is because it is Good to him I believe it is impossible with any Shew of Reason to deny it Now if this be so it will follow that 't is Good only which is the Formal Motive of the Will and Ease no otherwise than as it is Good 19. Secondly All that we naturally affect being only to be Happy or to be well it follows that Good only is that which our Rational Appetite the Will strives to attain or pursues and acts for 20. Thirdly Appearing Good being held by all to be the Object of the Will for none hold that Good will move it unless it appears such and the Greater Appearance of it having a greater and sometimes the Greatest Power to move it I observe that tho' Mr. Locke does now and then touch slightly at the Appearance of the Good proposed to the Understanding yet he no where gives the full Weight to the Influence the several Degrees of this Appearance have over the Understanding to make the Man will it but only denies that Good or the Greater Good in it self determines the Will Whereas even the Greatest Good â—dimly appearing such may not perhaps out-weigh the least Good if it be very Lively represented or Apply'd close to our view by a Full Appearance of it Hence his Argument that Everlasting Unspeakable Goods do not hold the Will whereas very great Uneasiness does has not the least Force because he still leaves out the Degree of their Appearing such to us For since especially in our Case eadem est ratio non entium non apparentium and no Cause works its Effect but as it is Apply'd he should either have put an Equal Appearance of the two Contesting Motives or nothing will follow 21. Fourthly This Equal Appearance put his Argument is not Conclusive but opposes himself For the prodigious Torments inflicted by the Heathen Persecuters upon the Primitive Martyrs were doubtlesly the Greatest present Uneasiness Flesh and Blood could undergo yet the Lively Appearance of their Eternal Happiness tho' Distant and Absent which their Well-grounded Faith and Erected Hope assur'd them of after those Short tho' most Penal Sufferings overcame all that Inconceivable Uneasiness they suffer'd at present 22. Lastly How can it be thought that the getting rid of Uneasiness or which is the same the Obtaining of Ease can be the Formal and Proper Object of the Will Powers are ordain'd to perfect the Subject to which they belong and the better the Object is which they are employ'd about so much in proportion the Man is the Perfecter who applies that Power to attain it It cannot then be doubted but True Happiness being the Ultimate Perfection Man can aim or arrive at which is only attainable by Acts of his Will that Power was naturally ordain'd to bring Man to his highest State of Perfection by such an Acquisition or by loving above all Things and pursuing that Object and consequently since this consists in obtaining his Summum Bonum 't is the Goodness of the Object apprehended and conceited such which determines the Will and therefore the Straining after Greater and even the Greatest Goods and being Determin'd to them is what by the Design of Nature his Will was given him for Now who can think that meerly to be at Ease is this Greatest Good or the Motive Object End or Determiner of the Will Ease without any farther Prospect seems rather to be the Object of an Idle Drone who cares not for perfecting himself at all but sits still satisfy'd with his Dull and Stupid Indolency It seems to destroy the Acquisition of all Virtue which is Arduous and not perform'd but by Contrasting with Ease and present Satisfactions It quite takes away the very Notion of the Heroick Virtue of Fortitude whose very Object is the Overcoming Ease and attempting such Things as are Difficult and Inconsistent with it I expect Mr. Locke will say that all these Candidates of Virtue had not acted had they not according to their present Thoughts found it Uneasie not to act as they did But I reply that Uneasiness was not their Sole Motive of Acting nor the only or Formal Determiner of their Will For in that case if meerly to be rid of Uneasiness had mov'd them to act meer Ease had satisfy'd them Whereas 't is Evident they aim'd at a Greater Good than meerly to be at Ease In a Word Ease bears in its Notion a Sluggish Unactive and most Imperfect Disposition It seems to sute only with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Insensibility of a Stoick Pleasure and Joy have some Briskness in their Signification Desire is Active and implies a Tendency to some Good we affect But the meer being at Ease denotes no more but a Stupid Indisturbance which Noble Souls hate as mean and are weary of it And if Ease be the proper Motive and Determiner of the Will and the Greatest Good the Will can have or wish is Eternal Glory it would follow that the Glory of the Saints and Angels in Heaven is nothing but being in the best manner at Ease which is far from Elevating the Soul to the highest Degree of Perfection as Glory or the Beatifying Sight of God does and only signifies she is when in Heaven securely out of Harm's way or free from being disturb'd ever after By which no great Good accrues to her but only a kind of Neutral State in which she shall receive no Hurt 23. The true Point then seems to me to stand thus The Object of the Will an Appearing Good works many Effects immediately consequent to one another First When the Appearance is but slight it begets a Liking of it when Lively a Love of it which determines the Will to it to which if Great follows an Effectual Tendency towards it called Desire of it Desire not satisfy'd troubles us or makes us Uneasie Uneasiness makes us strive to change our Condition to get Ease This makes us to cast about and Consider how to find Means to do it Means found we make use of them and actually go about to rid our selves of what was Uneasie to us Now tho' some of these are nearer to our Outward Action than others yet the Appearing Good in the Object is the Common Cause which produces all those Orderly Dispositions in virtue of which as the First Motive they do all Act Assist and Concurr to determine our Will to go about the Outward Action with Vigour 24. Ere I part with this Chapter of Power I am to observe that Mr. Locke has not any where so much as touch'd at the Power to be a Thing tho' Nature gives us as Clear a Notion of it as of any other Power whatever For as oft as we see one Thing made of Another which we know is not Created anew so often our Natural Reason forces us to acknowledge that somewhat of the former Thing could be made another Thing and this as evidently as when we see a Thing Act
of Substance The Essences are no otherwise Ingenerable but as they are from Eternity in the Divine Ideas nor Incorruptible but as they are either there or else in some Humane or Angelical Understanding out of which they can never be effaced Lastly What have Names or Words which are nothing but Articulate Air or Figur'd Ink excepting what is Annexed to them by our Minds to do with the Intrinsecal Natures of Things that they should be one Sort or Kind of Essences 13. This Learned Author justly complains that we have so few Definitions and my self have both resented it in my Preface to my Method and have also excited and encourag'd Learned Men to make good that Defect But till the Best and only Proper Way which I mention'd lately to make Definitions be allow'd and taken I am sure there will be no new ones made that will deserve that Name and those Few that are already made will still be exposed to the baffling Attacks of Fancy Aristotle was certainly the best Definer of any Philosopher yet extant yet his Definitions are excepted against by Witty Men and which is worse for no other Reason but because they are too Learned that is too Good Mr. Locke expresses here great Dis-satisfaction at two of them which to my best Judgment not all the Wit of Man can mend The First is of Motion which Aristotle defines to be Actus Entis in potentia quatenus in potentia Now I wonder not that Mr. Locke who in his large Chapter of Power never so much as mention'd the Idea of Power to be a Thing nor the Power to have such an Accident or Mode nor consequently the Idea of an Act answering to such a Power should conceit this Definition to be Gibberish However he came to pretermit them it is most manifest that we have Natural Ideas or Notions of both these We cannot see a Thing made actually of Another or Alter'd to be any way otherwise than it was but Nature obliges us to see and say that that Thing of which the new one was made could or had a Power to be It or have Another made of it Or when we see 't is anew made Hot Cold Round White Moved Placed c. but that it could or had a Power to become such ere it was Actually such These Ideas then of Act and Power are so Natural that Common Sense forces us to acknowledge them and Common Language must use them And 't is a strange Fastidiousness not to allow those Transcendent that is most Common and most Clear Words in Definitions whose Notions or Meanings Nature gives us and which Words or Equivalent Expressions Common Discourse forces us to use Yet in the Uncouthness of these Words to some Men's Fancies consists all the Difficulty which they so boggle at in this Definition The Ens or Body was only Capable or had a Power to be moved ere Motion came and now by Motion it is Actually moved It is evident then that Motion is the Act or which is the same the Formal Cause which reduced that Power into Act or formally denominated it moved Actually Act then was a Proper Genus as far as those most Common Notions can have one Now comes the Difference in potentia which is to determine what kind of Act Motion is To understand which we may reflect that a Body has many other Acts or as we conceive and call them Forms in it such as are Quantity Figure and all Qualities whatever as Roundness Length Breadth Health c. But they are not Acts of that Body as 't is in power to be otherwise than it is but as 't is actually such or such For they truly denominate it to be actually Round Long Healthful c. Whereas Motion being formally a meer Tendency to an Effect not yet produced constitutes and denominates a Body to be only in power to be what by that Motion it is to be afterwards For reflecting on all Motions whatever v. g. Generation Alteration Augmentation Sanation c. none of them affect the Subject or Body in order to what it has already fixedly but in order to a newly generated or rather producible Thing Quality Quantity Disposition Health c. which the Matter or Subject has only a Power to have or acquire by means of those respective Motions The last Words quatenus in potentia signifie that the Thing as affected with Motion is formally and precisely consider'd to be in power to be such or such and not at all as actually so Matter has the Notion of Power to be another Thing but in regard it is a kind of Compart constituting actually the stable and entire Ens the Thing or Body which has Matter in it cannot be said to be meerly in power to have Matter which it has Already Whereas by having Motion in it which is only the Way or Means to attain what Nature aims to produce it must be thus meerly and formally in Power to that to which it is Tending Wherefore this Definition most appositely fits the Notion of Motion by distinguishing it most perfectly from all other Sorts of Acts whatever without a Tittle conceivable in it that is Defective Superfluous or Disparate Yet this is here character'd to be Exquisite Jargon and a Famous Absurdity I should be glad to see how one of our new Philosophers would define Motion I doubt he would find it a puzzling Task to explicate its Formal and Proper Nature in regard that besides its being very General it is the Blindest and most Imperfect Notion we have and most approaching to Non-Entity being neither the Thing as it is in it self nor as it is yet another but hovering as it were between both And I am certain it is impossible to perform it without varying the Words used by Aristotle to others of the same Sense or even to give some tolerable Explication of it which can sute with its Formal Notion 14. The other Definition which Mr. Locke mislikes is that of Light which he says Aristotle defines The Act of a Perspicuous Thing as it is Perspicuous Now tho' Light be Fire were the Particles of it contracted into one closer Body as it is by a Burning-Glass yet the Rays of it thinly scatter'd have like all other Effluviums the Notion of a Quality or Mode of the Body they are receiv'd in and Modes or Accidents have their Analogical Essences from the manner they affect their Subjects The Question then is What is the Proper Subject of Light Mr. Locke's Principles deny the Sun is the Subject and put it to be onely the Cause of it Nor can an Opacous Body be the Subject of it for it affects not that Body it self but the Surface which reflects it and then it has the Notion of Colour 'T is left then that the Proper Subject of Light must be a Medium which is Perspicuous or which has a Power in it to let it pass through it to our Eyes and therefore
else being determin'd to be This or That Ens or capable of Existing Nor can Propositions be any where but in the Mind Whereas in the Understanding the Notion of Animal is really larger and that of Homo narrower which Artists call Genus and Species And in the foresaid Proposition Petrus and Homo which are its Parts are as truly in our Mind the Subject and Predicate as that Proposition it self is there or as the Thing as existing in Nature is White or Black 36. This then is the Test to try all the Speculations made by Logicians and other Reflecters or Artists viz. to examin whether they suit with and are built on the Natures of the Things themselves as they exist in our Mind that they conduce to order our Notions so as may clear the Way to Science and that they be not meerly Impertinent and shallow grounded Fancies as they too frequently are particularly the Entia Rationis which make such a Noise in the Schools Corollary II. Whence upon the main is clearly discovered how all true Philosophy is nothing but the Knowledge of Things either as they have their Being in Nature which is done by Direct Acts or else in the Understanding only which are known by Reflex ones 37. Besides those Impressions which cause our Direct and Reflex Acts there are others which breed meer Whimsies coin'd by the Fancy and are purely Chimerical For our Fancy having Innumerable Effluviums or Atomes in it of many Sorts which are oft-times agitated disorderly hence it comes that it conjoins and imprints Incoherent Phantasms on the Seat of Knowledge and so makes Apprehensions of them in our Minds such as are those of a Golden Earth a Hircoceruus an Elephant supporting the World a Chimera and such like This most commonly happens in Dreams conceited Prophesies and Enthusiastick Revelations especially those caused by the Spleen Nor is groundless Speculation exempt from this Enormity Generally this happens when our Thoughts are Unattentive to the Things in Nature whose Direct Impressions keep our Fancy Orderly and Firm. Now there is little Harm in our apprehending those extravagant Connexions the Danger is lest Speculaters seduced by Imagination do come to Judge that the Things are so in Nature as they fancy them which must necessarily fill their Minds with Caprichio's and Frantick Conceits The Ways to avoid these Inconveniences are First To attend heedfully to the Direct Impressions from the Things without us and to examine whether the Connexion of those Fancies be agreeable to their Natures or no. Secondly To make Right and Strong Judgments concerning those common Notions we had from Nature which keep our Thoughts and Discourses Steady and Solid especially to keep an Attentive Consideration that as all these Notions came from the Thing so they are still the Thing conceiv'd according to somewhat that is in it and to take care we do not make them forget their Original nor disown the Thing from whence only as being Modes meerly depending on it they had any kind of Being at all nor consequently Intelligibility Thirdly To observe the Methodical Rules and Maxims of True Logick which teach us how to distinguish our Notions exactly and to keep them distinct lest we blunder in our Discourses and which do withall shew us what are the Ways how to frame true Connexions or right Judgments and Discourses But the last and best Means to keep us from being mis-led by Fancy or following its Vagaries is the Study of Metaphysicks which being built on the Highest Steadiest and Clearest Principles abstract from all Fancy and will scarce ever permit those who who are well vers'd in it to fall into Errour And let it be observ'd that nothing in the World more perverts all true Science than does the admitting those disorder'd Fancies because being cleanly express'd they have sometimes a Lively Appearance for Solid Truths nay laying them often for Grounds and Self-evident Principles This this I say is the main Source of all Hypothetical Philosophy and of all Erroneous Schemes of Doctrine not grounded on the Natures of the Things which therefore must needs be at best Shallow and Superficial and if pursu'd home to their Principles plain Nonsence the usual and proper Effect of Ungovern'd Fancy 38. Of those Things that do not come in by our Senses as Bodies do but are of a different or opposite Nature of which therefore we can have no Notion but by joining a Negation to the Notion of Body such as are Indivisible Incorporeal Immaterial Immortal and in general all Spiritual Things and their proper Modes we can have no proper Effluviums or Phantasms as is evident Wherefore also the Notions we have of them and consequently the Words by which we express them are all Improper or Metaphorical which if not reflected on will breed Innumerable Errours The best Notion we can frame of them is that of Thing with a Negation of Body and of all the Modes of Body joined to it which does not so much tell us what it is as what it is not or rather it gives us a Blind but Certain Knowledge of what kind of Nature it must be because it tells us of what kind of Nature it cannot be the Differences which constitute that Nature and its Opposite being contradictory which forces it to be either of the One or of the other Yet this hinders not but we may discourse consequently or Scientifically of those Things that connotate the Negation of Body full as well as of the Bodies themselves For as we can conclude evidently from the Notion of Body that it is Divisible Changeable Placeable Moveable thus or thus Qualify'd c. so we may conclude with Equal Evidence from the Notion of a Thing which is not a Body that it is not Divisible not Extended not Moveable not Placeable not affected with any Physical Qualities c. 39. Lastly As for the Notion we have of God however the An Est of such a Supreme Being be many ways Evident and Demonstrable yet the Notion of the Quid est of such a Being is the most Obscure that can be imagin'd For First Since he must have Innumerable Perfections in his Nature and the Notion we have of every ordinary Suppositum in Nature is therefore Confused and Obscure because it grounds many Notions which we cannot clearly conceive at once or have a Distinct Apprehension of them it follows that much less can the Divine Nature be clearly conceived by us in this State which comprehends all the best Perfections found in the whole Universality of Creatures and infinitely more Secondly 'T is yet harder to frame a Notion of a Being in which those Innumerable Perfections are not found Single but are all of them center'd in one most Simple and most Uncompounded Formality which contains in it self eminently all the Excellencies that can possibly be conceived in Creatures and Millions of times greater and more Thirdly As we can have no Notion of
of Endless Misery It is also true that we are Conscious here of any perceptible Good or Harm that happens to our Person because we cannot but Reflect on what concerns any part of our Individuum which is our Self which yet is so far from proving that our Personality consists in this Consciousness that it proves the direct contrary For it shews that our Person or Individual Self affected thus agreeably or disagreeably is the Object of that Consciousness and Objects must be antecedent and pre-supposed to the Acts which are employ'd about them because the Objects are the Cause of those Acts. Nor is there any farther Mystery in the Word Self for it means no more but our own same Intelligent Individuum with which we are well acquainted partly by Direct partly by Reflex Knowledges 14. It looks so very odly to say that one of our own Acts should constitute our own particular Essence which it must do if our Personal Identity consists in our Consciousness that I am apt to think that Mr. Locke's great Wit aim'd at some other Truth tho' he hap'd to mis-apply it I can but guess at it and perhaps 't is this 'T is without doubt true that the Essence of Subsistent Spiritual Natures which as having no manner of Potentiality in them are Pure Acts I mean Angels consists in Actual Knowledge which Act is first of themselves And if so why may not this Act of the Soul call'd Consciousness employ'd about her self or her own Actions constitute the Soul or the Man's Personality But the difference lies here that those Pure Spirits having no Matter or Potentiality in them Annex'd to much less Identify'd with their Natures their Essence is formally constituted by their being in Act according to their Natures that is by being Actually Knowing Whereas the Soul in this State being immers'd in Matter and Identify'd or making One Thing with her Bodily Compart and needing to use it as her Conjoin'd Instrument as it were to attain Knowledge is therefore in a State of Potentiality whence she has no Innate Notions much less Principles but is meerly Passive in acquiring those First Rudiments of Knowledge However after she is thus pre-inform'd she or rather the Man according to his Spiritual Part is in part Active when he improves those Knowledges or ripens them to Perfection by his Reflexion and Reason as both of us hold 15. I see no Necessity of making any farther Remarks upon this Chapter after I have noted some other ill-laid and wrongly supposed Grounds which occasion'd his Mistakes As First That the Soul of a Man is indifferently alike to all Matter Whereas each Soul not being an Assistant but an Informing Form and withall being but the Form of one Particular and therefore fitted as was lately proved to the Disposition of the particular Pre-existent Embryo it can be receiv'd in no Matter but that which is individually determin'd in it self as to its Animality and therefore it requires a Form distinct from all others or as the Individual Constitution of the Embryo was Secondly § 28. he makes account the Specifick Idea if held to will make clear the Distinction of any Thing into the same and Diverse Whereas our Subject as I suppose being about Individual Identity and Diversity how the holding to the Specifical Idea in which all the Individuums under it do agree and which makes them one in Nature should clear the Distinction of Individuals is altogether inexplicable It must then be only the Individual Idea or Notion as far as we can reach it to which there go more Modes than to the Specifical and its Intrinsecal Composition which can diversifie Things Really or make them to be Really the same or Divers However some Outward Circumstances can do it quoad nos I am not much surpriz'd that Mr. Locke led by the Common Doctrine does think there are no Essential Notions under that which Logicians call the Species Whereas all Individuals being most properly Distinct Things must have also Essence being the Formal Constitutive of Ens Distinct Essences and so be Essentially Distinct. But of this enough in my Method Book 1. Less 3. § 11. c. His Proof of it is very plausible But the Reader may observe that while § 29. he uses the Word that Rational Spirit that Vital Union he supposes it That that is Individually the same instead of telling us what makes it That Besides that he throughout supposes Existence to individuate which is already confuted Lastly I observe that to make good his Distinction of Person from the Individual Substance and Individual Man he alledges that a Hand cut off the Substance is vanish'd By which 't is manifest that he takes Substance not for the Thing called Man constituted by a Soul as its Form but for the Quantity of the Matter or the Figuration of some Organiz'd Part Whereas taking the Word Substance as he ought for Ens or Thing no Alteration or Defalcation of Matter Quantity or Figure c. makes it Another Substance or Another Thing but such a Complexion of Accidents or such a New Form as makes it unfit for its Primary Operation to which it is ordain'd as it is a Distinct Part in Nature Nor can this argue in the least that Consciousness constitutes Personality because this happens not only in Men or Persons but also in Trees and Dogs which if they lose a Branch or a Leg are still the same Substance or Thing that is the same Tree and the same Dog as all the World acknowledges REFLEXION Fifteenth ON The 28th 29th 30th 31th and 32th CHAPTERS 1. THE 28th Chapter Of other Relations is very Ingenious and consonant to his his own Principles It might indeed shock a less attentive Reader to see Virtue and Vice rated or even so much as named so from the Respect they have to the Lesbian Rule of Reputation or Fashion call'd in Scripture Consuetudo Saeculi which the more Libertine Part of the World would set up and establish as a kind of Law And this I suppose was the Occasion that made that very Learned and Worthy Person Mr. Lowde except against it But the Author has clear'd that Point so perfectly in his Preface that none can now remain dissatisfy'd For who can hinder Men from fancying and naming things as they list 2. I take leave to discourse it thus The word Virtue both from its Etymology and true Use signifies Manly or becoming a Man taking him according to his Genuin and Undeprav'd Nature given him by God that is Right Reason This Reason if we use it and attend to it will give us the Knowledge of a Deity In Speculative Men by way of Demonstration in others by a kind of Practical Evidence from their observing the Regular and Constant Order of the World especially of the Celestial Bodies as likewise by their Scanning according to their different Pitch the Solid Grounds of the Christian Religion Reveal'd to us by
run into Errour which is always prejudicial to our Nature and if the Errour does concern matters of high Moment pernicious to our Souls Eternal Welfare This I take to be plain Reason nor do I doubt but that each Branch of this Discourse may be reduced to perfect Evidence We come to examin now what Mr. Locke delivers in this most important Point 2. First He Confounds Outward Action of which there is Necessity and can be no Evidence of Success with Interiour Judging and Assenting of which there can be no Necessity if there can be no Evidence and of which Evident Knowledge may oftentimes be had as also concerning whose Truth or Falshood till Evidence appear we may safely and honourably suspend our Judgment nay if in such a case we do not we hazard to do our selves an Injury when we need not That he thus confounds those two vastly Different or rather Contrary Considerations appears hence that § 1. he shews the Unreasonableness of not eating and of not going about our Business till we have a Demonstration that the Meat will nourish us and the Business will succeed which Instances evidently relate to Outward Action but in § 3. he speaks in the same Tenour of taking the Proposition to be True or False which clearly relates to Inward Assent Secondly God 's Wisdom has indeed given us generally no more but Probability for our Outward Actions doing us good or succeeding but to think our all-wise Maker has given us no better Grounds to make us Assent or rather that he intended we should Assent upon Probabilities which are still liable to be False and if they be but Probabilities may all be False is to think that God meant to expose our Souls to innumerable Errours nay allows and designs we should embrace Errours For if as Mr. L. says God has given as a Faculty to judge that to be True which the Reasons for their Truth being but Probable may not be True then since God has most certainly intended we should make use of the Faculty he has given us it must follow that God has exposed us to Errour or design'd we should err and that this Faculty as he says not being Knowledge very frequently Which is hardly consistent with the Reverence we do both of us owe to our Creatour who governs his Creatures according to the Nature he has given them which is to avoid Errour and never as will shortly be seen this does to admit a Contradiction 3. What therefore I extremely admire is that Mr. Locke should say in express Terms that Judgment is that Faculty whereby the Mind takes any Proposition to be True or False without perceiving a Demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs and that this Faculty is given Man by God to enlighten him For First Judgment does not enlighten us at all as appears evidently because False Judgments are Errours which are so far from enlightning the Mind that they manifestly darken it All that Judgment does is to Fix the Mind in the Perswasion it has whether that Persuasion springs from Clear Reason or Dark Passion and Mr. Locke seems to make good my Words while he contradistinguishes Judgment to Knowledge which later and onely which is our Intellectual Light Secondly The Words Taking Propositions to be True or False must mean Assenting to them as such for every Judgment is not only an Assent but a full and firm Assent Now that no Probability can with Reason cause Assent and certainly God who gave us our Reason has not given us a Faculty to use it against our Reason will be seen hereafter Thirdly Which is yet worse by contradistinguishing Judgment and Clear Knowledge he makes those Assents which spring out of Clear Knowledge to be no Judgments at all whereas These are the onely Judgments that we can be sure will do us good and are according to our True Nature Reason He tells us indeed in the Close that when we judge as things really are they are Right Judgments But how does this agree with his Contradistinguishing formerly Judgment according to its whole Latitude or in its General Notion from Knowledge unless we should say that we only do right when we judge at Hap-hazard or judge Right by Chance Qui quod aequum est statuit parte inauditâ alterâ Aequum licet statuerit haud aequus est tamen By which Rule we are ill Men even tho' we Judge right because we precipitate and hazard to embrace Errour when we need not Besides Things are so really to us as we know them to be And if we do not know them to be such we cannot with Reason say or judge them to be such and if we do we act against our true Nature to do which God has given us no Faculty Fourthly Amongst the Causes mention'd here that make us judge Necessity is reckon'd as one when Certain Knowledge is not to be had But this can be no Cause at all to make us Judge For there can be no possible Necessity forcing us to judge but Clear Evidence This indeed obliges us to Interiour Assent and compels us to judge that the Thing is so as we see it to be But if no Evidence can be had what Necessity is there at all of Judging one way or other Cannot we suspend our Judgment till Evidence appears or whether it does ever appear or not Why are we in such hast to hazard falling into Error Or who bids us Judge at all till we see a good or Conclusive Reason why I am sure whatever many Men may do out of Weakness neither God nor Nature ever impos'd upon any such an absurd Duty Lastly What means his making it then to be Judgment when we have no Demonstrative Evidence May we not judge a Conclusion that is Demonstrated to be True because it is Demonstrated Or that an Identical Proposition is True because 't is Self-evident Or rather ought we not to judge all such Propositions to be True for this very Reason because we know evidently they are so So far then is Certain Knowledge from being contradistinguish'd from Judgment that they are in some manner the same as I have shewn in my METHOD B. 2. Less 1. § 3. where I hope I have set the Nature of Judgment in a Clear Light as I have that of Assent Suspense and Certainty B. 3. § 9. 4. I should be glad to think my self mistaken in Mr. Locke's Meaning if his Express Words the Tenour of his Discourse and his next Chapter Of Probability which runs in the same Strain would give me leave Perhaps he thinks that since none can embrace Christianity without judging it to be True and few know it to be so we should exclude the Generality from the way to Salvation if we do not allow such a Faculty given us by God as Judging without Knowing I Answer 1. Those Gifts that come from Above from the Father of Lights are all Perfect as being the Endowments of his Infinitely-bountiful