he might seeme to finde a contradiction when I afterward say that it may be done by originall constitution or by after condescent but yet he confesseth I have a salve when I make it such a condescent as is equivalent to an Originall Constitution because amounting to a change of Title and a resolution in the Monarch to be subjected to no other way I make no salve nor doe I need any he who weighes the Uniformity of Truth in that Treatise will see it needs no salves Onely I distinguish those things which are in their natures distinct which if the Doctour had done this Contention either had not been begun or would soon have an end Who sees not that a Promise whereby a Monarch may bind himselfe may either be with a limitation of the bond of subjection or without And that this makes a reall difference for in this the Government remaines the same because the Dutie of subjection received no variation but in that there is for so much a Transitus into a limited condition But these things cannot be more fully and clearly expressed then they are in the page 13. of that Treatise But he answers Where there is such a change of Title it is done at once and by expresse and notorious resignation of former Power but it is not necessary that an absolute Monarch should come to a limited Condition after that manner I say if he will passe into a limited condition it is necessary there be a limitation of his Power else he is not truly limited But that all such limitation be done at once and by notorious resignation it is not necessary as will appeare afterward where this matter of Limitation is more distinctly handled Sect. 5 His next complaint is against something I have in the page 25. sc That in a mixed Government if it be of three the Soveraign Power must be in all three originally and from fundamentall constitution He judges this not necessary p. 17. and he gives a wonderfull Reason For as Limitation may be only of the exercise of the Power and not of the Power it selfe so mixture is in regard of Persons ioyned to the Monarch for certain acts and purposes but that they should have any share in the Soveraign power the nature of Monarchy will not admit 1. Just so for as a Monarchy is not limited unlesse there be a limitation of Power for Monarchy is a Power so a Monarchy cannot be mixed unlesse there be a mixture of Powers for Monarchy is a Power and to say a mixt Monarchy and yet the Power not mixt is to speake contradictories 2. If the mixture be not of divers concurrent Powers wherof is it He tells us of the Monarch and certaine other Persons joyned with him for certaine acts and purposes These joyned Persons have they any concurring Power to doe those acts for which they are joyned If not then the adjoyning is futulous and vaine and the Power of Monarchy is mixed of a Person having Power and of others having no Power to doe that for which they are joyned You will say They have Power but not distinct from that of the Monarch that is they have none for in mixture if it be not distinct it is none at all Againe if they have any it must be distinct for subordinate it cannot be if the Acts to which they concurre be supreme Acts unlesse we should be so absurd as to say They may concurre to supreme Acts by a subordinate Power But let us see what a maine Reason he hath for averring a conceit subject to such absurdities Such a mixture would make severall independent powers in the same State or Kingdome which is most absurd I grant it is absurd if he speake of severall complete independent powers but to affirme severall incomplete independent powers concurring to make up one integrall mixt power it is no absurdity at all for so it is in all Aristocracies and Democracies and must be acknowledged in all mixed States where the supremacie is not wholy in the hands of one person Yet here we doe not so make them independent but that we give a large predominancie to One as in nature in all mixed bodies there is as I have at large explained my selfe in the next Section if the Doctor had been at leasure to have taken notice of it I yeild to that which he sayes p. 17. that it is not necessary the Mixture should be so Originall but that it may also come afterwards by condescent It matters not so it be originall that is radicall of Powers and not of meere Acts And indeed there cannot be a mixture of Acts unlesse it be also of Powers for Acts are from Powers and where Powers are subordinate there can be no mixture in their Acts the Acts of causes subordinate are also subordinate and not coordinate and mixed But I there brought two Arguments to prove that in a Mixed Government the Concurrents must have independent and distinct Powers Let us see how he answers them 1. Because else it would be no mixture but a derivation of Power which is seen in the most simple Monarchy He answers that derivation of Power is either upon substitute Officers supplying the absence of the Monarch in the execution of Power and this is in the most simple Monarchy Or else upon Persons whose concurrence and consent is required to certaine Acts of Monarchicall Power and this makes a mixture though they have no share in the Power it selfe p. 17. I answer 1. Absence or presence of the Monarch whether they Act for him or with him varies not the case If the Power they work by be derived from him then it is his Power and so constitutes no Mixture 2. As if in the most simple Monarchy the Soveraigne doth mannage the ardua imperij the weightiest matters of State alone and not by consent of his Counsell without whom he is morally bound that is on the sinne of rashnesse not to transact them and that is all which the Doctor yeilds to the Houses of Parliament sc that the King is morally bound to their concurrence and consent in certaine Acts. This is nothing but the shadow of a Mixture If the Power of Acting be so in one that if he please he may doe those Acts without the concurrence of those adjunct Persons though he ought not it is no Mixture because the Power is simple and One and mixed Acts cannot flow from one simple Power This the Doctor sees and therefore sayes If this Authour will not call this a Mixture we cannot help it p. 18. We doe not enquire of Names but of things nor whether it make a difference in Government or no We treat of a Mixt Governement and I think no man of common sense will affirme that a Government can be really mixed and yet the Power be simple 2. Because the End of Mixture which is Effectuall Limitation cannot be had by a derivate Power He answers Though a Derivate Power cannot
the exercise thereof p. 17. 2. Which followes from the former that Consent of people may be the meane of designing the person and yeilding subjection to him who else could not challenge it more then an other man also a meane of limiting that power in the exercise of it but not the measure of the power it selfe which in such a measure is given of God to all Soveraignes p. 41. so then Question proposed let this be the Question Whether it be Gods Ordinance that Governing power in all Soveraignes be one unlimited thing and can receive no measure from the people The Doctor affirmes it and p. 84 tells us he hath often insinuated it but he should once directly prove it if he be able so he might have prescribed to the whole controversie for if he can make this good in vaine doe we enquire about the constitution of this Monarchy or the lawfulnesse of resistance of subversive instruments of the Princes will Doth he think a covert insinuation would serve the turne to impose such an Assertion which frustrates the intent of mankind in framing limitations of Governing power and captives all into an absolute passive subjection to the vilest instruments of the will of him who is supreme In all his reply I find but two places which have any shew of proofe of this overbold Assertion One is p. 14. Before Government established the people have not any power of a community or politick power whereby a command may be laid upon others but only a naturall power of private resistance The other is p. 42. The people have not of themselves out of Government the maine power the power of life and death how then can they give it either for Government or reserve it for Resistance Here be weake foundations to build such an Assertion and three such insulting books on What a nothing this is I shall make appeare anon Question stated Now I hold the Negative of this Question and doubt not to approve it firme truth To that end first I will premise such things as we agree in that so the point in question may the more distinctly appeare Which I apprehend are or may be these 1. That Governing power is originally from Gods Ordinance 2. That it being so is unresistible in its whole latitude in all the acts which flow from it This the Apostle is cleare for Rom. 13. and for no more that I know Also that this is true as well in Limited as Absolute Governments v. g. In absolute Monarchy where Authority doth invest the whole will the Monarch is unresistible in all the acts of his reasonable will because all are acts flowing from Gods Ordinance So in limited Monarchy where Authority doth not simply invest the will of a Monarch but so far forth as it is regulated by such a law the Monarch is unresistible in all the acts of his will which are according to that law because they are acts flowing from Gods Ordinance Yea though either of these doe limit himselfe in the exercise of his power no way thereby diminishing the fulnesse of his power and afterward exceed those limits yet he is unresistible and to be subjected to actively in lawfull things and passively in unlawfull my reason is because even those acts notwithstanding limitation flow from Gods Ordinance of Authority which remaines the same and not lessened by such limitation 3. This governing power is ordinarily conveyed to persons by publick consent which is a point made good in my former Treatise and in the former chapter hereof 4. That this publick consent is not only a meane but hath a causall influence in conveying Authority to persons 5. That men working by such consent as second causes doe necessarily convey such Authority as God hath ordained so that if it can be proved either by Scripture or sound reason that it is Gods ordinance that supremacie should be unlimited and as large as all the acts of his will which hath it then whatever men capitulate about limitation of it is vaine so that the Doctor need prove only that point and for my part I will give him the cause 6. Limitation of Power may be either of Acts when Power is conveyed to Persons to doe certaine Acts of Power but not all Or else of Manner of working when Power is conveyed to doe all Acts of Authority but according to such a prescribed Rule Now I grant the former cannot be in the conveyance of Soveraigne Power an inferiour Officer may be limited by commission to certaine acts of Power and have no Authority to do other Acts of power but when Soveraignty is conveyed and the Person is set up next to God above all the people as the Doctour saith He must have an unlimited Power in respect of Acts of Government for Gods Ordinance is not onely that there should be Power for such an end sc a Peaceable life in godlinesse and honestie but sufficiencie of Power for the attainment of that end So that all Power of doing any Act needfull for that end must be in him who is supreme and the comprehensive Head of Power to inferiour Magistrates So that all the Question truly stated is about the other sort of Limitation sc Whether Soveraigne Power be so unlimited in its Rule of Acting that it investeth the whole Reasonable Will of him who hath it So that all the acts which proceed from him who hath it according to the rule of his owne Reason be potestative and from Gods Ordinance Secondly having thus punctually stated the Question Question determined the Determination must proceed in a double way sc 1. In simple Governments 2. In mixed Governments I do maintain the Negative in both and my proof shall be formed accordingly First then In simple Government Power is not one Vnlimited thing Assert 1 in the supreme But may be limited in the very being and root of it 1. The cause or meane by which alone it is conveyed if it bestow or Reas 1 convey only a limited Power then it is limited in the very Being of it For there can be no more then is conveyed Now we know the people by their publike act of consent and compact may either bind themselves to a full subjection to the Monarchs Will guided by his owne Reason or by some constituted rule or law set him to governe by which latter if they doe then is his Authority radically limited For they owing no more subjection He can have no farther Power 2. If soveraignty may be so limited that Active Obedience is not Reas 1 due to the commands which exceed those limits but may lawfully be denied to them as the Doctour acknowledges it may p. 16. Then it may be limited in the Power it selfe For in such case the Power exceeds not the limitation for if the exceeding Acts were potestative we owe Active subjection to them in as much as they are the Ordinance of God to which in omnibus non prohibitis Active
subjection Reas 3 is due 3. If Power in the supreme be such that it cannot be limited then either because it is Gods Ordinance or else because it is supreme but it s being Gods Ordinance hinders not for we see Rom. 13. All Powers as well supreme as subordinate are Gods Ordinance yet subordinate Powers may be limited not only in the Rule of Acting but in the kind of Acts as none can denie Neither its being supreme doth hinder its limitablenesse indeed as before it hinders it from being capable of confinement in the kind of Acts but in the measure or rule of working it doth not hinder in as much as a Soveraigne Power may as well attaine its end by being confined to another Law from without as by the Law of its own Reason if not much better also we no where finde Gods Word making any difference or giving power to confine subordinate Powers but forbidding it of Soveraignes Reas 4 4. That is to be granted which denied makes all Soveraignes arbitrary and of equall Power but to affirme that Power is one unlimited and investing all the Acts of the Soveraignes Will doth so for then is soveraignty arbitrary not when it hath no morall bounds for then none were or could be arbitrary but when Power is so fully in Reas 5 one that every Act of his Arbitrium or Will is Potestative and soveraigne 5. I have the judgement of all the Reformed Churches and Divines in Germany France Belgia Scotland on my part who have both allowed and actually used forceable Resistance against subversive Instruments of their Soveraignes Will yea our owne famous Princes Elizabeth James and our present Soveraigne both by edicts and Assistance have justified the same which they would not have done had they been perswaded of such an unlimited Ordinance of God investing all the Acts of the Will of him who is supreme So that by all this it appears that the Doctors conceit of such an unlimited Ordinance of God which he brings not a tittle of Gods word to prove is a meere chimera and groundlesse conceit Object Now the onely difficulty which I can thinke on is this Gods Ordinance in soveraignty as before is not onely Power to such an end but sufficiencie of Power to the assecution of that end now a limited Power seemeth not to be sufficient for the end of Government because there are two Powers necessary to the end of Government sc Power of making and authentique Interpreting of Laws which are not consistent with a Limitation of Power I answer It is true of Limitation in respect of Acts Sol. and therefore I averre that such a Limitation cannot be where Power is supreme but for Limitation to a Rule and defined way of Working I cannot see how it with-stands the end of Government So that supposing Power of making and Interpreting Laws be necessary to the end of Government yet that they be Absolutely resident in him who is supreme sc To make Lawes and Interprete Lawes authoritatively without being bound to follow any Light or Rule therin but his owne Reason is not necessary to the end of Government In these Acts a regulated Power is enough in the most simple State sc a Power to make new Lawes if any be needfull and Interpreting the old if ambiguous according to the Rule of the former established Laws and by the advise of his learned Counsell and Judges of his supreme Courts of Justice We see in matters spirituall there is no Legislative Power resident to ordain or give authentique sence in matters de fide yet the Church stands well enough one standing Rule of Scripture being sufficient with a ministeriall Interpretation So it is probable a State might by a complete standing Rule of Law and a Ministeriall Power of Interpretation were there no Legislative Power resident in any Supreme Magistrate thereof But the matter is farre more cleare in a mixed Government so that Assert 2 were it necessary in a simple Government that the Supreme should be unlimited in his Power yet in a Mixed which is enough for us in this Kingdome evidently it is not so And to make this appeare I will lay downe three grounds 1. Such a Government may be established that the supreme Power may be placed in many persons either of the same or divers condition that is in a mixed Subject else all formes were unlawfull except simple Monarchie 2. If this supreame Power be inequally placed in these Persons or States of men so that a reall sublimity and Principality be given to one then the denomination may be taken from that Principall and so it is a Monarchy or Aristocracy or Democracy mixed in the Power it selfe however it pleaseth this Replier to deride it with the top or Crowne of the head of which more hereafter 3. Where the Supremacy of power is thus in many although all taken together have an unlimited Power as in ours yet neither of them severall by himselfe hath or can have for it is a contradiction that it be resident in many and yet unlimitedly in One. Now to those two shewes of Argument which in the beginning I produced out of this Reply I say before Government be established it is true the people have no formall Politique Power of Life and Death yet they have a seminall that is every one for himselfe his family and posterity hath a power of resigning up their naturall liberty to be governed by One or many after this or that forme as they shall judge fittest God ordaining that Powers should be to such an end hath thereby legitimated and ratified any Consent or Contract which people may make of parting with their liberty and giving Magistrates a common Power over them to that end And Gods not prescribing any Rule or Measure of Power by his Ordinance of Authority hath left it in the peoples liberty to resigne up themselves according to such Rule and Termes as they judge fittest so it be such as the end of his Ordinance may be attained thereby Thus although by it selfe and excluding Gods Ordinance they have no immediate Power to lay a command on others nor Power of life and death yet in vertue of Gods Ordinance their common consent and contract is sufficient to set up such a Power which is endowed with a sufficiency of Command for Government and the end of Government over those which have each man for himselfe and his set it up So although second Causes have no Power by themselves to produce their effects yet working in vertue of the first Cause they have Power to produce effects sometimes farre beyond their own Measure Therefore I desire this Doctour either to bring some Ordinance of God expressely forbidding to set any bounds or Rule of Power upon the Will of the Magistrate or else let him suffer Man-kind to use their Right in resigning up that liberty which God and nature hath given them upon such termes and conditions as they apprehend best
for their own good and the due end of Government Summe In the close of this Question I will lay downe three Conclusions concerning the Ordinance of God and the Nature of Soveraigntie Conclus 1 1. God hath ordained that in Societies of Men there should be a Politike Power for a peaceable and godly life This Ordinance hath put a Seminall Power in all the Societies of Men sc a Liberty and Power by common Consent to resigne up themselves and theirs to one Supreame thereby constituting a common Politique Power 2. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined any kind Conclus 2 or forme of Power hath left it to the libertie of Societies of men to choose to which kind they will resigne up themselves either to a supreme regulated in the Acts of his Will by his owne Reason as in absolute Government or to one regulated by a Common Reason or Law constituted by publike consent as in Limited 3. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined the subject Conclus 3 of this Power hath left it to the choice of Societies to invest with this Soveraigntie either one Person or many and those either of the same or divers sorts and rankes of men Whence arise simple or mixed Governments and this is the Architectonicall Power left in societies before they are engaged in a Government which the Doctour doth so causlesly deride Here is the summe of what I do averre concerning Gods Ordinance in Soveraigntie which I challenge the Doctour or any else to gain-say The second sort of the Doctors false supposals respect the Nature and Sect. 2 Quality of Limitation Of nature and Quality of Limitation where also I observe that he proceeds on two false and fallacious Principles sc 1. He every where confounds Morall and Civill or Legall Limitation so p. 18. 93. 39. 2. That Soveraignty is capable onely of a morall Limitation p. 39 42. So that if any other be in any State ordained He cannot beleeve but such a condition is unlawfull and unreasonable against the Order of Government p. 39. If the nature of Limitation be well knowne it will appeare that the Doctor hath done very inconsiderately or rather very fraudulently for he hath obscured the Truth much by it in confounding morall and Civill Limitation We will therefore consider the nature of Limitation something more accurately then I have done in my former Treatise for it will be a great light to the whole controversie First We must consider a distinction of Power which is either A Pos 1 simple Power of Willing or Doing which is in every Morall Agent 2. A Power of Authoritative and obligatorie Willing or Doing so that an act of it whether a Will of Command or Censure expressed hath in it a binding power to subjection this is that which we call Magistracy of whose Limitation now we treat Secondly concerning Limitation we must know that it induceth Pos 2 an absolute necessity of not producing any Act beyond those Limits For a Power having bounds beyond which it can exceed if it please though with difficulty it is not properly limited but hindred Pos 3 Thirdly This necessity of not exceeding those bounds is such as the bounds themselves are so that it is ever true That a Power in what way it is limited cannot exceed those limits Pos 4 Of Moral limits Fourthly There are of this Power but two sorts of Limits sc 1. Morall and 2. Civill or Politique Of which two we must distinctly consider 1. Morall Limits is the Morall Will or Law of God and a Power is said to be limited by this not when it cannot produce any Act at all but when it cannot morally produce it that is without sin For the supervening of a morall bond doth not take away the Power of doing but of right or sinlesse doing v. g. in Naturall Powers Gods prohibition of eating Swines flesh did not take away from the Jew the naturall Power of eating it but the power of sinlesse eating it So in Civill power a prohibition of God comming upon it doth not take away the Power of Civill and Authoritative Doing but of lawfull or sinlesse doing And hence it followes 1. That Morall Limitation is only of the Exercise of Power not of the power it selfe for the power is not thereby taken away but remaines equally extense and able to all its acts as it was before only now it cannot put forth it selfe unto certaine Acts without sinne which it could before Thus an Absolute Monarch who hath a power of doing as extense as his Reasonable Will promises to doe but this or in this manner now he is morally bound by vertue of this promise and cannot without sinne doe otherwise yet if he doe his Commanding Power is the same and its act binding to the Subject And so it is proportionably in Legall Governments Cyprian Bishop of Carthage hath by the Canons a power of judging Ecclesiasticall causes committed to him He resolves and promises to doe nothing of moment herein but by the consent of his Clergie now he is morally bound and if afterward he doe a thing by himselfe without their consent he sins yet no man will say his Episcopall power is lessened or the act he so doth is canonically invalid and not obligatorie 2. Yea it followes also that it is not properly a Limitation of the Exercise of power neither for by a morall bond the Power is not so bound up but that it can exercise it selfe and that validly too though not without sinne as appeares before 3. Also that it is no detraction from Absolutenesse of Power nor is it sufficient to make a distinction of it into Absolute and Limited For 1. It causes no reall Limitation of power either in the nature or exercise of it 2. It is not distinctive being to be found in the most absolute power under heaven Legall Limits all being bounded by Gods Law the Law of Equity and many promises by themselves made 2. Civill or Legall Limits cause a Civill and Legall definement of Authority so that its exceeding acts are not Legall and binding that is are non Authoritative for as a Morall bond induces a necessity of confinement in esse morali so a Civill and Legall bond doth in esse legali obligatorio Hence follows 1. It is these Legall and civill bounds which constitute a Government in a limited condition not those morall for this is distinctive and is never found in an absolute Governement for there the Soveraigne by promise or Oath binding himselfe to a stated course doth put no Law civill upon his power or the exercise of it for though he sinne in exceeding afterwards yet his acts are truely Legall and Authoritative 2. This induceth a reall Limitation of power neither can it be only of exercise for sith it brings an illegality and unauthoritativenesse on acts exceeding that is makes them none in esse civili politico it is
a limitation of Power it selfe for when a Power can produce no potentiall acts beyond such limits then it is limited in the very being 3. Acts exceeding politique and legall Limitation being not Legall nor authoritative in that State can give no authoritie to the Instruments and therefore they may be resisted without resistance or violation of Authoritie Whereas it is otherwise in Acts exceeding morall Limitation for being authoritative they authorize the Instrument and give him an unresistance In summe Limitation morall and civill or legall doe differ in three main particulars 1. Morall sith it is no politique or Authoritative Act Conclus 1 makes no reall detraction either in power or exercise of it and therefore agrees with the most absolute Government whereas Legall being a politique and authoritative Act makes a reall diminution and so is the ratio formalis or distinctive conceit constituting Limited government nor can be found in absolute 2. Hence Exceeding Acts notwithstanding morall limitation are Conclus 2 authoritative proceed from Gods Ordinance and challenge subjection but they are otherwise which exceed a legall limitation Conclus 3 3. Exceeding Acts in morall limitation being authoritative have the Sword or compelling power annexed to them which may not be resisted but in Legall being not authoritative they have not the sword or compelling power annexed and therefore may be resisted in their Instruments I will illustrate all this by a familiar instance In our Government a Iudge hath a Commission to heare and determine Causes according to the Verdict of twelve men Here is a Power limited in the very being that is Legally and Civilly This Iudge useth indirect meanes to corrupt the Iurie to bring in an unjust Verdict but judgeth as his Commission binds him according to their Verdict Here is a morall exceeding yet the Act of judgement is Authoritative because according to his Commission and must not be resisted Againe He passeth sentence in another cause expressely against the Verdict of the Iury in an arbitrary way Here is a Legall exceeding and the sentence is non authoritative He having no such Power committed to him the sentence can have no binding power in it Hereby it appeares how without any ground of Truth the former supposals are Sect. 3 Thirdly concerning the Causes and Meanes of Limitation the Doctors supposals are Causes meanes of Limitation 1. That Radicall Limitation that is of the Power it selfe requires an expresse and notorious act it must be done in the beginning and at once p. 15. 24. 39. 2. That a Prince may so limit himselfe as not to require to be actively subjected to and yet be limited only in the exercise not in the power it selfe p. 16. 3. That no Limitation by after condescent is of the Power it selfe p. 28. this being a consequent from the first Now that the falshood of these and the like grounds every where scattered in his bookes may appeare Let us a little more diligently handle the Causes and Meanes of Limitation which as before Causes of Moral Limitation being twofold Morall and Civill We will begin with Morall 1. Now the Formall cause of a meere Morall Limitation is that which morally bounds or makes sinfull any act of Power We are therefore to enquire what it is which can doe that And this is 1. Principally the Morall Law of God forbidding such an exercise of Power This is an universall perpetuall and invincible Limitation of all power of Government either absolute or legall yea of all Active Power of reasonable creatures 2. There is another meane of Limitation morall sc a Promise Oath or positive constitution whereby a Prince puts a bond upon himselfe making that now sinfull to be done which before was not so This also induces a morall Limitation as well in absolute as legall Governments as if an Absolute Monarch promise to follow such a Rule which hath a Power to use any which his reason shall dictate Or if a Legall promise to abridge himselfe in a course in which the Law hath left him indeterminate in this respect they come under a morall limitation But concerning this positive meane we must note 1. This promise how solemne soever it be must be a simple bond It must extend to no diminution of power or discharge from duty of subjection for then it is not meerely morall it makes the exceeding act not only sinfull but non obliging whereas it is the note of a meere morall bond that it extends not to any lessening of Authority or discharge of duty as if a Captaine take his enemy prisoner he to save his life sweares him a full vassalage afterward his Master promises to command him only such services never absolving him from his former bond of absolute slavery here is a morall bond yet still a full debt of subjection in case the Master should breake his word and put him on other employment 2. If the matter be more throughly looked into this positive meane of limitation is either none at all or else addes nothing to the former of the morall law of God For in such promise or Oath whereby a Governour limits himselfe there is an expresse or tacite condition if it conduce to the end of Government the glory of God and publick good For if such Oath or bond hinder the end of Government it is eo nomine unlawfull and invalid but if conduce to it then it was no more then was virtually required of him before by the morall Law this promise or Oath being but a more solemne profession and protestation to doe that which before implicitely he was bound morally unto Thus we see all that Doctor speakes of Morall and irrevocable limitation by promise and oath comes to nothing in the issue so that this being granted that the Monarchs power in this State were only Morally limited in the Doctors sense We are as much under and owe as much subjection as the captive slave to his Master and all our Laws and Statutes being but morall limitations of this second sort are not so much as morall limitations any farther then the Prince sees them conduce to the end of Government if any seem to stand in his way and hinder him therein he is no longer bound to it but may account it an ill made promise or Oath which is better broke then kept 2. Causes of Legall limitation Of the Causes and Meanes of Civill and legall limitation whereby not only the exercise but the power it selfe is confined 1. The formall cause hereof is the limitation of the duty of subjection in the people The duty of subjection is the originall of the power of Authority People by becomming debtors of subjection doe set up Authority and by stinting and terminating the duty of subjection doe put bounds and termes to the power of commanding 2. Let us see then by what meanes the duty of subjection may be terminated I conceive it may be done two wayes 1. At first when a
discovered And p. 51. of my Treatise in a full dispute have I proved the Parliaments power in resisting destructive instruments which I doubt not will appeare cleare notwithstanding any thing said in this Reply But that is very strange which he affirmes p. 39. That if they use a Legall restraining power the Monarch cannot alter the established frame Sure by cannot he understands fallaciously as he useth to doe a morall cannot that is not without sin which is a poor small cannot now adays if he mean indeed cannot that is is not able it is against reason by his grounds for what is not he able to doe whose lowest most desperate instrument of pleasure is unresistible Let him remember where he said p. 19. A forcible consent cannot be wanting to a Conquerour and a Conquerours power is no more then unresistible Nay I am senselesse on the Doctors grounds if he cannot lawfully for suppose he be pleased to make it a Question whether he were not better governe by the Civill-Law as more conducent to Gods glory and the end of Government He is by Law the last judge of this Question if he determine it best then he may lawfully doe it Now we are come to the second part of this Section in which he Sect. 2 undertakes the proofe of this Assertion His Arguments against power of resistance reserved answered that Limitations and Mixtures in Monarchy doe not imply a forcible constraining power in subjects for the preventing of dissolution but only a Legall p. 39. Answ He failes in the very proposall of his Assertion in three points 1. He proposeth it of Limitation in generall whereas I grant it of that which is only in exercise affirming it only of that which is of the power it selfe 2. He sayes Forcible constraining power in subjects when he should have specified against subversive instruments for I grant it of the Monarch himselfe 3. He opposeth forcible to Legall when it should be opposed only to meere Morall not to Legall as before Now let us weigh his Arguments First Such a power must be in them by reservation and then it must be expresse in the constitution of the Government and Covenant or else by implication I will answer distinctly concerning this Reservation of power of forcible Resistance 1. There is a Reservation of liberty or power of not being subject neither actively nor passively to the exceeding Acts of the Monarchs will This is by implication for what they did not resigne up they did reserve 2. A power of Authoritative judging and resisting the Monarch thus exceeding This neither expressely nor implicitly is reserved not because it is unlawfull as the Doctor imagins but contradictory to the very institution of a Monarchy and so under that intention impossible 3. A power of forcible resistance of subversive instruments This by the Authority of the Law is not reserved but expressely commited not only to the Houses of Parliament but all inferiour Courts for the Law whose execution the King committeth unto them commands them not only to resist but punish its violaters much more its subverters without exceptions of Persons or respect of their number or ground and reason why they doe it whether with or against the Kings private and absolute will or Warrant supposing such men to be without warrant And this power of judging all violators and subverters of Laws being committed to them includes a power of imploying the force or Armes of the County or whole Kingdome if need be to make good the sentence of the Law against them This power being a necessary attendant to the former And they who have the power of judging by Commission have the power of force by implication To his five Arguments therefore by which he proves this power not reserved by implication I briefly Answer 1. Limitation cannot infer it c. Answer Limitation in exercise only doth not but in the power it selfe doth infer it as I have often shewed 2. The inconveniencies of exorbitancie cannot infer it Answer They doe not infer it of themselves for they are the same in absolute Rule but supposing a people mind in their Frame effectually to prevent those inconveniencies that doth infer it 3. The consent and intention of the people choosing a Monarch cannot infer it because it is not the measure of the power it selfe Answer I have before proved the contrary and made the Doctors supposall appeare a groundlesse falshood concerning unlimited power by Gods ordinance 4. The intention of the people in procuring Limitations of power cannot infer it Answer If the peoples intention in it be a greater security from oppression then in an absolute Government they can have or a meere morall limitation can give them then it doth inferre it 5. If the Architects did intend such a forceable power to these States they would not have best it in his power to dissolve them p. 42. This hath had its full satisfaction before These are poore infirme arguments as the reader cannot but see yet he ends in a triumph Therefore I conclude here as I promised in the second Section where the Prince stands supreme c. there Subjects may not by force of armes resist though he be exorbitant c. p. 43. 'T is true he concludes as he promised but he hath not proved as he promised nor as we expected for here is nothing but that which fals to the ground with his supposals on which they are built and which I have demolished in the 4th Chapter CHAP. VII An Answer to the 7th Section of his Replie of places of Scripture out of the old Testament HIs sixt Section doth wholly concerne the Authour of the fuller Sect. 1 Answer which I passe over because I am chargeable for no more then is my owne And come to his seventh which containes an Examination of places alledged in this Question out of the old Testament Where he begins confidently that there is no warrant for Resistance p. 56. and he yeelds two Reasons why 1. Because the Institution of that Kingdom was such as doth plainly exclude Resistance 2. Because the Prophets never call for it Ans I grant it doth exclude it as farre as in an absolute Monarchie it may be excluded and therefore there is no need of answering his Arguments But yet let us consider them sith he is so large in them To shew us the Institution of that Kingdome he brings 1 Sam. 8.11 Where he sayes we have it For Samuel is commanded v. 9. To tell the people Jus Regis Now this jus Regis he makes a great matter of and tels us it implies not a Right of doing such unjust Acts but a securitie from Resistance and force if he does them p. 56. Ans 1. It is no prejudice to the cause I defend if I should grant all he would worke out of this Text for it prooves no farther then of that particular Kingdome inducing no necessitie that all others must have the same Institution Also
to use force against one he grants the cause by it of all for a warrant from an act of the Kings will is as valid to secure a few Emissaries as a whole Army and Gods Ordinance in one man is no more resistible then in a multitude Then for Davids intent to keep Keylah against Saul it is so evident by the history that I will say no more about it but doe refer him to that which the Pleaders for defensive Armes say about it The Doctor seeks divers evasions to get out of the reach of this example but doth not satisfie himselfe much lesse others and therefore adds the fourth on which he must rest when all is said That Davids example was extraordinary Hereon he brings some things in him which were extraordinary We grant it in many things but we deny it in this If the Doctor will prove him to have a speciall priviledge to resist Gods ordinance in his Soveraign more then other men he must bring the grant and warrant for it otherwise David must come under the common condition for this matter He himselfe acknowledges he had none for violating the person of his Prince and sure then he had none for violating the Authority of his Prince conferred on private Emissaries if they had any But in his p. 65. He layes hard at me and challengeth not only my Reason for calling this a shufling Answer but also my ingenuity who confesse the people in that Government might not resist and yet doe urge these examples for Resistance Answer 1. For my Reason I have made it appeare I have reason to call it so is it not a meere evasion to affirme in him an extraordinary priviledge and can bring no word nor warrant for it 2. For my ingenuity it is without cause challenged by him for from the lawfullnesse of Resistance of unreasonable Acts of will in an absolute Monarchy where Reason is the Princes law I may a fortiori conclude the lawfulnesse of resisting of instruments of illegall Acts in a limited Monarchy where the Law of the Land is the Princes Law and bounds CHAP. VIII The 8. Section concerning Resistance forbidden Rom. 13. answered NOw we are come to his principall strength against Resistance out Sect. 1 of Rom. 13. From whence nothing can be collected against any Resistance but that which is of the Powers of the Ordinance but that which I defend is of neither of them therefore I have no cause to feare his inferences from that Text. Now supposing the truth which I have made good that in a limited State the limitation is of the Power it selfe and not only of the exercise it followes evidently that in such a State resistance of destructive instruments is neither of Power nor Gods Ordinance I might therefore well omit that which at large here he speakes of Resistance of the Powers The first part of the Section is spent in replying to the Exceptions of the Reverend Divines The first thing I find which concernes me is p. 77. I will therefore begin with him there Where he accuseth me that in my 59 64 and 66. page of that Treatise I grant they might not resist in that Monarchy but affirme that subjects may in this and he brings me in giving two Reasons for it 1. Because Religion was then no part of the Lawes but here it is 2. Because that was an Absolute Monarchy this a Limited and mixed p. 77. But may I not here challenge both the ingenuity and conscience of this Replyer Did I ever grant that Gods Ordinance of Power might be resisted here or give any Reasons for so unreasonable an Assertion It would be tedious to repeate here what I have said there Let the Reader see if he please I will recite the summe 1. The Doctor affirmed that in the Apostles time the Senate of Rome might challenge more then our Parliaments can now I denied it and gave my reason sc That State was then devolved into a Monarchy by Conquest c. of this the Doctor speakes not a word perhaps he is now ashamed of that comparison 2. He said there was greater cause of Resistance then than now I answered There was then no cause at all Not for Religion being then no part of the Law Not Liberties because then that was past the Government changed and an Oath taken of absolute subjection Have I by these things granted a liberty of Resistance of Gods Ordinance to this people and deny it to those No Neither They nor We not that enslaved Senate nor our free Parliaments no cause no priviledge can justifie this Yea I ascribe more to Gods Ordinance of Power then He He sayes that in a limited state we owe only passive subjection to exceeding commands of a Prince by promise limiting himselfe in the use of his power I say though he sin in exceeding such promise yet we owe him also Active obedience in such commands which Gods Law forbids us not to be Active in Neither doe I bring Doctor Bilsons testimony to prove that Religion was then no part of the Law as he affirmes I doe p. 77. but sure he neither heeded what I had written nor what himselfe wrote I laid down an Assertion that Gods Ordinance of which St Paul speakes is the Power and the Person of him which is supremely invested with that Power and for this did I bring Dr Bilson who explaining the Power there forbidden to be resisted sayes it is the Princes will not against his Lawes but agreeing to his Lawes Here he serves Dr Bilson and other Divines as before the King and the Parliaments teaches them a meaning contrary to their words They meane such states as may by the knowne Laws use forceable restraint No such meaning of his words He makes no distinction of states but expounds the Text in question speaking of Gods Ordinance in generall in all Rulers He knowes it well enough and therefore addes They were willing to excuse as much as might be those motions of the Protestants in France and the Low-Countries but had they lived now they would have spoken more cautelously That is They spake rashly wronged the truth and reached their consciences to excuse the commotions and rebellions of those dayes This is like a Doctor But he likes the Homilie better then them all that speakes home he sayes but what he speakes not nor doe I answer But he will try the force of this exception because I professe with Mr Burrowes against Resisting of Authority though abused And with Dr Bilson admit of resisting the Princes will against the Lawes This is fast and loose sayes he How so In limited Monarchies where the Prince hath no Authority beyond the Law there an act beyond the Law is unauthoritative and meerely private so that it is no abusing of Authority but an exceeding of Authority Authority abused to undue acting of matters within its compasse Mr Burrowes speakes of and that must not be resisted But the Princes will acting against