Angelus adversus Deum elatus per concupiscentiam quae est radix omnium malorum volens usurpare c. mala opera hoc est Peccata praescisse tantum non etiam praedestinasse quia ibi non opus Dei esse dicitur sed judicium Ideo in peccato opus Dei non est sine operante Deo malus operatur LOMBARDUS l. 2. d. 2. Dist. 40. c. Opera ipsa peccata sunt ut furta stupra Blasphemiae sunt nonnulli actus qui peccata sunt mala per se quaerimus quis Actus peccatum sit dignosces quis Actus sit Peccatum In lieu of producing more Antiquity in words at length which would increase my Readers trouble I shall insert the
the love of God and his glory I shall be willingly bound up from ever speaking or writing or injoying any place in the Church of God if my Superiours can but imagine how that maytend to the publick good rather than lay the least Block in the way of unity which now is attempting a return to such a Babel as ours hath been But besides my contention will be believed to have been such as mine Adversary in time will applaud me for when he shall find my Rudest twitches were but to snatch him from a Praecipice As soon as Mr. Hickman shall be convinced that though for a sinner to hate God and to murder men are as positive entities as any actions to be imagin'd yet they cannot but be reckon'd among the worst sorts of sins and therefore cannot without impiety be said to be any of God's creatures or God himself which yet Mr. Hickman hath often taught I say as soon as he shall discern not onely how dangerous and sinfull but how irrational and sensless his errour is he will as heartily thank me even for this very Book as I would thank that man who should pluck a thorn out of my eye Besides that my aime in what I have written hath been the same with that of the most moderate Doctor Sanderson For to express it in his words I have not written against the moderate but onely the Rigid-Scotized-thorow-paced Presbyterians Of them Mr. Hickman can be but one And even with him I am as ready to be upon just as good Termes as with my neighbour Mr. Barlee I long have been Let him onely forbeare to wound me in the Apple of my eye nay in the tenderest part of my very soul by dishonouring God and his Anointed long before whose restauration which is but hoped whilst â— am writing I had sent my Vindication of his Supremacy to the Press and which had certainly been as publick as now it is though the Republicans had prosper'd in their Cariere Let him I say but do that and my work is done If I shall ever again appear in the behalf of any one of the five controverted points it will be likelyest to be in Latine as being the Scholars Mother-tongue and onely in order to reconcilement Now that the God of peace and unity will make us at unity and peace within our selves enlightning our heads with that knowledge which is the mother of humility and inflaming our hearts with that zeal which is according to such a knowledge and thereby making up our breaches as well of judgement as of charity or at least of charity if not of judgement that we may all be held together by the bond of unity in the truth shall be as heartily the endeavour as it is the frequent and fervent prayer of Your meanest Brother and Servant in our Lord and Master Iesus Christ. THOMAS PIERCE Brington May 2. 1660. A PARAENETICAL PREFACE Shewing the purpose of the Author with the Necessity of the Work Representing its usefulness in all Times but more especially in these with some Praeparatory Advertisements making the whole the more manageable to the less Intelligent of the people Christian Reader IF thou shalt ask in curiosity why I happen to come so late to this Discharge of my Engagement to which I stood by my Promise so long obliged Know that my several Praeengagements with severall Books of Mr. Baxter together with several interventions both of sickness and journies and other Impediments unavoidable do conspire to give thee the Reason of it For these did keep me from the thought of what I have brought to a conclusion till somewhat after the beginning of this last Winter Besides that at the end of my Autocatacrisis which I conceive more useful then all my Controversies besides and upon which I bestowed the greatest labour that it might put a full end to the whole Dispute I made a promise to my Readers of what I had purpos'd within my self that if I return'd to any Dispute in any kind whatsoever as it would fall out Cross to my Inclinations so I resolved to do it onely at times of Leisure That whilst my howers could be spent in my chief employment I might not lose too many of them in my least necessary Defences For though I remember I am a Shepherd and bound as well to defend as to feed the Sheep yet it cannot but be to me an unpleasant Game to tyre my self in the hunting of Wolves and Foxes But after the Reason of my lateness I am to render another Reason why I betook my self at last to the present service I saw the flock was indanger'd by several Vermin and partly driven out of the Fold too Nay the great Master-shepherd was himself assaulted by their Inventions by whom he was slanderously reported to be the principal cause of their going astray Some I found teaching and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in broadest Terms That God is the Author of Injustice the Author of Adultery the Author of the evil of sin not onely the Author of the sinfull work it self but of the evil intention too In a word The Author of all thâ—se things which we affirm to come to pass by his mere permission and not at all by his appointment Others I caught in the Act of teaching That God doth incite or stirr men up to wicked actions that He seduceth commandeth doth make obdurate draws sends in deceipts and effects those things which are grievous sins Of which I now give an Instance from Peter Martyr in my Margin because he was the most famous and learned Calvinist of Florence In so much that Doctor Whitaker did most ingenuously confess when he answer'd Campian that if Calvin or Peter Martyr or any other of that Party affirms God to be the Author and cause of sin they are all of them guilâ—y of the most horrid Blasphemy and wickedness And yet when the Florentine I spake of had put the Question in the page preceeding his above cited words An Deus causa sit peccati whether God be the cause of sin he presently call'd it Quaestionem non dissimulandam and professedly held it in the affirmative A third sort I found there were who taught That God is the Author not of those actions alone in and with which Sin is but of the very pravity Ataxie Anomie Irregularitie and sinfulness it self which is in them yea that God hath more hand in mens sinfulness then they themselves These were publickly and in Print the very words of Master Archâ—r a Presbyterian Minister of London in Lombard street who went over into Holland with Thomas Goodwin Oliver Cromwel's Ghostly Father and the present usurper of the Presidentship in Magdalen Colledge by which Goodwin he was commended for as pretious a man as this earth bears any In Holland he was Pastor of the Church of Arnheim as we are told by Mr. Edwards his loving Friend too His book he was pleased
c. But let us hear Dr. Iackson also § 9. The Hypothesis for whose clearer Discussion these last Theses have been praemised is this Whether it being once granted or supposed that the Almighty Creator was the cause either of our mother Eves desire or of her actual eating of the forbidden fruit or of her delivery of it to her husband or of his taking and eating it though unawares the same Almighty God must not upon like necessity be acknowledged to be the Author of all the obliquiâ—ies which did accompany the positive acts or did necessarily result from them This is a case or Species Facti which we cannot determine by the Rule of Faith It must be tryed by the undoubted Rules of Logick or better Arts. These be the onely perspective Glasses which can help the eye of Reason to discover the truth or necessity of the consequence to wit whether the Almighty Creator being granted to be the cause of our mother Eves first longing after the forbidden Fruit were not the cause or Author of her sin Now unto any Rational man that can use the help of the forementioned Rules of Art which serve as prospective Glasses unto the eye of Reason that usual Distinction between the Cause or Author of the Act and the Cause or Author of the Obliquity which necessarily ensues upon the Act will appear at the first sight to be False or Frivolous yea to imply a manifest contradiction For Obliquity or whatsoever other Relation can have no cause at all besides that which is the Cause of the Habit of the Act or Quality whence it necessarily results And in particular that conformity or similitude which the first man did bear to his Almighty Creator did necessarily result from his substance or manhood as it was the work of God undefaced Nor can we search after any other true Cause of the First mans conformity to God or his integrity besides him who was the cause of his manhood or of his existence with such qualifications as by his creation he was endowed with In like manner whosoever was the cause whether of his coveting or eating of the Tree in the middle of the Garden was the true cause of that obliquity or crooked deviation from Gods Law or of that deformity or dissimilitude unto God himself which did necessarily result from the forbidden Act or Desire It was impossible there should be one Cause of the Act and another Cause of the Obliquity or Deformity whether unto Gods Laws or unto God himself For no Relation or Entity merely relative such are obliquitie and deformity can have any other Cause beside that which is the cause of the Fundamentum or Foundation whence they immediately result It remains then that we acknowledge the old Serpent to have been the first Author and Man whom God created male and female to have been the true positive Cause of that obliquity or deformity which did result by inevitable Nâ—câ—ssity from the forbidden Act or desire which could have no Necessary cause at all and more to this purpose p. 3013. c. § 10. Diotallevius doth also prove that they who make God the Author of the positive act of hatiâ—g God do make him the Author of the obliquity Because saith he God himself cannot effect what doth imply a contradiction that the moral obliquity of an Act which is intrinsecally evil and freely exerted by the creature shall not follow or rather attend the positive entity of the act which is such as hath been said and so exerted For it implies a contradiction that an act intrinsecally evil to wit the act hating God should be freely exerted and yet not evil or that it should not have a moral pravity conjoyned with it 2. They who hold all positive entities to be effected by God himself must needs believe him to be the cause as much of the worst as of the best actions in the world both because hating is as positive when it is fixed upon God as it can possibly be when it is fixed upon the Divel And because an obliquity is as vnavoidable to the one as rectitâ—de or conformity can be possibly to the other 3. If an immediate working of the formal obliquity be required to make an Author of anothers sin then neither Man nor Divel in perswading another to do wickedly can possibly be the Author of it because they are not any otherwise the causes of the obliquity then by tempting to that act to which the obliquity is annexed And for the very same reason no creature could be the cause of any such sin within himself because he doth not produce the moral obliquity of the act but by producing the act to which the obliquity is annext 4. When we do absolutely and simply inquire after the cause of another mans sin we do not inquire after the cause which immediately reacheth to the obliquity of the act but after the inducing or moving cause by which he is led to such a voluntary act whose object is repugnant to the rule of Reason That is the method of Aquinas De malo quaest 3. art 1. 3. 1.2 q. 75. per totam from whence it follows that if God doth induce us efficaciously to an aversion from himself and so to a hatred of his Divinity it is every whit as true that he is the Author of our sin as that he induceth us efficaciously to that aversion and hatred which is intrinsecally evil And therefore Mr. Hickman must recant the first or contentedly smart for the Impiety of the second § 11. Doctor STEARN is very severe and upon very just ground to the use that is made of the same Distinction For he doth not content himself to say that to be the cause of the action from which the obliquity cannot be separate is to be the very cause of the obliquity it self because the obliquity is annexed to the entity of the Action and thâ—t in a manner unavoidable Nor doth he onely add this That man himself is no otherwise the author of his sin then as he is author of that action to which the obliquity is annexed But he saith yet farther That if God well-knowing the absolute inseparability of the obliquity from the action doth wâ—llingly produce that very action he is so far from being free from the obliquity of the action that he is môre guilty of it then the man himself in whom that action is â—o produced as who does seldome or never think of the obliquity annext quam Deus nunquam non cognoscit animadvertit Nay he chargeth the Adversaries with a higher blasphemy then that even with making God more guilty then the divel which how they can answer let them consider whom it concern's I shall onely for the present subjoyn his words Immo Daemones hominem ad peccandum tentantes minori jure Authores peccati sunt censendi quam Causa Libera Actionis illam producens non tantùm sciens malitiam esse
illi annexam Nam Daemones non producunt Actiones quibus malitia est annexa sed tantum solicitant c. multo itaque magis Malitiae reus est qui sciens volens non tentat aut solicitat sed actionem reipsa producit cujus malitia ut ab ea prorsus inseparabilis ipsi quà m clarissimè patet What kind of Adversaries they are whom the Doctor thus handles and how much Mr. Hickman becomes concern'd he gives us to know by his two instances in Twisse and Zuinglius § 12. A whole Colledge of Remonstrants men of renown for their piety and learning too thought fit to shame the common subterfuge by these two wayes of Argumentation 1. Whensoever a superiour and omnipotent cause doth so move and determine the inferiour and impotent that it being so moved cannot choose but sin Then must the guilt of that sin be wholly transferred on the superiour and omnipotent cause But according to those men who affirm the positive acts of all the very worst sins to be the creatures and works of God the inferiour cause is so moved by the omnipotent and superiour as that it cannot choose but sin Therefore according to those men the sin is wholly to be transferred on the superiour cause 2. When two causes do concurr to one action to wit the action of hating God whereof the one act 's freely and the other of necessity then must the cause which acts freely sustain the whole fault of its coming to pass But according to the men aforesaid God acts freely in the producing of such an action which M. Hickman reckons amongst Gods creatures and the inferiour cause of necessity Therefore according to those men God sustains the whole fault of its coming to passe And we know in the whole fault is included the obliquity as well as the act § 13. The Apologist for Tilenus doth make this Answer to the distinction 1. That man doth seldom or never entertain sin or consent to it with a designe to oppose himself to the divine Law but to enjoy his Pâ—easure and satisfie his appetites 2. He supposeth that a man should consent to sin with such a set purpose to oppose Gods Law And then infers that according to Mr. H.'s Doctrine that consent and that purpose being positive entities and acts of the soul are from God and of his production from whence it followes either that man doth not sin when he commits such an act or that the fault is imputable to God who is called by Mr. Hickman the first cause of that Act. I wonder when Mr. H. will give that Author a Reply § 14. But after all and above all I commend to consideration the words of the Reverend Dr. HAMMOND who having shewed how those Doctrines which are commonly called Calvinistical are so noxious to the practice and lives of men as to be able to evacuate all the force of the Fundamentals of Christianity those I mean by him forementioned And coming to speak of the Distinction betwixt the act and the obliquity which the Assertors of those Doctrins have commonly used as an Artifice for the avoiding of those consequences by which their Doctrines are rendred odious at last proceeds to make it appear That this is no way applicable to the freeing of God from being the Author of that sin of which he is said by those men to predetermine the act For 1. Though a free power of acting good or evil be perfectly distinct and separable from doing evil and therefore God that is the Author of one cannot thence be inferred to be the author of the other yet the act of sin is not separable from the obliquity of that act the act of blasphemy from the obliquity or irregularity of blasphemie the least evil thought or word against an infinite good God being as crooked as the rule is straight and consequently he that predetermines the act must needs predetermine the obliquity Nay 2. if there were any advantage to be made of this distinction in this matter it would more truely be affirmed on the contrary side that God is the author of the obliquity and man of the act for God that gives the rule in transgressing of which all obliquity consists doth contribute a great deal though not to the production of that Act which is freely committed against that rule yet to the denominating it oblique for if there were no Law there would be no obliquity God that gives the law that a Jew shall be circumcised thereby constitutes uncircumcision an obliquity which had he not given that law had never been such But for the act as that differs from the powers on one side and the obliquity on the other it is evident that the man is the cause of that To conclude this Chapter It is a thing so undeniable that the Author of the act of hating God must needs be the Author of the obliquity that as the men of the Church of England affirm man to be the Author and the sole author of both and God of neither so the rigid Presbyterians as well as Papists affirm God to be the Author not onely of the act but of the obliquity of the Act. Witness Mr. Archer so much commended by Thomas Godwin in his Comfort for believers p. 36.37 Mr. Whitfield also and Mr. Hobbs Occham in sent 3. q. 12 cited by Dr Field p. 128. and Mr. Hickman in effect when he saith that God is the Cause of all Beings p. 78. and p. 95. and Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 2. CHAP. V. § 1. THE positive entity of sin is so clear from Scripture and from the writings of all the Fathers both Greek and Latine that as Mr. Hickman hath not attempted to give us Scripture for his opinion so the FATHERS are very few whose very figurative speeches do look that way And their meaning is so conspicuous by what the same Fathers say before and after that if he drank out of the Foâ—ntaines as I see he hath done out of several Cisterns I admire the greatness of his delusion His performance being no better then mine or any mans would be who should prove that an Idol hath not a positive being although the work of mens hands and made of Massy Gold or silver because it is said by the Apostle an Idol is nothing in the world Or that the Planters of Christianity had not onely no positive but not so much as a Real Being because it is said by the same Apostle that God hath chosen the things that are not to bring to naught things that are Yet this ad hominem is a strong way of arguing very much stronger then Mr. Hickmans by how much that of the Scripture is the greatest Authority in the world Now though it is said by the Holy Ghost that Circumcision is nothing that the foreskin is nothing that wicked men are of nothing that every man is but vanity yea and
is a high self-determining principle the great spring of our actions of Iudgement pag. 152. But Mr. B. as many others is produced by me in no fâ—â— place I not observing any order either of dignity or of time but giving to every one a place as he meets my memory or my eye The words of GROTIUS deserve great heed whilst he saith that the liberty of a man's will is not vitious but able by its own force to produce a thing that is vitious that is an action meaning that a vitious action as the action of hating God is meerly from the sinner man or Divel and not without impiety to be ascribed unto God either as a mediate or immediate cause And though I cited some part of his words before yet not to fail of his intenâ— I shall intreat my Reader to weigh the whole Neque ab eo quod diximus dimovere nos debet quod mala multa evenire cernimus quorum videtur origo Deo adscribi non posse ut qui perfectissimè sicut ante dictum est bonus sit Nam cum diximus Deum omnium esse Causam addidimus eorum quae verè subsistunt Nihil enim prohibet quominus ipsa quae subsistunt deinde causae sint Accidentium quorundam quales sunt actiones Deus hominem mentes sublimiores homine creavit cum agendi libertate quae agendi libertas vitiosa non est sed potest suâ vialiquid vitiosum producere Et hujus quidem generis malis quae moraliter mala dicuntur omnino Deum adscribere auctorem nefas est p. 27 28. LYCERUS vindicating God from the very same calumnie with which Mr. Hickman hath not feared to â—sperse him saith that the Divel did peccâ—re ex semetipso according to our Saviour Ioh. 8.44 that he alone is pater fons malorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first inventor of evil things to which he accommodates that of Austin Quomodo Deus pater genuit filium veritatem sic Diabolus lapsus genuit quasi filium mendacium God is said to be omnipotent not because he can do all things saith LOMBARD out of Augustin but because he can do whatsoever he will who cannot will to do any thing but what is good But there are some things saith he which God cannot do to wit those things wich are unjust sunt alia quaedam quae Deus nullatenus facere potest ut pâ—ccata p. 247. Non potest Deus facere injusta p. 248. These following Doctrines quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult eligit quod liberum Arbitrium est potentia passiva quod necessitate movetur ab Appetibili item quod dignitas esset in causis superioribus posse facere peccata Item quod alâ—quis faciat aliquid omnino ut Deus vult ipsum facere voluâ—tate Beneplaciti quod talis peccet c. were condemned with an Anathema by the Bp. of Paris and all the Professors of Divinity in that university A. D. 1270. 1341. together with the Blasphemies of Ioannes de Mercurio of the Cistercian order that God is in some sort the cause of the sinful act And that whatever is caused by the will of the Creature is so caused by vertue of the first cause And that God is the cause of every mode of the act and of every Circumstance that is produced All which are the Blasphemies asserted as Necessary truths by Mr. Hickman accordingly do call for a condemnation Bp. BRAMHALL shewes it to be his judgement whilst he censures Mr. Hobbs for saying that God wills and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad and saith it implyes a contradiction that God should willingly do what he professeth he doth suffer Act. 13.18 Act. 14.16 Then he thus states the matter God causeth all good permitteth all evil disposeth all things both good and evil The general power to act is from God in him we live move and have our being this is Good But the specification and Determination of this general power to the doing of any evil is from our selves and proceeds from the free will of man it is a good consequence This thing is unrighteous therefore it cannot proceed from God Thus Aquinas and others are also expounded by Diotallevius not to mean that God is any cause of the evil act but that he doth not withdraw his necessary support from the will which abuseth its liberty in determining it self to the evil act and so that God is only the condition without which we cannot do evil not the cause by which we do it And so saith Aquinas Licet Deus sit universale principium omnis intentionis motus humani quod tamen determinetur voluntas humana ad malum consilium hoc non esse à Deo sed ab ipsâ again he saith non à motione divinâ sed à dispâ—sitione humanae voluntatis oriri ut malae potius actionâ—s quà m boâ—ae sequantur He also cites for his opinion what I have cast into the Margin and of which the result is this Dâ—termiâ—ationâ—m ad producâ—ndam huâ—â—s actus enâ—itatem esse à voluntate humanâ non autem à Deo Deum ita nolle antecedenâ—er ut haec entitas sit ut eam eâ—iam esse patiatur suum concursum non subtrahendo si conditio id exigat ex Creaturae libertate opposita p. 92.93.94 mark how it is expressed by Dr. GO AD. God made Adam able to be willing to sin but he made him not to will sin that he chose death it was by the strength of his will given him by God but God did not binde him to chose death for that were a contradiction a necessitated choice if the Nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed this point will be most evident And now the judicious Dr. Hammond will be the fittest to shut up all He that first gives the Law and then preâ—etermines the Act of transgressing the disobedience the doing contrary to that law that first forbids eating of the tree of knowledge and then predetermines Adams will to choose and eat what was forbidden is by his decree guilty of the Commission of the act and by his Law the cause of its being an obliquity And indeed if the obliquity which renders the act a sinfull act be it self any thing it must necessarily follow that either God doth not predetermine all things or that he predetermines the obliquity and Regularity bearing the same pâ—oportion of Relation to any act of Duty as obliquity doth to sin it cannot be imagined that the Author of the sinful Act should not be the Author of the obliquity as well as the Author of the pious Act is by the disputers acknowledged to be the Author of the regularity of it To conclude this Chapter in the words of Dr Reynolds Let not any man resolve sins into any other original then his
that sin is nothing which is but non-ens in English why not figuratively spoken when they say that sin is a privation especially when there are testimonies out of the very same Writers not onely for the reality but positivity also of sin 2. The little Greek he produceth hath so very many faults in so very few lines not observed in his Errata that I conceive he did he knew not what with an implicit Faith in the skill of others from whom he borrow'd at second hand which I believe so much the rather because I find his own Authorities do overthrow the very errour for which he bâ—ings them Witness the words of Aâ—hanasius which prove that sin hath no substance in opposition to those Greeks who contended that sin had a subsistence of it self whereas to the having a positivity there is nothing more required then that it be some kind of Accident Witness also those other words affirming no evil thing positive or privative to proceed from God who being the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gives occasion to the expression of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which evil things may be called as not derived from him who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So when it is said by St. Austin ex uno Deo esse omnia quae sunt he explains his meaning to be of all good things and of none besides because he presently adds tamen non esse peccatorum auctorem Deum And if when Austin doth elsewhere say Peccatum nihil est he means according to the letter that sin is nothing in very deed first 't is a gross contradiction to what he saith in other places and secondly 't is the worst of his many Errours 3. The meaning of Aquinas I have elsewhere shewed And yet if I say with Dr. Iackson that Aquinas and his followers have sometimâ—s spoken uâ—excusably concerning God I shall but speak to the dishonour of Popish Writers by whom the rigid Presbyterians have been unhappily corrupted in these affairs Lastly whereas he saith that heaâ—hâ—n Philosophers did see this giving an instance in Salustius and no one else a man that shall affirm the eternity of the world may urge Aristotle for it and say the Heathens themselves discernd this truth Thus I say a man may argue who can find in his heart to argue no better then Mr. Hickman But be it that a heathen is of the Presbyterian judgement the Christian Fathers and Schoolmen are still of mine unless when they speak in such a manner against me as to speak as much against themselves too § 11. His second Reason is because he knows no other way of defining what ens primum is but this that it is such a Being which is not from any other being and which is the cause of all the Beings that are p. 78. First I observe from these words that the Libertine advanceth more and more to a clear discovery of it self For if he thinks that any sin as hating cursing blaspheming God hath any being in the world he professeth to believe that God himself is the cause of it And the cause is the Author of any being And so he is caught in the act of that very crime which himself had confessed to be the worst of all blasphemies and which is the Quintessence of all blasphemy saith Theophilus Churchman which is thought to signifie three men of which number Master Hickman himself is one in the rationall conjectures of all I meet with If he thinks that sin hath no being and by consequence that it is nothing then his words are most impertinent and prove him besides a meer Carneadist Secondly In saying God is the cause of all beings meerly because he is the first he seems to think there is but one way of priority whereas a Freshman in Logick could have told him there are five Is it not enough that God is the first of all Beings and was from eternity without beginning whereas all things else began to be and so was before the being of sin and of all things else in four respects but he must also be before it as the â—ause of its being Thirdly It may suffice to the defining of ens primum to say it is that which alone did neveâ— begin to be or that than which there is nihil prius and which praecedeth all others as much as eternity praecedeth time Or if the word cause must needs be added let it be said he is the cause of all good things that have a being whether naturally and necessarily or voluntarily acting But not the cause of those acts or actions which cannot but argue in the causer either wickedness and guilt or imperfection § 12. His third Reason in effect is but the same with the second as the second is the same with what he call'd his second Argument p. 77. And so I referr it for its answer both to the Section before going and to what I have said in my whole fifth Chapter especially to § 5 anâ— 6. Onely I add my observation that whilst God is by him affirmed to be the fountain of all essences p 79. who yet ascribeth one essence unto sin whilst he saith the action of hating God is essentially evil p. 94. he affirms God to be the fountain of all the sins in the world and that not only of the act but of the very essence of sin it self And because he seems to stumble most at the common axiom in Philosophy which is found urged by Mr. Barlow severall times upon one account to wit that the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect I will first send him back to what I have said in Answer to it chap. 5. § 5. num 2. Next I will set him down at large Aquinas his Answer unto the same effectus causae secundae procedens ab eâ secundum quod subditur causae primae reducitur etiam in causam primam Sed si procedat à causâ media secundum quod exit ordinem causae primae non reducitur in causam primam Sicut si minister faciat aliquid contra mandatum Domini hoc non reducitur in dominum sicut in causam Et similiter peccatum quod liberum arbitrium committit contra praeceptum Dei non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam § 12. His fourth pretended reason is most ridiculously pretended He believes no medium because forsooth Mr. P. hath not been able to find any for whereas I told him the works of the Divel are a medium he saith I could not sure but think he would distinguish in blasphemy lying c betwixt the vital act and its deficiency c. p. 79. The folly of this being discovered throughout my whole fourth chapter and in the beginning of this sixth and I may say throughout my fifth too but most expresly in my third chapter § 6. which is too long to be here repeated I shall onely
unlesse he thinks our very nature may be said to be sinfulnesse it self or that our nature and our faculties are meer privations which yet he cannot say soberly because he absolutely denyes that sin doth signifie abstractly 4. Dr Hammond who knew best the true importance of the Text thought fit to paraphrase it to us by customary sins not by nature and faculties as Mr. Hickman 5. By this he justifies Dr. Iackson and Flaccius Illyricus whom before at adventure he did so liberally condemn 6. In saying that the faculties by reason of privations do lâ—st against the working of the spirit ibid he implyes that lusting to be a sin without a figure and yet implyes it as much to be something positive 7. If he quarrels with me and others for expressing the hatred of God by sin which is positive but not good how hath he railed in effect at the blessed Apostle for expressing that by sin which he confesseth to be good as well as positive and therefore good because positive 8. Let sin be taken for nature and its faculties as he desires yet concupiscence is not which sin is said to bring forth And that concupiscence as it is positive so our selfe-contradictor will hardly deny it to be a sin Sect. 24. To prove the efficient cause of sin I argued thus in the first place If man is the cause of sin and not efficient he is the material formal or final cause if the deficient is none of these as none will say it is it is no cause at all If sin hath no cause it hath no real being much lesse can it be the cause of punishment and so God is inferred to punish men without cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 145. Now comes the Answer of Mr. H. as much for my interest as I could wish Rather then we will seem to be too much frighted we will say that man is the material or subjective cause of the Action such a material or subjective cause as evil can have p. 102. To which I reply 1. That Mr H. did either intend to speak to the purpose or else for fear of that he speaks industriously beside it if the first he fully grants that sin is an action and so a positive being if the second he is convinced of sinning against his own Light and effectually confesseth he cannot answer when the Question is of the cause of sin why does he answer touching the cause of the Action if he does not believe it to be a sin and if he believes it to be a sin why undertook he in his Titlepage to prove that sin is a mere privation Here I leave him to be hist by the Colledge-boyes for having written as if he had written on purpose to make himself the object of scorn and laughter Nor is it fit it should go better with such as write against God as the cause of all sins because of all actions acts and habits 2. That here by action he means sin one would believe by what he saith in his second clause as an explication of his first cause of the Action such a material cause as evil can have if he means it can have none why did he yield a material causâ— if he means it can have any mâ—terial cause ex quâ or in quâ then he confesseth it hath a cause which is not meerly deficient if ex quâ it is a concrete if in quâ an accident if either positive It hath besides materiam circa quam and so a threefold subject constituens recipiens occupans subjectum As for his confession which next ensues of the efficient cause of sin which must needs be meant by the evil of the action and how again he falls into the youngsters hands I have long since shew'd Chap. 3. Sect. 28. num 7. so ill he prospers with stollen goods out of Robert Baronius which he would certainly have cited Baronius for had he so well understood it as I hope he now doth For how he builds up my cause upon the Ruins of his own by what he saith of the first sin a proud desire to be equal with God p. 103. I have largely shewed ch 3. Sect. 28. Num. 1. 25. To my 2. Argument that where there is no efficient there is no effect that is there is nothing and so according to mine Antagonist men are either not damned or damned for nothing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 145. He is so far from the courage to frame an answer that he dares not be so honest as to repeat my words fairly but tells his Readers of my inference without a syllable of of my premâ—ses from whence my inference was drawn for fear his Readers should discern how conscious he is of his disability and how resolutely bent on Tergiversation which he had nothing to keep from being seen but an easie boast so that still I am to ask 1. How that is an effect which hath no efficient and 2. How that can be something which is effected by nothing and 3. How nothing can be the cause of a mans damnation To these 3. things he should have answered had he been able but nemo tenetur ad impossibile and so he thinks he hath a priviledge to be impertinent what is meant by nihil applyed to sin in one case and to substance it self in another I have abundantly inform'd him throughout my fifth Chapter especially § 1.3 and § 5. num 6. c. But since he shews himself a seâ—ker he shall not fail to find my meaning My meaning is that p. 104. God will punish impenitent sinners with damnation both for not having in their faculties Habits and Actions what should be in them And also for having that which should not be in them He will not therefore damn infants for their meerly not-having original righteousness in the root for he accepteth according to what a man hath not according to what he hath not but he will damn those adulti who work unrighteousness and continue such working unto the end To this I add 2. things 1. That no willfull sinner who is liable to wrath can so omit that which is good as not to commit that which is evil 2. That God will punish such sinners not onely for having something in their actions and habits which they should not have but for having such habits and for exerting such actions or for putting those things in being which God would not have and forbidâ— to be 3. There is a positive abnegation of God Tit. 1.16 and so Mr. Hickman doth deny him So did they also who forsook God and followed Baalim 1 King 18.18 And therefore that passage which Mr. Hickman took from Dr. Robert Baron without so much as saying by your leave Sir as an Anonymous writer is known to say cannot stand him in any stead For a man cannot not pay the money which he owe's without detaining or keeping back the money which he should pay And however
to stretch out his hand to cut which act so far forth onely considered and no farther doubtless is no sin for then every stretching out of the arm to cut any thing should be a sin according to the old Logical axiome Quicquid convenit quatenus ipsum convenit omni But the applying of such an act to an undue object referring it to an undue end performing it in an undue manner or with undue circumstances by any of which obliquities it becometh a sin proceedeth wholly and solely from the corrupt will of the inferiour agent and not at all from God which as it layeth the whole guilt of the sin or moral act upon the actor so it clearly acquitteth God such his concurrence to the natural act or motion of his creature as aforesaid notwithstanding from the least degree of any agency or efficiency therein 8. He saith That what he hath here declared concerning these two last points as it is axactly agreeable to what his judgement then was when the two Sermons wherein the passages quoted by Mr. Hickman are found were preached so it is his present opinion still which he hath therefore somewhat the longer insisted upon not onely for that it seemeth to be the consentient tenet of the best School-men grounded upon discourse of reason and the Authority of St. Augustin and other of the antient Fathers and no way in his apprehension derogatory to the holiness goodness wisdom or majesty of God But also because the due consideration of it might prove if it were by some able hand distinctly clearly and intelligibly set down a probable expedient toward the reconciling of some differences among Divines held at a greater distance then perhaps they needed to have been for want of a right understanding between the dissenting parties For the Doctor professeth himself and he well hopeth he is in most things not much further from the truth for so doing as on the one side extreamly jealous of extreme opinions till they have undergone a severe trial so on the other side very inclinable to embrace middle and reconciling opinions where there appeareth not pregnant evidence of reason to the contrary 9. Lastly to conclude this whole businesse so far as he apprehendeth himself concerned he saith he is not unwilling the world should know that having from his younger years as his Genius led him addicted himself mostly to the study of the moral and practical part of Divinity but especially having for fear of approaching too neare to the Ark of Gods secret counsels kept a loof off from medling more then needs must with those more nice and intricate disputes concerning Gods eternal decrees the cooperation of Gods free Grace and mans free-will c. He contented himself for sundry years to follow on as most others did by a kinde of implicit credulity in the Sublapsarian way as the then most troden path until having a just occasion A.D. 1628. to make a little farther inquiry after the truth in those questions upon due search he saw a necessity of receding from that way in some things a more particular account whereof is given in a narrative lately printed with his consent which if well considered ought he thinketh in reason and charity to excuse him from the necessity of justifying every syllable or phrase that might slip from his tongue or pen in any thing by him spoken or written before that year and whilest he was very little or rather nothing at all versed in the study of those Questions Now since I have proved undeniably that the question was from the beginning betwixt my adversaries and me whether any kinde of sins plainly meaning whole sins not the formal part of sin which cannot possibly be the sin of which it is but the formal part have a positive being And since it is said by Dr. SANDERSON that the positive acts above mentioned murdering and ravishing of men women are so in the concrete horrid sins nay in the plainest tearmes to be imagined that a sin of commission doth consist of two things an act and an obliquity and since it is said by Mr Hickman that it belongs to the universality of the first cause to produce not onely every positive but every real being and not onely so but also the positive modifications of beings p. 95. It is apparent that Doctor SANDERSON is as much for my cause and as much a-against Mr. Hickmans as either my heart can wish or my cause require For though he conceiveth that the act may be considered without considering the object about which it is conversant in which case it cannot possibly be considered as a sin yet he declares that the Act of sin cannot possibly exist without the obliquity any more then the obliquity without the Act. And farther yet he doth affirm towards the end of his sixt paragraph both that the vitiated Act is the very sin and that the sin which is the vitiated act is not only a real but a positive entity I have published this happy concurrence with me not onely in his sense but according to his desire in his own manner of expression § 69. I now go on to discover his wilfull Calumny not so much against me as against Bp. HALL Bp. MORTON and Bp. BROWNRIG whom though he knew to be Bishops of the Church of England yet he reckons them them with the men of the Kirk or Consistory or their Adherents here in England whom I had charged with swearing the Scottish Covenant and making God the Author of sin who had done dishonours unto the Protestant name p. 31 32. For if the Reader will consult my Auâ—ocatacrisis chap. 2. p. 61 62. he will see I onely spake against the Papists and Presbyterians in words at length and by name and that upon no lesser motive or provocation then their making God the Author of sin So that now Mr. Hickman must either prove that those excellent Prelates were Presbyterians or Papists or such at least of their adherents as have been known to make God the Author of sin Or if he cannot prove this as I know he cannot he must make some amends for so foul a slander § 70. The request he puts up to the Episcopal Divines who close with such as he is in the present contest p. 31. renders him yet more criminall in two respects First because there are none of the Episcopal Divines who ever closed with the Hickmanians in saying that sin if it is positive is either God's creature or God himself or that our English Presbyterians have any power to make Priests For this and that he must confess is the present subject of our contest Next because he calls their Brethren Arminian Ardelio's by whom they must expect to be last devoured By which he would intimate to his Readers if I am able to understand him That we design the Doctrines they call Arminian as the condition of our Brethrens Communion with us which as it hath ever been
to Intitle Comfort for Believers in their Sins and Suffrings for fear Believers should be afflicted with the sinfulness of their sins which God himself is the Author of and more the Author in his opinion than they can be Yet his Book with this Doctrine was even printed by Authority cum Privilegio when Presbyterianism was up with the License and approbation of old Mr. Downham who was impowred to such things by the-world-knows-whom It was the Doctrine of Mr. Knox the great Introducer of Presbyterianism in Scotland That the wicked are not onely left by Gods suffring but compelled to sin by his power p. 317. And again he saith we do not onely behold and know God to be the Principal cause of all things but also the Author appointing all things p. 22. It is also taught in another Treatise at first written in French but after published in English That by vertue of Gods will all things were made yea even those things which are evil and execrable p. 15. Another takes upon him to prove That all evil springeth out of God's Ordinance And his Book is Intitled Against a Privy Papist as 't were on purpose to betray the Protestant Name into Disgrace But now at last Mr. Hickman outgoes them All if they all are but capable to be outgon For the most execrable and hainous of all the sins to be imagin'd is the Divel 's hating Almighty God Which though Mr. Hickman doth confess to be the worst of all actions and again essentially and intrinsecally evil p. 94. lin 2. evil ex genere obâ—ecto ibid. lin 9. and such as no kind of Circumstance can ever make lawful ib. lin 17. yet he grosly calls it The work of God as all other positive things are p. 96. lin 8. wilt thou know good Reader what may lead him to such a Blasphemy Thou must know his principle is this Verbatim It belongs to the universality of the FIRST CAUSE to PRODUCE not onely EVERY REAL BEING but also the positive MODIFICATIONS of Beings 95. l. ult p. 96. lin 1. And this he gives for the very Reason why The Action of hating God spoken of just now is the work of God Now that this is a Principle or a Doctrine whose every consequence is a crime I cannot better convince the Calvinists than by the confession of Mr. Calvin For when the very same Doctrine which I suspect to have been brew'd by the Carpocratians was freshly broached by the Libertines breaking in with Presbytery to help disgrace our Reformation just as the Gnosticks to the discredit of Christianity it self Master Calvin called it An Execrable Blasphemy not onely once but again and again too And what was that which he declaimed so much against in that stile was it that God was said plainly to be the Author of sin no such matter It was onely for saying it in aequivalence It was for saying another thing from whence God might be inferred to be the Author of sin It was onely for saying God worketh all things This was called by Mr. Calvin An Execrable Blasphemy And his Reason for it is very observable For saith he from this Article God worketh all things Three things do follow extremely frightfull First that there will not be any Difference between God and the Divel Next thâ—t God must deny himself Thirdly that God must be transmuted into the Divel A greater Authority than Calvins no man living can produce against his followers of the Presbytery some few Episcopal Anti-remonstrants being unjustly called Calvinists there being a wide gulf fixt between them and Calvin And I have cited him so exactly as few or no Writers are wont to do that if an enemie will not believe me he may consult Mr. Calvin with expedition and make his own eyes bear witness for me Next considering with my self how that a lesser Blasphemy than This is called Railing against the Lord 2. Chron. 32.17 and that a Doctrine less divelish is broadly said by the Apostle to be the doctrine of Divels 1 Tim. 4 1â— That it is God blessed for ever against whom the children of transgression do open a wide mouth and draw out the Tongue Isa. 57.4 the tongue which reacheth unto the heavens Psalm 73.9 and whose talking is against the most high v. 8. That our common enemies of Rome do object these things to the Reformation as if forsooth they were our Protestant and common sins Nay that the Lutherans themselves will rather return unto the Papists from whom they rationally parted than live in communion with the Calvinians for this one Reason becausâ— the Calvinians seem to worship another God to wit a God who is the Author and cause of sin I say considering all this both with the causes and the effâ—cts I confess my heart waxt hot within me and though for a Time I kept silence yea even from good words yet as the Psalmist goes on it was pain and grief to me I often call'd to mind that pertinent saying of Saint Peter 1 Epist. c. 4. v. 14. and then concluded within my self If God on their part is evil spoken of 't is the fitter that on ours he should be glorified If all his works are commanded to speak well of him in all placâ—s of his Dominion Psal. 103.22 I could not have answer'd it to my self should I still have been guilty of keeping silence much less to Him could I have had what to say under whom I am entrusted and that with souls Since he describes a good Shepherd by his readiness to lay down his life for the sheep I durst not be such a Lasche and unfaithful servant as not to offer up my oyle or shed a little of my Ink where I should think my dearest blood were too cheap a sacrifice Finding therefore that Doctrine which is so execrable and hainous as hath been shew'd suck'd in greedily by the Ranters in these our dayes breaking in upon the Church which is Gods Inclosure as well as Spouse even at that very gap which some had purposely made to cast out Bishops and obedience and whatsoever was Christian besides the name I also considered who they were who took upon them the Tapsters office and drawing out the very dreggs of this deadly wine boldly gave it instead of drink to the giddy people Mr. Hickman seemed to be the boldest and the busiest officer of them all and the more popular he was thought I thought him the fitter to be encounter'd For if his Favourers come to think That God is the cause and the producer of every reall being not excepting the cursing or hating God They have nothing to defend them from being Libertines Or if they come to be persuaded that sin hath no reall being but is a non-entity that is a nothing they must needs be Carneadists for ought I am able to apprehend And when they perfectly are either to wit Carneadists or Libertines I know not what can secure them
recovery The true state of Sin specified as it differs from either part of Sin and from Sinfulness it self Mr. Hick gets nothing though we should grant him his Reduplication but rather looseth all he gapes at Nay proves himself a Carneadist or Libertine That Sin is positive and concrete may be concluded from Bonaventure CHAP. III. MR. Hick's chief strength from Mr. Barlow's youngest writings Why first encountred An accompt of Dr. Fields Reasons for the positive Entity of sin The first Reason the second Reason The first Reason was never answer'd The second answer'd by Mr. Barlow in his younger years The Answer shew'd to be invalid in 5 Respects 1. by its granting what it pretendeth to deny 2. by implying a contradiction 3. by being offensive to pious mindes 4. by offending against the Rules of sense 5. by the twofold unfitness of the Simile alledg'd Gulielmus de Rubione vindicated by way of Reply to Mr. Barlows Answer Mr. H's answer proved vitious in 3 respects 1. by such a gross Fallacy as by which he is proved no man but either a beast or somewhat worse 2. by such a shifting from the Question as proves him convinced of maintaining a gross error 3. by Blasphemy expressed and Contradiction implyed A third Reason taken from H. Grotius amounting to the same with Iacobus Almain Mr. Barlows Answer proved faulty in 7 respects The words of Capreolus make for me Mr. Barlows plea out of Hurtadus proved faulty in 6 Respects The Act of Hating God now and of sin hereafter unduly taken to be the same Act. A Denyal of Positivity betrayes its Owners to deny a Reality in Sin A fourth Reason out of Ioannes de Rada Mr. Barlows answer proved invalid in 4 Respects A 5 Reason out of Aquinas A Reply to the Answer of Mr. Barlow proving it faulty in 3 Respects Mr. Hick contradicted by his Masters and himself too A sixt Reason is taken out of Franciscus de Mayron and divers others Not answer'd by Mr. Barlow A Seventh Reason alledged by several Authors partly cited by Dr. Field Mr. Barlows answer proved faulty in 5 Respects An eighth Reason gathered out of Fran. Diotallevius confirmed by a ninth Argument leading the Adversary Mr. Hick to the most horrid Absurdities to be imagined A tenth Argument or Reason out of Cardinal Cajetan A 11th Argument collected from Episcopius A 12th and 13th Argument urged by Dr. Stern in his Animi Medela A 14 Argument out of D.R. Baron his Metaph. The arguments backt by the Authority of the most discerning by the explicit and implicit Confâ—ssions of the Adversaries By ten several Confessions of Mr. Hick himself CHAP. IV. MR. Hicks Distinction of the positive Act of Hating God and its obliquity frees him not from making God the Author of sin Proved first out of his mouth Secondly by Reason Thirdly by Authority in conjunction with Reason CHAP. V. THe Positive Entity of Sin made undeniable from Scripture God is the fittest to be Judge of what is properly called Sin Confirmed by the Concurrence of Antient Fathers The confession of Vossius for the greatest part of them Apollinarius by name and the greatest part of the Orientals as Ierome witnesseth Augustin held the propagation of the soul and Original sin to be a positive Quality The several wayes of reconciling such Writers unto themselves who plainly holding the positivity of sin do sometimes seem to speak against it An Accident opposed to Res simpliciter The Manichaean Haeresie occasioned some figurative expressions Substantia expressed by Natura Aliquid and Res. Substance called hoc aliquid by all the Followers of Aristotle All the Fathers grant sin to be an Act and the work of our Will How unhappily some men confuâ—e the Manichees How the Sinner is able to give the whole being unto his sin How they that deny it must submit to the Manichees or worse The Concurrence of the Learned both Antient and Modern for the Affirmative That the sinful Agent is the sole Cause of the sinful Act. The power to Act is from God but the vitious Action is not Melancthon's distinction of the first Cause susteining but not assisting the second in evill Actions CHAP. VI AN Accompt of those things which Mr. Hick calls his Artificial Arguments Of twelve things answered but 4 replyed to A Rejoynder to the First to the Second to the Third to the Fourth His second Argument Artificial How largely answered His remarkable Tergiversation without the shadow of a Reply His offers of Reason Why all things positive are from God or God himself and primarily none from Men or Devils The Infirmities of the First Of the Second by which he is proved out of his mouth to be the worst of Blasphemers Of the Third wherein he makes God the Fountain of the Essence of sin Of the Fourth wherein he ascribeth unto God what God ascribeth unto the Devil His third Argument Artificial The positive Importance of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not considered by Mr. Barlow The like Importance of Peccatum proved by Reason and Experience His Fourth and last Argument A short accompt of those Shifts which pretend to be Answers to some few Arguments Of Sins being called the works of the Devil His Concessions and Contradictions about the Habit of Drunkenâ—sse His Concessions and Contradictions about the positive filth of Sin His Concession and Tergiversation concerning Blasphemy and Atheisme c. His Remarkable Forgery of an Argument in his Adversaries name His stupendious Impertinence and supposal of Grace in Hell or Some privation besides All. Of Sins working Concupiscence Mr. Hicks Answer absurd in 8 Respects Of the efficient Cause of Sin Mr Hicks Conviction and Confession in despite of his whole Enterprise Of Sins being Nothing if no Effect Mr. H's vain attempt to prove Knavery to be Nothing The Cause of punishment Mr. H's Denyal of any positive Damnation unlesse he thinks it no punishment to be Damn'd The Contents of the APPENDIX Touching his Epistle Dedicatory MR Hickman his Flattery and Condemnation of himself His Willfull falsehood His Self contradiction and Confession of having written against his Conscience Dr. Hammond vindicated from Mr. H. His several falsifications His confounding the things which he once distinguisht The sad Effects of the Calvinian Schism Mr. H's sawciness and irreverence to Dr. Hammond added to all his willfull Forgeries His scurrilous usage of Dr. Taylor and its occasion Originall sin The dissatisfaction of Episcopal Divines Dr. Taylors error on the right hand extreamly better then the heresie of Presbyterians on the left Mr. H's preferring Calvin to the 4. Evangelists The way to stop a Papists mouth Mr. H's sense of his Scurrility with his desire never to mend His new sense of his Carnality And malignity to the Episcopal Government Touching his Book-like Preface to the Reader THe first Page of his Preface proves all that follows to be but the fruites of his Revenge His frivolous exception to Heathen Learning The Heathenish nature of his
the confession of the Adveâ—sary that what is privative of one thing is also positive of another 5. From the necessity of its being complexum quid confessed also by M. Hickman 6. From the meaning of Bonum Metaphysicum as comprehending res aliquid and as signifying no more then ens in ordine ad appelitum whereas it is onely the moral good which is oppos'd to the thing in Question 7. From the positive entity of a Lye which is therefore verum as much as bonum Metaphysicum and yet hath no more of reall goodness then of reall truth in it 8. From the positive being of Satans pride and of Petronius his Inventions together with those of the Presbyterians 9. From the difference or distinction betwixt a negative and positive Atheism 10. From sins being divided into actuall and habiâ—uall 11. From the positive filthiness of flesh and spirit of which a man is deprived when God by his grace is plea'sd to cleanse him 12. From the Importance of the word privative which may be predicated of sinners as well as of sins 13. To harden our own hearts to consent unto Temptations and to destroy our selves by such consent are granted by all to be positive things 14. Sin is spoken of as such throughout the Scriptures 15. It is confessed by M. Hickman and by the men of his way that sin is a compound which doth consist of a materiall and formall part whereof the one being granted to be a posiâ—ive entity both together cannot be less 16. Betwixt the act of haâ—ing God and the sin of hating God which is the act of haâ—ing God there cannot he the least difference because itself cannot be different from itself for that would imply the very grossâ—st of Contradictions ☜ But the Aâ—t of hating God is confessed by Master Hickman to be a positive entity And so he yields the whole Cause in spight of all his endeavours to make resistance § 8. But yet he endeavours a Resistance as far as a Tiâ—le-page can doe it which doth not really belong to any book in all the world much â—ess to thaâ— which he unhappily call'd his For it pâ—etends a Iustification of the Faâ—hers and Schoolmen from their being self condâ—mned for denying the positivity of sin And yet it pâ—etends to be an Answer to so much of my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as doth relate to the foâ—esaid opinion Hâ—re are â—everall things which prove him willfull in his Impostures For well he knew I had not written against the Fathers or Schoolmen much less against them as self-condâ—mned much less yet for denying the positivity of sin I writ indeed against Himself and M. Hobbs but they aâ—e hardly so much as sons much less Fathers of the Church And though I writ against others also yet neither of thâ—m was a Schoolman much less a Father I writ against them as self-condemâ—ed because I proved out of their writings that they asserted the very Doctrines which themsâ—lves had confessed to be blasphâ—mouâ— So that unless our Iustificator is thicker of sense and understanding then all men else which his perusall of M. Moâ—â—ice forbids his Readers bâ—lieve his prevaricâ—â—ions must neâ—ds be wilfull § 9. After the promises of his portal I find his building is nothing else but a very long Ent y and three Back-doors As if the former were intended â—or the Amâ—sing of his Readers whilst the latter might serve for his own escape His Entry hath such an unseemly length that little less than a whole hour will serve hiâ— Readers to Travel through And if their patience will but serve them as far as the End of so long a passage in hope at last to meet with something whereby to disprove the positivity of sin they will be able to find nothing besides the mentioned Back doors at which the Fâ—â—â—hâ—r eâ—capes from the Thing in Question As if he were coâ—scious to himself of having rashly undertaken to prove a dangerous falshood to wit that sin hath no positive being he spends almost his whole book upon a mulâ—itude of subjects b sides the purpose rather hudling up a Volume from whatsoever he thought pretty and durst purloin from some English Authors then taking the â—ouâ—age to treat of that to which his Tiâ—le-page confesseth he stands obliged Observe good Reader the strangest Answerer of Books that in all thy life thou hast read or heard of § 10. His Volume consists of 175. pages 65. of these are spent in an Epistle and Preface to all that follows wherein there is not one syllable so much as offering to disprove the positivity of sin Then there begins a fresh reckoning up of pages And though he takes upon him again as in his Title-page he had done to prove that sin hath not a positive Being yet he immediately flies out for 48. pages together talking of Bishops and Presbyteries and other subjects of Evasion I will not say in a phrenetick but in a very idle manner before his misgiving heart serves him to make a shew of some proof of the Thing in Question And thus he hath made an easie shift to fill up two parts of three of his Tedious Rhapsodie with more then an hundred such fragments and ends of stuff as serve to prove nothing at all besides his fearfulness to discourse of the matter in hand and his gift of impertinence above the rest of mankind and also the lightness of his fingers to supply the heaviness of his invention For after 113 pages 65 being of that which he calls his Preface and 48 of that which he calls his Book I find him using these words Having removed the Rubbish we may now come at the Question Yet goes he not many steps farther in a pretended preparation to his design when straight he digresseth to curse M. Barlee to talk of the Calvinists and Arminians by the old assistance of M. Prin and to speak for Puritans by such an admirable Impertinence that he is fain at last to use these words The Reader will pardon me who can scarce pardon my self for this excursion yet no sooner doth he confess then he commits the same trespass even by making a new excursion to my dispute with Doctor Reynolds to a Fable of Aesop and to a gross falsification of the Learned and Reverend D. Hammond which in due time and place I shall demonstrate to be such in a high Degree At last indeed he speaks something lesâ— impertinent then before although impertinent also as shall be shewed Insomuch as his Readers may well admire how he could venture to call his Book by so extravagant a Title as did least of all relate to the subject matter of his Discourse unless he thought that his Readers would look no farther § 11. But having shew'd his long Entry I conceive it high time that I discover his Back-doors at which he maketh his foul escapes from the principall Duties Incumbent on him First when it
granteth the very thing which it pretendeth to deny and which alone was the thing that D. Field contended for to wit that no Rectitude can be due to the hatred of God which is no longer the hatred of God than the hatred is limited to such an object to wit God So what is urged by D. Field is exactly yielded by M. Barlow and I appeal unto himself whether it is not as I have said For the Doctors words are what Rectitude is due to the specifical act of hating God now it cannot be the specifical act of hating God unless the act be limited to that very object and when it is 't is fully granted that nothing of Rectitude or goodness is due unto it Secondly I reply That when he saith the hatred of God being taken by it self may be good he flatly contradicteth what he had said a little before to wit that the hatred of God remaining it cannot be possibly made good by any circumstance whatsoever And the subject of the Dispute being the hatred of God it must needs remain till it is taken away And being taken away there is nothing of it to be disputed no kind of thing either good or evil Thirdly It is an uncouth sentence to say no worse which affirms any goodness in hating God let the hating God be taken in what sense it can be For 't is acknowledged by all to be Intrinsecally evil evil ex genere objecto so as nothing to be imagin'd can make it otherwise then evil And to say that that can be good in any notion which is confessedly good in none is to add impiety to contradiction For the hatred of nothing excepting sin can be morally good And therefore to say that the hating God in any sense can be good is to imply that the hating God is in some kind of sense the hating of sin Fourthly It is far from good sense to say the hatred of God being taken by it self that I would gladly think it an errour of the Press if I did not find it so often used However I am confident his meaning was That Hatred being taken by it self without relation to God may be good For the hatred of God cannot possibly be taken by it self so as hatred may stand without relating to the object to which 't is joyn'd for then the hatred of God were not the hatred of God which would be an express contradiction And his meaning being granted to be so different from his words as hatred taken without God for its object must needs be from the expression of hating God I then profess it to be true but not at all to the purpose For t is affirmed by D. Field that no rectitude can be due to the hatred of God not that it cannot be due to hatred eithâ—r considered in it self or in relation to any object which is not God Fifthly The simile taken from walking of it self and walking to kill or commit adultery is very halting in two respects For 1. walking by it self hath no proportion with the hatred of God whatever it might have had with hatred by it self The hatred of God being rather represented by walking to kill or commit adultery 2. The Doctor spake of such acts as are evil ex genere objectâ— so as nothing of circumstance can make them good and are denominated evil by active denomination from which walking of it self is as wide as Heaven from North to South And thus I have vindicated the Doctor for the love of the Cause which he asserteth not from the learned M. Barlow who now is Provost of Queens in Oxford and I am confident doth condemn the aberrations of his youth but rather from M. Barlow who was but newly Master of Arts and Iunior even to M. Hickman who yet hath nothing any otherwise to be vouchsafed a Confutation than as he hath thought it worth stealing out of so young a mans Essayes as M. Barlow was when he was Metaphysick Reader from whom as I dissent without the least diminution of solid Friendship so I have not exprest it without his leave § 5. To the Argument urged by GVLIELMVS DE RVBIONE which was the same in effect with Doctor Fields M. Barlow thus answers p. 73. That the hatred of God is onely evill through the defect of a due object for that haâ—red would be good were it terminated on sin But I reply to this Answer That the hatred of God being an act determin'd upon an object can have no other object then what it hath for if it be the hatred of any thing else then is it no longer the hatred of God much less can it be terminated on the hatred of sin the hating God rather implying the love of sin if by the hatred of God he means nothing but hatred in which case the word â—od must be blotted out then t is quite beside the purpose as hath been shewd for t is not hatred per se much less hatred of sin which was said to be so evil that no circumstance advenient can make it good but rather the contrary the hatred of sin is so good as that it cannot be made evil And therefore the hatred of God being the term in the Argument proposed should also have been the term in the Answer pretended Whereas it is added to his answer that the hatred of God is not taken aggregately or by way of connotation when t is said it may be good by the position of the due circumstance p. 73. I also add to my reply that though hatred can per se yet hatred of God cannot be possibly so considered for it implies a contradiction Hatred there being the Act and God the object and both together the Aggregate which whilst it is it cannot be but what it is If by hatred of God he means hatred of nothing or of sin then he must say what he means and not the contrary to what he means which when he shall say t will prove to be nothing to the purpose § 6. That which follows in M. Barlow's Answer is so fully expressed by M. Hickman that I will set down his words and then discover the infirmity of them The hating of God is complexum quid and must not be spoken as of one The vital action of hatred is a thing positive but the undue referring or terminating of that act to such an object which is altogether lovely that 's the sinfulness of the action and not positive but privative p. 95. In evil works there are two things considerable the works themselves and their pravity The works themselves we doubt not are positive and from God as all other positive things but their pravityes add no new entities to them c. To shew the Ayles of this Answer I will proceed by these degrees First it labours with the Fallacy à benè conjunctis ad malè divisa for the sin of hating God doth so
the negative precepts of the Almighty whereby he forbids us to give a being to this or that which he tells us he hateth the being of Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife is as much as to say thou shalt not put such a concupiscence in being And yet to covet another man's wife is as positively something as to covet his own and more positively something than not to covet another man's though that is the vice and this the virtue 13. They indeed who deny this natural freedome of the will must either yield to the Manichees or else do worse as hath been shew'd But this being granted there needs no new principle as the Manichees dreamed for the production of what is evil For he that may do good by maâ—king use of that Talent which God hath given him hath eo ipso the power to do the contrary unless he is irresistibly and unavoidably good which no man is on this side heaven Now since both the habits and acts of sin are as positive as the habits and acts of virtue and equally reducible to the species of Quality and that there needs no other power for the production of the former then what is given us whilst it is given us to be truly free agents It will be fit to make it appear that I have not onely my private but publick reason also for what I teach § 6. DIONYSIVS the AREOPAGITE who refell's the two principles in the Manichaean sense doth set them up and assert them in the sense of the Scripture Affirming God to be the principle of every thing that is good and the Divel on the contrary of every thing that is evil to wit the evil of sin which is evil properly so called He asserts the first in these wordâ— of Saint Paul Rom. 11.36 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he explains by the Restriction thought fit to be added by Saint Iames c. 1. v. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. he affirms the second in these termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yet 3. the power to sin though not the act of sin it self he rightly affirm's to be from God which power is innocent as in Adam and the Angels before their Fall who could never have sinned if before they actually sinned they had not had the power to sin But for the exertion of that power into act that being evil cannot possibly proceed from so good a fountain IGNATIVS in ep ad Magnes p. 53. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 IUSTIN MARTYR in Apolog. 1. pro Christ. p. 35. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 see him especially in Quaest. Resp. ad Orthod p. 396. 436. TERTVL contra Marcion Lib. 2. cap. 5 6. Suae po testatis invenio hominem a Deo constitutum lapsumque hominis non Deo sed Libero ejus Arbitrio deputandum ATHANASIVS de anima humana loquens in orat contra Gent. p. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And very much more to this purpose p. 9.37 de Incar verbi dei p. 57 58. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 58. AVGVSTIN Retract l. c. 9. per totum Malum non exortum nisi ex libero voluntatis Arbitrio Quid opus est queri unde iste motus existat quo voluntas avertitur ab incommutabili bono ad commutabile bonum cùm eum non nisi animi voluntarium ob hoc culpabile esse fateamur c. Quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem Causa voluntatis Aut igitur voluntas est prima causa peccandi aut nullum peccatum est prima Causa peccandi Non ergo est cui rectè imputetur peccatum nisi voluntati voluntas est quâ peccatur rectè vivitur NAZIANZ orat 40. p. 671. apud D. Barl. p. 52. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vide D. D. Hammondi Annot. in 1 Cor. 8.4 FVLGENTIVS apud Aqu. 1.2 q. 79. art 3. Deus non est ultor istius rei cujus est Actor PROSPER in senten ex Aug. p. 444. Iniquitas per ipsum facta non est quia Iniquitas nulla substantia â—st Mark hâ—s Reason and the two things which it implyes 1 That iniquity is an Accident and 2. Such as is not from God and therefore elsewhere he saith that the sole cause of evil deeds is the liberty of the will ad quam solam male gesta recurrunt CLEM. ALEX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And so in the place above cited § 3 he saith all substances have their production from God but not all Actions or operations unless when they are good The Original of the evil he imâ—putes to free-will And thus he disputes against them who feigned another crâ—ator even of substances beside the onely true God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 CYRILLUS HIERO 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 citing that Text Eccles. 7.30 And that of the Apostle Ephes. 2.10 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And after in the same page 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and a little after p. 34. speaking of the Devil and applying to him that of Ezek. 28.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he adds it was very well said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 AMBROSIVS de Cain Abel l. 2. c. 9. fol. 260. H. Qui peccatum suum ad quandam uti Gentiles asserunt Decreti aut operis sui Necessitatem referunt Divina arguere videntur quasi ipsorum vis Causa Peccati sit sed quanto gravius Peccato ipso ad Deum referre quod Feceris Reatus tui invidiam transsundere in Authorem non Criminis sed Innocentiae EPIPHANIUS l. 1. To. 3. Haeres 36. p. 266 267 268. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothing can be without God except sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and more to this purpose p. 265.588 yet saith he God doth not hinder men from sinning by violence or force upon their wills 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 671. AUGUSTIN de civit Dei l. 5. c. 9. Malae voluntates à Deo non sunt quia contra naturam sunt quae ab illo est Sicut omnium Creaturarum Creator est ita omnium potestatum dator non voluntatum where by the will he means the action of the will § 7. That God gives onely the power to act what he forbiddeth and that no more is meant by those Fathers who say that all things in some sort do come from God still implying the act it self to be solely from the creature when it is wholly against God as the act of hating God is confess'd to be I have already made apparent by diverse instances recited And Doctor Stearn hath don it by diverse others An. med l. 2. p. 256 257. of which I shall mark but three or four ANSELMVS de concord Praed Praesc Nulla
c. Athanasius's testimonie p. 76. l. 4. à fin c. See in p. 55. l. 9. c. Greg. Arimin a noble Schoolman p. 85. l. 10. c. compare p. 58. l. 5. à fin c. with Gregor Arimin nobilior Scholasticus p. 19. 124. p. 53. l. ult p. 30. l. 14 c. Mr. Hickman Rob. Baronius in Metaphysica Generali How many men have been imprisoned for not paying summs of money which they did owe p. 104. l. 19. c. Apud homines debitor incarceratur ob non solutam summam pecuniae quod negativum quid est §. 5. p. 54. l. 5. c. Suppose the first sin of Angels to have been a proud desire to be equal unto God the cause of this proud desire was the wil of the Angel But it was of the vitiosity of the Action onely the cause per accidens per concomitantiam Nor doth the vitiosity of the effect allways suppose a vitiosity in the cause though it always presuppose an imperfection in the cause And where the cause it self is vitious its vitiosity is not the cause of the vitiosity of the effect for vitiosity of it self neither can effect nor be effected but the vitious cause taking together the being and the supervenient privation is the cause of the vitious effect taking it in like manner for the being and the superadded privation p. 103. l. 9. to l. 20. Supponamus primum malum culpae in Angelis fuisse vitiosam volitionem aequalitatis cum Deo causa efficiens hujus vitiosae volitioniâ— fuit ipsa voluntas Angelica Verùm per accidens per concomitantiam quandam producta est ea vitiositas vitiositatem effectâ— non semper praesupponere vitiositatem in causa p. 59. l. 4. c. Non ergò volumus vitiositatem causae per se efficere vitiositatem effecti quia vitiositas causae per se nihil operari potest vitiositas verò effecti per se produci non Potest sed tantum asserimus Causam vitiosam prout includit ens privationem enti superadditam producere effectum vitiosum sumendo similiter nomen effectûs vitiosi prout includit ens aliquod privationem enti superadditam p. 61. l. 12. c. Had Mr Hickman been Heire apparent to Dr. BARON and Mr. BARLOW as sure I am he is to neiâ—her he should have waited for the Decease as well of the second as of the first For how liberally soever a man intends towards his childe he seldom puts off his shooes till he goes to bed Nor will any but such Vermin as are Followers of a Camp not at all to fight but to prey and plunder strip a man of his cloathes before the breath is out of his body Dr. ROBERT BARON indeed is dead and knows not what is done to him But I hope Mr. BARLOW is both alive and live-like and so t is too soon for Mr. Hickman to take his goods into possession If Mr. Hickman shall deny what is become so proverbial for Notoreity and excuse himself by an older proverb that many times good wits do Iump which being true when Mr. H. doth knock his head against a post can have no truth here even for that very Reason A man may fitly say to him as I have heard Sr. Thomas More once said to Gallus in a Tetrastick Although what Gallus had done in verse as Mr. H. hath done in prose was many centuries of years before Sr. Thomas was yet in being Vatibus idem animusque vere spiritus idem Qui fuit Antiquis est modo Galle tibi Carmina namque eadem versusque frequenter eosdem Quos fecere illi Tu quoque Galle facis Now because that great and good man was no Philosopher of the Heathens Mr. Hickman will not be angry at it if I try to put his good Latine into almost as good English Thou Gallus hast the same both spirit and minde With them that writ in time of yore For when thou writest Verses oft I find Thou writ'st the same they writ before § 20. Whereas Mr· Hickman adds further p. 2. that I abused Mr. Barlee with Drollerie as hansome as ever dropped from the pen of of Ben Iohnson in his polemicals I thank him as much as if I did but I do not accept of his Commendation of which how ambitious Himself hath been we see by other mens Drollery to which he hath put his own name Vindicative Iustice is such a necessary Vertue as without which it is impossible for humane society to subsist Which if Mr. Hickman will needs call Drollery I must needs assure him he shews his ignorance of the word My doing of justice on some offenders in vindication of God and Man I own as a Duty incumbent on me And in particular this last which I have done upon this Compiler I take to be such as could not safely have been omitted For Diagoras turned Atheist upon his seeing a Plagiarie escape unpunisht § 21. He saith he reckons me unfortunate in choosing the tremendous mystery of reprobation for my first publick essay p. 2. Not that he thinks me to be unfortunate indeed but because his fingers itchâ— to be stealing a passage from Mr. Hales on 2 Pet. 3.16 concerning Eccius his saying that he chose to speak of Reprobation as an Idoneous subject in quo juveniles aestus exerceret which Mr. H. knew not how to introduce with any fitnesse unlesse he might say I was unfortunate in making choise of that subject But was not the Refuting of irrespective reprobation and of the horrible Blasphemies deduced from it by its Assertors a subject fit for my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or first endeâ—vours when if that Tenet is once swallowed down all further study is rendered uselesse that I may not say pernicious too And when no more then common Reason improved a little by Philosophy is required to refute it upon the principles supposed And when in the principles I speak of all who have read our Church Catechisme are very sufficiently instructed Whether so or not so let it be judged by them who have read me at least as they were running and not by him who will not read me As Mr. H. professeth he neither hath nor will p 3. though he professeth the contrary in other places For which and other Contradictions I leave him wholly to their lash who bid him go forth and be a Preacher though not a Priest especially for his saying I was unfortunate in any thing because by using that word he hints the falshood of his own and his Brethrens Doctrine That whatsoever comes to passe was fore-determined by an absolute unconditional decree importing the Necessity of all events Which doctrine must needs be false if I was unfortunate in my choise and as false if I was fortunate But if he will have the Doctrine true then it was clearly the will of God even according to his own and his Brethrens Doctrine
Bellarminus apud Alsted ubi supra CHEMNITIVS in Harm Evang. c. 59. p. 792. Gerhard in Har. Ev. p. 70. GROTIVS de Ver. Chr. Relig edit Lugd. 1633 p. 27 28 * Nihil enim prohibet quo minus ipsa quae subfistunt deinde causae sint accidentium quales sunt actiones This is the judgement also of Prosper and Austin lib. sent ex August pag. 444. The severall wayes of RECONCILEING such Writers unto themselves who plainly holding the positivity of sin do sometimes seem to speak against it Bish. BRAM HAL'S Reply mihi p. 105. Anim. Medel p. 270. In what sense God is said to be Almighty see LOMBARD l. 1. dist 42. F G. See correct copy p. 22 23. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dionys Areop Peccatum est nihil Aug. de lib. Arb. l. 1. Rom. 1.20 * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being nothing he deceiveth himself Gal. 6.3 * Peccatum nihil est inquit Bernard in annum B. Mar. Sâ—rm 1. p. 123. †Quid est omne peccatum nisi Dei conâ—emptus quo ejuâ— praecepta conâ—emnimus 〈◊〉 l. de mo 〈◊〉 viv Sir 37. p. 1281 a AQVIN in 1.2 quâ—st 75. art 1. b ibid. c ibid. ad 1. d ibid. ad 3. e ib. art 2. f ib. ad 2. * Sicut aegriâ—udo corporalis ali quid habet positivum Ita etiam peccatum originale non est privatio pura sed est quidam corruptus Habiâ—us Idem 1.2 q. 82. arâ— 1. ad 1â— * Sicut aegriâ—udo corporalis ali quid habet positivum Ita etiam peccatum originale non est privatio pura sed est quidam corruptus Habiâ—us Idem 1.2 q. 82. 〈◊〉 1. ad 1â— An accident oppos'd to Res simpliciter Seâ— Prosper's sent ex Aug p. 444. * Augustin de persect Justitiae non longè à pri lib. in resp Ratiocin 4. to 7. †AVGVST nominat ibi Rem id quod est Res simpliciter sc. substantiam sic enim actus peccati non est Res. AQV in 1.2 q. 79. Art 2. ad 1. GREG. NYSS Hom. 5. in Ecclesiasten p. 417. opposeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as that is explained by substanâ—ia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The MANICHAEAN heresie occasioned some figurative expressions * TERTVL advers Mar. l. 1. c. 1. 23. 26. HIERON in Nâ—hum c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 †〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 EPIPHANIUS l. 2 tom 2. Haerâ—s 45. seu 55. pag. 619. B. D. Ex omnibus Physicoâ—um sive Metaphysicorum terminls obseuris nulli explicatu digniores quà m 〈◊〉 duo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Meric Casaub. de verb. usu p. 134. Manichaus having expressed Substantia by Natura Aliquid Res. * VASQUEZ Disp. 95. c. xi As Aristotle himself by Hoc aliquid Whom the Antients followed in their expressions Not including Accidents in the word nature But granting â—in to be an act and the work of our will An example taken out of S. AUSTIN Why ens many times is used onely for substantia How unhappily some men confute the MAâ—NICHEES How the sinner is able to give the whole being unto his sin * Ecclus. 15.14 * Eccles. 7.29 How they that deny it must submit to the MANICHEES or worse The concurrence of the Learned both ANTIENT and MODERN for the Affiâ—mative That the sinfull Agent is the sole cause of the sinfull Act. DIONYS AREOP de Coelest Hieraâ— c. 1. p. 1.2 * De Div. Nom c. 4. sect 18. p. 570. cum quâ confer p. 571. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ibid. p. 574. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. pag. 577 pag. 578. ib. p. 7. * Neque ullam ejâ—s substantiam esse Petrus Nannius interpretatur p. 8. * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Deuâ— non est causa ejus quod homo sit deterior Idem apud Aqu. 1.2 q. 79. Art 3. Idem in lib. de ingratis p. 573. ib. p. 169. * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 219. ib. p. 34. Idem l. 2. tom 1. Haer. 64. p. 587. * Mala voluntas Peccatum dicitur metonymicè seâ— Lombard l. 4 dist 50. A. The power to act is from God but the vitious action is not p. 302. ib. p. 49 ib. p. 50. ib. p. 53. ib. p. 55 56. MELANCHTHONS Distinction of the first cause sustaining but not assisting the second in evil actions ** Vitium originis est ipsarum partium hominis inquinatio confusio ib. p. 49. accedunt motus qui sunt res positivâ— etsi sunt motus errantes quaedam ordinis Confusio c. p. 50. ** Vitium originis est ipsarum partium hominis inquinatio confusio ib. p. 49. accedunt motus qui sunt res positivâ— etsi sunt motus errantes quaedam ordinis Confusio c. p. 50. †53. He also saith in collat Wormat. Peccatum vel est defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei Defens sent Rem circa 1. de praed art p. 250. M. BAXTER of Iudgement p. 151 152. GROT de ver Chr. Rel. p. 27 28. POLYCAR LYCERVS in Harm Evang c. 103. p. 1460. PET. LOMBARDVS l. 1. dist 42. p. 248 D. E. F. Omnipotens est â—oâ— quod possit omnia facere sed qâ—ia potest efficere quicquid vult c. vide August Encâ—iâ— cap. 96. in fine tom 3. v. Arâ—ic condem excomm à Stephanâ— Paris Episâ— per Magistros Parisienses ad calcem Lomb. p. 953 967 969. ibid. p. 971. col 1 2. †p. 79 95.96 c. Bp. BRAMHAL in a reply to T. H. Animadv p. 94.95 id ib. p. 97. ib. p. 101. Diotallevius in Opusc. Theol p. 103. p. 2. q. 80 〈◊〉 1. ad 3. * Greg in 2. d. 34. 37. q. 1 art 3. ad 8. 12. Câ—preol ib. q. 1. art 3. Scotus in 2. d 37. q. 2 Suarez in opusc l 2. de concursu Del ad actus malos c. 3. * Greg in 2. d. 34. 37. q. 1 art 3. ad 8. 12. Câ—preol ib. q. 1. art 3. Scotus in 2. d 37. q. 2 Suarez in opusc l 2. de concursu Del ad actus malos c. 3. Dr. GO AD at the end of his Dispt Ms. Dr. HAMMOND of Fundamentals ch 16. p. 183 184. * Dr. ED. REYNOLDS of the sinfulnesse of sin p. 212. in 4to An account of those things which Mr. H. calls his Artificiall Arguments ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ch 3. p. 10. â—o p. 153. Of 12. things answered buâ— 4. replyed to A rejoyndeâ— to the first †See his pag 95 lin ult ☞ To the 2â— To the 3 d. To the 4 th His second Argument artificial * See the place cited in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 3. p. 154. examin'd till as far as P 1â—6 How largely answered His remarkable Tergiversation without the shadow of a reply His offers of Reason why all things positive are
back on ch 3. Sect. 28. p. 52 53 54. The Synagogue of the Libertines a Acts. 6.9 b Acts 7 54. c Verse 57. d Verse 58. Fitly applyed to Mr. Baxter e See the New Discoverer Discoverd Ch. 3. Sect. 1. p. 61 62 63 64. where Mr. Baxters words and pages are set at large His railing on K James and Bp. Bancroft f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is derived frâ—m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And is used by Atheneus lib. 18. for an Incendiary a Boute-few a setter of things into combustion New Discov Discov ch 5. p. 98 99. Ibid. from p. 1â—3 â—â— p. 117. On Bp Andrews and Dr. Sandeâ—son for their Iustice to the Puritans See that Preface of Dr. Sanderson Sect. 17 aâ—d 18. i See the Reverend Dr. Hammond his pacifick Discourse c. p. 8. l. ult k Cavendum ne cum Purâ—tanis â—uibusdam Deum faciamus Autorem peccaâ—i vid. episâ— Ded. Dan. Tilen pref Notis suâ—s in Canon Synod Dordr l See the last page of the most learned Dr. Sandersons most incomparable preface m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Herodot in Thalia c 78. p. 194. His Confession of his own wickednesse again confessed by himsâ—lf â—hough but in pâ—rt His prodigious falsifying of Common Prayers a Postscrip at the end of his True Catholick p 315. b Iude 13. His denial of that Confession which hâ— confessed a litâ—le before His perjury and Rebellion proved out of his own words See his holy Commâ—nwealâ—â— Prâ—f p â— Ibid. p. 10. Ibid. p. 9. â—nd 10. His playing at fast and loose with his Integrity His timâ— seâ—ving and fawring upon his Soveraign Richard a Five Dispuâ— of Church Gov. and worship Epist. Dedic per totam b Maâ—k how this suits with the Assemblies Confess of faith that all things whatsoever are ordained by God c Compare this with his Confession that was no Parliament which yet had a better pretencâ— then Richard Hiâ— rejoycing in our late miseries c. d Key for Câ—tholickâ— Epist. De. per totam e Note the Presbyterian agreement with the Pope in excommunicating Kings K. Charlâ—s might be faught against but Mr. Richard must not f Note his chaâ—ging upon God all the Villanies of the times His Flattering mentions of old Oliver as tenâ—erly carefull of Christs câ—uâ—e g Dedâ—c epist. or pref before his Holy Commonvvealth p. 6 h ibid. i ibid. p. 8. k ib. p. 25. l ib p. 484. m ibid. n bid o Epist. Ded. before his Key for Cath p. 8. p ibid. b. 17. His bâ—ing Accessary to the most parrâ—cidial act the murdeâ— of Gods Aâ—ointed q See the preface to the Essaâ— for the good Olâ— Cause r 1 Tim. 5.22 Reâ—el 18.4 The sâ—ven wayes of partaking in other mens sins Such were Mr. Baxters Priâ—â—es Oliver and Râ—chard Hâ—s being an incendiary in the Wâ—rr and incouâ—aging many thousands â—â— rebell proved out of his confessions t Though here he confâ—sseth he was a Cokblower and incouraged thousands to Rebell yet he daâ—es not â—epent p. 486. u Mark the tendernesse of his Conscien e first he sought against his King then considered if lawfully x Note that by one of the 3. estates he must mean the King or the Bishops His Denying the supremacy of the King which yâ—t he allovved the tvvo Cromwells vvâ—â—reby he is proved by his Confession to be a Râ—bell x Note that by one of the 3. estates he must mean the King or the Bishops y Pref. p. 23. His being a Traytor to the Houses which he had set above the King by setting Richard above them wâ—en they disowned him And for owning Cromwells Iuâ—to for a full and free parliment * Note his ungodly Resolution to take that for granted which was visibly false viz. that the King would have ruin'd the Representatives of the Nation and its whole security Holy Com. wealth page 480. section 19. He is evinced out of his mouth to have been perjur'd over and over His charge against the Lords and Commons and his setting aside the King more then the houses ever did His most Notable contradiction about the Houses ruling without the King His new Miscarriage against Grotius and the Episcopal Divines He is proved to be a Jesuite by as good Logick as he useth * See my Appendix to New Disc. Disc. sect 5. p. 170. to 174. The Jesuites Doctrine of Probability chez les provinciales p. 73 74. Popery common to Thom. Goodwin with some noted Presbyterians * See his Antapologia p. 29. * See Dr. Roger Drakes letter to M. Love p. 7. Mr. Baxter's Puritanism as well in life as Doctrine His additional Falshood The originall of Puritanism among Professors of Christianity * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 †〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Iren. advers Haer. l. 1. c. 9. p. 72. * Homer· Il. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Irenaeus ubi supra †See the pages exactly cited with the wordâ— in my new Dis. Disc. c. 3. sect 1. p. 61 62 63. c. * See his Confession in his Holy Common wealâ—h pag. 490 lin 9 10. †He hath promis'd neve to gainsay it on the hypothesis spoken of Our English Puritanes caracterized by Salmasius one of the learnedest of the Beyond-sea Protestants * Defens Reg. c. 10. †How neerly this toucheth Mr. Baxter see the whole third Chapter of my New Disc. Disc. Mr. Baxter declared by God's Anointed to be a factious and schismatical person * Quaere whether M. Baxter was not the Kings subject as much as â—romwell's * Quaere whether the King and his learned Iudges with him did not know his Right as well as Mr. Baxter His double injury to Master Dance * Quaere whether the King and his learned Iudges with him did not know his Right as well as Mr. Baxter His double injury to Master Dance Homer Odyf. 17. His unparallel'd bitterness against Episcopacy and our Church seven wayes rebuked * He means â—y that word the constant sons of the Church of England * Key for Catholicks page 416. †☞ Note that in the 42 of Edw. 3. the first chapter doth enact that if any staâ—ute be made to the contrary it shall be holden for null And see Iudge Ienk. p. 62. * Consult Biblioâ—heca Regia for it sect 3. p. 328. †See his Majesties Concessions at the â—sle of Wight ib. p. â—57 * See Doctor Gauden's Hiera Dacrua c. â—1 p. 334. Hom. Odyss 17. The Conclusion * Eccles. 8.11 * Ad quartum actum ultra in hoe Dramate desultando fâ—igultientes Presbyteriani spectati sunt Quinam alii merito Râ—gis Occiâ—i crimine notari magis debuere quà m qui viam ad eum occidendum munierunt Illi sunt qui nefariam illam securim cervicibus ejus inflixerunt non alii Salmas Defens Reg. c. 10. †Praevidit eas quas nunc Britania sentit Calamitates inde orituras Gâ—ot vot pro pace p. 49. * 2 Thes. 3.14