Subsection 2. Certain Propositions to explain those several wayes wherein things are said to be of God BUt the question will be concerning the being of a thing of Gods hand by way of efficiency and the being of a thing of Gods mouth by way of warrant rule or precept whether both of these or but one of them and if but one then which of them is it which is intended by this clause of God Before I come to determine this question as it lies betwixt these two in particular it may be somewhat conducible to compare them together and to explain them a little more and the reduceableness of things to both or each of them For the which observe 1. Sometimes a thing is both these wayes of God viz. both of his mouth authorizing and of his hand working it That which his mouth enjoynes his hand sometimes effects 2 Chron. 30.12 In Judah the hand of God was to give them one heart to do the commandement of the King and the Princes by the word of the Lord. The like see 1 Chron. 29.14 Phil. 2.13 2 Cor. 5 5 18. 2. Sometimes a thing is of Gods mouth commanding but not of his hand working God shews injoynes to men their duty mâ—ny times when as it is not performed in them see Jer. 7.23 24. 3. A thing is sometimes of Gods hand but not of his mouth Many things come to passe by divine providence or working which though himself effect and that by mans agency yet he allowes not of that agency of man in them Take for instances Gods sending of Joseph into Egypt by his Brethrens selling of him Gen. 45.5 7 8. 50.20 the expulsion of David out of his Kingdom and the ravishment of his Wives by Absolom 2 Sam. 12.11 12. The destruction and captivity of Judah by Nebuchadnâ—zar Isa 10.5 6 15. Jer. 51.7 25.9 compared with Chap. 47.6 Jer. 50.17 18. 51.24 34 35 36. The sufferings of Christ by the Jews Act. 2.13 4.28 with many other things as 1 King 11.14 23. 1 Sam. 26.19 Judg. 2.14 15. Hab. 1.6 13. 4. Some things are neither of Gods mouth approving nor of his hand acting So are the sins of men in their formal precise or abstract consideration Jam. 1.13 Gal. 5.8 1 Joh. 2.15 Subsection 3. CHAP. II. SECT II. Subsect 3. Of Gods working in humane actions whether good or evill and the difference betwixt the being of the one of God and of the other FOr the better understanding of these four particulaâ—s especially the two last of them upon which there may lie some obscurity let these Propositions be thereto added 1. All beings or things whatsoever hath subsistence or existence all events effects and productions as to their matter or positive entity are of Gods hand and working Rom. 11.36 1 Cor. 8.6 Ephes 1.11 2. Of those things that are of Gods hand of working 1. Some are of him as the sole efficient of them So are those things which receive their being by creation regeneration or other such like supernatural or miraculous production 2. Others are so of God as to be also the work and effect of second agents So are all those things which come to passe here below and in the order of nature or the ordinary course of providence 3. In the causing of the latter sort of effects viz. those wh ch are both of God and the creature these two are not coordinate agents or set collaterally or in parity or equality of order for that would import that both were first and but partial sociall causes and as well the one as the other to be independent or to have their causality in and from themselves alone But the one is subordinate to the other that is God is the supreme and first the creature is the inferior and second cause and is dependent on and receive its physical efficiency or attingency of the effect from God and that not partially or by way of addition or supply but wholly Act. 17.25 28. Isa 54.16 Ezek. 30.24 32.3.11 12. and this holdeth in all acts of the creature whether holy or sinful good or evill as to the natural being of the action That which the Apostle saith of his gracious workings Not I but the grace of God which was with me 1 Cor. 15.10 the same Joseph saith of his brethrens sinful deed It was not you that sent me hither but God Gen. 45.8 The creature acteth yet not it but the power of God with it The creature hath truly and really in it an active principle and that principle truly and really exerteth or putteth forth acts but it hath both the principle and the activenesse put into it of God His influence not only toucheth the effect but the second cause and moveth it * Contrary to this some of the Schoolmen Molina de lib. Arbitrio qu. 14. Disp 26. pa. 111. Disp 32. pag. 133 He worketh not only with but by it and that though in some sense mediately in regard of his elevation and use of the second cause yet immediately also in regard of his nearest attingency and that both by immediety of person and of virtue 4. It behoves us to consider the subordinacy of the second to the fiâ—st cause of the creature to God somewhat more distinctly Observe therefore it is twofold 1. Physicall 2. Morall The former simply and absolutely concernes the being of every reall effect and the virtue or power by which it is produced by any second cause The latter respecteth the manner of the procedure of an effâ—ct fâ—om a rational agent and the relation and correspondency it bears to the revealed and preceptive will of God given unto him All creatures in all their actions are physically subordinate to God but reasonable creatures moreover are and particularly man is morally subordinate to him viz. as he receives all his activity from him so he is to act by his Commission and in a conformity to his direction or command given forth by word the ground and reason of the former subordination is his being a creature for as such he totally depends on God for his being and operation the latter is from his being a creature endued with reason and will and therefore working with deliberation and free volition thence his person and actions are qualifiable with a moral goodness and evilness and are capable of being regulated by a law and prosecuted with rewards and punishments Man therefore in respect of his moral actions stands in this twofold subordination unto God physical and moral 5. There are divers differences twixt these two subordinations of man unto God some of which it is to our present purpose to consider They are different 1. In the formall respect or term to which they refer the physical subordination respecteth Gods will of purpose and hand of providence the moral respecteth Gods revealed will or word of precept 2. In point of necessity the physical subordination is certain and immutable so necessary as
asserted in a contradistinction to an arbritrary and unwarrantable assuming or usurping So in that of Mat. 21.23 24. the chief Priests and Elders ask Christ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By what authority dost thou these things and who gave thee this authority The authority here demanded to be shewn is a warrant or lawfull commission for the doings of our Saviour the things done they had seen his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the act of Power or force he had put forth in his Doctrine Miracles and imperious driving out of the Temple the traffiquing profaners of it but they call in question and therefore demand of him and accordingly he conditionally promises to tell them by what authority he did those things and who gave him that authority So again in that of Mat. 9.6 our Saviour asserteth to himself the having 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power on earth to forgive sins they that were present had heard him executing the act towards the Palsie-sick person in his saying to him thy sins be forgiven thee But they doubted of or rather denyed his authority or lawfull power to do it and that was the thing therefore which he there avoweth In like manner in that of Joh. 19.10 Pilate thought Christ now standing before him and not making any answer to his examinations of him implyed that he took him to have no lawfull power over him in that cause and therefore asks him Knowest thou not that I have power to crucifie thee and have power to release thee Where by the way the allegarion which some make of this Text as though the word here signified an abusive or unlawful power◠in as much as what ever power Pilate might have to release Christ he had none to crucifie him is utterly impertinent For it is not materiall to the use of the word here to say what power Pilate really had or what he had not but the matter is what power he thought and meant to assert that he had for the word there must needs bear that sense which the speaker meant it in and for that there is no doubt but Pilate looked on himself as the lawful Governor of that place and at Christ as a common person of that Nation and so intended that himself was the competent Judge of the person and cause of Christ then before him and that he had therefore power to crucifie him and power to release him viz. respectively accordingly as he should finde his cause to deserve So in that of Rom. 9.21 the Apostle disputing for the equity and justness of Gods purposes and proceedings in his acts of Free Election and Reprobation in order to the benefits of his Grace and in his excutions thereof he alleadges by way of comparison the example of the Potters power over his clay to make a vessel of it to what use he pleaseth Where if the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were ambiguous and did not clearly signifie right and just power the argument were of no force or evidence Secondly The other thing I observe is that this word is in those forequoted places put for such a power as doth not necessarily import or require to its being or depend upon possession actual tenure or exercise of the matter or object of the power but is in some of those instances de facto separate and in all separable therefrom yea in some of them the power is so affirmed as that the act or exercise of it is expresly secluded and laid aside as neither done nor to be done in the particular case That universal Power which Christ assumeth to himself Joh. 17.2 Mat. 28.18 was then in him in regard of grant and investure and in respect of right and title to all the things to which it referreth but a jus in re a seisure or possession of them he had not For before his passion being then in the state of humiliation he was far from an actual dominion or command over all nay after his rising again and his ascending up unto and session at the right hand of God in heaven the Apostle saith of him We see not yet all things put under him Heb. 2.8 That power of Believers to eate of things unto Idols And that of Paul and Barnabas to marry and to take with them in their travail Wives and to receive maintenance for themselves and them of the Churches of Corinth and Thessalonica 1 Cor. 8.9 9.4 5. 2 Thess 3.9 these were powers inherent in those persons respectively but they were not acted no nor could lawfully be put forth by them as the case then stood with those Christians It is against this Observation of the force of this word objected by some that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is put for a Power unlawful as to title in two or three places viz. Luk. 4.6 Rev 13.2 4. Ephes 6.12 Col. 2.14 Unto which I say 1. It should still be remembred what was before said that the propriety of a word is not a thing of so precise a nature as that it is ever punctually kept and that it is to be judged not by its use once or twice but by its common and frequent use 2. Let the Texts brought for this be severally looked into For that of Luke 4.6 I can see no reason to conclude the word is there used for a rightless power Who can think but that Satan there intendeth to assume to himself a good title and just interest over this worlds kingdoms and not a false or usurped claim and according to his intention that speaks must the sense of the word be construed to be Indeed he lyed in taking that large composs of power to himself and this he had done whether he had spoken of that power in point of right or in point of fact for in neither sense had be all that power either given to him or to give to others but his lie had not been so specious or to his purpose had he not meant of a real and good authority For that of Rev. 13.2 4. where it 's said The Dragon gave the beast his power and his seat and great authority and the Dragon gave power unto the beast presupposing that by the Dragon is meant Satan and by the Beast the Roman Empire as distributed into ten Kingdoms or States upon the dissipation of the Monarchy of the Caesars by the wars of the Barbarians which ten are therefore it may be called one Kingdom Rev. 17.17 or that part of the said Empire which is called the Western Empire as reduced partly in regard of secular State and Title into the hands of the Exarch of Ravenna first then of the French and after of the German Emperor but acted and over-swayed by the Pope of Rome * See Mr. Mede on Revel com part 2. cap. 13. Napier Simson Ds. Annot. in loc Now where it is said this Dragon gave this Beast his power and seat and great authority the possessive his is I take it necessarily to be
our Saviour That which cometh out of a man that defileth a man for from within out of the heart of men proceed evill thoughts c. All these things come from within and defileth man And that of the Apostle CHAP. II. SECT II. Subsect 4. God gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts to dishonour their own bodies God not at all inclining or drawing or intrinsecally determining the wil in the election of evil as neither doth he in its act of aversation or refusal of good or in a sin of omission And thus it is manifest according to our fourth proposition above it may be said that some things taking the term Thing in a vulgar sense are neither of Gods mouth approving nor of his hand working For mans sinful action though the matter virtue or activity be of Gods hand yet in its formal and moral stamp it is neither of Gods hand nor mouth Subsection 4. How the hand of God is clear from the sin of man when it acteth in mans sinful action and from injustice in punishing him for that action IF it be here asked How this may be that God may use and be the author of those actions or motions of his creature in subordination to his working providence which in their formal and moral habitude are evill and so deordinate or repugnate to his word and yet his hand and providence be as clear from the sin as his word is clear against it and how the creature is in this case justly punishable by God I answer briefly 1. For the former How God is clear from being the authour of the sin 1. It is not the sin formally taken which God makes use of to the production of any natural effect but the physical motion of the creature to which the sin is adherent 2. Let it be considered how man acteth in this physical subserviency to God He is not impelled by God but he moveth of his own accord and free choice he is not moved as I think it may be affirmed physically of God till he first move himself morally Unto every moral act of man that is transient and productive of any thing there are required two things to be in him Will and Power the power how great soever doth nothing of it self it is the wils injuction that educeth the act though both concur to the action or effect yet the power doth not lead or draw forth the will but the will actuates the pâ—weâ— The power in it self is neither good nor evill posse peccare was no fault in Adam he had it in his integrity a defectibility was both in him and in the nature of Angels originally neither doth the power make the action to which it is exerted either good or evill but the moral tincture is wholly from the will and so intirely doth it result thence that the will in some sort whether to good or evill stands for or is equivalent to the deed in Gods account The question then is Whence is the will moved to this or that sinful act God indeed useth the creatures hand or power but who or what is the mover or swayer of the will The Philosopher saith and it 's true God is primus motor the first mover but this he understands of physical motion and therefore in the external execution of that deed which is sinful let it be granted that God begins but in humane actions there is a moral act which goes before the natural an elicite act precedes the imperate an election of the will before an elevation of the power Now for the volition of the wil in reference to a sinful work that 's of it self and its counsellor or dictator the practicall Intellect as they may be each in their kind morally excited or induced by their objective attractives without or the suggestions of Satan It must necessarily be acknowledged unto an evill course the will is not intrinsecally determined by God he neither morally perswades nor physically impels it to such resolution purpose or choice God tempteth not any man c. Jam. 1.13 all I think that can be said of God as to that act of the will is that he abandons or leaves the man to himself and to his objective and injective temptations which though it may be an antecedent yet is not in the least a positive cause of the wills default and yet he never doth that but very righteously both in regard of his disobligation from any debt of assistance to his creature and in regard of just provocation from him ever since his first defection 3. There are causes imaginable wherein even one man may honestly joyne in the same act with another when it is to his knowledge in that other a sinful action the diversity of the principle and end making the concurrence of the one just of the other wicked Take for instance Reubens counselling and acting with his brethren in the casting of his brother Joseph into the pit which they did for a mischief he for a deliverance to him Gen. 37 21. and Hushaies counsel to Absalom which Absalom and his companions embraced in shew for Absaloms service against David but in intention and real tendency quite contrary 2. Sam. 17.11 c. And this is seen in the guiltless concurrence of one that is necessitated to enter into any contract that is unlawfull in the party voluntarily contracting whether usury or other * Vide Grotium de Jure Belli lib. 2. cap. 26. Sect. 5. lib. 3. cap. 1. Sect. 22. How much more may it be yeelded to be so betwixt these two in this respect as in other infinitely dispar agents God and man especially when we know there is no lesse distance betwixt the end which the one hath and that of the other according as Joseph expresseth it in the case between his brethren and himself But as for you ye thought evill against me but God meant it unto good to save much people alive Gen. 50.20 could it not be so betwixt man and man that one might lawfully joyn his hand in that act wherein another joyneth sinfully yet God though most righteous is unconfined to the bounds of mans righteousness it is his prerogative as the supreme cause not to be tyed within those rules which subordinate agents are 4. Let it be added when God useth mans efficiency to inflict that upon one which from the subordinate agent is sinfully inferred as suppose slaughter robbery defamation or the like there what is wickedly done by man is alwayes justly from God upon the patient he no lesse righteously as to the sufferer takes away a mans life by the hand of an assassinate then if he did it by a disease or any other means and being so if we think it no impeachment to the justice of a supreme magistrate to take away the life of a capital offender by such a judge or executioner as may act corruptly in it as doing it with a
findeth this shift The obedience which all Subjects yeeld to Kings is but the paying of that duty which is due to the supreme Fatherhood Many times by the act either of usurper himself or of those that set him up the true heir of a Crown is dispossessed In such cases the subjects obedience to the Fatherly power must go along and wait upon Gods providence who only hath right to give and to take away Kingdoms and thereby to adopt subjects into the obedience of another Fatherly power †The Anarchy c. pag. 12. Hereby the Fatherly right and power are made a meer Equivocum or to signifie power entitled or coming in any way whatsoever though it do not only not derive from the right of Fatherhood but be privatively opposed to or destructive of it and thus he confounds and makes to meet together in one name and title the thing that he had argued against with the thing that he had asserted And the saying that Providence in dispossessing of a Crown him that is the true heir and so hath the right and disposing it to the hands of an unjust invader doth put a fatherly power in that invader and adopt the subjects to an obligation to it is to deny the right both of paternity and birth-right and of the consent of the people and of every other special way of conveying a title to Government and to make the right thereof only to follow come by and consist in possession and to die forthwith in the Father and heir upon dispossession And to what purpose then is all his plea for Fatherhood and primogeniture or any other mans for any other title what a void distinction is that of his when he distinguisheth of a natural and an a usurped right According to him now there is no Power but Fatherhood no Fatherhood but possession But let us passe by this laxe and wide claim to dominion by the sword which swalloweth up all other titles and look into that which I noted to be qualified and cautioned and so admitted by learned authors ancient and modern as it is distinguishable from this and reconcileable with that of the consent of the ruled Two wayes I observe the Sword is admitted to conduce or have influence into the disposal or placing of Government but by neither is it made the sole or the immediate ground or cause of a right or title to it or any otherwayes then as concordant with that political constitution I have asserted 1. Conquest or the Conquerour rather is admitted to be interested in Government where it is the effect of a reall and just war And so it makes no exception against my assertion That Victory which is acknowledged justly to lay claim to a Crown is the issue of such a war as supposeth the equity and necessity of the war to be on the victors part and the default and provocation to be on the part of the conquered and moreover that the default of the conquered is so high as either to detain from the Conqueror his right or to forfeit into his hands by wrong offered their power or liberty in the enjoyment or disposal of the throne and that there is a necessity on the part of the Conqueror in reference to his attaining and enjoying of his own right and just security therein that he take and use that forfeiture * Vide Groâ—a Jure â—elli lib. 3. ca. 15. Sect. 1. In this case conquest is only a means to the conquerers seising and holding of that power or rule which was his own before he prevailed and which the cause and state of the war before the successe obtained entitled him unto By which it is evident that his right is not founded on his victory but was in being before it and had its rise from an antecedent investure or trespass Upon this ground it is that the title of the sword is alledged not by it self alone but in subjunction to another title A late Historian tels us that our King Henry the sevenâ—h at his coronation was proclaimed with these titles Henâ—icus Rex Angliae Buckes History of Richard the Third lib. 2. pag. 54 55. Jure Divino Jure Humano Jure belli And that the Pope Innocent the 8. in his bull to the said King Anno 1486. hath theâ—â— words Hic Rex Angliae de domo Lancastriae originem trahens ac qui notorio Jure indubitato proximo successionis Titulo praelatorum procerum Angliae electione successione c. etiam de Jure belli est Rex Angliae And this way of ingresse into the seat of Authority as it is not grounded on conquest as its title so it is not privative of or altogether another from that which was before affirmed to be the only ordinary way viz. the consent of the people Forfeiture as it is a singular exception that lies in many cases so it presupposeth a law or constitution that ordains it and so in a sort involveth their consent of whom it is taken Though there be no explicite and present act of will in the conquered that the Conquerer shall reign over them but an utter averseness and all possible reluctancy against and that brings the war yet it is so allowed to be when that case is put which is presupposed as the cause of the war by the law of Nations yea of Nature and being so their wils have antecedently originally and implicitely subscribed to it as such and are therefore in this manner concluded in it In like manner as we account that to be by a mans will or consent which his Predecessors in whom he is virtually included have willed or himself hath formerly granted though now he be quite of another minde He that gives his vote personally or by proxie to any penal law or act to be binding to the community of which he is though he do not formally and absolutely will his own punishment yet he doth it interpretatively consequentially and conditionally if he himself shall fall under the provision of that Act and his will so passed is upon his offending after it sufficient to make his punishment not only just in it self but just ex ore proprio and to have his own consent 2. As Conquest may interest a person in Government by being an attainment of possession in pursuance of an antecedent right so the other sort of conquest to wit that which is a seasing of anothers right or the setting of a man in meet possession may have some tendency thereto though not so directly and that is thus It may be an inducement to the conquered if they be indeed free and unengaged to any other to a submission and delivery up of themselves to be the subjects of the victor and to take him for their Soveraign The former way conquest is postnate and subsequent to the right of the Conquerer and so doth not give him his title but only introduce his possession this latter way
usurping powers Which is this the powers that be of God are ordain'd but take them in their ordinary and to them most favourable reading and so the defenders of an obligation to unlawfull powers do much lay hold and insist on this tearm For this purpose they observe the word to be in the participle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which they translate in being the powers that are in being putting an high emphasis upon that word and urging that the being or existence in rerum naturâ of any power brings it into this Text and under this pred câ—te of being ordained of God Whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is but put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is wont often to be and therefore translated by our Interpreters be But however let them enjoy this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 let it be the powers that are in being there would be in this no colour of an argument at all did they as was before said take the subject spoken of the powers in its proper sense CHAP. VII SECT I. but let that be set aside also and try we what they can make of this word SECT I. The question moved wherein consists the being of the power or what it is that makes the power to be THe question here will be in the midst of all the strong urging of it what must be meant by the being of the power or what it is for the power to be or wherein the being of the power the Ratio formalis of it consists or what it is that puts a power in being There are that tell us the being of a higher power or that which makes the power to be or one to be a power is his actuall prepotency or his present ruling or his holding the sword de facto or his plenary possâ—ssion of superiority In this Text say they the powers that be are the persons that occupy the place of rule that have the Militia in their hand or prevail with their sword or that hold however they come by them the reins of Gâ—vernment in their hand The taking up of this at first sight or blush without further examining to be the meaning of the words is that which hath carryed away some to a strong imagination either of a Usurpers right or of a duty of obedience to him as the ordinance of God and hath staggered others to an unresolvednesse about it Notwithstanding to me this seems to be an overhasty raw and indigested interpretation of the Text. CHAP. VII SECT II. Subsect 1. SECT II. Reasons to prove that prevalency or actuall possession of the seat of Government doth not make or inferre one to be the power TO pass by what was above noted Cap. 1. Sect 2. that in Scripture we finde 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 put for such a power as doth not necessarily import or depend upon possession but is separable from it and that sometimes not only de facto but de jure my Reasons for what I say of this definition of the being of the powers are these Subsection 1. Argument 1. Taken from the nature of existence THe being or existence of a thing is eductio rei extra causas the putting or extraction of a thing out of its causes Its causes that is those proper causes that have a power or faculty to produce that thing If then actuall possession or prepotency do necessarily carry with it the productive act or acts of those causes which are qualified to produce the power in the Text and that it can be said where ever there is a holding of actuall Rule or a mastering sword over a people there must needs be the concurrence of those causes which constitute or create a civil Magistrate then is it true that actual prevalency makes or argues the said power to be in being But I ask what cause or efficient of the civil power doth actuall regency necessarily and individually import or put into act a man might be in that condition of actual prepotency if God had never ordained Magistracy to be or though having ordained Magistracy to be yet he should not have given this man any commission to be the Magistrate yea though he should expressely have given out a prohibition that he should not be a Magistrate and though the people over whom he bears sway and all the world besides only himself and his strong hand by which he carries it excepted were utterly and professedly dissenting and opposite to it That its evident that actual rule may be where there is no concurrence of the causes interested and capable to produce a civil power I shall need further to alledge no other medium but the nature or definition of Usurpation as the word hath reference to civil policy What is usurpation but the assumption and use of the preheminencies and acts peculiar to the office of the Magistrate without a lawfull call title or admission to that office which lawfull calling entitling or admission to that office is the proper act or acts of those agents who are competent to conferre this office If then this be the nature of usurpation and there be or can be such a thing as usurpation in the world there may be actuall rule without the concourse of the causes whose place and faculty it is to convey the civil power and consequently it is not actuall rule which doth put the civil power in being or inferre its existence CHAP. VII SECT II. Subsect 2. Subsection 2. Argument 2. From the absurdity of admitting Satans and the Popes usurped powers upon the ground of actual rule 2. THe command and rule of some over the Kingdomes of the world actually challenged and possessed by them will I doubt not be disclaimed by the very authors and urgers of this large exposition of the being of the power and not admittabâ—e into this Text and if so then they must confesse meer prevalency or actuall sway doth not give being to or hold forth that power of which the Text speaks The antecedent is proved by a double instance one of Satan the other of the Pope 1. Satan we finde claiming to himself the possession and disposall of the power and glory of all the Kingdomes of the world Luke 4.6 and for the reality of his possession or actuall predominancy when he made this challenge yea and ever since certainly it was and is true if not of all yet of many of this worlds Kingdomes for which reason he is stiled the God of this world and principalities powers the rulers of the darknesse of this world the Prince of the power of the aire Now if he or any from him should by vertue of this possession and the authority of this Text so extended demand the civil subjection of any Kingdome or person what should be said to this demand If you say though he have possession yet he hath no right that is to abandon meer possession from being that which makes or proves one to be the power and
interpreted first of Zerubbabel in whom the soveraign dignity was restored at the return from the captivity and then of Christ * So Calvin Diodate and the Divines Annotat. So may this parallel prophecy be understood But whether we apply it to Zerubbabel or to Christ this must needs be granted that after Zedekiah's removall and the Lands captivity was consummate by Nebuchadnezzar a right there was extant and remaining somewhere or in some person to the Crown and Kingdome of Judah though for the present suspended from actuall exercise both by the hand of Gods providence in the full conquest of Nebuchadnezzar and by his extraordinary direction and dispensation by word of mouth sent by his Prophet Jeremiah as we find Jer. 27.12 16.21.8 9. and that right did not descend upon Christ till he was born nor then per saltum or immediately from Zedekiah or Jehoiakim to him but by the interposal of those peâ—sons in whom the race and line of blood or inheritance was continued down to Christ Subsection 9. CHAP. VII SECT II. Subsect 9. Argument 9. Taken from the nature of Magistracy 9 REason is to be drawn from the nature of Magistracy It cannot agree thereunto to say that actuall possession or rule gives being to the power or is an inseparable adjunct or convertible attribute thereof Magistracy is a râ—lation of office Every relation is founded upon something that is absolute What should be the foundation of the relatâ—on of Magistrate and Subject but the act of constitution of such a person or persons in authority or to be and stand in the office of Magistracy to such a people from this transaction as from its foundation results this estate or relation and then from this estate or relation result the mutual duties and acts of Magistrate and Subject his actual superiority and their subjection his rule and their obedience Well then actuall superiority and rule being acts proper to and resulting out of Magistracy they must needs presuppose it to be first in being ere they can be educed First I say not onely in order of nature but of time for the civill transactions whereby Magistracy is produced and the politcall acts which proceed from it are not immanent or instanâ—aneous such as are those whereby the forms of natural beings do produce their facultieâ— or properties but transient and succedaneous and such as require some â—lâ—xâ— of time to be put forth in It must needs be then an incongruous assertion to affi me that the acts which flâ—w from Magistracy in timâ— dâ— gâ—ve being to or are convertible adjuncts of it A man is first a man and then he reasons A man is first an Artificer and then he works in his Art So a man is first a power and then he rules possession of the Throne or Territory and Regency or coercion of the people by the sword are after and latter in time then the Creation or Investure of the power Magistracy is the antecedent the cause the principle the first act and actual dominion or coercion is the consequent the effect the effluxe or the second act thereof Men first are Kings and then they reign they rule because they are the higher powers and they are not the higher powers because they rule As on the other hand the state of inferiority in a politicall body is the cause and principle of the Subjects acts of obedience Men are first in the relation of Subjects and then they act or yield obedience This precept of the Apostle Let every soule be subject to the higher powers though delivered in â—â—arms illimitedly universall is onely intended and given to them that are in the state of Subjects and because they are in that estate therefore it takes hold on them they that are either supream Magistrates or within no Common-wealth are not obliged by it And as every person is not involved so every act of submission which may be done to any kind of power in the civill State is not that which is comprized in this precept or contained within the matter of it It is possible a man may submit out of a principle of humility or policy or be forcibly prostrated where he oweth no obedience but it is a submission ex debito and that stricti juris or proper to the conscience of him that is in the state of a Subject that is hereby required Let Solomon be our instance to illustrate this Having been before designed and chosen to be his Father Successor in the Kingdome of Israel he is thereupon first anointed and proclaimed King by Zadok Nathan and Benaiah and then after this it is said He sate on the throne of the King in stead of David his father and prospered and all Israel obeyed him and all the Princes and the mighty men CHAP. VII SECT II. Subsect 5. and all the sons likewise of K. David submitted themselves unto lomon the King Here Solomons constitution precedes his actuall possession and rule and the Subjects submission and obedience both in order of nature and of time as the ground and reason thereof And the same is exemplified in Joshua When Moses was to dye he spake unto the Lord saying Let the Lord the God of the spirits of all flesh set a man â—ver the congregation which may goe out bâ—fore them and which may lead them out and which may bring them in Here in this petition there is first desired the setting of one over the Congregation which is the calling admitting of him to the Soveraign power and then follows his leading them out and bringing them in his exercise of rule And according to the order of this Petition is the method of the Lords concession and direction upon it The Lord in the next words commands Moses to take Joshua and lay his hand upon him and set him bâ—fore Eleazar the Priest and before all the congrâ—gation and give him a charge in their sight and puts some of his honour upon him and then it follows That all the Congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient There may be a violent brutish subduednessâ— but there can be no rational moral submission and obedience as of Liege-people to their Liege-Lord in any other course And as to this the case is altogether the same and there is no dâ—fference whether the Magistrate come in by extraordinary assignation from God as Joshua and Solomon did or by the ordinâ—ry means Those commands and rules that are given in Scripture for the doing of publique distribâ—tive jâ—stice as that Defend the poor and fatherlesse do jâ—stice to the afflâ—cted and needy and deliver the poor and needy rid them out of the hand of the wicked Psalâ— 82.3 4. and many others * See Levit. 19.15 Deut. 1.16 17.16.19 1 Sam. 23.3 2 Chr. 19.6 c. I would aske â—o whom they are given who do they concern are they spoken to all without exception or onely to them that are Magistrates and Governours I suppose
habait Of Tiberius his admission by the Senate and people let be consulted Tacitus Suetonius Arch bishop Usher and Emanuel Thesaurus * Tacit. Annal. lib. 1. cap. 2. Sueton. in Tiberio cap. 24. Usseri Annal. pag. 549 554. Of whom the last saith Sponte se Roma tyranno tradidit tempori serviens non Regi Of the most cheerfull coming in of Cajus Caligula let Suetonius testifie †Sueton. in Caio cap. 13 14. And of Claudius see Josephus Cluverus and Mr. Lightfoot * Josephus de Bel. Jud. lib. 2. cap. 10. Antiqu. lib. 19 cap. 3. Cluver hist lib. 8. pag. 267. Lightfoot on Acts Ann. Christi 42. Sect. 4 5. Of Nero Tacitus †Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. cap. 14. If against the validity of the consent given to any of these it be alledged that it was enforced by armes and therefore void It may be said 1. Unto some of them as Augustus Caligula and Nero the consent of the Roman S a e is related to have been such as leaveth no colour for this objâ—ction 2. It will be a very hard yea I think an impossible thing for any at this distance of time and in such an imperfection of historical narration of circumstances to bring sufficient ground upon which to conclude any such awe to have been upon the Senate and people at the time of their consent given to any or to such of them as might be in the Throne at the mission of this Epistle as may serve to make the said consent invalid Let the definition which Civilians and Casuists give of that terrour which may annull a civill act to wit that it must be 1. From a cause extrinsical 2. Probable 3. Grievous 4. Unjust 5. Impressed on purpose to overawe to such an act * Metus 1. Extrinsecus 2. Probabilis 3. Atrox 4. Injustus 5. Incussus ad hoc Vide Bonacinam Tom. 2. Tract 2. de Restit Disp 3. qu. 1. punct 2. sect 3. Et Tom. 1. Tract 2. qu. 3. punct 8. Et Greg. Thol Synt. Jur. lib. 21. cap. 2. sect 3. Et lib. 36. cap. 25. sect 5. he made out to have been then the case There is no great ground of presumption for it that I met with in story in any of them save in that of Julius Caesar which will no way concern the title of them that followed particularly of that Nero in whose reign the writing of this Epistle is computed to fall 3. There are that conceive though in foro civili promises made under some kind of feare or force are voyded that is are made politically null yet by the law of nature and so in the Court of Conscience a contract notwithstanding any force impelling the contractor is obliging †Grotius de Jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 11. sect 7. SECT II. CHAP. X SECT II. Subsect 1. Object Of Christs paying and commanding Tribute-paying to Caesar of his owning Pilates power Of Souldiers serving the Romans without the disallowance of the Baptist Christ c. Object 2. CHrist himselfe payed and commanded the Jewes to pay Tribute to Caesar acknowledged Pilates power which was the Romans to be of God and we read of diverse souldiers and officers under the Romans with whom John the Baptist Christ and his Apostles had to do and none of them that we read of ever reprehended any of them for or disswaded them from that service But the Romans were usurpers over Judea Subsection 1. The question whether the Romans were usurpers over Judea discussed and concluded negatively Answer 1. IF the Romans were usurpers over Judea there is something of an argument otherwise there is none in all this But how will this be proved Most of the Authors of this objection do no more for this then cite the names of some learned and good Authors affirming it and so they take it fâ—r granted But for their full answer and the clearing of this I shall 1. Scan a little this their common proof by such humane assertion 2. Then consider what reason may suggest to us in this matter 3. And then remove some other reasons pretending the conviction of the Romans of usurpation For the former the assertion of sundry learned Authors that so it was though such do in transitis aliud agentes affirme the Romanes in the dayes of our Saviour upon earth to have been usurpers over Judeaâ— yet is not their bare affirmative to be taken for an evidence in such a businesse viz. sufficient to state the sense of a Scripture in controversie or to extend or limit a Scripture rule of practice such as this is Their ground for so saying would be seen to such an end and untill then I shall with as good authority I think deny it Not that I oppose mine own negation as to be as firm and credible as the assertion of any such learned men but because I have the authority of I deeme as learned and good Authors denying the same and asserting the lawfulness of the Roman government over the Jewish Nation by consent ere this given to it whereby it stood cleared of usurpation There is a little Treatise printed about 7 yeares since called An exercitation concerning usurped powers which pag. 87 88. hath cited some passages out of Josephus to prove the Jewes giving up themselves to the Roman Dominion antecedently to this time which the objection concerns I shall refer the Reader to these adding here one or two more out of the same Author whose testimony in this matter is absolutely the greatest of humane and then produce the attestation of others of best note and after that subjoyn a shâ—rt vindica iâ—n of what that exercta ion had before given A further testimony out of Josephus is in these words of Agrippa in his oration to the Jewes at Jerusalem a little before their siege and destruction by the Romans for their rebellion For servitude is grievous when new Joseph de Bel. Jud. lib. 2. cap. 16. and it seems just to strive to avoid it but he that is once brought under it and then makes defection appears to be rather a rebellious servant then a lover of liberty Therefore it behoved when Pompey entred into this Province to have used all meanes against the Romans entry but yee that have received an hereditary obedience and are far inferiour in meanes to those who first submitted how can ye now thinke of making resistance to the whole Roman Empire This passage is clear enough for the Jewes reception of the Roman Rule under Pompey Another may be that which the same Author hath in the relating of an occurrence which happened about seven yeares after this first close of this Nation with the Roman in subjection which was this Alexander the son of Aristobulus who was the head of that party that fell under the force of the Roman sword and still repined at their government beginning to make insurrection against the Romans was supprest by Gabinius
them man hath a dominion given him of God * Gen. 1 2â— Psal 8.5 or more strictly as it respecteth man only and this Power this related we peculiarly call Authority And this again is distinguishable according to the diversity of humane societies some whereof are private and domestical and some are more publique But as it is found in or related to a publique civill community or body politique it's tearmed Magistracy or political power That there is a reall difference to be found betwixt those two powers the Natural and the Moral as in general so as they may be seated in man as the subject and respect man as the object and particularly as they are competible to a body politique and that the difference lies as was said herein that the one consists in a meer impetus or prepotency or a sufficiency of strength to impose or make impression on another the other in a right or imerest to bear sway may be easie to feâ— 1. The reality of the difference is evident Natural power is found not only in man but in brute beasts yea in inanimates Moral is proper to reasonable creatures Again although reasonable creatures be enduable with both yet among men the natural and the moral might and right to rule may be and for the most part are distinct or separate each from other in regard of the subject of inherence * Potestas in populo Authoritat in Senatu Cicero de leg lib. 3. The Natural power is ordinarily in them that do not ought nor to rule but to obey and be in subjection There is a Moral power or right to rule in Man over the other Creatures yet in natural power he is inferiour to many of them And amongst men in Natural power that is strength or might of body the family in greater then the Master the Subjects excelâ— their Soveraign the Souldiert overmatch their Leaders whereas the Moral power in relation to each of these is in the Master the Soveraign the Leader It is very seldom seen if ever in any humane Society that Natural and Moral power do meet in the same persons as the subjects of inhesion Suppose a City or Nation ruled by some strong hand or a military force even in that force there must needs be some one head or councel of a few to guide and command it some Pretorian Magistracy to govern the Army and in that head or Pretorian office far inferior in Natutal power to the Army as the Army possibly is to the City or Nation under its beck would the supreme Power lie and the military force would but be subordinate and ministerial to that command in like manner as the unarmed people are to that force And although it be both right and necessary to the well-being of a political Society that the Natural and Moral power do concur the former to serve and support the other and the discord of these is the high way to the ruine of both yet it is not simply necessary to the being either of the Moral power or of the community Every sudden mutiny or temporary Sedition which is the Insurrection and prevalency of the Natural power against the Moral doth not dissolve the present Society or Magistracy Political or Military The uproar at Ephesus Act. 19. was within a few houres quelled and the City remained in its former state Although upon the death of Ahaziah 2 Chron. 22.9 his house had no power viz. natural to keep still the Kingdom but Athaliah usurped it yet within a few years it removed the usurpresse and repossessed both Power and Kingdom as in its former right 2. And that the difference twixt those two Powers lies as was said in the meer forciblenesse or prevalidity of the one and the right or legitimacy to command of the other that the one can the other only may or ought to rule the one possibly hath the appetite and act of governing the other hath only the commission and warrant should me thinks easily be conceived Natural power we oppose to impotency weakness Moral power we oppose to illicitness or wrong Thence that saying Id tantum possumus quod jure possumus whereby it appears that Natural power consists in strength Moral in rightfulness And indeed wherein else should the difference be placed What difference is there to be made betwixt the power of one Brute prevailing over another or over a Man and that of the owners ruling over that Brute or betwixt that of a Man-stealer that hath gotten anothers childe into his hand by stealth and that of the true father over his childe or betwixt that of a Rout or Band of Rogues or drunken companions that may have assaulted and beaten the Magistrates officers and perhaps himself too and that of the Civil Magistrate each of these may de facto be Master each of them may be found assuming and exercising rule they cannot therefore be distinguished by their acts The d stinction then betwixt them must be taken from the ground rise or principle from which the acts of rule are put forth which in the one and the other are divers In the one those acts are from meer force and will in the other they are from authority or a will authorized to prescribe or command Each of these Powers I say may be found exercising rule for we cannot call any power morall meerly because it acteth in or manageth those we call Moral or Civil affairs for that a Natural power in a subject endued with reason may do there may be an intermedling with Civill matters where there is no moral power as in case of Sedition where they that are to obey will needs rule as on the other hand there may be a Moral power that is a right to command or dispose where the object is not moral or civil such is the power of man given him of God over other creatures animate and inanimate of disposing according to his reason and will of their natural acts of feeding generating labouring c. But that is a moral power in relation to any of these objects or matters about which power is exercised which hath a moral rise or deduction viz. an authorization and right and what hath not so is meerly natural The proper character then or formall difference of each of these two Powers is that the Natural power is no other then a brutish predominancy or violence * Potentia est id quod per si est effican Vit est majoris rei impetus qui repelli vel saltem ex arbitrio commode non potest Greg. Tholos Synt. Juris lib. 11. cap. 2. Sect. 3. cap. 1. Sect. 4. the reason of its superiority is its own might and will it knows nothing of any civil liberty order or right its proper act is ruere impetere or impellere to rush in upon assault or bear down before it what stands in its way if it use reason so far as to give out commands
to ordain or proceed by any laws or to take cognisance of causes by any rule it is but ad libitum without any obligation certainty or constancy only as far as stands with its own humor or interest for as its rise is its own force and appetite so its end is its proper and private accommodation and safety The Moral power to speak of it only as seated in and relating to man and more particularly that of the Civil Magistrate is a special state or function or administration amongst men It s original is not its own inherent or adjacent robiâ— or main strength but positive constitution It consisteth in not only an ability but a right to command It hath indeed de jure and should have de facto a Sword as well as a Scepter a coactive as well as a directive power the Natural power joyned to its Moral but its Moral power lyeth in its word Eccl. 8.4 not in its sword Where the word of a King is there is power Solomon saith It is its reason not its might which gives law and its reason is legislative whereas anothers is not Ratio cujuslibet non est factiva legis saith Aquinas * Aquinas 1. 2a. quast 96. artic 3. Cajetan in quaest 96. artic 5. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 4. pag. 46. It s proper primary and genuine act is to prescribe guide and direct the sword is requisite to it but ex accidenti upon occasion of others pravity compulsoriness is not of its essence but an after addition to it for its preservation and efficacy †It 's probably conceived that the sword is a superaddition to the Civil power annext to it Gen. 9.6 See Dr. Hammond of Resisting c. pag. 27. It could not be from the beginning for in the state of integrity there was no use of it It never useth the sword but where equity and dignity are consemned where by reason of the subjects either vitiousness or defect of reason bare authority cannot take place The special reason of its erection by men is the proneness of some to take the advantage of their natural power to invade and the inability of others to defend themselves against such and a prime end of it is to prevent or remedy the â—xorbitances of Natural power in ill disposed persons and thereby to secure the community in order to the general and each ones particular good Again it doth not take the Sword in the sense of our Saviour Matth. 26.25 * Per accipere gladium intelligitur propria authoritate voluntate uti gladio Principes enim judices non accipiunt quasi a seipsis sed concesso sibi gladio a deo utuntur Cajetan Jentac 6. quaest 3. but beareth it as Rom. 13.4 that is it doth not snatch it up or wrest it from another to it self but hath it delivered It hath the Sword not only in its hand but in its commission and the Sword that it hath is not the cause but the consequent of its superiority It doth not assume or hold its authority by vertue of the sword but it assumes and holds the sword by vertue of its authority The Scepter goes before the Sword and is that which legitimates it * Potentia vero debet sequi justitiam non praire Aug. To. 3. de Trinit lib. 13. cap. 13. Observemus jus gladâ—i magistratibus esse a deo datum tanquam necessarium adminiculum nervum suae potestatis Pareus in Rom. 13.4 when it draweth the sword the difference betwixt its Sword and anothers that is armed only by natural strength is that its edge is not meerly backed with mettal or in an arme of flesh and sinews but with warrant and commission and that signed by God Let me add by way of Supplement to what hath been said to demonstrate both that there is a reall difference betwixt Power Natural and Moral and what it is this further That even in God we distinguish betwixt his Power by which we mean his arme of strength and might and his Power by which we signifie his throne of authority or Soveraign rule betwixt his power of command and his power of efficiency betwixt his working power and his legislative or willing power betwixt the power of his right hand and the power of his scepter of righteousness in the Lords-Prayer Kingdom and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power ascribed to God are distinguished and though both be natural that is essential to God yet the one we may call his Physical the other his Moral power †Vide Zanchium de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. qu. 3. Thes 3. Arminium Dis priv Thes 22. Sect. 2. Thes 27. Sect. 2. Answerable to this twofold power in Man there is a twofold subjection one of the body only which respecteth the Natural power the other of the body with the minde also relating unto the power wich is Moral * Duplex est servitus corporis animi vis quippe in corpore in externis prohibitio autem Juris animum poâ—issinum cogit Greg. Tholos Synt. Jer. lib. 11. cap. 1 Sect. 4. The Morall power layeth an oblâ—gation upon the conscience to it a man doth or ought to submit as of right and duty It may challenge our obedience though and where it cannot compel to it and we are to subject though there be nothing to overaw us to it and this is the property of this Power in distinction from the natural that which is but natural reacheth not the mind the acts it putteth forth may lay a coaction on the body but not a tie on the conscience What ever be the natural or armed power of one person or party above another no man is under any obligation to obey nor hath he any claim to rule by virtue of it if he had there could be no such thing as Moral power in the world this being as was before said for most part if not ever seated in those persons who in regard of Natural power are inferiour to them whom they should reign over If Natural power could oblige to obedience the Monarch were bound to resign his Crown to the multitude and the Senate or Parliament must receive laws from the community Every heady commotion or rout of a multitude risen up were to be submitted to and were not to be repressed the Town-clerk did not well to check the tumult at Ephesius or to refer the plaintiffs from the present uproare to a court or lawful assembly he should have let them go on and have both submitted to and assisted them But this is absurd enough to appear so to any man the commonly received maxime is By nature men are in regard of Civill jurisdiction all equal no man a Ruler or servant to another * Hooker Eccl. posit lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26 c. Ascham Discourse c. part 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Hobs Elem. part 1. c. â— 1. So that the