only by the potential being of a thing which in proper speech is nothing but requires an actual or formal being to its production Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not evident by the light of reason to any one that will diligently consider them Yet because that when I am careless and the Images of sensible things blind my understanding I do not so easily call to mind the reasons why the Idea of a being more perfect then my self should of necessity proceed from a being which is really more perfect It will be requisite to enquire further whether I who have this Idea can possibly be unless such a being did exist To which end let me aske from whence should I be From my self or from my Parents or from any other thing less perfect then God for nothing can be thought or supposed more perfect or equally perfect with God But first If I were from my self I should neither doubt nor desire nor want any thing for I should have given my self all those perfections of which I have any Idea and consequently I my self should be God and I cannot think that those things I want are to be acquired with greater difficulty then those things I have but on the contrary tis manifiest that it were much more difficult that I that is a substance that thinks should arise out of nothing then that I should acquire the knowledge of many things whereof I am Ignorant which is only the accident of that substance And certainly If I had that greater thing viz being from my self I should not have denyed my self not only those things which may be easier acquired but also All those things which I perceived are contain'd in the Idea of a God and the reason is for that no other things seem to me to be more difficultly done and certainly if they were Really more difficult they would seem more difficult to me if whatever I have I have from my self for in those things I should find my Power put to a stop Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to have alwaies Been what now I am and that therefore I need not seek for an Author of my Being For the Durance or Continuation of my life may be divided into Innumerable Parts each of which does not at all depend on the Other Parts Therefore it will not follow that because a while ago I was I must of necessity now Be. I say this will not follow Unless I suppose some Cause to Create me as it were anew for this Moment that is Conserve me For 't is evident to one that Considers the Nature of Duration that the same Power and Action is requisite to the Conservation of a Thing each Moment of its Being as there is to the Creation of that Thing anew if it did not exist So that 't is one of those Principles which are Evident by the Light of Nature that the Act of Conservation differs only Ratione as the Philosophers term it from the Act of Creation Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question whether I who now Am have any Power to Cause my self to Be hereafter for had I any such power I should certainly know of it seeing I am nothing but a Thinking Thing or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me which is a Thing that Thinks to which I answer that I can discover no such Power in Me And consequently I evidently know that I depend on some Other being distinct from my self But what if I say that perhaps this Being is not God but that I am produced either by my Parents or some other Causes less perfect then God In answer to which let me consider as I have said before that 't is manifest that whatever is in the effect so much at least ought to be in the cause and therefore seeing I am a thing that thinks and have in me an Idea of God it will confessedly follow that whatever sort of cause I assign of my own Being it also must be a Thinking Thing and must have an Idea of all those Perfections which I attribute to God Of which Cause it may be again Asked whether it be from it self or from any other Cause If from it self 't is evident from what has been said that it must be God For seeing it has the Power of Existing of it self without doubt it has also the power of actually Possessing all those Perfections whereof it has an Idea in it self that is all those Perfections which I conceive in God But if it Be from an other Cause it may again be asked of that Cause whether it be of it self or from an other Till at length We arrive at the Last Cause of All Which will Be God For 't is evident that this Enquiry will not admit of Progressus in Infinitum especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at first made Me But chiefly of that which conserves me in this Instant time Neither can it be supposed that many partial Causes have concurred to the making Me and that I received the Idea of one of Gods perfections from One of them and from an other of them the Idea of an other and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found scattered in the World but not all of them Ioyn'd in any one which may Be God For on the contrary Vnity Simplicity or the inseparability of All Gods Attributes is one of the chief Perfections which I conceive in Him and certainly the Idea of the Vnity of the Divine Perfections could not be created in me by any other cause then by That from whence I have received the Ideas of his other perfections For 't is Impossible to make me conceive these perfections conjunct and inseparable unless he should also make me know what perfections these are Lastly as touching my having my Being from my Parents Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour'd of Them were True yet certainly they contribute nothing to my conservation neither proceed I from them as I am a Thing that Thinks for they have onely predisposed that material Thing wherein I that is my mind which only at present I take for my self Inhabits Wherefore I cannot now Question that I am sprung from them But I must of necessity conclude that because I am and because I have an Idea of a Being most perfect that is of God it evidently follows that there is a God * Now it only remains for me to examine how I have received this Idea of God For I have neither received it by means of my Senses neither comes it to me without my Forethought as the Ideas of sensible things use to do when such things Work on the Organs of my Sense or at least seem so to work Neither is this Idea framed by my self for I can neither detract from nor add any thing thereto Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is
Conjectures and not indubitable reasons is enough to Draw my Assent to the Contrary Part. Which Lately I have sufficiently experienced when I supposed all those things which formerly I assented to as most True as very False for this Reason only that I found my self able to doubt of them in some manner If I abstain from passing my Iudgment when I do not clearly and distinctly enough perceive what is Truth 't is evident that I do well and that I am not deceived But if I affirm or deny then 't is that I abuse the freedome of my will and if I turn my self to that part which is false I am deceived but if I embrace the contrary Part 't is but by chance that I light on the Truth yet I shall not therefore be Blameless for 't is Manifest by the light of Nature that the Perception of the Vnderstanding ought to preceed the Determination of the Will And 't is in this abuse of Free-Will that That Privation consists which Constitutes Error I say there is a Privation in the Action as it proceeds from Me but not in the Faculty which I have received from God nor in the Action as it depends on him Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a larger Intellective Faculty or more Natural Light for 't is a necessary Incident to a finite Vnderstanding that it should not Understand All things and 't is Incident to a Created Vnderstanding to be Finite and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has bestowed upon me tho he owed me nothing then to think my self Robbed by him of those things which he never gave me Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a Will larger then my Vnderstanding for seeing the Will Consists in one thing only and aâ— it were in an Indivisible viz. to Will or not to Will it seems contrary to its nature that it should be less then 't is And certainly by how much the Greater it is so much the more Thankful I ought to be to him that Gave it me Neither can I Complain that God concurrs with me in the Production of those Voluntary Actions or Iudgements in which I am deceived for those Acts as they depend on God are altogether True and Good and I am in some measure more perfect in that I can so Act then if I could not for that Privation in which the Ratio Formalis of Falshood and Sin consists wants not the Concourse of God For it is not A Thing and having respect to him as its Cause ought not to be called Privation but Negation for certainly 't is no Imperfection in God that he has given me a freedome of Assenting or not Assenting to some things the clear and distinct Knowledge whereof he has not Imparted to my Vnderstanding but certainly 't is an Imperfection in me that I abuse this liberty and pass my Iudgement on those things which I do not Rightly Understand Yet I see that 't is Possible with God to effect that tho I should remain Free and of a Finite Knowledge I should never Ern that is if he had endowed my Vnderstanding with a clear and distinct Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an Occasion of deliberating or if he had only so firmly fix'd in my Mind that I should never forget this That I must never Iudge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Vnderstand Either of which things had God done I easily perceive that I as consider'd in my self should be more perfect then now I am yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there may be a greater perfection in the whole Vniverse of Things for that some of its parts are Obnoxius to Errors and some not then if they were all alike And I have no Reason to Complain that it has pleased God that I should Act on the Stage of this World a Part not the chief and most perfect of all Or that I should not be able to abstain from Error in the first way above specifi'd which depends upon the Evident Knowledge of those things whereof I deliberate Yet that I may abstain from Error by the other means abovemention'd which depends only on this That I Iudge not of any Thing the truth whereof is not Evident For tho I have experienced in my self this Infirmity that I cannot always be intent upon me and the same Knowledge yet I may by a continued and often repeated Meditation bring this to pass that as often as I have use of this Rule I may Remember it by which means I may Get as it were an habit of not erring In which thing seeing the greatest and chief perfection of Man consists I repute my self to have gain'd much by this days Meditation for that therein I have discover'd the Cause of Error and Falshood which certainly can be no other then what I have now Declared for whenever in Passing my Judgement I bridle my Will so that it extend it self only to those things which I clearly and distinctly perceive it is impossible that I can Err. For doubtles All clear and distinct Perception is something and therefore cannot proceed from Nothing but must necessarily have God for its Author God I say Who is infinitely Perfect and who cannot Deceive and therefore it Must be True Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must beware off that I be not deceived but also what I must Do to Discover Truth for That I shall certainly find if I fully Apply my self to those things only which I perfectly understand and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but confusedly and obscurely Both which hereafter I shall endeavour MEDITAT V. Of the Essence of Things Material And herein Again of God Aâ—d that he does Exist THere are yet remaining many Things concerning Gods Attributes and many things concerning the nature of my self or of my Mind which ought to be searched into but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite seeing I have discover'd what I must avoid and what I must Do for the Attaining of Truth then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things But before I enquire whether there be any such things Really Existent without Me I ought to consider the Ideas of those things as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are Distinct which confused In which search I find that I distinctly imagine Quantity that which Philosophers commonly call continued that is to say the Extension of that Quantity or thing continued into Length Breadth and Thickness I can count in it divers Parts to which parts I can assign Bigness Figure Position and Local Motion to which Local Motion I can assign Duration Neither are only these Generals plainly discover'd
him and I not comprehend Why or How they are done for seeing I now know that my Nature is very Weak and Finite and that the Nature of God is Immense Incomprehensible Infinite from hence I must fully understand that he can do numberless things the Causes whereof lie hidden to Me. Upon which account Only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from the End viz. Final Causes as of no use in Natural Philosophy for I cannot without Rashness Think my self able to Discover Gods Designes I perceive this also that whenever we endeavour to know whether the Work 's of God are perfect we must not Respect any one kind of Creature singly but the Whole Vniverse of Beings for perhaps what if considered alone may Deservedly seem Imperfect yet as it is a part of the World is most perfect and tho since I have doubted of all things I have discover'd nothing certainly to Exist but my self and God yet since I have Consider'd the Omnipotency of God I cannot deny but that many other things are made or at least may be made by him so that I my self may be a part of this Vniverse Furthermore coming nigher to my self and enquiring what these Errors of mine are which are the Only Arguments of my Imperfection * I find them to depend on two concurring Causes on my faculty of Knowing and on my faculty of Choosing or Freedome of my Will that is to say from my Vnderstanding and my Will together For by my Vnderstanding alone I only perceive Ideas whereon I make Iudgments wherein precisely so taken there can be no Error properly so called for tho perhaps there may be numberless things whose Ideas I have not in Me yet I am not properly to be said Deprived of them but only negatively wanting them and I cannot prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of Knowing And tho I understand him to be a skilful Workman yet I cannot Think that he ought to have put all those perfections in each Work of his singly with which he might have endowed some of them Neither can I complain that God has not given me a Will or Freedom of Choise large and perfect enough for I have experienced that 't is Circumscribed by no Bounds And 't is worth our taking notice that I have no other thing in me so perfect and so Great but I Understand that there may be Perfecter and Greater for if for Example I consider the Faculty of Vnderstanding I presently preceive that in me 't is very small and Finite and also at the same time I form to my self an Idea of an other Vnderstanding not only much Greater but the Greatest and Infinite which I perceive to belong to God In the same manner if enquire into memory or imagination or any other faculties I find them in my self Weak and Circumscribed but in God I Understand them to be Infinite there is therefore only my Will or Freedome of Choice which I find to be so Great that I cannot frame to my self an Idea of One Greater so that 't is by this chiefly by which I Understand my self to Bear the likeness and Image of God For tho the Will in God be without comparison Greater then Mine both as to the Knowledge and Power which are Ioyn'd therewith which make it more strong and Effective and also as to the Object thereof for God can apply himself to more things then I can Yet being taken Formally and Precisely Gods Will seems no greater then Mine For the Freedome of Will consists only in this that we can Do or not Do such a Thing that is affirm or deny prosecute or avoid or rather in this Only that we are so carried to a Thing which is proposed by Our Intellect to Affirm or Deny Prosecute or Shun that we are sensible that we are not Determinâ—d to the Choice or Aversion thereof by any outward Force Neither is it Requisite to make one Free that he should have an Inclination to both sides For on the contrary by how much the more strongly I am inclined to one side whether it be that I evidently perceive therein Good or Evil or Whether it be that God has so disposed my Inward Thoughts By so much the more Free am I in my Choice Neither truly do Gods Grace or Natural Knowledge take away from my Liberty but rather encrease and strengthen it For that indifference which I find in my self when no Reason inclines me more to one side then to the other is the meanest sort of Liberty and is so far from being a sign of perfection that it only argues a defect or negation of Knowledge for if I should always Clearly see what were True and Good I should never deliberate in my Iudgement or Choice and Consequently tho I were perfectly Free yet I should never be Indifferent From all which I perceive that neither the Power of Willing precisely so taken which I have from God is the Cause of my Errors it being most full and perfect in its kind Neither also the Power of Vnderstanding for whatever I Understand since 't is from God that I Vnderstand it I understand aright nor can I be therein Deceived From Whence therefore proceed all my Errors To which I answer that they proceed from hence only that seeing the Will expatiates it self farther then the Vnderstanding I keep it not within the same bounds with my Vnderstanding but often extend it to those things which I Vnderstand not to which things it being Indifferent it easily Declines from what is True and Good and consequently I am Deceived and Commit sin * Thus for example when lately I set my self to enquire Whether any thing doth Exist and found that from my setting my self to Examine such a thing it evidently follows that I my self Exist I could not but Iudge what I so clearly Vnderstood to be true not that I was forced thereto by any outward impulse but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Vnderstanding so that I believed it so much the more freely and willingly by how much the less indifferent I was thereto But now I understand not only that I Exist as I am a Thing that Thinks but I also meet with a certain Idea of a Corporeal Nature and it so happens that I doubt whether that Thinking Nature that is in me be Different from that Corporeal Nature or Whether they are both the same but in this I suppose that I have found no Argument to incline me either ways and therefore I am Indifferent to affirm or deny either or to Iudge nothing of either But this indifferency extends it self not only to those things of which I am clearly ignorant but generally to all those things which are not so very evidently known to me at the Time when my Will Deliberates of them for tho never so probable Guesses incline me to one side yet the Knowing that they are only
our selves a Faculty of producing them OBJECT * THe whole stress of which Argument lyes thus because I know it impossible for me to be of the same nature I am viz having the Idea of a God in me unless really there were a God A God I say that very same God whose Idea I have in my mind Wherefore seeing t is not demonstrated that we have an Idea of God and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that God is Inconceivable that is as I suppose that we cannot have an Idea of Him it follows that the Existence of God is not demonstrated much less the Creation ANSWER When God is said to be Inconceiveable t is understood of an Adequate full conception But I am ' een tired with often repeating how notwithstanding we may have an Idea of God So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing against my demonstration OBJECT XII Against the Fourth Meditation Of Truth and Falshood * BY Which I understand that Error as it is Error is not a Real Being Dependent on God but is only a Defect and that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God 'T is Certain that Ignorance is only a Defect and that there is no Occasion of any Positive Faculty to make us Ignorant But this position is not so clear in Relation to Error for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot Err for this Reason only because they have not the Faculties of Reasoning or Imagination from whence 't is Natural for us to Conclude That to Err there is requisite a Faculty of Iudging or at least of Imagining both which Faculties are Positive and given to all Creatures subject to Error and to Them only Moreover Des-Cartes says thus I find my Errors to Depend on two concurring Causes viz. on my Faculty of Knowing and on my Faculty of Choosing or Freedom of my Will Which seems Contradictious to what he said before And here also we may note that Freedom of Will is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists ANSWER Tho to make us Err there is requisite a Faculty of Reasoning or rather of Iudging that is of Affirming and Denying because Error is the Defect thereof yet it doesnot follow from thence that this Defect is any thing Real for neither is Blindness a Real Thing tho stones cannot be said to be Blind for this Reason only That they are incapable of sight And I much wonder that in all these Objections I have not found one Right Inference I have not here assumed any thing concerning the Freedom of Mans Will unless what all Men do Experience in themselves and is most evident by the Light of Nature Neither see I any Reason Why he should say that this is Contradictious to any former Position Perhaps there may be Many who respecting Gods predisposal of Things cannot Comprehend How their Freedom of Will Consists there-with but yet there is no Man who respecting himself only does not find by Experience That 't is one and the same Thing to be Willing and to be Free But 't is no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter OBJECT XIII * AS for Example When lately I set my self to examine Whether any Thing Do Exist and found that from my setting my self to examine such a Thing it evidently follows That I my self Exist I could not but Iudge what I so clearly understood to be true not that I was forced thereto by any outward Impulse but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Vnderstanding so that I believed it so much the more Freely and Willingly by how much the Less indifferent I was thereunto This expression Great Light in the Vnderstanding is Metaphorical and therefore not to be used in Argumentation And every one that Doubts not of his Opinion Pretends such a Light and has no less a Propension in his Will to Affirm what he doubts not than He that really and truely knows a Thing Wherefore this Light may be the cause of Defending and Holding an Opinion Obstinately but never of knowing an Opinion Truly Moreover not only the Knowledge of Truth but Blief or Giving Assent are not the Acts of the Will for Whatever is proved by strong Arguments or Credibly told we Believe whether we will or no. 'T is True To Affirm or Deny Propositions to Defend or Oppose Propositions are the Acts of the Will but it does not from thence Follow that the Internal Assent depends on the Will Wherefore the following Conclusion so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that Privation consists which Constitutes Error is not fully Demonstrated ANSWER 'T is not much matter Whether this expression Great Light be Argumentative or not so it be explicative as really it is For all men know that by light in the understanding is meant clearness of knowledge which every one has not that thinks he has and this hinders not but this light in the Vnderstanding may be very different from an obstinate Opinion taken up without clear perception But when 't is here said That we asseâ—t to things clearly perceived whether we will of no 't is the same as if it were said that willing or nilling we desire Good clearly known whereas the word Nilling finds no room in such Expressions for it implies that we will and nill the same thing OBJECT XIV Against the Fifth Meditation Of the Essence of material things * AS when for Example I imagine a Triangle thy perhaps 〈◊〉 a Figure exists no where 〈◊〉 of my thoughts nor ever will exist 〈◊〉 Nature thereof is determinate and its Essence or 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 immutable and eternal which is 〈◊〉 made by 〈◊〉 noâ— depends oâ— my mind as appears from this that 〈…〉 be demonstrated of this Triangle If a Triangle be 〈◊〉 where I understand not how it can 〈◊〉 any Nature for what is no where is 〈◊〉 and therefore has not a Being 〈◊〉 any Nature A Triangle on the Mind 〈◊〉 from â— Triangle seen oâ— from one made up of what has been seen but when once we have given the name of a Triangle to a thing from which we think the Idea of a Triangle arises tho the Triangle it self perish yet the name continues In the like manner when we have once conceived in our thought That all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones and when we have given this other name viz. Having its three Angles equal to two right ones to a Triangle tho afterwards there were no such thing in the World yet the Name would still continue and this Proposition A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones would be eternally true But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were destroy'd This Proposition likewise A Man is an Animal will be true to Eternity because the Word Animal will eternally